MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN ROOM 2169 NEW WAR DEPARTMENT BUILDING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00362R000700010009-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: October 1, 1946
• Content Type: MIN

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SECRET COPY NO. 32
I.A.B. 8th Meeting (LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
Minutes of Meeting held in Room 2169
New War Department Bui in1;
on Tuesday, 1 October 19k6, a 2:30 P.M.
Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of
Central Intelligence, in the Chair
MEMBERS PRESENT
Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State for Research and In-
telligence
Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director
of Intelligence, W.D.G.S.
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval
Intelligence
Brig. General John A. Samford, Deputy Assistant
Chief of Air Staff-2
ALSO PRESENT
Mr. A. Sidney Buford, Department of State
Colonel E. J. Treacy, U.S.A.
Captain R. K. Davis, U.S.N.
Colonel E. P. Mussett, U.S.A.
Mr. George B. McManus, Central Intelligence
Group (for Item 1 only)
Mr. Donald Edgar, Central Intelligence Group
SECRETARIAT
., Secretary, N.I.A.
asistant Secretary, N.I.A.
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ADMIRAL INGLIS asked specifically what changes had been
made in C.I.G. 12/2.
GENERAL VANDENBERG explained. the change:-, and stated that
he was willing to go along with the paper, as amended, since he
was fully in accord with Mr. Hoover's viewpoint.
ADMIRAL INGLIS questioned the phrasing of paragraph 2 of
C.I.G. 12/2, and particularly that part thereof which reads "and
American residents travelling abroad". He suggested that con-
sideration be given to clarifying that phrase.
ADMIRAL INGLIS then brought up the question of whether or
not the changes in this paper would preclude O.N.I. from con-
tacting "hyphenated" groups and individuals.
GENERAL VANDENBERG replied that it would not, since such
individuals and groups were not mentioned in.the paper at all
and there was no effect whatsoever.
ADMIRAL INGLIS suggested, and it was agreed, that an
understanding to that effect appear in the minutes.
road an interpretation of the intent of paragraph 25X1
3-b, which was accepted.
25X1 THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:
a. Concurred in the revision of C.I.G. 12/2 (subsequently
Issued as C.I.G. Directive No. 15).
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2. POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR DUTIES WITH CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE GROUP --
C.I. Directive No. 8)
GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that C..T.G. Directive No. 8 was
based upon the arrangement existing at that tle under which
departments assigned personnel to C.I.G. The departments,
therefore, assumed the responsibility for conducting necessary
security investigations. He further stated that two develop-
ments had made this Directive out of date. First, it is clear
that in the future the majority of C.I,G. persorxn.el must be re-
cruited from sources other than the departments. Second, the
War Department finds it impossible to carry out the necessary
investigations because of reduced personnel ceiling. As a re-
sult of these facts it will be necessary for C.Y.G. to assume
responsibility for all future security Investigations required
to clear its personnel. In conducting these security investi-
gations, C.I.G. will adhere to the same security standards as
established in this Directive and will, of course, check with
the departments in each case. General Vandenberg assumed that
when the departments nominate individuals in the future for
C.I.G., the nominating department has at least made a pre-
liminary check on its own files to determine that the
individual meets C.I.G.'s.security standards. General Vanden-
berg also assumed that the departments will complete all inves-
tigations initiated up to this time.
GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that the War Department could
check records on any new personnel nominations to C.I.G. and.
also that those checks they have started can be completed. How-
ever, that was about as far as he could go, in view of the
greatly restricted personnel ceiling and tremendous backlog of
requested checks now on hand.
ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that the Navy Department could also
give a quick check on any personnel nominations they might make
to C.I.G., but that the Navy Department too was suffering from
reduced personnel and also had a large number of requested
checks on hand. Admiral Inglis further stated that he believed
that C.I.G. should in some way be covered to take care of the
type of individual who did not pass a full security check but
whose services would be of value to the Central Intelligence
Group.
GENERAL CHAMBERLIN suggested that exemption in these
cases should be made by the Director of Central Intelligence.
GENERAL VANDENBERG agreed that provision for such exemp-
tions would be made.
THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:
a. Concurred in the proposal by General Vandenberg that
C.I.G. undertake responsibility for all future security in-
vestigations required to clear its personnel, subject to the
same security standards as established in C.I.G. Directive
No. 8 except for exemptions authorized by the Director of
Central Intelligence. (Recision of G.I.G. Directive No. 8
subsequently circulated.)
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3. ASSIGNMENT OF FUNC
S F I E D D O? STATIC INTELLI-
GFNCE TO THE CENTRA
C.I.G. 1
INTEL IG i NCE ROUP
GENERAL VANDENBERG noted that the C.I.G. has already Given
consideration to this problem and its broad implications. Inter-
departmental-discussions on coordination, allocation, and
centralization are being held under C.I.G. auspices. However,
these discussions have indicated the need for an early I.A.B. or
N.I.A. decision regarding the broad basis on which the assign-
ment of primary responsibilities should be considered, and how
each agency of secondary interest will have its needs for
finished intelligence rmet.
MR-. EDDY asked what was meant by the term "statis intelli-
gence".
ADMIRAL INGLIS explained that it involved roughly the
field covered by JAMS studies.
GENERAL VANDENBERG considered that it involved gathering
a large mass of data and then preparing a basic study which
would be of use to many agencies. He explained that political
matters of a more or less permanent nature were included., such
as the constitution of the country and the form of government
if this was fairly stable.
MR. EDDY felt that political and economic matters were at
the present time in a state of change throughout a large part
of the world. He said that the State Department did not object
to coordination of these fields, but was not willing to turn
over to C.I.G. the responsibility for getting this intelligence.
That responsibility must remain in the State :department.
ADMIRAL INGLIS explained that O.N.I. mu.3t retain an
interest in political and economic matters as they affect naval
affairs. He did not think that naval and. military attaches
should be blind to political and econoraic developments. The
subject paper, however, was not concerned with the problem of
collection. Admiral Inglis explained that the War and Navy De-
partments had been studying what functions and activities could
be performed jointly. It was useless, however, for these de-
partments to make any joint arrangement if C.I.G. proposed to
take over various functions and activities. The purpose of the
subject paper was to initiate a study to find out what C.I.G.
planned to do. He explained that the JANIS studies were used
only as an example of the fields involved, but not as an
example of the procedures to be used. The subject paper con-
templated the possibility of turning over to C.I.G. people in
the various agencies working on geographical desks who prepared
material which is edited by the JANIS Board. Admiral InSlis
stated that the paper was not confined to the subject of JANIS
studies.
.RJR. EDGAR stated that the question raised by C.I.G.
could be explained as follows: If political intelligence, in
which O.N.I. has an interest, is allocated to the agency of
primary interest, would O.N.I. expect to receive this intelli-
gence directly from the primary agency in proper form, or
would O.N,I. have a group to put it into form, or would O.N,I.
expect C.I.G. to do that?
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GENERAL VANDENBERG said that C.I:Gi desired an expression
of opinion frog: the I+A4B. as to Vhebher they would like C.I.G.
to operate as a middleman between departments, or if they would
like direct contact between departments with C.I.G. in a
coordinating role. He explained that if C.I.G. was to take
over the preparation of static or strategic intelligence studies,
C.I.G. would either have to receive the intelligence from the
departments as JANIS now does, or would have to take over the
people in the agencies who are now preparing this intelligence.
GENERAL CHAMBERLIN felt that it was clear that certain
departments were responsible for certain elements of intelli-
gence, although this had never been put in the form of a
written statement, to his knowledge. He wondered if it wasn't
Possible for C.I.G. and the departments to parcel out
functions on the basis of primary responsibility. Then each
department would furnish finished intelligence to other depart-
ments who could rework it to meet their particular needs.
GENERAL VANDENBERG said that the question involved in
such a plan was whether C.I.G. should operate in the middle be-
tween departments or on the side.
GENERAL SAMFORD stated that he voted for C.I.G. In the
middle position.
MR. EDGAR said that a further question was whether the
required intelligence should be written in proper form by the
agency of Primary responsibility, or by C.I.G.
GENERAL CHAMBERLIN felt that another solution was
preferable. This was that the proper function of C.I.G. should
be to obtain intelligence from all departments and put it in
the best form for the use of all departments.
GENERAL VANDENBERG said that it was hard to have the in-
telligence put in the form required by any single department.
For example, it would be difficult to get people in State to
put intelligence in final form for use by the War Department.
CAPTAIN DAVIS said that the subject Paper suggested a
study of the possibility of placing C.I.G. in the middle role.
MR. EDDY said that the problems facing the various depart-
ments were different. He thought that most of the intelligence
now produced in the War and Navy Departments was for potential
use in case of active operations. Political operations, how-
ever, are going on day by day, and the State Department has to
produce intelligence for those current operations. He said
that he would be glad to have State's product sent to C.I.G. and
integrated with similar intelligence from the Jar and Navy De-
partments.
GENERAL VANDET`TBERG pointed out that the economic intelli-
gence produced by State did not cover all of the needs in that
field of the War and Navy Departments.
GENERAL SAMFORD said that what each intelligence agency
does stems from what Its chief wants done. He felt that with
C.I.G. in the middle role, the agencies would find that C.I.G.
could do completely many of the things they required, and
would eventually find that it was best to rely on C.I.G.
MR. EDDY
send to State the said ilitaryeandunaval~~intelligencearequired byuld
the diplomats. y
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GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that if G-2 had an insight into
State's needs, G-2 could incorporate those needs into its docu-
ments. If all agencies sat down with C.I.G, to find each
others' needs, each agency could produce documents containing
all the essential elements in its field of primary responsibility
that any other agency needed to extract and pass to its operating
officials.
MR. EDGAR felt that would mean that C.I.G. would devise a
format of a national intelligence handbook to meet the
individual requirements of each of the agencies.
GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that was not quite what he in-
tended. Rather, if C.I.G. would find out what military intelli-
gence State needs, then C.I.G. could arrange that G-2 include
these needs in its documents.
GENERAL VANDENBERG felt that a further step was involved.
He thought that General Chamberlin was tallcint; about weekly and
daily reports, whereas the subject paper was concerned with the
preparation of basic handbooks for use by all agencies. The
question was whether C.I.G. should produce these handbooks, or
ask each agency to produce appropriate sections of them.
GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he preferred the latter
arrangement. He noted, however, that the present JANIS covers
only a part of the basic intelligence required.
ADMIRAL INGLIS enumerated the following fields which he
felt should be studied by the conulittee proposed in the basic
paper:
1. Establishment of elements which are susceptible of
operation by C.I.G.
2. Proposed organization for the operation of such ele-
ments by C.I.G.
3. Space requirements.
4. A time schedule for the steps involved in taking over
by C.I.G.
5. Standard filing system and central library, standard
report form, and form for intelligence directives.
6. Method for responding to urgent requests.
GENERAL SANFORD felt that each agency should retain its
own group to prepare reports, but that the basic material would
be easier to work on if it were integrated by C.I.G.
ADMIRAL INGLIS thought that each agency should retain
responsibility for operational intelligence and for collection
and. dissemination. He felt the place that C.I.G. could. be of
most help would be in the processing required between
collection and dissemination. He felt that each agency must
retain a staff to disseminate and to put material into the
final form desired by its customers. He thought that each
agency should assist in obtaining the basic intelligence informa-
tion for C.I.G.
NR. EDDY and GENERAL SAP ORD said that they were in favor
of the proposal as described by Admiral Inglis.
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GENERAL CHAMBERLIN felt that one other element must be re-
tained in the departments, namely, that the intelligence
officers must always be able to give their commanders an inde-
pendent judgment,
GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that each agency should not be
excluded. from getting; information through their field representa-
tives on subjects outside of the field of its primary interest.
GENERAL SAM FORD agreed that each agency should be able to
exploit all sources available to it.
GENERAL CHAMBERLIN reiterated that it was necessary for
each agency to retain independence of judgment.
ADMIRAL INGLIS said that this should be satisfied. by each
agency having its own people in C.I.G. He felt strongly that
when naval officers were assigned to C.I.G. they were still
naval officers and responsible for seeing that C.I.G. gets all
necessary naval information and that the Navy gets all C.I.G.
intelligence of interest to it.
GENERAL VANDENBERG added that naval officers in C.I.G.
should also ensure that C.I.G. estimates have the proper naval
slant.
ADMIRAL INGLIS felt that If this was understood, the con-
cern of each intelligence head regarding responsibility to his
chief, was largely obviated.
MR. EDDY said that State would be willing to cooperate if
C.I.G. produced documents the use of which was permissible
but not mandatory. If the subject proposal, however, lead to
referring State Department requests to C.I.G. for preparation,
he felt this would be a dangerous practice.
ADMIRAL INGLIS said that one of the problems is that, if
personnel is turned over to C.I.G. and the departmental agencies
accept this reduction of their force, they must be assured of
the quick service required by their departments.
MR. EDGAR noted a further step in that, if the primary
responsibility is allocated to another agency, C.I.G. will have
to arrange that the latter agency meets requirements on time.
MR. EDDY reiterated that each agency must retain
responsibility for intelligence of primary interest. What is
passed to C.I.G.. will involve material of secondary interest to
the various agencies.
GENERAL SAMFORD agreed that all agencies must still concen-
trate on intelligence of primary interest.
GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that G-2 does not handle opera-
tional intelligence, but is concerned solely with strategic
intelligence.
ADMIRAL INGLIS agreed that this was also true of O.N.I.,
except that it must retain a skeleton force for mobilization in
case of active operations.
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GENERAL CHAMBERLIN felt that the solution lies along both
lines suggested. Certain activities must be performed in the
departments and other activities should be done centrally when
they are of common interest and can be more efficiently handled
centrally. He did not think that the I.A,B. could Give
definite guidance one way or the other. He felt that each
case must be studied separately.
ADMIRAL INGLIS agreed that the problem could not be solved
at this time, but that a committee must be formed to break the
problem down into its various elements.
GENERAL VANDENBERG said that he would ask for nominations
for such a committee in the next few days. He explained that
the purpose of this discussion was to have Mr. Edgar hear the
viewpoints of the I.A.B. members so that he could guide the
committee's discussions.
THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:
Noted that the Director of Central Intelligence would ask
for nominations for a committee to conduct the study proposed
in C, I; G. 13v ,
4. WAR PLANS FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP.
C.I.G. 1 -
GENERAL VANDENBERG noted the recommendations in C.I.G. 14
and stated that as a general principle he firmly believed that
the personnel requirements. of the C.I.G. should be as fully
mobilized in peace as in war, On that basis he stated that he
would furnish the War and Navy Departments with an estimate of
C.I.G. personnel requirements based on present planning, taking
into account the probable number of Reserve officers assigned
to C.I.G. He stated, however, that at C.I.G.'s present stage of
organization any such estimates should be considered tentative
and subject to substantial revision as the organization
develops.
ADMIRAL INGLIS agreed that all C.I.G. personnel figures to
be submitted at the present time could only be estimates. How-
ever, he wanted to be sure that all Regular Line officers
assigned to C.I.G. would not be frozen in case of an emergency,
He stated that he felt that the Navy Department should have
some assurance that the Regular and Reserve Line officers
assigned to C.I.G. would either be retained in toto or that a
certain number of them would be released to the Navy for sea
duty.
GENERAL VANDENBERG agreed to give the Navy this informa-
tion, and that such information would be based on the best
possible estimation.
GKE 2AL CHAMBERLIN stated that the War Department would
like to have the sane estimate on both Regular and Reserve Army
officers assigned to C.I.G.
I Istated that C.I.G. had already received such a re-
quest and that a reply was being prepared.
Imo. EDDY asked if C.I.G. would try to protect civilians
assigned to C.I.G, in case of an emergency, in order that their
services would not be lost.
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GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that these civilians would be pro-
tected unless they would be of more service to the Government
elsewhere.
MR. EDDY brought out the point that he believed that the
civilians in C.I.G. would generally feel that they should be in
uniform. He suggested that provision be made for retaining
C.I.G. civilian personnel in time of war.
GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that this involved a much longer
range problem and should, in his opinion, be considered at a
later date.
THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:
Noted that the Director of Central Intelligence would fur-
nish to the War and Navy Departments estimates of C.I.G.
miJ.itar_y and naval personnel requirements in case of -mobiliza-
tion.
5. ESTABLISHMENT OF A CHANNEL BEWEEN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
;:J ,D 1N JOI:]~i CIIIy -' a T,
tC,.?,15)
GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that Admiral Inglis had raised
the question of the relationship between C.I.G. and
drtherJoint
Chiefs of Staff. As a result of this, C.I.G.
proposed directive on the subject, which he b,~, eelieveurd hea had s been
aeed
seen by all I.A.B. members. General Vandenberg
that it was his understanding, as a result of inforrial dis-
cussions in the departments by members of the Interdepartmental
Coordinating and Planning Staff, that this proposed directive
was generally acceptable to the I.A.B., and he therefore
recommended concurrence in its suhr.:i"tt_, ' to the N.I.A. and the
J.C.S.
ADMIRAL INGLIS and. GENERAL CHAMBERLINe-tated that this
paper as written was not entirely
stated that it was his understanding that members
of ICAPS had coordinated this paper with representatives of the 25X1
ps.
intelligence agencies of the State, War, and Navy De
ADMIRAL INGLIS said that he was afraid. the Joint Chiefs of
Staff would be embarrassed if N.I.A. approved this proposal
prior to the J.C.S. having-; a chance to comment.
I said that this was merely an attempt to find an
appropriate recommendation for a solution to the problem. He 25X1
also said that this paper, if acceptable to the J.I.C., could
be submitted by them to the J.C.S. prior to N.I.A.'s considera-
tion.
ADMIRAL INGLIS explained that this problem had been
brought up by a J.I.S. request for information on nuclear
energy, which had been prepared without knowledge of the fact
that C.I.G. was also working on this probleE. Hi;-, original
proposal, serve as a staff f:tr the I.A.B., was in-
tended J.1.3.
tended to offer an immediate interim means or coordinating
C.I.G. and J.I.C, activities.
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GENERAL VANDENBERG felt that we should Co the whole way if
an acceptable final solution could be found. He felt that it
might even be desirable for him as an intelli-
tive to sit in on J.C.S. meetings as a non-votinge merber~intorder
to learn what areas of the world were being worked on.
ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that he had the following changes
to suggest in the C.I.G. pa-,Der: He had r
to havin-
the Director of Central In tellir enceas a no
membertofnthe J.I.C.,
but he did not think that any one individual should be
des? ?Hated as chief intelli ;cr_ce adviser to the J, C. S,
GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that for his protection he
wanted some assurance that, if he served both the N.
the
J.C.S., it was clear that only one of them wa; his master. and
GENERAL CELI SERLIN pointed out that the difficultywas that
the Joint Chiefs of Staff must be assured that their priorities
are met. He thought that they would therefore wish to retain
an intelligence organization under their control.
MCI. EDDY suggested a modification of Adriiral Inglis l pro-
posal whereby the J.I.S. would formulate J.C.S. requirements
for intelligence and would transmit them to C.I.G. for
compilation, In this way the J.I.S. would serve more as a
secretariat, and the intelligence would be prcduced by C.I.G.
GENERAL SAIVPORD noted that this would
who could then fulfill
retain
the
J.I.S.
J.C.S. requirements
to give them the necessary priority.
,
if C.I.G. was unable
GENERAL Ca MBEtLIN questioned whether this would be
acceptable to the planners, since he wondered whether they would
be willing to lot an outside agency in on their plans. He
stated. that the J.I.C. even now was still working' on the problem
of persuading the planners to let the intelligence people in on
their plans.
GENERAL VANDENBERG suggested that this problem be deferred
pending further study.
GENERAL CHtVdBEL=N agreed, and said that he would like to
discuss it with General Eisenhower.
THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:
Deferred action on C.I.G. 15.
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