SITUATION IN EL SALVADOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00153R000200040021-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 25, 2007
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: December 9, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP
DATE
12/16/82
TO:
C/LA/ DDO Mr.
Cl arri dge
ROOM NO.
I BUILDING
REMARKS:
Attached FYI.
FROM:
H. F. Hutchinson, Jr. VC/NIC
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
IOFEEI5S 241
REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.
C?oPY o-Cc
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1 0
NIC/AG
SUBJECT: Situation in El Salvador
1. During your meeting with the AG on Thursday you raised a question about
the situation in El Salvador, expressing some concern that the situation might
be deteriorating, if I heard you correctly. in response, opined
that solid progress is being made. I was less optimistic and would like to
expand my comments here.
2. I attach the DIA publication, Salvadoran Insurgent Capabilities TT
which I think is very good, much better than the April 1981 SNIE on the same
subject. Although released last month it is based only on intelligence
available as of March 1, 1982. Thus, it does not take into account the effect
of the March 28 elections which were a severe setback to the
DRU, particularly in the area of international public opinion. I also attach
a report from Major McKay, USMC, who I think is the best official observer in
El Salvador.
3. My sense of the situation from daily reading of El Salvador traffic is
that the Government of El Salvador (GOES) has been unable to exploit the
successful elections and by now their beneficial effect on world public
opinion has all but disappeared. In the military area there is little
evidence to show any significant progress by the GOES either in terms of
victories in-the field or demonstration of increased capabilities relative to
the insurgents. Guerrilla offensives this summer and during October and
November show, if anything, improvement on the insurgent side. Government
counter-offensives are always "successful" but involve not much more than
marching thousands of troops into the contested areas of Morazan,
Chalatenango, La Union (most recently), and Usulutan and claiming great
numbers of dead guerrillas. These are suspicious because relatively few
weapons are reported as recovered and there are almost never any prisoners.
The operations typically last 10 days to two weeks (the logistical limits of.
the Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF)) and restore captured towns to GOES
control. Garrisons are re-established and within a couple months are again
overrun by the insurgents. A partial exception to this was the attack on the
insurgent complex at the La Guazapa volcano in June which did seriously reduce
the guerrilla presence there.
4. A disturbing development in this pattern over the past few months is
that GOES garrisons tend to surrender quickly, with.the insurgents taking
significant quantities of weapons and numerous prisoners. Some of the
prisoners are recruited into guerrilla ranks. The rest are propagandized,
treated well, and released--whenever possible to the Red Cross. Some
observers believe that the returnees are creating morale problems for the ESAF
as they spread the word that it is better to surrender than to risk death by
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fighting. Moreover, by taking and releasing prisoners the insurgents insure
listenership for their Radio Venceremos over which they broadcast the names
and state of health of the prisoners. They also often broadcast the names of
government KIAs and either deliver the corpses to civil authorities for
transmission to the families or announce where the bodies, often coffined,
have been buried so that relatives can reclaim them. As for weapons, the most
recent series of guerrilla attacks in Morazan and La Union netted the
insurgents over 500 modern rifles, 4 81 mortars, 2. 50 cal. MGS, 3 90 mm RRs,
some M-79s, M-60 MGs, 60 mm mortars, and a dozen TRC-77 radios besides almost
160,000 rounds of rifle ammunition.
5. I think it fair to say that the scale of insurgent operations and their
relative success in the face of what we know (or think we know) about health
conditions, availability of food and clothing, the interdiction of arms
crossing the Honduran border, and the problems of coordinating operations
among the ideologically divided insurgent groups, bespeaks a rather higher
level of insurgent capabilities vis-a-vis the ESAF than we had expected at
this time. Conversely, I think it fair to say that there has been some
disappointment at the performance of the ESAF after the amount of US traininq
and supply they have had. Also, in view of the effort that has been put into
interdiction of arms supplies that current working assumptions about routes
and sources have been brought into question. Likewise, the ability of the
insurgent forces to recruit and maintain their force levels raises questions
about the extent of their support within the population. There is recent
speculation, based on interrogation of FMLN leaders captured in Honduras that
the unchanging total of 4500-5000 fulltime armed insurgents may be too low and
should be adjusted to 7,000 or even higher.
6. On the other hand, the US-supported buildup in ESAF strength has not
yet been translated into a positive change in the military situation. The US-
trained mobile battalions have had a mixed record. (It should be noted that
training is a wasting asset in the ESAF since draftees serve only one year and
there is no professional corps of NCOs). The National Guard is composed
chiefly of army veterans and arguably should be a more experienced and
effective force. However, there is little evidence to show that this is so.
Employed alone or in combination with local civil defense forces the Guard
often provides static garrison forces in El Salvador's small towns and
cities. Recently, as noted, these garrisons appear more and more to prefer
surrender to last ditch defense. Moreover, the Guard is most often charged
with responsibility for abuses of the civil population.
7. The appearance, if not necessarily the fact, that the guerrillas hold
the initiative is adding to a widespread belief in El Salvador that it is the
insurgents who have stalemated the government. The lack of military proqress
combined with continuing sabotage of the infrastructure has caused
disillusionment among many influential civilians, particularly businessmen
who, especially after the elections had removed Druate and the Christian
Democratic reformers, had believed that the "unleashed" Army would rapidly
reduce the insurgency. Recent traffic reports highly placed conservatives
telling of their belief that the military is content to
let the war arag on since many officers are personally profiting from US
materiel assistance. Others complain that General Garcia in particular is
less interested in prosecuting the war than in positioning himself to win the
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presidential election. He is careful, they say, not to allow possible
political opponents in the military to hold key commands, regardless of their
competence. There are continuing rumors of discontent in the officer ranks
over what some military men see as Garcia s concentration on politics, or his
lack of competence, or his alleged subservience to the Americans, or,
especially among majors and lieutenant colonels, his violation of Salvadoran
military tradition by clinging to power instead of retiring to let the next
tanda (in this sense, military academy generation) take over. All of this
discontent is exacerbated by lack of significant military success and is
having a negative effect on armed forces morale. Although they have to be
discounted, the comments of the Honduran military on their Salvadoran
colleagues' competence are far from laudatory.
8. The purely political situation, involving the power struggle among the
Christian Democrats, the National Conservatives (now split into two parties),
and D'Auboisson's ARENA, the dicey question of US relations, including the
murder trials and certification, and, above all, the economy, are none of them
causes for optimism. The election of March 28 continues to fade into history
and the war drags on. When the Pope visits Central American in early 1983 he
probably will call for negotiations. This will put further strain on a
divided government that clings to the dictum that the insurgents should not be
allowed to gain at the conference table that power they were unable to win in
the field. However, in view of the insurgents' success in the field (or, at
least, the government's inability to drive them from the field) this argument
wears thin. Indeed, it can be reversed with some plausibility.
9. The election, it is also argued, was a vote against the insurgents.
But it was not merely that. It also was a vote against the Duarte government
that had been carrying on the fight against the insurgents. And, it was a
vote for peace, in the sense that whatever government succeeded Duarte was
supposed to bring peace by one means or another. In several senses, then, the
elections have been a failure. They have not produced a clearly popular
government,. and they have not produced any progress toward peace through
continuation of the military and economic polices of the Duarte regime. The
option of seeking peace through negotiations has not been tried, but it can
hardly be argued that the elections were a referendum against negotiations.
This is not to say that negotiations are a wise course. It is only to point
out that pressures are building in their favor--if only on the grounds that
nothing else has worked--and that in all likelihood the papal visit will
increase those pressures. The fact that the Pope will be on his Central
American tour at about the same time that congressional recertification of
human rights progress in El Salvador is required only makes the situation more
interesting from the point of view of US policy.
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