THE PROSPECT FOR AFRICA 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00153R000100010042-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 28, 2008
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: January 15, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 40505
DDI-215-82
15 January 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: L. Gray Cowan
National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT: The Prospect for Africa, 1982
Africa will continue to suffer in 1982 and, for that matter, in the years
beyond, from the twin problems that are endemic to the Third World, economic
scarcity and political instability. Food shortages and the crushing burden
of energy costs weaken the economies of every country except South Africa.
Together chey,preclude the raising of living standards which in turn leads to
political unrest. The extreme fragility of national political institutions
facilitates the overthrow of representative government where it has begun to
take root and paves the way for its replacement with authoritarian leadership.
Even such relatively secure regimes as those in Nigeria or Kenya are not immune
to the virus of military takeover,
The combination of economic and political weakness will continue to
provide ideal opportunities for Soviet intervention throughout the continent.
However, Soviet domestic economic stringencies may possibly change the character
of this intervention in the immediate future, not only in Africa but throughout
the Third World. The Soviets have never been able (or willing) to meet African
needs for development aid; instead they have substituted arms assistance both
to established regimes and to guerrilla movements. Indeed, they have been more
than amenable to Western economic aid to their client states, provided political
control remains solidly in the hands of a pro-Soviet leadership. In 1982 and
beyond the Soviets will be increasingly emphasizing less costly forms of
intervention in their attempts to block US interests and initiatives. This is
not to say, of course, that the Soviets are incapable of mounting another
massive effort to secure another client if a suitable opportunity were to present
itself or to.save an existing one. .
Signer
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We can look forward to more aid to insurgent groups, and greater diplomatic
activity designed to destabilize pro-Western regimes and to frustrate US goals.
Diplomatic interference and supply of arms to insurgents are relatively cheap
forms of fostering Soviet goals compared to the-Aiossive effort required in an
Angola or a Cuba. We may expect to see more intensive disinformation campaigns,
more widespread support for terrorist activities, especially in Southern Africa,
more clandestine activity aimed at political destabilization and more overt
diplomatic moves to counter American initiatives wherever they occur. In
carrying out these policies the Soviets will rely even more heavily on their surro-
gates than in the past, particularly Libya, so long as Qhadafi is able to substitute
Libyan funds for what would otherwise be Soviet expenditures. Such economic and
technical aid as the Soviets are disposed to provide will come from Eastern
European sources except for Soviet technical advisers in the military and security
fields essential to preserve Soviet dominance in Ethiopia, Angola. and Mozambique.
During 1982 I expect to be paying particular attention to the following
countries and areas where I judge the situation to be most precarious.
Sudan
The reporting on the internal situation grows constantly more pessimistic;
the continued deterioration of the economy will give rise to growing political
agitation that will further undermine Nimeiri's position. There is increasing
reason to believe that military support for him is declining. Without it he
cannot hope to remain in power. The US has a very substantial stake in the
Sudan both for itself and because of its regional importance. The Soviets will
undoubtedly take advantage of any opportunity here, aided by the Libyans; if
they succeed f`gypt is endangered, as is, to a lesser degree, Kenya. In the event
of Nimeiri's removal we must be prepared to exert our influence to ensure a
smooth transition to a successor who will continue to take a pro-Western position.
Somalia and the Horn
Siad's position is far from secure, despite his ability in political
manipulation. It is in the combined interests of the Soviets and Ethiopians
to replace his regime with one more receptive to their concerns and, given the
sorry state of the Somali armed forces, an overthrow by invasion or assassination
is always just over the horizon. While Somalia may not be the kingpin of US
Indian Ocean policy, it plays an important role in it. The presence of a
pro-Soviet regime in Somalia would have serious consequences for our relations
with Kenya.
Angola
Internal dissension within the MPLA may lead the Soviets to decide to
replace Dos Santos, particularly if they feel that he is leaning too far in
the direction of seeking assistance from the. West. There is community agreement
that Cuban-troops have been increased since the September South African raids.
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In the negotiations on a Namibian settlement, we should be aware that the Angolans
could well offer some draw down of Cuban forces without, in fact, any real
reduction below the level of September 1981. The recent gradual hardening of the
South African attitude on Cuban troop withdrawal.would perhaps be reduced if the
Angolans were to make such an offer.
t that the danger of an outbreak of hostilities
There is general agreemen
in Shaba is greater than at any time over the past three years. Although
reporting is sketchy at best, it would appear that Soviet support for FLNC has
been offered. Given the present low state of organization within the FLNC, a
full scale invasion in the coming months seems unlikely but a coordinated
campaign of sabotage perpetrated by FLNC infiltrators into the province would
create severe economic dislocation and the departure of white technicians. In
view of the precarious economic Shaba and we must Mobutu's
seriously weakened by unrest for aid, both military and economic.
With the exception of the Horn and Southern Africa, the continent will not
be at the top of the priority list of US policy concerns in 1982. But we will
continue to have substantial interests in Africa which could be seriously harmed
by Soviet actions. We cannot afford to allow the Soviets to assume preponderant
influence in the Third World by default while we are preoccupied with counting
missiles in Geneva.
Zaire
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