REPORTING ON TEST ICBM AND SPACE VEHICLES
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85S00362R000600070008-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
6
Document Creation Date:
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
May 5, 2003
Sequence Number:
8
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 17, 1958
Content Type:
MF
File:
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Body:
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Appr yed For Release 2003/05/27
IAC -D -124
17 July 1958
Limited Distribution
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: Reporting on Test ICBM and Space Vehicles
At the 15 July meeting Mr. Dulles referred briefly to the
proposal which is outlined in the attached memorandum. We
expect to place this matter on the agenda of the IAC meeting now
scheduled for 22 July.
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Approved For Ref 2@B(W ITC1
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Approved Fo'elease 2003/05/27 : CIA-
6000600070008-0
IAC-D-124
17 July 1958
Limited Distribution
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of the Director
MEMORANDUM FOR : Intelligence Advisory Committee
SUBJECT : Reporting on Test ICBM and Space Vehicles
1. As. a result of the great interest and publicity on the Soviet
test ICBM and satellite firings last fall, the intelligence community
has attempted to provide information'.before launch of such research
and development firings.
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3. Of far greater importance to the intelligence. community
are. the detailed studies of the Soviet guided missile and space
programs. The emphasis on current reporting of the research and
development test aspects has seriously retarded these analyse,
particularly because of the burden placed on GMIC and NSA analysts.
Relaxation of the present requirement that the probable imminence
of a launching be reported immediately would not only permit a more
defini,ive statement of the importance of each launching, but would
permit a much better over-all evaluation of the programs.
4. Consequently, without change in the collection effort, the
intelligence community should plan to(reduce the emphasis on current
reporting of the research and development activity at Tyura Tam.
As a result, the intelligence community would not necessarily be
advised beforehand that a Soviet launching was imminent; however,
shortly afterwards some information would be available concerning
any attempted launching or similar activities, which information
would be appropriately reported. Of course, in some cases we might
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Approved For Release? /0S ,': P85S00362 000600070008-0
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Approved Foelease 2003/05/27 : CIA-1 PP8990036 Ij L_
000600070008-0
IAC -D - 124
17 July 1958
Limited Distribution
not know from COMINT until one to three days after launching the
type of vehicle launched or the degree of its success or failure;..