LETTER TO STEPHEN W. BOSWORTH FROM CHARLES E. WATERMAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00153R000200060012-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 12
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85T00153R000200060012-1
?
0
THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
12 August 1983
Ambassador Stephen W. Bosworth
Chairman, Policy Planning Council
State Department
Dear Steve:
Per our discussion, I sent the attached
note to Don Fortier, Don Gregg, and Andy
Marshall.
Sincerely,
Charles E. Waterman
Vice Chairman
Attachment
Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85T00153R000200060012-1
 Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council 12 August 1983
Mr. Donald Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20506
In pursuit of our attempt to induce serious deliberation within
government on longer-range issues, I put together the attached list of
tacit assumptions underlying the US world view on a variety of issues.
The list is not inclusive, is not well prioritized, and contains some
items which may border too closely on "current" issues. I do feel some
of the assumptions bear examination.
I also sent the list to Steve Bosworth, who is sympathetic to the
concept that some of the categories would bear scrutiny by a group of
pertinent, cleared, and interested individuals from policy, intel-
ligence, and appropriate non-governmental organizations. We both agree
careful structuring of the deliberations of any forum decided upon would
be necessary to preclude irrelevant and time-wasting debate.
We would be interested in your reaction to the attached list. Any
ideas on the desirability and methodology for instigating meaningful
deliberation on the issues would be welcome. Incidentally, I sent a
similar note to Andy Marshall and Don Fortier.
Charles E. Waterman
Vice Chairman
Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
 Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council 12 August 1983
Mr. Andrew W. Marshall
Director, Net Assessment
Department of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301
Dear Andy:
In pursuit of our attempt to induce serious deliberation within
government on longer-range issues, I put together the attached list of
tacit assumptions underlying the US world view on a variety of issues.
The list is not inclusive, is not well prioritized, and contains some
items which may border too closely on "current" issues. I do feel some
of the assumptions bear examination.
I also sent the list to Steve Bosworth, who is sympathetic to the
concept that some of the categories would bear scrutiny by a group of
pertinent, cleared, and interested individuals from policy, intel-
ligence, and appropriate non-governmental organizations. We both agree
careful structuring of the deliberations of any forum decided upon would
be necessary to preclude irrelevant and time-wasting debate.
We would be interested in your reaction to the attached list. Any
ideas on the desirability and methodology for instigating meaningful
deliberation on the issues would be welcome. Incidentally, I sent a
similar note to Don Gregg and Don Fortier.
Charles E. Waterman
Vice Chairman
Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
 Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
? ?
The Director of Central Intclligencc
National Intelligence Council
Mr. Donald Fortier
Senior Staff/Western Europe
National Security Council
Washington, D.C. 20506
12 August 1983
In pursuit of our attempt to induce serious deliberation within
government on longer-range issues, I put together the attached list of
tacit assumptions underlying the US world view on a variety of issues.
The list is not inclusive, is not well prioritized, and contains some
items which may border too closely on "current" issues. I do feel some
of the assumptions bear examination.
I also sent the list to Steve Bosworth, who is sympathetic to the
concept that some of the categories would bear'scrutiny by a group of
pertinent, cleared, and interested individuals from policy, intel-
ligence, and appropriate non-governmental organizations. We both agree
careful structuring of the deliberations of any forum decided upon would
be necessary to preclude irrelevant and time-wasting debate.
We would be interested in your reaction to the attached list. Any
ideas on the desirability and methodology for instigating meaningful
deliberation on the issues would be welcome. Incidentally, I sent a
similar note to Andy Marshall and Don Gregg.
C
harles E. Waterman
Vice Chairman
Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
 Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
. SECRET
Assumptions Underlying Major US Foreign Policies
All foreign policy decisions necessarily rest on assumptions--
whether articulated or merely implicit--abo1t the nature of the outside
world and our ability to affect events. Many of these assumptions are
well-founded, have stood the test of time,-and still provide a sound
basis for making policy judgments for the future. Others, however, may
no longer be valid and will need to be changed.
There is value in periodically articulating and re-examining all
key assumptions underlying major policy choices, if only to sharpen
awareness of the bases of US policy and to stimulate thinking about
developments in the world and in US capabilities. Indeed, the questions,
asked both by intelligence officers and by policymakers often themselves
shape both the analysis and the policies that result.
This paper seeks to examine and to differentiate among underlying
policy assumptions. Its central purposes are to help ensure that we do
indeed understand and agree with assumptions underlying major foreign
policies, and that those assumptions are grounded on the most accurate
information available. Thus this paper proposes certain questions
regarding some of the most significant areas of US foreign policy,
followed (in capsule form) by what appear to be today's prevailing US
assumptions. This is not to argue that prevailing assumptions are
wrong; rather that looking at them anew could produce fresh insights.
At this point, the list of questions and prevailing assumptions is
not meant to be comprehensive--either in regional/functional scope or in
specific issues. Rather, by focussing on several key topics, it is
designed to provide a basis for starting discussion. In each case, the
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
 Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
0 SECRET
0
time frame for discussion is "the next few years"; as discussion
proceeds, the time frame could usefully be extended further into the
future.
I. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
II. Western Europe
III. The Middle East
IV. East Asia
V. Central America
VI. Southern Africa
VII. International Economics (including North-South relations)
VIII. Non-Proliferation
I. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe:
A. Do Soviet actions to provide and test a strategic war-fighting
capability indicate that, under certain circumstances, the
Soviet leadership may be prepared to initiate a strategic
war? Does Soviet doctrine necessarily require that any major
war escalate promptly to the strategic nuclear level? (The
prevailing US assumption has been that the Soviets would not
risk everything in strategic war short of a direct threat on
the homeland. There is no established US consensus on the
practicalities of Soviet military doctrine.)
B. Does Soviet perception of the prevailing "correlation of
forces" mean that Moscow is now more willing to risk military
conflict with the United States in non-central areas (e.g.,
over an Arab-Israeli conflict)? (The prevailing US assumption
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
 Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
I* SECRET
9
is that the Soviets will still shy away from any such direct
engagements with the US, but beneath that threshold will be
willing to push more than in the past.)
C. Have increasing impediments to technical monitoring rendered
impossible the conclusion of strategic arms limitations
agreements that are both comprehensive and verifiable, or are
alternative technologies on the horizon? To be verifiable,
will future strategic arms control agreements have to be
narrower in scope and less comprehensive? What about CBR?
(The prevailing US assumptions are that adequate levels of
monitoring will be feasible in the future, and that CBR threats
are of second-order importance.)
D. Are the Soviet Union's growing economic problems likely
significantly to color its approach to defense spending, arms
control agreements with the US, aggressiveness in the Third
World, or the relative priorities of the Soviet leadership?
(The prevailing US assumption is that, while economic factors
are important, their impact will be at the margin and will not
significantly alter Soviet objectives or tactics.)
E. Are corruption, some attenuation of ideological belief, the
slowing economy, increasing dependence on non-Russian
nationalities, and demographic trends adverse to ethnic
Russians creating a potentially volatile situation which
threatens the foundation of the regime? (The prevailing US
assumption is that Soviet society is in some trouble, but that
the problems are manageable at least for the foreseeable
future.)
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
 Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
0 SECRET ?
F. Are there factors in Eastern Europe leading toward erosion of
Soviet control and a weakening of military and'economic
cooperation within the bloc? Is East European reliability
for the Soviets in a crisis at isiue? Are there intra-East
European developments (e.g., Hungarian-Romanian relations, the
Macedonian question, Yugoslav national tensions) that could
lead to a breakdown of the pattern of security? Can--and
should--the United States or its allies exert any effective and
significant influence on intra-bloc relationships? (Prevailing
US assumptions are that the Soviets can always squelch
disintegrating tendencies through'a mixture of toughness and
flexibility; and that any effort to exploit Soviet problems in
Eastern Europe could lead to difficulties we could not--and
would not want to--manage.)
G. Is a security regime possible for Europe that could lead to
peaceful evolution in Eastern Europe without a real reduction
in the actual security of the USSR and in a form which the USSR
might accept? (The prevailing US assumption is that the
existing security system cannot be altered because Soviet
strategic and ideological thinking, as reflected in the
Brezhnev doctrine, demands a continuation of Communist Party
control, plus Soviet military domination and occupation,
regardless of the wishes of Eastern European peoples.)
H. In general, is there an increase or decrease in the willingness
of the Soviet Union to wage or support political-paramilitary
warfare in the Third World? Will Soviet investments in
military power-projection necessarily lead to intensified
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
 Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
9 SECRET ?
efforts to translate this into political influence in the Third
World? (The prevailing US assumption is that no change has
occurred in past Soviet policy; and that Moscow will continue
to seek greater influence in the Third World, deriving from its
military capabilities.)
I. Could there be a major shift in USSR-China relations, either
toward a rapprochement that would damage US interests or toward
direct conflict? (The US assumption is that the status quo
will endure, with minor variations, for the foreseeable
future.)
II. Western Europe
A. Are long-term trends underway that could seriously degrade the
quality of US relations with Western Europe? In particular: a)
Could a general difference of view on East-West relations
critically erode the ability of the alliance to coordinate on
issues such as conventional defense preparedness, the role of
nuclear weapons, East-West trade, and the Soviet role outside
of Europe? b) Will there be insuperable differences of
view/interest on "outside of area" problems (e.g., the Middle
East, Latin America) such as to prevent effective allied action
(Middle East) or to undercut basic alliance cohesion (Central
America)? c) Will long-range systemic changes in the global
economy lead progressively to economic competition across the
Atlantic that will cut into political assumptions about Western
security? (The prevailing US assumption is that problems in
all three areas can be contained.)
SECRE1I
Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
 Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
0 SECRETF
?
B. Could a combination of Western European neutralism, pacifism,
anti-nuclear movements, nationalism (e.g., in Germany) and the
"successor generation" problem seriously erode the foundations
of the alliance during the next few years? (Prevailing US
assumptions are that the first three are essentially passing
phenomena that can be dealt with through relatively minor
shifts in policy; that the fourth is unlikely to become
serious, and that the fifth can be dealt with through
education.)
C. Could long-term stagflation lead to a reversal of West European
cohesion, an effective collapse of the European Community, and
a challenge to Atlantic security arrangements? (The US
assumption is that this could not happen.)
III. The Middle East
A. In the Arab-Israeli conflict:
1. To what extent is the level of instability in the
Middle East a function of the Arab-Israeli
dispute? Specifically, would fundamentalist or
leftist revolutions be less likely if there were a
Palestinian "solution," or are they likely in any
event? How does the state of Arab-Israeli relations
affect the possibility of Soviet inroads? (US
opinion is sharply divided on these issues.)
2. Is a "solution" or at least a substantial
amelioration of the Palestinian problem essential to
US interests, or will it gradually become less of a
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
 Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
SECRET
potent irritant if merely left to evolve? Will the
Palestinian movement grow into a true insurgency
without "settlement," or will a process of
accommodation occur? (The prevailing US assumption
is that the Palestinian question is central to US
interests and will become more, not less of an
irritant.)
3. Is there a degree of flexibility to be found
anywhere in the Israeli body politic which
realistically offers the likelihood of a compromise
on the West Bank/Gaza/Jerusalem acceptable to even
moderate Arabs? Is the basic trend in Israel toward
greater or lesser flexibility? (The prevailing US
assumption is that such flexibility exists in
liberal Israeli circles, under certain
circumstances.)
4. Would establishment of a Palestinian state in Jordan
resolve the problem, or merely whet the appetite of
Palestinians for military recovery of the West Bank?
(While opinion is divided, the prevailing US assumption is
that this development would not enhance the prospects for
peace.)
5. With the passage of time and continuation of the Arab-
Israeli conflict, under what kinds of conditions would the
current Israeli military advantage be threatened? Would
proliferation of nuclear weapons to the area (e.g., Iraq,
Libya, or Pakistan) decisively change these
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
 Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
?
SECRET_________
calculations? (The prevailing US assumption is that the
Israeli advantage will eventually erode.)
6. Is there serious risk that Egypt would turn away from the
United States, toward the Soviet Union, and renounce the
treaty with Israel? (The prevailing US assumption is that
these problems can be avoided.)
B. In the Persian Gulf:
1. Is Soviet expansion toward the Persian Gulf area a
realistic threat, or has fear of it largely resulted from
the juxtaposition of two coincidental events: the Iranian
revolution and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan?
Does the risk of further Soviet expansion toward the Gulf
rest on definite Soviet planning/timetables, or on
willingness to seize opportunities? Is the threat
primarily military or political? (Prevailing US current
assumptions accept the validity of the Soviet threat, and
that substantial military planning effort and resources
must be devoted to countering this possibility. Opinion
is divided on whether the Soviets have a grand design.)
2. Can local security efforts (e.g., the Gulf Cooperation
Council) contain likely threats to the Persian Gulf, or
will some form of US involvement and probably military
"presence" be needed for the foreseeable future? Does the
price of oil (and oil income) affect these calculations?
(The prevailing US assumption is that our direct role,
SECRE
Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
 Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
. SECRET
0
with or without West European allies, will be critical--
.all the more so if regional oil income falls.)
3. Could US military involvement in the Persian Gulf
stimulate either hostile reactions to our presence or
internal revolt? (The US assumption is that the risk is
worth taking and that, properly managed, the US presence
will not have these effects.)
4. Is the Iranian revolution likely over time to moderate,
adopt more pluralistic forms of government, and gradually
subdue its more expansionist tendencies? Would this lead
Iran to turn Westward and tend to negate Soviet
opportunities? (The prevailing US assumption is that such
a trend is inevitable although lengthy.)
5. Will "Khomeinism" prove to be exportable to other regional
states, to the detriment of Western interests? (The
prevailing US assumption is that differences in national
circumstances are likely to outweigh similarities provided
that Iran does not decisively defeat Iraq.)
7. Will post-Khomeini Iran be able to survive as a unified
country? Could the Soviet Union gain control over Iran
through political means? Would a splintered Iran be
vulnerable to the Soviet Union? (US opinion is divided on
these questions.)
IV. East Asia:
A. Will a continuing US tendency to focus on Soviet/European
affairs result in Japan's achieving preeminent influence in
Pacific Basin affairs--and would this circumscribe future US
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
 Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
? SECRET
0
options in the Basin? (The prevailing US assumption is that
this will not occur.)
B. Is there a point at which continuing US pressure on Japan to
increase its military capabilities-will result in such
increasing negative reactions from other Asian countries (or
from Japan itself) that the US will have to curtail its
pressure and change its mutual security objectives vis-a-vis
Japan? (The prevailing US assumption is that adequate Japanese
military forces can be sustained without critical political
cost.)
C. Could US-Japanese economic/trade disputes undercut mutual
security understandings? (The US assumption is that this will
not happen.)
D. Can Vietnamese/Soviet power in Southeast Asia be contained, or
are there other "dominoes" yet to fall (e.g., Thailand?). The
prevailing US assumption is that this can be contained.)
E. Could failure of Chinese modernization effectively reduce its
role in the region--and would this redound to Soviet benefit?
Conversely, will China become more assertive in the region?
What about China's role elsewhere in the Third World? Can the
US influence the outcome? (The prevailing US assumptions are
that a) we have only a marginal ability to influence China's
course, internally or externally; and b) that China will play
an increasingly important role, at least in East Asia.)
V. Central America:
A. Does economic, propaganda, and implied military pressure
on Cuba inevitably force the Soviet Union to escalate
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
 Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
SECRET
0
support to that country, or is there a realistic point
when the costs to the Soviets would outweigh the
advantages? If the latter is true, would meaningful
Soviet pressures on the Cubans to hschew revolutionary
pretensions and actions in the Third World be either
likely or effective (i.e., would Castro continue to
export revolution on his own)? (Prevailing US
assumptions are that the Soviets might suggest tactical
retreats to the Cubans, but not long-term substantial
changes; and that Castro is totally dependent on the
Soviet Union for Third World ventures.)
B. Is Castro susceptible to some partial rapprochement with
the United States, whereby he would reduce Third World
activism and we would provide Cuba with economic
incentives to do so? (The prevailing US assumption is
that no change is possible--though this is disputed by
some academics.)
C. Can centrist forces in the Central America/Caribbean area
carry out social reform or even moderate revolution
without being overcome by leftwing subversion or becoming
objects in the East-West struggle? Would the answer be
different if these forces received some kind of external
support, and if so, of what kind (economic, technical,
intelligence, policy, military)? Is US involvement
likely to exacerbate or ameliorate internal
developments? (US assumptions are divided on these
points.)
-10-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
 Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
? SECRET
10
D. Is there a significant role for countries other than the
US in Central America to prevent developments hostile to
our interests (e.g., the Contadora group, Mexico on its
own, Spain)? (The prevailing US assumption is that other
countries might be helpful, but that our role will still
be vital.)
E. Can any externally-supported rightist counterinsurgency
in Central America--with the region's tradition of US
interference--succeed against a regime that is inspired
by social injustice but that has become communist-
supported? Can such movements ever be dissociated from
discredited groups that are associated with past
exploitation? Can an effective counter-insurgency be
mounted on the basis of centrist forces akin to those now
dominant in Venezuela and the Dominican Republic? (The
prevailing US assumption is that such an effort is
feasible.)
F. Should El Salvador become leftist and Nicaragua maintain
its current political complexion, how likely is a domino
effect in Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama or Mexico? (The
prevailing US assumption is that these developments are
likely to have consequences adverse for our interests in
other countries of the region.)
G. Can Mexico simultaneously maintain the stability of its
system and make major policy concessions to the US
(e.g., on Central America, immigration, petroleum)? Can
Mexico remain stable in any event, and can the US affect
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
 Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
SECRET 4)
.10
the outcome? (The prevailing US assumption on the first
question is "no"; views are divided on the second
question.)
VI. Southern Africa:
A. Are Apartheid and its policy consequences in southern
Africa essentially immutable or is change possible
through whatever means? Can the United States
significantly influence internal developments in South
Africa--either with carrots or sticks? (The US
prevailing assumption is that some combination of US
policies will, in time, secure changes in South Africa
sufficient for us to protect our interests elsewhere in
the region, e.g., in Namibia.)
B. Would US withdrawal from active concern with southern
African issues necessarily work against our interests
there? Or would "benign neglect" be at worst neutral in
terms of our interests/relations with black Africa? (The
prevailing US assumption is that we have to be involved.)
C. Would upheaval in southern African countries (including
South Africa)--especially if violent--necessarily work
against our interests and in favor of those of the Soviet
Union? Would countries initially favoring the Soviet
Union in time turn to the West because of economic
problems? (Prevailing US assumptions are that we have
much to lose and the Soviets much to gain; and that an
-12-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
 Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
? SECRET
evolution away from the Soviet Union could be either too
uncertain or to slow to use as a basis for policy.)
VII. International Economics (including Nort?i-South Relations)
A. Will sustained economic recovery in the West fairly
rapidly end the LDC debt crisis? -In the meantime, can
the debt crisis be managed so as to minimize risks, such
as rising political opposition to austerity policy and
the chances of changes in policy orientation in a more
nationalistic, inward-looking, and confrontational
direction? (The prevailing US assumption is that the
debt problem will quickly go away with sustained economic
recovery.)
B. In the longer term, is the Third World likely to achieve
adequate rates of economic growth? If net bank lending
remains low, is it essential to develop alternative
sources of foreign capital for LDCs, e.g., official aid,
private direct investment? Under what circumstances
might such flows be forthcoming, and with what effects?
Is an expansion of export opportunities a reasonable
substitute for capital flows? (The US government has not
yet addressed this problem, so it is not clear what is
being assumed.)
C. Will world trade continue to be a major dynamic factor in
the world economy during the remainder of the 1980s? Or
will trade become severely constrained by protectionism
and market controls? If the latter, what would be the
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
 Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
. SECRET
implications for industrial countries and developing
countries, especially the NICs? (The prevailing US
assumption is that rapid growth of trade will continue.)
D. Can developed countries retain an ,essential monopoly of
global economic decisionmaking, or must other countries,
e.g., "newly-industrialized countries," become more
deeply engaged? (the prevailing US assumption is that
the developed countries will retain most authority for
economic decisionmaking, although a few other countries
might become involved at the margins.)
E. Is the global energy crisis "over," or merely in
remission? (The prevailing US assumption is the latter.)
F. Is another "food crisis" likely during the next 5-10
years? Under what conditions might such a crisis occur,
and with what effect? (The prevailing US asumption is
that a food crisis is unlikely.)
G. Is there any longer something called the "Third World,"
or has differentiation among developing countries reached
the point that this is now (and increasingly will be) a
misnomer? Will institutions like the Non-Aligned
Movement thus wither away, or will political factors
continue to promote cohesion among the "Southern"
countries? (Prevailing US assumptions are that talking
about developed vs. developing countries, in general,
still provides a useful distinction; and that solidarity
within the "South" will still need to be reckoned with at
SECRETI
Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
 Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85T00153R000200060012-1
? SECRET 0
least economically, although groups like the NAM have
seen their day politically.)
-H. Can there be actual or potential regional leaders in the
Third World ("regional influentiaTs") through which we
can work to encourage stability in those areas because of
interests they share with us? Or did the Iranian
revolution explode that theory? (The prevailing US
assumption is that there are such countries and we should
seek to strengthen them.)
VIII. Non-Proliferation
A. Is the proliferation of nuclear weapons inherently
destabilizing, or does this depend on a) where it
happens; b) the nature of regional rivalries; and c) the
character of individual governments? (The prevailing US
assumption is that nuclear proliferation, in general, is
destabilizing, although there is a minority view that
stable regional balances could emerge.)
B. Is the risk of nuclear proliferation overblown, in view
of the low rate of development and testing of nuclear
explosives relative to the capacity of governments to do
so? Will this trend continue? (The US assumption is
that policies pursued during the past several years have
helped produce this trend, yet may not sustain it.)
C. If a country is determined to "go nuclear," are there
incentives or disincentives that can still be
effective? Are violent measures effacacious? (US
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85T00153R000200060012-1
 Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1
9 SECRET 0
assumptions are that incentives/disincentives can work
where a government is in doubt about "going nuclear"; and
that violent measures cannot be effective permanently,
and may only exacerbate proliferation trends.)
D. Has the global non-proliferation regime (the NPT, the
IAEA and its safeguards systems, and nuclear supplier
guidelines) been decisive in preventing the spread of the
bomb? Or has this regime been more or less incidental to
national decisions taken for other reasons, e.g.,
national technical difficulties, fears of reaction by
neighbors and superpowers, vulnerability to preemption,
or the ability to achieve national objectives by other
means (military or political)? The US assumption is that
the non-prolieration regime has been the more important
disincentive.)
E. Will the Soviet Union continue to view proliferation as
not being in its interests? Is this view changing, and--
if so--where? (The prevailing US assumption is that the
Soviet Union essentially opposes proliferation.)
-16-
SECRETI
Approved For Release 2007/07/03: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200060012-1