INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00362R000600120001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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u vt ae am 0
Di CtasS ed
Class. Ch d 10: T
flext Review Date: ---
Ruth: HR 70-3
ri tc: y.-/..7 -3L--
The over-all classification of this report
is Top Secret. Portions of the report
are of lower classification and are so
designated.
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CONTENTS
The Intelligence Advisory Committee
The Evolution of the I.A.C.
The Coordination of National Intelligence Estimates
The Coordination of Intelligence Activities
Subordinate Committees of the I.A.C.
Page
14
Appendix A -- Permanent Committees of the I.A.C.
Appendix B -- Selected Actions of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee Exclusive of National
Intelligence Estimates. (Under Separate
Cover)
Appendix C -- Statutory Authority and Basic Directives
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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Chairman -
Mr. Allen W. Dulles,
Director of Central Intelligence
Mr. W. Park Armstrong,
Special Assistant for Intelligence,
Department of State
Major General Arthur G. Trudeau,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
Department of the Army
Rear Admiral Carl F. Espe,
Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
Major General John A. Samford,
Director of Intelligence, Headquarters,
United States Air Force
Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton,
Deputy Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff
Mr. Harry S. Traynor,
Atomic Energy Commission
Representative to the IAC
Mr. Ralph R. Roach,
Acting for Assistant to the Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Secretary -
Deputy Assistant Director for National Estimates
Central Intelligence Agency,
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As presontly constituted, the rntelligenoa .1dvi8o1y C ttee (TAG)
mists of the following officialm
The D3reetor of Central Intelligence,, Chair
The Speo Uslstut fox Intell c a Dent of State
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the r
The Director of Naval IntellUence,
The Direct tor of Intelhigenc, Heacll ,users,, United States Air Force
The Deputy Directo Y for Intel.",ence, The Joint Staff
The Atomic Emrgly Go scion Representative to the IAG
The Assistant to the Direotor, $'edera1 oau of Imrestigatiou
The function of the l&G is to advise and assist the Director of Central
Intelligence in the discharge of his .statute responsibilities (see NSCID l)
THE 3LUTION OF TIM, I.A.C.,
Beginning with General Dommn4 s owl proposals,, in J 3941, it has
alga been considered that a c o ntttee am*osed of the heads of the sevoml
depart nta1 intel li gex agencies pd be an essential element in and p'
for the ooordinaticm of the nations, intelligence effort. In times past;.,
however, there has been considerable eontr r y regarding the proper relati .
ship betwa . such a ac ,ttee and the director of central Intelligence z t Ant
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is, whether the cmasndtteet s function should be to advise and assist a
director individ 2y responsible to higher authority., or whether the comittee
itself sbat d fa i tion as a collectively responsible board of directors, the
directcw being m ly an executive officer responsible to it. These conflicti
ooncepts have been referred to In brief as the principles of individual versus
collective responsibility.
Donovan eti'omgly advocated the principle of i d vid responsibii.ity, but
his concept of an individual "coordinator of strategic InfbzuatIon" mats too
novel and undeveloped to be accepted in 1941. The solution then adopted, =de r
pressure of the mar emergency, was the establishment of a Joint Intelligence
C ittee under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In imitation of the British JIC,
this Co ittee :included representatives of the State Dept, the Board of
Boonomio Shrfare, end.the Office of Strategic Services, as well as the heads
of the th e9 service intelligen3e agencies? but it lacked both the British team
spirit and owl personal leadership and responsibility as was vested in the
British J10 chairman. Wye experience with the hindrances resulting from
diffusion of responsibility in a committee system finally made the case for
the principle of Individual responsibility.
Several plans were proposed for a postwar organization for the coordination
of the national intelligence effort. That ultizately a opted was based on
proposals by Donovan-as modified by the JIC after a bitter internal struggle.
It was subsequently adopted by the JCS, subjected to thorough exudnation by
the Lovett Committee on behalf of the Secretary of War, and recommended to the
S 0RET
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President by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy* in this plan the Din for
of Sentraj. Intelligence (DCZ) was mete responsible to a National Intelligence
Author t r (NIA.) used of the S etaries of State? War? and Navy, and the
cca dttee of heads of depertnenfial intelligence agencies, called the Intelligum
Advisory Board (NAB) was made ezpreasly advisory in its relationship to him.
The prInciple of collective reeponsibi .it r had been stroag2y advocated
before the Lovett Ccr itteep and had been deliberately rejected by it. In
his presentation to the tbaree Secretaries, Lovett had deed that the DCI
should consult the SAB in all Important ratters,, but that he moat himself retain
the- power of d+ecisden, in keeping with his iz~di dun`J. reaponeibili r to the
=At while reporting to the NIA any substantial dissent by axW NAB member.
Stab was the approved doctrine when the Central Ingeligense Group (Glib) was
established pursuant to the President's letter of 22 Je nuary 1946. (See also
NIA Directive No. 1, 8 February 1%b
Ad i 'e-1 Souers, the first Director of Central Intelligence, fully under-
stood the Lovett doctrine. At the same t13x he was careful to cultivate the
goodwill and cooperation of the 10 members. He consulted fully with them,
but, irAsmuch as few plane for ooordii ation and no national intelligence
eatimtea more produced dewing his brief tenure? no firm precedents in DCI-.TA
relations were set.
General Vandenberg succeeded Admixel Sonora as DCI in June 1946. He was
determined to make CIG an indepeuedent, self-.auftioient intelligence agency as ,
in the process to reduce the dental agencies to man unite restricted
a 3 r
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to technical tatters of exclusively departmental interest. This determination
brought bin into conflict with the tembora of the ,AA, whose rice bass were
to be broken. The Issue Game to a head in Vandenberg' a proposals that he be
authorired to engage in independent intelligence research at his disoretLcn
and to act as tttive agent of the NIA In ooordinating and supervising the
departmental agencies. Vandenaberg bad to forego executive supervision of the
departmental agencies, but otherwise he did obtain friom the NIA. substantially
the authority he wanted. (See NIA Directive No. 5, 8 duly 19 Thereafter
he p eeded to build up CIG in competition with the departmental agencies
and with scant regard for the lAB.
Such to the state of affairs while the National Security Act of 191*7
was in preparatioua. The Act established the Cwtval Intelligence Agency as an
independent agency under the direction of the National Security Council. It
made the Director of Central. Intelligence ooleiy responsible for advising the
NBC in intelligence matters,, m%kWg ree endati one to the NBC for the coordination
of Intelligence activities, preparing national intelligence estimates, and
pert ag such other services as the NSC might direct. The Act intentionally
made no reference to any c oimnittee analogous to the l8. Under its terms,,
subject to NSO direction,, any consultation with the heads of the departmental
agencies would be a natter of the Direotor's own convenience and discretion.
It may be noted parenthetically that the National Security Act of 1947 also
omitted. any reference to the Joint Intelligence Cote ittee, or to any intelligence
function in the JOS and Joint Staff. The JIG owes its continued existence to
the discretion exercised by the JCS in organizing the Joint Staff. The conflict
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between the principles of individual amd collective responsibilli ty arose in
that connection also. An attempt was made to establish individual reaponsibUity
by the designation of a Deputy Director of the Joint Staff for Intelligence
in charge of the Joint Intelligence Group. However, ins s ch as the work of
the Group was subject to the review and ate. of the JICs the principle or
collective responsibility prevailed there and the Deputy Director for Intca1..
igence bec In effect an executive officer responsible to the JIC as a
board of directors.
Admiral Hill n1 oetter relieved General Vandenberg an Director of Central
Inte lligea ce on I May 1947. Raslising that Vanden?'s embattled relations
Frith the I0 had been harmful to proper coordination of the national Intell-
igence effort, Hillenko?tter vo1imtari3r sought and obtained the revocation of
NIA Directive No. S. He hoped thereby to restore mutual confidence and
eaoperatIo n. However, certain members of the IAD (Admiral Ica lee and General.
Chamberlain) took advantage of b le conciliatory attitude to press for esUblish-
ment of the principle of collective responsibility in the drafting of NSC
Intelligence Directive No. 1. The ensuing cemtroversy became so intense that
Hulenkoetteur requested the I ntervmtion of the Secretary of Defense. Mr,
Forrestal very forcefully inoth cted his subordinates on time point, and con-
sequently 11SCID-1 was draw up on Admiral Hi11e -ettur's terms.
NNSCID-1 establishes the Intelligence Advisory Cow ittee as It is presently
constituted. In consonance with. the National Security Act Itself, it leaves
the Director of Central Intelligence sole]y responsible for the advice,
r dati one, and intelligence which he submits to the NSO, and for the
SbyRET
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other services which be performs. It does require, however, that he consult
with the 1AC with respect to his recommendations and estimates in order to
obtain their concurrence or to report any substantial "dissent.
Despite this further authoritative decision on the issue of individual
versus collective responsibility, Admiral Hi lenicoetter's relations with the
IAC remained strained, his . antagonists having been convinced against their will.
Certain practices and procedures which he had inherited (see below) continued
to produce friction with the departmental agencies, and, in the circumstances,
he was unable to ameliorate the situation without compromising his authority
and responsibility under the Statute and NSCID-1. Thi a he was not willing to
do. Consequently he came to make no more use of the IAC than NSCID-1 absolutely
required.
The continuation of this unsatisfactory situation caused the NSC to establish
the Dulles .Corea-Jackson Study Group to look into the matter and recommend
remedial action. The Group's report, dated 1 January 1949, was highly critical
of CIA, attributing the Agency's shortcomings primarily to the Director's
failure to enlist the cooperation and participation of the IAC with respect to
both coordination and estimates. The report contained one internal inconsistency.
The section on coordination stressed the Director's obligation to exert leader-
ship and recognized the function of the IAC as advisory,, but that on estimates
espoused the doctrine of collective responsibility.
The DCI and the members of the IAC were invited to comment on the Dulles
Report and did so,, the IAO members seizing the opportunity to renew their drive
to establish the principle of collective responsibility. The NSC found that
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it could not readily digest the eu .ati ve volume of controversial literature,,
It therefore requested the Secretaries of State and Defense to prepare a
succinct action paper for is consideration.
'11* Secretaries, report, MC 50, 1 July 1949, was acts prepared by
Gene, ft%rney. It held that, under more forthright leadership by the DCI,
the I11G should participate more actively In the coordination of 'lnte111gezacs
activities and the adoption of national Intelligence estimates, but only as
an advisory body. It again essly rejected the doctrine of collective
responsibility. It was NBC 50, not the Dulles Report, whin h the fiz y
adopted as direction to the DM.
Mven this did not solve the problem ibr the DOI and the I C Hound them.>
ielvrea unable to agree regarding the implementation of NSC 50. On the ground
that HSC 50 had been systernticallyr frustrated? the members of the LAC were
active y -preparing a now approach to the NBC designed to advance the cause of
collective responsibility when Admiral R s+nkoetter was relieved as DCI and
General Bedell Smith was called to take his place.
At his first meeti with the IAG, on 20 October 1950, General Smith
announced a new +a in IC.-lAG relations, stressing the necessity of active
collaboration and collective Judgment. To some of those present his remarks
may have sounded :hike are, acceptance of the principle of collective responsibility.
On another occasion, however,, when an exuberant member of the IAC referred to
it as a board of directors, General. Smith out hit short;,; reminding him and his
colleagues of the individual responsibility and authority of the DOI. General
Smith had the personal prestige necessary to nintain his leadership and individual
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aamendcd if naecetiasaary, and adopted at meeting of the DCI with the M. In
Mariann love coordination the DCI' as representative would have the po r of
d eoision with respect to the text to be a:u i ttsd, taking into account the
views of the departmental rep roaseratatd ve s . annd ensuring that divergent opinions
on substantial issuee were duly reported with the aadopted texto The Director
would exercise the S=@ power of decision at his level, taking into considm
oration the advice of the IAB and reporting in the published ess to any di-
vergent opinion on a asubaitantial iss v The CIa, however, was never able to
produce an estfi to during Admiral Soue3rs n time, so that this contemplated
procedure was rover eabliahed in practice o
The initiative in departing from this originally intended procedure io
attributable, not to Genera]. Vandenberg, but to the lAB itself, although its
members wars undoubtedly influenced by the hostilities which had already do-
velopeed over i Directive No. S. First, IAB mews demanded that Vanden
berg make his estimators stop calling for contributions from their overworked
staffso Then the lAB representatives refused to attend conferences with CIQ,
resorting instead to written ca nt on draft estimates. These devolo ents
eopelled CIO to rely pri erily upon its own intelligence research, precluded
the possibility of reaching a consensus in joint discussions and reduced the
coordination process to a solicitation., by mail, of concurrence, w ent, Or
dissent from a ncieas whose interest was ossentia l y negative (to pant
any GIG action poesi prejudiciaal to their own interests) rather than posi-
tivo (to mako a constructive contribution to the development of an authori-
tative nationaal. eati mate) o To complote tI ruin, General Vaa nberge as
9
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relations with the IM warn such that he navor submitted an eatit ate to con-
sideration at a meting with the IAB CIG, in effect, abandoned its omission
as coordinator to beco a costing fifth intelligence agency, perhaps nor*
objective than others because of its freedom from departmental policy bias,
but under a peculiar obligation to su i:t its product to the critioi of Its
coa petitorso The procedure of "coordination" which evolved in these oirc --
stances could hardly have been more rigid, indirect,, cumber-sons, and sterile.
The result was neithar true in spendence of action and judgment nor a truce:
collective effort in the national interest.
This situation was improved to some extent during Admiral Eill nkostter ? s
time, but the basic pattern ramained unoh do Under the terms of DCID-3/1,
8 July 19W), CIA. undertook to notify the IAAC agencies of projects undertaken
by request or on its own initiative It might or might not request contri -.butionso In dui course draft estisates, usually based for the most part on
CIA's own research, were submitted to the IAC -agencies for written comsent
Divergent views revealed by such comments were discussed with representatives
of the agent 4.as concerned. Ultimtel y CIA submitted a final draft to the
memabere. of the TAG for their written concurrence or dissent. The I AAC never
seat to discuss the Aubetanca of an estimate o
Within this fr vork, CIA. parconnel often made earnest and laborious"
efforts to achieve a true coordinations At the working level there was con.
eidlerabl a consultation and cooperation with regard to terms of reference,
contributions., and preliminary draftso The most thorough working level
coordination, ho ver' gave no assurance regarding final action at the IAC
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level. The entir process rya ::ad discourng ngly involved, tip?consMjing,
and sometina futile. Nevertheless, CIA did produce, during this period, a
considerable body of estimates as well coordinated as today. About
threemfovrtha,: of then had the full concurrence of all nmbora of the IAC..
In most other cases, the dissents wore similar in number and kind to those
now published. There were, however.. a few cases of spectacular failure in
coordination.
A wore significant consequence of the difficulty of the coordination
pro coos was an increasing tendency on the part of CIA to divert its effort
from the production of coordinated estimates to the production of uncoordi-
nated current intelligence publications and miscellaneous research reports.
This tendency undirected and largely unconscious but was basically pro-
determined by the organizational and functional structure which General Van-
deenbarg had purposefully created. It a1sr sd anew the IAC agencies, as-
pe,cially State, and was severely condannod by the Dulles Reports No effective
action was taken In the matter, hustever, unti1 the coming of General Smith,,
when the entire process of estimates production and coordination wan completely
trafad,
The organization and procedures established by General Smith and new in
effect am essentially a return to the concept held by Admiral Scnsra at the
beginni . The Office of National. Estimates, the responsible office within
CIA, is wed of the Board of National Estimates, a + .l coup of senior
officials distinguished for pertinent oaperienco and aptitude (e0g., Dr.
Sharman Kent, Ideuta General Harold mill), and a ama31, select supporting
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et 'f, Tim Office hau no other i tion than the drafting and cocxdit atien
of ratio ml inte;L ene est&mateea The p oedin' of coordination is
out-
Umed in ID 315, I apt r X3534 The aatitsaatea prodvatio prog Is
d loped by the Board in aomMIlIzatim w th XA-0 re sentativw% and is
adopted tV the IAC Mm estimates are dratbad by t on the baste of
awoa *r buticns rece i ed : the IA4 egeneis pursuant to agreed tares of
reference and are t orougM meted at stings with l rep sentatives
prior to their subdaeicn to the U00 At such aeetingra an diifferenew we
nora a y reao3.ved, but If,,* in the judg nt of the Hoards the nature of the
issue requires its, a Bxwd position is taken and divergnt vima are duly
recora ? lAa action on a u eU..coos ted estimate be no mwe than
ratification of the aagreametan reached at the vorftng 3evaL4 than are
unresolved issues, h oer,, the 1AC discus them Adly and either reaoAves
them or else accepts the notat m of a dissenting op .on with understanding
and godU on the part of an concerned,
CATION OF XNMII MM A+CTtVIT S
The developwnt of pro dares for the coordination of ant ligence act3-
vitiers roughly paraal.3.elled that with resymb to the coerdinattoan of out-
=toe. A iLrai. Scuare contemplated fu3]. consultation, with the 3 in such
nattere,, but t bet cone a lost in the aotro ray been Cleneral Virg
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and the over Irective No. 5. Thereafter plane for ooordtr tion
ware duped in CIA with little or no consultation with the deft
ne e, and we a then submitted to a prweee of formal and indi.z*et com,,di
nation l 2 that for tint:eab 'inl UB lion. s nu many. obtained
by the mares of 'feting a lip . Actual IkB tinga to e.scues such matters
~ o ram,* mast vwe cue aaie .3 hail, as they per a to consider
~tea~
The D a to $ e f'f for the i epar?ation of such p vas celled SAPS
(jntw 1 to l Coordinating and nn ing Staff). It was composed of
peen domed from the. s ral Departments} but represented the I etor
rather than the in apWies Daring General Vandenb rg la time the TAB
OUSW xily es blished ad hoc co ttsa to deal, with ICAPS in WoUcular
a. At Adalral Bille soetterza requests a Standing Corn nittee of the TAO
etablched in lieu of the ad hoc c+ ;tteea,, but that made. no appreciable
differen , In either owe., OIL (=&J~S) was c onted by the TAC representativw
in battle arrsW and theme no co on approach to the solution of eamwn
p le' in the n .tonal interest,
As with reaapoet to ea aatee,; General Smith abolished her predecessors'
e rang ants and established a small office,, the Office of intelligence
v ration clearly i gral to CIA and re resit to him, to some as
hie a' in the dopnnt of PlAma for the coordination of intelligence
SST
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aeti. tiea, t to do so in close ooMboratic z with L40 ropa^es tivea e
'GI s *Moe also served as the TAC a wreta4at. In effect its head, an
C se-zee-tary, famed vax .oue ad bee avmitteoa to deal with partioular
pr ob1.cas, as the Z might direct,, and then served as their chaff n0
The office consisted on2y of kJjwaU and am or two assistants*
Eby, in r ogolfton of the fact that 1kG mew re pooftr.-
ently concerned with the cc ide3ratian of national intelligence eest to s
a d related matters., the TAC secretaryship was reassigned to the Depay
Asstl Dire otor for National tinaates and OZC''s cocas i.nating function
a p ?.sl ware transferred to the Dirsetores Special Assistant for
Planning and G rftmtione
81L RDIUM. COMM"MS C*' T&E I .M.
Fad the a -ti .Dg coordination of certain intelligence activities, the
] CI have established tan p ent cca aittsee o eed of represez .
tivos of CIA and of other agencies, as appropriates Thwe f of .ows a list of
theme committees, With the dates of their establishment.
Joint At .o rgy Intelligence Cc .ttee (JAM) 31 fiber 191s?
lntaarc metal C .tteo far the Inpl ntatLon
and Coition of N ]l 7 12 ftbruary 1948
Nis Cemittee
. 14
19118
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