SNIE 12.6-82 POLAND'S PROSPECTS FOR THE NEXT 12 TO 18 MONTHS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00176R001000150038-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 17, 2008
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: April 2, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/06/17: CIA-RDP85TO0176RO01000150038-9~ /uSS f -EE
The Director of Central Intelligence
2 April 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SUBJECT: SNIE 12.,6-82, Poland's Prospects for the
Next 12 to 18 Months
1. I am sending you this copy of a Special National
Intelligence Estimate recently produced by the Intelligence
Community on Poland's Prospects Over the Next 12 to 18 Months.
2. The take-off point for the SNIE is the imposition of
martial. -law which so changed the country's political dynamics
that a very broad assessment of the situation was necessary. In
the process the SNIE became longer than we would have
preferred. For that reason, let me highlight for you the SNIE's
major findings:
--The primary Soviet and Polish regime priority is
control.
--There is little prospect over the next year or so
for political accommodation between the Jaruzelski
regime and Polish society, although the regime may
well approve certain cosmetic changes in martial law
designed to secure a relaxation of Western
sanctions. The likelihood is for continued or
intensified repression.
--The chances that unorganized violence will occur
in the coming months are very high. However,-we
think that the internal security forces are strong
enough to keep any disturbances localized and .
prevent nationwide disorder--if necessary with the
support of some reliable military units. Thus the
likelihood of a Soviet military intervention is
slight.
DERV ' CL BY SIGNER
REVW ON 2 APR 1988
SECRET
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SECRET
--The economic situation is still deteriorating, and
it is problematic whether a disastrous further slide
can be prevented. The key factor is a shortage of
Western imports, which is exacerbated by the impact
of Western sanctions.
--Warsaw will be unable to make any significant
principal payments on its $27 billion dollar debt
for the foreseeable future, and will not meet much
of the $2.5 billion dollars in interest due banks in
1982. The risk of default will continue to grow.
--In short, the West cannot expect its pressure to lead
to serious political liberalization in Poland over the
near term. The most we can hope for is that the
combination of Soviet and Polish need for Western
economic cooperation, steadfast Western rejection of
business-as-usual, and continued passive resistance to
the authorities by the Polish population will have some
moderating influence on the regime and maintain the
possibility of long-term compromise within Polish
society.
Attachment:
As stated
Distribution:
Orig - The President
1 - Each as listed
- Chm/NIC (w/c off)
- NIO/USSR-EE (u)/o,)
ER
Approved For Release 2008/06/17: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 000150038-9