HOW THE PLO TERRORIZED JOURNALISTS IN BEIRUT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00153R000300020015-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: January 1, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTUK
Date: 6 Jan. 1983
TO: DCI
FROM:
PLO Terrorism of Journalists
SUBJECT: in Beirut
REMARKS:
article reports, in
1? This how for years the
detail, operating
considerable ou specially
PLO has terrorized j offers e
in Beirut. The article terrorist activity
graphic accounts of such during the recent Israeli campaign-
offers
If accurate, this article
that
2. PLO terroristced. project It is a
evidence of a
has gone, unnotiolicy would
pnotij project ul nOwhose impact on US 9
r
be significant.
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STAT
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Observations
How the PLO Terrorized
Journalists in Beirut
Kenneth R. Timmerman
M UCH was made during the Is-
raeli campaign in Lebanon
this past summer of attempts by
Israel to muzzle the international
press. The French daily Le Monde,
in an article entitled "War against
the Press?," reported on July 8,
1982 that a photographer for the
Sygma agency was held up for sever-
al hours at Tel Aviv airport, and
that after interrogation his film was
temporarily seized. As for the Amer-
ican public, the climax was perhaps
reached when, at the end of June,
CBS broadcast a 30-second segment
completely whited out, bearing the
stamp of the Israeli censor.
In order to get around Israeli
military censorship, which they
feared would delete their best foot-
age, the American television net-
works chartered a high-speed yacht
to make the trip from Junieh to Cy-
prus, carrying their video cassettes
of the bombardments of West Beirut.
By the end of the siege, ten tele-
vision companies from several coun-
tries were sharing this service, since
the direct-transmission station in
the mountains surrounding Beirut
had been knocked out at the very
beginning of the war ... by Syrian
shells. The price demanded by the
Athenian millionaire who owned
the yacht was $80,000 per month.
By contrast with the allegedly re-
stricted situation in Israel, corre-
spondents in West Beirut constant-
ly affirmed their freedom to report
what they saw as they saw it, unin-
fluenced by the PLO which con-
KENNETH R. TiMMERMAN, a new con-
tributor, is a young American novelist
and free-lance journalist who makes
his home in Paris. He has written a
book on the war in Lebanon and his
experience in the prisons of the PLO.
trolled that part of the city. Marc
Kravetz, in the French daily Le
Matin (August 2), attacked Israel
for charging that he and other jour-
nalists were biased in their reports.
"Throughout this war, the press was
able to evaluate the difference be-
tween a country without censorship
and its neighbor," Kravetz wrote.
"Most journalists working from the
Israeli lines were at least theoretical-
ly supposed to submit their dis-
patches to a regime of censorship
which we could not even imagine
existing in West Beirut."
Yet the idyll Kravetz paints is
false. The risks journalists incurred
while working in Beirut did not
come solely or even mostly from Is-
raeli bombs. As an independent
journalist who spent three weeks in
a PLO jail this past summer (July
14-August 6), I can testify that when
it came to muzzling the press, the
PLO had things worked out to a
fine science.
THERE were two centers for the for-
eign press crews in Beirut, the Com-
modore Hotel in the West and the
Alexander in the East. Most of
the television coverage of the siege
was filmed ? from the rooftops of
one of these two hotels, both of
which, despite an occasional shell,
were the safest place to be while still
within reasonable view of the fight-
ing. ?
Both hotels spent enormous sums
to keep their telexes and interna-
tional telephones in operation. Is-
raeli soldiers often came to the
bar of the Alexander for a drink,
while the Palestinian Press Agency,
WAFA, according toN Kravetz's own
description, would arrive at the
Commodore the day after bombard-
ments to show selected journalists
the damage caused by the enemy."
The information supplied by
WAFA on the number of victims
and their category--civilian or mili-
tary-provided the basis for the dis-
patches leaving West Beirut, in the
absence of other sources. The "Le-
banese police" so often quoted in
this context had ceased to function
in West Beirut early in the siege.
With deadlines to meet and under
the risk of falling bombs, most jour-
nalists were content with what they
got. This, then, was one source of
the wild exaggeration in the figures
of civilian dead reported throughout
the war and especially during the
siege of Beirut.
But this aspect of the story has
been well documented, and is a
staple of almost every military con-
flict. Much more important were
the direct means employed by the
PLO to control the journalists pres-
ent in West Beirut, and the indi-
rect means used to intimidate them.
First there was the press pass is-
sued by WAFA with the bearer's
photograph, a duplicate of which
remained in WAFA's offices. With-
out this pass, no journalist could
hope to circulate in West Beirut;
caught photographing, or taking
notes, he would be immediately
arrested if not shot on sight.
No newspaper or other medium
would commit the error of sending
in to West Beirut someone who had
adversely reported in the past on
the activities of the PLO or the
Syrians, for fear of his simply dis-
appearing. Thus a first "selection"
of journalists was made by the PLO:
there simply were no unfriendly
journalists operating in the besieged
sector of the city. (Needless to say,
no similar selection was made by
the Israel Press Office. Western cor-
respondents reporting fromTel Aviv
freely criticized the Begin govern-
ment's handling of the war.)
? The Alexander received several direct
artillery hits from Palestinian positions
on July 12, and was damaged by a car
bomb in early August, while the Com
modore was hit by a single Israeli bouih
on August 4, the day of the hcavicst fight
ing of the entire siege.
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The list of journalists who over
the years have been murdered, shot,
kidnapped, imprisoned, or otherwise
intimidated in Beirut for their "in-
discretions" is a long one: ten deaths
from 1976 to 1981 alone, not count-
ing those of this past summer. The
ten slain journalists include two
ABC television correspondents, Lar-
ry Buchman and Sean Toolan;
Edouard Saab, the editor of Orient
le Jour, the largest French-language
daily in the entire region; Salim
Laouzi, editor of the periodical Al
Hawadess; and Robert Pfeffer, from
the West German magazine Stern.
Sean Toolan was shot dead in the
street in July 1980, after having
completed an ABC film on Pales-
tinian terrorism.
Robert Pfeffer was shot dead in
front of his Beirut apartment short-
ly after he published a book on the
use of PLO terrorist-training bases
in Lebanon by the Baader-Meinhof
gang.
Edouard Saab had been critical of
Palestinian military activities in Le-
banon since 1970. In September
1976, as he was leaving Beirut, his
car was stopped at an Al Fatah
checkpoint where he was killed by
a machine-gun burst in the fore-
head.
The horribly mutilated corpse of
Salim Laouzi was found by a shep-
herd near the village of Aramoun,
on the outskirts of Beirut, on March
4, 1980. Threats against his life be-
gan in 1975. That summer a bomb-
ing totally destroyed the Beirut
headquarters of his weekly magazine
Al Hawadess, forcing him to move
editorial offices to London, where
Laouzi (a Lebanese Muslim) con-
tinued to fight against Palestinian
and Syrian occupation of his coun-
try. On a return trip to Beirut to
see his family, his car was stopped
at a Syrian army roadblock, and
Laouzi was abducted by militiamen
from the pro-Syrian Saiqa group of
the PLO. His body was not discov-
ered until ten days after his dis-
appearance.
In June 1980, Bernard Debuss-
man, Beirut bureau chief for Reu-
ters, was shot in the back with a
pistol equipped with a silencer,
upon leaving the home of a col-
league in Beirut. He had been re-
peatedly threatened by the pro-
Syrian faction of the PLO for his
articles on events inside Syria. The
other Western newsmen who wit-
nessed' the shooting were hastily
withdrawn from their posts. Debuss-
man, after a long stay in the hospi-
tal, survived.
Peter Meyer-Ranke, Middle East
correspondent for the Springer
newspaper chain in West Germany,
wrote in February 1982 that "Beirut
is no place for an honest journalist
to work." Referring to coverage of
the heavy fighting between Syrian
troops and Phalangists in 1978,
Meyer-Ranke said that he had fre-
quently observed "self-censorship,
self-restrictions, and silence" from
his Western colleagues in Palestin-
ian and Syrian-controlled areas.
"More important for them is the
press card from the PLO and the
Syrian government."
THINGS got no better during the
siege of Beirut this past summer.
For journalists West Beirut was the
place to be. But to be in West Bei-
rut, they had to play by the rules
of the PLO.
Thus did the PLO campaign of
intimidation and direct elimination
over the past six years pay off. No
one needed to be reminded of it.
Nor would anyone try to "infiltrate"
West Beirut unbeknownst to the
PLO: armed Palestinian and Syrian
guardposts covered every street, and
Europeans stuck out like sore
thumbs. It was impossible to cir-
culate incognito. If you wanted to
cover West Beirut, the press pass
was a must.
There were other means of PLO
control. For the journalist who was
truly recalcitrant, foolhardy, or
curious, there was the PLO prison
system. Each of the 15 organizations
comprising the Palestine Liberation
Organization had its own prison in
West Beirut. The primary aim of
these prisons was to keep the Leb-
anese and other Arab inhabitants
from fleeing the city during the
siege; most of the inmates had been
arrested at various PLO checkpoints
on their way out. The "Arab tele-
phone" communicated the news of
this practice to all the inhabitants
of the city, who, as a result, mostly
remained behind as hostages and
propaganda decoys, preferring the
risk of Israeli bombardment to the
certain terror of the PLO prisons.
The Western press corps failed
completely to report on the exis-
tence of the prisons, despite the fact
that many journalists were aware
of them. When I was released after
being held underground for 24 days
during the bombings, I approached
a well-known wire service with news
of the prisons. I was coldly received,
and dismissed with the assurance
that they would report nothing.
They still had people in West Bei-
rut, and could not put them in
jeopardy.
This is exactly what it means to
say that the PLO is a' terrorist or-
ganization. The efficient terrorist
strikes in such a way as to make his
potential victims feel vulnerable on
every front, at every moment. That
is his equivalent of the "deterrent"
so often evoked in discussions of
nuclear war, and it operated very
effectively in the case of the news
service I tried to interest in the
story of the PLO prisons.
ON July 30, during my imprison-
ment, I met two American journal-
ists who were terrorized in this
sense. This was in the subcellars of
a modern building in Fakhani, one
of the military headquarters of the
PLO and thus a prime Israeli tar-
get. They were a couple, brought
down to the shelter during a bom-
bardment. Bit by bit they realized
that off in the dark around them
were not "conveniences" for soldiers
wishing to recoup their energies
during the raids but cells to hold
Arab and Western prisoners, includ-
ing myself. The couple broke down.
"When we get back to the States
we'll tell everyone how brave you
are," said the girl to her "guardians."
"We'll tell them how well you
treated us."
The two never published a word
on their brief and unwitting tour
of the PLO prisons; it is extremely
doubtful they will ever do so. Ter-
ror is not knowing when you will
be struck down. As such it has been
the most successful weapon of the
PLO in its campaign to influence
the Western news media.
A journalist who has actually
been arrested or threatened by the
PLO for some "indiscretion" be-
comes subject to the tacit under-
standing on the part of all con-
cerned that such incidents will be
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50/COMMENTARY JANUARY 1983
covered up for fear of further re-
prisals against associates and parent
organizations. One American jour-
nalist I talked to denied reports
that he had received Syrian threats,
despite the fact that these had been
confirmed by other sources. The
jo+trnalist in question has since been
relieved of'duty on Middle Eastern
affairs and been given an assign-
ment elsewhere. This has happened
time and time again, as it did with
those who witnessed the gunning of
Bernard Debussman.
The New York Times, the Wash-
ington Post, the Associated Press,
News-week, and others have been
cited by Israeli authorities as having
deliberately covered up incidents of
arrest, mistreatment, and overt
threats against their correspondents
in Beirut at the hands of the PLO.
According to the Jerusalem Post, "a
condition for their release was that
their media not mention their ab-
duction."
Several French newsmen were
held captive by the PLO during
the siege of Beirut for periods rang-
ing from six to twenty-four hours.
Their film was examined, they were
personally threatened and in several
cases beaten and physically intimi-
dated to insure their silence. In my
own case, French consular authori-
ties arranged a trade for my release.
Since returning to France I have
learned from sources in contact with
the PLO that I have been written
off as one who will never speak.
During my 31 weeks of constant,
direct intimidation, I was supposed
to have "learned."
Terror, intimidation, and the law
of silence: these are the basic tools
used by the Palestine Liberation
Organization to manipulate the in-
ternational press. Most of the sins
committed by Western newsmen
under PLO constraint were sins of
omission: showing bombed build-
ings but not the arms stockpiled in
their basements; describing bombed
hospitals but not the PLO fighters
whose bases of operations were in-
side; and so forth. The list is in-
finite, but the effect unmistakable:
the reversal of international opinion
on the moral equation of the Mid-
dle East conflict.
Anti-Nuclear Fantasies
Patrick Glynn
T HE anti-nuclear movement has
typically expressed itself in
broad, emotional gestures of public
protest-marches and rallies, the-
atrical demonstrations of the horri-
ble effects of nuclear bombs, popu-
lar referenda for some sort of
"freeze" on the arms race. But along
with this popular protest, a special-
ized literature has been forming-a
growing corpus of "anti-nuclear
books" that attempt to provide
more specific theoretical underpin-
nings for the movement. The best
known of these books is Jonathan
Schell's The Fate of the Earth. Two
major new additions to the genre
are Indefensible Weapons and Be-
yond the Cold War-the former a
PATRICK GLYNN, a' new contributor, is
senior editor of the Journal of Con-
temporary Studies.
collaborative effort by two activist
American professors, Robert Jay
Lifton and Richard Falk, the latter a
collection of polemical essays by E.P.
Thompson, the well-known British
Marxist historian and spokesman
for the European disarmament cam-
paign.?
In Indefensible Weapons, Robert
Jay Lifton and Richard Falk direct
our attention to a phenomenon
called "nuclearism," which they de-
fine as the "psychological, political,
and military dependence on nuclear
weapons, the embrace of the wea-
pons as a solution to a wide variety
of human dilemmas, most ironically
that of 'security.' " At different
points in the text, nuclearism is
characterized as a "disease," a fun-
darnentalist "religion," and an "ad-
diction."
The book consists of two long
essays, one by each author, with a
jointly written introduction and
conclusion. In the first essay, called
"Imagining the Real," Lifton, who
teaches psychiatry at Yale, argues
that the sheer presence of nuclear
arms and the dangers they pose are
responsible for a wide variety of
psychic ills in modern societies; that
governments have tended to cope
with the nuclear peril by taking
refuge in the neurotic "illusion"
that stockpiling the weapons can
provide security; and that the cure
for our problem lies in rejecting
such illusions-in "casting off our
? Indefensible Weapons: The Political
and Psychological Case Against Nuclear.
isrn, by Robert Jay Lifton and Richard
Falk, Basic Book3, 301 pp., $15.50. Beyond
the Cold War: A New Approach to the
Arms Race and Nuclear Annihi:ation, by
E.P. Thompson, Panthcon, 198 pp., $15 00.
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