NSC TASK FORCE ON U.S. INDUSTRIAL VITALITY AND NATIONAL SECURITY
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85T00153R000300070004-8
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 10, 2008
Sequence Number:
4
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 23, 1983
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP85T00153R000300070004-8.pdf | 204.77 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP85T00153R000300070004-8
NSC Task Force on U.S. Industrial Vitality
and National Security
A Paper for Discussion
In recent months, foreign economic and technological
competition has emerged as a major issue of public debate in
the United States. The focus of the debate is on its economic
aspect: employment and the balance of trade. Perhaps the more
important aspect is that of national security. In a broad
sense and in the long run, foreign competition is eroding the
viability of the United States as a superpower and as a leader
of the Free World. If present trends continue, an important
change in the world balance of power with far reaching
implications for U.S. national security will take place in the
next fifteen years.
Foreign. economic, and technological competition has an
immediate significance for U.S. national security. In part as
a result of a decline in U.S. technological and industrial
vitality and in part because of the growth of the technological
strength and competitive vigor of U.S. allies, the U.S.
industrial base has been subjected to serious erosion. Abroad
range of defense sensitive manufacturing and assembly
operations have moved overseas. This presents a serious danger
of impairing U.S. defense production in the event of a major
protracted military conflict and weakens the credibility of the
U.S. deterrence posture. Foreign competition has materially
curtailed the U.S. mobilization base and its surge capability.
The perception of industrial and economic weakness saps the
effectiveness of American foreign policy in general. Moreover,
the impact of foreign competition on U.S. employment is
imposing specific constraints on U.S. foreign policy.
Pressures and counter-pressures of various domestic groups can
seriously impede an optimal foreign policy with regard to
Japan, produce a reaction abroad, and be seriously damaging to
the U.S. national interest.
There is a growing awareness of the relevance of U.S.
industrial vitality to national security and of the need for
resolving certain aspects of international economic and '?
technological competit`aon as an issue of national security, and
not just an economic issue. Recently, a few steps to deal with
this subject, directly and indirectly, have been made.
Noteworthy among them are:
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP85T00153R000300070004-8
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP85T00153R000300070004-8
1. The establishment of the private Japan-
U.S. Wisemen's Group in May 1983.
2. The forthcoming establishment of the President's
Commission on Industrial Competitiveness.
3. An agreement between the Departments of Defense and
Commerce to conduct a study (under contract) of the impact of
foreign competition on the U.S. electronics industry.
4. A decision by the Department of Defense (April 1983) to
launch an R&D program on a fifth-generation computer.
The above steps are useful and in the right direction.
However, present actions in this area have been usually
undertaken on an ad hoc basis by various components of the U.S.
Government. They lack an overall coordination, are not
comprehensive, and are not always sufficiently time-sensitive.
A high-level U.S. Government mechanism is thus needed to ensure
that the deleterious impact of economic and technological
competition on U.S. national security and foreign policy is
dealt with in a timely, well-coordinated, and comprehensive
manner.
It is therefore proposed that an NSC Task Force on U.S.
Industrial Vitality and National Security, reporting to the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, be
.established. This coordinating/action mechanism will deal with
economic and technological competition from both Western Europe
and Japan. However, because of the more immediate impact of
the Japanese competition, Japan will be addressed first.
For its Phase I (Japan), the composition of the Task Force
will be as follows:
H. Eugene Douglas, Chairman (State)
Fred C. Ikle, Vice Chairman (Defense)
William E. Schneider (State)
Norman A. Bailey (NSC)
Stephen W. Bosworth (State)
Gaston J. Sigur (NSC)
Paul D. Wolfowitz (State)
Richard T. McCormick (State)
Charles Z. Wick (USIA)
Harry S. Rowen (CIA)
James P. Wade (Defense)
Richard L. Armitage (Defense)
The specific functions of the Task Force will be:
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP85T00153R000300070004-8
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP85T00153R000300070004-8
-3-
1. To identify gaps in the present efforts to counter the
deleterious impact of economic and technological competition on
U.S. national security 'and to take and/or recommend specific
steps to fill the identified gaps.
2. To interact with the Japan-U.S. Wisemen's Group and
design specific means for implementing its recommendations, if
and when approved by the President or the Secretary of State.
3. To ensure that, in U.S. Government studies and/or
policies dealing with international economic and technological
competition and U.S. industrial viability, national security
aspects are given due consideration.
4. To initiate such analyses and policies which would be
more appropriate for development within the U.S. Government, as
distinguished from private bodies such as the Japan-U.S.
Wisemen's Group or joint private-Government bodies such as the
Commission on Industrial Competitiveness. In particular, the
Task Force will examine the avenues through which the
concentrated thrust of Japan towards external industrial
competition could be modified so as to be more compatible with
longer-term U.S. national security, that of the Free World, and
of Japan itself. However, insofar as such a modification could
be more effectively explored by joint or parallel studies with
the Japanese, the Task Force will either initiate such studies
or recommend for consideration by another body, e.g., the
Japan-U.S. Wisemen's Group.
5. To explore the avenues of inquiry and initiate specific
action aimed at the strengthening of the feeling of security on
the part of the Japanese through improving their relationship
with other nations in East Asia and Western Europe. (This task
is related to Task #4 above, insofar as the Japanese economic
and technological aggrandizement is motivated by insecurity.)
6. As a concurrent task to the above, to .develop policies
to systematically engage the Japanese in the international
political process with the intent of gaining long-range support
by Japan of international stability and the international
system.
7. To review from time-to-time the activities and policies
within the purview of the Task Force so as to ensure their
effective functioning and their consistency with each other.
To accomplish the above tasks, the Task Force will be
divided into the following Working Groups:
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP85T00153R000300070004-8
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP85T00153R000300070004-8
1. Japan Working Group
Gaston J. Sigur, Chairman
Richard L. Armitage
Charles Z. Wick
Paul D. Wolfowitz
2. Economic/Technological Working Group
Norman A. Bailey, Chairman
Richard T. McCormick
Harry S. Rowen
James P. Wade
3. Policy Coordination and Integration Working Group
Stephen W. Bosworth, Chairman
Norman A. Bailey
H. Eugene Douglas (Ex Officio)
Fred C. Ikle (Ex Officio)
William E. Schneider
Gaston J. Sigur
The functions of the first two Working Groups are
self-explanatory. The function of the Policy Coordination and
Integration Working Group_ will be to ensure effective
coordination of policy recommendations and other actions
between the first two groups and with related policies
emanating from other sources.
The Task Force will be supported by a small staff
established jointly by the Departments of State and Defense.
It will lean on research support provided by the Departments of
State and Defense, USIA, and CIA. The Task Force will have an
annual budget of $250,000 for external research and consultants.
O643A
5/23/83
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP85T00153R000300070004-8