HOW WE COULD DO A BETTER JOB (AND OBSTACLES TO DOING SO)
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85T00153R000100020048-7
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 12, 2008
Sequence Number:
48
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 7, 1983
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP85T00153R000100020048-7.pdf | 89.92 KB |
Body:
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0
7 January 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Henry S. Rowen
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
SUBJECT : How We Could do a Better Job (and
Obstacles to Doing so)
Products
Formal Estimates (59 last year) are the most visible. The greatest
difficulty we face is in the quality of the drafters we can find.
Proposals: to line up a competent drafter before getting committed to
estimates and get the heads of the appropriate agencies/directorates to assign
the drafters to this task. Such work also needs recognition and reward.
. I also am committed to making estimates shorter and crisper (with the
main exception of the major military estimates for which considerable length
is inescapable). We should do more short, policy relevant, SNIEs at the
expense of longer "country" papers that are not directly tied to policy issues
(and that are probably not much read either).
Our record on meeting Estimates schedules is poor. We need to be more
explicit about assigning priorities to estimates and more realistic in
scheduling.
Our Estimates are often properly criticized for being poorly written and
not presented in a lively format. We need a good Senior Editor and Director
of Production, who would be supported by the existing production staff and we
need help on improving our formats.
Informal Papers are mainly of two types: Contingency (warning-type)
papers on potentially important events that may or may not be highly likely,
and Forecasts, events that are prettly likely to happen. These papers have
the imp'- ortant attribute that they present the NIOs view of what will -- or
might -- happen, not diluted through coordination. These products are more
important than is generally recognized and their production arguably should be
more regularized and have more standing inside the Community.
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Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP85TO0153R000100020048-7
Q0
NFIB Process: Two suggestions:
o As we are now planning, have brief NFIB discussions of
selected estimate topics while they are at an early stage in
preparation.
o Also, we should have early preparation of draft Key
Judgments and circulation by you to the Principals to get
their attention.
A Neglected Activity.
Many NIOs have the potential for doing so, but tend not to generate ideas
on information-related actions for the DO Covert Action Staff. Someone in the
NIC might be charged with promoting this activity.
Budget and Space
.The NIC will have inadequate funds for consultants and travel for the
rest of this FY -- because we didn't ask for enough two years ago in the
budget cycle -- but FY 84 looks okay. On space, we don't have enough to house
the Analytic Group at full strength and don't yet have an office for the
NIO/S&T.
The Several NIO Activities and Priorities Among Them
The main activities are:
.o Support for you on current issues.
o Oversee the production of national estimates (and prepare
other products as noted above).
o Support of consumers (which takes around 50% of the time of
several NIOs).
.o Help guide collection activities.
Each NIO has worked out a division of his time that seems to best meet what
you want, but maybe it isn't right in some cases. This might be an item for
discussion at a meeting with them sometime soon.
Henry S. Rowen
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