LIST OF REPORTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00362R000500030001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 241
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: LIST

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IAC-D-57
Intelligence Deficiencies Revealed in SE-27
(21 Oct 52)
25X1
i/ IAC-D-57/2
Post-Mortem of NIE Production for First Six Months
of 1954 (16 Nov 5L )
IAC-D-57/3 Post-Mortem on NIE 11-6-54: Soviet Capabilities
and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field
(8 Feb 55)
IAC-D-57/4 Post-Mortem of NTE Production for the Period
V 1 July to 31 December 1954 (3wMay 55)
IAC-D-57/5 ~co3. in--~ea~
25X1
25X1
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IAC-D-57/6. Post-Mortems on NIE 63.1-55: Probable Developments
in North Vietnam to July 1956;
NIE 63.2-55: Probable Developments in Cambodia
Through July 1956; and
NIE 63.3-55: Probable Developments in Laos
Through July 1956 (16 Aug 55)
IAC-D-57/7 Post-Mortem on NIE 11-3-55: Soviet Capabilities
and Probable Soviet Courses of Action Through 1960
(16 Aug 55)
IAC-D-57/8 Post-Mortem on NIE 11-7-55: Soviet Gross Capabilities
for Attack on the US and Key Overseas Installations
Through Mid-1958 (23 Aug 55)
IAC-D-57/9 Post-Mortem on NIE 11-5-55: Air Defense of the
Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1955-1960 (23 Aug 55)
IAC-D-57/9.1 EIC Progress Report on Action Taken Pursuant to
Post-I4ortem on Soviet Air Defense Estimate
(23 Dec 55)
IAC-D-57/9.2 Progress Reports on Action Taken Pursuant to
Post-Mortem on NIE 11-5-55, "Air Defense of the
Sino S oviet Bloc, 1955-196O" (17 July 56)
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IsE
IAC-D-57/12
Post-Mortem on NIE 100-5-55: Implications of
Growing Nuclear Capabilities for the Communist
Bloc and the Free World (23 Aug 1955)
Post-Mortem on NIE 10-55: Anti-Communist
Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc
(30 Aug 1955)
Draft Procedure for the Post-Production Review of
National Intelligence Estimates (6 Sep 1955)
IAC-D-57/13 Post-Mortem on NIE 31 Series (7 Sep 1955)
IAC-D-57/14 Post-Mortem on NIE 11-6-55: Probable Intelligence
Warning of Soviet Attack on the US Through Mid 1958,
Dated 1 July 1955 (7 Sep 1955)
IAC-D-57/16 Post-Mortem on NIE 63.1-3-55; Probable Developments
in South Vietnam to July 1956, dated 11 Oct 1955
(18 Oct 1955)
IAC-D-57/17 Post-Mortem on NIE 43-55: The Prospects for the
Chinese Nationalist Government, dated 1 November 1955
(15 Nov 1955)
25X1
25X1
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IAC-D- 7/20
Post-Mortem on NIE 71-55: Probable Developments
in French North Africa (7 Dec 55)
25X1
IAC-D-57/22
IAC-D-57/23
IAC-D-57/24
IAC-D-57/25
IAC-D-57/26
Post-Mortem on NIE 13-56: Chinese Communist
Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action
Through 1960 (5 Jan 56)
Post-Mortem on NIE 12-56: Probable Developments
in the European Satellites Through 1960
(10 Jan 56)
Post-Mortem on NIE 64-56: The Political
Outlook in Malaya Through 1960 (24 Jan 56)
Post-Mortem on NIE 24-56: The Political
Outlook in Italy (7 Feb 56)
Post-Mortem on NIE 142.1-56: Probable
Developments in the Republic of Korea Through
Mid-1957 (7 Feb 56)
25X6
IAC-D-57/28
IAC-D-57/28.1
(Revised)
Post-Mortem on NIE 11-56: Soviet Gross
Capabilities for Attack one US and Key Over-
seas Installations and Forces Through Mid-1959
(20 Mar 56)
SEC Progress Report on Action Taken Pursuant
to Post-Mortem on NIE 11-56 (.4.' Dec .56)
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ac-D-57/29 Post-Mortem on NIE 61-56: Probable Developments
in Burma (10 Apr 56)
IAC-D-57/30 Post-Morten on NIE 88-56: Probable Developments
in Colombia (10 Apr 56)
IAC-D-57/33
Post-Mortem on NIE 100-3-56: Sino-Soviet Policy
and Its Probable Effects in Underdeveloped
Areas (9 May 56)
IAC-D-57/34 Post-Mortem on NIE 51-56: India Over the Next
Five Years (9 May 56)
IAC-D-57/35 Post-Mortem on NIE 100-5-56: Chinese Communist
Capabilities in the Taiwan Straits Area and
Probable Courses of Action Over the Next Six
Months (23 May 56)
IAC-D-57/36
IAC-D-57/37
IAC-D-57/38
IAC-D-57/39
IAC-D-57/41
IAC-D-57 /1i2
Post-Mortem on NIE 27.1-56: Probable Developments
in Spain (13 June 56)
Post-Mortem on NIE 36.5-56: The Outlook for US
Interests in Libya (25 June 56)
Post-Mortem on NIE 32-56: The Outlook for
Greece (27 June 56)
Post-Mortem on NIE 42.2-56: Probable Developments
in North Korea Over the Next Few Years
(5 July 56 )
Post-Mortem on NIE 36.2-56: The Outlook or
Iraq's Stability and Fot'eign Policies (20 July 56)
Post-Mortem on NIE 63-56: Probable Developments
in North and South Vietnam Through Mid-1957
(20 July 56)
25X1
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IAC-D-57/43
IAC -D - 57 / 44
IAC-D-57/45
IAC-D-57/46
IAC-D-57/47
IAC-D-57/48
IAC-D-57/49
IAC-D-57/50
IAC-fl-57/,51
Post-Mortem on NIE 91-56: The Outlook
for Argentina (20 July 1956)
Post-Mortem on NIE 65-56: Probable Develop-
ments in Indonesia (9 August, 1956)
Post-Mortem on NIE 72-56: Conditions and
Trends in Tropical Africa (16 August 1956)
Post-Mortem on NIE 28. 4-56: Outlook for
Iceland (21 August 1956)
Post-Mortem on NIE 71. 2-56: Outlook for
Algeria (10 Sept 1956)
Post-Mortem on NIE 92-56: The Outlook for
Bolivia, dated 11 September 1956 (12 Sept 1956)
Post-Mortem on NIE 11-4-56: Soviet Capabilities
and Probable Courses of Action Through 1961,
(20 September 1956)
Post-Mortem on NIE 43-56: The Prospects of
the Government of the Republic of China,
dated 9 Oct 1956 (10 Oct '1956)
Post-Mortem on NIE 52-56: Probable Develop-
ments in Pakistan, dated 13 Nov 1956 (15 Nov 1956)
IAC-D-57/53
IAC-D-57/54
IAC-D-57/55
Post-Mortem onSNIE 11-6-57: Soviet Gross
Capabilities for Attack on the Continental US
in Mid-1960, dated 15 Jan 1957 (17 Jan 1957)
Post-Mortem on NIE 34-57: The Outlook for
Iran, dated 23 Jan 1957 (24 Jan 1957)
Post-Mortem on NIE 71. 1-57: The Outlook for
Morocco, dated 29 January 1957 (1 Feb 1957)'
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IAC-D-57/56 Post-Mortem on NIE 66-57: Political Outlook
for the Philippine Republic During 1957,
dated 12 Feb 1957 (15 Feb 1957)
IAC-D-57/57 Post-Mortem on NIE 12-57: Stability of the
Soviet Satellite Structure, dated 19 Feb 1957
(21 Feb 1957)
IAC-D-57/59
Post-Mortem on NIE 11-5-57: Soviet Capabilities
and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile
Field, dated 12 Mar 1957 (21 Mar 1957)
IAC-D-57/59. 1 Progress Reports by GMIC, JAEIC and SEC
Pursuant to Recommendations in Post-Mortem
on NIE 11-5-57, Soviet Capabilities and Probable
Programs in the Guided Missile Field
(19 Sept 1957)
IAC -D -57 / 59. 2 Progress Report by GMIC on Action Taken
With Respect to Post-Mortem on NIE 11-5-57
(5 Nov 1957)
IAC-D-57/59.2 Priority National Guided Missile Intelligence
(Draft) Objectives (27 Nov 1957)
IAC-D-57/59.3 Progress Report by SEC on Action Taken with
Respect to Post-Mortem on NIE 11-5-57
(12 Nov 1957)
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IAC-D-5.7/60 Post-Mortem on NIE 13-57: Communist China
Through 1961, dated 19 Mar 1957 (21 Mar 1957)
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IAC-D-57/60
21 March 1957
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Post-Mortem on NIE 13-57:
Communist China Through 1961,
dated 19 March 1957
1. On 19 March 1957 the IAC noted the attached findings
and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take
appropriate steps to comply.
25X1A
Secretary
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IAC-D-57/60
21 March 1957
Post-Mortem on NIE 13-57:
Communist China Through 1961,
dated 19 March 1957
I. Findings
1. The most important single body of political and economic
information on Communist China consists of official statements,
broadcasts, and newspapers. This type of material is available in
adequate quantity, with the exception of certain regional and local
newspapers that are available, if at all, only spasmodically and after
considerable delay. Most of the official material can throw consider-
able light on internal developments if allowances are made for certain
usually fairly obvious distortions and for the Communist viewpoint of
the originators and intended audience.
25X1
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IAC-D-57/60
21 March 1957
categories should continue to receive priority attention 25X1
a. Popular reaction to the Communist regime,
particularly to the Communist drive to socialize
agriculture.
b. The effectiveness of the regime's efforts to
increase agricultural production.
c. The volume and quality of output in machine
building, armaments, and the volume of railroads,
inland water, and ocean traffic.
d. Specific detailed knowledge of the armed forces
including policy and doctrine, command structure, unit
organization, strength, equipment, stockpiles, training,
and other military activity.
e. The relations between the Chinese Communist
Party and the indigenous Communist parties in Asia.
f. Sino-Soviet relations including the formulation
and communication of policy decisions, the amount and
nature of Soviet economic assistance, and the role of
each in furnishing guidance to the Communist parties
within and without the Bloc.
YL. The relations between Communist China and
the non-Communist Asian countries.
25X1 C
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IAC-D-57/59. 3
12 November 1957
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Progress Report by SEC on
Action Taken With Respect to Post-Mortem on NIE 11-5-57
1. As directed by the IAC (IAC-M-310, iter. 5), the
Scientific Estimates Committee (SEC) has prepared the attached
progress report. This paper up-dates and revises the "earlier SEC
progress report drafted pursuant to the recommendation in the
postmortem on NIE 11-5-57 which the IAC reviewed on 8 October
(Annex B to IAC-D-57/59. 1, 19 September).
2. We propose to place this matter on the agenda of an
early IAC meeting, for noting.
25X1A
Secretary
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C IAC-D-57/59.3
0
P
Y
12 November 1957
SCIENTIFIC ESTIMATES COMMITTEE
6 November 1957
MEMORANDUM FOR : Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee
SUBJECT Progress Report on Action Pursuant to IAC
Post-Mortem on NIE 11-5-57, Soviet
Capabilities and Probable Programs in the
Guided Missile Field (IAC -D - 57 / 59, 21 March
1957, as approved in Item 3 a, IAC -M-281)
1. In compliance with its responsibilities under paragraph 5
of subject post-mortem, the Scientific Estimates Committee (SEC)
submits the following progress report of measures taken within the
SEC's purview to reduce the indicated major gaps.
2. Member agencies have continued to investigate all sources
of information which could shed light on Soviet development or
modification of surface ships, submarines or aircraft for transporting
and launching guided missiles. While there has been little new infor-
mation concerning such developments since NIE 11-5-57 was published,
that which has become available tends to substantiate the statements
made therein.
25X1A
/s/
25X1A
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IAC-D-57/59. 2
27 November 1957
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Priority National Guided Missile Intelligence Objectives
Attached is a revision of the draft Priority National Guided
Missile Intelligence Objectives (Tab A to IAC-D-57/59.2, 5 November)
which were. considered. by the IAC on 26 November. This revised
draft, which reflects changes suggested in the course of the IAC
discussion, will be placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting now
scheduled for 3 December, for review and approval.
25X1A
Secretary
Attachment
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TABA
IAC -D 57 / 5.9.2
27 November 1957
Draft
PRIORITY NATIONAL GUIDED MISSILE INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES
1. Pursuant to National Security Council Intelligence Directive
No. 4, paragraph 2., Director of Central Intelligence Directive No.
4/6, (DCID 4/6) established a list of priority national intelligence
objectives as a guide for the coordination of intelligence collection
and production in response to requirements relating to the formula-
tion and execution of national security policy. The guided missile
intelligence objectives below have been derived from DCID 4/6.
2. By definition, all items in this listing are deemed to be
critical factors requiring priority attention and effort. Distinction
is made between two levels of priority within the general priority
category. Order of listing within these two groups has no significance
with respect to the relative priority of specific items within the group.
1. First Priority Objectives'
A. Soviet intentions, doctrine and plans to employ guided
-Z-A G missiles parrti ,
,ML
arl ith reap t to initiating hostilities using
Soviet -epr Satellite armed forces. (DCID 4/6, para. 1 a)
B. Present and probable future Soviet capabilities to employ
guided missiles in operational units for nuclear attack on the United
States or key US overseas installations and for defense against air
attack. (DCID 4/6, para. 1 c)
C. Deployment of missiles including such factors as con-
struction of operational sites, characteristics of such sites and
associated equipment and installations, types and numbers of
missiles deployed and operational readiness.
*First Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit
the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of
foreign states which would occasion gravest consequences to the
US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or
actions within them) which could occasion greatest benefit to the
US (DCID 4/6, para. 3 a).
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TAB A
IAC-D-57/59. 2
27 November 1957
Draft
D. The capabilities of the USSR to conduct research on and
develop and produce guided missiles of all types and other components
of guided missile, systems suitable for nuclear attack on the United
States or key US overseas installations (DCID 4/6, para. 1'c).
Particular emphasis will be placed on:
1. Characteristics of existing operational, guided
missile weapon systems to include type, range, accuracy,
lethality, and reliability.
2. Function and capabilities of institutes, plants
and organizations engaged in the research, development,
and production phases of the guided missile weapon
systems and specialized auxiliary equipment.
E. The capabilities of the USSR to conduct research on and
develop and produce guided missiles and other components of guided
missile systems suitable for defense against air attack (DCID 4/6,
para. I c). Particular emphasis will be placed on the determination
of research and development on:
1. Surface-to-air guided missiles
2. ' Air-to-air guided missiles
3. Anti-ICBM guided missiles
F. The capabilities and intentions of the USSR to conduct
research on, develop, produce, and employ earth satellites and
space vehicles.
II. Second Priority Objectives
III. Third Priority Objectives
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IAC-D-57/59. 2
5 November 1957
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Progress Report by GMIC on
Action Taken With Respect to Post-Mortem on NIE 11-5-57
1. Attached is a report by GMIC on "Action Taken With
Respect to Post-Mortem on NIE 11-5-57. " This paper supersedes
the analogous GMIC report which was circulated previously (Annex
C to IAC-D-57/59. 1,' 19 September) and discussed by the IAC on
8 October. Please note that Tab A comprises a revised statement
of Priority National Guided Missile Intelligence Objectives, pre-
pared in the light of that IAC discussion (IAC-M-310, item 5 d).
2. This report will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC
meeting, for noting and appropriate action with respect to GMIC's
recommendation that the IAC endorse Tab A as a statement of
Priority National Guided Missile Intelligence Objectives.
25X1A
Secretary
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C
0 IAC-D-57/59.2
P 5 November 1957
Y
GUIDED MISSILE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
25 October 1957
MEMORANDUM FOR : Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee
SUBJECT . Action Taken with Respect to Post-Mortem
on NIE 11-5-57
REFERENCE . Post Mortem on NIE 11-5-57, IAC-D-57/59,
21 March 1957
1. In reply to paragraph 5. a. of reference, the Guided Missile
Intelligence Committee (GMIC) has taken the following actions:
a. Has studied the existing gaps in guided missile
intelligence in detail and has formulated for guidance of
the collectors a compilation of Priority National Guided
Missile Intelligence Objectives. (See Tab A. )
b. Has recently established a subcommittee to
operate in the area of guidance to collectors.
25X1 C
2. In reply to paragraph 5. b. of reference, GMIC currently
has no assigned responsibility for developing and applying additional
collection methods. GMIC has, however, served as a mechanism in
bringing advanced technical thoughts on new collection methods to the
attention of groups charged with this responsibility. GMIC. will,
where possible, guide collectors to areas where additional collection
effort might be applied.
3. In reply to paragraph 5. c. of reference, GMIC has taken
the following actions:
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IAC-D-57/59. 2
5 November 1957
25X1 C
b. An ad hoc subcommittee is being established to
study and recommend to GMIC methods and procedures
for optimizing community exchange of guided missile
intelligence information.
4. It is recommended that the IAC endorse Tab A as a
statement of Priority National Guided Missile Intelligence Objectives.
25X1A
Colonel, USAF
Chairman, GMIC
Attachment:
Tab A
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TAB A.
IAC-D-57/59. 2
5 November 1957
PRIORITY NATIONAL GUIDED MISSILE INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES
1. Pursuant to National Security Council Intelligence Directive
No. 4, paragraph 2, Director of Central Intelligence Directive No.
4/5 (DCID 4/6) established a list of priority national intelligence
objectives as a guide for the coordination of intelligence collection
and production in response to requirements relating to the formulation
and execution of national security policy.
2. The Guided Missile Intelligence Committee has derived the
following guided missile intelligence objectives from DCID 4/6. The
statement of these objectives will be revised when required by re-
vision of DCID 4/6.
3. By definition, all items in this listing are deemed to be
critical factors requiring priority attention and effort. Distinction
is made between two levels of priority within the general priority
category. Order of listing within these two groups has no significance
with respect to the relative priority of specific items within the group.
1. First Priority Objectives`
A. The capabilities of the USSR to conduct research on and
develop and produce guided missiles of all types and other components
of guided missile systems suitable for nuclear attack on the United
States or key US overseas installations (DCID 4/6, para. 1 c).
Particular emphasis will be placed on:
1. Characteristics of existing operational, guided
missile weapon systems to include type, range, accuracy,
lethality, and reliability.
* First Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit
the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of
foreign states which would occasion gravest consequences to the
US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or
actions within them) which could occasion greatest benefit to the
US (DCID 4/6, para. 3 a).
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TAB. A
JAC -D-- 57 / 59. 2
5 November 1957
2. Function and capabilities of institutes, plants
and organizations engaged in the research, development,
and production phases of the guided missile weapon
systems and specialized auxiliary equipment.
B. The capabilities of the USSR to conduct research on and
develop and produce guided missiles and other components of guided
missile systems suitable for defense against air attack (DCID 4/6,
-para. I c). Particular emphasis will be placed on the determination
of research and development on:
1. Surface-to-air guided missiles
2. Air-to-air guided missiles
3. Anti-ICBM guided missiles:
II. Second Priority Objectives
None.
III. Third Priority Objectives
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IAC -D -57/ 59. 1
19 September 1957
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Progress Reports by GMIC, JAEIC and SEC Pursuant to
Recommendations in Post-Mortem on NIE 11-5-57,
Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs
in the Guided Missile Field
1. Pursuant to recommended action in paragraph 5 of the
post-mortem on NIE 11-5-57 (ZAC-D-57/59, 21 March 1957), as
subsequently approved by the IAC (IAC-M-281, item 3), GMIC,
JAEIC and SEC have prepared the attached progress reports.
Since these reports pertain to the same general subject matter it
was thought desirable to circulate them together rather than indi-
vidually, in order that the IAG could consider them as a unit.
2. These three reports will be placed on the agenda of the IAC
meeting now scheduled for 24 September, for noting and any other
action deemed appropriate in the light of the reports. For example,
specific IAC action will be required with respect to GMIC's recom-
mendation that the IAC endorse its proposed statement of Priority
National Guided Missile Intelligence Objectives. In this connection,
the Board of National Estimates has reviewed these proposed ob-
jectives, as it did recently in the case of proposed objectives in other
fields (IAC-M-288, item 6), and finds no inconsistencies with the
over-all Priority National Intelligence Objectives. Also, please note
that the Chairman of GMIC, in his covering memorandum (para. 2),
states that these proposed objectives are in consonance with the
"Priority National Scientific and Technical Objectives" (IAC-D-50/8)
which have been previously approved by the IAC.
25X1A
Secretary
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Annex A
IAC-D-57/59. 1
19 September 1957
JOINT ATOMIC ENERGY INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
3 September 1957
MEMORANDUM FOR 25X1A
Intelligence Advisory Committee
SUBJECT Report of Progress
REFERENCE : A. IAC-D-57/59 dated 21 March 1957, subject:
Post-Mortem on NIE 11-5-57
B. Minutes of IAC Meeting of 30 July 1957,
Para. 5
1. Since the completion of NIE 11-2-57, the Joint Atomic
Energy Committee has been endeavoring to improve both the useful-
ness and the reliability of national intelligence on the Soviet atomic
energy program. A working group under the chairmanship of
DAD/ONE is engaged in the task of preparing a draft estimate of the
allocations of nuclear materials stockpiles shown in NIE 11-2'-57 to
various weapons and delivery systems. Steady progress is being
made towards compliance with the directives of the Chairman, IAC,
on 30 July 1957. Results of this group should be available to the
Chairman, IAC, about 1 October.
2. In addition, the rather recent developments which indicate
joint efforts between Soviet missile and warhead development and
test groups have been accompanied by increased coordination and
joint efforts by JAEIC and GMIC. 25X1 B
A concrete result of such coordination is the report
furnished to the Secretary, IAC, on 19 August.
Secretary
3 September 1957
25X1A
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Annex B
IAC-D-57/59.1
19 September 1957
MEMORANDUM FOR : Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee
Progress Report on Action Taken Pursuant
to IAC Post-Mortem on NIE 11-5-57,
Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs
in the Guided Missile Field (IAC-D-57/59,
21 March 1957, as approved in Item 3 a,
IAC-M-281)
1. In compliance with its responsibilities under paragraph 5
of subject post-mortem, the Scientific Estimates Committee (SEC)
submits the following progress report of measures taken within the
SEC's purview to reduce the indicated major gaps.
2. Member agencies have continued to investigate all sources
of information which could shed light on Soviet capabilities with
respect to transporting and launching guided missiles. There has
been no significant progress in the past six months in this respect.
Several possible collection schemes,
are under study but their implementation is not likely to occur in the
near future. Primary responsibility for these schemes is in the
guided missile intelligence effort.
/s/
9 August 1957
hairman
Scientific Estimates Committee
25X1 B
25X1 B
25X1A
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Annex C to
IAC-D-57/59. 1
19 September 1957
GUIDED MISSILE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
14 August 1957
MEMORANDUM FOR : Chairman, Intelligence Advisory
Committee (IAC)
SUBJECT : Post Mortem on NIE 11-5-57
1: In compliance with IAC -D-57 / 59, regarding the Post
Mortem on NIE 11-5-57, the Guided Missile Intelligence Committee
(GMIC) has taken action as indicated in the attached memorandum.
2. The "Priority National Guided Missile Intelligence
Objectives" proposed in Tab A of the attachment are in consonance
with the proposed "Priority National Scientific and Technical
Objectives" (IAC-D-50/8) and with DCID 4/6.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Chairman, GMIC
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Annex C
IAC-D-57/59. 1
19 September 1957
GUIDED MISSILE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
12 August 1957
MEMORANDUM FOR : Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee
SUBJECT : Action Taken with Respect to Post Mortem
on NIE 11-5-57
REFERENCE,- ? Post Mortem on NIE 11-5-57, IAC-D-57/59,
21 March 1957
1. In reply to paragraph 5. a. of Reference, the Guided Missile
Intelligence Committee (GMIC) has taken the following actions:
a. Has studied the existing gaps in guided missile
intelligence in detail and has formulated for guidance of
the collectors a compilation of Priority National Guided
Missile Intelligence Objectives. (See Tab A. )
b. Has recently established a subcommittee to
operate in the area of guidance to the collectors. A copy
of the subcommittee Terms of Reference is attached hereto.
(See Tab B.)
2. In reply to paragraph 5. b. of Reference, GMIC currently
has no assigned responsibility for developing and applying additional
collection methods. GMIC has, however, served as a mechanism in
bringing advanced technical thoughts on new collection methods to
the attention of groups charged with this responsibility. GMIC will,
where possible, guide collectors to areas where additional collection
effort might be applied.
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Annex C
IAC-D-57/59, 1
19 September 1957
3. In reply to paragraph 5. c. of Reference, GMIC has taken
the following actions:
b. An ad hoc subcommittee is being established to study
and recommend to GMIC methods and procedures for opti-
mizing community coordination of guided missile intelligence
research and production, to include (1) guide lines to govern
GMIC initiated reports to the IAC; (2) circumstances and
procedures whereby GMIC might publish under its own rubric;
(3) methods and procedures whereby all member activities
are informed on a periodic basis of community research and
production projects; and (4) methods and procedures for co-
ordinating research and production projects where appropriate.
The Terms of Reference for this subcommittee are under study.
c. An ad hoc subcommittee is being established to study
and recommend to GMIC methods and procedures for optimizing
community exchange of guided missile intelligence information.
The Terms of Reference for this subcommittee are under
consideration.
25X1 C
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Annex C
IAC-D-57/59. 1
19 September 1957
4. It is recommended that IAC endorse Tab A as a statement
of Priority National Guided Missile Intelligence Objectives.
/s/
37 Colonel,
Chairman, GMIC
Attachments: 2
Tabs A and B
12 August 1957
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Tab A to
Annex C
IAC-D-57/59. 1
.19 September 1957
PRIORITY NATIONAL GUIDED MISSILE INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES
First Priority Objectives
I. Soviet Capabilities for Nuclear Attack, using nuclear equipped
weapon systems:
1. Surface-to-surface missiles of 500 nautical mile range
or greater, including those with nuclear propulsion.
2. Submarine launched missiles of 200 nautical miles or
greater.
3. Air-to-surface missiles of 40 nautical miles or greater.
A. Present Capability for Attack
1. Characteristics of existing operational weapon systems.
Characteristics of the weapon system include: type, range,
accuracy, lethality, reliability, and vulnerability.
2. Numbers of missiles and associated launching and
guidance equipment sets, in being, with production rates.
3. Characteristics of the launch bases, including site loca-
tions, launch site mobility, numbers of weapons in storage,
possible targets, possible firing rate, logistical and operational
features, and vulnerability.
B. Future Capability for Attack
25X1 B
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Annex C
IAC-D-57/59. 1
19 September 1957
25X1 B
4. Requirements, plans and intentions for future weapon
systems of equal or better capabilities.
C. Preparation for Attack
Indicators of preparations to use such weapon systems against
other states, beyond the normally expected precautionary measures.
25X1 B
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Annex C
IAC-D-57/59. 1
19 September 1957
25X1 B
D. Vulnerabilities
1. Susceptibility to detection, prior to employment, of the
operationally ready weapon system.
2. Concentration of any critical components of the weapon
systems in a few manufacturing or storage sites.
25X1 B
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Annex C
IAC-D-57/59. 1
19 September 1957
25X1 B
II. Soviet Capabilities for Defense Against Air Attack, using nuclear
or conventionally equipped weapon systems:
1. Surface-to-air guided missiles.
2. Air-to-air guided missiles.
3. Anti-ICBM guided missiles.
A. Present Capability for Defense
Characteristics and production of existing weapon system and
of the launch bases:
1. Characteristics of existing operational weapon systems.
Characteristics of the weapon system include: type, range,
accuracy, lethality, reliability, and vulnerability.
2. Numbers of missiles and associated launching and
guidance equipment sets, in being, with production rates.
3. Characteristics of the launch bases, including site
locations, launch site mobility, numbers of weapons in storage,
possible targets, possible firing rate, logistical and operational
features, and vulnerability.
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Tab A to
Annex C
IAC-D-57/59. 1
19 September 1957
4. Capability for development and production of warning
systems, including electronic, suitable for alerting the missile
air defense system in adequate time.
B. Future Capability for Defense
25X1 B
4. Plans and intentions for future weapon systems of equal
or better capabilities.
5. Capability for development and production of warning
systems, including electronic, suitable for alerting the missile
air defense system in adequate time.
6. Capability for development and production of missile
guidance systems suitable for providing the guided missiles
above with an adequate air defense role.
-4-
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Annex C
IAC-D-57/59. 1
19 September 1957
C. Vulnerabilities
1. Susceptibility to detection, prior to employment, of the
operationally ready weapon system, and the adequacy of the
resultant warning time for appropriate countermeasures.
25X1
25X1 B
5. Susceptibility of the launch base to air attack.
Second Priority Objectives
The Status of Sino-Soviet Bloc Progress in the Fields of:
A. Solid propellants.
B. Improved high energy liquid propellants.
C. Advanced engines and associated components.
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Annex C
IAC -D - 57 / 59. 1
19 September 1957
D. Structural improvements.
E. Guidance systems, advanced in accuracy or reliability.
G. Improved warheads.
H. Improved fusing systems.
I. Research and development programs on the above topics,
especially those where a large increase in potential is expected.
J. Technological developments leading to large increases
in the military and economic potential.
K. Organization and control of science.
L. The general quality and quantity of the scientific and
technical manpower.
M. The general quality of the scientific and technical
abilities of the armed forces.
N. Future plans for technological programs.
0. Technological weaknesses, indicating vulnerabilities in
regard to the above items.
25X1
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Tab A to
Annex C
IAC-D-57/59. 1
19 September 1957
II. Status of Sino-Soviet Bloc Economic Capability to Support a
Major War with Regard to Items Critical to Guided Missile System
Production
A. The motivation, character, magnitude and implementation
economic programs in the following industries:
1. Electronics.
2. Precision mechanisms.
3. Chemicals.
4. Construction.
5. Transport.
6. High temperature alloys and materials.
B. The general quality and quantity of industrial manpower.
C. Industrial weaknesses, indicating vulnerabilities in the
items above.
Third Priority Objectives
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Tab B to
Annex C
IAC-D-57/59. 1
19 September 1957
(Approved 9 August 1957
Supersedes Terms of Reference
approved 5 July 1957)
TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR
THE GMIC SUBCOMMITTEE FOR GUIDANCE TO COLLECTORS
I. Mission
The mission of the Subcommittee for Guidance to Collectors (SGC)
is to perform completed staff work for the Guided Missile Intelligence
Committee (GMIC) in the field of guidance to collectors concerning
acquisition of intelligence data on guided missiles.
II. Responsibilities
The SGC is responsible to GMIC for the following relative to
providing guidance and support for the collection of guided missile
intelligence:
a. Within the limits of the GMIC Terms of Reference,
reviewing the scope of the collection effort to meet the ob-
jectives established by the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
b. Periodically, in view of probable changing guided
missile intelligence objectives and status of our knowledge,
survey missile intelligence collection guidance media and
advise GMIC as to the status of guided missile intelligence
requirements; submit specific recommendations as deemed
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Tab B to
Annex C
IAC-D-57/59. 1
19 September 1957
appropriate, which may contribute to the continued improvement
of collection processes.
C, Providing staff support, when required by 3MIC, for
other problems in the collection guidance area.
III. Proficiencies
To discharge the responsibilities indicated above, the SGC shall
acquire and maintain general knowledge in the following fields:
a. The nature and scope of the collection effort
currently existing in the guided missile area. This includes
not only collection techniques and devices but also guidance
media furnished to the collectors, such as requirements,
guides, etc.
b. The potential of proposed and planned additional
collection programs.
IV. Membership and Tenure
Each GMIC member or associate member agency may designate
one member and one or more alternate members to SGC. The Sub-
committee Chairman shall be elected by GMIC. The Subcommittee
shall function for an initial period of six months, following which GMIC
will evaluate the requirement for its continued tenure.
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Copy No.
IAC-D-57/59
21 March 1957
Post-Mortem on NIE.11-5-57:
Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs
in the Guided Missile Field,
1. On 19 March 1957 the IAC noted the post-mortem on
NIE 11-5-57, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in
the Guided Missile Field," and approved the action set forth in
paras. 5 and 6. (For details with respect to IAC action see
IAC-M-281, item 3 a).
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take
appropriate steps to comply.
Secretary
25X6
25X1A
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IAC-D-57/59
21 March 1957
Post-Mortem on N1E 11-5-57:
Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs
in the Guided Missile Field,
dated 12 March 1957
25X6
1. This estimate supersedes NIE 11-6-54, 5 October 1954,
and its supplement, N1E 11-12-55, 20 December 1955. Much time
and effort was expended over the past year in estimating the USSR's
military requirements for guided missiles, its capabilities to develop
missile systems and its intentions regarding missile production and
operational employment during the next ten years. We were unable
to make an estimate of production and operational programs in terms
other than feasibility and reasonability. This portion of the estimate
was handicapped by: lack of agreed estimates on how the USSR is likely
to balance its future military programs; lack of agreed estimates on how
the USSR is likely to apportion its nuclear materials stockpile among
various weapons systems, and our inability to form a valid judgment
thereon; our inability to predict Soviet judgments over a ten-year
p eriod regarding missiles versus other weapons systems. 25X1
25X1
Findings
2. Major Gaps in Scientific and Technical Intelligence.
Intelligence is still insufficient to determine accurately the detailed
characteristics of missile systems already known to exist, i. e. , the
currently-deployed Moscow surface-to-air system, short-range
ballistic missiles, and air-to-surface missiles. Even greater gaps
exist in the air-to-air and submarine-launched categories, and in the
B
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IAC-D-57/59
21 March 1957
development of more advanced systems in all categories. Of
particular significance is our almost total lack of firm evidence
relating to Soviet development of an IRBM and an ICBM. There
continues to be a need for more detailed up-to-date intelligence
on Soviet guided missile research and development organizations,
facilities, and personalities. An urgent requirement exists for
further information on Soviet guided missile testing activities.
3. Major Gaps in Economic Intelligence. Specific evidence
on Soviet missile production capabilities and facilities is extremel
limited.
4. Major Gaps in Intelligence on Operational Status and
Deployment. Specific evidence is lacking on Soviet military doctrine
pertaining to the current and future relationship of guided missiles to
a balanced military program. We have no direct evidence of Soviet
judgments as to the advantages of missiles versus other weapons
systems. improved techniques for
evaluating the comparative performance of the various Soviet weapons
systems are needed. Although we have estimated that nine Soviet
missile systems could already be operational, we have firm evidence
of the deployment of only one system in one area, i. e. , the surface-
to-air system at Moscow. A very urgent requirement exists for
collection of intelligence on the operational status and deployment of
Soviet guided missile systems.
5. The appropriate IAC agencies and subcommittees are
requested to take the following action and report on progress to the
IAC by 1 September 1957:
25X6
25X1 B
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21 March 1957
a. Continue intensive efforts to fill the gaps noted
above, by exploiting to the fullest all existing intelligence
collection methods;
b. Seek to develop and apply additional collection
methods;
C. Study and recommend methods for improving the
exploitation of available intelligence in the guided missile
field, including methods for improving the community-wide
coordination of effort.
6. The IAC agreed to designate an ad hoc committee to study
and recommend by 1 June 1957
25X6
25X1 B
25X1 B
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IAC-D-57/57
21 February 1957
Post-Mortem on NIE 12-57:
Stability of the Soviet Satellite Structure,
dated 19 February 1957
The attached post-mortem on NIE 12-57, "Stability of the
Soviet Satellite Structure, " which was noted by the IAC on
19 February 1957, is circulated for information and appropriate
action.
25X1A
Secretary
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21 February 1957
Post-Mortem on NIE 12-57:
Stability of the Soviet Satellite Structure,
dated 19 February 1957
The principal intelligence deficiencies noted were shortages
of reliable information concerning Soviet policy intentions; the
internal political situation in the Satellites, especially Czecho-
slovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania; the loyalties of all
Satellite military forces; and the scale and nature of dissidence.
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IAC-D-57/56
15 February 1957
I N T E L L I G E N C E ADVISORY C O M M I T T E E
Post-Mortem on NIE 66-57:
Political Outlook for the Philippine Republic During 1957,
dated 12 February 1957
1. On 12 February 1957 the IAC noted the attached findings
and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take
appropriate steps to comply.
25X1A
Secretary
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15 February 1957
Post-Mortem on NIE 66-57:
Political Outlook for the Philippine Republic During 1957,
dated 12 February 1957
1. Findings
1. Although coverage of the development of nationalism and
anti-Americanism in the Philippines has increased recently, we
still do not feel we have sufficient information on how deeply national-
ism has penetrated Philippine society and the manner in which it is
affecting the attitudes and actions of the Filipino leaders and general
populace. We also do not have sufficient information on the relation-
ship between nationalism and anti-Americanism in the Philippines.
2. Intelligence weaknesses continue with respect to the
various facets of Communism in the Philippines, notably the organi-
zation and strength of the CCP and its relations with the PKP. There
is also a lack of intelligence concerning the nature and extent of the
relationship between the Communist parties in the Philippines and
the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties.
The IAC agencies are requested to take appropriate action
with respect to these two intelligence gaps.
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IAC-D-57/55
1 February 1957
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Post-Mortem on NIE 71. 1-57:
The Outlook for Morocco:
dated 29 January 1957
The attached post-mortem on NIE 71. 1-57, "The Outlook
for Morocco, " which was noted by the IAC on 29 January 1957,
is circulated for information and appropriate action.
25X1A
Secretary
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1 February 1957
Post-Mortem on NIE 71. 1-57.:
The Outlook for Morocco:
dated. 29 January 1957
-'~I Moroccan independence, however, creates
additional information requirements which will have to be filled if
future intelligence estimates are to attain greater precision. More
comprehensive information is needed concerning the strength and
internal functioning of political parties and labor organizations,
especially the Istiqlal and the. UMT. Additional information is re-
quired on political conditions in rural areas, such as the former
northern Spanish Zone and areas south of Marrakech. Particular
attention also should be devoted to other groups and forces which
could seriously affect Moroccan stability,
25X1
25X6
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IAC-D-57/54
24 January 1957
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Post-Mortem on NIE 34-57:
The Outlook for Iran,
dated 23 January 1957
1. On 23 January 1957 the IAC noted the attached findings
and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take
appropriate steps to comply.
25X1A
Secretary
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24 January 1957
Post-Mortem on NIE 34-57:
The Outlook for Iran,
dated 23 January 1957
I. Finding s
25X1
we would have benefited by more information on the following points:
corps.
b.
The strength, character, and potential of
Communist, nationalist, and other groups
in active opposition to the present regime.
Progress or lack of progress in economic
development, particularly with regard to
the Second Seven Year Plan.
The members of the IAC are requested to take such action as
they deem appropriate to deal with these problems.
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Copy No.
IAC-D-57
17 January 1957
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Post-Mortem on SNIE .11-6-57:
Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the
Continental US in Mid-1960,
dated 15 January 1957
1, On 15 January 1957 the IAC noted the attached findings
and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appro-
priate steps to comply.
25X1A
Secretary
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17 January 1957
Post-Mortem on SNIE 11-6-57:
Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the
Continental US in Mid-1960,
dated 15 January 1957
1. Findings
1. The predecessor of this estimate was NIE 11-56, completed
in March 1956. Since publication of the post-mortem of that estimate
(IAC-D-57/28, 20 March 1956), there has been considerable improve-
ment in intelligence on Soviet airfield development, and some additional
intelligence on inflight refueling and guided missile submarines. Some
gaps in intelligence on the performance characteristics of Soviet air-
craft have been narrowed (see IAC-D-57/Z8. 1,- Revised, 4 December
1956). However, deficiencies continue to exist in intelligence on
these subjects, as well as on Soviet biological and chemical warfare
capabilities and Long-Range Aviation crew training and proficiency.
2. A number of other problems encountered in preparing this
estimate, most notably the current and future strength of Soviet
Long-Range Aviation, were essentially the same as those met in
NIE 11-4-56, completed in August 1956. The general need for better
intelligence on Soviet military plans and programs, noted in the
post-mortern on NIE 11-4-56 (IAC-D-57/49, 20 September 1956),
continues to exist.
II. Action
The IAC agencies and subcommittees are requested to take
appropriate action on the intelligence deficiencies and needs
described above.
25X1
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IAC-D-57/51
15 November 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E ADVISORY C O M M I T T E E
Post-Mortem on NIE 52-56:
Probable Developments in Pakistan,
dated 13 November 1956
1. On 13 November 1956 the IAC noted the attached finding
and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take
appropriate steps to comply.
25X1A
Acting. Secretary
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15 November 1956
Post- Mortem on NIE 52-56:
Probable Developments in Pakistan,
dated 13 November 1956
I. Finding
No critical intelligence deficiencies were encountered in prepara-
tion of this estimate. However, we would have benefited by more
detailed information on the following points:
25X1
25X6
c. Communist relations with members of the Awami
League and other parties, particularly in East Pakistan.
d. Patterns of political interest and activity in rural
areas, notably in East Pakistan.
M
The members of the IAC are requested to take such action as they
deem appropriate to deal with these problems.
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10 October 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Post-Mortem on NIE 43-56:
The Prospects of the Government of the Republic of China,
dated 9 October 1956
The attached post-mortem on NIE 43-56, "The Prospects of
the Government of the Republic of China, " which was noted by the
IAC on 9 October 1956, is circulated for information and appropriate
action. V
WILLIAM P. BUN Y
Secretary
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10 October 1956
Post-Mortem on NIE 43-56:
The Prospects of the Government of the Republic of China,
dated 9 October 1956
In the preparation of NIE 43-56, "The Prospects of the Government
of the Republic of China, " a number of intelligence gaps were revealed.
The most important of these are as follows:
1. The effect of Chinese Communist propaganda directed
toward Taiwan and individuals on Taiwan.
2. Power rivalries and the structure of power below
Chiang Kai-shek.
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20 September 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Post-Mortem on NIE 11-4-56:
Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of
Action Through 1961,
dated 2 August 1956
1. On 19 September 1956 the IAC noted the attached findings
and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take
appropriate steps to comply.
WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Secretary
25X1A
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20 September 1956
Post-Mortem on N1E 11-4-56:
Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of
Action Through 1961,
dated 2 August 1956
1. This estimate was approved by the IAC on 2 August 1956
after a more than usually prolonged period of coordination which began
on 7 May 1956. The issues which were most difficult to resolve and
occasioned the most delay were in the military field. They included:
current Soviet strength in heavy bombers; the future strength of the
Long-Range Air Force; the personnel strength of Soviet forces; and
the likely distribution within them of estimated reductions; Soviet
strategic concepts for the conduct of general war. Political and
economic issues produced less fundamental divergences of views,
although the shifts in Soviet internal and external policy over the last
year occasioned some differences.
1. Findings
2. General. While long-standing deficiencies of intelligence
on the USSR remain, there have been some gains as the result of a
greater openness on the part of the Soviet leaders as well as the more
extensive contacts in many fields which their current policy permits.
On the whole, estimates of current Soviet strengths, capabilities, and
programs as well as the intentions of the USSR over the short term
are probably more soundly based than formerly. However, longer-
range predictions of Soviet military developments or of Soviet inten-
tions continue to be seriouslyandicapped by lack of direct evidence
and lack of knowledge of the weight given various considerations by the
Soviet leaders in their choice of alternative courses of action.
3. Political intelligence. The post-Stalin reforms and the
greater accessibility of Soviet personalities at all levels have given
us a better picture of the forces at work in Soviet society. Gaps
remain with respect to the roles of top Soviet leaders and possible
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20 September 1956
policy differences among them, and with respect to the influence of
the Party'; military, managerial, and other professional elites.
These gaps probably cannot be filled short of the acquisition of much
more interior knowledge of the regime than we seem likely to get.
However, full exploitation of information gained through the broaden-
ing contacts currently taking place is indicated.
4. The problems of long-run social and political change in the
USSR exceed, in the strict sense, the limits of the five-year estimate.
Neverthele d
, Ju gments concerning Soviet developments over a
longer period do in fact influence the current attitudes of policy-make
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5. Estimates of Soviet intentions in external policy depend
largely on deductions from the general Soviet posture. Since this
seems relatively stable at present, predictions are probably fairly
sound, at least for periods of a year or two. But particular maneuvers
of Soviet policy cannot be anticipated without greater inside knowledge
of Soviet plans, and perhaps not even then because of the opportunistic
character of many Soviet actions. F- I
6. Economic intelligence. The post-mortem of NIE 11-3-55
identified the costing of the Soviet military effort as the major weakness
in economic intelligence on the USSR. The findings of the IAC Ad Hoc
Military Cost Study Committee incorporated in NIE 11-4-56 represent
a substantial advance in this field but still leave much to be desired
in terms of definitiveness and an appreciation of margins of error
involved.
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12 September 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Post-Mortem on NIE 92-56:
The Outlook for Bolivia,
dated 11 September 1956
1. On 11 September 1956 the IAC noted the attached findings
and approved the action set forth in section II,
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take
appropriate steps to comply.
25X1A
WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Secretary
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12 September 1956
Post-Mortem on NIE 92-56:
The Outlook for Bolivia,
dated 11 September 1956
I, Findings
The following intelligence deficiencies were noted in the prepara-
tion of NIE 92-56:
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b. The political orientation and allegiance of the
military and para-military forces, particularly in the
event of a. moderate-lefts lit,
Individual IAC members are requested to take such action within
their own spheres of responsibility as they deem appropriate for
dealing with these problems.
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10 September 1956
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Post-Mortem on NIE 71. 2-56:
Outlook for Algeria,
dated 5 September 1956
The attached post-mortem on NIE 71. 2-56, "Outlook for
Algeria, " which was noted by the IAC on 5 September 1956, is
circulated for information and appropriate action.
25X1A
WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Secretary
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Post-Mortem on NIE 71.2-56:
Outlook for Algeria,
dated 5 September 1956
The main deficiencies of information on Algeria are in the
fields of the military strength and popular support of the nationalists,
their arms supply, and their willingness to compromise.
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information on the plans and activities of both the Communists and
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21 August 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E ADVISORY C O M M I T T E E
Post-Mortem on NIE 28.4-56:
Outlook for Iceland,
dated 21 August 1956
1. On 21 August 1956 the IAC noted the attached findings and
approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take
appropriate steps to comply.
Secretary
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Post-Mortem on NIE 28.4-56:
Outlook for Iceland
dated 21 August 1956
I. Findings
,onomic data are not up to date,\
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Moreover,
we do not have sufficient information regarding the Communists'. capabilities
to stage a coup d'etat , or regarding the probable attitudes and capabilities
of Icelanders in the event of a Communist attempt to take over Iceland by
force.
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these gaps
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16 August 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E ADVISORY C O M M I T T E E
Post-Mortem on NIE 72-56:
Conditions and Trends in Tropical Africa,
dated 14 August 1956
1. On 14 August 1956 the IAC noted the attached findings and
approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take
appropriate steps to comply.
25X1A
WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Secretary
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16 August 1956
Post-Mortem on NIE 72-56:
Conditions and Trends in Tropical Africa,
dated 14 August 1956
1. Findings
1. Lack of detail in our information on opinions, attitudes and
political associations of Africans in many territories makes it diffi-
cult to estimate the pace of change. The general statements to which
we are confined may be valid without being useful in identifying the
particular points at which trouble later develops. In evaluating the
effects of rapid social change, we are particularly dependent on
basic sociological and political research which is impossible for
government officials to undertake and is proceeding in few places
under private auspices with the scope and speed desired.
2. We lack sufficiently intimate knowledge of the intentions of
native leaders, the pressures on them, and their evaluations of their
positions. This deficiency is of great moment for many territories,
particularly Nigeria and the Gold Coast.
3. In general, our intelligence on Tropical Africa requires
bolstering with respect to (a) the opinions, attitudes, and aspirations
of the native populations; (b) the extent of Communist influence; (c)
political, social, and economic conditions and trends in the many
territories rarely visited by American diplomatic or consular repre-
sentatives ; and (d) the relationships between territories, particularly
how and to what degree developments in one area affect those in
other areas. In addition, there is a serious lack of basic intelligence
on conditions and trends in the rural areas of all territories in Tropical
Africa. The following highlights major deficiencies by areas.
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on African students and labor leaders requires closer examination.
4. The importance of Communist influence from the
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More intelligence is needed on African student attitudes and organiza-
tions African
contacts with Communists and Communist-front organizations, and
trips behind the Iron Curtain by Africans
5. The influence of the Communist-dominated CGT in France
on African affiliates in French West and Equatorial Africa, Madagascar,
Cameroons, and Togoland must also be probed more deepl
6. In order to estimate the probable response to a call by
traditional leaders in the Gold Coast for all-out resistance to the CPP
government, information is needed on the strength of traditional
loyalties among the Ashanti and the degree to which these would con-
flict with other (primarily material) interests. We also need informa-
tion on the attitudes of Northern Territories leaders which would
enable us to estimate the support they would give to any Ashanti
revolt or secession. The present effect of historic animosities and
alliances on the alignment of certain native states in the Colony,
Ashanti, and Northern Territories regions is also uncertain.
7. For Nigeria, we lack information on the attitudes and
minimum requirements of the leaders of the three regions which are
likely to determine the outcome of the forthcoming constitutional
review conference. We also need information on public opinion in
each of the regions and on the basis and strength of the opposition
elements in each region.
8. For Sierra Leone, information is needed on the activities
in the Protectorate of Marcus Grant's Labor Party and Wallace-
Johnson's Progressive Party, and of efforts by the Sierra Leone
People's Party to prevent their gaining influence there. Changes in
the authority and influence of the chiefs resulting from the tax riots
and from the role given them by the new diamond mining legislation
also need close examination.
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9. For all three territories, but especially the Gold Coast,
we need continued close watch on developments favorable to the
growth of Communist influence,
C. Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
10. Information on European attitudes and proposals relating
to. race relations generally and African advancement particularly will
continue to be a prime requirement. The plans and strength of African
organizations opposed to federation and to European dominance, such
as the African National Congresses of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasa-
land, and the existence or formation of similar organizations in
Southern Rhodesia also require close attention. Information on African
opinion, of both leaders and followers, toward such matters as imple-
mentation of the Land Husbandry Act in Southern Rhodesia, the program
for African advancement in the Copperbelt, and the adequacy of
Nyasaland's share of federal development activities will aid us to esti-
mate more precisely the development of African resistance.
D. British East Africa
11. In Kenya, serious deficiencies exist in our information on:
(a) progress in implementing the government's programs for economic
development in both European and African sectors of the economy and
for African advancement; (b) the response of Africans toward these
projects, especially the "villagisation" program in the Kikuyu, Meru,
and Embu reserves; and (c) the political orientation, programs,
leadership, and capabilities of district African political associations
and of African and Asian organizations and groups likely to exert
political influence.
12. Our intelligence for Uganda is particularly weak on:
(a) the relations of the Kabaka with the Uganda nationalist groups;
(b) the strength of the nationalist movement outside of Buganda; and
(c) the attitudes of Africans in the rest of Uganda toward Buganda
hegemony.
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E. Belgian Congo
13. Our intelligence is deficient on the attitudes of the detri-
balized and semi-educated Africans in urban areas toward: (a)
European settlers, businessmen, missionaries, and government
administrators; and (b) the lack of opportunities for political ex-
pression.
F. French West and French Equatorial Africa
14. For future estimates we shall need fuller intelligence with
respect to (a) native political development in the major component
territories of the two federations; (b) the nature and extent of Com-
munist influence in the labor movement; and (c) the progress and
effects of economic development programs.
15. We need information on the strength of nationalism as a
whole, and particularly on the UPC, and on the extent of Communist
influence in the UPC and the labor movement.
H. Madagascar
16. Intelligence is virtually nil on political and social condi-
tions in Madagascar. We especially need information on nationalist
and Communist activities.
I. Portuguese Colonies
17. Our information on basic social trends, African attitudes,
and most aspects of the life of Africans in these territories is scanty
-and does not indicate where or when African resistance to Portugal
rule is most likely to start. Information is particularly required on
such matters as relations between Africans and Portuguese adminis-
trators and African views on government control of the sale of
African-grown export crops, and on the small proportion of develop-
ment activities devoted to Africans.
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J. Liberia
18. Our need for information on Liberia extends from basic
demographic and sociological data to the cliques, intrigues, plots,
and shifting fortunes of the principal Americo-Liberians. Information
is also needed on the degree of President Tubman's control,. par-
ticularly in order to allow us to estimate the likelihood of an attempted
coup or its success. The impact of economic development on the
hinterland peoples is not sufficiently known and will require special
attention in the next few years.
Ethiopia and Somalia
19. Basic information is needed with respect to: (a) political
conditions in rural areas- -particularly the Tigrai, Ogaden, and
eastern borderlands of Ethiopia; (b) the extent of discontent within
the Ethiopian government, army, and Imperial Body Guard, and among
young intellectuals; and (c) the strength and organization of political
movements in Somalia- -especially the Somali Youth League.
Individual IAC members are requested to take such action within
their own spheres of responsibility as they deem appropriate for
dealing with these problems.
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9 August 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E ADVISORY C O M M I T T E E
Post-Mortem on NIE 65-56:
Probable Developments in Indonesia,
dated 7 August 1956
1. On 7 August 1956 the IAC noted the attached findings and
approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAG agencies are therefore requested to take
appropriate steps to comply.
25X1A
WILLIAM P. BUND 3
Secretary
II
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Post-Mortem on NIE 65-56:
Probable Developments in Indonesia,
dated 7August 1956
I. Findings
In estimating the Indonesian internal situation, we continue to lack
information in depth concerning:
a. Political development in the rural areas
b. Political trends within the major political parties
c. The extent and nature of the relationship between
Sukarno and the Communists
d.
e.
The background, orientation, beliefs, and motivations
of the principal political and military leaders
The composition and strength of the principal factions
within the military forces and the policies and courses
of action which these factions support.
The IAC agencies are requested to take appropriate action to increase
the flow of information on the subjects noted above.
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20 July 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Post-Mortem on NIE 91-56:
The Outlook for Argentina,
dated 17 July 1956
1. On 17 July 1956 the IAC noted the attached findings and
approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take
appropriate steps to comply.
25X1A
Secretary
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Post-Mortem on NIE 91-56:
The Outlook for Argentina,
dated 17 'July 1956
I. Findings
The preparation of the section on the present political situation
and of the political estimates that rested on this section was handi-
capped by a lack of adequate field coverage. We lack adequate
information on the political ties, aspirations, and labor connections
ok military groups, especially the navy and "Young Officers" group.
of the army, and of key military personnel including high officers who
have been dismissed or retired by the present regime. We also lack
information on the strength and influence of the various political
parties and affiliated trade union groups. Information is especially
needed on the Communist Party, and on the Radical Party including
the relative strength of its various factions and their military ties.
The appropriate IAC agencies are requested to take such action
as they deem essential to increase the over-all intelligence coverage
of Argentina.
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20 July 1956
INTELLIGENCE A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Post-Mortem on NIE 63-56:
Probable Developments in North and South Vietnam
Through Mid.=1957,
dated 17 July 1956
The attached post-mortem on NIE 63-56, "Probable Develop-
ments in North and South Vietnam Through Mid-1957, " which was
noted by the IAC on 17 July 1956, is circulated for information and
appropriate action.
25X1A
WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Secretary
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Post-Mortem on NIE 63-56:
Probable Developments in North and South Vietnam
Through Mid-1957,
dated 17 July 1956
I. Findings
We have encountered a number of intelligence gaps in the
preparation of this estimate which limit our ability to deal confidently
with a number of important questions:
a. Military intelligence coverage of North Vietnam
has deteriorated markedly during the past year;
Timely Order of Battle information
on the. Viet Minh forces is almost totally lacking and
information on training and logistic activities is poor.
b. Coverage of Viet Minh paramilitary forces in
South Vietnam also is'unsatisfactory. The quality of
the information available is such that our possible margin
of error on the strength of these forces exceeds 50
percent.
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d. Accurate information on production and trade
in North Vietnam Es; lacking. Information on the avail-
ability of food would indicate the prevalence of mass
starvation; yet we have no evidence that large numbers
of deaths have occurred.
It is requested that appropriate action be taken by the agencies
concerned, particularly with respect to DRV troop movements and
dispositions.
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20 July 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Post-Mortem on NIE 36. 2-56:
The Outlook-for-Iraq's Stability and Foreign Policies,
dated 17 July 1956
The attached post-mortem on NIE 36. 2-56, "The Outlook for
Iraq's Stability and Foreign Policies," which was noted by the IAC
on 17 July 1956, is circulated for information and appropriate
action.
25X1A
Secretary
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Z O `ulLy 195-L
Post-Mortem on NIE 36.2-56:.
The Outlook for Iraq's Stability and Foreign Policies,
dated 17 July 1956
The chief estimative problems encountered in this estimate were
not the result of specific intelligence deficiencies but matters of
general estimative judgment. They are:
a. The broad question of what will happen to
Iraq's internal stability and foreign orientation after
Nuri Said disappears from the scene; and
.b. The extent to which Iraq's development
program will in fact serve in the long run to create
conditions of fundamental political stability in the
kingdom.
C. Future Iraqui courses of action with respect
to Syria.
' We do not consider that a validity study would be useful in
the present case, since previous estimative coverage of
Iraq appears piecemeal in such a wide variety of estimates
on the Arab states and the Middle East as a whole that
generalizations on their validity would serve little purpose.
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5 July 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E ADVISORY C O M M I T T E E
Post-Mortem on NIE 42. 2-56.-
Probable Developments in North Korea
Over the Next Few Years,
dated 3 July 1956
The attached post-mortem on NIE 42. 2.56, "Probable Develop-
ments in North Korea Over the Next Few Years," which was noted by
the IAC on 3 July 1956, is circulated for information and appropriate
action.
25X1A
WILLIAM P. BUNT Y
Secretary
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Post-Mortem on NIE 42.2-56:
Probable Developments in North Korea
Over the Next Few Years,
dated 3 July 1956
Finding
Information collected in 1950-51,
during the occupation o Nort Korea by UN forces, still constitutes
the most reliable recent data on conditions and trends within North
Korea. We are forced to rely primarily on our analysis of official
Communist pronouncements for our estimates of the current political
and economic developments. In typical Communist fashion, pro-
duction and capacity data are announced in percentage terms referring
to base years for which absolute data are either not known at all, or
only available on a partial basis.
In particular we lack
detailed information on the following questions, of interest in this
estimate:
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27 June 1956
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Post-Mortem on NIE 32-56:
The Outlook for Greece,
dated 26 June 1956
1. On 26 June 1956 the IAC noted the attached findings and
approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take
appropriate steps to comply.
25X1A
WILLIAM P. BUNDY '
Secretary
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Post-Mortem on NIE 32-56:
The Outlook for Greece,
dated 26 June 1956
I, Findings
While the essential facts were available for analysis in the
preparation of this estimate, certain additional background information
on internal political developments in Greece and on the Cyprus situa-
tion would have proved helpful.
a. Within Greece information on such matters as the
strength and motives of the secret society within the armed
fore
Further intelligence on the
relations between the non-Communist left and the Communists
would also have been useful.
b. More definitive information on the relationships
existing among the various enosis nationalist elements on
Cyprus and their supporters within and outside the Greek
government would have been most useful. We would also
have benefited by having more detailed information on the
scope and intensity of popular support for the enosis
movement both on the island of Cyprus and in Greece itself.
II. Action
Individual IAC members are requested to take such action within
their own spheres of responsibility as they deem appropriate for
dealing with these problems.
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25 June 1956
INTELLIGENCE A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Post-Mortem on NIE 36. 5-56:
The Outlook for US Interests in Libya,
dated 19 June 1956
1. On 19 June 1956 the IAC noted the attached. findings and
approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take
appropriate steps to comply.
25X1A
WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Secretary
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25 June 1956
Post-Mortem on NIE 36. 5-56:
The Outlook for US Interests in Libya,
dated 19 June 1956
.I. Findings
1. No major intelligence deficiencies were encountered in
the preparation of this estimate. The chief estimative problem--
that of the outcome and implications for US interests of the
political struggle likely to follow the death of the king- -is one of
speculative judgment, rather than one resulting from specific
intelligence deficiencies.
2. While the following are not major deficiencies, this
estimate would have been strengthened by:
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25X1 C
3. Future estimates on Libya, if they are to be of wider
coverage than was called for in the present one, would benefit from
more basic information than is now available concerning:
a. Political conditions in the countryside--
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25 June 1956
b. The attitudes of all elements of Libyan society
toward the Libyan government.
25X1 C
II Action
The appropriate IAC agencies are requested to levy such re-
quirements in their field as are necessary to overcome the above
deficiencies.
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13 June 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E ADVISORY C O M M I T T E E
Post-Mortem on NIE 27. 1-56:
Probable Developments in Spain,
dated 12 June 1956
1. On 12 June 1956 the IAC noted the attached findings and
approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appro-
priate steps to comply.
WILLIAM P. BUND
Secretary
25X1A
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13 June 1956
Post-Mortem on NIE 27. 1-56:
Probable Developments in Spain,
dated 12 June 1956
I. Findings
More information is needed on the following:
a. The Falange--its present position; its organization;
its effectiveness in relation to the regime; its relationship to
other political forces, its
potential; the relative position o the opposing groups within
the Falange.
c. The business interests--any divergent views of
politically active business leaders.
d. The opposition- -details on the intellectuals and
labor, particularly on potential leaders and their views,
and on clandestine; Communist activities in labor and among
the intellectuals.
e. The succession--the relative prospects of various
possible successors to France.
The appropriate IAC agencies are requested to take such action
as they deem essential to increase the over-all intelligence coverage of
Spain.
25X1
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23 May 1956
Post-Mortem on NIE 100-5-56:
Chinese Communist Capabilities in the Taiwan Straits Area
and Probable Courses of Action Over the Next Six Months,
dated 22 May 1956
1. On 22 May 1956 the IAG noted the attached findings and
approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAG agencies are therefore requested to take
appropriate steps to comply.
25X1A
WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Secretary
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23 May 1956
Post-Mortem on NIE 100-5-56:
Chinese Communist Capabilities in the Taiwan Straits Area
and Probable Courses of Action Over the Next Six Months,
dated 22 May 1956
1. Findings
Although our general knowledge of Communist military strength
in East China appears to be good, we lack information on the extent
of military stockpiling in the area, on strength of ground forces in
East China, and on the status of airborne training and organization.
We particularly lack timely information on the movement of military
forces.
Individual IAG agencies are requested to take appropriate
action.
25X1 C
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9. May 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Post-Mortem on NIE 51-56:
India Over the Next Five Years,
dated 8 May 1956
1. On 8 May 1956 the IAG noted the attached findings and
approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAG agencies are therefore requested to take
appropriate steps to comply.
WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Secretary
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9 May 1956
Post-Mortem on NIE 51-56:
India Over the Next Five Years,
dated 8 May 1956
I. Findings
The following intelligence deficiencies and problems were noted
in preparation of NIE 51-56, "India Over the Next Five Years":
a. Preparation of the critically important economic
section of this estimate was handicapped by the lack of a
consistent, organized body of statistical data on which
quantitative judgments regarding the state of the economy
and major trends over the last few years could be based.
This deficiency is in considerable measure the result of
India's own statistics.
There is also need for more precise guidance to col-
lection agencies as to what basic statistics and studies
are desired.
b. More detailed information on the present rela-
tionship between the Congress Party and the government
and between various groups within the Congress Party,
together with details on the efforts now being made to
strengthen the party's organization at the grass roots
level, would have aided us considerably in estimating
the probable course of political development in India.
Information on the organization and strength of other
political parties is also inadequate.
C. Information is also inadequate on the degree of
Communist influence and penetration in the higher levels
of the Indian Government. Perhaps more important in
the future will be the obtaining of information regarding
Soviet influence on the Indian Government resulting from
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9 May 1956
grants of economic and technical assistance, trips by
official Soviet visitors, and the provision of Soviet
technicians.
II. Action
Individual IAC members are requested to take such action within
their own spheres of responsibility as they deem appropriate for
dealing with these problems.
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9 May 1956
Post-Mortem on NIE 100-3-56:
Sino-Soviet Policy and Its Probable Effects
in Underdeveloped Areas,
dated 24 April 1956
1. On 8 May 1956 the IAC noted the attached findings and
approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take
appropriate steps to comply.
25X1A
WILLIAM P. BUND
Secretary
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9 May 1956
Post-Mortem on NIE 100-3-56:
Sino-Soviet Policy and Its Probable Effects
in Underdeveloped Areas,
dated 24 April 1956
I. Findin s
1, instead of rehearsing the gaps observed in preparation of
this paper--which would in any case largely duplicate gaps pre-
viously reported from earlier estimates--it seems more helpful
in this case to set forth the key problems which the agencies had
to consider in preparing the estimate. This post-mortem thus
takes the form of a program of action and portrays what the
agencies are endeavoring to do in this field.
2. Listed below, therefore, are certain important problem
areas, selected on the basis of their importance to the two
principal estimative problems of NIE 100-3-56: (a) the motivation,
qualitative and quantitative content, and duration of current Bloc
tactics in the underdeveloped areas, and (b) the economic and
political effects in the underdeveloped areas of Bloc tactics.
3. Key problems with respect to Bloc motivations, capabilities,
and future courses of action are:
a. The extent to which Bloc economic tactics reflect:
(1) Bloc economic requirements and
(2) Bloc political considerations.
b. The probable level and pattern of Bloc trade with
the underdeveloped areas over the next five years.
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9 May 1956
4. Key problems with respect to the effects of Bloc tactics in
underdeveloped areas are as follows:
a. Effect of Bloc tactics on the morale, prestige,
and attractiveness of local Communist parties.
b. Bloc performance on trade arrangements and
technical assistance programs.
d.
e.
The vigilance of the underdeveloped countries
with respect to activities of the local Communists;
with respect to the dangers involved in current or
future commitments to the Bloc.
The likely degree of economic dependence on the
Bloc and the willingness of local leaders to
sacrifice economic gains if faced with compro-
mising political demands.
Long-term trends in world trade and demand and
trends in the attractiveness of the Bloc as a
market.
f. The relative weight of economic and other factors
determining political orientation.
The economic requirements for development in
the underdeveloped countries and likely contri-
bution of Bloc trade to development.
II. Action
The appropriate IAC agencies are requested to take such
action as they deem essential to increase the over-all intelligence
effort devoted to the underdeveloped areas and Bloc efforts to
influence them, with particular attention to the problems noted
above.
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10 April 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Post-Mortem on NIE 88-56:
Probable Developments in Colombia,
dated 10 April 1956
1. On 10 April 1956 the IAC noted the attached findings
and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take
appropriate steps to comply.
25X1A
WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Secretary
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10 April 1956
Post-Mortem on NIE 88-56
Probable Developments in Colombia,
dated 10 April 1956
I. Findings
The following intelligence deficiencies were noted in the
preparation of NIE 88-56:
a. The preparation of the section dealing with subversive
activities was handicapped by a lack of adequate field coverage.
We also lack
information on the government's capabilities and intentions with
respect to the guerrilla problem, and on possible international
Communist support for the guerrilla movement, particularly in
the provision of arms and money.
b. In both the political and military sections of the paper, it
would have been useful to have had additional field information on
key armed forces personalities, especially with respect to their
loyalties, intentions, and capabilities.
Individual IAC members are requested to take such action
within their own spheres of responsibility as they deem appropriate
for dealing with these problems.
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10 April 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Post-Mortem on NIE 61-56:
Probable Developments in Burma,
dated 10 April 1956
1. On 10 April 1956 the IAC noted the attached findings
and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take
appropriate steps to comply.
25X1A
WILLIAM P. BUND
Secretary
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10 April 1956
Post-Mortem on NIE 61-56:
Probable Developments in Burma,
dated 10 April 1956
I. Findings
1. The most important intelligence deficiencies noted in the
preparation of NIE 61-56 affect our ability to assess the reaction
of Burma to current Bloc tactics. In some cases these deficiencies,
involving attitudes and psychological reactions, cannot be overcome
by increased collection or analysis. However, we believe that a
more precise definition of the attitudes of Burmese university youth
could be obtained
We also believe that a more precise statement of
Burma's economic requirements and vulnerabilities could be attained
2. Although not critical to the present estimate, we lack detailed
and accurate information on:
a. Insurgent strength
b. Plans, organization, training, and equipment
of the army
c. The BCP and the BWPP and the relations between them
d. The impact of present Bloc tactics and propaganda
II. Action
It is requested that the appropriate IAC agencies continue their
efforts to overcome the deficiencies noted above.
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30 November 1956
XDMR NDUM F(Rs Director, Central Intelligence
SUBJECT $ SEC Progress Report on Action Taken Pursuant to
IAC Pest-A)brtem on NlE 11-56, Soviet Gross Capar-
bilities for Attack on the US and Key Overseas
Installations and Forces through Mid 1959
(1,D-57/28, 20 March 1956)
1. The Office of Scientific Intelligence has participated in
the preparation of subject progress report and is in agreement therewith.
2. General progress has been made, through coordinated community
effort, in reducing intelligence deficiencies with respect to related
Soviet research and development programs and technical capabilities of
Soviet aircraft. However, critical areas of insufficiency persist.
3. The Scientific Estimates Committee (SEC) believes that the
degree of success achieved in narrowing the intelligence gaps in
NIE 11-56 may be ascertained the post-mortems on the forthcoming
related estimates.. N>E 11-7-5 and ME 11-57.
~. For this reason the SEC recommends that the post-mortems on
the respective national intelligence estimates again assess the adequacy
of intelligence with respect to the two fields discussed in paragraph 2,
above, I suggest that the recommended reassessment include inquiry
into the following areas in which in my opinion, critical gaps remain:
(a) BW and CW munitions and delivery capabilities; (b) aircraft develop-
ment projects; (c) technical characteristics of Soviet aircraft, includ-
capabilities and limitations; (d) development of in-flight refueling
e bombing-navigation radars; (f) electronic countermeasures; and
(g development or adaptation of submarines to carry guided missiles.
25X1A
Chairman
Scientific Estimates Committee
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Revised
4 December 1956
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
SEC Progress Report on Action Taken Pursuant to
Post-Mortem on NIE 11-56
At the IAG meeting on 4 December the IAC noted this SEC
progress report, subject to the amendment of the last sentence of
para. 3, and approved the recommendation contained therein.
Attached is a copy of this report as amended. Pursuant to the
direction of the IAC, recipients of this document are requested to
destroy all copies of the report distributed earlier (IAC-D-57/28. 1,
27 November 1956).
25X1A
Acting Secretary
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0 IAC-D-57/28. 1
P Revised
Y 4 December 1956
MEMORANDUM FOR : Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee
Progress Report on Action_ Taken Pursuant
to IAC Post-Mortem on NIE 11-56, Soviet
Gross Capabilities for Attack on the US and
Key Overseas Installations and Forces
Through Mid-1959 (IAC-D-57/28, 20 March
1956)
1. In compliance with its responsibilities under paragraph II
of subject post-mortem, the Scientific Estimates Committee (SEC)
submits the following progress report of measures taken by the intel-
ligence community to improve intelligence collection, research, and
analysis with regard to Soviet research and development programs and
technical capabilities of Soviet aircraft.
Soviet Research and Development Programs
2. The. Scientific Estimates Committee in collaboration with
the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, the Guided Missile
Intelligence Committee, and the Economic Intelligence Committee,
within respective spheres of responsibility, completed the first
comprehensive coordinated study on Capabilities and Trends of Soviet
Science and Technology, which served as the basis for NIE 11-6-56,
same subject, approved by the IAC on 9 October 1956. This estimate
is the first evaluation by the intelligence community of the Soviet
scientific effort as a whole and of the major facets thereof in relation
to the total effort.
Technical Capabilities of Soviet Aircraft
3. Air Force, Navy, Army, and CIA (a) have generally
strengthened their efforts with regard to collection, research, and
analysis of technical capabilities of Soviet aircraft, and (b) have
concentrated and sharply focused their efforts with regard to areas
of insufficiency therein. As a result, some intelligence gaps in
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Revised
4 December 1956
this field have been narrowed, notably through the refinement of the
methods used for the determination of aircraft characteristics.
4. The SEC recognizes that, although improvement is noted in
all phases of intelligence on.th.e!Awo fields, the critical areas of in-
sufficiency continue to exist in some form. The SEC therefore
recommends that the IAC reinquire in the post-mortems of NIE 11-7-56*
and NIE 11-1-57, ** into intelligence deficiencies encountered in these
fields during the preparation of the respective national intelligence
estimates.
25X1A
20 November 1956
NIE 11-7-56, Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the
Continental US in Mid-1960
NIE 11-1-57, Sino-Soviet Bloc Air Defense Capabilities
through Mid-1962
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20 March 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Post-Mortem on NIE 11-56:
Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the US
and Key Overseas Installations and Forces
Through Mid-1959,
dated 6 March 1956
. 1. On 20 March 1956 the IAC noted the attached findings
and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take
appropriate steps to comply.
25X1A
WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Secretary
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20 March 1956
Post-Mortem on NIE 11-56:
Soviet Gross Capabilities. for Attack on the US
and Key Overseas Installations and Forces
Through Mid-1959,
dated 6 March 1956
I. Findings
1. This estimate is essentially an updating of NIE 11-7-55,
completed in July 1955. The primary intelligence deficiencies noted
in the post-mortem on NIE 11-7-55 (IAC-D-57/8, 23 August 1955)
still exist, and little progress has been made in overcoming them
during the intervening six months. In summary these deficiencies
are: lack of adequate intelligence on Soviet research and development
programs, on production of major weapons, on training in the Soviet
Long-Range Air Force, on airfield developments and capacities, and
on technical capabilities of Soviet aircraft. The USSR is apparently
developing guided missiles on a rapidly increasing scale; although
more evidence is now available than formerly, intelligence is still
deficient in this field as well.
2. Finally, it should be noted that a general weakness of this
paper, and its predecessors, stems from the lack of any agreed
analysis of Soviet strategic concepts, which would assist in estimating
the manner in which the USSR is likely to allocate its resources among
various weapons systems in order to satisfy its operational require-
ments. An initial effort in this direction was approved by the IAC for
the 1956 version of the over-all Soviet estimate. (See the Post-Mortem
on 11-3-55 in IAC-D-57/7, 16 August 1955.)
It is requested that the appropriate agencies or IAG subcommittees
pursue vigorously the collection, research, and analysis recommended
in this post-mortem and in the post-mortem on NIE 11-7-55, and re-
port on progress made to the IAG by 15 October 1956.
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7 February 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Post-Mortem on NIE 42. 1-56:
Probable Developments in the Republic of Korea
Through Mid-1957,
dated 7 February 1956
1. On 7 February 1956, the IAC noted the attached findings
and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take
appropriate steps to comply.
25X1A
Secretary
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7 February 1956
Post-Mortem on NIE 42. 1-56:
Probable Developments in the Republic of Korea
Through Mid-1957,
dated 7 February 1956
I. Fins
Preparation of-this estimate was not critically handicapped
by intelligence gaps. The most difficult estimative problems are
those involving the ROK's actions with respect to North Korea and
developments following the death. of Rhee. Since developments
following Rhee's death may lead to the emergence of new leaders
and alignments it is important that information on the thinking,
motivations, and strength of all potential leaders including major
military commanders be developed. The attitudes and loyalties
of sevet-al large groups in the population such as the peasants and
common soldiers deserve continuing scrutiny. Although we be-
lieve that these groups are largely passive with respect to
political developments, they might become of increasing im-
portance over the next few years.
II. Action
The IAC agencies are requested to note these findings and
take appropriate action.
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7 February 1956
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Post-Mortem on NIE 24-56:
The Political Outlook in Italy,
dated 7 February 1956
1. On 7 February 1956, the IAC noted the attached findings
and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take
appropriate steps to comply.
25X1A
Secretary
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Post-Mortem on NIE 24-56:
The Political Outlook in Italy,
dated 7 February 1956
I. Findings
1.
Existing intel-
ligence deficiencies have not significantly affected our ability
to estimate the over-all situation and the broad lines of future
political developments.
2. However, because of the extremely fluid domestic
political situation, we need additional information on matters
such as trends in policy, strength, and leadership of the Com-
munist party and of the Christian Democratic party; the
attitudes of Nenni, and of other Nenni Socialist party members,
with respect to center-left cooperation and with respect to the
Communist-Nenni Socialist alliance; and, in general, develop-
ments bearing on the so-called "opening to the left."
The IAC agencies are requested to note the above defi-
ciencies and take appropriate action.
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24 January 1956
INTELLIGENCE A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Post-Mortem on NIE 64-56:
The Political Outlook in Malaya Through 1960,
dated 24 January 1956
1. On 24 January 1956, the IAC noted the attached findings
and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take
appropriate steps to comply.
25X1A
Secretary .
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24 January 1956
Post-Mortem on NIE 64-56:
The Political Outlook in Malaya Through 1960,
dated 24 January 1956
I. Findings
detailed information is spotty on indigenous
organizations and their activities, particularly in Singapore.
Moreover, the extent of Communist strength has not been pre-
cisely determined in either the Federation or Singapore; and
information is inadequate both on the organization of PAP and
on the question of the extent and nature of Communist strength
within PAP.
Intelligence organizations of the IAC are requested to take
appropriate remedial action.
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IAC-D-57/23
10 January 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Post?Mortem on NIE 12-56:
Probable Developments in the European Satellites
Through 1960,
dated 10 January 1956
1. On 10 January 1956, the IAC noted the attached findings
and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take
appropriate steps to comply.
25X1A
Secretary
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10 January 1956
Post-Mortem on NIE 12-56:
Probable Developments in the European Satellites
Through 1960,
dated 10 January 1956
I. Findings
1. NIE 12- 56, the annual estimate of trends in the European
Satellites, was coordinated without major delays or serious disagree-
ment. The principal differences centered around questions of judg-
ment:. (a) whether Soviet leaders might be considering some
modification in the essentially coercive nature of their control over
the Satellites; (b) how far Soviet relations with Yugoslavia, China,
or the neutralist states may have a bearing on Moscow's policy in
the Satellites; (c) to what extent coordination of the Satellite
economies would be effective; (d) the extent of disaffection among
the Satellite populations; and (e) to what extent the Satellite armed
forces could be employed in the event of general war.
2. While most of the difficulties encountered in the prepara-
tion and coordination of NIE 12-56 were the result of long-standing
deficiencies of data on the Satellites, the course of coordination
made clear that, currently, a significant gap in our knowledge of
the Satellites concerns the Satellite Communist parties. Specifically,
we do not know enough concerning the character, size, and influence
of various factions and divisions within the Satellite parties. It is
not clear in what way divisions within the Soviet regime are re-
flected in shifts in Satellite leadership and policies. The extent to
which factions within the Satellite parties are desirous of imitating
Tito also needs illumination.
It is recommended that a Satellite equivalent of the 25X1A
study be undertaken in the form of a pilot study dealing with possible
factions in the Czechoslovak Communist party.
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5 January 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Post-Mortem on NIE 13-56:
Chinese Communist Capabilities and
Probable Courses of Action Through 1960,
dated 5 January 1956
1. On 5 January 1956, the IAC noted the attached findings
and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take
appropriate steps to comply.
25X1A
Sec
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5 January 1956
Post-Mortem on NIE 13-56:
Chinese Communist Capabilities and
Probable Courses of Action Through 1960,
dated 5 January 1956
I. Findings
1. We are still dependent in large measure on Chinese
Communist radio broadcasts, newspaper articles, and official
announcements for information concerning developments in
Communist China. While our ability to crosscheck the consistency
of data has improved, we are able to evaluate such material, in
most instances, only in a general way
2. Within the general intelligence deficiency concerning
Communist China, we believe the following specific categories
to be the more important:
a. The popular reaction to the Communist regime
and, particularly, to the Communist drive to socialize
agriculture.
25X1 B'
25X1 B
25X1 B
25X6
d. Sino-Soviet relations including:
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(1) Formulation and communication of policy
decisions.
(2) Amount,and nature of Soviet economic
assistance.
(3) The nature of guidance to the Communist
parties in other Asian countries and the respective
roles of Communist China and the Soviet Union in
this field.
e. Training, morale, logistics, unit organization and
location, and the progress of the re-equipment program of
the military forces. In addition, information on the com-
mand structure and the operation of the newly instituted
system of military conscription.
f. The effectiveness with which the Chinese Communists
develop and execute complex industrial projects. The volume
and quality of production in heavy industry with special em-
phasis on machine building, armaments, steel, and petroleum.
.g. Capacity and utilization of all forms of transportation
and details of their component factors, particularly the size
and production of railroad rolling stock.
h. Information on the price structure particularly with
respect to equipment and producer goods.
i. Trends in diet and the standard of living both urban
and rural.
. L. The number and- quality of graduates from secondary
schools and colleges, particularly in technical fields.
3. The above items relate directly to the sectors of the
Chinese Communist society which were considered in NIE 13-56
to be the most critical relative to the Communist objectives of
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achieving economic progress and strengthening the regime's
control over the Chinese people. As we move further away
from 1949 and from intelligence on China based directly on
non-Communist sources, our estimates of Communist strength
and weaknesses will become increasingly dependent on Chinese
Communist official sources.
II. Action
The IAC agencies are requested to examine their collection
effort to see what can be done to reduce the above described gaps.
25X1 C
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IAC-D-57/20
7 December 1955
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Post-Mortem on NIE 71-55:
Probable Developments in French North Africa,
dated 2.9 November 1955
1. On 6 December 1955, the IAC noted the attached findings
and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IA.C agencies are therefore requested to take appro-
priate steps to comply.
25X1A
Secretary
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7 December 1955
Post- Mortem on NIE 71-55:
Probable Developments in French North Africa,
dated 29 November 1955
Findings
1. Our chief need is for additional intelligence on the
nationalist movements in the area, particularly in French Morocco
and Algeria. We need details on: (a) the capabilities, leadership,
and policies of the various nationalist movements, especially the
Istiqlal and the CR UA; (b) extremist groups and their relationships
with the recognized nationalist parties; (c) cooperation or rivalry
between nationalist leaders both within and outside French North
Africa; (d) the role and composition of nationalist committees El
I Ioutside North Africa-, (e) the degree to which tribal
iza ions are being affected by nationalism; and (f) the sources
and levels of external assistance for the nationalists including arms,
equipment, personnel, and training.
2. Since the Communists will probably expand their activi-
ties in French North Africa, we will require increasing intelligence
on the strength and capabilities of the Communist parties in all
three areas. In particular, we will need information on the extent
of cooperation between the Communists and the nationalist move-
ments.
II. Action
The IAC agencies are requested to intensify their efforts
to overcome the intelligence deficiencies listed above,
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15 November 1955
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Post-Mortem on NIE 43-55:
The Prospects for the Chinese Nationalist Government,
dated 1 November 1955
1. On 15 November 1955, the IAC noted the attached findings
and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appro-
priate steps to comply.
25X1A
Acting Secretary
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15 November 1955
Post-Mortem on NIE 43-55:
The Prospects for the Chinese Nationalist Government,
dated 1 November 1955
1. Findings.
25X1
However, our estimates could be strengthened by fuller and more
specific information on the extent and nature of Communist sub-
versive efforts, 25X1 C
and by more positive information on the state of civilian morale on
Taiwan, especially among officials. There is also a need for more
complete information on the basic attitudes and views of Nationalist
leaders, on Taiwanese-mainlander relations, and.on specific
economic matters, particularly a sound GNP calculation. Our
ability to judge Taiwan's economic growth and prospects is also
hampered by inadequate date on the size, structure, rate of growth,
and employment pattern of the population.
The IAC agencies are requested to continue and intensify
their efforts to obtain the indicated information.
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18 October 1955
INTELLIGENCE A.D VISORY COMMITTEE
Post-Mortem on NIE 63. 1-3-55:
Probable Developments in South Vietnam to July 1956,
dated 11 October 1955
1. On 18 October 1955, the IAC noted the attached findings
and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appro-
priate steps to comply.
25X1A
Acting Secretary
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18 October 1955
Post-Mortem on NIE 63.1-3-55:
Probable Developments in South Vietnam to July 1956,
dated 11 October 1955
I. Findings
In the preparation of this estimate the Board of National
Estimates and the IAC representatives found that there continue
to be serious intelligence deficiencies with respect to Viet Minh
capabilities and intentions. In particular, there is little reliable
information concerning: the size and most important areas of
concentration of Viet Minh political and military cadres in South
Vietnam; the extent of Viet Minh political influence in rural and
urban areas; and the extent to which the Viet Minh may have
infiltrated or have reached understanding with non-Communist
opposition groups in South Vietnam, especially the sect groups
remaining in dissidence.
II. A ction
The IAC agencies are requested to intensify their col-
lection efforts to close the serious gaps cited above.
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..Copy No.
IA C-D- 57; 14
7 September .1955
I N T E L L I G E N C E ADVISORY C O M M I T T E E
Post-~Mortem on NIE 11-6-E,5 Probable Intelligence
Warning of Soviet Attack on the US Through:
Mid-1958, dated 1 July 1.955
1. On. 7 September,. the IAC noted the attached findings
and approved the action set. forth in section' Il.
2: The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take
appropriate steps to comply.
Secretary
25X1A
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7 September 1955
Post-Mortem on NIE 11-6-55: Probable Intelligence
Warning of Soviet Attack on the US Through
Mid-1953, dated 1 July 1955
I. Findings
1. NIE 11-6-55, approved by the LAC on 1 July 1955, was essen-
tially an updating of.the previous warning estimate, SNIE 11-8-54.
In coordinating this estimate primary disagreement continued to center
around the degree of specific advance warning intelligence was likely
to provide under various scale;:; of air attack. On one point the Air
Force entered. a formal dissent. Disagreement stemmed primarily
from divergences in view as to the current and probable future Soviet
capabilities for surprise air attack, and the nature and extent of the
problems i~iherent in interpreting wwarning indicators.
Z. In many respects thin NIE involves questions of judgment or
estimates of future capabilities upon which little or no factual evi -
dence can be brought to bear. However, there are certain significant
intelligence deficiencies, particularly as regards the nature and
quality of training (including inflight refueling), the nature and extent
of activity in forward base areas, and the status of forward air base
development -which bear upon the vital question of Soviet operational
readiness, methods,. and effectivenes,, and thus upon Soviet capability
for surprise attack. Further intensification of the already vigorous
intelligence efforts in these fields may result in some further narrowing
of the intelligence gaps, although, short of a major change in Soviet
security practice or some intelligence breakthrough, no dramatic im-
provement is to be expected.
3. To estimate the probable degree of advance warning that
could be, provided by intelligence i; is essential that all relevant
techniques and capabilities, current and prospective, be carefully
considered. Written contributions frorn the government organizations
probably best able to supply such technical information, including
special intelligence, should be requested. Moreover, since the
nature and degree of warning depends in large part on the performances
of these organizations, these contributions should include an evaluation
of their operational capabilities.
4. The nature and degree of warning is also affected b
tional factors,
which -were not fully explored.
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b'6% 57 1'4
7 September. 1955
When estimates of probable intelligence 'warning:are under
consideration:
a. That the Watch Co*nmitt se when appropriate `(1):
submit written contributions covering technical
information and an evalua:tian.of their pperational
capabilities, and (2) provide consultative partici-
pation by members of its staff as appr'opriat:e;
That NSA be asked, when appropriate, to continue
to provide consultants, who would participate more,;
fully than in the past at the IAC representatives
level
That an effort be made to determine what c.gotribution
to warning might be mad 71
urid.er various degrees of
tension."
25X1
25X1
-2
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7 September 1955
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Post-Mortem on NIE 31 Series
1. On 7 September, the IAC noted 'the attached findings
and approved the, action set forth in paragraph 4,
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take
appropriate steps to comply.
25X1A
Secretary
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7 September 1955
POST-MORTEM ON NIE 31 SERIES
1. Coverage. This is a post-mortem on NIE 31-55,
"Probable Developments in Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, It
23 February 1955, NIE 31/1-55, "Yugoslavia and Its Future
Orientation," 19 Mey 1955; and NIE 31-2-55, "Yugoslavia's Inter-
national Position, " 7 September 1955.
2. Findings. Since NIE 31-55 and NIE 31/1-55 cover the
same ground, and NIE 31-2-55 overlaps these earlier estimates to
a considerable extent, the intelligence deficiencies encountered in
the preparation of all three were much the same. The deficiencies
stem primarily from the secretiveness and aloofness of Yugoslav
officials in their contacts with representatives of Western powers.
3. The most important of these intelligence deficiencies,
both relating to key estimative questions, were:
a.
b.
A lack of reliable intelligence on relationships
between the Yugoslav regime and party on the
one hand, and those of the Soviet Bloc on the
other,
A similar lack with respect to relationships within
the Yugoslav ruling group, particularly as these
bear on the regime's foreign policy toward the
Bloc and the West. Although we feel safe in
estimating that a pro-Soviet element .exists in
Yugoslavia, we have little intelligence on its
present or potential influence.
4. Action. That the IAC agencies continue systematic efforts
to collect and analyze data bearing on:
a. Yugoslav-Bloc relations; and
b.
Relationships within the Yugoslav regime and
party, particularly as they may affect Yugoslavia's
international position.
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6 September 1955
A
F
T
INTELLI( NCE ADVISORY C
Procedure for the Pest-'Produotiou. Review
of National Intelligence Estimates
25X1A
1. P?oeas
This paper sets forth the general procedure for reviewing the
performance of the intelligence comaanmity in producing national
intelligence estimates in order to'take remedial action if such is
requiredo:
2 Po
The IAC shall:
a. Review each estimate J=wd.iately to identi$r the
intelligence deficiencies encountered by the
estimators during its preparation; and
b. Review each estimate after the lapse of an appropriate
interval to determine its validity, ioe., how good the
estimate was in the light of subsequent developments.
3. Reepanaibili1 r for Thitiating Action
The Board of National Estimates is responsible for initiating
action, but the IAC agencies ra$p request alternative action if they
do not agree with the action . proposed by the Board*
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Procedure on Deficiencies
a. Poet-aortem findings are simply a statement of intelligence
deficiencies or gaped These can be (a) substantive-.lack of adequate
data; or (b) procedural, e.g., insufficient analytical effort on
certain subjects. Findings will usually be confined to statements of
such deficiencies, in which case action recommended will be to enjoin
the intelligence community to take appropriate steps to reduce the
deficiencies noted. In other cases specific remedial action will be
cat forth, specific as to what is to be done or as to what agency
shall do it,
b. The IAC agencies will include in their contributions to NIE's
a statement of the deficiencies (substantive or procedural), if atq,
encountered during the preparation of the contributions,,
Cc The Board will incorporate a section on the findings together
with recommended remedial action in the draft estimate:. Agreement on
this statement will be sought just as in the case of the estimate
itself.
d. The TAC will note the findings agreed upon and will act on
recommendations made,
e. Subsequent to IAC actionthe Secretary of the IAC win
circulate the findings noted and the action to be talmn by the
intelligence community,
Z. In those cases where it is clear that few intelligence de-
ficiencies of a sort Justifying a post-mortem exist, the Board will
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so inform the TAC representatives and seek agreement to so advise
the IAC.. In such cases the IAC would be notified,, and the matter
be made a part of the recordo by the inclusion of a Secretary's Note
in the current IAC minutes.
in those cases where a detailed post-morten is required.
or the estimate would be delayed because of an attempt to complete
action on the post-mortem when the estimate is up for approval, the
Board will prepare a separate post-mortem and the findings and recom-
mendations will be coordinated subsequent to the coripletion of the
estimate0
5. Procedure on Validation
Whenever an estimate is rued,, the contributing agencies
will be requested to submit a critique of the previous estimate
together with their regular contributions These critiques will be
consolidated by the Board of National Estimates and coordinated with
the IAC representatives. These will then be noted by the IAA and
circulated by the Secretary of the TAC for information.
b. In instances where estimates are revised only infrequently,,
a validity study may be undertaken at any time upon the initiative
of the Board of National Estimates or at the request of any one of
the IAC agencies,
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. a. lJhenever, in the judgment of the Board of National Estimates,
the subject-matter of a national estimate or the period it is designed
to cover render a validity study infeasible, the Board may elect not
to undertake such a study provided no objection is raised by one of
the IAC agencies.
!4_
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30 August 1955
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE
SINO-SOVIET BLOC
1. On 30 August, the IAC noted the attached findings and
reconstituted the Resistance Intelligence CDnmittee under the
chairmanship of the Department of State.
2. The Department of State has designated Mr. Boris Klosson
as its representative and chairman of the RIC.
3. IAC intelligence organizations are hereby requested to
take appropriate action to close specific intelligence gaps and
to support the work of the 1CC.
ILLEGIB
Secretary
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23 August 1955
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Post- tortean on NIE 100-5-55: Implications of
Gmwing Nuclear Capabilities for the Communist
Bloc and the Free World
1. The attached post-mortem findings were noted by the IAC on
23 August.
2. The attention of recipients is in particular called to para-
graph 4.
Secretary
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23 August 1955
POST MORT4 ON NIE 100-5-55: IMPLICATIONS OF
GROWING NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES FOR THE
COMMUNIST BLOC AND THE FREE WORLD
FINDINGS
25X1 C
25X1 B
1. Since NIE 100-5-55 dealt so largely with questions of judgment
and longer range estimates, it is difficult to assess the extent of
intelligence gaps. However, there is a continuing growth in both the
volume and the scope of information available on public and official
attitudes toward nuclear problems which pro vide valuable background
for estimates like those made in NIB 100-5-55. E- I
Much of this data was assembled
u ere was still a relative paucity of sufficiently concrete evidence
upon which estimates could, be based. Another major difficulty was a
general lack of organization in the material available throughout the
agencies.
2. Because nuclear developments will have an increasingly important
impact on the course of foreign policy, it is essential to accelerate,
expand, and systematize the collection of pertinent material. In general,
the collection effort should be a continuing process and include any data
bearing on the effect of increasing nuclear capabilities on public
attitudes and national policies of Free World, Communist Bloc, and so-
called neutral or independent countries. Dnphasis should be on intelli-
gence having broad implications for foreign and militarv nolicv.
3. Among the information which would be particularly useful would
be that related to the effects of nuclear developments on foreign public
attitudes and the policies of foreign governments with respect to:
18
25X1 B
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(a) general foreign policy objectives and tactics
(b) publicity and propaganda
(c) increased or decreased risk of war
(d) evaluation of alliance systems
(e) neutralist or isolationist tendencies
(f) increased boldness or caution in foreign policy
(g). instigation of or intervention in local conflicts
and local aggression
(h) approval of the use of "tactical" nuclear weapons
(i) necessity for nonnuclear powers to develop their
own nuclear capabilities
(j) general disarmament and international agreements
restricting or controlling production, testing,
or employment of nuclear weapons
(k) health and genetic effects of nuclear explosions
(1) prospect for employment of and reaction to attempted
nuclear "blackmail"
(m) further development of peaceful applications of
nuclear energy
(n) assessment of balance of military power
(o) military organization, emphasis, deployment, and
doctrine
(p) levels and types of armament and military expenditures
(q) development of offensive and defensive capabilities
(including both weapons and delivery capabilities)
4. It would greatly facilitate the thorough and timely consideration
of the above factors in relevant national estimates if the agencies and
CIA offices in a position to collect and analyze such data would make a
systematic and continuing effort to do so.
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17 July 1956
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Progress Reports on Action Taken Pursuant to
Post-Mortem on NIE 11-5-55, "Air Defense
of the Sino-Soviet: Bloc, 1955-1960'P
References; IAC-D-57/9, 23 August 1955
IAC-D-57/9. 1, 23 December 1955
1, Attached are copies of reports on progress made in over-
coming certain intelligence deficiencies in the electronics field,
prepared by the'Scientific Estimates Committee and the Economic
Intelligence Committee, pursuant to the direction of the IAC in con-
nection with its approval of the Post-Mo.rtem on NIE 11-5-55
(IAC-D-57/9, 23 August 1955, para. 5). An interim. report by the
EIC on the same subject.: has been circulated for information previously
(IAC-D-57/9 1, 23 December 1455)..
2; These reports will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC
meeting, for noting.
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WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Secretary
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P 17 July 1956
Y
MEMORANDUM FOR : Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee
SUBJECT : Progress Report on Action Taken Pursuant
to IAC Post-Mortem on NIE 11-5-55, Air
Defense of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1955- 1960
(IAC-D-57/9, 23 August 1955)
1. In compliance with its responsibilities under paragraph 5 of
subject IAC post-mortem, the Scientific Estimates Committee submits
the following progress report of measures taken by the intelligence
community to overcome intelligence deficiencies with respect to probable
operational capabilities of Soviet radars.
2. It has been found difficult to obtain complete agreement of
technical experts on the operational performance of any radars, in-
cluding US radars whose characteristics are accurately known.
Nevertheless SEC members are in unanimous agreement on the
pressing need to determine the performance characteristics of Soviet
radars to the'greatest possible extent. Accordingly, the SEC acted
in January 1956 to sponsor a coordinated, all-source research
program on Soviet radars. The program consists of two phases:
(a) community agreement on assumptions of parameters to be used in
estimating radar characteristics, and (b) production of an agreed
estimate of operational capabilities of Soviet radars, The SEC will
endeavor to complete this study during the current quarter of Calendar
Year 1956. It is anticipated that a community position on Soviet
radars will be achieved by this means in ample time for the next,NIE
on Sino-Soviet Air Defense, now scheduled for the first quartet of
Calendar Year 1957.
3. In addition, to their active participation in the SEC-sponsored
program described above, Army, Navy, Air Force, and CIA report a
general strengthening of their collective and individual research efforts
with regard to Soviet radars. These member agencies have also in-
tensified their efforts to improve the quality and scope of intelligence
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collection with regard to Soviet radars by (a) increasing emphasis on
the development and circulation of coordinated information requirements
on Soviet radar's;
airman
Scientific Estimates Committee
3 July 1956
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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
12 July 1956
MEMORANDUM FOR : Secretary, Intelligence Advisory Committee
SUBJECT : EIC Responsibilities under Post Mortem of
NIE 11-5-55, IAC-D-57/9 of 23 August 1955,
REFERENCE : EIC Progress Report on Action Taken Pursuant
to Post Mortem on Soviet Air Defense Estimate,
IAC-D-57/9. 1, 23 December 1955
1. The subject.paper directed the EIC to review, community
research efforts related to "probable costs of Soviet radar and other
electronics".
2. On 23 December 1955 the EIC reported to the IAC that an
expanded economic research program for FY 1956 had already been
initiated by the IAC Agencies engaged in research on Soviet Bloc
electronics, and that this current program is as comprehensive as
can be supported by presently available information. The EIC also
indicated that it would follow the current program closely and report
further towards the close of the fiscal year--indicating the extent
to which the programmed research had been successful in closing
priority intelligence gaps.
3. Because of the security surrounding this industry in the Bloc,
collection of information on costs has not been greatly improved.
Some intelligence reports concerning this deficiency have been completed
during the past six months. The military intelligence agencies have
completed projects which provide basic data related to the costs of
radar and other electronics, for example,
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More data, however, will be required before this priority
intelligence gap can be successfully closed.
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23 December 1955
INTELLIGENCE AD VISORY COMMITTEE
EIC Progress Report on Action Taken Pursuant to
Post-Mortem on Soviet Air Defense Estimate
The attached report of the Economic Intelligence Committee
on the progress being made on discharging EIC responsibilities
assigned under IAC-D-57/9 is circulated for information.
25X1A
6ecretary
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IAC-D-57/9. 1
23 December 1955
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
23 December 1955
TO : Secretary, Intelligence Advisory Committee
SUBJECT: EIC Responsibilities under Post-Mortem of NIE 11-5--55,
IAC-D-57/9 of 23 August 1955,
1. The subject paper directed the EIC to review community
research efforts related to "probable costs of Soviet radar and
other electronics." Accordingly, the EIC requested its Subcom-
mittee on Electronics and Telecommunications to explore and
report to it on the situation.
2. The EIC has itself been aware for some time of the
inadequacies of available finished intelligence on this area of
Soviet production. An expanded economic research program for
FY 1956 had already been initiated t y the IAC agencies engaged in
research on Soviet Bloc electronics prior to receipt of the IAC
post-mortem. * In addition, another major project has been laid on
more recently in CIA/ORR, which will include cost estimates and
operating data on Sino-Soviet Bloc radar facilities.
3. In the view of the EIC, after consulting its technical
subcommittee in this field, this current program is as compre-
hensive as can be supported by presently available information.
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If further expansion of research in this field is desired, it will
require additional collection- -particularly fuller information on
equipment characteristics.
4. The EIC will follow this program closely and report
further towards the close of the current fiscal year- -indicating
the extent to which this programmed research has been suc-
cessful in closing priority intelligence gaps.
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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
post-Mortem on NIB 11-5-55: Air Defense. of the
Sino-Soviet Bloc 1955-1960
1. On 23 August, the IRC noted the attached findings and approved
the action set forth in paragraph 5.
2. She TAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate
steps to comply.
25X1A
Secretary
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23 August-19$5
POST MORTEM ON NIE 11-5-55: AIR DEFENSE OF THE
SINO-SOVIET B10C, 1955-1960
1. NIE 11-5.55, approved by the IAC on 12 July 1955s was
approximately six months in preparation. 1b provide a logical and
systematic approach to a complex and bulky NIB of this type, it was
produced in four separate steps using ad hoc interagency committees
in three preliminary stages. The three committees prepared successively:
(a) an estimate of Bloc air defense requirements; (b) an estimate of
present and future air defense equipment, forces, and capabilities of
the Bloc as,.determined by available intelligence; and (c) an estimate
of the cost of the program estimated in Step Two, as well as of the
economic capabilities of the Bloc to provide such an air defense system.
Finally., agency representatives coordinated in the usual way a draft
prepared by 0/N$ on the basis of contributions produced by the three
committees. This method was a further refinement of that used initially
in preparing NIE 11-6-54 on guided missiles.
S. 7rNMNGS
2 Certain difficulties were encountered in the committee method
of preparing this estimate. It proved impractical and in some respects
would probably have been undesirable to obtain complete interagency
concurrence for the committee contributions. However, a large degree
of concurrence was obtained informally at the committee level, which
assisted greatly in the subsequent review of the estimate by the lAC
Representatives. There was some lack of consistency in the interpreta-
tion of requirements by the various committees, leading to different
positions being taken by the same agency in these committees. This
made the reconciliation of differing views time-consuming in the final
stages of the estimate.
3. Nevertheless, the step-by-step committee approach facilitated
the preparation of the estimate and is a technique which should continue
to be used where appropriate. Howevers this process requires that each
agency's representatives on the various committees should be completely
familiar with the process of producing national estimates and fully
coordinate their approaches to the problem.
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4. The many intelligence deficiencies encountered in this
estimate are not likely to be fully overcome short of major changes
in Bloc security practices or some unexpected breakthrough by intelli-
gence. Deficiencies continue to exist in weapons research, development,
and production,, deployment of equipment and forces, technical capabilities
of weapons, training programs and combat readiness and economic costa I
25X1 and capabilities in articular fields.
25X1 conditions.
ere was a vergence of
25X1 In
addition our data on the rate of production and on the probable costs
of electronics equipment is weak. An effort to produce more comprehensive
special studies on the technical capabilities of Bloc air defense equip-
meat m ight help to fill the present gaps in intelligence.
5. ? That the agencies with primary responsibility in the electronics
fields undertake a more intensive and comprehensive research effort to
overcome intelligence deficiencies with respect tot (a) probable opera-
tional capabilities of Soviet radar., and (b) probable costs of Soviet
radar and other electronics. The SIC and X[Care to review these research
efforts and submit a report on progress made to the IAC prior to 1 July 1956.
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I N T E L L I G E N C E .A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Post-Mortem on NIE 11-7-55c. Soviet Gross
PIP-abilities for Attack on the US and Key'
Overseas Installations Through Mid-1958
1. On 23 August, the IAC noted the attached findings and approved
the action set forth in paragraph 7.
2. The IA C agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate
steps to comply.
Secretary
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POST-KORTI +I ON NIE 11-7-55: SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES
FOR ATTACK ON 'HE US AND KEY OVERSEAS INSTALLATIONS
THROUGH MID-1958
1. NIB 3.1-7-55 was approved by the IAC on 17 M 1955. Subsequent
information I I required sev-
eral substantive changes and a considerable increase in over-all estimates
of Soviet Long-Mange Air Force capabilities. These changes were reviewed
by the IAC representatives and approved without formal submission to the
IAC on 23 June 1955. There were no agency dissents.
I. FINDINGS
2. This estimate was essentially an updating of NIE 11-7A-54, com-
pleted in the last quarter of 1954? The principal new feature was an
attempt to analyze in greater detail the operational problems of the
Soviet Long-Range Air Force. NIE 11-7-55 indicates a substantial in-
crease in the capabilities of this force over those estimated in 11-7A-54,
due primarily to the appearance of a new long-range turbo-prop heavy
bomber (BEAR) and an increase in estimated numbers of the jet heavy
bomber (BISON).
3. Estimates of Soviet capabilities to attack the US still suffer
from lack of adequate intelligence pertaining to Soviet aircraft pro-
duction, training in the Soviet Long-Range Air Force, airfield develop-
ment and capacities, and the technical capabilities of Soviet aircraft
and equipment. These estimates likewise suffer from deficiencies in
nuclear weapon and guided missile* capabilities intelligence.
I ix view or
deficiency in our knowledge on rates of production, it is entirely pos-
sible that the judgments as to future Soviet capabilities given in NIE
11-7-55 could be quite wide of the mark.
5. Although there is considerable evidence pertaining to Soviet
Long-Range Air Force home bases, training programs, and deployment of
forces, it is not adequate for an accurate assessment of capabilities.
See Post-Kortem on NIE 11-6-54: Soviet Capabilities and Probable
Programs in the Guided Missiles :Field
(TA M-183 8 February Item 9.)
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Information on the capacities of forward bases is particularly weak and
is of primary importance for an assessment of present capability to launch
any substantial air attack within a limited period of time. At the same
time, there is a complete lack of evidence on development or use of in-
flight refueling techniques for range extension. As the Soviet forces
bring into use even more complex weapons systems, the quality of combat
readiness of personnel and units becomes an increasingly important factor.
There also appears to be a need for a more complete analysis of LRMF
training programs, to provide indices of Soviet operational doctrine and
readiness.
6. No attempt has been made thus far to estimate the economic cost
of the Soviet Long-Range Air Force buildup. This will be of increasing
importance in view of the choices the USSR will have to make in the future
between aircraft and guided missiles. The recommendation made in connection
with the post-mortem on NIE 11-3-55 to initiate research on the economic
cost of the total Soviet military effort should meet this need.
II. ACTION
7. The I&C has approved the following actions:
a. That an effort be made to produce more comprehensive studies
on all Soviet operational problems in connection with attacks
against the US and key overseas installations.
25X1A
c. That continuing efforts be made to improve collection and
analysis of intelligence on Soviet aircraft production,
particularly on those aspects of the problem pertinent to
estimating future Soviet AOB.
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16 August 1955
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Post-Mortem on NIE 11- 3- 55: Soviet Capabilities and Probable
Soviet Courses of Action Through 1960
1. On 16 August, the IAC noted the attached findings and
approved the action set forth in paragraph 8.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take
appropriate steps to comply.
25X1A
Secretary
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POST-MORTEM ON NIE 11-3-55: SOVIET CAPABILITIES
AND PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF
ACTION THROUGH 1960
1. NIE 11-3-55, the annual estimate of trends in the
development of Soviet power and policy, was approved by the
IAC on 17 May 1955. Coordination proceeded relatively
smoothly without major delays or serious disagreement, and
the estimate was produced on schedule. The principal dissents
occurred on questions of judgment -- the degree of independence
enjoyed by Communist China in matters of major policy, the
degree of likelihood that the USSR would withdraw from East
Germany, and the likelihood of open intervention by the USSR
in hostilities between the US and Communist China which
threatened the existence of the latter.
2. As in the past, most of the difficulties encountered
in the preparation and coordination of NIE 11- 3- 55 were the
result of long-standing deficiencies of data on the Soviet area,
deficiencies which, barring a break-through in collection and
analytical techniques, are unlikely to be corrected at an early
date. This post-mortem does not attempt to catalogue these
standard gaps again.1 / Instead, i+ explores some of the basic
problems of analysis that were encountered in the preparation
of the estimate.
I. FINDINGS
3. General. The general limitations of intelligence on
the USSR were clearly evident in the process of attempting to
measure the forces shaping Soviet policy. Intelligence was
able to illuminate the broad outlines of the chief problems con-
fronting the Soviet leadership, but it was unable to reveal the
degree to which these problems, either separately or col-
lectively, generated pressures on Soviet policy. How, for
example, would the continuation of group rule affect Soviet
decision-making? How heavy were the various claims on Soviet
1/ Such a list is contained in 1AC-D-57/Z, Post-Mortem on NIE
Production 1 January - 30 June 1954, which was noted by the
IAC on 16 November 1954.
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economic resources? How seriously did the Kremlin regard
German rearmament? The absence of satisfactory answers to
these and similar questions seriously limited our ability to
estimate the course which Soviet policy was likely to pursue
in the future.
4. Political Intelligence. One of the principal diffi-
culties encountered during the coordination of NIE 11-3-55
was in obtaining agreement on the key issues which confront
the Soviet leadership and which promote unity or dissension
within its ranks. In particular, there was disagreement about
the evidence regarding the policy issues behind the February
1955 shift in the Soviet leadership. This disagreement arose
in large measure because of uncertainty as to the nature and
degree of actual high-level controversy within the USSR. As
a matter of fact, we cannot expect to get very firm evidence
on such matters, and our judgment has to depend in large part
on the assumption that deviations and contradictions in Soviet
communications media provide clues to the underlying realities
of Soviet political behavior.
5. Economic Intelligence. Despite some progress made
in economic intelligence on the USSR, most notably in estimates
of economic growth, substantial problems still remain. The
basic problem in this field is to determine the extent to which
the Soviet economy is capable of meeting the competing claims
for resources arising from the various internal and external
commitments of Soviet policy. In an effort to find some solu-
tion to this problem, attention was focused in the discussion of
NME 11-3-55 on a particularly difficult aspect of intelligence on
Soviet resources allocation, the estimated economic cost of the
over-all Soviet military effort.
6. It now appears, in light of the findings of the later
and more intensive research effort on air defense costs in
NIE 11-5-55, that the procedures adopted in ME 11-3-55 for
estimating total future Soviet defense expenditures can be im-
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7. Military Intelligence. Although the intelligence
community has succeeded in collecting much information on
the separate branches of the Soviet armed forces, it has thus
far failed to include in the NIE's agreed views on broad Soviet
strategy which are a sential to estimating general trends in the
Soviet military establishment. The requirement for such an
estimate is particularly urgent at the present time because of
recent indications that Soviet military thinking is adjusting to
the impact of modern military technology. An agreed view as
to probable Soviet strategic concepts would contribute greatly
to long-range estimates of probable Soviet choices in weapons
systems or in strengths of particular military components. An
effort was made to include such an estimate in NIE 11-3-55, but
it did not succeed.
II. ACTION
8. In addition to regular, action taken to meet outstanding
requirements, the IAC intelligence organizations shall:
b.
Initiate as soon as possible a study of the over-all
costs of the Soviet military effort and its impli-
cations for future trends in the Soviet economy
(see Paras. 5, 6 above) in an effort to obtain a
coordinated appraisal in time to be contributed
to the 1956 estimate on the USSR.
Anticipate the need to include in their contributions
to the 1956 paper a statement of their views on.
Soviet strategic concepts and their implications
for future development of Soviet forces (see Para.
7 above).
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I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Post-Mortems on NIE 63.1-55, "Probable
Developments in North Vietnam to July 1956";
NIE 63. 2-55, "Probable Developments in
Cambodia Through July 1956"; and NIE 63. 3-55,
"Probable Developments in Laos Through July
1956"
1. On 16 August, the IAC noted the principal intelligence
gaps in the coverage of each area as follows:
a.
North Vietnam. With the exception of a few
reports concerning the attitudes of the people
in Hanoi, there were almost no reports concern-
ing the reaction of the bulk of the population to
Communist control.
b. Cambodia. There exists practically no informa-
tion concerning Communist activities, strength,
or capabilities in Cambodia. While Communist
strength in Cambodia is not believed to be sig-
nificant at the present time, this is nevertheless
an important deficiency.
Laos. There is an almost complete lack of intel-
ligence of any kind on the extent, nature, and
capabilities of the Pathet Lao outside the two
provinces that they occupy, and, except for order
of battle, little information concerning the Pathet
Lao within their two provinces.
2. Intelligence organizations of the IAC are requested to
take appropriate remedial action.
25X1A
Secretary
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16 May 1955
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16 May 1955
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IAC-D-57/4
3 May 1955
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
1 July to' 31 December 1954
1. There is attached a review of intelligence deficiencies
noted in NIE production for the period 1 July to 31 December 1954.
This has been prepared in compliance with the IAC action of
11 May 1954 (IAC-M-151) directing that such a paper be produced
semi-annually for IAC noting and circulation by the DCI.
2. The IAC noted these findings on 26 April 1955 (IAC-M-194).
3. These have been approved by the Director of Central
Intelligence. Recipients are requested to take appropriate action
when reviewing research and collection programs.
25X1A
Secretary
TAC-D- 57 /4
3 May 1955
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SUBJECT: Post-Mortem of NIE Production for the Period
1 July to 31 December 1954
This review of intelligence deficiencies has been based on
the production of the last six months of 1954 and is limited to
those estimates in which specific gaps were revealed. The
remaining estimates are listed separately at the end of the paper.
The deficiencies noted in this study identify areas in which
intelligence information is inadequate due either to gaps in
collection or in research and analysis. No attempt is made to
deal with the validity of substantive judgments made in the
estimates. Papers are reviewed in the regular sequence of the
numbered series in which they fall and no order of priority is
implied. Gaps noted at the time of production which have since
been closed have been omitted.
There continue to be significant deficiencies in our intelligence
information, notably on the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The gaps in this
area are largely due to the great difficulties of collection in the
face of the stringent security policies of the Communist countries.
More effective exploitation of available information is also desirable.
In most non-Communist areas, with the exception of Southeast Asia,
the problem is more one.of research and analysis than collection
since great quantities of data are available.
IAC-D-57/4
3 May 1955
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10 Series: SOVIET BLOC
NIE 10-7-54: "Communist Courses of Action in Asia through 1957"
(23 November 1954)
The following specific deficiencies were encountered in the
production of this estimate:
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b. The extent and nature of Chinese Communist support
of Communist activities in Burma.
The division of Sino-Soviet responsibilities in and
direction of Asian Communist movements.
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3 May 1955
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NIE 11-4-54: "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action
through Mid-1959" (14 September 1954)
1 77
The deficiencies in intelligence on the Soviet Bloc (excluding
Communist China) that were noted in the previous review of intelligence
gaps were encountered in the preparation of this estimate. (See
IAC-D-57/2, "Post-Mortem of NIE Production for the First Six
Months of 1954,11 16 November 1954, pages 2 and 3).
NIE 11-6-54: "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the
Guided Missile Field" (5 October 1954)
A special post-mortem study of this paper has been undertaken
and issued as IAC-D- 57 / 3, 8 February 1955.
SNIE 11-7-54: "Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attacks on the US and
Key Overseas Installations through 1 July 1957"
(17 August 1954)
SNIE 11-7A-54: "Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attacks on the US
and Key Overseas Installations through 1 July 1957"
(14 September 1954)
D
The major gaps encountered were inadequate information on the
operational effectiveness of the Soviet Long-Range Air Force,
especially training, refueling, status of facilities, and capacities
of bases; specific allocations by the USSR of available nuclear
materials to types of weapons in the small, medium and large yield
categories; specific allocations of nuclear weapons and warheads to
various delivery systems; actual disposition, including storage, of
nuclear weapons and warheads; guided missile program and
capabilities; andthe specific performance characteristics of aircraft.
SNIE 11-8-54: "Probable Warning of Soviet Attack on the US through
Mid-1957" (14 September 1954)
This estimate revealed a deficiency in available intelligence
on the scale of development and state of readiness of Soviet forward
air bases
IA C-D- 57 /4
3 May 1955
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NIE 12-54: "Probable Developments in the European Satellites
-
through Mid-1956" (24 August 1954)
1
1
There continue to be wide margins of probable error in
estimating certain areas of industrial production in the Satellites.
For the area of military production in Poland and Czechoslavokia,
deficiencies were especially noted in information on aircraft and
tanks. Furthermore, there is a lack of information on the state
of integration -- economic, scientific, military, and political --
of the Eastern European Satellite area with the USSR; the relations
of the Satellite governments with each other and with the Soviet
government, the relationship between the Eastern European Satellites
and the Communist states in the Far East, and the influence of
public attitudes upon Satellite policies.
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40 Series: FAR EAST
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NIE 53-54: "The Outlook for Afghanistan" (19 October 1954)
Increasing Soviet interest and activity in Afghanistan have
emphasized the inadequacy of:
a. Reliable economic data for determining the extent
to which Afghanistan has become or may become economically
dependent on the USSR. We have little data on the levels of,
Afghan-Soviet trade, other than Afghan-Soviet trade agreements,
which may have been only partially fulfilled and may involve
deceptive pricing.
b. Specific information on the extent of Soviet
penetration of Afghanistan, particularly in the technical aid
field, i. e. , the number and location of Soviet technicians in the
country, the extent of their subversive activities, and their
success in this regard.
60 Series: SOUTHEAST ASIA
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NIE 63-5-54: "Post-Geneva Outlook in Indochina" (3 August 1954)
This paper was prepared on a crash basis without benefit of
formal contributions. There were man in intelligence
concerning the situation in Indochina, an n Viet Minh
capabilities, and Vietnamese attitudes.
NIE 63-6-54: "Current Trends in South Vietnam" (15 September 1954)
1 -1
NIE 63-7-54: "Probable Developments in South Vietnam, Laos,
and Cambodia through July 1956" (23 November 1954)
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1 C
Information was inadequate on actual conditions
in the provinces in South Vietnam, particularly the extent of Viet
Minh and Government influence and control, and on relations
between the sects and the French, and between Bao Dai and the
sects. A similar lack of information on political conditions and
Viet Minh influence existed with respect to Laos and Cambodia.
E76For a detailed consideration of Viet Minh violations of the
armistice terms see IAC-D-93/2, 31 January 1955. )
70 Series: AFRICA'
NIE 71-54: "Probable Developments in North Africa" (31 August 1954)
Additional intelligence is required
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on such questions as Nationalist and Communist strength, relations,
and capabilities.
100 Series: MISCELLANEOUS
SNIE 100-4-54: "The Situation with Respect to Certain Islands Off
the Coast of Mainland China" (4 September 1954)
SNIE 100-4/1-54: "The Situation with Respect to the Nationalist
Occupied Islands Off the Coast of Mainland China" (10 September
1954)
In the preparation of these estimates there was revealed a lack
of detailed information on Nationalist total ground Order of Battle,
Order of Battle on the Offshore Islands, and specific defense
preparations on these islands. Only very general information was
available on Communist air, ground, and naval capabilities in the
East China area.
SNIE 100-6-54: "World Reactions to Certain Possible US Courses
of Action Against Communist China" (28 November 1954)
This estimate revealed the need for more. information and
research on the question of the relative importance of imports into
China by land and sea.
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Other Estimates
The following estimates, also produced in this period, have
not been included in the above review since they either did not reveal
notable gaps in information or called for broad intelligence judgments
not involving deficiencies in collection or research.
NIE 2 5- 54
NIE 34-54
NIE 43-54
NIE 80-54
"Probable Developments in Austria"
(21 September 1954)
"Probable Developments in Iran
through 1955" (7 December 1954)
1
"Probable Developments in Taiwan
through Mid-1956" (14 September 1954)
"The Caribbean Republics"
(24 August 1954)
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8 February 1955
Copy No. ( 0
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Post-Mortem on NIE 1 1- 6- 54:
Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field
1. Attached are the findings on intelligence deficiencies noted
in the production of NIE 11-6-54, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable
Programs in the Guided Missile Field, " dated 5 October 1954.
2. The IA.C noted these findings on 8 February 1955 (IAC-M- 183,
item 9).
3. These have been approved by the Director of Central
Intelligence. Recipients are requested to take appropriate action
when reviewing research and collection programs.
25X1A
Secretary
IAC-D-57/3
8 February 1955
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CENTRAL I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
Post-Mortem on NIE 11- 6- 54:
Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field
1.. The preparation of. NIE 1 1-6- 54, during the course of which
an intensive effort was made to exploit every possible source of evidence,
revealed serious gaps in our intelligence in this important field. In
view of our conclusion that the US and its allies face a growing Soviet
guided missile threat, including eventually an entirely new type of
threat from intercontinental ballistic missiles, the lack of up-to-date
intelligence is of critical significance to the intelligence community.
2. Major Scientific and Technical Gaps. Although we have
available conclusive evidence of the great postwar Soviet interest in
guided. missiles and numerous indications that the USSR has a large
and active research and development program, we have no firm
intelligence on what particular missiles the USSR may presently be
developing or may now have in operational use. Almost all of our
intelligence on specific missile development work concerns
projects in the USSR and even then is at least a few years old.
also need more up-to-date intelligence on Soviet research and
development facilities and personalities connected with missile
activities to permit us to determine more accurately the extent of
the Soviet program.
3. Major Economic Gaps. In this field the major gap is our
lack of any specific intelligence as to Soviet missile production. We
have no evidence beyond the reported Soviet production of a few
hundred V-1's and V-2's in 1947-1949. Our economic analysis also
revealed the need for better data on Soviet prices and costs, and on
Soviet production and consumption patterns in the key fields of
electronics and precision mechanisms, and special fuels, where
important bottlenecks are believed to exist.
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INADEQUACY OF PRESENT INTELLIGENCE EFFORT
4. The basic reason for our lack of intelligence on the Soviet
guided missile program is the inadequate collection effort presently
being devoted to this field. Although the intelligence community
has increased its effort 25X1A
there are still only a very limited number of intelligence
assets devoted specifically to the collection and analysis of information
regarding guided missiles. There continues to be an urgent
requirement for increased intelligence collection relating specifically
to types and numbers of guided missiles being developed, tested,
.and/or produced.
5. Guided missile intelligence has received an insufficiently
high priority effort in the past. The IAC has recognized this problem
by placing GM intelligence in the highest priority category of
National Intelligence Objectives (DCID 4/4).
6. There also continues to be a need for effective coordination
of effort in all aspects of GM intelligence.
AREAS FOR GREATER INTELLIGENCE EXPLOITATION
25X1 C
IAC-D- 57 / 3
8 February 1955
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SUGGESTED METHODS OF EXPLOITATION
9. A major effort to exploit all possible intelligence methods
is desirable.
d. Study of the possibilities of pilots' reconnaissance and
the problems related thereto.
IAC-D-57/3
8 February 1955
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16 November 1954
I N T E L L I G E N C E ADVISORY C O M M I T T E E
Post-Mortem of NIE Production
for First Six Months of 1954
1. Attached are the consolidated findings on intelligence
deficiencies noted in NIE production for the period 1 January -
30 June 1954. Tab A lists the estimates produced in the six-month
period on which the findings are based.
2. This review of intelligence deficiencies was prepared in
compliance with the IAC action of 11 May 1954 (IA.C-M-151) directing
that such a paper be produced semi-annually for IAC noting and
circulation by the DCI.
3. The IAC noted these findings on 16 November (IAC-M-174,
para. 3 a).
4. These have been approved by the Director of Central
Intelligence. Recipients are requested to take appropriate action
when reviewing; research and collection programs.
5. Please note that the IAC representatives recommended that
post-mortem findings should be passed by IAC members to their
respective collection units with a request that these units report
back ar*ion taken and results obtained. It was agreed that the
Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee (IPC)
should be included among those requested to act.
17
Secretary
The classification of TAB A. to
the Attachment is SECRET
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16 November 1954
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CENTRAL I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
16 November 1954
SUBJECT: Post-Mortem of NIE Production for the Period 1 January
to 30 June 1954
The following is a review of intelligence deficiencies revealed
in the preparation of National Intelligence Estimates during the
first six months of 1954. These deficiencies identify areas in which
intelligence information is inadequate due either to gaps in collection
or in research and analysis. No attempt is made to deal with the
validity of substantive judgments made in the estimates. No order
of priority is implied in the listing of gaps within sections. The
estimates upon which these consolidated findings are based are
listed in Tab A.
1. General
Since the intelligence deficiencies noted in this report reflect only
the estimates undertaken during the six month period being reviewed,
the list is by no means complete. In. spite of the substantial intelligence
information available, there continue to be numerous areas in which
significant data are lacking. In general, it will be noted that the
most important intelligence deficiency in the Soviet Bloc is one of
collection, a fact which emphasizes the necessity for greater
collection efforts in this area. Meanwhile, there is a need for
full exploitation of available information. In most other areas,
the over-all coverage is good and vast
quantities of data are available. The problem here is largely one
of research and analysis rather than collection.
2. Soviet Bloc (excluding Communist China)
Gaps in intelligence on the Soviet Bloc continue to be those
inherent in the restrictive security policies of the Communist states.
However, the methods open to US intelligence for exploiting the
IAC-D-57/2
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limited range of data available are capable of further development
and improvement. In general, the most significant gaps continue
to be those relative to economic trends and scientific and
25X6 technological developments. There also are gaps in many aspects
of Soviet military capabilities. Estimative work in the period
under review indicated a need forl
a. Soviet Economy. Intelligence on the Soviet
economy continues to be limited.
25X1 B
b. Soviet Aircraft. There is urgent need for more,
and more reliable, data on Soviet aeronautical
research and development programs; actual air-
craft production; aircraft characteristics, and the
capabilities of new Soviet aircraft types, especially
long-range bombers and all-weather interceptors.
c. Soviet Airfield Development. An intensified effort
is required to collect more information on the
development of Soviet airfields, especially those
capable of supporting long-range bombers for
attacks on the US and its overseas installations.
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16 November 1954
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d. Soviet Logistics. A greater collection effort is
needed for information bearing on the Soviet logistic
capability to support continuing ground, naval, and
air operations in various theaters, with special
emphasis on the long-range air force and the air
defense system.
e. Nuclear Weapons. There is a continuing and urgent
need for more effective collection and a greater
analytical effort on weapons of mass destruction
(such as the atomic cannon).
f. Application of Nuclear Energy. Very little evidence
is available on Soviet efforts with respect to the
power applications of atomic energy. This field
has special significance in view of proposals
currently being considered at the international
level.
Guided Missiles. There is a continuing and urgent
need for more effective collection and a greater
analytical effort on all aspects of the Soviet
guided missile program. (For details see the
post-mortem, now in preparation, on NIE 11-6-54,
5 October 1954. )
h. BW, RW, CW. No reliable information is available
which indicates the status of Soviet developments
in the fields of biological, radiological, and
chemical warfare, nor on Soviet intentions
relating thereto.
i. Submarines. Although information on the numbers
of Soviet submarines is very good, there is
insufficient information on the technical characteristics
of new submarines, particularly propulsion, weapons
for use with submarines (torpedoes, mines, missiles),
and tactics.
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The most critical uncertainties in this area recurred in one
form or another in the preparation of many of, the estimates produced
during this period. Certain of the gaps listed probably can never
be closed, others could be
a. Sino-Soviet Relations. More reliable information
is necessary on these questions: What is Peiping's
role in the formulation and execution of major
Communist policies in Asia? What division of
responsibilities exists with respect to North Korea,
Indochina, and the Asian Communist Parties? Are
there any major differences over desired strategy or
timing? For example, which partner was chiefly
responsible for the Communist decision for an
armistice in Korea? In Indochina? For what reasons?
What is the extent and nature of Soviet economic and
military assistance, particularly overland, to
Communist China? What is the extent and nature
of Soviet influence or control in the Chinese
Communist Party and Government?
b. Chinese Communist Domestic Developments. The
work done by the IAC agencies 'in preparing NIE 13- 54
"Communist China's Power Potential through 1957,
resulted in better coverage than hitherto of
developments within Communist China. However,
the preparation of this and other estimates during this
period revealed that our intelligence coverage on
Communist China is still very inadequate on a
number of questions, as is to a lesser extent our
analysis of available data. We have to rely too
largely on Chinese Communist public statements for
our estimates of economic developments in mainland
China. Our information is not adequate enough, nor is
there an area of common agreement on -methodology
sufficiently large, to permit an agreed estimate on the
capacity of the mainland transportation system. In
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agriculture we lack reliable information on production,
the rate of collectivization, and peasant reactions
to the regime's agricultural policy. We know that
some kind of disciplining of party and government
personnel at the highest level has been occurring,
but we have no firm .or detailed evidence concerning
policy or personality differences within Communist
China's top leadership. Lastly, the preparation of
NIE 13- 54 has revealed that more reliable intelligence
is needed on the question of public attitudes in China
toward the regime.
c. Viet Minh Capabilities and Intentions. We need
more objective intelligence on Viet Minh capabilities
I This was particularly
the case with respect to. intelligence on Viet Minh
military capabilities.
d. Other Deficiencies:
(2) Laos and Cambodia. The quality and stability
of the military and national leadership.
(3) Indonesian politics. Our ability to estimate
future trends and developments in Indonesia has been
limited by insufficient coverage of inter and intra-
party activities, particularly at local levels.
(4) Communist relationships in the Philippines.
Relationships among the Huks, the CCP, and the
PCP are not clear.
IAC-D-57/2
16 November 1954
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4. Western Europe
The major intelligence problems with regard to Western Europe
primarily involve the evaluation, analysis, and synthesis of vast
quantitites of data, rather than collection deficiencies.
6. Latin America
Over-all intelligence coverage of the Latin American area is
good, although deficiencies still exist in the following fields:
a. The political positions of important military
figures, trends in the political views of both
senior and junior military officers, and the
ITC-D- 57 /2
16 November 1954
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degree of dissatisfaction within the officer corps
in regard to their governments. In Bolivia, the
strength, capabilities, and loyalty of the civilian
militia.
b. The political orientation, the economic status, the
personalities, and factionalism of labor movements.
c. Trends in Communist Party strengths and capabilities;
in Communist infiltration of government, labor, and
intellectual circles; and in the inter-territorial
coordination and communications procedures between
Communist movements.
The NIE's produced during the period in the 100 (Miscellaneous)
series were rather specialized estimates dealing primarily with
questions involving speculation and judgment on which little
"evidence" was available. However, NIE 100-3-54 "Consequences
of a Relaxation of non-Communist Controls on Trade with the
Soviet Bloc" indicated, as have other East-West trade estimates,
the need for better evidence with respect to Soviet scientific and
technological developments in order to more adequately determine
the "qualitative" (as opposed to the quantitative) importance of
imports from the West to Soviet military strength.
IAC-D- 57/2
16 November 1954
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IAC-D- 57/2
16 November 1954
National Intelligence Estimates Published
From 1 January 1954 to 30 June 1954*
00 Series: GENERAL
None
10 Series: SOVIET BLOC
NIE 10-54
NIE 10-2-54
NIE 10- 3- 54
SNIE 10-4-54
Soviet Bloc Economic Warfare
Capabilities and Courses of Action
(9 March 1954)
Communist Courses of Action in Asia
through Mid-1955 (15 March 1954)
Communist Capabilities in Indochina
(1 June 1954)
Communist Reactions to Certain US
Courses of Action with Respect to
Indochina (15 June 1954)
Soviet Bloc Reaction to Certain US
Courses of Action to Restrict Bloc
Representation in the US (29 June 1954)
SNIE 11-54 Likelihood of General War through 1957
(15 February 1954)
SNIE 11-2-54 Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the
US through 1957 (24 February 1954)
*NOTE: Prior to 22 June dissemination date is shown. Subsequent
estimates show the date on which IAC action was taken.
Tab A to
IAC-D-57/2
16 November 1954
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NIE 11-3A-54 Summary of the Soviet Atomic Energy
Program to Mid-1957 (16 February 1954)
NIE 11-5-54 Soviet Capabilities and Main Lines of
Policy through Mid-1959 (7 June 1954)
NIE 12. 4- 54 Probable Developments in East
Germany through 1955 (22 January 1954)
NIE 13-54 Communist China's Power Potential
through 1957 (3 June 1954)
20 Series: WESTERN EUROPE
NIE 20-54
NIE 27. 1- 54
NIE 28. 5- 54
40 Series: FAR EAST
None
50 Series: SOUTH ASIA
The Outlook for Western Europe over
the Next Decade (26 April 1954)
Probable Developments in Spain
(17 May 1954)
Current Situation and Probable
Developments in Finland during 1954
(8 January 1954)
Tab A to
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60 Series: SOUTHEAST ASIA
NIE 63-54 Consequences within Indochina of the
Fall of Dien Bien Phu (30 April 1954)
SNIE 63-2-54
NIE 63-3-54 Probable' Military and Political Develop-
ments in Indochina (21 May 1954)
NIE 63-4-54 Probable Military and Political Develop-
ments in Indochina over the Next 30 Days
(15 June - 15 July) (15 June 1954)
NIE 65-54
NIE 66-54
70 Series: AFRICA
The Effects of Certain Possible
Developments on the Military Security
and Political Stability of Laos and
Cambodia through 1954 (9 June 1954)
The Probable Outlook in Indonesia
through 1954 (19 May 1954)
Probable Developments in the Philippine
Republic (23 March 1954)
25X1
90 Series: SOUTH AMERICA
Probable Developments in Argentina
(9 March 1954)
NIE 92- 54 Probable Developments in Bolivia
(19 March 1954)
TabAto
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Tab A to
IAC-D- 57/2
16 November 1954
100 Series: MISCELLANEOUS
Probable Reactions of Communist China,
the USSR, and the Free World to Certain
US Courses of Action in Korea (9 March 1954)
NIE 100-3- 54 Consequences of a Relaxation of Non-
Communist Controls on Trade with the
Soviet Bloc (23 March 1954)
Tab A to
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IAC-D-57 1
1 May 1953
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
PROGRESS REPORTS ON ACTIONS TO.D/JPROVE
INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF COMMUNIST CHINA
1, Attached for your information are two reports(TABs A and B)
which attempt to bring up to date the status of subject actions,
previously reported on 21 October 1952 (IAC-D-57).
2, The previous reports resulted exclusively from action taken
followin.; a pay t-mortern on SE-27. Those now transmitted also bear
directly on thc?t est .-Hate. In the interim, however, the Office of
National Es'imates, in co-,jperation with the other agencies, has
issued a me; io andum sumrna>rizing the results of three post-mortems:
on NIE-?47, "(-1)mmunist Capabilities and Intentions in Asia;" on
NIE-551, "Communist Capabilities and Probable Cour cs of Action
in Korea;" and on NIE-58, "Relations Between the Chinese Conimun st
Regime and the USSR: Their Present Character and Probable Future
Courses" (Meeorandum to AD/IC, dated 28 January 1953, TAB C).
3. As has been recognized by the IAC representatives, the
actions taken initially in response to SE-27 are equally significant
in connection. with these three later post-mortems. Moreover, many .
of the gaps referenced in the paper of January 28 (particularly 1(a),
2(a), 2(d), 3, 1+, 5, C-l(a)) are covered by the collection priorities
earlier assigned by the IPC in pursuance of DCID 4+/2. (It should
be borne in mind that whereas gaps in most cases raise research
problems, the T.PC effort is directed not at research but exclusively
at obtaining raw information.) The rest of the gaps mentioned are
not now covered by targets accepted under IPC priorities, though
in some instances there will be useful re orts
4. The administrators of the collection systems of the Foreign
Service, the Service Attaches, and CIA have stated that adequ-;,'e
requirements and priorities for obtaining additional information
on these matters have been served. These requirements and priorities,
as well as collection responsibilities, are constantly re-examined
and revised to reflect essential gaps in information.
Secretary
S-E-C-R-E-T
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IAC-D-57/1
S-E-C-R-E-T
I May 1953
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
28 "Lnuary 1953
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE
COORDINATION
SUBJECT: Post-Mortem on NIE-47, "Communist Capabilities
and Intentions in Asia," NIE-55/l, "Communist
Ca.v-abilities and Probable Courses of Action in
K;.-a--a,11 and NIE-58, "Relations Between the
Chinese Communist Regime and the USSR: Their
Present Character and Probable Future Courses."
REFER: CE: Procedure for Reducing Intelligence Deficiencies
in NIE's, dated 3 June 1952
ENCLOSURE: A. List of Intelligence Deficiencies Revealed
in the Preparation of NIE's 47, 55/1 and. 58
1. On 16 December 1952, the IAC representatives held
a post-mortem meeting on NIE's 47, 55/1, and 58.
2. The IAC representatives noted that:
a. Steps taken by the IAC agencies as a result
of the post-mortem on SE-27 ("Probable Effects of Various
Possible Courses of Action with Respect to Communist China,"
dated 5 June 1952) are beginning to result in better coverage
of economic questions.
b. Many of the deficiencies encountered in the prepara-
tion of NIE-47, NIE-55/l, and NIE-58 are obvious weaknesses
which the IAC agencies are currently trying to correct. In
other cases the gaps may well be "unknowable."
c. Nevertheless, a further study of the intelligence
weaknesses in these estimates may assist the efforts made by
collection and research activities coping with these and related
problems.
S-E-C-R-E-T
IAC-D-57 1
1 May 1953
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LAC-D-57 1
I 'May 1953
*b. Chinese Communist military production. Of POL?
Of munitions? Of transport equipment?
**c. The effect to date of the Korean war. On the
viability of the Chinese Communist economy?... On the rehabi-
litation and expansion of productive capacity? On the economic
dependence upon the USSR, and on the terms under which Communist
China receives military and economic aid from the USSR?
,~. What is the amphibious capability of the Soviet Far
East forces?
*3. What is the role of the Soviet Air Force in the Korean
war and the CCA `? What combat experience have CCAF pilots actually
had? What degree of combat proficiency have CCAF pilots demonstrated
in Korea?
**4* What staff responsibility relationships exist in the joint
Sino-Soviet military direction of the Korean war?
**5. What trends exist in Communist Chinats armed force mobili-
zation progra:'.s? Are the armed forces growing larger, smaller,
or reiia?ning static in their numerical strength?
B. Popular Attitudes within Communist China
*l