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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00362R000400130001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2002
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CONTENTS
IAC-D-55/ 10
IAC-D-55/10. 1
IAC-D-55/ 10. 2
IAC-D-55/ 11
IAC-D-55/ 11
(Final)
IAC-D-55/ 11. 1
IAG-D-55/ 11. 2
(First Draft)
IAC-D-55/ 11. 2
(Second Draft)
IAG-D-55/ 11. 2
(Second Draft -
Revised)
NSC Request for a Three-Year Projection
of Program (20 June 1956)
Estimated Costs of Foreign Intelligence Program,
1954 Through 1959 (9 July 1956) (TS-Eyes Only)
NSC Status Report on the Foreign Intelligence
Program (Fiscal 3-Year Projection)
(16 July 1956) (TS-Eyes Only)
Memo for IAG and Chairmen, IAC Subcommittees
re IAC Annual Report to NSC on Status of
National Security Programs on 30 June 1956
(22 June 1956)
Annual Report to the National Security Council
on the Status of the Foreign Intelligence Program
(14 Aug 1956)
Memorandum for DD / P and AD/NE, AD / 1,
AD/RR, AD/SI, AD/O,
Status of National Security Programs on 30 June 1956
(22 June 1956)
Annual Report to the National Security Council
on the Status of the Foreign Intelligence Program
(27 July 1956)
Annual Report to the National Security Council
on the Status of the Foreign Intelligence Program
(7 Aug 1956)
Annual Report to the National Security Council
on the Status of the Foreign Intelligence Program
(9 Aug 1956)
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SIGNATURE RECORD AND COVER SHEET
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
REGISTRY
~
.;
:OURCE
on 102497-d
CIA CONTROL NO.
IA04-55/71 Final
T RECEIVED
E
sOC. NO.
18 August 1956
DATE DOCUM
N
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DATE
))
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5 T
=OPY NO.
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LOGGED BY
OF PAGES
CUMBER
Dirt.,",*
Limit
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TOPSL PJt.
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intel-
ligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until sl,ch time as it
is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control.
;personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive
.and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand
-columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the
right-hand columns.
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1
Final
18 August 1956
CENTRAL I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
MEMORANDUM FOR : The Executive Secretary
National Security Council
SUBJECT : Report on the Status of the Foreign
Intelligence Program
88
25X1
1. The attached report has been prepared pursuant to Presidential
directive as forwarded to the Direotor of Central Intelligence by the
Executive Secretary, National Security Council, by memorandum dated
4 June 1956. Primary reference has been made to national security
policy objectives applicable to the intelligence community as set forth
most recently in NSC 5602.
2. Annex A, attached, is a cross-reference of the material in
the report to applicable National Security Council Intelligence Directives.
Annex B is the three-year projection of the costs of foreign intelligence
programs previously forwarded to you under date of 13 July 1956 and not
enclosed herewith. Annex C is a report of action taken pursuant to the
recommendations of the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science
Advis&t?y Committee, submitted as a part of this report in accordance
with your memorandum of 4 June. (For security reasons, only Annex A
is being attached to the copies of this report circulated within the intel-
ligence community. )
3. This report, with Annex A, was concurred in by the Intelligence
Advisory Committee on 14 August 1956. Annex B had been previously
concurred in by the IAC on 10 July 1956. Annex C has been prepared by
CIA, with appropriate concurrence from the Department of Defense on 25X1A
matters where that D
epartment shared in the respo a ility.
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25X1
Copy No.
IAC-D-55 11
Final
14 August 1956
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ON THE
STATUS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
(as of 30 June 1956)
Submitted by
Intelligence Advisory Committee
August 1956
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IAC-D-55/ 11
Final
14 August 1956
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ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ON THE
STATUS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
SUMMARY
Evaluation of U. S. Capabilities to Provide
Warning of Attack
We continue to believe that the U. S. could expect possibly as
much as six months and not less than 30 days warning of Soviet pre-
paration for a full-scale land, sea, and air attack based on full, or
nearly full mobilization. However, warning of the intent actually to
launch the attack might be obtained only within a period from a few
hours to a few days in advance..
The growing air capabilities of the USSR makes unlikely any
relative improvement in our ability to give advance intelligence warning
of surprise air attack. Should the USSR attempt a major surprise air
attack against the U. S. from forward bases in 1956, the preparations
might be detected, and if they were, would provide a generalized
degree of warning of several days, and specific warning of unusual and
possibly threatening air activity on the order of 18-24 hours. A
lesser scale of attack, involving about 250 aircraft, if accompanied by
an extraordinary security effort could be launched as early as 1956
with no assurance of specific advance warning to the U. S. (apart from
that provided by early warning radar). Attacks against U. S. bases or
forces overseas, or against U. S. allies, could be made with equal or
greater likelihood of being accomplished without advance warning,
and the situation with respect to warning in these areas will worsen
over the next three years if the USSR acquires the guided missiles
which we estimate are within Soviet capability.
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Final
14 August 1956
In the period between now and 1959, Soviet capabilities for
surprise attacks will almost certainly increase. Furthermore, the
USSR will have a progressively increasing capability for launching
attacks on the U. S. from interior Soviet bases. Such a method of
attack would probably provide no specific advance warning to U. S.
intelligence.
Evaluation of Soviet Capabilities and Intentions
The field of political intelligence has profited from the greater
accessibility of Soviet personalities and the opportunities for wider
contacts within the USSR which have resulted from the turn in Soviet
policy in the post-Stalin period. On the whole, we can probably have
somewhat greater confidence than formerly in our estimates of
probable Soviet courses of action in the foreign policy field. Never-
theless, despite the gains in this respect, there are many aspects of
the Soviet political scene which remain obscure. In assessing
political developments within the USSR, we continue to feel fairly
sure of our analyses of short-term trends, but we are uncertain about
the basic interplay of forces producing future policy, e. g. , personality
relationships, the reasoning behind the announced reductions in
military forces, the effect within the USSR of the denigration of Stalin,
and the impact of economic problems on policy. Externally, the in-
tensification of the diplomatic offensive of the Sino-Soviet Bloc poses
increased intelligence problems of evaluating Bloc intentions and
capabilities and the vulnerabilities of the target areas, particularly
in connection with the increased use by the Bloc of trade and aid
agreements in support of its diplomacy. Political intelligence on
Communist China remains a major problem and is still highly in-
adequate for an assessment of Communist Chinese motives and
possible future actions.
Military intelligence information available on the countries of
the Sino-Soviet Bloc continues to be generally adequate to support
broad assessments of the capabilities of the armed forces of those
countries and to discern trends in their development. This informa-
tion, however, continues to be inadequate in many critical fields to
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IAC-D-55/ l l
Final
14 August 1956
provide a firm intelligence basis for military plans, operations, and
research and development. Gains have been made in certain categories
of milita.cy information due in part to some relaxation of security re-
strictions and increased travel to and within Bloc countries. The
deficiencies in our military intelligence, as is to be expected, occur
in those categories over which the target nations exercise the most
stringent security measures. A continued expansion of clandestine
activities is being undertaken to intensify the collection of military
intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Increased attention is also
being given to the development of scientific and technical equipment
and methods for overcoming security measures in target areas.
Improvements in economic intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc
have resulted not only from more intensive research and analysis but
also from a significant increase in published data on nondefense in-
dustries, particularly for the USSR. Large-scale research has
enabled us to improve cost. calculations for Bloc military programs,
to estimate the cost burden of the programs on their economies, and
to provide a basis for comparison with similar programs of the U. S.
Detailed data on production of military end-items remain generally
inadequate and the prospect is that detailed estimation in this field
will become increasingly difficult. In most other areas of economic
research, including the economic aspects of the Soviet guided missile
and atomic energy programs, the out'look is for continued improvement.
Special emphasis has been placed upon the economic growth problems of
underdeveloped countries bordering on the Bloc. There is also under
way a continuing systematic study of Bloc economic activities in
underdeveloped areas.
There has been continued imp o vement in scientific intelligence
on the Sino-Soviet Bloc both through research and through information
gained from increased contacts with Soviet nationals. Significant in-
formation on the Soviet atomic energy program, particularly in the
fields of nuclear weapons development and testing and in the production
of fissionable materials, was obtained during FY 1956. Although recent
developments, particularly within the last year, have improved the
quality of our guided missile intelligence information and expanded the
extent of our general knowledge of the Soviet program, available infor-
mation is inadequate and fails to meet our minimum intelligence
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Final
14 August 1956
requirements. The highest priority has been given to this problem
with special emphasis being placed on technical collection techniques.
Concerted efforts to determine the quality and quantify of Soviet
scientific manpower and developments in specific fields of basic and
applied science, have resulted in some improvement in our under-
- of these underlying factors in Soviet technological capabilities.
Collection
Pursuant to NSCID No. 4, the list of priority national intelligence
objectives was again revised "DCID 4/5). This revision has further
refined the First Priority Objectives to focus special emphasis in
intelligence ,,ollection on intentions, policies or actions of the Sino-
Soviet Bloc related to the initiation of hostilities, especially nuclear
air attack or the clandestine delivery of weapons against the U. S. or
key U. S. overseas installations. Our over-all collection capabilities,
overt and clandestine, have shown improvement in the past year both
within and outside the Sind-Soviet Bloc, and information and material
received from the field have increased in both quantity and quality,
due primarily to the currently increased access to target areas,
personalities and materials. Soviet publications, with the exception
of those in the military field, are becoming increasingly available and
include items, hitherto prohib'ted for export, containing new scientific
and economic data. Further development and use of technological
methods, such as ELIN T, has also brought about improved collection
results.
Nonetheless, serious deficiencies remain in our collection
capabilities in all fields, particularly in relation to the Sino-Soviet
Bloc. With respect to political and economic: deficiencies, improve-
ment and expansion of existing facilities and methods are required.
With respect to deficiencies in critical military and scientific fields,
expanded Clandestine programs must be continued and technological
collection -capabilities further developed. Such expanded programs
must be in. cperaticn for a long period before a significant reduction
of ou-c critical intelligence deficiencies can be expected.
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Final
14 August 1956
A. Warning of Attack*
1. Evaluation of U. S. Capabilities
a. We continue to believe that the U. S. could expect possibly
as much as six months and not less than 30 days warning of Soviet
preparation for a full-scale land, sea, and air attack based on
full, or nearly full mobilization. However, warning of the intent
actually to launch the attack might be obtained only within a period
from a few hours to a few days in advance.
b. The growing air capabilities of the USSR make unlikely
any relative improvement in our ability to give advance intelligence
warning of surprise air attack. Should the USSR attempt a major
surprise air attack against the U. S. from forward bases in 1956,
the preparations might be detected, and if they were, would provide
a generalized degree of warning of several days, and specific
warning of unusual and possibly threatening air activity on the
order of 18-24 hours. A lesser scale of attack, involving about
250 aircraft, if accompanied by an extraordinary security effort
could be launched as early as 1956 with no assurance of specific
advance warning to the U. S. (apart from that provided by early
warning radar). Attacks against U. S. bases or forces overseas,
or against U. S. allies, could be made with equal or greater
* A revision of NIE 11-6-55, "Probable Intelligence Warning
of Soviet Attack on the US through Mid-1958, " 1 July 1955,
on which some of these statements are based, is scheduled
for completion in December.
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Final
14 August 1956
likelihood of being accomplished without advance warning, and
the situation with respect to warning in these areas will worsen
over the next three years if the USSR acquires the guided missiles
which we estimate are within Soviet capability.
C. In the period between now and 1959, Soviet capabilities
for surprise attacks will almost certainly increase. Furthermore,
the USSR will have a progressively increasing capability for
launching attacks on the. U. S. from interior Soviet bases. Such a
method of attack would probably provide no specific advance warning
to U. S. intelligence.
2. The Watch Committee of the IAC
a, Through the past year the Watch Committee has continued
its close inspection of intelligence for indications of hostile Soviet
Bloc intentions and, by direction of the IAC in February 1956, of
Arab and Israeli intentions to launch hostilities in the Middle East.
The National Indications Center (the 24-hour staff of the Watch
Committee;, in addition to its regular support of the Watch Com-
mittee, has made considerable progress in the development of
indicator lists, contacting in the process a large number of
activities within the intelligence community which have been alerted
to the need of the Watch Committee for the specific types of infor-
mation required to execute its mission.
b. During the next three years, it is anticipated that the
Watch Committee will continue to improve and expand its informa-
tion. system involving a better intelligence collection and analysis
of data relating to Soviet Bllcc~i intentions to initiate hostilities.
This process will include the improvement of lists of indicators now
in prepa.raticn in the National Indications Center and close collabora-
tion with the intelligence agencies and field collection organizations
looking toward more sharply focused collection and analysis of data
required for the mission of the Watch Committee.
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Final
14 August 1956
3, USAF Indications Center
The Air Force has continued operation of a world-wide
Indications System keyed to the detection of the imminence of
hostilities, especially air attack with nuclear weapons, Indica-
tions Centers serving the Air Defense Command, Alaskan Air
Command, Northeast Air Command, Far East Air Forces and
USAF Europe are tied in with Washington by rapid communications
for flash transmissions of early warning intelligence. The USAF
system ma:ntains close liaison with the unified command indications
centers and with the National Indications Center in Washington. The
establishment of additional centers and sub-centers is currently
under study.
4. "Situation Room" in the White House
At the request of the White House, CIA has established a
"Situation Room" in the White House and, with the cooperation of
other IAC agencies, is arranging to provide the necessary intel- 25X6
ligence support for it.
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Final
14 August 1956
6, Formosa Strait Coverage
The ad hoc IAC Current Intelligence Group on the Formosa
Strait Problem, established by the IAC in March 1955 in response
to the President?s desire for coordinated intelligence coverage of
this area, continues to meet regularly. The Group issued daily
reports in tially and then weekly reports until August 1955; since
then the reports have been prepared on a biweekly basis. A
special. study of the military and logistic situation was issued in
January 1956.
70 The Arab-Israeli Situation
In response to an informal request of the Department of State,
an ad hoc IAC Working Group on the Arab-Isareli Situation was
set up in March 1956 to cover the potentially explosive developments
in Palestine, The working group issued its first statement on the
military and po:i.itical situation on 8 March and has since kept it up
to date, together with current maps and military statistics.
8. Emergency Plans
In recognition of the probable impact of emergency situations
on the functioning of the IAC,, there was established, at the sug-
gesticn of the Director of Central Intelligence, an ad hoc Working
Group on Emergency. Plansfl charged with the examination of the
impact of war on the functions of the IAC and the identification of
problems thatt might arise at Operation Alert 1956, The IAC
adopted a series cf recommendations prepared by the committee and
designed to anti ipate problems affecting the operations of the IAC
both under s:mlatted. and actual war conditions.
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Final
14 August 1956
1. National Intelligence Estimates (NIE)
a. Production of NXE's continued to be guided largely by the
needs of the NSC and related bodies. Of the 48 NIE's published
during the last year, 26 were related to specific NSC papers or
policy decisions.
b. The IAC. has prepared a number of estimates in support of
the reports to the NSC on the 7?net evaluation" of the capabilities of
the USSR to inflict direct injury on the continental U. S. The main
estimates for the 1955 report, which were keyed to the focal period
of mid-1958, were "Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attacks on the
ITS and Key Overseas Installations Through Mid- 1958, 11 and
"Probable Intelligence Warning of Soviet Attack on the US Through
Mid--1958. " For the net evaluation tc be submitted on 15 November
1956, the IAC has produced 'Soviet Gross Capabilities for Ai-tack
on the US and Key Overseas installations and Forces Throv.gh
Mid-195911 and 'Soviet Nuclear Program. `'` The following N'1E e
will also provide intelligence support for the 1956 report- 'Soviet
Capabilities and Probable Soviet Courses of Action Through 961, 1'
and the pending "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs
the Guided Missile Field.''
c. The following estimates have been produced in support of
the work of the Special Assistant to the Presider!t for Disarr* cement:
"Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attacks on the US anc. Key Over ee,ae
Installations and Forces in 1965, ?" and "Some Implications of a.
System of International Armarnen s Inspection. t"
d. There has been completed a "Survey of NIE Disssernin.aticr.
and Use, " which had been undertaken to assist in determining how
national estimates can be made more useful to policy makers, The
results of this survey are currently being reviewed by the IAC.
During the past year there has also been a further refinement ~f
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Final
14 August 1956
the reporting of intelligence deficiencies encountered in the
preparation of estimates in order to alert the intelligence
community to gaps which need to be closed. In addition, a
careful study of the validity of each estimate is made after a
lapse of time as a furthez check on the estimative process.
2. National Intelligence Surveys (;NIS)
ao NIS production during the year exceeded the yearly goal
set for the program by the JCS, and brought the total of the NIS
produced thus fax to nearly 3, 300 sections, which represents more
than 60 percent of the total world coverage. Major effort ,on-
tinued on the JCS high=priority areas, on which coverage is now
over 85 percent complete. All NIS contributing agencies continued
their strong support of the program and their field collection re-
sults showed improvement,
b, in addition to regularly scheduled production, the NIS
on Antarctica was produced to satisfy a priority requirement of
OCB for basic intelligence to serve as a basis for pcli cy dis-
cussions (pursuant to NSC 5424/1). During the past year there
was also undertaken under the NIS Program greatly expanded
intelligence research and production on international Communism.
(See also Section C-9, "International Communism.".
C. During the next three years the NIS Program
_'.
continue
to meet the JCS annual requirements providing
ibuting
agencies maintain their capabilitie z- a*- the pA e. ,~:?a
: X ?s .
`-'his
will result in 80 percent coverage of world areas by 30 rune '.959,
and the revision of at least 20 percent of all published NIS under
the maintenance program.
3. Military Intelligence
ao Military intelligence information available on the Sino-
Soviet Bloc is generally adequate to support broad assessments
of the capabilities of the Armed Forces of those countries and to
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Final
14 August 1956
discern trends in their development, This information, however,
continues to be inadequate in many critical fields to provide a
firm intelligence basis for military plans, operations, and research
and development.
b, ym r.,ovements have been made in certain categories of
military information on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, due in part to some
relaxation of security restrictions and in`;re&sed travel to and
within Bloc ccuntyies, Significant gains have been made in our
technical Jnowledge of Soviet naval vesse- through increased
photographic coverage of Soviet fleet exe; ci ed and of naval visits
by elements of the Soviet fleet to Western European countries,
However, we lack definite knowledge of new weapons systems and
related te:hniques which the Soviets intend to introduce into their
navy, especially their submarine arm, With respect to Soviet
ground forces, Intel genres c^i the tactical organization of rifle,
tan , and mechanized divisi,oras has improved somewhat but infcr-
mia.tion remains inadequate on other types of units,
supple E. e gy , Ina, planning factors, the design and < hara Uteristlos
of neviy-In'r'oduced convent snal ground for ces weapons, and the
identifi:atic and location of Sovier military units, Eva::u:atIcn of
the over=.al' s en_gth of the Soviet Army c nt.inues to be hampered
by lack of information on strength levels of active units" Air
Order of Battle information on the Soviet Air Forces .:..~ iprrved
to some extent and our knowledge of the 4=:ap bil t e and r e: formancce
chara cteristics of :urrently operational air- raft na 3 improved,
However, the lack of more aircraft
productions research and development prog-sa.m ;, inc; o.em. weapons,
that may be introdu-ced in! the S,o-vie;t Air Force continue to 'hamper
an evaluation of over'--all cwpabilities.
The status cf information on the European Sateite armies
has continued at almost the came: level as in the previous ywar,
a`.though improvement has been noted in ~ 7 ve &ge cf ~?- Pr,,.'--, s'h,
Rumanian, and Albanian armies, Order of aat a on the Chinese
Communist Annoy continues to be relit:?vE-1y good but intelligence is
inadequate for advance warning purposes. This inadequacy is also
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Final
14 August 1956
true of intelligence on the North Korean Army. The departure of
the French and the inadequacy of Vietnamese intelligence efforts
have resulted in a virtual "drying up" of reliable reporting on
Viet Minh military forces.
d. The deficiencies noted in military intelligence, as is to
be expected, occur in those categories and areas over which
target nations exercise the most stringent security measures and,
consequently, in which overt collection means are .most .estr cted,
A continued expansion of clandestine activities is being undertaken
to intensify the collection of military intelligence on the Sino..
Soviet Bloc. Much attention is also being given to the development
of scientific and technical equipment and methods for overcoming
security measures in target areas. In view of the nature of the
problem, however, the expanded program must be in operation
for a long period before a significant reduction of our critical
military intelligence deficiencies can be expected.
e. For air target materials there was completed during the
period of this report, a realignment of production, identified as
the Air Target Materials Program, which provides a more adequate
framework for the utilization of both departmental and field re-
sources in fulfillment of the requirements of the Unified and
Specified Commanders. Of the basic air target mater?ia s. needed
to employ current weapon systems effectively, one or rnc-e have
been completed for 90 percent of the targets in , ur r c, A=. zi
annexes for which weapons have been assigned. red a .? : on
present target selections and production capabi`: ties, all of the
basic air target materials on the highest pr-..ority targe`E f the
Unified and Specified Commanders are scheduled for completion
by 30 June 1957. It is anticipated that prior to 1 July :959 the Air
Target Materials Program will be functioning in phase with the
JCS Program for Planning, thus assuring ava?:11abii:dts :f esseri-ial
air target materials on joint war plan targets dur:.ng the effective
period of such plans.
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F ina1
,4 August 1956
inte'li& ence with the exception of some improvement with respect
to East Germany and 'Communist Chine Since the Twentieth Party
Congress i_nthe USSR, the RIC has been watching, parti ulariy in
terms of resistance sentiment, the effects of the denigration of
Stalin and of the various iiber,alization measures being taken behind
the Iron Curtain. A new- inte:Iigenc.e estimate has been scheduled by
the IAC to oea;- tr.e stabi,ity ana cohesion o the Soviet Satellite
structure,
5. Economic inteN igeri:ce
a, improvement in economic: intelligence on the Sino-Soviet
Bloc have resulted not only from more intensive research and
analysis but also from a aigmiicant increase in published data on
nondefense industries, particuiariy for the USSR. At the same time,
there has been a reduced access to information from other sources
which fc - nerly p-r educed v 'able details on defense industries.
b. Larg?.sca,ie research is under way on certain economic
aspects of the 3mc