MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN IAC CONFERENCE ROOM, ADMINISTRATION BUILDING CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00362R000200080015-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 29, 2002
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: March 5, 1957
• Content Type: MIN

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IAC-M-279
5 March 1957
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Minutes of Meeting Held in
IAC Conference Room, Administration Building
Central Intelligence Agency, at 1045, 5 March 1957
Director of Central Intelligence
Allen W. Dulles
Presiding
Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant for Intelligence,
Department of State
Major General Robert H. Wienecke, acting for Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army
Rear Admiral Laurence H. Frost, Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
Major General Millard Lewis, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters,
United States Air Force
Brigadier General Richard Collins, Deputy Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff
Mr. Harry S. Traynor, Atomic Energy Commission representative
to the IAC
Mr. Ralph R. Roach, acting for Federal Bureau of Investigation
representative to the IAC
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IAC-M-279
5 March 1957
1. Approval of Minutes
19 February Meeting
(IAC-M-278)
Approved as written.
2. Review of Crisis Situations
a. Watch Committee Reports
No. 342 and No. 343
b. Situation in Indonesia
(Memorandum to IAC, 1 March)
The members exchanged views on this situation, using
as a basis for discussion a CIA memorandum on this subject, dated
1 March, which was distributed prior to the meeting and a State
Department paper which was circulated at the meeting. They also
considered information and intelligence from various other sources
pertinent to this situation.
Following the preparation of a new draft paper based
on the CIA and State memoranda, the members agreed (in renewed
discussion following item 7) that the memorandum, as amended,
should have the same distribution, and be forwarded under a covering
memorandum similar to that used in transmitting the "crisis"
situation paper which had been discussed at the last IAC meeting
(IAC-M-278, item 2 b).
c.
Chinese Nationalist Intentions
(Report by Ad Hoc Current
Intelligence Group for the
Taiwan Strait Problem, 21
February, with attachments)
Noted this report. In the course of the discussion of
this matter Mr. Armstrong suggested, and the members agreed,
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"Both surface-to-air and air-to-air guided missiles."
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that a special national intelligence estimate on Chinese Nationalist
capabilities and intentions with respect to attacking the mainland
this year be prepared for IAC consideration at an early date.
3. Information Report to the IAC
on the Defector Program
(IAC-D-8/27, 26 February 1957)
Priority National Scientific
and Technical Objectives
(IAC-D-50/8, First Revision,
21 February 1957)
Approved this proposed revision of IAC-D-50/8, subject to
the amendment of paragraph I, B, 3 to read as follows:
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5 March 1957
7. NIE 11-5-57
Soviet Capabilities and
Probable Programs in the
Guided Missile Field
The Chairman noted the request of General Lewis that final
action with respect to the approval of this estimate be deferred for
one week, and the members concurred in this procedure. I
The members then discussed the paper generally, with
particular reference to proposed changes by AEC and CIA, which
were circulated at the meeting. General Lewis also outlined and
exchanged views with the members andi on certain
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5 March 1957
questions he had with respect to the draft estimate, particularly
Section IV. It was agreed that these matters, as well as questions
arising as a result of further review by General Lewis, Admiral
Frost or other members, would be considered by the IAC repre-
sentatives prior to the next IAC meeting.
In the course of the general discussion, the Chairman also
emphasized the overriding importance of the subject matter of this
paper, inviting the members' attention particularly to the recom-
mendations of the draft post-mortem on this estimate which were
designed to improve intelligence in the field of guided missiles.
Adjournment: 1245
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Secretary
SECRETARY'S NOTES
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IAC-M-279
5 March 1957
4. No objection having been raised b a member, the
Secretary has authorized release to USIA of
NIE 12-57, "Stability of the Soviet Satellite Structure, " both dated
19 February 1957 (IAC-M-278, 19 February 1957, Secretary's
Note 3).
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IAG Meeting, 5 March 1957
Central Intelligence Agency
Lieutenant General Charles P. Cabell
Mr. Huntington Sheldon
Mr. Sherman Kent
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Mr. Otto Guthe
Mr. Herbert Scoville, Jr.
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Department of State
Mr. David Wilson
Mr. Howard Wiedemann
Mr. Richard K. Stuart
Department of the Army
Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Pratt
Lieutenant Colonel William R. Parr
Major Kenneth E. Buell
Mr. Carl J. Paurowski
Department of the Navy
Captain W. S. Howell
Commander W. R. McClendon
Lieutenant Commander G. H. Barker
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Department of the Air Force
Colonel Harold E. Cotter
Lieutenant Colonel George Wilson
Lieutenant Colonel Van A. Woods, Jr.
Major Marvin M. Glass
Mr. Frank H. Perez
Mr. William M. Laxson
The Joint Staff
Colonel E. G. Van Orman, USMC
Colonel C. H. Dayhuff, Jr., USA
Lieutenant Colonel A. E. Stoll, Jr., USAF
Atomic Energy Commission
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1446
I N T E L L I G E N C E ADVISORY C O M M I T T E E
5 March 1957
THE SITUATION IN INDONESIA
The situation in Indonesia, as outlined in the attached memo-
randum, was discussed by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on
5 March 1957. The Committee considered that the matter was of
sufficient importance to be brought to the attention of the following
addressees.
ADEN W. fJLLES
Chairman
White House (Gen. Goodpaster)
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Chairman, JCS
Special Asst. to the. President for
National Security Affairs
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5' March 1957
THE SITUATION IN INDONESIA
1. On March 2 the Commander of Territory VII in Eastern
Indonesia proclaimed martial law, designated military governors for
the four provinces within his command (Celebes, Moluccas, Lesser
Sundae and West New Guinea), and presented an ultimatum to the
Djakarta government. In addition to greater regional autonomy and
the retention of seventy percent of the revenues of the provinces,
which would be used for economic development within his territory, he
made additional demands with respect to governmental changes pro-
posed earlier by President Sukarno. On March 5 he demanded that
Prime Minister Ali resign and stated that Communists would not be
tolerated in the government.
2. These events in Eastern Indonesia are the latest in a series
of bloodless insurgencies which have seen army commanders, ap-
parently supported by civilian elements, take over the North, Central
and South Sumatra provinces in defiance of the Djakarta government.
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They have all demanded a greater degree of autonomy, but have given
no indication of an intent to quit the Republic. Some have declared a
loyalty to President Sukarno but have made it clear that they oppose
the present cabinet. Earlier, in the period from August to November
1956, coups planned by Army elements in West Java apparently were
thwarted by the government.
3. Developments in Eastern Indonesia and Sumatra are all
symptomatic of increasing unrest in the Indonesian Army and of
growing regionalism in areas outside Java. Poor living conditions
for the troops, outmoded equipment, and a cumbersome organization
have drawn the criticism of some army leaders. Repeated appeals
to the government for funds to carry out improvements in the Army
have met with little effective response, while the incidence of cor-
ruption in high places has destroyed the faith of many Army leaders
that conditions would improve.
4. At the same time Army commanders in the areas outside
Java are influenced by growing pressure from the population for in-
creased local control of government. and finances. This pressure has
resulted from the failure of the central government to bring about
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improvements in communications, school facilities and living standards--
all of which had been among the objectives of the revolution against
the Dutch. The feeling that the government administration is
dominated by the Javanese, and that the outlying provinces are not re-
ceiving economic benefits commensurate with their contributions to
the government's revenues have added to regional sentiment. In acting
as they did, Army leaders have not only served their own interests
but appear to have expressed the views of a substa tial part of the
Indonesian people.
5. Partly in answer to growing disaffection and perhaps in-
fluenced by impressions gathered during a visit to the Soviet Union
and Communist China during the fall of 1956, President Sukarno made
public on February 21 his "concept" of a new organizational form for
Indonesian democracy. He would establish a national council repre-
sentative of all parties in the parliament but augmented by delegates
of functional sectors of society, including veterans, laborers, and
the armed forces. The council would give "advice," apparently
mandatory, to Parliament and to the cabinet, which again would be
representative of all elements in Parliament. In outlining his plan,
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Sukarno, obviously harking back to the nationalist unity which pre-
vailed during the independence struggle, held that opposition was the
key to the failure of parliamentary democracy in Indonesia and that
elimination of an opposition by inclusion of all elements in the gov-
ernment would ensure its success.
6. Because the Indonesian Communist Party would have of-
ficial status in the government for the first time since Indonesia
became independent in 1949, Sukarnots plan has had a =i..4 reception.
It has also been pointed out that the proposals offer little hope of
dealing with the problems of growing regional feeling. Only two of the
major parties support Sukarno's proposal, the Nationalist Party,
albeit reluctantly, and the Communists, Impressed by the reluctance
of the other parties to support him, Sukarno has announced that he
would study counterproposals, thus holding out the hope of eventual
adjustment or compromise.
Possible Developments
7. The immediate course of events is unclear. In view of
the Indonesian faculty for compromise and the fact that only one of
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the political parties, the Masjumi, has flatly opposed Sukarnois plan,
perhaps the most likely short-term outcome is some accommodation
of conflicting positions. Sukarnots proposed council might be given a
purely advisory function, the role of the Communists might be limited
to this council, and some means of temporarily accommodating re-
gional interests may be found.
8. However, a compromise solution is not likely to satisfy for
long the pressures for a greater degree of regional autonomy., the
complaints of the army, or Sukarnots impatience with parliamentary
processes and party politics. These circumstances, taken in con-
junction with Sukarnots, willingness to accept Communist support,
will continue to offer excellent opportunities for the Communists to
improve their position and have the potential of leading to major civil
disturbances, an attempted coup dietat, or political fragmentation of
the Indonesian Republic.
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