(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00362R000300110001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 133
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: LIST

Approved For Release ~b1/12/04:CIA-RDP85S00362R000300yyA001-5
IAG-D-23/1 Progress Report on
Program, January - anuary
(14 August 1956)
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 Approved For Release 2012/04 : CpS00362R000300111-5
LAC-D-29/4 Foreign Intelligence and Related Activities
(13 Sept 1951)
IAC-D-29/5
LAC-D-29/6
IAC-D-29/7
IAC-D-29/8
LAC-D-29/9
Recommended P3,a.n to Accomplish the
Summary Evaluation Required by
Paragraph 2 of NSC Action 543
(1 October 1951)
Revision of Annex 6 to NSC 114/2
(22 March 1952)
Revision of Annex 6 to NSC 114/2
(27 March 1952)
Revision of Annex 6 to N5C 114/ 2
(9 April 1952)
Revision of Annex 6 to NSC 114/2
(15 April 1952)
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 Approved For Release 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP85S00362R00030077~~"(~1~~0
Job no. 85S00362R is one of several DCI jobs recommended by the
DCI History Staff for the Historical Review Program in November
1990. These documents had been reviewed in 1986 by the
Historical Review Section, found generally unproductive, and
..~
the effort was abandoned, with this in mind we decided to do a
quick review of the eight boxes with no reproduction and no
actual sanitizing--just yellow, white or green bands. Although
we found some }~istorically useful and releasable material the
results pretty much confirmed our earlier judgment:
Box 1 (Gloria): DIF
" 2 (Gloria): 40o releasable
3 (Frank) :
33~
4 (Jim) :
380
5 (Jim)
05~
" 6 (Frank) :
500
" 7 (Jim) :
140
" 8 (Jim) :.DIF
average: 22.5% releasable
If and when this job is taken up again, a full, detailed
by the normal procedures would be necessary for boxes 2 t
7.
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 T3~~For.Q,~lease 200 ~~85S0036`S~)00300~'lOm01-5 ~
,~ Security Information ,,.
~P6Y- SECRET
Security Informat3_on
IAC-D-29/9
15 April 1952
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
REVISION OF ANNEX N0. 6 TO NSC 114/2
hereto the final version of the redraft of Annex No. 6
to NSC 114/2 as approved by the IA.C at its meeting; on
14 April 1952. This paper has been transmitted to the
NSC.
James Q. Reber
Secretary
Dotumcnt tio. -- --
~tn Change In Class. ;Ji
--~ Derlassifi~d
Glass. Changed io: T;i
Next Review pate: ---
~uth.: NR 7C-3
Date: ~~ r z-..~ -
z ~ .~7E~
6y: - ---------
?~!?-SECRET
IAC-D-29 9
15 Apr i ], 1952
~~~Urlt l -
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~ aD ~3~5~
 Approved For lease 2001'~'~4 ~~85S0036003~~i~~~~I~~~~nformation
Security Information IAC-D-29/9
15 April 1952
Draft Annex No. 6
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
(Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency with the
Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee)
Fore_~n Intelligence
1. Insofar as possible the intelligence programs of the
intelligence agencies and CIA are tied into the President's over-all
program f. or Fiscal Year 1953, although in many cases indirectly. It
should be noted, however, that many of the functions and programs
of intelligence must be of a continuing nature quite apart from the
specific aspects of any given over-all annual program. Thus the
departmental intelligence agencies and CIA, which compose the
Federal Intelligence Community, must make certain that the sub-
stantive objectives controlling the+r collection, research, and
estimating activities are properly related to the problems posed
by the Soviet world and to others which confront the National
Security Council. These activities must be so developed and related
that the resources of each provide maximum support for the attainment
of these objectives. Many intelligence programs have an intimate
bearing on one another or are a composite of departmental programs
and activities so that the strengthening of our habits and means
of collaboration is in a sense a major part of the intelligence program.
-+~6P-SECRET
IAC-D-29 9
15 April 1852
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Security In orrra~~~'
IAC-D-29/9
15 April 1952
2. As a matter of convenience and means of giving an appraisal
of the extent to which intelligence programs may achieve their
goals for Fiscal Year 1953 within the resources available the follow-
ing are analyzed below separately;
a. National Intelligence Estimates;
b. Research in support of National Intelligence Estimates
and intelligence programs for departmental needs,?
c. Current intelligence; and
d. The collection of intelligence information.
3. National Intelligence Estimates: These Estimates, under
the arrangements developed since October 1950, are today the authori-
tative intelligence opinion of the Government. Through the support
of the programs for research and collection discussed below, and
with the existing resources employed directly in the estimating
program, it is expected that continued improvement in the quality
of our National Intelligence Estimates can be expected during the
period under discussion.
~. Research iri support of National Intelligence Estimates:
The achievement of the standard of research in support of National
Inte].~..iganc4 S~Otixro-tP,q, which is our goal, must be vieWt.a in terms
of years rather than a limitea period sv~h s.s FY X953? `Phis achi~. .
meet is dependent on a sharper definitiu~: o# tho essential research
iP6~-'GECRET
IA.C -D-29 9
15 April 1952
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IAC-D-29/9
15 April 1952
required on new methods of cooperative effort, and in certain
cases on increases in staff.
a. Political intelligence research: The political intel-
ligence programs of the Department of State are oriented
towards the urgent problems confronting the NSC and the policy
makers in the Department, towards research-in-depth into the
situations out of which 'the immediate problems arise, and
towards new demands for specialized intelligence products,
notably in the psychological warfare field. Adjustments have
been made, and will continue to be made, in organization and
in priorities with a view to meeting these objectives. However,
it remains true that the intelligence production resources of
the Department are insufficient to meet urgent and specialized
needs and at the same time to maintain the research effort
essential in the longer term if intelligence efforts directed
at immediate problems are to have a sound basis.
b. Military intellip~ence as a result of Korea and the
threat of hot wax is faced with increased demands of an
operational nature. At the same time it is faced witYz
responsibilities in support of National Intelligence Estimates.
The Military Services will also bear the brunt of the increas-
ing demands of NATO and its commands for tactical and strategic
~-SECRET
IAC-D-29 9
15 April 1952
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c.:,~?rite Information IAC-D-29~
15 April 1952
intelligence. Despite efforts to rationalize intelligence
research activities to meet these demands, the resources
presently allocated to these activities will not permit such
demands to be met as they should.
c. Economic intelligence: It is expected that the coordin-
ated program which has been launched for the systematic analysis
of Soviet and satellite economies will have made considerable
progress during this period. It should provide a better,
thaugh by no means complete, appraisal of the long-range
capabilities of the USSR and should suggest possible avenues
of U. S. counteraction by exposing economic vulnerabilities.
By the end of FY 1953 the cooperative research. in this area
under the guidance of the Economic Intelligence Committee
should lave made satisfactory progress toward defining the
major problems, identifying the available and relevant informa-
tion existing in the Government, developing new methods of
research and producing a substantial number of studies which
will provide a firm foundation for National Intelligence
Estimates and reliable departure points for continuous survey
assd appraisal off' sc~vi~t economic activity. The needs of
intelligence support for economic warfare have not yet been
clearly defined thaugh it is believed they will be of a magni-
tude beyond the existing resources of the intelligence. @~mtnun{ty.
-4-
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15 April 1952
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Ts 3c~234-i
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c .:.~.rn~alioR
. ~ . IAC-D-29/9
15 April 195
d. Scientific and technical intelli ence, to a certain
extent like economic intelligence, is a responsibility of the
agencies in respect of their individual needs. The intelligence
community is seeking t4 define clearly the areas of responsi-
bility in this field and will develop mutually satisfactory
arrangements for pooling of resources requiring ,joint effort.
This planned cooperative attack an vital scientific and
technological intelligence problems should result by the end
of FY 1953 in considerable improvement. Notable success in
these respects has already been achieved in the coordination
of atomic energy intelligence.
e. National Intelli~e,_ nce Survey: Tho production schedule
for NIS has been revised during the last year to take into
account changed world conditions. It is expected that the
goals established for the coming year will be substantially
met with the existing resources available for this program.
This year`s program will be the equivalent of eight complete
country national intelligence studies. This will leave -
approximately 60~ of the high priority areas to be completed.
5. Current jntelligence programs. are of course related to
both operational and strategic needs of the departments and the
President and are keyed to the responsibility of intelligence to
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IAC-D-29 9
15 April 1952
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nr?n my Intnrm ~fi nn
Security -Inf ormr~ti.on
IAC-D-299
15 April 1952
provide warning of imminent attack by hostile powers and of situa-
tions abroad affecting U. S. security. For purposes of -this warning
the collaborative efforts of the current intelligence resources of
th.e departments and CIA are brought together through the TAC Watch
Committee. It is expected that by the end of FY 1953 the individual
and cooperative efforts should be more sensitive in the detection
of hostile threats as we11 as current trends which necessarily
have a bearing upon National Estimates and policy matters.
6. Collection: The guidance for those resources devoted to
collection activities both overt and covert should be materially
improved by virtue of the foregoing programs although the nature
of the Soviet society will greatly limit our achievement. Programs
are being designed to exploit more effectively existing U. S. govern-
mental and other available sources of overt foreign intelligence
information which have hitherto gone uncxploited. Although by far
the greatest quantity of intelligence information can be collected
by overt means, much of the most critical information needed can be
obtained, j.f at all, only by clandestine means, The objective here,
because of the difficulty of the target, namely, the Soviet orbit,
must be to define clearly the most important targets. United States
efforts in clandestine operations are relatively new and the number
of personnel trained and qualified as is necessary for successful
-6-
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IAC-D-29 9
15 April 1952
~1Y.. h li ~ll\~~
~~-4.+a
'~ ~ }trs`4= ~PtiOCrYiSftar_
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15 April 1952
operation is small, Clandestine intelligence, therefore, must
be viewed izi the long perspective of 15 to 20 years and our objectives
for the Fiscal Year 1953 call for the elimination of marginal
targets and greater concentration on the significant targets, the
building up of operational bases and nets which inevitably require
a great deal of time and are frequently faced with setbacks arising
from counterespionage activities of the enemy or detection and
exposure of our effort. It is recognized, of course, that the
military services have urgent tactical intelligence requirements
which also require the use of clandestine collection activities.
By the end of this period considerable strides will have been made
toward isolating the most essential elements of information which
must be collected by covext means giving proper attention to
priorities. There has been some success in the collection of
intelligence on the Soviet and satellites by clandestine techno-
logical and scientific means. The achievement of greater success
in this field is to a great extent dependent on the establis~unent
of arrangements for cooperative concentration of efforts.
7. With respect to the foregoing discussion of U. S. intelli-
gence programs, it should be noted that our intelligence system is
confronted by certain limitations which will inevitably result ir_
a margin of uncertainty both in our estimate and in our ability to
-7-
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15 April 1952
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IAC-D-29/9
15 April 1952
give early warning of attack. These limitations arise from the
security consciousness and practices of the Soviet State; the high
state of war preparations of the Soviet; their flexibility in
making decisions and the speed with which, under their system,
such decisions can be implemented. Tt should be emphasized that the
best collective effort of which the United States intelligence
community -- or any other -- is capable cannot guarantee adequate
advance warning of a surprise attack.
Related Activities
8. Related activities which have been undertaken or are planned
in support of the President's programs will require increasing
financial and manpower resources. Related to other programs the
financial requirements are not large. However, their size in
relation to the intelligence aspect of the CIA budget is such that
special methods of presenting it to Congress may have to be developed.
A major difficulty with respect to manpower arises from the difficulty
9.n recruiting and training officers for this work. Personnel needs
will require increased reliance on Armed Service personnel.
~P""SECRET
IAC-D-29 9
15 April 1952
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Security Information
 P SECRET'
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Ts 3623+-h
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SUGGES~D CHANGES IN ANNEX 6 (IAC-D-29/8)
Revise paragraph 5, first sentence, as follows:
Current intelligence programs are of course related to both
operational and strategic needs of the departments and the President
and are keyed to the responsibility of intelligence to provide
warning of imminent attack by hostile powers of and situations
abroad affecting U. S. security.
Paragraph 6, second sentence to read:
Programs are being designed to exploit more effectively
~ertain7 existing U. S. governmental and other available sources
of overt foreign intelligence information which have hitherto gone
unexploited.
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~ - ~?
MEMORANDUM FOR: SBG~~~gr"~!'H
NSC 11la./2~ US Programs for National Security,
is currently under revision,
The attached draft Annex 6 to NSC 11lt%2, pre_
pared at the request of the NSC to fulfill the
intelligence aspect of the revision, has been pre-
pared along the lines suggested by the NSC 5ecretar
iat and in consultation with interested CIA offices
and representatives of the TAC,
^ R.ECOMMENDATT?N: Approval of attached draft
l_ FARM N0. I0. ) 0 1 JAN 1 95 2
ll April 1952
'SECRET DATE)
Security Information
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 ? -~P~ SE~RE~-
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Security Information
IAC -D -29~$
g April 1952
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
REVISION OF ANNE3~ h TO NSC 1142
1. Attached for consideration of the IAC is a re-
vision of Annex 6, dealing with foreign intelligence and
related activities, which has been prepared for inclusion
in the NiC 1142 revision,
2. The present draft has been prepared through the
cooperation of the IAC agencies.
James Q,. Reber
Secretary
~~ruurr..ni N0.
Ufa Change In Glass. ~_ ~ . _
:~ Qaci;~ssdl!rd
Class. Chanrtt;d to: TS ~ G
~fxt Rev9ew i?ale:
Hate: J8 - ~.1 x.91 ~3v: 2~,3 7 ,
-+Pt~'' SECRET
AC -D -2g
9 Aprii 1952
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ormation
TS 3623+-g ~' SECRET
IAC -D -29/8
9 April 1952
Draft Annex No. 6
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
(Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency with the
Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee)
1. Insofar as possible the intelligence programs of the intelligence
agencies and CIA are tied into the Presidents-over-all program for Fiscal
yew' 1953, although in many cases indirectly. It should be noted, however,
that many of the functions and programs of intelligence must be of a con-
tinuing nature quite apart from the specific aspects of any given over-all
annual program. Thus the departmental intelligence agencies and CIA, which
compose the Federal Intelligence community, must make certain that the sub-
stantive objectives controlling their collection, research, and estimating
activities are properly related to the problems posed by the Soviet world
and to others wh~.ch confront the National Security Council. These activities
must be so developed and related that the resources of each provide maximum
support for the attainment of these objectives. Many intelligence programs
have an intimate bearing an one another or are a composite of departmental
programs and activities so that the strengthening of our habits and means
of collaboration is in a sense a ma,~ar part of the intelligence program.
2. As a matter of convenience and means of giving an appraisal of
the extent to which intelligence programs may achieve their goals for
Fiscal Year 1953 within the resources available the following are analyzed
? iP6~'" SECRET
AC -D -29
9 April 1852
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 ~P SECRET
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Secu~ rity Information
IAC-D-2g~8
g April 1952
below separately:
a. National Intelligence,Estimates;
b. Research in support of National intelligence Estimates and
intelligence pragxams for departmental needs;
c. Current intelligence; and
d. The collection of intelligence information.
3. National Intelligence Estimates: These Estimates, under the
arrangements developed since ?ctober 1950, are today the authoritative
intelligence opinion of the Government. Through the support of the pro-
grams for research and collection discussed below, and with the existing
resources employed directly in the estimating program, it is expected that
continued improvement in the quality of our National Intelligence Estimates
can be expected during the period under discussion.
~+. Research in support of National Intelligence Estimates: The
achievement of the standard of research in support of National Intelligence
Estimates,whic7i is our Baal, must be viewed in teams of years rather than
a limited period such as FY 1953< This achievement is dependent on a sharper
definition pf the essential research required, on new methods of cooperative
effort, and. in certain cases on increases in staff.
a. Political intelligence research: The political intelligence
...
programs of the Department of State are oriented towards the urgent pro-
blems confronting the NSC and the policy makers in the Department towards
research-in-depth into the situations out of which the immediate problems
~ SECRET
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TAC-D-298
q April 1952
arise, and towards new demands for specialized intelligence products,
notably in the psychological warfare field. Adjustments have been
made, and will continue to be mt;de, in organization and in priorities
with a view to meeting these objectives. However, it remains true
that the intelligence production resaurces of the Department -- which
are now less than at the outbreak of the Korean war -- are insufficient
to meet urgent and specialized needs and at the same time to maintain
the research effort essential in the longer term if intelligence efforts
directed at immediate problems are to have a sound basis.
b. Militsry intelligence as a result of Korea and the thxeat of
..
hat war 3.s faced with increased demands of an operational nature. At
the same time it is faced with respansib:ilities in support of 1Vational
Intelligence Estimates. The Military Services will a~_so bear the bxnint
of the increasing demands of NATO and its commands far tactical and
strategic intelligence. Despite efforts to rationalize intelligence
research activities to meet these demands, the resources presently
allocated to these activities will nat permit such cgemands to be-met
pis they should,
c. Economic Intelligence: It is expected that the coordinated
program which has been 1QUnched for tY~e systematic analysis of Soviet
and satellite economies will have made considerable progress during
this periad. It should provide abettor, though by zio means complete,
appra~.sal of the long-range capabilities of the USSR and should suggest
:>3_
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IAC -D -~9
9 April 1952
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9 April 1952
por lible avenues of U. S. counteraction by exposing econam:tc vulnera-
ba.li~f:ic~s. 13y the end of F'Y 7.,~5~; the cooperative research in this area
ta,nc3.e:r ?i~he @;uidai~ce of the Econon~.c Sntetligence Corr~rnittee should hsvc
rr.ic,de sata_sfac~;or. y pro tress toward defining; the ma,~or problems, identi-
:I'yixi~ ?the available and .relevant inforz*~,t:ton existing in the C:overnrnentX
d~veJ.o~?ing new methods of researc]_t and, producing a substantiaJ_ number
of stuc7.:tes whic}r will prav:tde a f'irrn faundatian for Nationa:+. In~tell.i-
~;er.~ce ~st..i.rnates and rel3.able deps.rture paints for continuous survey anc?.
a.~p~:?s,i,~s,l of "ov:Let ocoriamic ac~~t:iv:i.I;y. ~Che needs of. ix~?telligence ;,ur-
13ort far econon~i.c z?~arfare have not yet been clearly defined thok.:~i it
-t ;; 7~c;l.:teved they wi:l.l. be o:[~ a ma~*nitud.e beyond t~:,e exis~ti,ng reso~~.r.~a
oi' tic intel.l~.~;ence corn~mznity.
c1. Scientific and teekxr.:~.cal~tn?t~l_li~ri~cc, tc? a certa,~.n extent J..:t'~o
c,conGmic intelligence, is ?v res.non.si'~i1.:ity of the agencies irx respar
o:F t,he~ir. individual needs . Ta date tie ~.??tel.ligence camrmtnity har r:~~`~t
c:l.cr;.t~ly c3.ef'f.ned thc~ area,r~ of respon~ibil.~.ty :tn this field nor have
t1ir--:~~~ ~.c:velaped rmttually satJ.sfactoY~y arran~;ement~; !'or poal.in~; af' rcW
?c~u:r?crs nn Z~roblems rec~u~.r1.n{; joint ei'fbrt. By ?L-he and o:" 1?'Y 1953 "~t
~.;, a~,:fx:ctnd that such arran~oments will. be worked out and that a coorc:r-?
at?..vc; c~t?tack on vital. scient:ii'ic ancti technalo~ica'l. intell.~.gence prableU~`;
~ri7.1., x~rzv~a resulted i,n consid~:rabl?~ im-~rov?:men~~. NotabJ.e ;~ucces~ ~.
~tt?rr~:~,c~ a.~c: pects ha.s alrr~ady been achieved ire. the caordi.nflticr{ of ~.t~:n::_c
c.ne.~ry intezl:?.~;onc :.
_ lt. -
IAC`D -2>) ~~
9 Apr:i.l .152
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TAC -7J -?9,/8
Ap,1il 1952
e. Nation na~l_Intelligence Surv~: The px?oduct:ian ccliedule for NI"
harp been rev3.sed during the last year to take into accrnxnt 1:h~ge~1
world. conditions. It is expected that the goals established for the
coming year wi11 be aubUtantially raet with ~t;Yae existing resources
availabZ.e for tkiis progrart. ,This yearrs rragratn trill' be the equivale~~i~
of e~.[;ht complete cou~~try national intelligence :tu~.ic:s. This will
'leave approximately 6Q;~ of the high prior:i.t~r~ areas tc~ be completed.
5. Current intc:t].tgencc programs are of cou:~ s< related to both oper~
ational and strategic needs of the departments; a,nd the 1?re, ident and are
keyed to the responsibility of intelligence to provide z~?:~n~.ng of imminent
attack by hdctile powers. ~`or purposes of th-i.,? warn~.rzs~ the collaborative
efforts oi' the current intelligence resources of the cle7>a::?ttnents and CIA
are brought together tlirouQh the.IAC ?+latch Coli~t~i3.'ttee. xt is expected that
by the end of liyX 1953 the individual and coope;rat:i.vc ei'fc~rts should be mare
sensitive in the detection of hostile threats a;? well as current trends
which ncce:ssarily have a bearing upon National l~,stima~t~es said policy matters.
C. t;ollection: The guidance for those resources devoted to collection
act:-.v:i f,ies, both overt and covert should be matey?ia].ly itnp:roved by virtue of
the :E'o?.~egoi.ng pr. ograrna although the nature of the Soviet sociQty will greatly
lim:i.t oux? aclYie~vement. Programs are being desi~ncd to ex}~1oit mare effec-
tivt.ly r..~..t^ta:tn t~vailable sourcos of overt fox?eigri intelligence infortnat~.on
w},ic1:,. 7~~e~-~re hitherto gone unexploi~ted. .Althat,~~;h by far the ;~x?e:ateut t~u~~n?~
City of 1.rttelli.gence information can bF, collected by evert mean,:., much
-5-
~6!"'~FC't.ET
~AC ~7J -~ a ~
Approved For Release ~i~'~~'~JC~.RDP85S00362R000300110001-5
~cueit~ AnformatioR
 ' .~P SECRET
TS j~23~A~proved For Release 2 p1/1.~/Q4f ? ~I~~RDP85S003~Qr~10001-5
acuri y nor a i
Security Information
IAC -D -2y/#3
9 April 1852
bf the ~_x~t ei:~3tic~tl r~~'nx'mati.~n needed. can b~ ~tain.ed, i~ at
all, only by clande?tine means. The objective here, because of the diffi-
culty of the target, namely, the Soviet orbit, must be to define clearly
the most important targets. United States efforts in clandestine operations
are relatively new and the number of personnel trained and qualified as is
necessary far successful operation is small. Clandestine :intelligence,
therei'ore, moat be viewed in the long perspective of 15 to 20 years and
our objectives for the Fiscal Xear 1953 call for the elimination of marginal
targets and greater concentration on the significant targets, the bui7.ding
up of operational bases and nets which inevitably require a great deal of"
time q,nd are frequently faced with setbacks arising from counterespionage
activities oi' the enemy or detection and exposure of our effort. By the
end of this period considera~.ile strides wilJ_ have been made toward isol_atzng
the mist essential elements of information which must be collected by covert
means f;iving proper attention to priorities. There has been some success
in the collection of intelligence on the Soviet and satellites by clandestine
technological and scientific means. The achievement of greater success in
this field in to a great extent dependent on the establishment of arrange--
rnents for cooperative concentration of efforts.
7. With respect to the foregoing discussion of U. S. intelligence
programs, it should be noted that our intelligence system is confronted by
certain limitations which will inevitably result in a margin a~' uncertainty
..6-
~6i~-`aECH~;T
g April 1952
Approved For Release 20O~~~I,~,.F~DP85S00362R000300110001-5
Security Informafioe
 i ~;;,(~...~~r,.
Approved For Release 20a~0 ~~C1~DP85S004~~~10001-5
'2`S ~~~~!}...g i~cunly ~nFormation
Secu"~y information
IAC-D-298
March 1952
both in our estimates and in our ability to give early warning of attack.
'i'hes~: limitations arise from the security consciousness and practices of
the Soviet State; the high state of war preparations of the Soviet; their
flexibility in making decisions and the speed with which, under their
system, such decisions can be implemented.
1;elated Activities
8. ~ftelated activities xhich have been undertaken or are planned in
support at' the President's programs will require increasing financial and
manpower resources. Related to other programs the financial requirement~~
are not large. However, their size in relation to the intelligence aspect
of the CIA budget is such that special methods of presenting it to Congress
may have to be devel.aped. A ma,jar difficulty with respect to manpower
arises frara the difficulty in recruiting; and training officers for this
work, Personnel needs w:Cll require increased reliance on Armed Service
personnel.
jP9g-f ECRET
IAC -D~- . ~$
9 April 1952
Approved For Release 2 1l1 /04 : CIA~RDP85S00362R000300110001-5
6 :. ~ :: a
5scur~y Inforffl~liQ~
 ~@P- ~E~~~a~.~i-
Apppr ve For F~ase~00i~/11~~~,,.s~;~A-RDP85S~8~2010001-5
TS 3~623~+-g
SECRET
Security Information
IAC -D -29~$
9 April 1952
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
REVISION OF ANNEX 6 TO NSC lli+~2
1. Attached for consideration of the IAC is s re-
vision of Annex 6, dealing with foreign intelligence and
related activities, which has been prepared for inclusion
j.n the NSC ,lll+f2 revision.
2. The present draft ha3 been prepared through the
cooperation of the IAC agencies.
James Q. Reber
Secretary
Recurrent Np.
hto Change In CI~sS. [ j
,_] Drctassilied
Class. Changed ta: TS ~ C
Next Review cats: ____. _
Amts.: HR 7Q-3
a~t~: _~-d -'~ r_' 11
~ SECRET
I C -D -29
9 April 1952
sy: _2 3 3
Approved For Releasp~6~fy~1~0~~~1A-RDP85S00362R000300110001-5
I'"~os+nafion
 ,gip SECRET
TS "3~23~+-approved For Ruse 20~alar2~0-~ie~rt:'Pl~l"iRDP85S00~~~~s~'110001-5
Security Information
IAC-D-298
9 April 1952
Draft Annex No. 6
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED_ACTIVITTES
(Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency with the
Concuxrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee)
1. Insofar as possible the intelligence programs of the intelligence
agencies and CIA are tied into the Presidentts over-all program for Fiscal
year 1953, although in many cases indirectly. It should be noted, however,
that many of the functions and programs of intelligence must be of a con-
tinuing nature quite apart from the specific aspects of any given ever-all
annual program. Thus the departmental intelligence agencies and CIA, which
compose the Federal Intelligence community, must make certain that the sub-
stantive objectives controlling their collection, research, and estimating
activities are properly related to the problems posed by the Soviet world
and to others which confront the National Security Council. These activities
must be sv developed and related that the resources of each provide maximum
support for the attainment of these ob3ectives. Many intelligence programs
have an intimate bearing on one another or are a composite of departmental
programs and activities so that the strengthening of our habits and means
of collaboration is in a sense a ma~ar part of the intelligence program.
2. As a matter of convenience and means of giving an appraisal of
the extent to which intelligence programs may achieve their goals for
Fiscal year 1953 within the resources available the following are analyzed
~.Tll~ SECRET
SAC -D -2q
9 April 1952
Approved For Release~~Qa,(1~/~1?-~-RDP85S00362R000300110001-5
Securify Inforrsai'o~r
 TS ? 3623+ proved For Ruse
Cj~~.~~~
~0 u~it~/~~~~RDP85S003~'~'~~~110001-5
Security Information
IAC-D-29/8
g April 1952
below separately:
a. National Intelligence Estimates;
b. Research in support of National Intelligence Estimates and
intelligence programs for departmental needs;
c. Current intelligence; and
d. The collection of intelligence information.
3. National Intelligence Estimates: These Estimates, under the
arrangements developed since October 1950, are today the authoritative
intelligence opinion of the Government. Through the support of the pro
grams for research and collection discussed below, and with the existing
resources employed directly in the estimating program, it is expected that
continued improvement in the quality of our National Intelligence Estimates
can be expected during the period under discussion.
~+. Research in au~~ort of National Intelligence Estimates; The
achievement of the standard of research in support of National Intelligence
Estimates, which is our goal, rmist be viewed in terms of years rather than
a limited period such as Fx 1953. This achievement is dependent on a sharper
definition of the essential research required, on new methods of cooperative
effort, and in certain cases on increases in staff.
a. Political intelligence research: The political intelligence
programs of the Department of State are oriented towards the urgent pro-
blems confronting the NuC and the policy makers in the Department towards
research-in-depth into the situations out of which the immediate problems
-iP@1~' SECRET
IAC-D-29
9 April 1952
Approved For Release'f~'/~~~~~A-RDP85S00362R000300110001-5
.Security Information
 ~~ 36234-~ ~,~ SECP.ET ~- ~TcRET
- _ ___ ~ ---. ?. -?- - ~ -? - ---------a~~__~.~_T
.. ,e~~~ ~,, .. , - IAC -D ?29/g
a~iori
g April 1852
arise, and towards new demands for specialized intelligence products,
notably in the psyrhological warfare field. Adjustments have been
made, and will. continue to be made, in organization and in priorities
with a view to meeting these objectives. However,, it remains true
that the intelligence production resources of the Department -- which
are now less than at the outbreak of the Korean war -- are insufficient
to meet urgent and specialized needs and at the same time to maintain
the research effort essential in the longer term if intelligence efforts
directed at imntediate problems are to have a sound basis.
b. Military intelligence as a result of Korea and the threat of
_~..
hot war is faced witYi increased demands of an operational nature. At
the same time it is faced with responsibilities in support of Nationa]_
Intelligence Estimates. The Military Services will also bear the brunt
of the increasing demands of NATQ and its commands for tactical and
:strategic intelligence. Despite efforts to rationalize intelligence
research activ.ties to meet these demands, the resources presently
allocated to these activities wi11 not permit such demands to be met
as they should.
c. Economic Intelligence: It is expected that the coordinated
program which has been launched f'or the systematic analysis of Soviet
and satellite economies will have made considerable progress during
thi3 period. It should provide abetter, though by no means complete,
appraisal of the long-range capabilities of the USSR and should suggest
-'SECRET
IAC -A -?9
9 April 1952
Approved For Release 2Q,O~~~.I~,DP85S00362R000300110001-5
Security lnformatian
 ~`~ ~~~3~' i~pproved For R~'I~ase 0 /1 2~~~~~ RDP85S00
unify lnforinNio~
IAC -D -29 ~~
9 April 1952
passible avenues of U. S. counteraction by exposing economic vulnera-
bilities. By the end of FY 1953 the cooperative research in this area
under the guidance of the Economic Intelligence Committee should have
made satisfactory progress toward defining the mayor problems, identi-
:L'yiiag the available and relevant information existing in the Government,
develc~pin~; new methods of research and producing a substantial number
of studies which will provide a firm foundation for National Intelli-
gence Estimates and reliable departure points for continuous survey and
appraisal ai' Soviet economic activity. The needs of intelligence suer
port fo~? economic warfare have not yet been clearly defined though it
is believed they will be of a magnitude beyond the existing resources
of the intelligence community.
d. :cientific and technical intelligence, to a certain extent lake
economic intelligence, is a responsibility of the agencies in respect
of -their individual needs.. To date the intelligence community has not
clearly defined the areas of responsibility in this field nor have
they developed mutually satisfactory arrangements for pooling of re-
sources on problems requ~.ring point effort. By the end of FY 1953 it
i:; expected that s~zch arrangements will be warlted out and that a eoaper-
ative attack on vital scientific and technological. intelligence problcma
wil..l. have resulted in considerable improvement. Notable success in
tr~ese respects has already been achieved in the coordination of atomic
on~:rgy intelligence.
,~' SECRET
I C-D-29
9 April 195
Approved For Release 2001/'1 5S00362R000300110001-5
Security Infarmetiarl
 Approved For Fuse 200
TS 36234-
1
4 . ~~~P85S00~~110001-5
nfy InformaFio~ Secu-- ri- ty Infarznation
IAC-D-29~$
y April 1852
e. National Intelligence Survey; The production schedule for PdIS
has been revised during the ]_ast year to take into account changed
world condit9.ons. It is expected that the goals established for the
coming year will be substantially met with the existing resources
available for this program. This year's program wi11 be the equivalent
of ~;ight complete country national intelligence studies. This will
leave approximately 6Q?fo of the high priority areas to be completed.
5. Current intelligence pro~?rams are of course related to both oper-
at9.ona1. and strategic needs of the departm?nts and the President and are
l;.eyed ?to the responsibility of intelligence to provide warning of imnifnent
attack by hostile powers. I'or purposes of this warning the collaborative
efforts of the current a.ntelli,gence resources of the departments and CTA
are brought together through the IAC sJatch Committee. It is expected that
by ?t;he end of FY 1y53 the individual and cooperative efforts should be mare
sensitive in the detection of hostile threats as well as current trends
which necessarily have a bearing upon National Estimates and policy matters.
6, Collection: 'Ihe guidance for those resources devoted to collection
act:iv:i?ties both overt and covert should be materially improved by virtue of
the :t'or.egoing programs although the nature of the Soviet society will greatly
limit out? achievement. Programs are being designed to exploit more effec-
tively certain available sources of overt foreign intelligence information
which Ma?ve hi.therta gone unexploited. Althau~ by far the gxeatest Q'~n-
City of intelligence information can be collected by avert means, much
..T4~- SECI~ET
I C-D-2y
~,pp y April 1952
Approved For Release 2001/'94 : ~85S00362R000300110001-5
~Teatariry Informatlorl
 ~" SEC~z~. _, - -
' approved For Ruse 2001%~~1~}~;. ~{G~P85S003~110001-5
~~ ' 3234-~ ._...._.,._..,~...
Security ,Information
IAC-D~29/~
q April 1852
of thr TZO~t ex~aticril ini'rY?zz~ti~n needed ca,ta. bP o8-tain.ed, i~ at
a1.1, only by clandestine means. The ob,~ective here, because of the diffi-
aulty of the target, namely, the Soviet orbit, must be to define clearly
tYae most important targets. United States efforts in clandestine operatir~ns
are relatively new and the number of personnel trained and qualified as is
necesary for successful operat-ion is small. Clandest~.ne intelligence,
therefore, rmist be viewed in the long perspective of 15 to 20 years and
our or~~jectiv~:s for. the Fiscal Yeax? 1853 call for the elimination of marginal
targets and g.reate7~ concentration on the significant targets, the building
up af' operational bases and nets which 9nevitably require a great deal of
time: and are f'~equently faced with setbacks arising from counterespionage
activities af' the enemy ox? detect7.on and exposure of our effox?t. By the
end of this 1~eriod considerable strides will. have been made toward isolating
the most essezzt:i.al elements of information which must be collected by covert
means givf.ng proper attention to priorities, There has been some success
in the collection of intelligence on the Soviet and satellites by clandestine
tecl~.nolo~;ica1 and scietztific means. The achievement of greater succes^ in
th_Ys field is to a great extent dependent on the establishment of arrange-
ments for cooperative concentration of efforts.
7. Witkz respect to the foregoing discussion of U. S. intelligence
programs, it should be noted that our intelligence system is confronted by
certain l~.zr-i.tationa which will inevitably result in a ms,rgin of uncertainty
-6-
.T.AP-?.aFCRFT
IAC -D -29
q April 1952
Approved For R~=,~O~;'K~~/04:CIA-RDP85S00362R000300110001-5
?~'=vr~~y Information
 ~6P SEC~tE~
~~ ~_~~~~~-Approved For Ruse 2~~/~?!DP85S00 ~ 110001-5
Security Tnfornm,tion
IAC -D -29/8
9 March 1952
both in our estimates and in our ability to give early warning of attack.
These limitations arise from the security consciousness and practices of
the Soviet State; the high state of war preparations of the Soviet; their
flexibility in making decisions and the speed with which, under their
system, such decisions can be implemented.
;elated Activities
8. Related activities which have been undertaken or are planned in
support of the PreUi,den~t's programs wi1J_ require increasing financial and
manpower. resources. Related to other programs the financial requirements
are nat Large, However, their size in relation to the intelligence aspect
of the CT.A budget is such that special. methods of presenting it to Congress
may have to be developed. A major difficulty with respect to manpower
arises from the difficulty in recruiting and training officers far this
work, Personnel needs will require increased reliance on Armed Service
personnel.
~6i'"'SECREm
TAC-D-~9
SEC~CL~ 9 April 1952
Approved For Release 2001 12/04 ? ~IA-~~P85S00362R000300110001-5
urdy In orma i
 A r elease 20~'1'f'~/0~~~P85S00 0 00
~~~~~ Security lnformatiori ~~? "~'-~
-~f'"SECRET
Security Information
IAC-D-29/7
27 March 1952
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
REVISION OF ANNEX 6 TO NSC '111+/2
1. The President has requested that NSC 111~~2 be
brought up to date. There has been in both the NSC 111+2
and its previous form in NSC 68 an Annex devoted to
intelligence.
2. The attached draft has been prepared through the
cooperation of representatives of the IAC and is hereby
submitted for approval of the IAC. It will be considered
at the meeting on 3 April.
James Q. Reber
Secretary
Approved For Release Zl~~2,~
0acumr.~tit ~o.
~o Chan~c In Class. i l
E~rxt 1Sea;C'N pate:
Autw ? !a'R 70-3
;?eciassifie~
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~~: Z 3 ~ 7
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IAC-D-29 7
27 March 1952
~DP85S00362R000300110001-5
:3C~C.~ 3s ~
 ~$P- SE~kt f
TS ~~~v~d F~F2elease 2001~~1~~OtY 1n~o~~~P85S00~R00Q~'~,'~15
Security Information
IAC-D-297
27 March 1952
Draft Annex No. 6
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
{Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency with the
Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Coiiunittee)
Foreign Intelligence
1. The peculiar nature of intelligence operations makes it
difficult 'to project national intelligence plann~.n,; in terms com-
parable to those employed in a program aimed at the attainment of
manpower or production goals. While intelligence must increase
its efforts if it would audit the Soviet world's strength and
estimate with the required accuracy its intentions and chances of
success, expansion in itself offers no guarantee of increased
success in this regard. Tmprove:nent in the intelligence product
is dependent in considerable measure upon other factors such as
the refinement of our collection targets, the effectiveness of the
collection effort, the skill with which sources are exploited and
information is evaluated and conclusions drawn. Expansion is never-
theless essential in the intelligence agencies of the State and
Military departments, if the intelligence comrc~unity is to be
adequately prepared for the period of greatest danger ahead, for
the increased demands for intelligence service created in large
part by the programs set forth elsewhere in this paper., and for
the inevitable intelligence build-up which would be required in
~2biy.SECRE T
IAC-- D 29f 7
(~~ T 27 March 1952
Approved For Release 20~)T/'f,2/~~:~I-~-RDP85S00362R000300110001-5
ecunty n ormafioQ
 TS ~d F~Release 2001/1~~p~;y~C~~6~d~65S00R0(1Q,~~O~~`~-5
Security Inf'c?rmation
IA.C -D-29,7
27 March 1952
the event of a spread of hostilities. While the increased funds
necessary to support this expansion are negligible in relation to
the entire program, they have not in fact been allocated, and in
general it may be said that the departmental intelligence agencies
find themselves with na greater resources in personnel and logistic
support tYian they possessed in 1950.
2. The irnpravement of U. S. foreign intelligence is an
important objective and one closely related to the policies recom-
mended here since our estimates of foreign intentions and capabilities
bearing on the East-West struggle are directly dependent upon the
effectiveness of our .intelligence organization. To improve the
over-all value of their product, the intelligence agencies moat
focus upon these essentials:
First, they must make certain that the substantive objec-
tives controlling their collection, research and estimatinn activities
are properly related to the problems posed by the Soviet world and
others which confront the National Security Council.
? Second, both the collc:ctian and research activities of
the several inte113gence agencies must be so developed and related
that the resources of each provide maximum support for the attain-
ment of these object~.ves.
3. The Intelligence Advisory Committee, composed of the chiefs
~ SECRET
IAC-D-29 7
27 March 195
Approved For Release 2Q~~/Q~~P85S00362R000300110001-5
 SECRET
TS 3,~o~[ed F~ovr,~Release 2001/~y'f11~!:f'L/99~!14t4~85S0O~G^ROQ~~~~~,1-5
Security Information
IAC-D-29i7
2 ;' March 1952
of each of the intelligence agencies is of great assistance in
focusing the attention of the intelligence community on these
continuing efforts. It is also increasingly effective as a means
of achieving coordination on National Intelligence Es-cimates, and
of reaching agreement on the coordination of various other intelli-
gence activities.
~-. The IAC agencies, in recognition of the need for streng-
thening the collection of intelligence information bearing upon
the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union and Soviet
Orbit countries, have made renewed effort to explc;it available
overt information. In spite of some success, however, much of the
most critical information needed can be obtained, if at all, only
by clandestine means. The ordinary difficulties of "conventional"
clandestine collection are greatly magnified within the Soviet
Orbit where virtually the entire population is covered with a vast
counterespionage net and where State surveillance restricts oppor-
tunities for penetration. The enormous difficulties of such clandes-
tine activities strain available resources of qualified personnel
and may be expected to increase the costliness of such operations.
The resources and possibilities available for covert collection
are therefore and will necessarily continue to be insufficient to
provide all the critical information required in these areas. In
-3-
SECRET
IAC -D -~',~~
27 MarcYi 1952
Approved For Release 2001/~~r~4 :S~I~ R~~85S00362R000300110001-5
Y
 TS 3-~ed or Release 21'd~~G7A'-RDP85SOf,~2R0~'Of~1Q~D1-5
S~ru.ily i..fn.w.dS..r
Security Information
IAC-D-2y~7
27 March 1x52
order to make the maximum use of these capabilities, intelligence
agencies have made considerable strides toward isolating the most
essential elements of information which must be collected bar covert
means, giving proper attention to priorities. Increasing success
is also being achieved in the collection of intelligence on tine
Sov~.et and its satellites by technological and scientific means.
In the collection and analysis of foreign electro-magnetic
radiation we have not yet achieved a fully coordinated effort.
5. While the guali~ty of national and departmental intelligence
research is heavily dependent upon the intelligence information col-
lected, it is also dependent on a properly coordinated division of
labor among the agencies and on the timely availability of the
research product. In this regard it is felt that the National
Intelligence Estimates are making a significant contribution. There
has been notable progress in the coordination of atomic energy intel-
ligence and steps are being taken to improve coordination in other
aspects of scientific and technical intelligence production. There
is also under way a coordinated program for the systematic analysis
of the Soviet and satellite economies. This should provide abetter
appraisal of the capabilities and long-range intentions of the USSR,
and should suggest possible avenues cf U. S. counter-action by
exposing economic vulnerabilities. The agencies have continued
SECRET
IAC-D-2y~ 7
27 March 1952
~ SECk~T
Approved For Release 200'/ ~~~~~~h-~~P85S00362R000300110001-5
 TS 3~o~ed F~Release 200?~4 :`~CT~1~~~85SOO~ROpQ;~1-5
SQCUriiy Inlormaiion .......
Security Information
IAC-D-297
27 March 1952
their collaborative efforts to watch Soviet or Soviet Grbit develop-
ments in order to detect any short-range warning of an 3.ntent to
launch a military attack on the West.
6. Intelligence agencies suffer from inadequate numbers of
well-qualified personnel and inadequate space arrangements to meet
their responsibilities in collection and research production.
While qualified personnel are difficult to attract in the face of
the competition of other employers, bath inside and outside the
Government, some of the departments have been seriously hampered
in this respect by budgetary difficulties and uncertainties.
Related. Activities
7. Related activities which have been undertaken or are planned
in support of the foreign or military policies of the Government can
be expected to require increasing financial and manpower resources.
Related to other programs the financial requirements are not large.
Flowever; their size in relation to the intelligence aspect of the
CIA budget is such that special methods of presenting; i_t to Congress
may have to be developed. A mayor difficulty with respect to man-
power arises from the difficulty in recruiting and training officers
for this work. It is expected that increasing reliance on Armed
Service personnel will be required,
-~+9g~SECRET
IAC-U-2y 7
27 March 1952
Approved For Release 20~"~/(~~~y~
 ~~ ~P--SECRET,
A~ra~~c~ Rt3fease 200'~~fl%b'41r~f~l'F~~I~DP85S00362RO~QQ'1~8001C-~
~F- SECRET
Security Information
IA.C-D-29/7
27 March 1852
REVISION OF ANNEK 6 TG NSC 11-/2
1. The President has requested tha-~ NSC 11?~~2 be
brought up to date. There has been in both the NSC 11~~2
and its previous form in NSC 6~ an Annex devoted to
intelligence.
2. The attached draft has been prepared through the
cooperation of representatives of the IAC and is hereby
submitted for approval of the IAC. It will be considered
at the meeting on 3 April.
James Q. Reber
Secretary
!?rcumrst hu.
~!U Gl+~nge In Ci3ss. i
+7aci,~ssitied
Class. Changt~ tn: T~
+r~xt R~?~irt~ Gott: _
a,~th.: Hfl 7d-3
i3.t~:
-~P'C~''' SECRET
IAC-D-2y 7
27 March 1g52
Approved For Release~2001/12/04 :CIA-RDP85S00362R000300110001-5
~~~i~~f ~CI~3~ 7
 y d For ease 2 ~ 1/1.2/ ~ DP85S00362R 0p~~ 1QpQ15
TS $ '~ ~ecunfy nForm ~ +~J'P" ~ECRE`1'
Security Information
IAC-D-297
27 March 1952
Draft Annex No. 6
FQREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
(Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency with the
Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee)
Foreign Intelligence
1. The peculiar nature of intelligence operations makes it
difficult to project national intelligence planning i.n terms com-
parable to those employed in a program aimed at the attainment of
manpower or production goals, While 'intelligence must increase
its efforts if it would audit the Soviet world's strength and
estimate with. the required accuracy its intentions and chances of
success, expansion in itself offers no guarantee of increased
success in this regard. Improvement in the intelligence product
is dependent in considerable measure upon other factors such as
the refinement of our collection targets, the effectiveness of the
collection effort, the skill with which sources are exploited and
information is evaluated and conclusions drawn, Expansion is never-
theless essential in the intelligence agencies of the State and
Military departments, if the intelligence community is to be
adequately prepared for the period of greatest danger ahead, for
the increased demands for intelligence service created in large
part by the programs set forth elsewhere in this paper, and for
the inevitable intelligence bu~.ld-up which would be required in
,~6P-SECRE T
Inc-D..~9r7
27 March 1952
Approved For Release 22~CRDP85S00362R000300110001-5
Security informatioq
 TS ~~ For Fuse 2001/12/04 : C,CIA-F~DP85S00362R1~OO~p.1~1,5
ecun y In orma io
Security Information
IAC-D-29/7
27 March 1952
the event of a spread of hostilities. While the increased funds
necessary to support this expansion are negligible in relation to
the entire program, they have not in fact been allocated, and in
general it may be said that the departmental intelligence agencies
find themselves with no greater resources in personnel and logistic
support than they possessed in 1950.
2. The improvement of U. S. foreign intelligence is an
important objective and one closely related to the policies recom-
mended here since our estimates of foreign intentions and capabilities
bearing on the East-West struggle are directly dependent upon the
effectiveness of our :intelligence organization. To improve tine
over-all value of their product, 'the intelligence agencies must
focus upon these essentials:
First, they must make certain that the substantive ob,jec-~
tives contxolling their collection, research and estimatins; act9.vi.ties
are properly related to the problems posed by the Soviet world and
others which confront the Natiozial Security Council.
Second, bath the collection and research activities of
the several intelligence agencies must be so developed and related
that the resources of each provide maximum support for the attain-
ment of these objectives.
3. The Intelligence Advisory Cammittc:e, composed of the chiefs
r EGRET
IAC-D-29 7.
2 j March 1952
Approved For Release
~ ~~~A~RDP85S00362R000300110001-5
 SECREY
TS t~~d For Fuse 2001/7~EOr~x 85S00362R~,~.0~~~~,-5
Security Information
IAC-D-29/7
27 March 152
of each of the intelligence agencies is of great assistance in
focusing the attention of the intelligence community on tl~.ese
continuing efforts. It is also increasingly effective as a means
of achieving coordination on National Intelligence Estimates, and
of reach3.ng agreement on the coordination of various other intelli-
gence activities.
Z!-. The IAC agencies, in recognition of the need for streng-
thening the collection of intelligence information bearing upon
the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union and Soviet
Orbit countries, have made renewed efforts to exploit available
overt information. In spj.te of same success, however, much of the
mast critical information needed can be obtained, if at all, only
by clandestine means. The ordinary difficulties of "conventional"
clandestine collection are greatly magnified within the Soviet
Orbit where virtually the entire population is covered with a vast
counterespionage net and where State surveillance restricts oppor-
tunities for penetration. The enormous difficulties of such clandes-
tine activities strain available resources of qualified personnel
and may be expected to increase the costliness of such operations.
The resources and possibilities available far covert collection
are therefore and will necessarily Continue tc be insufficient to
provide all the critical information required in t~a.ese areas. In
-3-
.T~-~?SECRE T
IAC -D -29T
27 March l~?52
Approved For Release 2004~~~P85S00362R000300110001-5
Security Informatiarr
 ~ SECRET
TS ~~d For Ruse 2001/1~~yC~~~~85S00362R~0~3~~-5
Security Information
IA.C-D-297
27 March 195?_
oxder to make the maximum use of these capabilities, intelligence
agencies have made considerable strides toward isolating the most
essential elements of information which must be collected by covert
means, giving proper attention to priorities. Increasing success
is also being achieved in the collection of intelligence on the
Soviet and its satellites by technolog3.cal and scientific means.
In the collection and analysis of foreign electro-magnetic
radiation we have not yet achieved a,fully coordinated effort.
S. W~iile the quality of national and depaxtmental intelligence
research is heavily dependent upon the intelligence information col-
lected, it is also dependent on a properly coordinated division of
labor among the agencies and on the timely availability of the
research product, In this regard it is felt that the National
Intelligence Estimates are making a significant contribution. There
has been notable progress in the ccordination of atomic energy intel-
ligence and steps are being taken to improve coordination in other
aspects of scientific and technical intelligence production. There
is also under way a coordinated program for the systematic analysis
of the Soviet and satellite economies. This should provide a better
appraisal of the capabilities and long-range intentions of the USSR,
and should suggest possible avenues of U. S. counter-action by
exposing economic vulnerabilities. The agencies have continued
_ 'EGRET
IA.C -D-2y j 7
27 March 1952
-~- SECREY
Approved For Release 2001/~a'~3~ri4,~M~m~85S00362R000300110001-5
 TS 3,g~~~Qped For ease 2'17?2/~`~I~-RDP85S00362R0~1-5
Security Informa9ian Securit Information
IAC-D-297
27 March 152
their collaborative efforts to watch Soviet or Soviet Orbit develop-
meets in order to detect any short-range warning of an intent to
launch a military attack on the West.
6, Intelligence agencies suffer from inadequate numbers of
well-qualified personnel and inadequate space arrangements to meet
their responsibilities in collection and research production.
While qualified personnel are difficult to attract in the face of
the competition of other employers, bath inside and outside the
Government, some of the departments have been seriously hampered
in this respect by budgetary difficulties and uncertainties.
Related Activities
7. Related activities which have been undertaken or are planned
in support of the foraign or military polj.cies of the Government can
be expected to require increasing financial and manpower re^ources.
Related to other programs the financial requirements are not large.
Howevera their size in relation to the intelligence aspect of the
CIA. budget is such that special methods of presenting it to Congress
may have to be developed. A major difficulty with respect to man-
power arises from the difficulty in recruiting and training officers
for this work. It is expected that increasing reliance on Armed
Service personnel will be required.
~--BFCRE T
IAC-D-c~~
27 March 1Q52
Approved For Release 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP85S00362R000300110001-5
~" ~~~~~
 ~~p~86~d'~or RNQase 2001
00362R~30~t~~~T
Security Information
IAC-D-2g/6
22 March 1952
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
REVISION OF ANNEX 6 TO NSC 11+/2
The President has requested that NSC 11~~/2 be
brought up to date. There has been in both the NSC llt+/2
and its previous form in NSC 68 an Annex devoted to intel-
ligence.
A copy of the last edition of Annex 6 relating to
Intelligence is attached hereto as TAB B. The proposed
rev3.sion is at TAB A. It will be appreciated if your
representative would meet in my office, Room 2007 M
Building, at 2_:30 P.M. TYiursday, 27 March, to criticize
this draft prior to its submission to the IAC on 3 April.
James Q. Reber
Secretary
r.
~ecument tde. - -
Me Ch~ngr In Cl,ss. CJ
~~ t)eci~ssi#ied
Gass. Cnan~,ied b: TS ~ C
-iext Ravie'+x site: - - -----
~A~sih.: HR 70-3
ante: ~,~ - 2~ x.91 -
2337
sv: --- - -
~' SECRET
I -D-29
22 March 1y52
Approved For Release 2()Q~y~1~?,(O~~C~Q~pR,~5S00362R000300110001-5
 t. TS 3~ro~ied For ~a~077#2%~A~~CIA-RDP85S00362
SECUR4~l 1N~Q~.MATl~!'~
Draft Annex No. 6
~3~rmat 9. on
IAC-D-29~G
22 March 152
FOREIGN INTEL~TGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
(Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency with the
Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee)
Forei~-zn Intelligence
1. The peculiar nature of intelligence operations makes it
difficult to project national intelligence planning in terms com-
parable to those employed in a program aimed at the attainment of
manpower or product3.on goals. While intelligence must increase
its efforts if it would audit the Soviet world's strength and
estimate with the required accuracy its intentions and chances of
succe~, expansion in itself offers no guarantee of increased
ef'ectiveness. Some further expansion may indeed be necessary in
same of the intelligence agencies, but in general improvement in
the intelligence product is dependent upon other factors such as
the refinement of our collection targets and the skill with which
information is evaluated and conclusions drawn. The increased funds
necessary to support the intelligence activities required in the
State and Military departments, while important to the intelligence
effort, are not of a magnitude to require consideration in this
paper: Furthermore, the importance of these funds is not dependent
on thy: policies and programs contained in. the main body of this
Approved For Release
.TB~~ECRET
7'AC-D-29
22 March 1852
~~E~~~T DP85S00362R000300110001-5
 TS 3~p~~ved For Rolease1/ ~ ~~ ~~I -RDP85S00362
SECURITY INFtlRNlAT1~1N
ecurity~. riformatian
IAC-D-29/6
22 March 1952
2. The improvement of US foreign intelligence is nevertheless
an important ab,jective and one closely related to the policies recom-
mended here since our estimate of Soviet intentions and capabilities
is directly dependent upon the effectiveness of aux intelligence
organization. To improve the over-all value of their product, the
inte7..ligence agencies must focus upon three essentials:
First, they must make certain that the substantive ob~ec-
tives controlling their collection, research and estimating activities
are properly related to the problems posed by the Soviet world and
others which confront the members of the National Security Council.
Second, both the collection and research activities of the
several intelligence agencies must be so synchronized that the
resources of each provide maximum support for the attainment of these
objectives.
Third, .they must constantly seek to strengthens their capa-
bilities and resources in order to improve the quality and relic- fiJ ~~~i
bility of their product, whether in the collection or research field.
3. The Intelligence Advisory Committee, composed of the chiefs
of each of the intelligence agencies is of great assistance in focus-
ing the attention of the community on these three continuing efforts.
It is also increasingly effective as a means of achieving coordination
can National Intelligence Estimates, and of reaching agreement on the
coordination of vaxious. other intelligence activities.
-SECRET
IAC -D -29
22 March 1952
Approved For Release 2001/1 11 ~5~00362R000300110001-5
Y$
 d For Ruse 12-RDP85S00362
TS ~~`~ -
~- ~,
~'iF -5
Seciixity Information
IAC-~-2~f6
22 March 152
~+. The IAC agencies, in recognition of the need for strengthen-
ing the collection of intelligence information bearing upon the capa-
bilities and intentions of the Soviet Union and Soviet Orbit countries,
have made renewed efforts to exploit overt sources of information.
Tn spite of some success, however, much if not most of the critical
information needed will continue to be unavailable except by covert
means. The ordinary difficulties of "conventional" clandestine col-
lect:i.an are gxEatly magnified within the Soviet Orbit where virtually
'the entire population is covered with a vast counterespionage net and
where State surve1.11ance restricts opportunities for penetration.
The enormous difficulties of such clandestine activities strain
available xesources of qualified personnel and may be expected to
increase the costliness of such operations. The resources snd pas-
sibilities available for covert collection are therefore and w~.ll
necessar~.ly continue to be insufficient to provide all the critical
information required in these areas. In order to make the maximum
use of our limited possibilities, intelligence agencies have made
considerable strides toward isolating the most essential elements
of :information which must be collected by covert means, giving proper
attention to priorities. Increasing success is also being achieved.
in the collection of intelligence on the Soviet and its satellites
by technological and scientific means, although in the electro-
magnetic field we have not yet achieved adequate coordinated effort.
-~-
~"7f'' SECRE T
IAC-D-29
22 March 1952
Approved For Release 20 1/0~~"CIA-RDP85S00362R000300110001-5
 TS ~~~~Q~ed For F3~a '~4~~E~A-RDP85S00362~ -5
$~CURtSY tHF4RMptION Security Inforrnatiurl
IAC-D-2y/6
22 March 1y52
5.. While the quality of national and departmental intelligence
research is heavily dependent upon the intelligence information col-
lected, it is-also dependent on a properly coordinated division of
labor among the agencies and on the timely availability of the
research product, In this regard. it is felt that the National Intel-
l.~,gence Rstimates are making a significant contribution. There has
been notable progress in the field of Atomic Eriexgy intelligence and
it is hoped that in other aspects of scientific and technical intel-
ligence comparable satisfactory arrangements can be developed. There
is also under way a promising coordinated program for the systematic
analysis of the Soviet and satellite economies. This should provide
a better appraisal of the capabilities and long-range intentions of
the USSR, and should suggest possible avenues of US counter-action
by exposing economic vulnerabilities. The agencies have also
intensified their collaborative efforts to watch Soviet or Soviet
Orbit developments on a continuing basis in order tv detect any
short-range warning of an intent to launch a military attack on the
4Test.
~. All of the intelligence agencies suffer from inadequate
numbers of well-qualified personnel and inadequate space arrangements
to meet their responsibilities in coller_tion and research production.
Whip: qualified personnel are difficult to attract in the face of the
~~~
TCS ~7L+trLl.G 1
~ ~ IAC-D-29
T
22 March 1952
1~
~v ~ ~~ Y~~
/ Approved For Release 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP85S00362R000300110001-5
 `T'A}3 A
TS wed For Rase 2 2/ P85S00362~-5
SECI~R#TY INFORMATION Security Information
IAC-D-296
22 March 1952
competition of other employers, both inside and outside the Govern-
ment, some of the departments have been seriously hampered in this
respect by budgetary difficulties acid uncertainties.
SECRET
IAC-D-29
22 March 1952
Approved For Release 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP85S00362R000300110001-5
 Ti~4p~6~r~edPFor R~alaase /0 ~85S00362F7~3
`Rr~T
S~CURtTY INFt~R~lATION Sec~ty Information
IAC-D-296
22 March 1952
Annex No. 6
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
(Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency with the
Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee)
1. The peculiar nature of intelligence operations makes it
-difficult to project national intelligence planning in terms com-
parable to those employed in a program aimed at the attainment of
manpower ar production goals. While intelligence must intensify
its activities if it would audit the Soviet world's growth in
strength and estimate its intentions, expansion in itself offers
no guarantee of improved intelligence. Improvement in the intelli-
gence product is dependent not only upon increased collection of
reliable foreign intelligence but upon the skill with which it is
evaluated and assembled in the form of estimates. Thus the root
problem of intelligence is obtaining personnel skilled in col-
lection and evaluation.
2. Existing plans contemplate expansion within the next two
years to three times the current strength of personnel engaged in
clandestine intelligence and related activities. Expanded domestic
and overseas facilities for training are presently in process of
construction. A sizeable portion of that strength should consist
of personnel from the armed forces.
3. Policies approved i.n NSC 861 far the encouragement and
asylum of defectors from the Soviet Union and its orbit are being
studied in order that interdepartmental responsibilities for the
safekeeping, resettlement, and rehabilitation of defectors may be
further refined. This study is being conducted with a view toward
recommending to National Security Council such action as may be
appropxiate.
~-. To improve the over-all value of their iztelligence
product, the national intelligence agencies must-focus added emphasis
upon three essential parts of their program:
First, they must make certain that substantive objectives
in field activity, research, and estimates are properly related to
the political and military problems confronting members of the
National Security Council.
TOP SECRET
IAC-D-2~
22 March 1952
Approved For Release 2U~V~15S00362R000300110001-5
 T ~~YRgET 'T
~p~~d~or R~iease 2 2/0 A-gpp 85S00362F3
SECURITY IRFQRMATIO~ ecur ty Information
IAC-D-296
22 March 1952
Second, the activities of the intelligence agencies of the
government must be so synchronized that the resources of each pro-
vide maximum support for the attainment of these ob,~ectives.
Third, they must constantly reassess and strengthen their
capabilities and resources.
5. It is especially important that collection facilities of
the national intelligence agencies be improved. Efforts are being
made to establish accurate priorities of essential elements of
information. This requ:Irement is especially important in the
field of clandestine collection where extraordinary difficulties
are encountered.
6. Establishment, of a coordinated program for systematic
analysis of the Soviet and satellite economies should provide a
better appraisal of the capabilities and long-range intentions of
the USSR. It should likewise suggest possible avenues of U. S.
counteraction by exposing the vulnerabilities of the USSR and i.ts
satellites.
7. Progress has been made in the collection of intelligence
by scientific means (as distinct from the collection of scientific
intelligence itself) but much remains to be accomplished in this
field, especially in view of the difficulties encountered in
"conventional" clandestine activities.
~. 2n the coordination of foreign intelligence among national
intelligence agencies, the Director of Central Intelligence is
required by law to correlate the intelligence produced by each in
order ?to ensure that no gaps are left uncovered between agencies.
At the same time by recommendation to the National Security Council,
he can initiate action to prevent duplication of effort or over-
lapping of one agency upon the field of action or functions of
another. The Central Intelligence Agency is likewise charged with
responsibility far services of common concern which can most
advantageously be performed centrally. While progress has been
made in this process of coordination, there is still need for
improvement.
9, The Intelligence Advisory Committee with representation
from each of the departmental intelligence agencies has been in-
creasingly helpful in facilitating consultation and the exchange of
opinion among intelligence chiefs. The IAC prpvides a means whereby
the chief of intelligence of each agency of government can comment
upon, concur in, or object to recommendations, proposals, or con-
clusions regarding problems of national intelligence concern.
~.T13P-SECRET
IAC -D-29
22 March 1952
Approved For Release 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP85S00362R000300110001-5
-~ SECRET
 ip~d~~~l'I~r Rise 7Q~/0~?~l,4~R~5S00362F30.0~ ~' ~ ~T
Securi~ y Information
SECURITY INFCIRMATInH rAC-D-2g/b
22 March 1952
i0. To provide rapid dissemination of information on signiR
ficant military or political eventsD there has been created an
interdepartmental Watch Committee whose responsibility it is to
review systematically all incoming reports and to be alert fox
indications of critical moves. Facilities for prompt transmiss~.c~t~
and fur evaluation of those indications are constantly being
improved.
1.1. a. Moro and more critical information within the USSR and
l.ts satellites must be sought by clandestine meansp eithex
directly or scientifically. The ordinary difficulties of
"conventional" clandestine collection are hugely magn3.fied
within the Soviet orbit where virtually the entire population
is covered with a vast counterespionage net and where state
surveillance severely restricts opportunities for penetration.
Not only do the enaxmous difficulties of such clandestine
activities strain available resouxces of quai.ified personnel
but they may be expected to multiply in costliness and thus
require increasingly greater expenditures,
b_. In overt intelligence programs output varies almost
directly with the allocation of personnel and facilities.
Present limitations operate to the effect that a minimum
program to meet fixed commitments can be met only with the
greatest difficulty with na margin for satisfying increas-
ing demands resulting from the deteriorating world situation,
In the opinion of the Intelligence Advisory Committee repre-
sentatives of the Armed Forces, presently directed personnel
cuts will make it impossible to maintain even this minimum
program. The Ilepartment of State indicates difficulty in
obtaining budgetary provision for adequate personnel expansion.
12. a. In summary, the sharpened?.intensity of U.S.-Soviet
relationships emphasizes the immediate need for intensification
of intelligence and related activities. Additional, funds and
personnel will continue to be required, not only fox expansion
of the intelligence services but far the improvement in the
quality of their product, which neither now or in the fare-
seeabie future is likely to be all that the planners and policy
makers desire.
b. At the same time, the intelligence services, currently
taxed with expanded requirements, must adequately prepare fax
~ECREI'
IAC-D-2g
22 March 1952
Approved For Release 20
S~~~S00362R000300110001-5
 ~ TC 36pp~-e ~ ~~P ~CRET
A roved For R se 2/ 85S00362 t, ~ormatiorl
SECURITY INFORMATION zAC-D-29/6
22 March 1952
vast expansion in the event of the spread of hostilities. If
the intelligence services are to prepare for these wartime
operations while undertaking commitments that currently strain
their present capabilities, it is imperative that they obtain
sufficient personnel and the logistical support required for
the execution of these tasks.
-'SECRET
IAC-D-29
22 March 1952
Approved For Release 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP85S00362R000300110001-5
SECRET
 . ~ ~1~6P~ ~ ~~
Approved For~Release 29/0 5S003 2~f ~~1~00110001-5
SECORITY INFORMpflOR
COPY NO.
MEMORANDt1M FOR: Assistant Director, National Estimates
Assistant Director, Scientific Intelligence
Assistant Director, Research and Reports
Assistant Director, Current Intelligence
Assistant Director, Collection and Dissemination
Assistant .Director, Operations
Assistant Director, Special Operations
Assistant Director, Policy Coordination
Assistant Director, Communications
Assistant Director, Personnel
SUBJECT: Revision of NSC 11~~2
29 February 1952
1. The President has requested that NSC 11~~2 be
brought up to date. There has been in both the NSC 11)+/2
and its previous form in NSC 6$ an Annex devoted to intel-
ligence.
2. A copy of the last edition of Annex 6 relating to
Intelligence is attached hereto. It will be appreciated,
in the event that your office has any views with respect
to modifications in this paper, if you would send a
representative to a meeting tq be held in my office,
Room 2007 M Building, at 2:30 P.M.,, Tuesday, 4 March.
JAMES Q,. REBER
Assistant birector
Intelligence Coordination
Information copy:
Director of Train3xig
Document N~a. - -
~!a Change In Chss. _~
;,) Oeclassitied
Class. Changed to: TS ~ C
Next Review Gate: - -- -- - -
J!uth.: ItR 70-3
Date:. _~-p - 2 ~. - _9 _I
e~: 2 3 3 7
Approved For Release 2(~)~('I,~/0~~~~~f 1L i85S00362R000300110001-5
 Approved For F~elea
~~DP85S00362Oc,~~~~001-5
Annex Noy 6
~,.. .
F4.~E~I,~N ~NT.ELX;IGENCE A~ND~,RE~TET2 ACTIVITIEC
(~'repared by the Central Intelligence Agency with the
Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee]
1~ The peculiar nature of intelligence operations makes it difficult
to p~`oject national intelligence planning in terms comparable to those em-
p~.oyed in a program aimed at the attainment of manpower or production goals.
While intelligence must intensify its activities if it would audit the Soviet
world's owth in strength and estimate its intentions, expansion in itself
offers na guarantee of improved intelligence. Improvement in the intelligence
product is dependent not only upon increased collection of reliable foreign
intelligence 'but upon the skill with which it is evaluated and assembled in
the form of estimates. Thus the root problem of intelligence is obt~.ining
personnel skilled in collection and evaluation.
2. Existing plans contemplate expansion within the next two years to
three times the current strength of personnel engaged in clandestine intelli-
gence and related activities. Expanded domestic and overseas facilities fox
training are presently in process of construction. A sizeable portion of that
strength should consist of personnel from the armed forces.
3. Policies approved in NSC $6~1 for the encouragement and asylum of
defectors from the Soviet Union and its orbit are being studied in order that
interdepartmental responsibilities for the safekeeping, resettlement, and
rehabilitation of defectors may be further refined. This study is being con-
ducted with a view toward recommending to National~Security Council such
action as may be appropriate.
~+. To improve the over-all value of their intelligence groduct, the
national intelligence agencies must focus added emphasis upon three essen-
tial parts of their program:
First, they must make certain that subste~ntive objectives in field
activity, research, and estimates are properly related to the political and
military problems confronting members of the National Security Council.
Second, the activities of the intelligence agencies of the government
must be so synchronized that the resources of each provide maximum support
far the attainment of these objectives.
Third, they must constantly re-assess and strengthen their capabilities
and resources.
~. It is especially important that collection facilities of the national
intelligence agencies be improved. Efforts are being made to establish
accurate priorit~.es of essential elements of information. This requirement
is especially important in the field of clandestine collection where extraor-
dinary difficulties are encountered.
Annexes to Annex No. 6
NSC 11~+~2 Approved For Release 2001/12/041 CIA-RDP85S00362ROD03~O~~T001-5
SECRET
 ,. ~1~+~
Approved For~R leas 1/ DP85S003~2R ~Q~~001-5
'cFC~1RIT1f INFORMAfIOM
6. Establishment of a coordinated program for systematic analysis of
the Soviet and satellite economies should provide a betted appraisal of the
capabilities and long-range intentions of the USSR. I~ should likewise
suggest possible avenues of U. S. counteraction by exposing the vulnera-
bilities of the USSR and its satellites. ,
7. Pro ess has been made in the collection of intelligence by scien-
tific means ~as distinct from the collection of scientific intelligence itself),
but much remains to be accomplished in this field, especially in view of the
difficulties encountered in "conventional" clandestine activities.
$. In the coordination of foreign intelligence among national intelli-
Bence agencies, the Director of Central Intelligence is required by law to
correlate the. intelligence produced by each in order to ensure that no gaps
are left uncovered between agencies. At the same time by recommendation to
the National Security Council, he can initiate action to prevent duplication
of effort or over-lapping of one agency upon the field of action or functions
of another. The Central Intelligence Agency is likewise charged with respon-
sibility far services of common concern which can most advantageously be
performed centrally,. While progress has been made in this process of coordi-
nation, there is still need for improvement.
9. The Intelligence Advisory Committee with representation from each
of the departmental intelligence agencies has been increasingly helpful in
facilitating consultation and the exchange of opinion among intelligence
chiefs. The IAC provides a means whereby the. chief of intelligence of each
agency of government can comment upon] concur in, o~^ object to recommenda-
tions, proposals, or conclusions regarding problems of national intelligence
concern.
10? To provide rapid dissemination of information on significant military
or political events, there has been cheated an interdepartmental Watch
Committee whose responsibility it is to review systematically all incoming
reports and to be alert for indications of critical-moves. Facilities for
prompt transmission and for evaluation of these indications are constantly
being improved.
11. a. More and more critical information within the USSR and its satel-
lites must be sought by clandestine means, either directly or scien-
tifically, The ordinary difficulties of "conventional" clandestine.
collection are hugely magnified within the Soviet orbit where virtually
the entire population is covered with a vast counterespionage net and
where state surveillance severely restricts opportunities for penetra-
tion. Not pnly do the enormous difficulties of such clandestine
activities strain available resources of qualified personnel but they
may be expected to multiply in costliness and thus require increasingly
greater expenditures.
bt. In overt intelligence programs output varies almost directly
with the allocation of personnel and facilities. Present limitations
operate to the effect that a minimum program to meet fixed commitments
Annexes to
NSC 11~~2
Annex No. 6
Approved For Release 2001/12/4: CIA-RDP85S003600~~~iT10001-5
~8f' SECRET
 ' '~ ~ Approved Fo~elease ~9~1~12E1~-RDP85S003 2.~~~~300 10001-5
SECURt~^' ~~'~"RMaTioM ~"- sEC~T
can be met only with the greatest difficulty with no margin for satisfying
increasing demands resulting from the deteriorating world situation.
In the opinion of the Intelligence Advisory Committee representatives
of the Armed Forces, presently directed personnel cuts will make it
impossible tv maintain even this minimum program. The Department of
State indicates difficulty in obtaining budgetary provision for adequate
personnel expansion.
12. a. In summary, the sharpened intensity of U.S.-Soviet relationships
emphasizes the immediate need for intensification of intelligence and
related activities. Additional funds and personnel will continue to be
required, not only for expansion of the intelligence services but for
the improvement in the quality of their product, which neither now or
in the foreseeable future is likely to be all that the planners and
policy makers desire.
b. At the same time, the intelligence services, currently taxed
with expanded requirements, must adequately prepare far vast expansion
in the event of the spread of hostilities. If the intelligence ser-
vices are to prepare far these wartime operations while-undertaking
commitments that currently strain their present capabilities, it is
imperative that they obtain sufficient personnel and the logistical
support req~.ired for the execution of these tasks.
Annexes to Annex No. 6
NSC 11+/2 -3- ~ SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP85S00362R000300110001-5
-~B~P SECRET
 Approved For~elease/04$ ~1~2HPB5Sb03@~0030Q~p,1-5
CIA 36207 COPY N0. b+
-fig SECRET
IAC-D-29 5
1 October 19 1
RECOMMENDED PLAN TO ACCOMPLISH THE SUMMARY
EVALUATION REQUIRED BY PARAGRAPH 2. OF NSC ACTION 5~+3
The following proposal has been submitted by Czeneral Partridge
on behalf of the JCS in response to General Smith's request for a
suggestion as to procedure of NSC Action 5~-3. This will be discussed
at the next IAC meeting.
"Over-all
The Director of Central Intelligence should invite JCS, ICIS,
and IIC to .participate in creation of an ad hoc committee r_omposed
of one (1) senior officer or official of flag-rank from JCS, ICIS,
IIC, and IAC. The four members of the ad hoc committee should:
a. Scan the collated studies submitted. in response to
paragraph 1 of NSC Action 5~+3 and allocate among themselves
responsibility for summary evaluations in accordance with
areas of interest.
b_. In pxeparing summary evaluations, create small sub-
committees by calling upon the membership of the Groups they
represent as needed and. desired.
c. Review as a body the results of subparagraph b above
and. ,2arepare the over-all summary evaluation for submission
to the NSC."
JAMES Q. REBER
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee
Daeur.-es-t lyo. - ------------
l~o Chmge ~n Ciixs. ^
^ Deciassifitd
lrlacg. Ghangad to: TS ? C
;~~;zt l~~~evr Date: --
h~-ey.: l~t~ to?3
~r~ SECRET
IAC-D-29 5
1 October 1951
Approved For Release~^t~`PL/0~6:~1>~F~~i89~00362R000300110001-5
~ ~ G~ ~~~
 ' ' Approved For Rti~ase /OAE~('~I~"85S00362F~Q~0300110001-5
CIA 36203 COFY N0. -> c_)
.~ SE;CRET
IAC-D-2~~F
13 Se-~tember 151
7'OREIGN IN1'FLL7GENCE ANn R:i;LATED ACTIVI~iIFS
Attached for information is -the final version ~f
Annex 6 for the revision of NSC 5F3~4. This text has been
agreed to by the JAC s,ct3.ng throuh its au.tho.ri.zeii repre--
uentatives. It he,s been forwarded by the Director of
Central Intelligence without cY~,nge to the NSC Staff.
J1NiNa~ Q,, RLB}~1i
S~:cretary
Intelli.ge.nce Advisory Comr,littee
Document No. ~ -----------------~-----------
hto Change in CiasS. ^
i~] Dectassitied
Class. Changed te: TS ~ G
;as~xt Eieuiew Uate: - -- ------ ---------
A.~~th.: NR 7?-3 ~ 3 ~7
rkt~: ~o -2 ~ - 9 ! ~x. ----------
L
SECRET
IAC-D-29
13 Septerlrber 1y51
Approved For Relea
'-RDP85S00362R000300110001-5
~ c~a36~
 Approved For fa'12/~4E C~TA~2~PS5S00362A4Q~0
~e~ 1951
TOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AT?D RELATED ACTIVITIES
c~~ 36za3 ~ SECRET
-
1. The peculiar nature of intelligence operations makes it
difficult to project national intelligence planning in terms
comparable to those employed in a program aimed at the attainment
of manpower or production goals. While intelligence must
intensify its activities if f.t would audit the Soviet worlds
growth in strength and estimate its intentions, expansion in
itself offers no guarantee of improved intelligence. Improvement
in the intelligence product is dependent not only upon increased
collection of reliable foreign intelligence but upon the skill
with which it is evaluated and assembled in the form of estimates.
Thus the root problem of intelligence is obtaining personnel
skilled in collection and evaluation.
2. Existing plans contemplate expansion within the next two
years to three times the current strength of personnel engaged. in
clandestine intelligence and. Related Activities. Expanded domestic
and overseas facilities far training are presently in process of
construction. A sizeable portion of that strength should consist
of personnel from the armed forces.
3. Policies approved in P1SC F36/1 for the encouragement and
asylum of defectors from the Soviet Union and its orbit are beiny~
.~P SECRET
TAC -D-29
13 September 1951
Approved For Release 2b4 ~C~ASR[1~~53~0362R000300110001-5
 ' CIA 36203 ~ SECRET
Approved For Rise f~'1'$i04SBAEl~~P~5~00362R3$3~~~~r 1951
studied in order that interdepartmental responsibilities for the
safekeeping, resettlement, and rehabilitation of defectors may be
further refined. This study is being conducted with a view toward
recommending to NSC such action as may be appropriate.
~. To improve the overall value of their intelligence
product, the national intelligence agencies must focus added
emphasis upon three essential parts of their program:
First, they must make certain that substantive objectives in
field activity, research, and estimates are properly related to
the political and military problems confronting members of the
National Security Cauneil.
Second, the activities of the intellig?ncE agencies of the
gove:rnm~nt must be so synchronized that the resources of each
provide maximum support for the attainment of these objectives.
Third, they must constantly re -assess and strengthen their
capabilities and resources..
5. It is ;specially important that collection facilities of
the national intelligence agencies be improved. Efforts are being
made to establish accura.tE priorities of essential elements of
information. This requirement is especially important in the
field of clandestine collection where extraordinary difficulties
are encountered.
~PF SECRET
IAC-D-29
13 September 1951
Approved For Release~l'f~2/0~ :~I~-~pE8~S00362R000300110001-5
 CIA 3620 ~91CS-SECRET
Approved For RAi!'ase ~/04S ~]A("f~P~5'~00362F~~0~'~er 1951
6, Establishment of a coordinated program for systematic
analysis of the Soviet and satellite economies should provide a
better appraisal of the capabilities and long-range intentions of
the USSR, It should likewise suggest possible avenues of tT. S.
counteraction by exposing the vulnerabilities of the USSR and its
satellites.
7. Progress has been made in the collection of intelligence
by scientific means (as distinct from the collection of scientific
intelligence itself), but much remains to be accomplished in this
field, especially in view of the difficulties encountered in
"conventional" clandestine activities.
8. In the coordination of. foreign intelligence among national
intelligence agencies, the Director of Central Intelligence is
required by law to correlate the intelligence produced by each in
order to ensure that no gaps are left uncovered between agencies.
At the same time by recommendation to the NSC he can initiate
action to prevent duplication of effort or overlapping of one
agency upon the field of action or functions of another. The
Central Intelligence Agency is likewise charged. with responsibility
for services of common concern which can mast advantageously be
performed centrally. While progress has been made in this process
of coord:i.natian, there is still need for improvement.
~+P.rP-SECRET
IAC D- 9
13 September 1951
Approved For Releasel'04S ~~P~5'$'00362R000300110001-5
 CIA 3b2o3 -~-}P SECRET
Approved For Rb~ise ~/04g ?~A(f2~P~5~00362Ri1p~ 13 September 1951
9. The Intelligence Advisory Committee with representation
from each of the departmental intelligence agencies has been
increasingly helpful in facilitating consultation and the exchange
of opinion among intelligence chiefs. The IAC provides a means
whereby the chief of intelligence of each agency of government can
comment upon, concur in, or object to recommc;ndations, proposals,
or conclusions regarding problems of national intelligence concern.
10. To provide rapid dissemination of information on signifi-
cant military or political events, there has been created an
interdepartmental Watch Committee whose responsibility it is to
review systematically all incoming reports and to be alert for
indications of critical moves. Facilities for prompt transmission
and for evaluation of these indications are constantly being
improved.
11. a. More and more critical information within the USSR
and its sat~:llites must be sought by clandestine means,
either directly or scientifically. The ordinary difficulties
of ~Fconventional" clandestine: collection are hugely magnified
within the Soviet orbit where virtually the entire population
is covered with a vast countcrespionage net and where state
surveillance severely restricts opportunities for penetration.
Not only do the enormous difficulties of such clandestine
~!'` SECF~.ET
ACD-q
13 September 1951
-~-
Approved For Releases./0~: ~I~F~1~3~00362R000300110001-5
 . CTA 36243 ~ffF' SECRET
Approved For Rd~p~se 't~/048 ?]~5'~'00362RQQ~$9~6~5
13 September 1951
activities strain available resources of qualified personnel
but they may be expected to multiply in costliness and thus
require increasingly greater expenditures.
b. In overt intelligence programs output varies almost
directly with the allocation of personnel and facilities.
Present limitations operate to the effect that a minimum
program to meet fixed commitments can be met only with the
greatest difficulty with no margin for satisfying increasing
demands resulting from the deteriorating world situation.
In the opinion of the I.A.C. representatives of the Armed
Farces, presently directed personnel cuts will make it
impassible to maintain even this minimum program. The
Department of State indicates difficulty in obtaining
budgetary provision for adequate personnel expansion.
12. a. In summary, the sharpened intensity of U.S.-Soviet
relationships emphasi?es the immediate need .for intensifica-
tion of intelligence and Related Activities. Additional
funds and personnel will ccntinue to be required, not only
for expansion of the intelligence services but for the
improverrient in the quality of thoir product, which neither
now ar in the foreseeable future is likely to be all that
the planners and policy-makers desire.
-~SFCRET
IAC-D-29
13 September 1951
-~-
Approved For Release g/048 ~I~t~PB5~0362R000300110001-5
 CI~4 362?~ - cam-SECRET
Approved For ase~O~fPtfO~:~l~ I~~'i8~00362F~~0~~$~~
r 1951
b. At the same time, the intelligence services, currently
taxed with expanded requirements, must adequately prepare for
vast expansion in th? event of the spread of hostilities.. If
the intelligence services are to prepare for these wartime
operations while undertaking commitments that currently strain
their present capabilities, it is imperative that they obtain
sufficient personnel and the logistical support required for
the execution of these tasks.
'~dP"t"ECRET
IAC~D-29~,.~
13 September 1951
-6-
Approved For Release 204~~'AQ4~P~5$00362R000300110001-5
 Approved For asw'~tA2/~4 ECIA-~[~>#$S00362300110001-5~D
CIA 36200 COPY N0.
SECRET
IAC-D- 9
11 September 1951
PROPOSED ANNEX 6 TO THE NSC PAPER
OPd UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS
FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY
1. TherP,,:ls attached hereto a revised draft of Annex 6 to
be submitted to the NSC for inclusion with a revision of "United
States~Objectives and Programs for National Security" (NSC 68,/x).
2. In view of`'the fact that substantial agreement was
reached in the IAC meeting of September 10th, informal clearance
will be asked on the attached revised draft.
JAMES Q. REBER
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee
Decumant tto. -- - ----------------------
Mo Chaage to Class. [~
j-~ paclas3itie~
Class. Ghasgod tfl: TS t C
!text Rtriaw Date: ------------------
Auth.: HR 711-3 ~ 91 ~~ ~ 7
date: -gip -. t- ~ -------- ?1r? ----------
?~P"'SECRET
IAC -D ?-29T
11 September 1951
Approved For Release 24~G~A~R~P~5~'003628000300110001-5
 Approved For F~q~+ase~9Q~2/O~:~IQ-~p83S00362F~~300110001-5
CIA ~62c~o ~-SECRET
IAC-~- 9 3
11 September 1951
I'OREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
1. The peculiar nature of intelligence operations makes it
difficult to project national intelligence planning in terms
comparable to those employed in a program aimed at the attainment
of manpower or production goals. While intelligence must
intensify its activities if it would audit the Soviet world+s
growth in strength and estimate its intentions, expansion in
itself offers no guarantee of improved intelligence. Improvement
in the intelligence product is dependent not only upon increased
collection of reliable foreign intelligence but upon the skill
with which it is evaluated and assembled in the form of estimates.
Thus the root problem of intelligence is personnel skilled in
collection and analysis.
2. Expanded domestic and overseas facilities for training
are presently in process of construction. Existing plans
contemplate expansion within the next two years to three times the
current strength of personnel engaged in intelligence and Related
Activities. A sizeable proportion of that strength should. consist
of personnel from the armed forces.
3. Policies approved in NSC 8h/1 for the encouragement and
asylum of defectors from the Soviet Union and its orbit make it
'EGRET
IAC-D~ 9 3
11 September 1Q51
Approved For Release 2A~'I~I'~4 ~C~A-~R[~>~S~0362R000300110001-5
 Approved For R~`as2/0$ :~I~-Ip~$8~S00362R~0300110001-5
CIA 36200 -~P- SECRET
IAC D-29 3
11 September 1951
necessary to review and fix mare definitely interdepartmental
responsibilities to ensure tree safekeeping, resettlement, and
rehabilitation of defectors.
~. To improve the overall value of their intelligence
product, the national intelligence agencies must focus added
emphasis upon three essential parts of thou program:
First, they must make certain that substantive objectives in
field activity, research, and estimates are properly related to
the political and military problems confronting members of the
Pational Security Council.
Second, they must allocate responsibility among intelligence
agencies of the government that the resources and activities of
each are so synchronized as to provide for maximum support for
the attainment of these objectives.
Third, they must constantly re-assess and strengthen their
capabilities and resources.
5. It is especially important that collection facilities of
the national intelligence agencies be improved. Efforts are being
made in the establishment of an accurate priority of essential
elements of information. This requirement is especially important
in the field of clandestine collection where extraordinary
difficulties are encountered..
SECRET
I1AlCS-D- 9
Approved For Release 2~j'I~f945C~4~:~~~00362R0003U0'I~i~~~'~-5r 1gSl
-2-
 Approved For RL~aseD2/0~ :p~lg-q~8~S00362300110001-5
CIA 3b2Q0 -'1~ SR~CR,~
11 September 1951
6. Establishment of a coordinated program for systematic
analysis of the Soviet and satellite economies should provide a
better appraisal of the capabilities and long-range intentions of
the USSR. It should likewise suggest possible avenues of U.S.
counteraction by exposing the vulnerabilities of the USSR and its
satellites,
7. progress has been made in the collection of intelligence
by scientific means (as distinct from the collection of scientific
intelligence itself), but much remains to be accomplished. in this
field.
8. In the coordination of foreign intelligence among national
intelligence agencies, the Director of Central Intelligence is
required by law to correlate the activities of each in order to
ensure that no gaps are left uncovered between agencies. At the
same time by recommendation to the NSC he can in.-i.tiate action to
prevent duplication of effort or overlapping of one agency upon
the field of action or functions of another. The Central
Intelligence Agency is likewise charged with respons~.bility for
services of common concern which can most advantageously be
performed centrally. While progress has been made in this process
of coordination, there is still need for improvement.
9. The Intelligence Advisory Committee with repres4ntatian
from oath of the departmental intelligence agencies has been
SECRET
IlAC-D-29
Approved For Release ?t04 ~Cp~4~~~;i3~00362R0003~011~0~U1mb5 r 1951
-J-
 Approved For R
ase?$9~}f~/O~:~IQF~p~$5~00362R300110001-5
CIA 36200
.?~ SECRET
IAC-D- 9
11 September 1951
increasingly helpful in facilitating consultation and the exchange
of opinion among intelligence chiefs. The IAC provides a means
whereby the chief of intelligence of each agency of government can
comment upon, concur in, or object to recommendations, proposals;
or conclusions regarding problems of mutual concern.
10. To provide rapid dissemination of information on significant
military or political events there has been created an interdepart-
mental Watch Committee whose responsibility it is to review
systematically all incoming reports and to be alert for indications
of critical moves. Facilities for prompt transmission and for
evaluation of these indications are constantly being improved.
11. a.' In the projection of intelligence programs, it is
anticipated that more and more critical information within
the USSR and its satellites must be sought by covert and
cland~;stine means. The ordinary difficulties of clandestine
operations are hugely magnified within the Soviet orbit
where virtually the entire population is covered with a vast
counterespionage net and where state surveillance severely
restricts opportunities for penetration. Prot only do the
enormous difficulties of such c].andestinP operations strain
available resources of qualified personnel but they may be
expected to multiply in costliness and thus require
increasingly greater expenditures.
.~A~'ECRET
IAC-D-2q
11 Se tembe 1951
Approved For Release ~/04~ $I~F~JF~5~00362R0003001~10001-~
 Approved For Rise-~/~~/045: EI~'F~F~5B00362R~ii~300110001-5
CIA 36200 -~P9~ SECRET
IAC-D- 9 3
11 September 1951
b, In overt intelligence programs output varies almost
directly with the allocation of personnel and facilities.
Present limitations operate to the effect that a minimum
program to meet fixed commitments can be met only with the
greatest difficulty with no margin for satisfying increasing
demands resulting from the deteriorating world situation,
In the opinion of the I. A. C. representatives of the Armed
Forces, presently directed personnel cuts will make it
impassible to maintain even this minimum program. The
Department of State indicates difficulty in attaining
budgetary provision for adequate personnel expansion.
12. a. In summary, the sharpened intensity of U,S.-Soviet
relationships emphasizes the immediate need for intensifica-
tion of intelligence and related activities. Extraordinary
difficulties exist especially in the collection of clandes-
tine intelligence within the Soviet orbit where state
surveillance and mass counterespionage activity stringently
limit access to critical information. Additional funds and
personnel will caritinue to be required, not only for
expansion of the intelligence services but for the improve-
ment in the quality of their product, which neither now or
in the foreseeable future is likely to be all that the
planners and policy-makers desire.
'""I'C7t"`~ECRET
IAC-D-29T
11 September 1951
Approved For Release Z~'1'~04SC~A~~~5~0362R000300110001-5
 Approved For RA~se 104: EI~F~F,~5~00362RgQp300110001-5
CIA 3b200 ..T4F4 SECRET
IAC-D-29 3
11 September 1951.
b. At the same time, the intelligence services, currently
taxed with expanded requirements as the result of hostilities
in Korea and rearmament in Europe, must adequately prepare for
vast expansion in the event of the spread of hostilities. If
the intelligence services are to prepare for these wartime
operations while undertaking commitments that currently strain
the-i.r present capabilities, it is imperative that they obtain
sufficient personnel and the logistical support required for
the execution of these tasks.
Approved For Release ~4SC~A~2~P
~''PJ!""'SECRET
IAC-D-29T
11 September 1951
~5~0362R000300110001-5
 Approved For R+~ase~QS/1~Ip~~P85S00362F30~~~~0~~ 5 3 U
CIA 36199
PROPOSED ANNEX 6 TO THE NSC PAPER
ON UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS
F R THE NATION SECURITY
SECRET
IAC -D -29/2
7 September 1951.
1. There is attached hereto a revised draft Annex 6 to be
submitted to the NSC for inclusion with a revision of "United States
Ob,~ectives and Programs for National Security" (NSC 6$/4). This
draft is the result of discussion with the IAC representatives on
Fr i.day, 7 September.
2. The IAC is reminded of the Annex 6 an intelligence which was
submitted with the original NSC 6$ and of the progress report which
was submitted as approved by the IAC (IAC-D-29) which eventually came
out under NSC 111E.
3. The NSC Directive for the development of the present study
requests a review of the current programs including analysis of
difficulties encountered and recommendations regarding any revisions
or modifications.
~+. It is not passible to define intelligence programs in the
same way that war production ;~ragrams or military or economic ai.d
programs may be defined nor are the sums of money involved of the same
magnitude. This paper attempts to point out this difference and to
state in the broad sense what the intelligence program is, describing
developments in regard thereto and some of the difficulties encountered.
5. In view of the fact that this Annex is due at the NSC Staff
on 10 September this paper is placed on the IAC agenda for urgent
consideration at the meeting on Monday, 10 Saptember.
JAMES Q. REFiER
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee
r
?
t Ft
,~,
ncn
a. --..---.--
'~ Ghanga !n Gass. ^
i
j t}~C~~~ssittc~
':foss. Chararietl to: TS ~ C
~~xt Res#s~~r asie: -------------------
~rrt#t.: HR 70.3
- 1 ~ ~. 23 37 f
fat?: /,U 2 "- ~- - 0 ----------
"Z"L~P` SECRET
IAC -D -2~/2
'~ September 1851
Approved For Rele~~~/~~11~~DP85S00362R000300110001-5
.3~d 3~~
 Approved For Rq~se~/91i~85S00362F~9~300110001-5
CIA 36199 .'~8~-SECRET
IAC-D-29 2
7 September 1951
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
1. Because of the peculiar nature of intelligence operations,
it becomes difficult to project national intelligence planning in
terms comparable to those employed in a program aimed at the attain-
ment of manpower or production goals. While intelligence must
intensify 3.ts activities if it would audit the Soviet world's
growth in strength and estimate its intentions, expansion in itself
offers no guarantee of improved intelligence. Improvement in the
integrity of the intelligence product is dependent not only upon
increased production and collection of foreign intelligence but
upon the skill with which it is evaluated and upon the intellectual
competence with which. it is interpreted in the preparation of
estimates. Thus the root problem of intelligence is personnel--
personnel recruitment, training, and utilization.
2. Intensification of Related Activities can be more speci-
fically programmed. However, the unique nature of such undertakings
precludes detailed examination here. Although adequate funds have
been budgeted for support of these related activities, difficulties
in the xecruitment and training of both U. S. and foreign personnel
restrict the rate of expansion. Expanded domestic and overseas
facilities for training are presently in process of construction.
Existing plans contemplate expansion within the next two yeaxs to
three times the current strength of personnel engaged in Related
SECRET
TAC-D-29 2
7 September 1951
Approved For Release;AQ1~2/p~.~I~q,~P85S00362R000300110001-5
 ~~-~fCREl'
Approved For RojPase /12 : CIA-RDP85S00362F~~300110001-5
CIA 36199 ~P`SECRET
IAC-D-29 2
7 September 1951
Activities. A sizeable proportion of that strength will consist
of uniformed personnel from the armed farces.
3. Policies approved in NSC 861 for the encouragement and
asylum of defectors from the Soviet and its orbit make it necessary
to review and fix interdepartmental responsibilities to ensure the
safekeeping, resettlement, and rehabilitation of all such. defectors.
~+. To improve the integrity of their intelligence product, the
national intelligence agencies must focus added emphasis upon three
essential parts of tYieir program:
First, they must make certain that substantive targets in
research, field activity, and estimates are in support of political
and military problems confronting members of the National Security
Council.
Second, they must make certain under the existing division of
responsibility among intelligence agencies of the government that
the xesources and activities of each are so synchronized as to
provide for maximum support.
Third, they must constantly re-assess and strengthen their
capabilities and resources.
5. It is especially important that we achieve maximum effective-
ness in the collection facilities of the national intelligence agencies.
.~P#i'-SECRET
IAC-D-29 2
7 September 1951
-2-
Approved For Release 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP85S00362R000300110001-5
SECRET'
 pproved For Lease 20~ "~T4~~~5S003621~~~~'~'~Qip01-5
' CIA 36199
IAC-D-29 2
7 September 1951
Efforts are being made in this direction particularly in the
selection of w at is to be collected and in what priorj.ty. This
need is especially acute in clandestine collection where extraordinary
difficulties and hazards exercise serious limitations on what we
might expect from such sources.
6. Establishment of a coordinated program for systematic
analysis of the Soviet and satellite economies provides opportunity
for better appraisal of the capabilities and long-range intentions
of the USSR. It likewise suggests possible avenues of U. S.
counteraction by exposing the vulnerabilities of the USSR and its
satellites.
7. In the coordination of foreign intelligence among national
intelligence agencies the Director of Central Intelligence correlates
the activities of each with its consent and concurrence to ensure
that no gaps are left uncovered between agencies. At the same time
he endeavors by recommendation to the: NSC to prevent dissipation
of effort in the overlapping or encroaching of one agency upon the
roles and prerogatives of another. Central Intelligence is likewise
charged with responsibility for services of common concern which
can be mast advantageously performed. centrally. While progress
has been made in this process of synchronization, there is still
further need for improvement.
-~f6i~ECRET
TAC-D-29 2
7 September 1951
Approved For Release 2001/12/04 :'~:IA-RDP85S00362R000300110001-5
~ SECRET
 ' SECRET
' .~ roved For Fuse 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP85S00362
CIA 3619
~~K~,"1r 1-5
IAC-D-29 2
7 September 1951
B. The Intelligence Advisory Committee with representation
from each of the departmental intelligence agencies has been
increasingly helpful in facilitating consultation and the exchange
of opinion among intelligence chiefs. For IAC provides a.device
whereby the chief of intelligence of each agency of government can
comment upon, concur, or object to recommendations, proposals, or
conclusions regarding problems of mutual concern.~~'~
9. To guard against political or military surprise there has
been created an interdepartmental Watch Committee whose responsibility
it is to review systematically those current indications which might
forecast critical moves. Facilities for prompt transmission and for
evaluation of these indicat3.ons are constantly being improved.
10. a. In the projection of intelligence programs, it is
anticipated that more and more cxitical information within
the USSR and its satellites must bc~ sought by covert and
clandestine means. The ordinary difficulties of clandestine
operations are hugely magnified within the Soviet orbit where
virtually the entire population forms a vast counterespionage
net and where state surveillance severely restricts opportunities
far penetration. Not only do the enormous difficulties of
sucYi clandestine operations strain available resources of
~ CIA and State support t;he inclusion of this pars.graph, which
the other representatives would prefer to omit.
~P~ SECRET
IAC-D-2g 2
7 September 1g51
Approved For Release 2001/12/04 :~6A-RDP85S00362R000300110001-5
SECRET
 A roved For Rise 200T/'}2~04 t~~P83S00362300110001-5
czA 3~~99 .~9~-SECRET
TAC-D-2g 2
7 September ~g51
qualified personnel but they may be expected to multiply in
costliness and thus require increasingly greater expenditures.
b. With regard to intelligence programs other than covert
or clandestine, however, this situation does not obtain. In
overt intelligence programs output varies almost directly
with the allacatian of personnel and facilities. Present
limitations operate to the effect that a minimum program to
meet fixed commitments can be met only with the greatest
difficulty with no margin for satisfying increasing demands
resulting from the deteriorating world situation. Within the
Departments of Defense, presently directed personnel cuts
will make it impossible to maintain even this minimum program.
The Department of State has also experienced difficulty in
obtaining; budgetary provision for adc;quate personnel expansion.
11, Lack of sufficient, secure, and convenient space in which
to house intelligence headquarters activities has taxed several
of the agencies in their effectiveness and jeopardized the security
of their undertakings. Within CIA, however, this strain is expected
to be eased with construction of a headquarters building designed
to house securely the anticipated personnel strength of that
agency for FY 195;3. Funds have been authorized and construction,,
it is anticipated, may be completed in eighteen months. Should
this project be impeded or delayed, Central Intelligence would
.~9~-SECRET
IAC -D-29 2
7 September 1951
Approved For Release 2001/12/04~~:1A-RDP85S00362R000300110001-5
SECRET
 CIA 30199 ed For tease 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP85S00362~?~~Q11-5
IAC-D-29 2
7 September 1951
be severely handicapped in executing its existing programs far
expansion. No such improvement in space available to other intel-
ligence agencies, However, is in prospect.
1~. Current planning for the improvement and intensification
of intelligence and related activities is believed adequate for
the period under review. Implementation within the Department of
Defense, however, is contingent upon the attainment of currently
allocated personnel and facilities. Currently directed realloca-
tions in personnel below allowances will preclude obtainment of
present objectives.
?t~-SECRET
IAC-D-29 2
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PROPOSI~'I) APTNE;'X f:U TO TIIIE NSC PAPER
ON UNITCD S`.CATES 013JLC~1'IVES I~ND PROGRAMS
____ FOR T~ilaa NATIONAI~ SECURITY ~~
1. There is attacilcd hereto a draft Annex ~ to be submitted
to the NSC for inclusion with a revision of "United States Objectives
and Programs for National Security" (NSC 6~~~-).
2. The IAC is remir_dod of the Annex 6 on intelligence which
was slzurnitted. with the original NSC 68 and of the progress report
which was submitted as approved by tyre IAC (IAC-D-29) which eventually
came out under NSC 11~+.
3. 7'he NSC Directive for the development of the present study
requests a review of tl~e current programs including analysis of
difficulties encountered and recomtitendations regarding any revisions
or modifications.
4, It is not possible to define intelligence programs in the
same way that war production pro~;z?ams or military or economic aid
programs may be defined nor are the sums of money 9.nvolved of the
same ma~,nitud.e. Tha.s paper attempts to point out this difference
and to state in the broad.. sense what the intelligence program is,
describing developments irz rc~;ard t.hc~rcto and some of the difficulties
encountered.
5. In vic;w of the fact that this Annex is due at the NSC Staff
on 10 September this paper is placed on the IAC agenda for urgent
consideration at the meeting on Thursday, 6 September.
JAMES Q, REF3PR
Se:crc~tary
Intelli,~cnce Advisory Committee
~,~c.iment tlo, _ _ . ------------------------
-,o !'hange in Class. []
? "] dsslasssfied
f V~ ss. Ghanyt!d to: TS 5~ C
rSex; Ravierty pate: - -- - --------------
Arrth.: NR 70-3
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1. However Intently we strive toward. the fulfillment of goals in mili-
tary buildup, foreign aid, and. arms production, the adequacy of this effort
will hinge in lar~Pe part upon the accuracy with which we compute the capa-
bilities of the USSR and its satellites, thereafter upon the efficiency with
whj_ch we estimate their intentions. To calculate that Soviet strength, to
anticipate the uses to which it may be put, where and when and under what
circumstances, is the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence
and. the. national intelligence system. Every shred and source of information
must be exploited, if it, i.s to yield the data we seek and thus help us to
perceive th.e capabila.ties and intentions of the Soviet as well as the
vul.nerabi_lities of other nations. Most important, however, is the quality
of this information, the quality and comprehensiveness of intelligence
research and the character o.f: the estimates derived from both.
2. Because of the peculiar nature of intelligence operations, it
becomes difficult to project national intelligence planning in terms com-~
parable to those employed in a program aimed at the attainment of manpower
or production .goals, While intelligence must intensify its activities if
it would audit the Soviet world's growth in strength and estimate its lnten-
bons,. expans,.on in itself offers na guarantee of -the 3.ncreased probity
intelligence must ettain~ Improvement in th.e integrity of the intelligence
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product is dependent nat on],~ upon ~..ncreased. produ.ctior, and Collection of
foreign intel].igerrce but upon tYie skill w_i.th which it is evaluated and. upon
the intellectual competence with which it is in~cerpr.eted i.n the preparation
of estimates. Thus the root problem of intelligence is personnel--personnel
recruitment, training, and utilization.
3. Intensification of covert related. activities can be more spec~..fi.cally
programmed. However, the unique nature of such undertakings precludes detailed
exam.~.nation here. Although adequate funds have been budget..ed for svppart of
these related activities, difficulties in the recruitment and. training o.f.' both
U. S. and foreign personnel restrict the rate of expansion. Expanded. domestic
and overseas facilities for training are presently in process of construction,
Existing plans contemplate expans~_on within the next two years to three times
the current strength of personnel en?~aged in related activities. A sizable
proportion of that strength will cansist of uniformed persannel from the armed
farces ,
Pol:i.cies approved in 1dSC #361 for the encouragement and asylv.m of
defectors from the Soviet and its orbit a.re as yet too recent to permit sound
evaluation of that program, however, should these pol-i.c~_es stimulate a
sizable i.ncrea.se i.n tie numoer of d.efectora, it will become necessary tc~
review and. fix i.n.ter-departmental responsibilities that adequate provision
may be made far the safekeeping, resettlement, and rahabilitat~.on of all.
such defectors.
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Lr. To improve the integrity of its int~il~igerrce product, tie na.tienal
intelligence system must focus added emphas~s.i~pon three essential parts ref
its program:
1-'irst, it must make certain that substantive targets in research, field
activity, a.nd estimates are in support of both present ant anticipated polit~
ical and military problems confronting members of the National Security Council.
Second, it must make certain under the existing division of responsibility
among; intelligence agencies of the government that the resources and activities
of each are so synclYranized as to provide for maximum support.
Third, it must constartly re-assess and strengthen the capabilities and
resources of each of the component members of tho intelli~?ence system.
5. It is especially important that we achieve maximum effectiveness ~_n
the collection facilities of the national intelligence system. Efforts are
Being made in this direction particularly in the refining of wYzat i.s to be
ollected and in what priority. This need is espec9,a7.1y acute in clandestine
collection where extraordinary difficulties, hazards, and costs exercise
serious limitations on what we might expect from such sources.
b. Important beginnings have been made during the last year an a system
itic analysis of the Soviet and its satellite economies. At the same time
progress ha.s been made in ~th~; sifti_ng of extra-governmental projects in basic
:conomi_c research. Econvmi.c analysis has become a critical factor in any
leaningful appraisal of the capabilities and land;-range intentions of the
SSR. It likewise suggests possibl? avenues of U. S. countcractian by
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exposing the vulnerabilities of the USSR and its satellites to political and
economic undertakings.
7. Increasingly closer correlation :is required between intelligence
agencies and policy planni;rs ~.n the executive agencies of government, T.f
maximum use is to be made of intelligence, bath collecting; and estimating
offices should. be apprised of ir_oipiert policy decisions. For unless timely
notification is provided, intellig~:nce agencies may be har~dicapped in their
endeavor to provide the support they may be capable of rendering.
8. In the coordination of intelligence among departmental. agencies
within the intelligence system, Central In-telli~;ance monitors the activities
of each with its consent and concurrence to ascertain that no gaps are left
uncovered betwe~=n agencies. At thu same time it acts to prev~~~nt dissipation
of effort in the overlapping or encroaching of one agency upon the roles and
prerogatives of another. Central Intellig~:nce is likewise charged with
responsibility f.'or services of common concern zs wull as those services which
can be most advantag~;~ously exercised centrally. While progress has been made
~_n this pracc:ss of synchronization, there is still further need for improving
acid developing; new arrangements for working together in even c1osE:r
cooperation.
9. By making increasingly greater use; of the Intelligence Advisory
Committee with representation from each of the depa,rtm?ntal intelligence
agencies, jurisdictional issues have bean morn facilely r~:solved and a valuable
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forum established for consultation and exchange of opinion among intelligence
chiefs . In the machinery provided by this committee the chief of. intelligence
of each agency of government can corrimeTit upon, alters concur, or object to
recommendations, proposals, or cor_clusions regarding; day~by-day problems of
national intelligence concern,
Rqu.ally important has been the role of the IAC in the production of
national estimates. After assemalin~; and fusing the contributions of each
intelligence agency,. CIA drafts, in cooperation with each, a national intelli-
gence estimate on the situation, The final draft of this estimate is then
subjected. to the scrutiny of the IAC itself f'or concurrence, revision, or
dissent. Thus this final pracessing insures that each estimate shall accurate
ly reflect the viewpoints and. reservations of each separate agency within the
intelligence system. And as a result each estimate that is produced i.s the
prod.~_~ct of the na.tiona.l in~tell_igence system ratkier than of t?.ie agency in which
final synthcsi.s takes place.
10. To guard against political or rnilits.ry sur~~rise there ilas bE:~;n
creat~,d an interdepartmental Watch Committee whose responsibility it i.s to
review systematically those current indications which m9.ght forec~?st critical
moves. ~'acil.ities for prompt transm_-lssion of these: ind9.c~.tions are constantly
being improved.
11. ?rTith the buildup in U. S. military forcE~s overseas, it has become
neccss=pry to review the working rela~t,ionships that exist between military
authorities and CTA field personnel. Although ~:xisting re1?tionships have
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been improved, mutually satisfactory arrangements on the projected activities
of CIA in wartime theaters of apd~r~~~dhs have yet to be achieved.
1.2: In fine projection of intelligence programs, it is anticipated that
more and. more critical information within .the USSR and its satellites must be
sought by cavert and clandestine means. The ordinary difficulties of cl.andes~-
tine operatians are hugely magnified within the Soviet orbit where surveillanc
severely restricts opportunities for penetration. No problems are anticipated
in budgetary support for the a.d.ded costliness of such operations. And while
intel:Ligen.ce personnel goals are ambitious, it is anticipated they can be met.
13. Lack of sufficient, secure, and convenient space in which to hnuse
intelligence headquarters activities have taxed. several of the agencies in .
their effecti.~~reness and jeopardized -the security of their undertakings.
Trdithin CIA, however, this strain is exp~:cted to Tae eased with construction of
a headquarters building designed to house securely the anticipated personnel
strength of that agency for FY 1953. funds have been authorized and construc-
tion, it is anticipated, may be camplE~tE~d in eighteen months.
ll~. Current planning for the improvement and intensification of intelli~~-
Bence and related activities is believed adequate and satisfactory results are
anticipated within the period under review.
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September 1951:
AGENDA
Director's Conference Room, First Floor
Administration Building, CIA
on 1951, at 1030 hours
~Ic~ddyr ~A 3egtember
1. Approval of Minutes of last
meeting, held 30 August 1951
(IAC-M-~+3 )
2. Soviet Capabilities for St~.rprise
Attack on the Continental United
States before July 1952 Park; I
5E-10
3. Probable Develox~ments in the
Kashutir Dis ute to the End of
l~l NIE- i-1)
~+. Annex 6 Revision NSC 6B
(NSC 11~) (IAC-D-291)
5. Yro~ress Report (IAC-PR-17)
James Q. Reber
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee
Dr. Langer
S-E-C-R-E-T
IACIAC-A-~~
6 September 1957.
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2 August 1951
NSC il4 (REVIEW OF NSC 684)
1. The review of NSC 68~~~, of which ;;ou have been
aware, has been submitted to the National Security Council
as NSC ll~t-.
2. Enclosed herewith for your information are four ex-
cerpts from NSC 114 of particular interest to the IAC.
TAB A? Part I (paragraphs 1-12 ), which is largely,
but 'not exclusively, a summary of Appendix A (see sub-
paragraph cbelow).
TAB B.. Paragraphs 45-49 from Part II. 7.'hese paragraphs
area summary of Annex No. 6 (see subparagraph d below).
TAB C. Appendix A, Changes in the World Situation
Since the Completion of NSC 68. ~1'he original draft of
this Appendix was prepared in the Departtnpnt of. State.
It has been amended pursuant to oral consultation
between ONE and IAC representatives and to collation
with the 26 July text of NIE-25. (Other amendments
were made by State, Defense, ODM and JCS members of
the NSC drafting team.)
TAB D. Annex No. b, as amended by the IAC.
JAMES Q. REBER
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee
t~~c:r~~~ant ~~o. -------------------------------
i~.'a G'~0ltr< to E'~~ss. []
-~3 L'~ci~5~d~'s~~
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7.r.Y,1 ~1~b?:i :~~ y~a%;.fir.
~. ~r _$ . err
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2 August 1y51
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1. As anticipated in NSG 68 (April 1950), the Soviet rulers
have continued in relentless pursuit of the Kremlin design. In
Korea they- have demonstrated a willingness to take actions which in-
volve grave risk of precipitating global war. Such risk-taking appears
to be closely calculated: The U.S.S.R. has exercised considerable
care and restraint to avoid open and direct involvement. Neverthe-
less, the Kremlin's willingness to accept such risis has been greater
than was foreseen in NSC 68.
2. Since April, 1950 the U.S.S.R. has intensified its deliber-
ate and systematic campaign to prepare the Russian people psycholo-
gically for possible war with the United States. A similar campaign
is being carried out in the European satellites and China.
3. The U.S.S.R. is militarily substantially stronger than it
was in April; 1950. Furthermore, the increase in military strength
in-being of the Eastern European satellites since April, 1950 has
been large, and alone probably offsets the increases which have been
achieved in Western Europe. The Chinese communist regime has con-
siderable military capabilities at its disposal, has undertaken
military action in the Soviet interest, and thus far, at least, has
made progress in consolidating its control in China. Evidence from
various sources during the past year shows that Soviet military
production is of high quality--and of higher quality than had pre-
viously been estimated. The ability of the U.S.S.R. to develop
large military capabilities where none existed a few years ago as
in North Korea, has been shown i.n the Korean war and ~~his has re-
quired a revision of earlier judgments regarding satellite military
potentials. On all these taunts, NSC 68 presented a prospect which
was more favorable far the United States than now appears to have
been warranted.
4. Nothing has occurred within the Soviet empire which requires
a revision of earlier judgments that the regime is capable of main-
taining its control over -the Russian people and its satellites.
5. Notably in Korea, and elsewhere as in Iran and the. Balxans,
situations have developed which could mare easily issue in general
war by accident or miscalculation than was foreseen fifteen months
ago.
6. As anticipated in NSC b8, the Kremlin regards most seriously
the prospect of United States and Western rearmament generally. It
is highly sensitive to German and Japanese rearmament and the es-
tablishment of .American Bases overseas. Its principal immediate
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purpose is i~o frustrate these programs. Its presently indicated
course of action to that end is to exploit all opportunities to split
the Western Allies, particularly the United States and the UK, and to
conduct a specious peace campaign designed to exploit both fear of a
new general war and reluctance to make the sacrifices necessary to
redress the balance of power.. There is a serious danger, which may
become acute if a cease-fire in Korea is agreed to, that by such wiles
the U.S.S.R. may yet lull the free world into a false sense of security,
with adverse effect upon both its military posture and its political
cohesion. If, however, the United States demonstrates determination
and progress in meeting its commitments to build the strength of the
free world to the level at which it can deter or defeat Soviet aggres-
sion, and if Soviet conciliation is seen to present no real assurances
of peace and security, it is likely that the alignment of the West
can be maintained and its strength further developed.
7. If~ and when it becomes apparent to the Kremlin that the
Western alliance and projected rearmament cannot be disrupted and
frustrated b,r political and psychological means the danger of Soviet
preventive action will become acute.
8. The free world has made important progress in organizing
itself to meet the Soviet threat. UN action 'to counter Communist
aggression in Korea, the development of NATO, progress with respect
to the Schuman and Pleven plans, the successful conference of American
foreign ministers, progress on the Japanese peace treaty anti on Pacific
security arrangements, al.l indicate in some degree a developing co-
hesion and awareness of common peril. 'T'his .progress is impressive
in relation to normal expectation, but has been slow and unsatisfying
in relation to the abnormal exigencies of the situation. -The United
States and its allies have moved less rapidly than envisaged in NSC
68/x+ toward exploiting; their vastly superior economic potential to
improve their over-all power position vis-a-vis the Soviet system.
NATO planning has yet to be translated into effective military strength
in being. Tangible support for the UN cause in Korea has left much
to be desired. In general, Far Eastern issues have tended to divide
the :free world. Moreover, the situation in Iran and the Arab states
has deteriorated beyond all expectation.
g. Z'he level of mili-l;ary production in the United States is
not currently meeting the military readiness targets indicated in
NSC 68/4, which moved forward the military readiness level contem-
plated for July 1, 1854, to July 1, 1g52. The detailed materiel pro-
grams developed subsequent to the approval of force levels on December
14, lg5o, were finally 'approved when the military budget for FY 1g52
was approved on April lg, 1951. In-the interim; however, available
funds were used to expand the production base and to get, long lead
time items into production on an expanded basis. 'I'lie flow of military
assistance to allied countries has lagged behind the targets contem-
plated in NSC 68/4, in part because of the ma~i;eriel requirements
.. L ?'
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needed. to support United Nations forces in Korea. The level of
military production in Western Europe has been inadequate to support
the objectives of our economic and military assistance programs. In
the earlier phases of our build-up, the output of military equipment
has been a more serious limitation on the building of military strength
than the first drafts upon our manpower resources. The limitation on
the availability of military equipment stems from such as the following:
the recent date of final approval of the detailed materiel .programs;
the practical problem of reducing long lead time required far military
equipment such as tanks, aircraft, ships, tactical radio, motorized
equipment, and heavy construction items; delay in administrative
actions which could have made tools and facilities available at an
earlier date; organizational problems in production facilities; the
decision to expand the production base and concurrently to secure
delivery of end items; as well as a psychological situation less
favorable than that existing at the time of adoption of NSC 684.
10. The estimates of Soviet atomic capabilities contained in
NSC 68 have been revised upwards. It is now estimated that the
U.S.S.R. will have in mid-1953 the atomic stockpile formerly estimated
for mid-1954. The date when a surprise attack on the United States
might yield decisive results is correspondin,ly advanced.
11. Although a thorough examinaLian of the subject is not now
available, the strength-in-being of the U.S. and its a'_lies has
probably increased in absolute terms less than that of the Soviet
system since April 1950. The mobilization effort of the United
States and its allies has brought them closer to the actualization
of their potential than in April 1950. The date at which this
mobilization effort will enable them to achieve the capability of
supporting the objectives outlined in NSG h~ is still some time off,
certainly later than was expected. when the NSC F>~~4 programs were
developed. The question of comparative capabilities and the rates
of increase in capabilities is of such importance that a careful
assessment should be obtained as rapidly as possible.
12. Review of the world situat~.on shows that the danger to our
security is greater now than it was in April 1950. It is greater
now than it was then 1,hought it would now be. Fifteen months ago
1954 was regarded as the time of maximum danger. It now appears that
we are already in a period of acute danger which will continue until
the United States and its allies achieve an adequate position of
strength.
_ 3 ..
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?:.E~P S-E-C-R-E-T
Foreign Intelligence and Related Activities
l+5. The Director of Central Intelligence and the agencies re-
presented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee have taken and are
taking action directed toward the improvement and. intensification
of foreign intelligence and related activities. For reasons of
security, the specific programs undertaken and contemplated and their
budgetary requirements are not set forth here. It has been determined,
however, that even the substantially increased budgets required are
inconsiderable in re]_ation to the grand total of i-,he other programs
described in NSC 684.
la-6. Since September 1950 there has been substantial. progress
in the development of cooperation and coordination among the several
~.ntelligence agencies through the active utilization of the Intelli-
gence Advisory Committee as a means to that end. Although detailed
problems remain to be solved, an effective system of coordination has
been established and that aspect of 'the program may be said to have
been completed.
47. An intensification of intelligence and.. related activities,
to the extent feasible with the means available has also been
accomplished. Further progress depends on tY~e augmentation of per-
sonnel a,nd facilities. The projected expansion oz' CTA and the
departmental agencies is, in general, about half c:omple~ed.
DEB. All intelligence agencies ha~ae experienced difficulty in
finding and recruiting; properly qua]_ified personnel. Only the
intelligence organization of the Department of State has had notable
difficulty in obtaining adequate budgetary provision far personnel
expansion, Lack of ad.egtzate and suitable office space has hindered
development responsive to NSC 68.
49. Present programs for the improvement and intensification
of intelligence and related activities are deemed to be the most
practicable in the circumstances. Their substantial completion by
mid-1952 is anticipated.
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1: v?~~ . The U.S.S.R. hss given no indicatioea that its
ab,~ectiv~a , ~ chaaaged since !!peril ~9S?. Iadesd ell available
+s~dence leers to the c~clusioad that the Soviet rulers are ~ con-
ked +ss aver +~'' the basic ctao~rac~taness o! their policy and are
still ittteat upon unyielding pursuit of the lallasing goals:
a. The evreatual establ.isherent off' a Cwerumiet wrn*ld des-
inate~ b7 the tT.B.B.R. This basic ob~ective~, in addition to
i~es~ditioa~. liarxfan "vrxt]ri s~valutioa" >oativatiort, probably
egr3~rnes !'~r~o^t a ltkemtin comcr`lcticu that the vital interest# eri'
frl>~e U.l3.B.R. css- be assvx+ed raver the icing rue only by tine eli-
~ttiamt oi' all. govermrents it aanuot coe~trol. This cc~victicra
is pxobebly used is turn oan a !~'remlin belies' that pescefnl
e~ciiste~e mt the tT.S,S.R. end its expire, oast the +one hand,
and the U.B. sazd its alli~es~ te~- the others is iaq~ssible
irua~d shat art sr~ed con3lict bet,~neen ths~ is evantvaily in-
s~rita'IaaLe.
b. ds essenti~t stops tcAntrd reslisatzon of this basic
ob~ee~ive j the Soviet rulers 3n the carrent eituatioxt aeur
fro lte king toe
{l~ ldaintain an edvar~eed state o! ~,r-s~e~tdisees
sad oT'!'aet ~ i~ iar the capabilities oi' the II.S.
sad i#ac allies .
{Q) Fs+evsat the de~ne3.o~sreaat of aaty threat to the
viimal, interests of tYue U.B.S.R. ear to Soviet cexttral oi'
the satellites
{3} ~ the tarrstsriea. omits of the. Bcrviet
corbit;
{~} th~derm#,ne and secure control. of governaeenta
Wait yet ~mder Soviet doerinaticn;
{~) Divide the U.S. i"r+es its allies and cause
flee eo~mtries ~ the Srea troorld geaoerally to deny their
ressnrces, incl.udin~ strategic sites! tc~ the U.B.
c. Davelo~ee~ts since April 195t! and grc~ixag 3aa part out
o! ttee ~ocrean meets ova apyalcBntly cs-vsed the Soviet stealers to
~ ~arlaraty es~hasSs in thsir foreign policy on those o3` the
sboroe armed3~ate alas that r+ela~te to prerne>~tiug ~iestern {ne~tably~
iciest and apse 3 rear>daaent sad isyplasrntatioa ai' the
Tf.B. owersess bases policy.
~~r-I~, n ~--~ APPR~2R A
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2. - a~ i~.~. '~ U.S.S.R. eimce A$riI 19j4 baa
su~stsnt i~;rtyv~ede CapabS.].ity o~ its silittery Pages in
berg. Zt has lrxosght sa~riet and satellite military unit$ to sat
~cd state of battle readiness and has so degloyed t~;em in
a~ itioaa t~.at they coulc, in ~ critieal area of contiren-
ts7. Eurc ae Aiti~s, mays u~ix-twdl~,y ~tithrnxt iwrv'~.,er ~eobili,~atian
said caasotiaat and without sdditioaeal logistical, argt~reisattional,
said tarair~ng ~mapsaratiasatr,~ it has acaslereetcd the mtrdernizsti.on o~
tttet Sa-viet armed foeets--iaasdelttiding the convtstsiaa o~ the sir i'orce
to ~et~:, the coomstruct3oa arui extension oP six~Pields in the U.S.S.R.
sad the se~tellft~, sas~i t3aa csxtensioat oY its radar net vithis~t bat~x
U.S.B.Rr ~' a'~d. the ~at,~llites= snd it has taker fin't~her
3a~sxrrfiaat steps t~?d pL-rciz~ the 8ovfet and. aafiel3lte eccs.ers
oet a ,cur tt~9.aeg. Mary ~~es a! the Europa~en sstellit,~s, in-
c1. East Ge:t~ny, 3aave beteu iacrmesed 671,W0 in the siring
of 1~C to ,GOt~ at ~ore$cxs::, and subst+tatial progress has belpct
mida tororard SaTitstising these is wNtyts;ta, aarg~e3aatiaat said training.
Pae~tseat 8cnriet m33.itaty ctepebilitiet~ sre est~.msted as lollcma t
a. Sotie t a~ad satellite armed ~crcea r~at?tin the
cs~bil~.ty o#' or~~izeg cantineretatl Enrage arse. the Bvr3r sad
~.cid3,ts Batt (eaoc+~pt l~ is tend Pakiatar) atithia a ral?~tivaly
shay,-t pc-rivd. Berth military and non-miiitaty stacks, Frith
#,~e pa~asibia eaceaegtiou o! tev'iatioat fuel, are in suf'f'icient
gnastit~ tr~td so d3stributscl.:s Sezears]1y to permit austsirbedl
milite~y aperatiaass c3urizeg that period aroe+ere though II.9. atttxtic
,a-a7.ti~tab'f:Galiet~feea viers ,Y exarciesed agafnat straategic t~geta in
5-i~ V ti7 r!3 i~ .
b. S.ae t2te F~ Bad, h Kteee'ral war, it trould
mat btt in the aro+er-a11 st~cu~rity interests of t~ tTaeited States
to tit out farces to tha defense ~ the =rain2and c,* Asia.
CtsilvoCartfst fare sew thtrr~et'trctt be credited with this abi3ity
to ~ Bast and 8otrtheast Asia, aatd thr~ten the seerurity
of of'!'~hc~s islanud daPense line,
g. ~ ~.5.>~.R. does not nit hsv+e~ sad, c~en if' it shou7.~d
ssisa '~ht Burasisn ca~iaeat aasa3 the U.K., ~resu3,d be unl.ike3,y~
to secure adequate says]. farces sad s~`icieatt shipping to
pt~tit it ~ mom a sn~caeasf`ul invasion of the Westtarat Heai-
~ ~ _
d. The 8ariet Aar ice eontiuwes capable or providiasg
aVdelgmste fisctica]. suppar'~ to all ground ctntpaigeu which the
II.~l.a~t.R. ~.t laureGh ar^~a-issat c+sret3nentte]. Ev~vpe aaed they Near
and ~ Bast (except Iasdia sad Pakistan} red siaas3.taeretsusly
oi' atiamepflug a ats?:tegia sit of"ilSnsivs against the Unified
Ei~drsi teaed tha Uarth Amtacicaaa continent.
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e . Sasriet at+saio rapabilitias hs~ne ir~taasvd roughly at
t1~ tetra antiai~patard in Affil 1~Sa, but are eked to is>rat ~ the AA'~.'0 hrs. Mox~ettver, t~~e
. dta~tng the fast Y'am` indicates that in the short run. at least
t~ existitag gap will xidan. Ha~vever, the IT.8.3.R. has cont4nt
aa~d arvsrm ext~ada~ measures that enable it to translate its o~ and
suiet'i~ite ecic esources into atilitary der in being. S.n con-
se~e~t 3aarviet strength, at laatst tor' ia?ediata ~tl.lStary Furposss ~
c+c~ts lar$e3y ~scted by the ecc+a+ostic ia~riority srrg that
U.S.S.R. and the itatellitea.
~~ , I~~~b 'ice . ~11tha~b. d ~ ~erantrs since
39~i ~ paartic t wse re ~dted to X~rea have served
ter n eft #~ t ai' Itosa~'s ~~~~ cn fx*eea I~aBlas,
Sit ~biliti~ fsaar psychnl~o,S,iaal ~a-rtltre both oi"t+~sive and
det+ensi~t-~-haYe net bed apttarris~.l~y reduced. Ths c~~db3r~tiarY- t'~' that
~dn +sp~xetna with the xcn?ld-Bride netw~k of local
Cm3st parties aa~. l~Ont societies caRttiauas to give the Svrriat
U>3on an nixstional. +advant~age ~'or its pars+~aganda. efYmcts. 3asiat
ate. vi all iataa~tiomal aaedia liithin the tT.S.S.R. sect Sorv~.et
,~ of Riga broadce~sts gives the Kremlin a near ffiona~o~y in
~iag the thinking o! the 3aviat ~~es on i:ateraati,crnai >t~`sirs.
~f alte~aatia$ '"w+eRT scare" tecbw1Q11es and ~ to the uxtl~rsal
1+~3ag i'~ peace j tl~Le U.S.S.A, bras dera~t~"sb3,~ produced dur:Eng the
past motive e:ttects ttn Wel!atern ett~ts t? deal oolleatively
xith basic security prvbleaa . Dcaaastica2ly, a a~+r trend hee ~d
in tbRe S~ a~tti-Ass~ari+~i ca~e-i8n.. This tra~ad bas begin m~c]caS
by Vargas ~1~ that the U.~3: has moved frees p~peration oi' fission
'~ ~ #r?f` aresf~ion, and ~2) the U.S. has eessaittei ~w~t?n~3vea-
able" ~ s~a9.aast the Russia~t people and plans to r~rpest thrrse
?h+sse cb~ltrg6s bane bin yuiACipa3.Ay pegged on aCCoemts crP
alriregsdrd T.S. mtrocities in Kama and t2~ tT.B. "intesv~entian cam-
e age.ix~st Russia cat' 19x18-2d. Th+s sPtect of this nest dav+oslop-
~t is ouslzy to iae the psy~clwlogical. motion of tl~e
Sortwat pa+a for possible ter.
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~. Itmtte 1 tabil t f the~Soviet re ime. Evidence received
since Apr indicates that teaaions continue within the U.3.S,R.
Moreoirer,~ dev+elopnteats with regard to a collective farm Berger pro-
gram suggest that the regime stay be encountering unusual peasant
opyosltit~. Hcrrte{v+er j the gre~tlia, through utilisation of police
state techniques, appears capable of successfully suppressing any
ditticvlties that say arise. 2t suet be concluded, therefore, that
the reglse will continue in power and will not be ccm~elled to modify
say of its external policies because of internal pressures.
6. 8'tebi.~.tY of and decree of Soviet control over, Eur?~ee~n
~t use; mss. It is a~tparent that since April 190 stresses
and strains hale developed is the European satellites. These are
principally economic in nature, but appear to have same political
potentialities, particularly as regards increasing anti-Husaian
sentisent. The difficulties seem to result Pram the castbined im-
psct of tJ~ military preparedness effort, Western trade restrictions,
overrasttitious industrialization programs, ans. agrarian problems.
There are no indications that the difficulties are sufficiently
serious to ,~eopardiae the Ccmmtunist regiates' to reduce the .firm
grip of Soviet control over these regimes, or to prevent them from
undertaking say action demanded by the Kremlin. The military caps-
bilities and the general war readiness of the European satellites
have s~stantially increased since April 1950, the rate of increase
being in tact greater than was estisated at that tile.
7. Stabilit de o! con over Faun Eastern satellites.
a. Since April 1950 the Kreslin has been able to
secure large-scale silitary action furthering its awn interests
!'rant its satellite regime in Dforth gores and from the Chinese
ac~ists. During the Koreas war the sine of the Chinese
ccteetuaist silitary establishment has bean increased. Hoxever,
deployment to ~Corea and Manchuria of savor portions of their
beat foreses, increased internal dice requirements, sad the
logistic strain of the Korean star have reduced present Chinese
aat~ttxnist capabilities for additional external military opera-
tions,
b+ ~thile the Korean war has not yet posed a critical
threat to the econamtic stability of the Chin~eae cam~tunist
regime, the t/ar has subjected and will continue to stlb~ect the
regime to inereasia$ly serious economic difficulties. These
difficulties are most certain to increase durlag the next
year if Weatera trade restrictions are rigorously applied.
c. The Korean war has increased the dependence of the
Chixtaoe C+~stsun3.sts on the II.S.S.R., but apparently has not
msttrially changed 33no-Soviet relations. There are areas of
caaflicting interests Which make rugs of sutual dissatis-
fitctian plausible, but we have as firs evidence to substantiate
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these rumors. The Korean tray has Placed strains upon the
internal political, military and economic position of the
Chinese Cas~unist regime. While these strains have not yet
beet~e critical, thRty sight w+e31 become so if the rar were pro-
longed< Whatever gray have been the economic and internal poli-
-tical ccsasequances suffered by the Chinese as a result of
taxing such silitary aetiort, there is as yet ao firm indication
that the Chinese cesmiunist regime has been ~eogardized or that
Srnriet influence over the regime has been reduced,
8< Threat a~ the U,~B~S.R+ to i1.8. security. The Soviet rulers
mace Ayc~t~'"'~~5~i have"s~iown~ Yiiro~i :ns~-actions in Korea a greater
tri2lizss to asstase risks in the pursuit o= their objectives than
tras eatimat~ed at that time.: Moreover, the Soviet ru3.~rs have re-
~, during the sense period intense sensitivity over efforrts of
the West to strengthen its military position and have incaeasiagly
resorted t? threats over the? consequences lii~ely to ensure Frcn
continuation of these efforts. The threat to U.S. security posed by
Soviet policies and capabilities appears therefore, to have increased
since April 1954.
a. The Kremlin has since April 1950 stepped up its drive
to destroy the freedom of the Western trorld through political
rartare and has given every indication that it will Further
intensify this drive in the f'uiture. For eYampla, with the
isseedia-te objective pf dividing the Western powers, wnddrseining
II