SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: GROWING IRANIAN ACTIVITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00317R000300110005-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: December 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Sub-Saharan Africa:
Growing Iranian Activity
-seeec-,
ALA 84-10119
December 1984
copy 3 2 4
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 Africa Division, ALA,
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Regional Issues Branch,
Secret
ALA 84-10119
December 1984
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Sub-Saharan Africa:
Growing Iranian Activity
A Research Paper
Eastern and South Asian Analysis, and
contributions byl I Office of Near
This paper was prepared by
Office of Central Reference.
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Secret
Sub-Saharan Africa:
Growing Iranian Activity
Key Judgments Iran's policies toward black Africa have entered an activist phase over the
Information available past 30 months reflecting, in our view, both the consolidation of the Islamic
as of 29 November 1984 regime of Ayatollah Khomeini and Tehran's broader foreign policy goals.
was used in this report.
We believe Tehran is pursuing an aggressive campaign for three main
purposes:
? To win support for its foreign policies, particularly its war with Iraq.
? To enhance its international legitimacy by expanding its formal diplo-
matic relationships.
? To spread its revolutionary ideology.
The record shows that Iran has begun to build networks of sympathizers
among Muslim fundamentalist groups, Lebanese communities, and univer-
sities in the region. Iranian revolutionary propaganda has found an
audience among Muslim radical fundamentalists who admire Khomeini's
strict interpretation of the Koran and his revolutionary theology. In
northern Nigeria, for example,
Iranian delegations and embassy personnel are recruiting and
introducing t eir propaganda at the universities. In Senegal
Tehran has been providing financial support to an active
group of followers and funding to local publications.
d
Tehran has given a high priority to
Africa even though the Muslim communities there are mostly Sunni.
Shias-adherents of the branch of Islam that is dominant in Iran-are
found mainly in Lebanese and Asian expatriate communities in the Sub-
Saharan region. The targets of Tehran's campaign, we believe, are both
established governments and the conservative religious leadership that
traditionally has spoken for the majority of African Muslims.
Tehran already has made some, albeit limited, political gains in Sub-
Saharan Africa over the past two years:
? Iran now has 18 embassies in the region, compared to less than half that
number two years ago.
? A number of African governments have welcomed Iran's offers of
concessionary oil prices and financial assistance, and in some cases
(Sierra Leone and Ghana) have been willing to upgrade political relations
in return.
These inroads have not come easily. Tehran has been forced to cope with
Shia-Sunni sectarian differences, conflicts between radical and conserva-
tive Islamic fundamentalists, and a host of other cultural and political
Secret
ALA 84-10119
December 1984
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crosscurrents. Most African leaders are taking steps to blunt Tehran's
campaign, fearing it could upset the fragile political balance in their
countries. Governments also worry that closer ties to Iran could jeopardize
essential assistance from Western and Arab sources which are mainstays of
their economies. Conservative Muslims are apprehensive that radical
fundamentalist activities will undermine their leadership.
Iran's efforts to extend its influence in black Africa have been made even
more difficult by the historical antipathy between most Arabs and the
Persians of Iran. Thus, some Arab states-notably Saudi Arabia and
Iraq-have sought to block the spread of Iranian influence in Africa,
which they consider a threat to their own interests in the region. Libya, by
contrast, has encouraged some of Tehran's activities, which have goals that
are compatible with its own revolutionary program.
There is as yet no evidence that Iran has developed a terrorist capability in
Africa or has made inroads into the conservative majority of Africa's
Muslim populations. govern-
ment spokesmen and resident diplomats from conservative Arab and
Western states are concerned that Iranian-trained terrorists plan to
sabotage embassies and government installations.
Iran's activist policies are clearly aimed at challenging Western interests in
Africa. Khomeini's message is framed in terms hostile to the West and to
the United States in particular. Fundamentalist and xenophobic zealots in
Africa admire Khomeini's policy of condemning and excising the influence
of outside governments. While we do not expect Tehran to attain signifi-
cant influence in the region any time soon, over the longer term Iran's radi-
cal message may provoke Islamic terrorism or add to already existing
restiveness among some Islamic groups.
Although Tehran's campaign thus far speaks mainly to select elements of
African society, impressionable youth groups may come to respond more
actively to Islamic radical fundamentalism, creating pressures for new
political institutions and reopening longstanding ethnic and religious
jealousies that could provoke unrest and violence. We see a significant
increase in radical Islamic activity in Africa, therefore, as a potential
threat to political stability as well as a possible opening for increased
Iranian influence.
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Figure 1
Muslim Distribution and Diplomatic Ties with Iran in Sub-Saharan Africa
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MALI Country hosting Iranian Embassya
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not necessarily authoritative.
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Secret
Sub-Saharan Africa:
Growing Iranian Activity
Tehran is one of the three centers of power in the
Muslim world-with Riyadh and Tripoli-competing
for leadership in black Africa. Each has subsidized an
international organization designed to enlist agents
and to disseminate propaganda. According to some
scholarly observers, Libyan leader Qadhafi's Islamic
Call Society is now the weakest of the three: its
revolutionary appeal is being superseded by Iran's
network of agents and sympathizers in Africa. The
Saudis, however, continue to be the source of African
Islam's principal external support.'
we believe Tehran has
assigned black Africa a high priority in its campaign
for international recognition because of the large
number of countries there with Muslim populations,
and because Iranian foreign policymakers believe that
black African political systems have not evolved far
beyond colonial models and therefore are ripe for
revolution. Tehran's goals are often mutually incom-
patible, however-they seek to turn local Muslim
populations against both conservative Muslim leaders
and some of the same governments from which Teh-
ran seeks diplomatic support.
Despite its extensive efforts, we believe Iran has to
date achieved only limited success. Tehran has been
hampered by the hostility of African government
officials and by the indifference on the part of many
African Muslims to its revolutionary theology.
This paper sketches Iran's overall policy toward black
Africa and the apparatus through which this policy is
carried out, analyzes the patterns of Iranian involve-
ment, and assesses Tehran's prospects. It also dis-
cusses possible consequences for US interests if Iran
were able to successfully increase the influence of its
revolutionary doctrine in the region
A key dimension of Iran's political campaign in black
Africa is the export of its revolutionary theology and
encouragement of a fundamentalist Islamic revival in
the region. According to press reports, the Iranians
seek to overcome differences between Sunni and Shia
Muslims and to foment a popular return to Islam and
rejection of Western secular influences by means such
as those that led to the overthrow of the Shah.l 25X1
A Revolutionary Model
Many African Muslims, as well as other Africans, 25X1
view the Iranian revolution of 1979 as a victory of
popular forces against a corrupt and repressive regime 25X1
supported by the Western powers, according to a
variety of press and scholarly sources. Fundamentalist
and xenophobic zealots in Africa admire Khomeini's
policy of condemning and excising the influence of
outside governments. They too blame Western influ-
ences for the breakup of the traditional extended
family and for the pervasive secular emphasis on the
material over the spiritual.
Khomeini's reputation, we believe, has proved to be a
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valuable asset in attracting African followers among 25X1
sette form are widely distributed.
students and radical fundamentalists. Africa has yet
to produce a preeminent Islamic personality, and no
other contemporary Muslim figure can equal Khomei-
ni's ability to capture popular emotions. His message
has appealed to Africans dissatisfied with the econom-
ic and political inequities that have widened in the
postindependence era. Indeed, diplomatic reporting
and press accounts underscore this fact:
? Numerous delegations of African Muslims to Iran
have asked to meet Khomeini.
? His pictures have appeared throughout the African
Muslim world.
? Posters with Khomeini's portrait are carried in
demonstrations.
? Articles under his name appear in local newspapers.
? Collections of Khomeini's sayings in book and cas-
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In our judgment, the worldwide trend toward in-
creased political activity by radical Islamic funda-
mentalist groups-marked by the Iranian revolution,
the assassination of Anwar Sadat, and the bombing
of US installations in Lebanon by the Islamic Ji-
had-has been paralleled on a smaller scale by a
significant increase in Islamic consciousness in the
Muslim communities of Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite
internal divisions that dilute its political impact,
Islam is expanding rapidly in the region, encouraged
by a flow of population into cities where many
nominal Muslims and non-Muslims are becoming
ardent converts to fundamentalist beliefs.
African Muslims today number some 120 million-
nearly 15 percent of all Muslims in the world-most
living in 27 states south of the Sahara. The greatest
concentration is in West Africa-Nigeria alone has
nearly 45 million Muslims, about half of its
population.
West Africa is also the site of the highest level of
radical Muslim activity on the subcontinent. During
the past five years the followers of a heretical Mus-
lim leader in northern Nigeria have provoked serious
outbreaks of violence that have taken several thou-
sand lives and tested the federal government's au-
thority. Small fundamentalist groups in Senegal,
Ivory Coast, and Sierra Leone have also caused
official anxiety but have yet to attract national
followings.
The Muslim revival so far has been an untidy,
disorganized, sometimes violent movement often
marked by dissension among Muslims divided into
hostile camps. These include conservative Sufi broth-
erhoods, austerely militant fundamentalist groups,
and heretical fringe groups.
Sufi leaders rarely resort to revolutionary activity
but do grant or withhold religious support to or from
existing regimes. For them the pursuit of political
power is a distraction and an obstacle to the achieve-
ment of holiness. The Sufis aim to achieve holiness
through mysticism, contemplation, and imitation of
the Prophet's life.
Militant fundamentalists, on the other hand, are
often highly political. If inspired by Saudi Arabia's
religious tradition, they tend to support the govern-
ment in power. If theyfollow Khomeini's radical Shia
philosophy, they are hostile to secular authority.
Heretical fringe groups, such as the Maitatsine in
northern Nigeria, place the group's founder on a par
with Mohamed himself and are therefore considered
heretical by mainline Muslims. Such groups are
usually opposed to state governments because they
reject all authority but that of their own leader. They
often violently attack other religious groups.
The greatest Islamic threat to political stability in
Africa comes from radical fundamentalist groups
that are still no more than a small minority but who
have shown in Nigeria and other countries with large,
politically active Muslim populations, the greatest
potential for growth of any religious group in Africa.
Their hostility to established political and religious
institutions has attracted Libyan and Iranian atten-
tion and support. These groups are especially attrac-
tive to alienated Muslim students and the urban
unemployed who seek simple, often violent solutions
to the diverse and virtually intractable problems of
West African societies.
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Secret
Ali Mohammad Besharati-
Jahromi
Iranian policy on matters pertaining to black Africa
is generally set by the Foreign Ministry, acting on the
basis of the tenets of the Iranian Islamic revolution of
1978-79 and administrative guidance from senior
levels of the Iranian regime. The Foreign Ministry
has retained a degree of professionalism in its bu-
reaucracy while displaying some of the revolutionary
zeal expected of Iranians since the Shah's departure.
Supplementing the diplomatic focus in the work of
the Foreign Ministry are the endeavors of Iranian
commercial and intelligence agents, the Ministry of
Islamic Guidance, and the Revolutionary Guard.
The Foreign Ministry has been led since December
1981 by Ali Akbar Velayati, a physician by training.
Ali Mohammad Besharati-Jahromi, Velayati's chief
deputy since June, and Hosein Sheikholeslam, the
chief officer for political affairs in the Foreign Minis-
try, are also influential. Both men are regarded by
US officials as more radical than Velayati. Beshar-
ati-Jahromi, once a student of Khomeini's at Qom,
was a schoolteacher who joined the Revolutionary
Guard Command Council after the revolution and
headed the Guard's intelligence operations. Sheikho-
leslam was the leader of the "students" who seized
the US Embassy in Tehran in November 1979 and is
one of the most extreme anti-Western fundamental-
Sheikholeslam's deputy overseeing Iranian relations
with Arab and African states is Mohammad Hosein
Lavasani, who is US educated and has probably been
the Foreign Ministry's leading proponent of expand-
ing Tehran's relations with Sub-Saharan Africa. His
brother, Mohammad Ali Lavasani, serves as Iran's
Ambassador to Tanzania. Lavasani's directorate has
separate sections for Africa north and south of
Sahara; the section for black Africa is headed by
Hamid Moayer. Other personnel in the Foreign Min-
istry are also often involved in formulating and
carrying out Iranian policy toward black Africa.
Deputy Foreign Minister Hosain Kazempur-Ardebili,
for example, oversees directorates handling economic
relations and Iranian participation in Islamic and
other international conferences.
Iran has dispatched a number of delegations to black
Africa in recent years that have not been under the
auspices of the Foreign Ministry. The Ministry of
Islamic Guidance sees to it that Muslim Shia princi-
ples are paramount in Iranian domestic and forei n
sponsorship of such travel.
Assuming a reasonably coherent domestic situation
in a post-Khomeini Iran, the outlook for Iran's policy
apparatus in its dealings with black Africa is for few
changes in the structural framework but an increas-
ing sophistication in promoting the Islamic revolu-
tion. There is likely to be better coordination among
the several relevant ministries and a less heavy-
handed approach in pursuing policy objectives. That
prospect would include a greater reliance on gaining
long-term assets through the use of academic schol-
arships and military training opportunities in Iran.
Tehran will probably also be less abrasive in pushing
its brand of Islam among non-Shia African Muslims.
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The Shias and the Sunnis are the two major branches
of Islam. The differences between them are not in
belief or law, which, with some exceptions, are funda-
mentally the same for both, but in practice and
political theory. The Shias broke away from the
mainstream of Islam in the seventh century almost at
the outset of the religion's spread. Their quarrel with
the dominant Sunnis originated over the line of
succession from the Prophet Mohammed. Sunnis
believe any Muslim could succeed Mohammed, while
Shias believe that only members of the Prophet's
family were the rightful heirs.
The roots of Ayatollah Khomeini's political
philosophy particularly his central concept that
religion and politics are inextricably linked-lie in a
long tradition of "activist" Shia clergy who have
argued the need for deep clerical involvement in
politics to establish a `dust " government, defining all
other forms of government as illegitimate and enjoin-
ing faithful Muslims to oppose them as a religious
duty. This same approach was preached by the
leaders of the Muslim jihads (holy wars) in West
Africa during the 19th century and has even been
adopted by militant Sunni Muslims today.
of about 80 million in a worldwide Islamic communi-
ty of more than 900 million. More than 50 percent of
the world's Shias live in Iran. Other Shias have
emigrated from the Near East to India, Southeast
Asia, and Africa to escape from persecution.b
Shias in Africa. There are nearly 100,000 Lebanese
Shias in West Africa. Many came from southern
Lebanon after the first World War, encouraged by the
French and the British who wanted to create aforeign
business class to play a middleman role between
colonial administrations and the population. The
community has grown since then, particularly in the
past decade when the civil war in Lebanon brought
large numbers of new immigrants to join their fam-
ilies, many of which were already set up in business.
The Lebanese frequently forge alliances with African
politicians and businessmen, providing commercial
experience, capital, and international contacts in re-
turn for political protection.
The Shias of East Africa, who make up the majority
of the approximately 600,000 Asian Muslims living
there, are mostly prosperous merchants, bankers, and
tradesmen living in major cities and on the island of
Zanzibar. They are less politically active than the
West African Lebanese and have also avoided in-
Shias have generally been the underdogs of the
Muslim world, an oppressed, unassimilated minority
The Clerical Network
Judging from Iranian practices to date, much of the
effort to build bridges to African Muslims rests on
Tehran's development of a clerical network. Khomeini
seeks to use the Muslim clergy to support his activist
ideology, calling for their involvement in politics as a
religious duty. During the past two years, US Embas-
sy reporting points to the fact that groups of Iranian
clergy under the direction of the Ministry of Islamic
Guidance have visited Africa; contacting fundamen-
talist Muslim communities; conducting seminars and
conferences for Muslim clerics; giving inflammatory,
volvement in religious controversy.
highly political sermons in local mosques; and recruit-
ing candidates for training in Iran. Moreover, Iranian
theologians have been appointed as ambassadors to
African posts and travel widely to make contact with
African clerics on missions sometimes publicly blessed
by Khomeini himself.
The Khomeini regime has staged several widely publi-
cized, expense-paid conferences and seminars for Af-
rican Muslim clergy in both Africa and Iran.
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Secret
anti-Saudi and anti-US propaganda
conference center in Lagos where future meetings
relating to the hajj-the annual pilgrimage to Mec-
ca-will be scheduled. Three hajj conferences have
been held already under the auspices of the Organiza-
tion of Islamic Unity in Freetown, Sierra Leone. This
year's meeting drew representatives from Uganda,
Zimbabwe, Ghana, Chad, Liberia, Guinea, Nigeria,
Mauritius, Senegal, and Benin. The conferences have
produced lengthy declarations, heavily laced with
Tehran also is attempting to reach the Muslim popu-
lation through the medium of the Friday sermon.
According to diplomatic reports, delegations from
Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Nigeria, among others,
have attended a series of seminars for imams 2 in
Tehran. There, Iranian clergy give instruction in
revolutionary theory and practice, including sermons
on the "sin" of obedience to secular authorities.
Lebanese Shia Ties
The existing evidence suggests that the Iranians have
found Lebanese communities in Africa particularly
useful allies probably in part because, like them, the
Lebanese are mostly Shia Muslims. In Senegal, for
example, almost 90 percent of the 20,000-member
Lebanese community are Shias. Furthermore, the
Lebanese, although constituting a relatively small
minority group, are economically and politically pow-
erful. Lebanese have acted as intermediaries with
African governmental leaders and religious groups,
particularly in West Africa where there are large,
influential Lebanese communities. For example:
last year,
? The leader of the Lebanese Shia community in
Ivory Coast served as promoter, guide, and inter-
preter for the Iranian charge in Lagos during his
travels through francophone states in West Africa
? Lebanese living in Abidjan have interceded with
government ministers and the police on behalf of
Iranians trying to enter Ivory Coast without official-
ly approved visas
' While prayers are performed daily by Muslims either individually
or in groups, imams lead communal prayer on Fridays in local
mosques. On these occasions the imam will preach on Koranic law
and custom and may introduce political and social commentary into
? The Islamic Social-Cultural Institute in Dakar,
under the leadership of a Lebanese Muslim cleric, is
the chief point of contact for Iranian activities in
Senegal
? In Sierra Leone, where there is a large-about
4,000-economically and politically powerful Leba-
nese community, Afro-Lebanese businessman Jamil
Said Mohamed, a trusted associate of President
Stevens, has taken the lead in arranging sales of
Iranian oil to the Sierra Leone Government, accord-
ing to US Embassy reporting
According to US diplomatic sources, not all Lebanese
Shias are sanguine about the Iranian connection.
Some successful Lebanese businessmen are concerned
that an association with Iran could hurt their business
and political connections by antagonizing foreign
interests, particularly the Saudis. According to US
Embassy sources, the Lebanese recognize that they
are vulnerable as a racial and religious minority in
Africa, and Jamil Said Mohamed himself has urged
Lebanese Shia leaders in Sierra Leone to stay away
from the controversial political activities of the Irani-
ans.
The University Network
The Iranians have also established ties to radical
Muslim student groups on university campuses. Eye-
witness reports indicate that several hundred students
from Ghana, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Niger, and
Senegal have been brought to Iran for theological
indoctrination. According to press reporting, a special
school has been established in Iran's theological cen-
ter, the city of Qom, to provide training for African
university students.
We know that Iranian recruiters have been active at
universities in northern Nigeria, from members of the
Muslim community there. In 1983, for example, there
were a half dozen Iranians-among them former
Iranian diplomatic and military personnel-teaching
or studying at northern campuses while actively in-
volved with the Muslim Student Society. Sources of
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the US Embassy in Lagos report that the Iranian
Ambassador has traveled extensively in northern Ni-
geria, speaking to radical Muslim audiences at univer-
sities and mosques. In the effort to introduce Khomei-
ni's teaching on northern campuses, Iranians have
been joined by clerics from Tehran-many of whom
came to Nigeria without the knowledge of Nigerian
authorities-and by Nigerian students trained in
Iran. US Embassy source
have reported that Iranians paid large sums of money
to student groups such as the Kano University Stu-
dent Union to which they gave over $100,000 in 1983.
Muslim students on northern Nigerian campuses have
been involved in demonstrations extolling Iran's revo-
lution and demanding a purge of the political and
religious leadership in the country. According to
interviews in the press, this militant and idealistic
fringe of Nigeria's Muslim community views Iran as a
purified Islamic state that has shaken off "Western"
heresies. It has attacked police and members of
conservative Islamic groups, creating tensions be-
tween Christians and Muslims both on campus and in
surrounding communities. Christian students at the
University of Maiduguri have protested that it is
becoming "an extension of Iran,'
and claim that Tehran has funded
campaigns against alcohol and immodesty in women's
dress. Iran is also
responsible for the burgeoning of Muslim prayer sites
and the appearance of posters of Khomeini on campus
and in the surrounding community.
are seeking to establish
ties to fundamentalist groups outside the universities
who wish to purge what they believe is a heretical
traditional religious hierarchy in northern Nigeria
and a governmental structure corrupted by non-
Islamic practices. Press reporting indicates that reli-
gious riots in northern Nigeria by radical Muslim
university students and members of a militant Islamic
group have taken several thousand lives over the past
two years and stretched the Nigerian police and
military to their limits before order was restored. The
Iranian media, seeking to profit from these disturb-
ances, have portrayed those who died in the riots as
martyrs. The non-Muslim sector of the Nigerian press
reports that Iran is using its diplomatic presence to
recruit militant Muslim groups in an attempt to
establish an Iranian-style Islamic state in Nigeria.
The Nigerian People's Party, whose strength was
among Christians in southern Nigeria until it wa:.
banned by the present military government, publicly
complained in 1982 that radical Muslims were dis-
tributing leaflets and photographs of Khomeini in the
north
Iran is also interest-
ed in penetrating the established, conservative Mus-
lim communities of several African countries. Iranian
officials hope, that they
can undermine the influence that such "reactionary"
regimes as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the Sudan have
among the conservative majority of African Muslims.
the Iranians view Nigeria
as particularly important to their plans to bring
Islamic renewal to Africa because of its large and
politically active Muslim population and its influence
among its neighbors. Tehran's interest in the Nigerian
university and clinical networks underscore the coun-
try's importance. We believe that Tehran also wishes
to cultivate the small number of Muslims in Zaire
because of Kinshasa's economic potential and close
ties to Western countries.
Senegal is also likely one of Tehran's principal con-
servative Muslim targets. In our judgment, the Irani-
ans particularly value Senegal's Muslim community
because it is a highly organized political entity that
exercises, through Senegalese President Diouf, con-
siderable influence on world Islam and among neigh-
boring francophone African states. According to dip-
lomatic reporting, nearly all Senegalese Muslims
belong to the Muride and Tijani brotherhoods, which
dominate the country's economy and have assumed
the authority of traditional political leadership in the
society. In the past, the brotherhoods have forcefully
blocked radical Muslim fundamentalism in Senegal
and have supported the government's close ties to
Saudi Arabia. Moreover, early this year the Senega-
lese Government shut down the Iranian Embassy in
Dakar because of its alleged subversive activities.
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Now, however, with the Senegalese economy seriously
affected by drought and because of slowed rates of
assistance provided by Riyadh, the Iranians have
developed a small, but active, group of sympathizers
in the Senegalese Islamic community among members
of the Niassene branch of the Tijani brotherhood and
among students and teachers at Dakar University.
he Caliph-
Iranian cause
General of the Niassene recently visited Tehran and
accepted Iranian funds for the construction of a grand
mosque. A cross section of the membership of the
Senegalese Muslim brotherhoods was invited to the
fifth anniversary celebration of the Iranian revolution
in Tehran, according to the Senegalese press, and a
group of clerics from mosques throughout the country
attended. The group was received by Khomeini him-
self, visited the holy city of Qom and the battlefront
with Iraq, and met Iraqi prisoners who had joined the
Tehran appears to be generous in supporting its
friends in Senegal. Although the Saudis have given a
good deal more to Africa's Muslim communities, the
groups Iran has targeted would be unlikely to have
other-above all Saudi-sources of funding.
~he Iranians have made
to young Islamic leaders-such as the Shiite Muslim
Cheik al-Mun'in al-Zayn, an ardent admirer of Kho-
being offered both in Nairobi and Tehran for senior
Muslim offlcials
The Iranian revolution has also brought about a
Muslim resurgence among Asians in South Africa,
according to Muslim leaders interviewed in the press.
A few groups closely identify themselves with revolu-
tionary Iran, and a mass rally called by one group in
Cape Town recently attracted several thousand par-
ticipants.
tributing pro-Iranian publications, issuing invitations
to clerics to travel to Iran, funding Islamic schools,
and sending Iranian teachers to Kenya. Seminars are
Despite these efforts, we believe Iranian success to
date has been limited by indifference on the part of
the majority of African Muslims and by the Iranians'
aggressive methods. Iranian representatives and sym-
pathizers are outspoken in their criticisms of the Sufi
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brotherhoods,' which are popular in black Africa, and
are quick to chastise members for leniency in ritual
observances. The Iranian charge in Madagascar out-
raged women working in the office of the President
and the Foreign Ministry by refusing to shake their
hands and by lecturing them on their attire, according
to US Embassy reporting. Disturbances between Ira-
nian sympathizers over forms of prayer and consump-
tion of alcohol have caused fistfights at mosques in
Nigeria and elsewhere, according to press reports.
In our judgment, the spread of Khomeini's gospel at
the personal level is marching in step with the rebuild-
ing of official relationships with Africa-part of a
worldwide effort-which were broken off or suspend-
ed after the Iranian revolution in 1979. To accomplish
this purpose, Tehran has relied initially on high-level
delegations that visit targeted African states and on
follow-up activity by Iranian embassy personnel who
also attempt to create a network of agents and
sympathizers willing to spread the propaganda mes-
sage of Iran's revolutionary experience.
Sending Delegations
Official Iranian delegations have fanned out across
the Third World including Africa during the past two
and a half years, visiting for the most part countries
with large Muslim populations. In black Africa these
have included Senegal, Nigeria, Tanzania, Sierra
Leone, and Ivory Coast, according to press reports.
Iran has also not
neglected certain countries with small or negligible
Muslim populations as well, such as Zaire (10 percent)
and Zimbabwe, Angola, and Gabon (each with less
than 2 percent), that Tehran perceives to be strategi-
cally important because of regional influence or eco-
nomic potential.
Press reporting shows that many of these delegations
have been led by high-level Iranian officials, often
' The Sufi brotherhoods are religious orders whose members are
bound by personal loyalty to a single teacher and follow a mystical
and Sierra Leone.
including clerics and members of the Revolutionary
Guard. During July 1982, for example, eight delega-
tions, each led by a cleric or political leader, were
dispatched from Tehran to 24 African countries to
denounce Israel's involvement in Lebanon and to
suggest ways in which the Nonaligned Movement
(NAM) could put together a liberation force to sup-
port Palestinian political objectives. Over the past
year, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Hosein Sheik-
holeslam has visited heads of state and foreign minis-
ters in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola,
Nigeria, Gabon, Kenya, and Madagascar. During the
same period, Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati
made trips to Zimbabwe, Gabon, Nigeria, Tanzania,
These missions usually have noncontroversial public
mandates related to the establishment of diplomatic
missions or the negotiation of concessionary oil con-
tracts, according to press reports. Once on the scene,
Iranian delegations usually seek a general exchange of
views on a wide range of foreign policy issues. Press
reporting indicates that, during a recent visit to
Nigeria, Iranian Foreign Ministry officials spoke in
support of the Libyan-backed dissident Transitional
Government of National Unity (GUNT) in Chad, the
independence of Western Sahara, a crude oil price
rise within OPEC, direct confrontation with the Gov-
ernment of South Africa, and unconditional independ-
ence for Namibia.
At the same time, Tehran has also worked actively
among the Africans to obtain support for its positions
in the NAM and the United Nations. According to
press reports, Iran successfully lobbied African gov-
ernments to move last year's NAM summit away
from Baghdad. Iran has been a leader of the effort to
persuade African and other Third World delegates to
expel Israel from the United Nations, most recently
leading this year's challenge to Israel's credentials.
Iranian delegations that have been sent to Zambia,
Ethiopia, Nigeria, Niger, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Ango-
la, and Zimbabwe to lobby for this measure have had
only limited success,
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Tehran has not limited itself to bilateral contacts.
According to US diplomatic reporting, Iran also has
been active in the Organization of the Islamic Confer-
ence, presenting its side of the Iran-Iraq war and
calling for a pan-Islamic oil embargo and other
penalties against the United States for its support of
Israeli policies in the Middle East. The Conference
formed a Peace Committee in 1982 to resolve the
conflict between Iran and Iraq, first under the leader-
ship of the late President Sekou Toure of Guinea, now
under President Sir Dawda Jawara of The Gambia.
We believe the Africans are eager to see an end to the
war, in part because they know that it drastically
reduces the funds available to Tehran and Baghdad
for foreign assistance. According to press and US
Embassy reporting, Tehran has snubbed the Commit-
tee's offers of mediation, however, and continues to
demand the removal of the present Iraqi regime as a
theology at the University in Qom, according to US
Embassy sources.
A few senior-level Iranian diplomats have assumed
regional responsibilities, according to diplomatic re-
porting. The Ambassador in Zimbabwe has visited a
number of southern African countries, and, similarly,
Tehran's charge in Dakar has traveled extensively in
West Africa.
So far, few Sub-Saharan African states have estab-
lished embassies in Tehran. We believe, based on
diplomatic reporting, that, as of last year, only Gabon,
Ghana, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Nigeria, Zaire, and
Somalia were represented. Cameroon is represented
by its Ambassador in Riyadh. Ghana, pleading eco-
nomic necessity, has indicated this year that it would
close its mission Press
reports indicate that South Africa maintains an unof-
prerequisite to negotiations.
Opening Embassies
As a result of official contacts begun soon after Iran's
revolution in 1979-and expanded with the improve-
ment in its economy and the consolidation of clerical
control two years ago-there are now 18 Iranian
embassies in Sub-Saharan Africa.' In addition, Iran
has diplomatic ties with Congo through its mission in
Kinshasa, Zaire, with Cameroon through its Embassy
in Gabon, and with Djibouti through its mission in
Somalia. It also has an Interests Section at the Swiss
Embassy in Pretoria.
Most of these embassies are headed by charges
assisted by a cultural or a commercial attache. Irani-
an embassy personnel usually keep a low profile at
local official and diplomatic functions, according to
reporting from US Embassies in Africa. Most are
young, inexperienced, and lack language capabilities;
they include academics, clerics, Army personnel, and
former Revolutionary Guards. The new Iranian Am-
bassador to Sierra Leone, only 25 years old, was until
recently in charge of instruction in politics and ideolo-
gy for the Iranian armed forces and a lecturer in
' The group comprises Angola, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea,
Ivory Coast, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique,
Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania, Zaire, and
Zimbabwe. The Mauritanian Government has ignored the Embassy
office Iran opened two years ago in Nouakchott, but there is a
ficial consulate in Tehran.
ran, working
through its diplomatic missions in Africa, has estab-
lished a network of local press contacts which it uses
for the dissemination of propaganda. This network
places articles favorable to the Khomeini regime in
the media and makes publications and cassettes avail-
able in local languages, according to US Embassy
reporting. An as yet unsubstantiated report indicates
that newspapers, magazines, and other printed mate-
rials in English, Swahili, and Arabic were sent this
year from Tehran and Qom to some 50 locations in
Uganda.
According to French press reports, the Iranian Minis-
try of Islamic Guidance has allocated $65 million in
fiscal 1984/85 for the dissemination of such propa-
ganda abroad. As part of this effort, Iran provides
funds for the publication of books and periodicals by
African Muslims who use Iranian propaganda themes
and exploit Africa's Islamic revival. Prior to its
closure by Senegalese authorities earlier this year, the
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Iranian Embassy in Senegal supported two journals- To reinforce its propaganda message, Tehran has
one of them, The Dawn-published by Muslim radi- brought to Iran several hundred African Muslims
cal Sid Lamine Niasse, with a broad range of occupational and social and
Niasse has published tracts calling or an political backgrounds to attend educational confer-
Islamic revolution in Senegal and a holy war against ences at Iranian Government expense, according to
the West
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Figure 3. "The Dawn, " a phrase used frequently in anti-Iraqi war
propaganda, is highlighted on the cover of this Iranian-backed
social repression."
press reports. In December 1982, for example, a
group of Senegalese Muslims, leaders of the Shiite
community, and prominent judges from Tanzania
visited Tehran for an "Islamic Unity" seminar. In
1983 the Iranian press reported that the imam of
Freetown's Jula Military Barracks led a delegation of
clerics from Sierra Leone to the International Insti-
tute of Islamic Learning and Jurisprudence in Tehran
at the time of anniversary celebrations of the Iranian
revolution. They were joined by the principal officers
of the Freetown Lebanese Union and journalists from
Sierra Leone who had attended a World Islamic
Conference in Tehran. One Iranian-sponsored Sene-
galese journal hailed such gatherings as a first step
toward uniting African Muslim leaders in a single
political and religious group and as "a blow against
imperialism, neocolonialism, and all the forces of
SENEGAL :
TOUT SUR
L'UNI-.
VERSITE
Iranian propaganda in Africa stresses the unity of
Islam, playing down such formidable barriers between
Iranian and African Muslims as the sectarian differ-
ences between Shias and Sunnis and racial divisions
between Persians and black Africans, according to
US Embassy and press reports. Although most Afri-
can Muslims are Sunnis and only the Lebanese and
Asian expatriates are-like the Iranians-Shias, Teh-
ran portrays a territorial unity within the Muslim
world, stretching from Dakar to Jakarta. It identifies
Israel, the United States, and the Soviet Union and
their allies as the common enemy. Iran solicits sup-
port for its conflict with Iraq and attempts to counter
conservative Arab influence in Africa, particularly
that of Saudi Arabia, while supporting Tripoli and the
Libyan invasion of Chad. It seeks to foster anti-Jewish
sentiment and sharply condemns Liberia and Zaire
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Where possible, Iranian propaganda tries to deepen
rifts between Muslim and Christian populations and
between Muslim groups and non-Islamic govern-
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for example, the US Embassy reports that propagan-
da pieces of Iranian origin play on political and
religious differences between Muslims of the north
and Yoruba in the south. An Iranian publication in
London recently published an article on "The Agony
of Muslims in Kenya," alleging that Nairobi was
persecuting its Muslim minority, according to US
Embassy reporting.
Covert Actions
Tehran's foreign policy openly calls for the establish-
ment of Islamic governments in black Africa. The
record shows that the Iranians are seeking to do this
by attacking ruling elites in the media, proselytiz-
ing-with or without official permission-and offer-
ing military and religious training to dissidents. In-
deed, Iran is attempting to subvert several black
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far, such efforts have had little success because they
appeal mainly to the radical fringes of traditional
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Iranian activities among African Muslims have al-
ready caused alarm among a number of African
leaders. Unauthorized preaching by visiting Iranian
clerics among fundamentalist groups and Iranian
Shias living on Zanzibar, for example, has worried
Tanzanian officials, according to US Embassy report-
ing. The government in Dar es Salaam is particularly
sensitive to the potential for unrest among separatist
groups in Zanzibar and is keeping a close watch on
Iranian activities
Early this year, Senegal uncovered and publicized a
wide range of clandestine activity among Muslim
fundamentalists by the Iranian Embassy in Dakar,
including the distribution of tracts critical of Presi-
dent Diouf to the Lebanese community. Students
returning from Iran were urging the establishment of
an Islamic Republic, and, according to press reports,
the Iranian charge was supporting the activities of
dissident Muslim leaders despite warnings from Sene-
galese authorities
According to US Embassy reporting, the Iranian
Embassy in Lagos over a year ago targeted the large
and relatively poor Muslim population in northern
Nigeria that has been hard hit by economic stagna-
financing publications of Nigerian Muslim organiza-
tions and even funding public demonstrations of sup-
port for the Khomeini regime.
There is as yet no evidence that Iran has developed a
terrorist capability in Africa or has made inroads into
the conservative majority of Africa's Muslim popula-
tions. Nonetheless,
government spokesmen and resident diplomats from
conservative Arab and Western states are concerned
that Iranian-trained terrorists plan to sabotage em-
bassies and government installations. These concerns
reporting, an Iranian identified as a member of the
group that seized the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979
was seen in the neighborhood of the Ambassador's
residence in Dakar, causing the government to take
security measures to protect American and French
installations in the city.
The Iranians have been in contact with some secular
as well as Muslim dissident groups, according to US
Embassy and press sources, favoring those they be-
lieve will be able to exploit popular grievances against
corruption and economic inequality similar to those
that led to the downfall of the Shah. They maintain
that the present international political system is fun-
damentally unjust and that the globe is divided into
"oppressed nations" and the "oppressors."
Tehran's principal non-Islamic target has been the
South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO).
Tehran has offered SWAPO
both material and psychological support. Although
no evidence of
material support to SWAPO so far, the US Embassy
in Dar Es Salaam believes that Iran is likely to pursue
this option as a relatively low-cost means of enhancin
its image.
While focusing on religion and morality, Tehran has
not neglected the practical impact of closer economic
ties with African nations. Economic interests have
helped to shape Tehran's relations with Africa during
the past two years just as they did during the time of
the Shah. Delegations of high-level Iranian trade
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officials have demonstrated Tehran's interest in devel-
oping economic ties with a number of African coun-
tries and have been quick to offer preferential terms
to African clients who will support Iran's political
objectives in the region.
Oil Politics
Several black African governments have responded
eagerly to Tehran's economic initiatives, particularly
to offers of favorable oil contracts, and in some cases
have shown themselves willing to upgrade political
relations with Iran:
? Press and US Embassy sources reported in early
1983 that Iran had agreed to supply Tanzania with
300,000 metric tons of crude during the year. This
agreement was extended in October 1984 to delivery
of 400,000 tons of crude in 1985, provided the
Tanzanians could make a downpayment of $4.5
? US Embassy reporting indicates that the opening of
an Iranian Embassy in Freetown, Sierra Leone, in
May 1983 was linked to an agreement in December
1982 that Tehran would supply 360,000 tons of
crude. In May 1983, Freetown's Foreign Minister
Conteh signed a memorandum of understanding
covering economic, political, and cultural coopera-
tion and asked for help in exploiting Sierra Leone's
oil and gas reserves and creating a national oil
company, according to British press reports. One of
President Stevens's principal advisers, Afro-Leba-
nese businessman Jamil Said Mohamed of Sierra
Leone, has acted as middleman in dealing with the
Iranians.
? In October 1984, an Iranian delegation, led by a
special envoy of Iranian President Khamenei, signed
an oil agreement with Ghana and reached an accord
with Ghanaian officials on international and bilater-
al policy positions, according to press reports.
? Some months ago Iran contacted The Gambia's
Minister of Economic Planning with an offer of
concessional oil, according to US Embassy sources.
Although President Jawara is reluctant to develop
bilateral ties to the Iranians because of his position
on the Islamic Conference Peace Committee, ac-
cording to US Embassy sources, he will probably
find it difficult to turn down Iran's terms. As in
Sierra Leone, the negotiations have been undertak-
en by Jamil Said Mohamed, who will receive fishing
rights off the Gambian shore if the deal is put
through, according to US Embassy sources. The
Iranians insist they will negotiate the final agree-
ment only with the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
and we expect they will attach political strings to
the deal.
? Zimbabwe has shown some interest in buying Irani-
an crude, according to press reports. Lacking for-
eign exchange, Harare may attempt to barter local
products for oil. An Iranian delegation visiting in
May emphasized the need to coordinate policy
planning on African and Near Eastern issues, ac-
cording to Iranian press reporting.
? In the past year, at least five Iranian missions have
visited Ivory Coast
and concessional oil sales have played a key role -in
discussions with Ivorian officials. Although Abidjan
is virtually self-sufficient in oil, it refines imported
crude for reexport to other West African countries
to increase its hard currency earnings.
III
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? Iran attempted to come to an oil agreement with
Madagascar but has been unwilling to accept Mad-
agascar's terms for repayment and scheduling, ac-
cording to US Embassy sources. According to
Antananarivo radio, however, Madagascar has ne-
gotiated an export agreement with the Iranians
covering a number of agricultural products.
? Lebanese businessman Jamil Said Mohamed of
Sierra Leone offered to broker an oil agreement
between Tehran and Liberia in August 1983, ac-
cording to the US Embassy in Monrovia. We do not
know whether a deal was completed
A Market for African Commodities.
While oil supply is Iran's most substantial bargaining
chip, Tehran is also trying to exploit its potential as a
market for African goods.
Iran is discussing trade
terms with a number of African governments that
have not had commercial ties to Tehran since the
1978-79 revolution. Although some countries are
seeking contracts for the sale of agricultural products,
Iran has shown greatest interest during the past year
in buying African minerals
it has sought to purchase coal from a
South Africa is probably still Iran's most important
trade partner in Africa, although economic exchanges
between the two countries are undeclared for political
reasons. Before the Iranian revolution, Tehran sup-
plied almost 90 percent of Pretoria's crude and re-
fined oil needs. After the downfall of the Shah, Iran
promptly announced the end of commercial and diplo-
matic ties to South Africa and ended oil sales.
Nevertheless, according to US Embassy and press
sources, Iran imports significant quantities of South
African goods, particularly industrial plastics, con-
struction steel, vehicles, plate glass, and food grains.
South Africa also supplies arms to Iran, according to
press ---]and has probably bought
Iranian crude oil surreptitiously through the spot
market. The two countries trade with each other
through middlemen in Swaziland in order to circum-
Offers of Assistance
In addition to expanding trade relationships, press and
diplomatic reporting indicates Foreign Ministry offi-
cials and Iranian embassy personnel have promised
generous economic and development aid and oil at
concessional prices to African governments.
a number of governments have
been offered technical advice on oil exploration and
refining and on industrial and agricultural develop-
ment. Offers of assistance in road construction and
communications have been made to Niger. A similar
offer has been made to Zimbabwe for reconstructing
its long-inoperable oil refinery. Recently, the new
Iranian Ambassador in Dar es Salaam publicly an-
nounced Iran's readiness to assist in the construction
and development of Tanzania's new national capital
and to direct assistance to agriculture and small
industry in Tanzania's small but influential Asian
Shiite community.
Iran lacks the resources at present to follow through
with substantial levels of assistance to purchase Afri-
can support. Declining oil revenues have strained an
economy already plagued by war costs, mismanage-
ment, and ideological rigidity. Thus, for the most
part, Tehran has concentrated on limited, carefully
targeted assistance to African Muslim communities,
providing some scholarships and travel money and
helping to build mosques, Islamic schools, and clinics.
In addition, Iran has made well-publicized gifts of
food to Ghana, Mali, and most recently Ethiopia,
where it has given over 90 tons of food and medicines.'
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Although offers of assistance and closer economic and
diplomatic ties have been welcomed by some African
governments and by some radical fundamentalist
groups, we believe this enthusiasm is not widely
shared. Our reading of press and US Embassy report-
ing suggests that most African leaders perceive Iran
as a potential threat to the stability of their countries,
which rests heavily on balancing the interests of
highly diverse tribal, religious, and regional groups.
Because of widespread apprehension that Iranian
revolutionary rhetoric could upset this balance, sever-
al states have taken steps to blunt Tehran's campaign.
Iranian Embassies in Francophone coun-
tries were put under close surveillance by local police
and security forces. US diplomatic reporting indicates
that President Bongo of Gabon and other African
leaders have warned Lebanese communities to avoid
contact with the Iranian Embassy
Other African governments have reacted sharply to
Iranian activities in their countries:
? In February 1982,
Ivory Coast's Foreign Ministry forced the departure
of an Iranian delegation to Abidjan that had been
observed at mosques distributing pamphlets that
denounced the United States.
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The conservative Islamic community in Nigeria and
Nigerian officials have expressed concern over Iran's
contact with Muslim students in northern Nigeria,
agos
recalled its Ambassador from Tehran for consultation
after riots in that region in 1982 because Nigerian
officials believed that the Iranians had a hand in the
disturbances; in our judgment, however, the distur-
bances were related primarily to local issues. The
following year the Nigerians arrested and expelled a
delegation of Iranian clerics preaching in the north,
According to some Embassy reports, the government
is closely watching travel and contacts made by the
Iranian Ambassador. We believe Lagos feels ham-
pered, however, in its ability to take countermeasures
out of reluctance to stir up controversy with Muslim
sects in the north.
Senegal has reacted more forcefully. Outraged over
reports that the Iranians were engaging in extensive
clandestine activity
Ithe Senegalese Government ex-
pelled the Iranian diplomats and closed the Embassy.
The closing of the Iranian Embassy in Dakar caused
anxiety among neighboring African capitals, accord-
ing to US Embassy reporting.
? Mali rebuked Iranian diplomats, according to US
Embassy reports, after learning earlier this year
that the Iranians had been distributing pamphlets
attacking Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.
? Iranian officials in Kenya were cautioned by police
concerning anti-Iraqi and anti-Christian literature
being distributed in the Muslim community, accord-
ing to sources of the US Embassy.
Other African governments have reacted more cau-
tiously, not wanting to challenge the Iranians directly:
ment,
? For two years Mauritania has resisted Tehran's
pressure to recognize the presence of the Iranian
Embassy in Nouakchott or to accredit its diplomats,
fearing a sharp reaction by the Sunni Muslim
community and Iraqi sympathizers in the govern-
Sierra Leone has tried to rein in local Iranian
representatives and to dissociate itself from Iranian
statements attacking Saudi Arabia, Israel, Iraq, and
the United States, according to US Embassy report-
ing.
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The Arabs' Role
Iran's attempts to expand its activities in Sub-Saha-
ran Africa put it face to face with Saudi Arabia's
longstanding influence. The Saudis have been closely
associated in Africa with Islamic groups that are
politically conservative but fundamentalist in that
they seek strict adherence to Islamic law and custom.
Thus far, however, the Saudis have paramount exter-
nal influence on African Muslims. For example, the
yearly pilgrimage to Mecca brings thousands of West
Africans into contact with Saudi conservatism, and
Riyadh's influence is further enhanced by several
million dollars of financial support per year to govern-
ments and Islamic groups, far exceeding that of any
other Arab state and Iran.
In our view, Saudi Arabia's extensive effort to support
and increase its influence in Africa over the past 10
years had been designed in part to counter Libyan
activity there. The Libyans, like the Iranians, have
been supporting radical fundamentalist groups whose
primary political objective is to replace existing secu-
lar political institutions with Islamic ones. Libyan
leader Qadhafi's radical appeal has attracted many
among the younger generation who seek dynamic but
simple answers to Africa's economic, social, and
political problems.
Now, however, the Saudis identify the Iranians as the
greatest threat to their African interests, according to
US Embassy reporting. Iran's clerical leaders have
made no secret of their desire to supersede Saudi
influence in Africa, nor of their view that Saudi
leaders are corrupt lackeys of the West. The recent
hajj conference that Tehran sponsored in Sierra Le-
one, for example, provided a platform for inflamma-
tory anti-Saudi propaganda that reverberated all the
way to Riyadh. Since then, according to US Embassy
sources, the Saudis have announced they will open a
diplomatic mission in Sierra Leone and have brought
pressure to bear on Freetown to distance itself from
Iran
Because of its conflict with Iran in the Middle East,
Iraq is also opposed to Iran's activity in Africa.
Baghdad maintains a longstanding relationship with a
number of African states-most notably Tanzania,
Senegal, and Mali-and supplies modest amounts of
assistance. US diplomatic reporting indicates that
Iraq's embassies have closely monitored Iranian activ-
ities and have been quick to inform host governments
when the Iranians step out of line. The Iraqis played a
decisive role in souring Tehran's relationship with
Mali by relaying evidence of Iranian activity against
traditional Muslim leaders and the government, ac-
cording to US Embassy reporting.
the Iraqis have tried to put a stop
to Niger's proposed sale of uranium to Iran, and they
have broadcast to other West African governments
the reasons behind the Senegalese Government's clo-
sure of Iran's Embassy in Dakar. Occasionally, mem-
bers of Iranian and Iraqi Embassies have tangled
directly, and recently, according to diplomatic
sources, members of both countries' diplomatic mis-
sions in Madagascar fought a pitched battle in one of
the local mosques until police restored order.
While Iraq has tried to counter Tehran directly in
Africa, the general intent of Libyan efforts in the
region lie parallel to Iranian interests. Both countries
are eager to undermine Saudi and Western influences
in black Africa, according to their own testimony. In
public statements high officials of both governments
have underlined their common purposes: to create a
unified Islamic revolutionary movement, to rid the
Third World of "exploiters," and to undertake bilater-
al cooperation in the political, economic, and cultural
sectors. They both have attempted to disrupt the
annual pilgrimage to Mecca in the past two years in
order to embarrass the Saudis. Moreover, there is
some diplomatic reporting on direct Libyan-Iranian
achievements in Africa. They have cooperated in
seeking influence among Muslim communities living
on Nigeria's borders with Chad and Cameroon. There
also is at least some spotty evidence that the Libyans
have encouraged Iranian-African oil deals during the
past year.
African leaders have generally tried to underplay
their relations with Iran in order to avoid antagoniz-
ing the Saudis and other Arab states, according to
press and US Embassy reporting. Most Sub-Saharan
African governments have maintained a neutral posi-
tion on the Iran-Iraq wart
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Prospects and Implications for Political Instability
Tehran faces a continuing uphill battle in its efforts to
broaden the base of its support in Africa. Barriers
include:
? Hostility of traditional African Muslim leaders and
conservative African governments.
? The Iranians' difficulties, as Shias, to insinuate
themselves into the Sunni African Muslim
mainstream.
? The active opposition of the Saudis, Iraqis, and
Western governments, which are important sources
of aid for many African states.
? The Iranians' limited ability to offer aid in suffi-
cient quantities to win over African leaders.
? The Iranians' penchant for attaching political
strings to promises of aid.
? Iran's reputation for supporting and conducting
terrorist activities.
The main factors working in favor of Iran's campaign
to establish its presence in Africa are its image as a
successful revolutionary regime, Africa's need for
sources of moderately priced oil, and the potential for
instability among Muslim communities, particularly
in West Africa where social, economic, and ethnic
divisions are being fueled by the Islamic revival. If the
fundamentalist revival-within which Iran finds its
most receptive audiences-continues to grow in Afri-
ca as we believe it will (see box on page 2), the
potential for Iranian activity in the region will in-
crease
In the short term, we expect Iranian gains to be
limited because of the combined weight of the forces
working against them. Over the longer term, if eco-
nomic and social conditions continue to deteriorate,
Tehran's influence among Muslims in Africa, and
hence its claim to Islamic leadership, will grow
We believe the most worrisome development in the
long run would be if Khomeini's radical and politi-
cized view of Islam captured the imagination of
Africa's Sunni urban masses, say, in Lagos, Dakar, or
Zanzibar. Although Tehran now speaks mainly to
selected elements of African society, Africa is experi-
encing an awakening in Islamic fundamentalist
awareness that risks reopening longstanding ethnic
and religious jealousies, provoking widespread vio-
lence, and eventually jeopardizing the ability of some
Over the longer term, it is likely that more Iranian-
supported groups of political activists and some terror-
ist cells will emerge. As Iranian officials develop
expertise and acquire international contacts, they will
be able to use their assets more effectively to advance
Iranian interests by initiating clandestine activities
under diplomatic guise and by training host-country
nationals in Iran. If Tehran continues to articulate
defiance of Westernization and of the great powers to
radical Muslim audiences, we believe it will be able
increasingly to attract, train, and support like-minded
individuals and groups dissatisfied with the status
quo.
A significant increase in radical Islamic activity in
black Africa would heighten the chances for political
instability, particularly in Senegal, Nigeria, Tanza-
nia, Sierra Leone, and Ivory Coast, and offer expand-
ed opportunities to Iran. This prospect would also
increase the likelihood of a growing anti-Western bias
if as militant followers of Khomeini's revolutionary
ideology now in the universities eventually fill posi-
tions of influence in African governments traditional-
ly friendly to the West.
We believe that a significant increase in Iranian
influence in Sub-Saharan Africa and of related politi-
cal activity by radical Islamic groups would damage
US relations with a number of these African states.
Tehran's activities in the region already present a
multifaceted challenge to US interests:
? The Iranian propaganda line is directed explicitly
against the West.
? Iran is providing training and support for a number
of dissident groups who could target US embassies
and personnel for hostile acts.
? Using oil as a bargaining tool, Tehran has tried to
secure the backing of African governments on a
variety of international issues
governments to remain in power
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The E ect of Iranian Activities in Africa on the
Soviets
The Soviets will receive little direct benefit from
Iranian influence in Africa at least over the short
term. Iranian suspicion of the USSR, clerical hostil-
ity to Communist ideology, and the Soviet occupation
of Afghanistan will continue to distance Tehran from
Moscow. The Soviets are also hampered by the
dissatisfaction of African Muslim leaders, such as
Senegal's President Diouf; and the Nigerian military,
and their civilian predecessors, with the paucity and
poor quality of Moscow's assistance
To the extent that Iranian activities in Sub-Saharan
Africa undermine US influence, the USSR will indi-
rectly benefit, particularly since most African states
with significant Muslim communities are predomi-
nantly moderate or even pro-West. The Iranians also
would create opportunities for the Soviets if Moscow
targets militant revolutionary groups, such as the
Muslim student associations or Senegalese Niassene
radicals, for significant support.
We believe the image of the United States as an
enemy of Islam will remain an important symbol for
Khomeini's followers in Africa. The Iranians criticize
the United States for its close links with Israel, and
try to exploit this issue as well as Washington's
support of moderate African regimes.
Danger Signals for the Future
We can foresee a number of developments related to
the present wave of Islamic fundamentalism that
would open opportunities for increasing Iranian influ-
ence in Sub-Saharan Africa and could signal greater
regional instability or problems for the United States,
such as:
? Indications that individual governments are unable
to detect and control Iranian activity.
? Evidence that Iranian terrorist networks are being
extended to Africa.
? Increased activism by African Muslim radicals in
local governments or international Muslim organi-
zations on behalf of causes that conflict with US
positions.
? Rising levels of violence associated with disputes
between conservative and radical Muslims or differ-
ences between Christians and Muslims.
? The gradual dominance of Islamic political institu-
tions in black Africa, particularly in countries such
as Senegal and Nigeria.
? Increasing numbers of countries forced to turn to
Iran for oil or as a market for their goods-for
example, Nigerien uranium-making them vulnera-
ble to coercion.
? Indications of mainline Sunni Islamic groups, in
need of funds, are opening themselves up to use by
Iran as a means of propaganda or political
manipulation.
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Appendix
Country Survey of Iranian Activity in Africa
Percent Diplomatic Trade Economic State Visits,
Muslims Relations Assistance Delegations
Angola
1-2
Benin
12
Burkina
20
Burundi
1-2
Cameroon
16
Iranian Embassy None. None. 1983: Delegation led by Iranian
opened March 1983. Foreign Ministry official Sheikho-
leslam discussed diplomatic
relations.
None. None. None. 1984: Visit of Benin's Planning
Minister to Tehran ... discussed
economic matters ... issued joint
communique supporting expulsion
of Israel from UN.
Established relations None.
1 November 1984.
None. 1983: Imports $24 mil- None.
lion of Iranian goods,
mainly oil through
Western multinational
oil companies.
Cameroon represent- None.
ed through its Em-
bassy in Saudi Ara-
bia, Iran through its
Embassy in Gabon.
Central African 15 None.
Republic
Congo
1-2
Djibouti
92
Ethiopia
40
Gabon
1-2
Tehran represented
through its mission
in Kinshasa.
Iran represented
through its Embassy
in Somalia.
Iranian Embassy in
Addis headed by a
charge with two staff
members.
Iranian Embassy
opened in 1983,
headed by an Am-
bassador with three
staff members.
1984: Iranian Foreign Ministry of-
ficial met with President Sankara
in January.
None.
None.
None.
None.
Some spare parts for
planes.
None.
1984: Visits by Iranian clerics and
Foreign Ministry officials.
Iran buys some wood,
dried fruit, and nuts.
None.
1983: Visit by Sheikholeslam and
Foreign Minister Velayati; 1984:
Foreign Ministry delegation.
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Country Survey of Iranian Activity in Africa (continued)
Percent Diplomatic
Muslims Relations
The Gambia 90 None. Banjul has
proposed that Gam-
bian Ambassador to
Saudi Arabia be ac-
credited to Tehran.
(1984: President
Jawara chosen to
head Islamic Confer-
ence Peace Mission
to settle Iran-Iraq
conflict.)
12 Iranian Embassy
opened in 1983;
Ghanaian Embassy
in Tehran closed in
1984 because of fi-
nancial problems.
65 Iranian Embassy
opened in 1983 with
charge and one
attache.
Ivory Coast 25 Iran has Embassy
with a charge, a po-
litical counselor, and
two staff members.
7 Iranian Embassy
with charge and one
staff member.
15 Theoretically main-
tain relations but no
exchange of mis-
sions.
Madagascar 7 Iranian Embassy
opened in 1982. Am-
bassador appointed
September 1984.
90 Iranian Embassy
opened in 1983 un-
der a charge.
Economic
State Visits,
Assistance
Delegations
Iran has offered oil on
Some for build-
1984: Delegation of clerics from
concessional terms.
ing mosques.
Iran.
1984: Oil contract-
terms unknown-proba-
bly Iranian crude for
swap arrangement with
Ghana's normal suppli-
ers because Iranian
crude not suitable for
Ghana's refinery.
1984: Discussions of oil
deal and possibilities of
trade in other products.
1983: Limited 1983: Visit by Iranian delegation
amount of emer- bringing gifts of food. 1984: Dele-
gency aid-blan- gation bringing Iranian head-of-
kets, medicines, state's request to Rawlings to sup-
food for Ghana- port Iranian anti-Israeli proposal
ians expelled before UN.
from Nigeria.
None. 1984: Visits by Iranian Foreign
Ministry officials.
Modest 1984: Iranian Foreign Ministry vis-
amounts-no de- its to Abidjan.
tails provided.
1983: Kenya imported Modest amounts
$24 million-mostly oil. to Muslim com-
Kenya exported $4 mil- munity.
lion.
1984: Iranian Foreign Ministry of-
ficials visited Maseru to discuss
resuming diplomatic relations.
Negotiations of oil sale None. 1984: Iranian commercial delega-
fell through in 1984- tion discussing increased economic
issue still pending. Dis- exchanges.
cussions of export of
Madagascar's agricul-
tural products continue.
1983: Some 1983: Visits by Sheikholeslam and
4,000 lbs. of food Iranian Foreign Ministry officials
aid-flour and offering food aid and presenting
grain. case on Iran-Iraq war to President
Traore.
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Country Survey of Iranian Activity in Africa (continued)
Mauritania
100
Mauritius
17
Mozambique
11
Niger
85
Nigeria
50
Senegal
82
Sierra Leone
30
Somalia
100
Iranian Embassy of- None. Iran has offered 1983: Iranian Foreign Ministry
fice opened in 1982 oil and economic delegation.
but ignored by host aid, but none has
government. Two been accepted by
diplomats and three Mauritanian
staff members there. Government.
Mauritanian Embas-
sy in Tehran since
1977.
Diplomatic relations None.
but no Embassies.
1984: Iranian delegations seeking,
unsuccessfully, to open Embassy,
although Mauritius is interested in
developing commercial relations.
1984: Iranian Em- There have been some None. 1984: Iranian Foreign Ministry
bassy opened under a discussions of an oil sale. delegation.
charge. 1983: Iranian exports to-
taled $3 million, imports
$2 million.
1984: Iranian Em- No agreement as yet on 1984: Iranian of- 1984: Delegations from Iranian
bassy opened under a uranium sale or barter fer of technical Foreign Ministry and petroleum
charge with staff of for petroleum product. assistance in oil, and mining industries.
five. mining, road con-
struction, and
communications.
Iranian Embassy 1983: Exports to Nigeria Generous Iranian 1984: Iranian Foreign Ministry of-
with an Ambassador of $1 million. donations to ficials discussed political issues:
and staff of five. A Muslim commu- South Africa, Namibia, Chad,
Nigerian Embassy in nity projects, in- OPEC.
Tehran with an Am- cluding over
bassador. $100,000 to one
student group.
Iranian Embassy Iransen Oil Co. jointly Thousands of 1984: Two delegations of Senega-
closed by Senegal in owned by Iran, Senegal, dollars of aid to lese Muslim notables visited
February 1984. Ira- and Shell. Muslim commu- Tehran.
nian affairs handled nity.
by Syrian Embassy
in Dakar.
Iranian Embassy 1982: Oil agreement. Assistance to 1984: Two Iranian delegations visit
opened in 1983 un- Muslim commu- trade ministry and Acting Presi-
der an Ambassador nity projects and dent Koroma; Sierra Leone delega-
with a staff of eight. sponsorship of tion headed by Foreign Minister
hajj conferences visited Iran to discuss oil contracts.
in Freetown.
Iranian Embassy un- None.
der an Ambassador
with a staff of one. A
Somali Embassy in
Tehran as of 1983.
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Country Survey of Iranian Activity in Africa (continued)
Percent
Diplomatic
Muslims
Relations
South Africa
1
Iranian Interests
Section in Swiss Em-
bassy in Pretoria; an
unofficial South Af-
rican consulate in
Tehran.
Tanzania 35 Iran has an Embassy
with an Ambassador
and two staff.
Zaire 10 Iranian Embassy un-
der a charge. A Zair-
ian Embassy in Teh-
ran in 1983.
Zimbabwe 1-2 Iranian Embassy
opened in 1982 un-
der an Ambassador
with staff of two.
Iran imports plastics,
steel, vehicles, glass,
food grains, arms, and
oil via the spot market.
Both deal through mid-
dlemen in Swaziland.
Oil agreements: 1983
and 1984.
Economic State Visits.
Assistance Delegations
None.
1984: A member of the Iranian
Interests Section in Pretoria visited
Mbabane to propose establishing
relations. The Swazis declined.
Iranians have 1984: Several visits by Foreign
pledged to help Ministries of both countries to the
construct new other's capital.
capital at Do-
doma and to as-
sist in oil explora-
tion. Have aided
Muslim commu-
nity.
1984: Some discussion of None.
an Iranian oil proposal.
1984: Discussion of oil None.
deal and trade ex-
changes.
1984: Iranian Deputy Foreign Min-
ister seeking support for Iranian
positions at the UN and for open-
ing relations.
1984: Iranian political-economic
delegation visited Harare seeking
to expand political, cultural, and
economic ties and to gain agree-
ment on international political
issues.
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