LIST OF REPORTS AND MEMOSJUNE RECOMMENDING CERTAIN RESTRICTIVE MEASURES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00362R000500100001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 69
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 14, 1954
• Content Type: MF

Next 2 Page(s) In Doc
ument Denied
FBI review
completed.
DOS and NSC review(s)
completed.
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iit June 195
P.U!i,IORANDTFA FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Recommended 1AC Action on IIC-ICIS Report of
1 June Recommending Certain Restrictive Measures
on Soviet Bloc Representatives in US
1. Problem: To determine mechanics and allocate responsibilities
for preparation of the JA.C comments to the NSC on this paper.
2. Director of the FBI and the Chairman of the ICIS consider
the matter to be very urgent and wish to bring it to the NSC at the
earliest possible opportunity. After some difficulty General Cutler
agreed to give the IAC two weeks to formulate its views. Therefore,
IAC action on 29 June is indicated.
DD/I
to
lDCI
4. Retaliation Estimate: This should be prepared in the first
instance by ONE in collaboration with OIR in the form of a National
Estimate covering the likelihood of Soviet retaliation, its probable
nature and the effect on the over-all US foreign intelligence effort of
such retaliation.
Recommendation: That ONE prepare terms of reference
for the foregoing estimate using Appendix D, "Comments by State Member,"
as a guide and that through the usual inter-agency procedures the draft
estimate be submitted for ?AC consideration on,2Q June.
FBI review
completed.
DOS and NSC review(s)
completed.
SECRET
ROBERT AMORY, JR.
Deputy Director/Intelligen 4e
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IAC-D-83
9 June 1954
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
NSC Request for Report and Estimate as to
Probable Effects of Restricting Bloc Representatives
1. Transmitted herewith is an 8 June memorandum from
the Executive Secretary, NSC, to the DCI, levying subject re-
quest, The referenced IIC-ICIS report of 1 June was dissem-
inated to the IAC members by the NSC Secretariat on 8 June.
2, Mr, Dulles proposes to discuss at the IAC meeting
of 15 June procedures and actions to be taken in response to
this request. IAC members are requested to initiate immediate
agency consideration of the basic IIC-ICIS report.
Secretary
IAC
D-8.
SECRET
IAC-D-8.3
9 June 1954
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Tab A to
IAC-D-83
C-O-F-Y 9 June 1954
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Washington
June 8, 19 54
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Restricting Diplomatic and Official Representatives
of Soviet Bloc Countries in the United States in
Connection with Strategic Intelligence
In accordance with the recommendation contained
in the second paragraph of the enclosed memorandum from the
Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and the
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security,
the enclosed IIC-ICIS report is referred herewith with the re-
quest that you furnish, in conjunction with the members of the
National Security Council:
Intelligence Advisory Committee, for the information of the
/ s / James S. Lay, Jr.
JAMES S. LAY, Jr.
Executive Secretary
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9 June 1954
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June 14, 1951
Mr. James S. Lay
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
Washington, D. Co
Dear I[r. Lay:
RE: Restricting Diplomatic and Official
Representatives of Soviet Bloc
Countries in the United States in
Connection with Strategic
Intelligence.
Enclosed is a report on the above subject which has been
prepared in response to your memorandum of April 21, 19511, on the
Covert Acquisition of Strategic Intelligence information (Unclassi-
fied) by Soviet Embassy Representatives in the United States. The
report was prepared by a joint ad hoc group of the IIC and ICIS,
and is approved by both of the internal security committees, with
the Department of State dissenting. The State Department position
is set forth in Appendix D.
It will be noted that the first of the "Cpnelusionsit in the
report consists of the recognition of a threat to the United States
national security resulting from the recently increased collection
of strategic intelligence by Soviet Bloc representatives, which is
summarized, in Appendix A.
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With regard to Recommendation )4(a), for the reactivation of
the program on voluntary protection of technical information within
the Department of Commerce, it should be noted that, because of the
requirement for submission of the report by June Lt, 19541, the rec-
ommendation was not formally coordinated with the Department of
Commerce. Likewise, Recommendation 4(c), for the establishment
under the administration of the Department of Commerce of an
"Interdepartmental Committee on International Exchange of
Publications" and of an "Advisory Committee on Technical and
Industrial Information" was not formally coordinated with that
Department.
Sincerely,
J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence
Conference
Thomas J. Donegan
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security
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e
REPORT
TO
TIlE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE INTERDEPARIl'.L 7TAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE AND
THE INTERDEPARTiIEITTAL COM MITTEL ON INPa1RNAL SECURITY
RESTRICTING DIPLOMATIC AND OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVES
OF SOVIET BLOC COUNTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES IN
CONNECTION ".'ITH STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE
JUNE 1, 1954
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TABLE OF Ca M=S
P e
Statement of the Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2
Facts Bearing on the Case . . . . . * . . . . . . 2-4
Methods of Solution
Restriction at the Source , , . . . . . . . . 5
Voluntar- Restriction by Distributors cnd
Salespeople . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Further Restriction of Soviet Bloc Repre-
sentatives . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . 5-6
Discussion . . , . . . . . . * . . . . . . . . . . 7-11
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Examples of Unclassified Strategic Intelligence
Being Obtained in the U. S. by Soviet Bloc
Country Representatives . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix A
Summary of Travel Restrictions Applicable to
American Representatives in Soviet Bloc
Countries and to Soviet Bloc Representatives
in the United States . . . . , . . . . . .
Appendix B
Current Regulations Applying to Photography and
Sketching by Foreign Representatives in the
Soviet Union . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix C
Cements by Department of State Member , . ? , , Appendix D
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W S E C R E T *Wf
June 1, 1954
REPORT
TO
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
BY
THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE AND
THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY
ON
RESTRICTING DIPLOMATIC AND OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVES
OF SOVIET BLOC COUNTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES IN
CONNECTION WITH STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE
To restrict to the greatest degree practicable the acquisition
in the United States of UNCLASSIFIED strategic intelligence materials
by diplomatic and official representatives of Soviet bloc countries.
DEFINITION
As used herein, "publicly available unclassified strategic
intelligence materials" refers to aerial maps, aerial photographs
and mosaics, topographical maps, geodetic maps, similar special-
ized maps, city plans, published studies of technical Government
or Government-sponsored research projects, and like material, which
may be obtained openly in this country by purchase or request
and which singly or in combination are particularly susceptible
to use by the intelligence agencies of unfriendly nations in
support of strategic military plans directed against the
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United States. This does not Include newspapers, periodicals,
books, technical journals, general purpose maps, and other
published material which are normally commercially available.
1. FACTS BEARING ON THE CASE
1. The diplomatic and official representatives of the
Soviet bloc countries in the United States have overt ready
access to publicly available UNCLASSIFIED strategic intelligence
materials.
2. Tha overt acquisition of these materials by Soviet bloc
representatives has been intensified in recent months.* It is
apparent that emphasis is now being placed on the collection of
these materials and particularly aerial maps, aerial mosaics
and aerial photographs, which have direct application to the
selection of bombing targets or the guidance of hostile aircraft
to such targets in the united States. This information in its
basic form is unclassified. However, when collected, compiled
in substantial quantities, and analyzed, the results are
strategic intelligence which is kept in United States files as
highly classified concepts of the strategic vulnerability of
the United States. The overt acquisition of this material
represents a threat to our national security.
3. Voluntary refusals by private American distributors
and salespeople to make the more evident strategically significant
*Examples of this activity are contained in Appendix A.
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materials available to known Soviet bloc representatives represent
a potentially important means of limiting this overt collection.
However, the utilization of such voluntary cooperation is at
present seriously hampered by the difficulty experienced in
distinguishing Soviet bloc representatives from the general
American public. They are not now required to identify
themselves as Soviet bloc representatives and evade doing
so whenever possible. On at least one occasion, Soviet bloc
representatives evaded identifying either themselves or their
unmarked offices in which they were receiving American visitors
who came there at the request of those representatives. This
has frequently resulted, in the assumption by the American
distributors and salespeople that the persons with whom they
are dealing are in fact American citizens, a misunderstanding
which is frequently encouraged by misleading statements and
titles, particularly in correspondence, by the Soviet bloc
representatives.
4. Generally speaking, Soviet bloc representatives
are permitted to travel freely throughout the United States
subject to varying requirements of prior notification or
permission for travel beyond specified distances from
Washington, D C., or New York City. These requirements
have been applied by the Department of State to correspond
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W SECRET `om
to travel requirements imposed on American repre-
sentatives in the Soviet bloc countries. Thus far, it has not
been deemed desirable or feasible to extend such reciprocal action
to the prohibition of Soviet bloc travel in specified "off-limit"
areas or cities although the travel of American representatives
in some Soviet bloc countries, particularly the Soviet Union,
is limited in this fashl6n. Since June, 1953, Soviet bloc
restrictions placed on the freedom of travel of American representatives
have been significantly reduced. At the present time, American
representatives do not have access to approximately thirty-four
per cent of the territory of the Soviet Union as compared to appro-
simately eighty per cent which was not accessible to United States
representatives prior to June, 1953.*
5. Comparable types of strategic intelligence materials are
not available for overt collection by American representatives in
the Soviet bloc countries. It was not possible for the ITC and the
ICIS to compare the strategic intelligence materials being obtained
in this country by Soviet bloc representatives with information
which is overtly obtained in those countries by U. S. representatives
inasmuch as the State Department representatives did not submit a list
of the types of information being obtained by U. S. representatives
although specifically requested to do so.
*Appendix B contains a summary of the appropriate travel
restrictions applied by Soviet bloc governments, and
reciprocally, by the United States Government.
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II. METHODS OF SOLUTION
1. Restriction at the source: Controls over the publi-
cation or dissemination of the presently unclassified and
publicly available strategic intelligence materials would
greatly simplify and lessen the problem of their direct overt
acquisition by Soviet bloc representatives in this country.
In order to be completely effective, this would necessarily
have to take the form of classification, screening and/or
actual censorship, of such scope and magnitude as to be
not feasible under present legislation and peacetime Government-
public-private relationships.
2. Voluntary restriction b distributors and salespeople:
As previously noted (1?3), this method represents a potentially
important means of limiting direct overt collection. This
potential could be realized if some form of appropriate "public
education and guidance" were supplemented by steps to insure that
Soviet bloc representatives could be readily identified.
3. Further restriction of Soviet bloc re resentatives:
The overt collection of publicly available unclassified strategic
intelligence materials by Soviet bloc representatives can be
halted, limited or controlled by formally notifying the missions
of those countries of appropriate restrictions, limitations or
prohibitions to be henceforth applied to the activities of their
representatives in this country. This might take the form of
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outxight prohibition against the procurement of specified materials,
prohibition against procurement without prior permission, further
travel restrictions, requirements for full identification in all or
specified personal contacts, requirements for full identification
in correspondence, or a combination of one or more of these measures.
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III. DISCUSSION
Regarding Methods 1 and 2, it should be noted that the ICIS in
July 1950 approved a program on the voluntary protection of technical
information. Implementation was undertaken by the Department of
Commerce, within its Office of Technical Services. This was a volun-
tary program whereby business and industry were afforded a central
clearing house to which they could refer inquiries as to the advisability
of publicly releasing technical information. ICIS was notified thati
as of June 30, 1953, the program would not be continued
for budgetary reasons.
In November 1953, ICIS requested the Department of Commerce to
activate a related program, having to do with the control of the
export of unclassified government technical publications to the USSR
and satellite governments. The IOIS proposed that in view of the
functions of the secretary of Commerce in the administration of the
Export Control Act of 1949, an 'tlnterdepartmental Committee on Inter-
national Exchanges of Publicationstu be established within the
Department of Commerce, The Department of Commerce declined to
take action on this request pending ICIS action on an outstanding
proposal for protection of scientific technical industrial and
economic information against publication where prejudicial to the
defense interests of the United States. The outstanding proposal
is for the establishment of an "Advisory Committee on Technical and
industrial Information," which it would appear might well be established
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S E C R E T
under the administration of the Department of Commerce. If these
functions were established under the administrative auspices of the
Department of Commerce, they might include the function of a clearing
house through which Soviet bloc requests (in this country or from
abroad) could be channeled, Such a device would enable us to make
such materials available on a reciprocal basis and might also aid in
presenting the prohibition in a positive light as a "service."
The American public has become increasingly aware of the direct
threat posed to the national security by the activities of Soviet-
Communist agents in this country and frequently shows commendable
initiative in approaching agencies of the Government for advice as --
to the desirability of fulfilling requests or orders received from
Soviet bloc representatives, agencies or "fronts" in the United States
and elsewhere. This initiative can be encouraged by appropriate
public information activities undertaken to promote voluntary
refusals on the part of American distributors, salespeople, and.
the like to distribute or sell certain categories of publicly
available materials to Soviet bloc representatives and agencies.
Channels already exist through which United States industrial:
business and educational establishments could be urged not to make
certain categories of unclassified scientific and technological
materials available to Soviet bloc representatives or agencies.
It should not be overlooked that voluntary cooperation in
this regard by private American individuals and groups can be
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effective only if supplemented by some means of insuring identifica-
tion of the Soviet bloc representatives and agencies in their contacts
with Americans. If certain materials are informally publicized as
Unot for Soviet bloc representatives" the distributors and salespeople
could request identification by prospective over-the-counter purchasers
of those materials. Inasmuch as the making of such requests for
identification would not be practical in correspondence contacts,
proper identification could be effected only by requiring that
Soviet bloc representatives reveal their official status in all
mail communications with American citizens, companies and institutions,
Concealment or deliberate falsification of identity in response to a
direct request would permit formal action to be taken by this Govern-
ment against the Soviet bloc individuals concerned.
The institution of appropriate additional formal restrictions
and limitations on the activity of Soviet bloc representatives in
the United States would constitute the most simple, direct and
effective solution of the problem under consideration* once the
Soviet bloc missions had been notified of these restrictions and
limitations, our Government would be in a position to initiate
formal action against individuals violating the conditions set
forth in the notifications. Similar action could be taken should
Soviet bloc representatives attempt (as anticipated) to obtain
"forbidden" materials covertly through Soviet and American Communist
agents or unsuspecting "third parties."
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The Department of State has emphasized the possible danger
which the further restriction of Soviet bloc representatives would
pose to the continuation of the overt intelligence collection
activities of American representatives in Soviet bloc countries.
The State Department has noted that the risk of precipitating
undesirable Soviet bloc government countermoves, further restricting
the activities of American representatives, would vary according
to the nature of the new restrictions imposed by the United States
and, to some extent, according to the degree of technical reciprocity
reflected by the United States action. Any Soviet countermoves could
be met by reciprocal U. S. action.
No evaluation of the risk posed to United States intelligence
collection activities as a result of restrictions which might be
placed on the activities of Soviet bloc representatives in this
country could be made, because, as indicated above, no information
was furnished as to the quality of intelligence collected by U. S.
representatives in Soviet bloc nations. However, strategic intelli-
gence materials as defined herein are not normally available
commercially or otherwise to overt collection by American repre-
sentatives in the Soviet bloc countries, and the latter are not
permitted to take photographs or make sketches except of completely
innocuous subjects.* Thus, it would seem that the principal objective
__Ippendix C contains the text of and a discussion of the USSR
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Circular Note to Foreign Missions
which sets forth current regulations applying to photography
and sketching by foreigners in the Soviet Union.
S E R E T
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of the present problem might be realized with minimum risk of
"reciprocal" retaliation by denying to the Soviet bloc representatives
only those materials which formally or by virtue of their unavail.
ability are denied to United States representatives in the Soviet
bloc countries. Individual American representatives in Soviet bloc
countries rarely, if every have cause to correspond with Soviet
bloc individuals, agencies or institutions and such correspondence
contacts as may exist have no bearing on overt United States
intelligence collection activities. Therefore, it seems unlikely
that requiring Soviet bloc representatives to identify themselves
properly in correspondence with American individuals, companies,
agencies or institutions would result in unfavorable Soviet bloc
counteraction.
The Soviet bloc representatives in the United States accredited
to or assigned with international organizations have the same oppor-
tunity to collect overtly unclassified strategic intelligence as
other Soviet bloc representatives in the United States. Several
of these Soviet bloc representatives have engaged in espionage
activities. Hence, there is no reason to believe that they would
hesitate to collect overtly unclassified strategic intelligence
materials.
S E C R E T
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IV, CONCLUSIONS
1. A threat to the United States national security presently
exists as a result of the extensive overt collection of unclassified
strategic intelligence information by Soviet bloc diplomatic and
official representatives in the United States.
2. United States representatives in Soviet bloc countries are
unable to secure overtly comparable types of strategic intelligence
due to restrictions which have been placed against them or due to
the unavailability of such material either commercially or otherwise.
3. Some diplomatic and official representatives of the Soviet
bloc countries in the United States are obtaining this strategic
intelligence information without identifying themselves in their
official capacity, by misleading statements, and by the use of
evasion when requested to identify themselves.
4. The United States national security necessitates that
steps be taken to restrict to the greatest degree practicable the
obtaining of this material in the United States by the diplomatic
and official representatives of the Soviet bloc countries.
S E C R E T
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V. RECOMJ1ENDATIONS
The XIC and the ICIS recommend.
1. That all Soviet bloc missions in the United States be officially
notified:
(a) Of the privileges of their diplomatic, official, and
other personnel, including international organizations
and quasi-official agencies, insofar as their obtain-
ing unclassified strategic intelligence information in
the United States is concerned. (For State comment see
paragraph 6, page D-2).
(b) That the official notification include but not be
limited to the applicable types of information
included in the Soviet notification to the United
States of February 11, 195+ (see Appendix B) but
that it oatattionally contain the prohibition of
obtaining this information by any means, including
photographing and sketching. The notification should
include in the list of unclassified strategic intelli-
gence those items enumerated in the definition on
Page 1. (For State comment see paragraphs 5-7,
pages D-2, 3 . )
(c) That the list of types of information to be prohibited
and included in the notification to be given to the
Soviet bloc missions be determined by the Departments
of State, Defense (including the Army, Navy and Air Force),
and Justice.
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(d) That such notification contain the provision that the
deletion from the list of prohibited items will be
considered when and if comparable materials are made
available to, or can be purchased by, American repre-
sentatives in those countries. (For State comment
see paragraph 3, page D-l.) Such consideration for
deletion should be given by the Departments of State,,
Defense (including the Army, Navy and Air Force), and
Justice.
(e) That the Soviet bloc missions be required to have all
their missions in the United States, and any separate
establishments or offices thereof, plainly marked as
such in order that individuals entering those missions,
establishments or offices may be aware of their official
nature. (For State comment, see paragraph 5, page D-6.)
2. That the Soviet bloc missions be officially advised that the
failure of their representatives to reveal their official affiliation
with the mission, or International organization, in correspondence
with United States citizens, companies and institutions, will hence-
forth be considered a violation of the accepted norms of diplomatic
conduct.
3. That travel restrictions on the Soviet bloc representatives in
the United States be on a strict reciprocal basis and that they be
enforced on at least a basis comparable to the restrictions on U. S.
representatives in the Soviet bloc countries. (For State comment see
paragraph 8, page D-3.) In this connection, it is recommended that
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the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice in consultation
with other departments and agencies as appropriate, be directed
to compile a list of areas in the United States from which representa-
tives of Soviet bloc countries would be barred.
4. (a) That the program on voluntary protection of technical
information which was approved by the ICIS in 1950 and
which has been relatively inactive be reactivated
within the Department of Commerce.
(b) That the military agencies and the Atomic Energy
Commission circularize companies and facilities
manufacturing or engaging in research for those
agencies, advising of the practices of these Soviet
bloc representatives, in attempting to obtain
(c)
technical and strategic intelligence with the sug-
gestion that persons requesting information from
those companies be identified and that foreign
officials be referred to the appropriate Government
agency.
That the program for the control of the export of
unclassified government technical publication to the
USSR and satellite governments and the program on the
protection of scientific, technicalr, industrial, and
economic information against publication where pre-
judicial to the defense interests of the United States
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(see page 7 above) be activated under the adminis-
tration of the Department of Commerce.
(d) That when Soviet bloc representatives in the United
States desire unclassified Government documents they
be required to apply at a central office or point.
(For State comment see paragraph 6, page D-2.) This
would enable this Government to refuse these Soviet
bloc representatives any unclassified Government docu-
ment considered to be within the definition of un-
classified strategic intelligence as used herein and
would enable this Government to follow more closely
the requests being made by these Soviet bloc repre-
sentatives with a view to establishing a more realistic
reciprocal arrangement.
(This recommendation is not intended to interfere with the
normal course of business that these representatives have
with the military and State Departments. If approved, it
is recommended that the ICIS be instructed to prepare the
details for this plan.)
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EXAMPLES OF UNCLASSIFIED STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE BEING OBTAINED
-TN ThffU. S . - BY' SOVIET BLOC COUBTRY REPRESENTATIVES
The diplomatic and official representatives of Soviet bloc
countries in the United States have during recent months increased
to a considerable extent their efforts to obtain unclassified
strategic intelligence information. The following examples of
such activities on the part of these representatives will provide
a specific idea of the type of information that is being obtained.
It is to be noted that this information is being obtained without
these representatives revealing their official connections, by
statements which leave an erroneous impression, and in some cases
by outright subterfuge. The national security implications of
the type of information being obtained is readily apparent.
During October, November and December of 1953, representatives
of the Office of theSoviet Military Attache visited Minneapolis,
Minnesota; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Cincinnati, Ohio; and Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. In each city telephone directories were purchased
and oblique aerial photographic maps were either purchased or an
attempt made to purchase such maps. In Philadelphia, in attempt-
ing to purchase a particular map, a visitor's pass was signed
which bore the printed certification that the signer was a
U. S. citizen.
Since August, 1953, representatives of the Office of the
Soviet Military Attache have obtained a total of 127 documents
from the Photoduplication Service, Library of Congress, and the
Department of Commerce, relating to research and experimental
studies on military, industrial, and scientific matters.
During December, 1953, a member of the Office of the
Military Attache renewed his membership in the Society of
Automotive Engineers and during January of 1954 ordered a total
of 58 research papers prepared by the Society on varied topics
relating to the automotive field.
During the period July, 1953, through March, 1954, 48
industrial concerns in the United States, including such concerns
as the Atomic Instrument Company, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and
the Nuclear Instrument Company, Chicago, Illinois, were contacted
by a representative of the Office of the Soviet Military Attache
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with requests for catalogues, pamphlets or brochures concerning
the products of the company.
An attempt was made during March, 1954, by a representative
of the Office of the Soviet Military Attache to subscribe to
the magazine, "The Military Engineer," which subscription was
refused.
Representatives of the Office of the Soviet Military Attache
made an extended trip through New England between July 17 and
July 21+, 1953. They of rained highway maps, street g~.iiles and
pamphlets concerning eccrcnnic, industrial and cultueraL institutions
in Buffalo, New York, and Rochester, New York, They pw'chased
maps of Syracuse, New York; pamphlets and maps of Utica,; New York;
and maps of Scotia and Schenectady. They purchased ma,?g and
street guides of Albany, Monroe County, Northern New gland,
New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Philadelphia and Ticonderoga,
New York.
During October, 1953, representatives of the same office
were observed visiting East Rock Park, Connecticut, which offers
a good view of the city of New Haven, Connecticut, and the
New Haven Harbor. The same representatives were observed making
sketches while visiting locations overlooking the city of
Providence, Rhode Island. They purchased two topographical maps
of Providence, Rhode Island, and observed a radar display at
the Massachusetts Department of Commerce in Boston.
During December, 1953, a representative of this same office
purchased sixteen millimeter motion pictures prepared by United
Films, Incorporated, which films related to Washington, D. C.,
Niagara Falls and similar beauty spots in the United States.
A representative of the Office of the Soviet Military
Attache accompanied by a representative of the Office of the
Soviet Naval Attache during September, 1953, attended the
National Electronics Conference in Chicago, Illinois, and
obtained various literature available. Maps of Chicago and
vicinity were purchased and attempts made without success to
purchase topographical maps. These same individuals purchased
street guides and a Map of Indianapolis while in that city and
subsequently visited Cincinnati, Ohio, where they also purchased
maps and street guides. In October, these two individuals
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attempted, without success, to obtain a map of Wheeling,
West Virginia.
During February, 1954, a representative of the Office of
the Soviet Military Attache obtained b
of Congress microfilm copies of y mail from the Library
Board R arts. 39 reports known as Publication
radio, electroni0esr reports dealt adar, explosives,tehemica]eerei ~ mapping,
other matters. research and
Representatives of the Office of the Soviet Military Attache
in October, 1953, visited Milwaukee, Wisconsin, where they
attempted to obtain aerial and topographical maps of Milwaukee.
They purchased a railway atlas containing
drawing of all United States railw a large sized scale
a map of Milwaukee, the Milwaukee t lephonesdirectorybandnad
large scale map of the Milwaukee transportation system.
During October of 1953, representatives of this same office
purchased five books and pamphlets dealing with Cincinnati, Ohio,
industry and toured the Cincinnati industrial area.
Also during October, 1953, representatives of the Office
of the Soviet Military Attache visited Minneapolis, Minnesota,
where they purchased maps of Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Alaska.
They also purchased 15 oblique aerial photographs of Minneapolis
and St. Paul, Minnesota. They did not identify themselves as
Soviet officials.
On December 8, 1953, the Office of the Soviet Military Attache
attempted through correspondence with eight concerns to purchase
aerial views of the city of Philadelphia taken at a forty-five
degree angle. No Indication was given to diplomatic connections.
The orders were not filled.
On December 23, 1953, a representative of the Office of the
Soviet Military Attache purchased a Masco two station wireless
system.
Attempts were made by this serge office in December 1951,
to obtain aerial maps of the Milwaukee area. Official connections
were not revealed. The order was not filled.
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On April 5, 195+, a representative of the Office of the
Soviet Military Attache without revealing his Soviet connections
purchased 29 aerial photographs of Boston, Massachusetts, and
5 of Newport, Rhode Island. Attempts were made without success
to purchase aerial photographs of New London, Connecticut;
Hartford, Connecticut; and other New England cities.
During recent months a representative of the Office of the
Soviet Air Attache has ordered microfilm copies of 133 reports
from the Publication Service of the Library of Congress. These
reports related to research and experiments in aeronautical
and scientific fields which had been prepared under contract
by the United States Goverment for various branches of the
armed services. These items were not classified.
During October and November of 1953, representatives of the
Office of the Soviet Air Attache traveled to St. Louis, Missouri;
Kansas City, Missouri; Tulsa, Oklahoma; Fort Worth, Texas; and
Dallas, Texas. As a result, they obtained street maps of
St. Louis, Missouri, and aerial maps of Dallas, Texas, and
vicinity; Tulsa, Oklahoma, and vicinity; and Fort Worth, Texas,
and vicinity. They did not identify themselves during this
trip as representatives of a foreign country. Photographs
requested included areas of Dallas, which included the Dallas
Naval Air Station, Hensley Army Air Field, aircraft manufacturing
plants in the vicinity of Dallas and Carswell Air Force Base
in the vicinity of Fort Worth, Texas. The latter photograph
was not obtained.
During recent months, a representative of the Office of the
Soviet Air Attache, without revealing his official status and
using his home or business address, contacted the Library of
Congress, Department of Agriculture; the U. S. Census Bureau,
and the U. S. Geological Survey. He requested aerial maps of
Topeka, Kansas; Los Angeles, California, and vicinity. Other
requests of these Government agencies included microfilm copies
of Publicly available research reports conducted under Goverrmient
contract for various branches of the armed services on topics
including ordnance, electronics, and related subjects. The
material obtained was forwarded to either his residence address
or his business address in Washington, D. C.
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Recently a representative of the Office of the Soviet Air
Attache contacted five firms and identified himself as an
engineer or a Lieutenant Colonel or with no identification
whatsoever. In no instance was his official connection with
the Soviet Embassy revealed. Two instances reflected requests
for classified items on jet propulsion and rocket data and in
one of the instances the correspondence was signed with the
title of Lieutenant Colonel resulting in return correspondence
by the firm involved assuming that he was associated with the
United States Armed Forces.
A representative of the Office of the Soviet Air Attache
was identified in one instance contacting the General Electric
Company, Washington, D. C., where he consistently refused to
divulge his Soviet B4bassy connection until, under persistent
questioning by the firm representative, he admitted he repre-
sented the Soviet Embassy. This same individual has been identified
in ten :+?-istancea submitting requests to industrial firms for Items
advertised in trade journals. He consistently omitted his identi-
fication or characterized himself as an engineer,
During the National Aircraft Show at Vandalic, Ohio, in
September, 1953, a representative of the Office of the Soviet
Air Attache was observed photographing airplanes at the show
including the B-36, B-1+7, PT-l, H-21: X'-85 and I1-19.
During August and September, 1953, representatives of the
Office of the Soviet Naval Attache visited Connecticut and Maine
as well as Chicago, Illinois; Indianapolis, Indiana; and
Cincinnati, Ohio. They obtained maps, photographs, topographical
maps, and industrial data. In Chicago, they attended the
Annual National Electronics Conference and obtained copies of
all literature available.
During a four-month period In 1953, representatives of
the Office of the Soviet Naval Attache placed eight orders
with the Photoduplication Service, Library of Congress, totaling
156 technical documents. In each case the order was submitted
by mail and payment was made by personal check. The total
cost of this microfilm was $397,75. The documents dealt with
such subjects as metallurgy, armor plate, supersonic wind
tunnels, explosives, electronics, and aircraft.
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A representative of the Office of the Soviet Naval Attache
has communicated with a number of firms without revealing his
official status. One such contact was with the U. S. Department
of Commerce requesting that his name be added to the subscription
list of "Synopsis of U. S. Government Proposed Procurement and
Contract Awards."
In September, 1953, a representative of the Office of the
Soviet Naval Attache became a member of the Arctic Institute
of North America without divulging his identity as a Soviet
official. Members receive the publication containing various
articles of a scientific nature having to do with the geography
and life in the Arctic regions. Its research program has been
supported in part through a contractual relationship with the
Office of Naval Research and with other funds provided by the
defense agencies of the United States and Canada according to
a representative of the Institute.
An Assistant Soviet Air Attache directed a letter dated
March 10, 1954, on plain bond paper addressed to RCA, Camden,
New Jersey, signed M. Krylov, 2552 Belmont ttoad, N. W.,
Washington, D. C., (address of the Office of the Soviet
Air Attache). The letter requested information on an RCA
intercommunications system, which is best and. highest fidelity
type used in aircraft. This item was manufactured under
Air Force contract, was recently declassified, but was not
available to the public.
An Assistant Soviet Air Attache on October 19, 1953,
directed a letter to the California Institute of Technology,
signed L. E. Pivnev, Lieutenant Colonel, 2552 Belmont Road, N. W.,
Washington 8, D. C. The letter requested Jet Propulsion
Laboratory Progress Report No. 20-187, a list of reports of
jet propulsion laboratory and a catalog of other engineering
and related publications. The acknowledgement by the California
Institute of Technology indicated copies of Report No. 20-187
were not available and copies of jet propulsion laboratory
bibliography were classified. The acknowledgement indicated
recipient of Pivnev's letter assumed Pivnev was connected
with the U. S. armed forces.
In February, 1951, representatives of the Soviet Embassy
purchased from the Map Information Office, U. S. Geological
Survey, copies of all published topographical maps within a
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radius of 5p miles of Washington, D. C. During April,
16 maps covering the Fort Bragg, North Carolina, area and
all maps available in the vicinity of Raleigh, Durham and
Chapel Hill, North Carolina, were purchased. Also during
April an inquiry at the same establishment was made to
determine if all the published topographical maps in
Michigan, #llianoie and Kentucky could be purchased.
Information was fu,iished that they could be purchased
except for some maps that might be classified. An inquiry
was made, Concerning the classified maps but no information
was furnished. An order for complete coverage of Michigan..
Illinois; and Kentucky was placed and index maps of Ohio,
Texas, Tennessee, and Washington were requested and received
by this Soviet representative.
Lieutenant Colonel Leonid E. Pivnev, Assistant Soviet
Air Attache, contacted a photographer in Washington, D. C.,
and, while using a fictitious name and stating that he
represented a private firm, requested vertical aerial
photographs of New York City, Including the Bronx, Queens,
Manhattan and Brooklyn, the photographs to be on a scale
of 20,000 to 40,000. He made an advance payment of $400 on
an agreed $700 price., Pivnev was tentatively identified
as the individual who purchased 33 aerial photographs of
Washington.. D. 0., and vicinity in early March, 1954. This
individual also desired aerial maps of Chicago, Illinois.
The photographs obtained by him were described as suitable
for mapping or mosaic work and were photographed at a
conversion ratio of 20,000 to one.
Representatives of the Office of the Soviet Military
Attache and the Soviet Naval Attache, while in California
during May, among other things, ordered $80 worth of aerial
photographs from a Los Angeles photography shop covering the
Los Angeles area. They obtained maps of Los Angeles and
Long Beach Harbors and purchased a book entitled, "Southern
California Coast," which contains pictures and maps of the
coast line. They obtained maps of Oceanside, Carlsbad,
San Diego County, the city of San Diego and Southern
California.
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During the Armed Forces Day Parade, military employees
of the Soviet Embassy were observed in civilian clothes
photographing the personnel and equipment in the parade.
Military representatives of the Soviet Embassy visited Bolling
Air Force Base during the Armed Forces Day exhibitions on
May 15 and 16, 1951. They made extensive notes and carefully
and thoroughly took motion pictures of the following items:
"Nike" guided missile, "Matador" B-61 aircraft, "Bare" troop
carrie
F
86
"
r,
-
F Sabre Jet
B-16 F r, F-89D "Scorpion,"
U. S. M-97 tank, "Sky Sweeper" ann
r." I
ditch digging machine of the U. S.~Army Engineer Corps, mobile
radar equipment, USAF radar ground control approach unit,
other military exhibits, and a mock invasion by U. S. Marine
Corps helicopters.
Representatives of the Soviet Satellite countries have
the same access to this unclassified strategic intelligence
as do the Russian representatives. Investigative results
indicate that they are also availing tbemselves of this
information. They are, in addition, purchasing items which
they are not allowed to use in the United States and which
cannot be shipped out of the United States without a license
as required by the Export Control Act of 1918. Such items
include radio station equipment and electronics materials.
Investigative erforts have also indicated that quantities of
this material are apparently being taken out of the United States
in diplomatic pouches.
It is specifically noted that the foregoing incidents
are only examples of the types of strategic intelligence
information which are being collected by Soviet bloc repre-
serrbetives in the United States.
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StTIhiMARY OF TRAVEL RE; TRTCTIONS APPLICABLE
TO AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES IN SOVIET BLOC
COURrTRIi.S AND TO SOVIET BLOC REP I;SENTATIVES
IN THE UNITIID STATICS
Comparison of Soviet-American Travel Restrictions
1. Current Restrictions Imposed by the Soviet Government on
The Travel of U. S. Embassy Personnel in the Soviet Union.
Embassy personnel may not travel more than 40 kilometers from
the center of Moscow without prior notification to the Foreign Office.
In addition, approximately 28 per cent of the total area is offi-
cially off-limits including a number of cities located in areas not
designated as restricted. As a result of this latter limitation,
which frequently renders surrounding "free" areas inaccessible,
approximately 34 per cent of Soviet territory is blocked to travel
by Embassy Officers.
2. CurrAni- ~e4trict'ons Imposed by the United Staf.-es Government
on the Travel of Soviet Embassy Personnel in the United States.
Since March 10, 1952, Soviet official personnel of the Embassy
in Washington, TASS representatives and others who are Soviet citi-
zens assigned for newspaper work in Washington have been required not
to travel to any point more than 25 miles (about 40 kilometers) from
the center of Washington without previous official notification at
least 48 hours in advance. Similarly, Soviet official personnel
assigned to Amtorg may not travel more than 25 miles from the center
of New York City without previous official notification at least
48 hours in advance. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is noti-
fied immediately upon receipt of these notifications.
The current Soviet restrictions, effective June 22, 1953,
represent an appreciable relaxation from their previous Soviet
position. Under the earlier restrictions, effective on January 15,
1952, nearly 50 per cent of Soviet territory was officially off-
limits and approximately 80 per cent was blocked by the restriction
of certain key cities in "free" areas. Instead of banning entire
border areas, the Soviet Government has now specified only the 15
kilometer zone bordering non-satellite countries.
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Embassy personnel made a total of 41 extended trips during
the course of Fiscal Year 1953, a lower figure than normal as the
result of the Embassy's move to a new location. Since the travel
relaxation in June, Embassy travelers have enjoyed a much greater
freedom of travel and have visited such areas as Central Asia,
Southern Kazakhstan and TJ!lestern Siberia. For the first time in
years, they have frequently been able to obtain permission to
travel by automobile. Surveillance seems to be less constant than
previously, and fewer difficulties are now being experienced with
regard to obtaining tickets and accommodations.
It should also be noted that Soviet travel restrictions are
applied to all foreigners in the Soviet Union, inoludin the
personnel of satellite missions.
Coparision of Polish-American Travel Restrictions
1. Current Restrictions Imposed the Polish Government on
the travel of U. S. Embassy Personnel in the Soviet Union.
Embassy personnel are permitted to travel freely throughout
most of Poland. Service Attache personnel must notify the Polish
Army liaison officer three days in advance of each trip outside of
1'Jarsaw.
2. Current Restrictions Imposed by the United States Government
on the Travel of Polish bassy Personnel in the United States.
There are no travel restrictions which apply to Polish
officials resident in this country other than the reciprocal
requirement that their Service Attaches must notify the Department
of Defense three days prior to each trip they make out of the
Washington, D. C., area.
Our r arsaw Embassy personnel do a great deal of'useful travel-
ing throughout Poland with little surveillance attention except for
Service Attaches. No administrative impediments which might be
interpreted as Polish efforts to supplement the virtual lack of
travel restrictions are encountered.
Comparison. of Hungarian-l;merican Travel Restrictions
1. Current Restrictions Imposed by the Hungarian Government
on the Travel of U, S.
Embassy Personnel el in Hungary.
Embassy personnel may not travel outside Pest County (approxi-
mately 20 miles from the center of Budapest) without notification
to the Foreign Office 24 hours in advance of travel. In addition,
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a border strip 30 kilometers wide faein' Yugoslavia and Austria
and certain border counties as a whole are binned for travel by
foreigners. Transit by rail or road to Vienna, Belgrad and
Bucharest is allowed.
2. Current Restrictions Im osed by the United States Government
on the Travel of Hungarian Embassy Personae in the Hite tates.
Hungarian Embassy personnel are required to notify the
Department of State 24 hours in advance of all travel in excess of
40 miles from the center of t?ashington, D. C.
3. Discussion
The pres..nt Hungarian travel restrictions which came into
effect August 10, 1953, represent an appreciable relaxation from
the previous Hungarian position on travel by foreigners. Since
January, 1951, and prior to this August, U. S. official personnel
in Hungary were not permitted to travel beyond a radius of 30
kilometers (approximately 18 miles) from a central point in Budapest
without written authorization from the Foreign Office. Comparatively
few permits were granted for travel wholly within Hungary. Embassy
personnel may now travel quite freely throughout most of Hungary.
This Government's restriction of travel by .Hun""arian officials
in this country was revised on October 13, 1953, to correspond more
closely to the less stringent restrictions applied to Americans in
Hungary since August 10.
Comparison of Czeohoslovakian-American Travel Restrictions
Current Restrictions -Imposed bathe Czech .Government on the
Travel of U~ S. Embassy ersonnvln Czechoslovakia.
Service Attaches assigned to the American Embassy in Prague
are required to notify the Czech Government of the date and
itinerary of proposed trips over 24-hours duration three days in
advance. Except for a few restricted areas, all United States
representatives are permitted to travel freely in Czechoslovakia.
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2. Current Restrictions Imposed by the United States Government
on t e Travel of Czech Embassy Personnel in the United States.
There are no restrictions on the travel of Czech Embassy
personnel in the United States other than the reciprocal require-
ment that their Service Attache notify the Department of the Army
of the itinerary of trips outside of T:ashington two days in advance.
3. Discussion
Areas of Czechoslovakia closed to travel by foreigners include
a narrow border strip, the uranium mining area in Bohemia, and the
sites of military installations.
Comparison of Rumanian-American Travel Restrictions
1. Current Restrictions Imposed by the Rumanian Government on
the Travel of , S. Embassy ersonne n Ruman a.
American Embassy personnel must request permission of the
Foreign Office 48 hours in advance of travel outside the Bucharest
area. According to the present regulation which went into effect
October 15, 1953, travel by train or airplane.is permitted to a
large portion of the country, excepting a 50-kilometer-deep border
zone and certain interior industrial areas. Travel by automobile
is restricted to the Immediate vicinity of Bucharest although
permission may be granted in response to 46-hour prior request for
automobile travel to several mountain resort towns south of
Bucharest.
2. Current Restrictions Imposed b the United States Covernment
on the Travel of nian Embassy ersonne in the Unite States.
Since May 25, 1950, the travel of Rumanian officials in the
United States has been restricted to an area 35 miles from the
boundaries of the District of Columbia. Travel beyond this area
can be undertaken only by special authorization. Such authorization
is rarely granted (or requested) except for trips to and from
New York City.
3. Discussion
Subsequent to May 5, 1949, and prior to October 15, 1953, by
far the greater part of Rumania was closed to travel by foreign
officials resident in Rumania. However, they w ere permitted to
make frequent automobile trips in the area south of Bucharest. The
new regulations, while opening some formerly prohibited areas to
train and airplane travel, virtually ban automobile travel.
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CURRENT REGULHTIO"S APPLYING TO PIJOTOGRh.PHY AND
SKETCHING BY FO IG REPi SENTATIV IN THE SOVIET UNION
The Einistry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR on February 11, 1954,
directed Circular Note No. 42 to all foreign missions in Moscow set-
ting forth the regulations governing photography and sketching by
foreigners in the Soviet Union (see full text below). Noting that in
the past it had been difficult and even dangerous for Americans and
other foreigners to take any sort of pictures in the Soviet Union, the
American Embassy welcomed this circular as a clarification which would
prove helpful and advantageous if the rules therein established were
actually honored by Soviet officials. This has subsequently proved to
be the case, and American representatives in the Soviet Union have
been accorded a correspondingly greater degree of freedom in overt
photography and sketching.
There follows a full translation of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the USSR Circular Note No. 42/pr of February 11, 1954:
The Protocol Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the USSR presents its compliments to the Embassies and
Missions and, in connection with the question of a number of
Embassies and Missions regarding the regulations for photography
on the territory of the USSR, has the honor to state that
according to existing regulations foreign citizens:
1. Are permitted on the whole territory of the USSR,
except points and localities which foreigners are forbidden to
visit, to take photographs and also to sketch architectural
monuments; buildings of cultural, educational and medical
institutions; educational institutions; theaters; museums; parks
of culture and rest; stadiums; streets and squares; living
quarters; and also scones and landscapes in the background of
which there are none of the objects listed below in points "a,"
"b," "c," "d," and "e."
In industrial enterprises engaged in the manufacture of civilian
products, state farms, collective farms and IITS, railroad stations,
airdromes, river ports, governmental institutions, educational
institutions, and social organizations photographs and sketches
may, in individual cases, be made with the permission of the
administration of these institutions and organizations.
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2. The taking of photographs and sketching are forbiddens
a. In the 25 kilometer frontier zone, except for the
places and localities which foreigners are not prohibited from
visiting, where they are permitted to photograph the objects
listed in point 1;
be Of all types of military technology and armaments,
all military objects and institutions and storage places of
combustibles;
a. Of seaports, large hydroelectric installations
(sluices, dams, pumping stations), railroad junctions, tunnels,
railroad and highway bridges;
d. Of industrial establishments, scientific research
institutions, design offices, laboratories, electric power
stations, radio beacons, radio stations, telephone and telegraph
stations;
e. From airplanes on flights over territory of the
USSR and also surface panoramic photographs and sketches of
industrial cities.
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Supplement to Draft Report to the National Securit Council
by the Interdepartmental ntelligence Conference and the
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security on
"Restricting Di lomat c and Of icial Re resen atives of
Soviet Bloc Countries in the United States in Connection
with Strategic_ Intelligence
Comments by Department of State Member
1. The Department of State believes that the severity of the risk posed
to the
activities of American representa-
tives in Soviet bloc countries precludes the imposition of the additional
direct restrictions on the overt intelligence collection activities
of Soviet bloc representatives in the United States as envisaged in
Recommendations 1(e), l(b), 1(c), 1(d), 3, and l(d) of this report.
The Department bases its dissent on the following considerations.
3. The report notes that materials comparable to the "publicly avail-
able unclassified strategic intelligence materials" as defined there and
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available to overt collection by Soviet bloc representatives in the
United States are not available to overt collection by American rep-
resentatives in Soviet bloc countries.
The fact that strictly comparable materials are not available must not be
so construed as to minimize the value of the United States collection
effort.
6. On the other hand, the Soviet bloc states and particularly the
Soviet Union possess networks of agents and sympathizers both in the United
States and in those countries with which this country has broad exchanges,
public and private, of publicly available unclassified information, includ-
ing strategic intelligence materials as defined in this report. There are
many channels through which the Soviet bloc intelligence agencies, through
concealed agents, third parties, third countries and through the domestic
and international mails, can and could obtain publicly available unclassified
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strategic intellio:enoe materials originatintr in the United States. These
channels could and would be used if the overt collection of these materials
by official Soviet bloc representatives in the United States was curtailed.
Restriction of the latter Would amount to little more than a serious
inconvenience,
7. The Department questions whether the strategic intelligence
significance of many of the materials now being: openly collected by Soviet
bloc representatives in this country should not be reassessed in the light
of such revolutionary military developments as the atomic and thermonuclear
weapons. For example, it would seem that the pilot of an enemy bomber now
would need only to locate and to identify a general area, whereas a short
time ago he would have had to be concerned with individual specific targets.
8. Except for the designation of certain cities and areas as "off
limits", this Government's restriction of the travel of Soviet bloc rep-
resentatives has attained a full measure of reciprocity as compared to the
restrictions imposed on the travel of American officials in Soviet bloc
countries. The Department continues to feel that little if anything would
be gained by so designating certain cities and regions of the United States.
It is unlikely that over-all travel by Soviet bloc representatives would be
reduced, but rather that travel in "open" areas would be increased to com-
pensate for the lack of access to the comparatively small "restricted" areas.
Other channels would readily provide the publicly available materials and
other information formerly obtained by direct collection in the closed
Such action would be technically reciprocal. However, this would by no
means preclude anticipated Soviet bloc retaliation in any of a variety of
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means available to them in restricting the travel of foreigners.
Furthermore, the
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designation of ,restricted" cities and areas in the United States
would create a serious problem with regard to this Government+s
public relations with state and municipal organizations.
9. It has not been demonstrated that Soviet bloc representatives
connected with international organizations have engaged in:overt
intelligence collection activities of the sort with which this report
is concerned. Because of the sensitivity of this Governmentss
relationship with these organizations and many of the Governments
represented in these organizations, the Department feels strongly
that Soviet bloc representatives connected with international organi-
zations should not be considered for inclusion in any measures designed
to limit overt intelligence collection activity until such time as
they actually commence such activity on a significant scale.
II. The Department understands the contradiction inherent in the term
"publicly available unclassified strategic intelligence materials"
which results from the informational needs of our democratic society
and the difficulty of imposing and justifying complex censorship and
screening controls in "peacetime." Nevertheless, the Department feels
that "restriction at the source" and, to a lesser extent, "voluntary
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restriction by distributors and salespeople" represent the
only practicable means available of restricting Soviet bloc access to
such materials without precipitating Soviet bloc retaliatory action
contrary to the National Interest. Consequently, the Department
supports the action envisaged in Recommendations 1(e), 2, i(a), 1(b),
and 4(c). In this regard, the following comments are submitted for
consideration.
1. The recommended requirement that Soviet bloc representatives
properly identify themselves in correspondence with United States
citizens, companies and institutions is essential to the effective
utilization of "voluntary cooperation" by American distributors and
salespeople in denying "publicly available unclassified strategic
intelligence materials" to overt collection by Soviet bloc represen-
tatives.
2. Appropriate publicity of this Government's action in requiring
Soviet bloc representatives to identify themselves properly in corres-
pondence would contribute substantially to any "public education"
program aimed at promoting such "voluntary cooperation" in limiting
Soviet bloc access to these materials, either by correspondence or
by direct personal contacts.
3. A formal requirement of this nature would probably be inter-
preted by the Soviet bloc missions as a hint of future action should
their representatives continue to improperly identify themselves in
direct personal contacts with American distributors and salespeople.
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Consequently, the requirement for proper identification in corres-
pondence is likely to effect a reduction of the evasive and misleading
tactics employed by Soviet bloc representatives in their direct,
personal dealings with United States citizens. Furthermore, the
Department is prepared to call to the attention of individual Soviet
bloc missions the improper behavior of their representatives in cases
where there is sufficient documentation to prove deliberate misrepre-
sentation or concealment of identity. Flagrant misrepresentation or
continued deliberate concealment of identity would provide the basis
for requesting the departure of individual Soviet bloc representatives
or for refusing re-entry privileges to them.
4. Certain of the Federal Bureau of Investigation reports eon.
cerning the activities of Soviet bloc representatives have contained
indications that some procedure is already in existence which requires
certain private companies to inform prospective customers that appro-
priate "clearance" must be obtained before certain photographs or maps
can be purchased. If such a procedure is in existence, it should be
possible to extend it to include more of the materials with which this
report is concerned. It would seem that such a procedure would be
particularly suitable for government publications, maps, photographs,
and documents.
Be The Department does not interpret Recommendation 1(e) to
mean that all Soviet bloc missions should be notified that their
various offices and establishments must be properly marked regardless
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of whether or not such offices or establishments are now so marked.
As fir as the Department is aware, there has been only one instance
when the absence of visual identification of a single office may
have led to confusion or misunderstanding on the part of American
visitors to that office. The Department is prepared to take appro-
priate action in individual cases as they arise,
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IAC-D-91 / 3
6 May 1955
(Limited
Distribution)
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMIT TEE
Formosa Straits Problem
1. The question of the frequency of issue of the reports of
the IAC Current Intelligence Group on the Formosa Straits Problem
was referred to the White House pursuant to IAC-M-195, item 2.
2. The Director was assured on 6 May that the reports could
hereafter be issued weekly, supplemented by special reports as
necessary.
3. Accordingly, effective 7 May, the Group will meet only on
Wednesdays, except at the request of one of its members.
Secretary
IAC-D-91 /3
6 May 1955
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IAC-D-91 /2
28 March 1955
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Coordination of Intelligence Activities Regarding
the Formosa Straits Situation
In view of the fact that no meeting of the IAG is planned for
5 April, the attached proposal of the Director of Central Intelligence
has been.added to the Agenda of the LAG meeting scheduled for
29 March.
Secretary
IAC-D-91/2
28 March 1955
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IAC -D -91/2
28 March 1955
MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY CON4ITTEE
.SUBJECT: Coordination of Intelligence Activities Regarding the Formosa
Straits Situation
1. As a meaa.o of providing prompt and authoritative joint current
intelligence summaries to the President and other senior policy-makers
regarding the Formosa Straits situation, the IAC has established the
Current Intelligence Group meeting daily in the Indications Center. The
reports of that group have been disseminated every day since 21 March.
2. The Watch Co?m;iittee has prepared and caused to be disseminated
to field collection agencies, a sharpened list of "indicators" bearing
on this area, as a collection guide. This list will be kept under con-
tinual revision.
5. Accordingly, I suggest that the IAC note the steps being taken by
the military authorities in the area, and the other steps indicated above.
IAC -D -91/2
28 March 1955
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# 101707
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
7 October 1954
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans (OIR)
Colonel Robert O'Brien, USA (G-2)
Captain B. E. Wiggin, USN (ONI)
Colonel. William S. Boyd, USAF (AFOIN-2B2)
Colonel Floyd E. Dunn, USA (JIG)
SUBJECT Evaluation of Evidence Concerning Yugoalav-
Soviet Relations
REFERENCE : IAC-D-90, 29 September 1954
1. In accordance with IAC-D-90, para. 4, we are
forwarding for your information evaluations of certain
evidence concerning Yugoslav-Soviet relations, which were
discussed at a meeting of the Board of National Estimates
and the IAC representatives on 28 September.
2. The evidence presented at that meeting by Major
Pyle falls into three categories: (a) the Raditsa article
in Freeman; (b) statements attributed to pro-Cominform Com-
munists concerning the reasons for the dissolution of the
pro-Tito Communist party in Trieste; and (c) certain FBI
reports.
3. The attached evaluations are as follows: (a) on
the Raditsa article, we have enclosed an evaluation made
by the Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, dated 29 January
1954 (TAB A); (b) on the Trieste matter, we have attached
two articles from the Current Intelligence Digest (TAU B);
and (c) on the FBI reports we have attached an evaluation
of a series of FBI reports which cover much more than just
the Tito matter, but which shed light upon the source's
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reliability. This evaluation was concurred in by several
offices of CIA (TAB C).
L1. These evaluations bear only on the three categories
of evidence specifically raised by Major Pyle. We have not
attempted to evaluate herein the broad mass of other evidence
bearing on the problem.
Deputy Assistant Director
National Estimates
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