CHAD: HABRE AT A CROSSROAD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00317R000300090003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Crossroad
Chad: Habre at a
ALA 84-10111
November 1984
Copy 349
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Chad: Habre at a
Crossroad
This paper was prepared byl of the Office
of African and Latin American Analysis, with a
contribution from of the Office of
Central Reference. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Africa
Division, Office of African and Latin American
Secret
ALA 84-10111
November 1984
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Chad: Habre at a
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Key Judgments We believe President Habre's position is likely to erode gradually over the
Information available next year as Libya intensifies indirect pressure on his regime. Government
as of 2 November 1984 forces probably will be unable to contain serious Libyan-sponsored dissi-
was used in this report.
dence on two fronts, and Habre is likely to lose popular support in the south
as his troops take harsh reprisals for dissident actions. Renewed military
actions probably will discourage reconciliation with the insurgents and add
to the country's economic troubles.
We believe that France, to avoid having to send combat troops back into
Chad, will respond to the likely slow deterioration in Habre's position by
providing additional arms aid and by pressing him to accept a dissident
leader as a partner in a coalition government. Habre might accept-as a
last resort-such a power-sharing arrangement to help suppress a two-front
insurgency, limit opportunities for Libyan meddling among disgruntled
factions, and forestall the possible future withdrawal of remaining French
political, economic, and security support.
In our judgment, the withdrawal of French and Libyan military units from
Chad that occurred during November will severely test President Habre's
leadership skills and survivability. He faces the prospect of a war against
insurgents in the north and the south, which could dissipate scarce
resources and divert his attention from the crucial tasks of political
reconciliation and economic recovery. Moreover, Habre will have to work
to bolster his image as a strong, pragmatic leader to retain vital French aid
and the backing of moderate African leaders.
We believe that Libya's troop withdrawal represents only a tactical change
in its longstanding effort to achieve hegemony over Chad. Libyan strong-
man Qadhafi will continue to try to replace Habre, whom he sees as a tool
of France and the United States, with a malleable, pro-Libyan leader.
Libya almost certainly will increase clandestine support for insurgents to
sap Habre's limited military resources and encourage economic sabotage in
the south, the only economically viable area of the country. At the same
time, Libya may seek to raise the cost to Western and moderate African
states for their support of Habre by encouraging Chadian rebels to attack
their interests in the region
Secret
Secret
ALA 84-10111
November 1984
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We believe that France will resist being drawn into another direct armed
intervention on Habre's behalf and instead probably will increase economic
and military assistance to bolster his position. Although the French
mistrust Habre, they are likely to back him as long as he serves their
interest in thwarting Libyan designs and no better alternative leader
appears on the scene. Paris probably will dole out its assistance, however, to
encourage Habre to use military restraint and reconcile with rival factions.
We believe, however, that France probably would be forced again to
intervene directly on Habre's behalf to protect its credibility in franco-
phone Africa if Libya is emboldened to support a rebel offensive in clear vi-
olation of the terms of the mutual withdrawal agreement.
We believe Habre's position could deteriorate rapidly should he undertake
poorly planned military offensives in the north against French advice. In
this scenario, Habre's boldness probably would provoke greater Libyan
involvement on behalf of the rebels and lead to a series of debilitating
defeats. As Habre's military control deteriorated, southerners probably
would abandon the weakened regime to join the dissidents, resulting in a
serious erosion of his base of support and mounting insurgency. If Libya
did not further violate the withdrawal agreement, Paris might stand aside
in hopes that a more pliant leader would emerge to replace Habre. Paris
could then be tempted to accept Libya's proposal to install a "third force"
or compromise candidate to replace Habre in hopes of placating Qadhafi.
Nevertheless, prospects for the survival of a new compromise leader are
dim as long as Libya supports factional violence in place of political
discourse and deep-seated ethnic rivalries torpedo national reconciliation
efforts.
Habre's sudden death probably would trigger greater instability and
violence in N'Djamena. Any new leader would have to cope with military
resistance and political infighting on the part of rival factions that could
devolve into renewed civil war. Circumstances could drive Habre's hard-
core northern supporters to flee to their old sanctuaries along the Sudanese
border and revert to a guerrilla struggle against the new central govern-
ment
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In our judgment, if Libyan-supported dissidents gained control of
N'Djamena, substantial Libyan financial, logistic, and manpower support
would be required to subdue local warlords-particularly Habre's fellow
northerners. We believe that, even with such a Libyan investment, the new
regime would be unable to unify or control the country's traditionally
fractious population. Nevertheless, Tripoli could try to coerce a new regime
to sign some form of security pact or a formal union agreement. We judge
that, with a malleable regime in N'Djamena, Libya would intensify its
effort to destabilize neighboring Sudan.
We believe that Habre and neighboring moderate states will look increas-
ingly to Washington for additional assistance to stem Libyan encroach-
ment, particularly if they lose confidence in France's willingness to protect
them from external aggression. If the United States does not respond,
moderate African states are likely to find Libyan blandishments more
difficult to resist and will lend far less support for Western positions on is-
sues that might offend Libya. In the event that Habre falls in favor of a
pro-Libyan regime, African leaders would probably blame Washington as
well as France for, allowing Chad to become a potential base for Libyan
subversion. Moreover, Tripoli probably would be emboldened to increase
subversion against Sudan and in West and Central Africa
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Habre's New Challenges
Libyan Aims and Strategy
3
French Goals and Responses
4
Outlook and Scenarios
5
Slow Deterioration
5
Chad Without Habre
8
Implications for the United States
9
Key Dissident
Leaders
11
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-'- Prefecture boundary
Road
Gouro.
Lake
Chad
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Ba,
N-CHARI
Central African
Republic
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Crossroad
The French-Libyan troop withdrawal agreement of 18
September 1984 has left Chadian President Habre at
a critical juncture. He must now cope with Libyan-
inspired subversion and political pressures that will
place increasing demands on his leadership skills, as
well as scarce military and economic resources. The
3,200 French troops not only provided military protec-
tion in the north against Libyan and Chadian dissi-
dent forces, but also allowed Habre to focus on
curbing Libyan-backed southern dissidence, encour-
aging political reconciliation, and rehabilitating
Chad's war-torn economy. The French presence also
demonstrated to Chadians both inside and outside the
country that Habre commanded powerful Western
support and was the leader of the country's struggle
against Libyan encroachment.'
Military Decisions
Habre's most important military decision will be how
best to distribute his 10,000- to 12,000-man Army 2 to
maintain control over the country. According to the
US Embassy, his task will be complicated by the
Army's ethnic and regional rivalries, lack of disci-
pline, shortages of equipment and supplies, and inabil-
ity to maintain equipment. Despite French assistance
in training, organizing, and equipping the Army,
Habre's forces and weaponry still are more suited for
traditional desert warfare than counterinsurgency
' We estimate that actual troop strength is about 7,500. The rest
consists of former dissident groups who have rallied to the govern-
ment, but have not been equipped, trained, or organized into
campaigns.' In many cases, command authority flows
from personal loyalties, rather than from a formal
chain of command. Moreover, the government's fre-
quent inability to meet the Army's payroll and pro-
vide adequate food supplies has led to morale prob-
lems and weakened combat readiness.
In the north, Chadian commanders are planning to
reoccupy northern garrisons abandoned by Libyan
forces, They are
reported to be confident that many Chadian rebels
will rally to the government and that they can defeat
the-holdouts. We believe, however, that their opti-
mism is unwarranted and that, as in the past, chronic
transport and supply problems will thwart government
attempts to move rapidly north beyond Faya-Largeau.
In our view, Habre faces his greatest military chal-
lenge in the south, where dissident activity appears to
have increased significantly and become better orga-
nized in the last several months. The US Embassy in
Bangui reports that some 6,500 Chadian refugees
have fled to the Central African Republic to escape
renewed violence in the south
additional government troops were de-
ployed to key southern garrisons and that the Army's
northern Chief of Staff has been assigned to the
southern command in response to the upsurge in
dissidence
The US Embassy reports that Habre suspects that
dissident leaders in Brazzaville, Congo, began to
' US defense attache reporting indicates that the Army's arms
inventory is a conglomeration of Western and Soviet-the latter
having been captured from Libyan and rebel forces-infantry
weapons and small vehicles. Ground forces are equipped with an
estimated 78 armored personnel carriers, 24 light armored recon-
naissance vehicles, 300 Toyota land rovers mounted with antiair-
craft or machineguns, 105-mm howitzers, 60 antitank weapons,
60-mm and 80-mm mortars, 6,500 small arms, and 150 trucks.
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coordinate the actions of various rebel groups in the
south last summer.
some 3,500 well-armed southern dissidents, who
returned to the bush last August after the regime was
unable to meet their conditions for rallying,' were
joined within a few days by elements of other com-
mando groups.
(southern rebels are coordinating
their actions with dissidents in the north to increase
pressure on government troops. The US Embassy
believes that rebels move freely across the porous
borders with northern Cameroon, Nigeria, and the
Central African Republic, where they are able to
reorganize and resupply their forces.
Several Western observers, including the French Am-
bassador in Chad, are concerned that the rebels will
take advantage of the French troop withdrawal to
increase military pressure on Habre in the south in
the belief that his Army will be stretched too thin to
mount effective retaliatory action. Moreover, Habre's
fellow northern combatants, who are urging Habre to
retake the north, are also pressing him to take harsh
military action in the south
Habre had ordered troops located in
the south to scale down search-and-destroy operations
in an effort to encourage rebels to rally to the regime.
he govern-
ment's restraint probably had the opposite effect:
namely, encouraging dissidents to step up operations
in hope of forcing Habre to meet their political and
financial demands for rallying to the regime.F__1
Political Ferment
Most observers agree that Chad's endemic poverty
and regional, tribal, and religious cleavages make the
country almost ungovernable. The regime has taken
some steps in the last several months, however, to
build a political infrastructure aimed at unifying the
many rival groups that make up Habre's government.
In July, Habre launched a new political party-the
National Union for Independence and Revolution
(UNIR)-that included representatives from all re-
gions. He also reshuffled his Cabinet to provide a
'The dissidents demand full pay as newly integrated members of
the military, retention of personal weapons, and free circulation
throughout the country in exchange for rallying to the N'Djamena
A Country Unified Only in Name
The inability of successive postindependence govern-
ments in Chad to maintain internal security and
national integrity has left the country susceptible to
repeated foreign military interventions. An adminis-
trative unit of French Equatorial Africa during the
colonial period, Chad has never been a unified coun-
try. Its 5.1 million people are divided into some 200
ethnic groups lacking a common lanugage, religion,
and history. Upon gaining independence in 1960,
Chad began to fragment almost immediately. At no
time has the central government's control run the full
length and breadth of the country. For a quarter
century, large areas of northern Borkou-Ennedi-
Tibesti (BET) prefecture have been outside central
government jurisdiction. The unresolved struggle for
control of Chad since the 1970s has occurred primar-
ily between two rival Toubou tribesmen from the
BET-Hissein Habre and Goukouni Weddeye-their
factional allies, and their foreign backers.
better ethnic and regional balance. Although south-
erners in the regime welcomed their enhanced politi-
cal influence, little probably has changed for the bulk
of their followers. Moreover, Habre's northern
comrades-in-arms resent the reforms and appear de-
termined to retain ultimate control of political power,
making it unlikely that the more populous south will
be successfully appeased.
Economic Imperatives
Although northerners dominate the government, they
cannot successfully rule the country without the par-
ticipation of the better educated and more skilled
southern civil servants and the revenues derived from
the south's cotton-based economy. The presence of
French troops had provided much-needed security in
the south for the production of both cash and food
crops. Buoyed by strong export prices, cotton out-
put-Chad's principal cash crop-increased from
102,000 tons in 1983 to 150,000 tons in 1984, while
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sugar production rose by 22 percent and peanut
production by 5 percent. The US Embassy reports
that a commercial banking sector has been partially
reestablished and that the principal industries-cot-
ton and sugar processing, the national electric compa-
ny, and cigarette and beer production-are operating.
The recent upsurge in dissident activity and continu-
ing drought have disrupted the economy of the south,
however, raising the specter of a poor cotton harvest
and severe food shortages. The US Embassy reports
that only 50 percent of the lands under cotton produc-
tion last year have been cultivated this season. Gov-
ernment corruption, pillaging of food stocks by Army
troops and insurgents, lack of storage facilities, and
major transportation problems all aggravate the food
problem. Despite large infusions of food aid from
abroad, the US Embassy estimates a food shortfall of
reports that N'Djamena can pay only half this
amount and still meet essential government expendi-
tures.
Diplomatic Dilemma
According to US Embassy reporting, Habre is under
mounting pressure from France to agree to a negotiat-
ed political settlement that would broaden participa-
tion in the government to include representatives of
various dissident groups in and outside the country.
Preliminary talks held in Brazzaville, Congo, last
month between spokesmen for Habre and Chadian
dissident groups broke down, however, after Libyan-
backed rebel leaders refused to recognize Habre's
delegation as that of the legitimate government. In
addition to the representation issue, we believe that
Habre's flexibility at representing Chad in any future
talks also will be constrained by fears that the French
and Libyans have cut a secret deal aimed at using the
reconciliation process to maneuver him from office in
about 250,000 metric tons this year.
The departure of French troops, who had spent about
$500,000 a month, according to the US Embassy, will
also slow economic development. Local commercial
bankers indicate that they see signs of capital flight,
while local businessmen are halting expansion. More-
over, the US Embassy reports that Esso 5 had sent
advance oil exploration teams to begin drilling in the
south, but plans are uncertain in view of company
fears that its installations could be attacked by rebels
once the French are gone
Despite good crops, foreign assistance, and self-im-
posed austerity measures, the government still ran a
budget deficit of about $14.75 million and an external
debt c f about $152 million in 1983. Chadian officials
have expressed concern that the country could be
suspended this year from the International Monetary
Fund for failure to pay some $5.6 million in arrear-
ages on loans from the Fund. The US Embassy
' Four international oil companies conducted exploratory operations
in southern Chad from 1972 until 1979, when work was suspended
because of civil war. Total reserves were estimated at 200 million
barrels, but additional drilling was necessary to determine the
actual size and structure of the oil-bearing formations. Based on
geophysical data obtained during preliminary operations, the oil
companies estimate potential reserves at 500 million barrels, the
minimum level necessary to reach economically viable export levels.
favor of a "third force" compromise candidate.
We believe Tripoli's fundamental goal of installing a
more malleable and pro-Libyan regime in N'Djamena
is unchanged and that the troop withdrawal repre-
sents only a change of tactics. In our view, curtailing
the unpopular campaign in Chad eases mounting
domestic pressures on Qadhafi and enables him to
repair his relations with France as part of a campaign
to project a moderate image in Western Europe. At
the same time, it allows him to continue clandestine
aid to anti-Habre dissidents. Libya will remain en-
trenched in the Aozou Strip from which it can
continue to provide arms and logistic support to
Chadian dissidents in the north. In addition, Tripoli
may sponsor terrorist attacks against Habre with
Chadian dissidents, maneuver diplomatically to un-
dermine Habre abroad, and continue to try to barter
behind the scenes with France in search of a compro-
mise candidate to replace Habre.
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Tripoli already has begun to rebuild the dissident
forces in the north, which have been sapped by
desertions, poor morale, tribal frictions, inadequate
supplies, and inactivity.
Chadians again are being funneled via
Benin to Libya for reinfiltration into northern Chad.
the rebel army now
has no more than 4,000 combatants and is completely
dependent on the Libyans for logistic support. Never-
theless, US defense attache reporting indicates that
the departing Libyans transferred additional supplies
and equipment to the rebels. Moreover, Habre sus-
pects-probably correctly-that the northern rebels
will be strengthened by the clandestine presence in
their ranks of Libyan advisers and foreign African
mercenaries recruited by the Libyans.
In our view, stepped-up Libyan financial and materiel
support is largely responsible for the recent resur-
gence of dissident activity in the south. Chadian
officials claim that Libya continues to infiltrate sup-
plies to rebels, including the use of airdrops, and
provide money to win back the allegiance of dissidents
who have rallied to the regime.
Libya will probably continue to sponsor terrorist
attacks against the Habre regime.
We expect Libya also will work to undermine Habre
on the diplomatic front. US Embassy reporting indi-
cates that Libya sent uninvited observers to the
recently aborted Brazzaville reconciliation talks and
tried to manipulate the conference against Habre. US
Embassy officials note that the Libyan presence in
Brazzaville has grown to at least 45 personnel, large-
ly, in our view, to foment trouble for Habre and
Zairian President Mobutu, who has been Habre's
principal African supporter.
recognizes that the Chadian President has consider-
able support among francophone Africans, who
helped secure his recognition before the OAU as
Chad's legitimate leader, and that for now he proba-
In our view, the intervention of French combat troops
and aircraft to stop the Libyan and Chadian dissident
advance on N'Djamena last summer was designed to
reassure African leaders that Paris will honor its
defense agreements against external aggression. De-
spite clear divisions in the French Government on how
much support to give to N'Djamena, Paris appears
committed to thwarting Libyan designs against Chad.
We believe that, as long as Habre serves the French in
this respect-without being overly provocative toward
Tripoli-Paris is likely to suppress its longstanding
mistrust of him and continue its support of his regime.
Moreover, US Embassy reporting indicates that Paris
bly is the strongest Chadian leader available.
At the same time, France has tried to preserve
diplomatic relations and profitable commercial ties
with Tripoli as leverage to temper Qadhafi's behavior.
Libya provides about 6 percent of France's oil im-
ports, while Tripoli purchases 10 percent of its weap-
ons from French manufacturers. Although France cut
off arms deliveries and the negotiation of new weap-
ons contracts with Libya because of its intervention in
Chad last year, Paris continued to train Libyan pilots
and repair Libyan aircraft.
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We believe the Mitterrand government almost cer-
tainly will encourage Habre to use military restraint
in both the south and north. The US Embassy reports
that French military officials expect Habre to move
north but have counseled him to wait until the
withdrawal is completed, to avoid attacks on or near
the Aozou Strip, and to move only gradually to
consolidate his hold on northern outposts. France also
will urge Habre to continue the negotiation process
with southern commando groups in hope of fostering
domestic reconciliation. Moreover, Paris is likely to
tie increased military and economic assistance to
Habre's willingness to hold meaningful reconciliation
talks with dissident groups based outside the country.
Although France hopes to avert the need in the future
for another intervention of French combat troops and
aircraft in Chad, under certain extreme circum-
stances Paris indicates it could reenter, according to
the US Embassy in Paris. Mitterrand's chief African
adviser, Guy Penne, has told US Embassy officers in
Paris that France would send troops back into Chad if
Libya sends in its troops, launches airstrikes against
Habre's forces, or gives the rebels enough aid that
they achieve a clear predominance. Nevertheless, he
stipulated that Paris would not intervene if Libya sent
limited aid to dissidents in the south or if Libyan-
financed mercenaries operated in the country.
Habre relies heavily on French economic assistance,
both for day-to-day government operations and recon-
struction efforts. According to the US Embassy,
France has already channeled about $32.3 million in
overall economic assistance to N'Djamena in 1984.
French officials say that $4.9 million was provided in
direct financial aid and $2.9 million in food aid.
About $10.25 million also was committed for develop-
ment projects, including road reconstruction, health
and agricultural projects, and the training of teachers
Direct French military support for N'Djamena this
year will total $5 million, including technical and
medical support, contract personnel, materiel, and
uniforms. The US Embassy in Paris reports that
French officials may budget some $16-22 million in
aid after the French troop withdrawal is completed, to
include about 90 military trainers, a vehicle mainte-
nance program, and a C-130 transport aircraft plus
contract pilots.
Under any scenario, we believe that Habre's agenda,
in the wake of the French and Libyan departure, will
be to reassert military control over the country. At the
same time, he will continue to explore the possibility
of achieving reconciliation with dissident groups, but
only within certain well-defined limits. He will de-
mand that his position as legitimate chief of state is
protected and that control of the government is
maintained by his northern faction. Moreover, Habre
almost certainly will seek additional military and
economic assistance from Western and moderate
Arab donors. Habre's situation over the near term
could evolve in several ways, none mutually exclusive.
Slow Deterioration
This scenario-which we believe is the most likely
outcome-assumes that Habre acts with restraint,
that neither Libya nor France will intervene directly
in Chad, and that little progress will be made toward
a negotiated solution to Chad's problems. Under such
circumstances, we believe Habre's hold on power
would erode gradually over the next year as Libya
maintains indirect military pressure in both the north
and south, leaving N'Djamena hard pressed to con-
tain strong dissidence on two fronts. Habre's response
in the south probably would become increasingly
intolerant and heavyhanded, causing him to lose any
remaining popular southern support for his rule.
Habre's image abroad as a strong leader working for
national reconciliation would erode, as the Libyans
continue to use their influence with Chadian dissident
leaders and left-leaning African states to prevent any
political settlement acceptable to Habre. In addition,
Qadhafi probably would try to erode Western and
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moderate African backing for Habre by raising the
costs for their support by encouraging terrorist at-
tacks on French and US targets in Chad and moder-
ate pro-Habre states in the region.
Should Habre's position slowly worsen over the next
year, we estimate that the Mitterrand government
would be reluctant to send troops back into the
country as long as the fighting had the appearance of
involving only Chadians. Paris, we believe, would
respond to clear evidence of stepped-up Libyan sup-
port for the insurgents by providing additional arms
and training to Habre's army, though not on a lavish
scale. The French would also try to distance them-
selves from Habre's harsh pacification policies in the
south, the area of Chad that most openly welcomed
French colonialism and that still has an affinity for
the French.
Rapid Deterioration
This less likely scenario assumes that Habre takes
rash military action, which provokes greater Libyan
involvement on behalf of the rebels. Under such
circumstances, we believe Habre's situation could
deteriorate fairly rapidly if, against French advice, he
undertook poorly planned offensives in the north-
perhaps including attacks against dissident outposts in
the vicinity of Libyan-occupied Aozou Strip-leaving
his troops vulnerable in N'Djamena and the south.6
Habre's boldness would alienate the French and leave
him vulnerable to a series of debilitating military
defeats. France would probably respond to clear
Libyan violations of the withdrawal agreement by
intervening directly; if, however, Libyan violations
were not blatant, France might stand aside in hopes
that a more pliant leader would emerge to replace
HabreJ
We believe that French patience with Habre's appar-
ent obstinance would wear thin, leading Paris to let
him fend for himself initially. At the same time,
French officials would maneuver behind the scenes to
gain leverage with potential successors to help ensure
that a more pliant leader would replace Habre. Paris
' Habre continues to demand that Libya relinquish control of the
Aozou Strip, which he regards as sovereign Chadian territory. The
US Embassy reports that Habre has expressed his willingness to
submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice for
adjudication, rather than try to retake the area through force of
France had no control.
also would attempt to mitigate damage to its prestige
in Africa by claiming that France had restored
Habre's position once and that his new misfortunes
were the result of his own poor judgment, over which
Tripoli, in reaction, might conclude that, because
Paris had lost confidence in Habre, Libya could
afford to run the risk of a more direct military role in
support of the rebels. As in the past, Libyan interven-
tion could be formally requested by dissident leader
Goukouni, who would reassert his claim to be the
legitimate president by right of the 1979 Lagos
accords.
In the event that Libya is emboldened to violate the
mutual withdrawal agreement by sending in Libyan
troops or fighter aircraft, or to supply the rebels with
heavy arms and equipment, we believe that France
would probably redeploy its forces to Chad-as it
publicly has pledged to do-to protect the integrity of
its security agreements with other francophone states.
Paris would justify intervention under a military
technical cooperation agreement signed with
N'Djamena in 1976. We believe that Paris would
delay this decision until the last possible moment,
however, until the Libyan and dissident advance on
the capital had been broadly condemned by neighbor-
ing moderate states, other Western allies, and moder-
ate Arab countries, thus assuring broad domestic and
international support.
Nevertheless, if France-contrary to our expecta-
tions-did not intervene and Tripoli were able to
install a new government, Qadhafi could again be
tempted to try to coerce N'Djamena to sign some
form of security pact or to even agree to a formal
Libyan-Chad union.' In our view, however, a new
' Following the intervention of some 7,000 Libyan troops in Decem-
ber 1980, Tripoli announced in early January 1981 a merger
agreement with Chad. Then President Goukouni apparently initial-
ly resisted Libyan pressure but finally agreed to sign the pact after
Libya was rumored to have threatened his life. Within days after
the pact was announced, however, Tripoli began to back down on
the pact's significance in reponse to furious African diplomatic
lobbying and protests of Chadian political leaders. Libyan forces
began to pull out their troops from Chad in November 1981 after
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Chronology of Foreign Interventions
1960 After independence was declared, French
troops remain to administer the predomi-
nantly Muslim northern half of Chad under
terms of a mutual defense treaty.
1964 French forces withdraw at the request of
southern President Tombalbaye, whose
forces assume control of the north.
1968 France intervenes with air force units to
counter growing northern dissidence.
1969 Paris sends in 1,600-man ground force.
1973 Libya annexes Aozou Strip.
1978 France intervenes with 2,500 troops to sup-
port southern President Malloum against
northern insurgents led by Habre and
Goukouni.
1979 Nigeria mediates an OAU-sponsored recon-
ciliation agreement and sends a 1,000-man
peacekeeping force for three months.
May France withdraws its forces after new OAU-
1980 sponsored accord provides for Congolese
troops to enforce a cease-fire.
Novem- Libya announces formal merger agreement
ber with Chad, and, upon the request of Presi-
1980 dent Goukouni, sends in 7,000 troops to
bolster his regime against Habre's
insurgents.
Novem- Libyan forces withdrawn at request of
her N Djamena; OAU deploys a 3,500-man
1981 peacekeeping contingent made up of Nigeri-
an, Senegalese, and Zairian troops to ensure
order, but Habre seizes power a year later.
July Libyan forces intervene in support of Gou-
1983 kouni's rebels in the north; French troops
enter in August in support of President
Habre.
Libyan-Chad merger would provoke serious concern
and opposition among Chadians and moderate Afri-
can states, who quickly would bring strong interna-
tional pressure to bear on Qadhafi. Even if a Libyan
unification scheme were implemented, we believe it
would prove ineffective and short lived as Qadhafi
tried to mollify international opinion and strong do-
mestic Chadian opposition
Political Reconciliation
However Habre's military situation evolves, we be-
lieve that France will search for a political solution to
avert another direct intervention. In the event that
Habre's position slowly deteriorates, France's careful-
ly applied carrot-and-stick approach could convince
him to participate in some form of power-sharing
arrangement to forestall the withdrawal of French
backing and defuse the threat of a two-front war. In
our view, there are several potential rebel leaders who
could bring broader support to a coalition government
headed by Habre.
In the less likely event that Habre's position rapidly
deteriorates resulting in the loss of French support,
Paris might be tempted to accept Libya's longstand-
ing proposal for a "third force" or compromise candi-
date to replace Habre. Under this less likely eventual-
ity, the French could calculate that a new leader
would help placate the Libyans and, at the same time,
prove more pliant and subject to French influence
than Habre.
Under either an Habre-led coalition government or a
"third force" arrangement, however, deep-seated eth-
nic animosity almost certainly would undermine its
durability. Habre would be reluctant to participate in
a coalition government, fearing that such an arrange-
ment was the first step in a French effort to replace
him. No single dissident leader would be able to
persuade all rebel groups to lay down their arms and
rally to a coalition government. Moreover, the risk of
violence would increase as Habre's fellow hardline
northerners maneuvered to retain the upper hand
militarily and protect Habre from potential coup
attempts.
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The Libyan-backed Transitional Government of Na-
tional Unity (GUNT) has never been more than an
uneasy amalgamation of diverse and traditionally
hostile factions united solely by their common antip-
athy for Chadian President Habre and desire to share
the spoils of governing Chad. Since last summer, the
GUNT has been torn by increased factionalism and
animosity toward its Libyan mentors, according to
US Embassy reporting. Only three of the six groups
that comprise the GUNT retain any political or
military significance:
? The People's Armed Forces (FAP), a faction of
northern Toubou tribesmen led by GUNT President
Goukouni. A declining military force, the FAP
derives what remains of its influence from Gou-
kouni's titular role in the GUNT. We believe,
however, that Goukouni is essentially a Libyan
puppet with little following inside Chad and in
danger of being dumped by Qadhafi as soon as it
suits Libyan purposes.
? The Democratic Revolutionary Council (CDR), an
Arab-dominated faction of central Chadians led by
GUNT Defense Minister Rakhis Manani. The CDR
maintains close ties to Libya and contributes the
bulk of the GUNT's fighting force known as the
National Liberation Army (ANL). Former CDR
Chief Achiek Ibn Oumar, once touted as Libya's
choice to replace Habre, is frequently mentioned by
Chadian observers as a possible "third force" com-
promise candidate who would be acceptable to both
Libya and France.
? The Armed Forces of Chad (FAT), led by GUNT
Vice President Kamougue, is composed of southern-
ers and no longer contributes significantly to the
ANL. Kamougue recently formed a breakaway
group in Congo after he was accused of corruption
by GUNT officials. Most of the former FAT.fight-
ers operate in the south as separate commando
groups, although some remain close to Kamougue.
Tripoli is likely to try to create tensions in a coalition
government by wooing various leaders with bribes and
promises of support to either work against Habre or
abandon the regime. Also, Tripoli might increase aid
to rebel groups that remained outside the govern-
ment-of which there would be many with any
coalition that included Habre.
In the unlikely event that Paris agrees to Tripoli's
scheme to install a "third force" or compromise
candidate in N'Djamena, Habre's hardcore followers
probably would go on a rampage in the capital to
resist the installation of a new government, before
fleeing to old sanctuaries in the east and reverting to
guerrilla warfare. Any new leader would have to cope
with political infighting or even military resistance
among other rival factions vying for greater influence.
To survive, a government with such a limited constitu-
ency would require large amounts of outside military
and economic support. France, realizing such a leader
could never unify the fractious population, probably
would be reluctant to provide significant assistance or
become closely identified with the fragile regime.
Moreover, Qadhafi almost certainly would try to
maneuver such a leader to Libya's advantage in an
effort to install a staunchly pro-Libyan regime
Chad Without Habre
If Habre dies in office, we believe that a succession
struggle would ensue among his fellow northerners.
Unless the northern tribesmen were able to agree
quickly on a replacement, the country probably would
sink into renewed civil war as factions from all areas
of the country vied for leadership. The Army probably
would splinter into various factional militias, leaving
no one group in full control.
The US Embassy reports that one potential successor
to Habre might be Taher Guinassou, Minister of
Animal and Water Resources and one of Habre's
fierce desert fighters. He is a Muslim from the north
and would be acceptable to other members of Habre's
inner circle, which is dominated by members of the
northern-based Toubou ethnic group. Nevertheless,
the Embassy reports that Guinassou lacks Habre's
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fractious country together for long.
charisma, shrewdness, and leadership abilities, and we
doubt that he would be able to hold the ethnically
term.
In addition to finding a successor to Habre, northern
hardliners would face the crucial dilemma of retain-
ing French support. We believe that Paris would
mistrust any northern leader, calculating that, like
Habre, he would prove difficult to influence and have
similar problems consolidating support among south-
erners. Nevertheless, if Habre's followers could agree
on a replacement, we believe Paris probably would
back the new regime initially in hopes of forestalling a
takeover by Libyan-backed dissidents. Some 2,000 to
4,000 of Habre's hardcore supporters, under new
leadership and with French backing, probably would
be able to retain military control over N'Djamena and
some other areas of the country, at least for the short
tions against the new government (see map).
In the event that the northerners were unable to agree
on a successor and convince Paris to continue its
support, rebel forces with Libyan backing probably
would gain the upper hand. The remnants of Habre's
hardcore northern combatants would then be forced
back to their old stronghold in the Biltine prefecture
bordering Sudan and its cross-border sanctuaries,
where they would regroup and begin guerrilla opera-
If Libyan-supported dissident forces were to gain
control of the capital, the problems of restoring order
and subduing local warlords throughout the rest of the
country-including Habre's rebellious fighters in the
east-would require substantial Libyan financial, lo-
gistic, and manpower support. In our judgment, a
Libyan-sponsored regime probably would not be able
to unify or control Chad. Nevertheless, should Qadha-
fi gain such a foothold in Chad, he would be in a
position to step up efforts to destabilize neighboring
Sudan, and put pressure on Niger and the CAR to
In our judgment, the Habre regime is critically
dependent on continued French military and political
backing to ensure its survival. Although government
forces probably could cope with a limited surge in
Libyan-supported dissidence in the south and east,
they would be hard pressed without French support to
repel another direct Libyan incursion in the north or 25X1
contain strong dissidence on two fronts. Moreover,
Habre is totally dependent on Paris for military
equipment and supplies, training, and suonort in
forming an integrated national Army.
If Habre's position slowly deteriorates under the
pressure of Libyan subversion and limited French
support-the most likely scenario-N'Djamena will
look to the United States as the only other alternative
for additional assistance to bolster his regime. The
United States provided about $17 million in economic
and development assistance and $2 million in military
assistance to Habre in the fiscal year 1984 as well as
$25 million in emergency military assistance in mid-
1983. Washington had budgeted $13.7 million in
economic and development assistance, $5 million in 25X1
the military assistance program, and $150,000 for
military training for fiscal year 1985.
If France appeared hesitant to support Habre, neigh-
boring African states-especially Niger and Sudan-
probably would look to Washington to provide him
with emergency military aid and to exert political
pressure on France to intervene on his behalf. They
would probably hope that a larger role for the United
States in Chad, in cooperation with France, could 25X1
contain Libyan encroachment and strengthen regional
security.
If France and the United States were not perceived to
be responsive by concerned Africans and Habre fell in
favor of a pro-Libyan leader-our second scenario-
we believe that neighboring Africans would be quick
to blame Washington as well as Paris for failing to
ensure a moderate-led Chad that does not serve as a
possible base for Libyan subversion. Tripoli, in turn,
would be emboldened to step up subversion against
Sudan and in West Africa. Unsure of Western securi-
ty support, weaker moderate African regimes would 25X1
seek to lower their political profile, find Libyan
blandishments more difficult to resist, and lend far
less support to French and US positions on issues that
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might offend Qadhafi. Moderate African dependence
on French economic aid, US food assistance, and
Western-backed institutions like the IMF, however,
would provide for continued, albeit difficult, ties and
eventual opportunities to repair the damage to US
and French interests.
Habre's inclusion of dissident leaders in a coalition
government or the installation of a compromise candi-
date would be less risky for US interests than if he
were removed from the political scene in favor of a
compromise leader. We are dubious, however, that
either form of political reconciliation under this third
scenario would significantly advance prospects for
achieving a true government of national unity, the
cessation of hostilities, and curtailment of Libyan
meddling
Habre's untimely death, our fourth scenario, would
create a large and difficult-to-fill leadership vacuum
that would be likely to unravel US efforts to stabilize
Chad under moderate, anti-Libyan rule. Chad proba-
bly would quickly revert to full-fledged civil war for
control of N'Djamena.
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Appendix
President Goukouni Queddei. Goukouni-Chad's former president from Novem-
ber 1979 until June 1982 when Habre's forces entered N'Djamena-controls the
People's Armed Forces (FAP), a faction drawn from the Teda, who form the larger
of the two branches of the Toubou people. Goukouni, 40, has a long record of close
Libyan ties and over the past decade has been easily manipulated by Tripoli.
Essentially a simple warrior who was born in Zouar, he is a devout Muslim with
some secondary education. He has proved an indecisive leader whose decisions
tend to reflect the views of the last strong advocate who has seen him on a
particular matter.
Vice President Wadal Abdul Kadar Kamougue. Kamougue, 45, a southern Sara
tribesman born in Gabon and raised in Moundou, serves as vice president in the
GUNT. He is regarded as a corrupt opportunist who has accepted Libyan largess
in hopes of regaining control over Chad's non-Muslim south. As the south's
onetime military strongman, he reportedly exploited the region for personal gain
but still commands the loyalty of some elements of his old factional Army, the
Armed Forces of Chad (FAT). He has remained in Congo, unlike other GUNT
leaders who are on the scene in northern Chad. Recently, Kamougue has been
rumored to be upset with the Libyans and possibly amenable to exploring
Former Minister of National Defense Acheikh ibn Oumar. Acheikh, in his mid-to-
late thirties, is an ethnic Arab from Abeche in eastern Chad. He became
prominent within the Democratic Revolutionary Council (CDR)-made up of
Arab Muslims from central Chad-upon the death of Acyl Ahmat in June 1982.
The CDR was at that time the second-largest armed faction in Chad after
Kamougue's forces in the former Goukouni government. It traditionally has
received large amounts of Libyan arms and funding. Acheikh, an avowed Marxist,
has been rumored off and on to be Qadhafi's favorite to head a new government in
N'Djamena, while at the same time he is said to be held in high regard among
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Muslims, southern Catholics, and animists.
General Negue Djogo. General Djogo, 52, former commander in chief of the
GUNT's National Army of Liberation, moved to Brazzaville, Congo, last summer
following disputes with other rebel leaders over command responsibilities. He has a
reputation as an effective decisionmaker and organizer who is popular among his
troops,
IDjogo was largely responsible for soothing ethnic
tensions among the rebel ranks. Nevertheless, he reportedly has tried to undermine
his longtime rival and fellow southerner Colonel Kamougue by fueling discontent
among Kamougue's followers.
Djogo is a Sara tribesman of both Catholic and Muslim parentage. He served as
vice president and chief of staff in former President Lol's short-lived government
in 1979 and as a Cabinet minister under President Malloum from 1975 to 1976.
After 10 years in the French Army and study at the French officer candidate
school, Djogo proved himself a courageous and competent soldier. During earlier
periods of unrest in southern Chad, he tried to play a peacemaker role between
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