OPERATIONAL SUPPORT FOR FUTURE UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00153R000200050051-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 16, 2007
• Sequence Number: 51
• Publication Date: April 18, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved
For-Release 2007/07/24: CIA-RDP85TOO153R000200050051-9
SECRET
18 April 1983
Operational Support for Future Unconventional Warfare
From an operations perspective, there are serious impediments to
establishing underground networks in peacetime for contingency usage in time
of war. While not necessarily overwhelming, these problems do suggest caution
in making preparations for irregular warfare contingent on progress in this
area. Specifically:
-- Operations personnel are charged with establishing
professional, high level unilateral penetrations in denied areas.
This task consumes currently available resources.
-- The recruitment of clandestine underground "networks" is inherently
insecure and highly susceptible to host country penetration -
particulary in sophisticated counterintelligence environments such
as Eastern Europe.
-- While the risk to life of indigenous collaborators is worth it in
wartime, this point is more debatable in peacetime unless the
operation is of demonstrable high value.
-- Inherently insecure operations tend to heighten concerns of the
host governments about our operations, with resultant impact on the
security of other agents.
Political backing in the USG for such activity, some of which will
be compromised, comes and goes. Operators have found that
willingness to sustain a political repercussion to compromised
activity by one policy group is rapidly disavowed by succeeding
policymakers actually faced with the event. Among other things,
careers suffer.
Recruitment of this type of agent network sends an extremely'
militant message to the target government, and we must be certain
that war preparation is that desired message.
From the basic operator's point of view, the career pay off is not
high. There is little intelligence flow of value.
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? SECRET ?
The above negative considerations can, of course, be overcome by high
level sustained policy decisions. Short of that, however, the following is
immediately possible:
-- Tasking of current unilateral agents for identification of nodes of
opposition and related data.
-- Relevant operational personality target studies short of actual
recruitment. Some recruitment activity with these operations in
mind.
-- Related propaganda operations designed to intensify opposition
thinking in the target country.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: ? I
Steven Bosworth, Director Policy Planning -State
Norman Bailey, Staff Asst., NSC Staff
Andrew Marshall, Dir. Net Assessment, DOD
Richard N. Perle, Asst. Sec. (ISA) DOD
5 71 101 USE PREVIOUS
15 April 1983
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? CONFIDENTIAL ?
SUBJECT: Insurgency: Significant Trends in the Last Decade
1. The purpose of this memorandum is to highlight an obvious but
insufficiently noted shift in the political nature of insurgencies
worldwide. Most insurgencies a decade ago were leftist or at least anti-
Western due to intense nationalism. They were generally backed by the
Soviets or their representative, and were victorious. This situation no
longer pertains.
2. Specifically:
-- In 1973, 10 politically significant insurgencies were
underway (see chart). Nine were anti-Western in political
content, of which seven were victorious in at least the short
run. The one anti-leftist insurgency lost.
-- In 1983, there are 12 politically significant insurgencies
extant. Six are anti-leftist in political content, of which
the outcome of five remains in dispute and one has been largely
suppressed. There are also six anti-Western insurgencies of
which the outcome of three remains in dispute and three have
been largely suppressed.
-- Four of the now ongoing anti-leftist insurgencies are against
leftist regimes resulting from successful 1973 insurgencies.
Soviet "victories" have not been turned into "defeats" but they
have become costly.
-- In at least two anti-leftist insurgencies, the Soviets probably
believe there is US support.
3. This situation must affect Soviet judgments on support to
insurgencies, probably as follows:
-- "Peoples Revolutionary War," formerly a leftist preserve, has
become a two-edged sword.
-- Direct intervention, as in Afghanistan, does not guarantee
success.
-- Leftist insurgencies are no longer cheap instruments by which
to project influence. Initial victories in such wars may be
ephemeral, and increasingly costly.
-- Increasing Western, and particularly US support, to anti-
leftist insurgencies is a disturbing trend, and must be
considered a real possibility.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
-- Support by a leftist state to insurgencies in neighboring
countries may now trigger a retaliation internally in the
supporting state. This possibility gives any operational
planner pause.
4. In short, we have moved away from a situation in which insurgency
was a leftist monopoly. In part this is simply because there are more
established leftist governments, in part because of more aggressive Western
tactics, and in part because of activist regional policies of certain
conservative regimes (i.e. South Africa). For reasons outlined in
paragraph 3, a case can be made that the overall trend is desirable from
the US perspective.
Attachment:
Chart
CONFIDENTIAL
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0 CONFIDENTIAL S Att. to NIC 2689-83
POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT INSURGENCIES
Admittedly this chart oversimplifies the complex local issues at stake in
these conflicts by putting them in solely east-west terms, but is used for
illustrative purposes.
1973
Winner
Nicaragua Anti-Western Guerrillas Anti-Leftist Regime Guerrillas
Angola it it II 11 ?
Mozambique " 1' 'I If ?
Vietnam it
11 If If
Cambodia " If it If 11 Laos If II 11 II If
Zimbabwe if 11 It if 1.
Oman " If " If Regime
PLO/Israel It It ? If to
Iraq/Kurds Anti-Leftist Guerrillas Anti-Western Regime
1983 Winner
*Nicaragua Anti-Leftist Guerrillas Anti-Western Regime ?
*Angola If II II 11 ?
*Mozambique If If If 11 ?
*Afghanistan " ?
*Kampuchea If If Regime
If it
*Ethiopia/Eritrea
El Salvador Anti-Western Guerrillas Anti-Leftist Regime ?
Guatemala
Namibia
North Yemen
Western Sahara
PLO/Israel
Reg i me
*Leftist takeover in 1970s
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