EL SALVADOR: GUERRILLA CAPABILITIES AND PROSPECTS OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00317R000300040003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 53
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Top Secret
El Salvador: Guerrilla
Capabilities and Prospects
Over the Next Two Years
Top See. et
ALA 84-
October? 94
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Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
El Salvador: Guerrilla
Capabilities and Prospects
Over the Next Two Years
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This paper was prepared by
I (
Office
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of African and Latin American Analysis. Maior
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contributions were made by
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the Analytic Support Group;
Office of Central Reference; and
Office of Global Issues. Basic data on
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guerrilla performance, force structure, and arms
flows were provided by the Central American Joint
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Intelligence Team (CAJIT) in the Department of
Defense. This paper was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief,
Middle America-Caribbean Division, ALA, on
Top Secret
ALA 84-10104C
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El Salvador: Guerrilla
Capabilities and Prospects
Over the Next Two Years
Key Judgments The election of the Duarte government and the increasing aggressiveness of
Information available the Salvadoran military have put the Farabundo Marti National Libera-
as of 21 September 1984 tion Front (FMLN) on the defensive, but we believe the insurgents will
was used in this report.
continue to pose a serious challenge to the government for the next two
years at least. The guerrillas remain strong enough to regain the initiative
for short periods. Nonetheless, we believe declining popular support,
internal factionalism, and shortages of ammunition and other basic
supplies will prevent them from carrying out a sustained offensive against
the government or shifting the military balance decisively in their favor in
the next two years. This assessment assumes continued US support for the
Salvadoran Government, at least at present levels.
We believe the guerrillas' planned fall offensive-if it occurs-is unlikely
to alter the military balance. A statistical analysis of guerrilla-initiated
actions since 1981 shows that military activity has not increased since mid-
1982, but that the proportion of guerrilla incidents involving civilian
targets has grown considerably in recent years. This suggests that serious
problems within the insurgent movement are inhibiting military progress
and forcing the guerrillas to prey increasingly on the civilian population.
the guerrillas perceive that such
problems preclude them from launching a general offensive with any
realistic expectation of overthrowing the government.
they hope instead to mount at least a few "spectacular" attacks
on important military and economic targets in order to erode Salvadoran
military morale and US public support for the Reagan administration's
policy in El Salvador.
Some of the more serious problems confronting the guerrillas are:
? Shortages of food, medicine, and clothing, which have hurt morale and
spurred many recent recruits to defect. Such shortages have led to a
dramatic increase in robberies and kidnapings this year, and they could
tightly constrain efforts to increase force levels.
? The FMLN's inability to broaden popular support, which has impaired
guerrilla performance and undercut the FMLN's potential. Even in areas
dominated by the major factions, the FMLN has failed to provide goods,
services, and security to potential supporters. Moreover, forced recruit-
ment, constant harassment, and the expropriation of foodstuffs and other
basic necessities have alienated much of the population.
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ALA 84-10104C
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? Fundamental differences in ideology and policy as well as personal
rivalries, which continue to plague the alliance despite some progress
toward better coordination of guerrilla military operations.
? The FMLN's vulnerability to reductions in foreign assistance, which has
been underscored by several developments during the past year.
Nicaragua and Cuba have
considered-but not yet implemented-cuts in their assistance and that
other foreign countries and some humanitarian organizations have
reduced their funding and political support. Although the guerrillas
probably can come close to maintaining current arms inventories by
capturing weapons from the Salvadoran military, we believe they will
continue to depend on external suppliers for most of their ammunition,
communications support, and substantial amounts of food and other
supplies.
Despite these constraints, guerrilla combat effectiveness is high, communi-
cations are sophisticated, and the FMLN's ability to collect and dissemi-
nate intelligence on the armed forces is excellent. The FMLN has kept
9,000 to 11,000 guerrillas and militia in the field for over three years,
during which time the number of well-armed, well-trained, and combat-
experienced fighters has climbed steadily to between 6,000 and 8,000. C
despite harsh living conditions, the
bulk of the insurgents continue to exhibit great tenacity and an abiding
commitment to the guerrilla struggle.
Taking these factors into account, we believe the FMLN will continue to
pose a substantial military threat to the Duarte government, although it
probably will experience some degradation in its overall capabilities during
the next two years. We judge the most likely guerrilla scenario will see to-
tal force strength dropping by 1,000 to 3,000, and greater emphasis placed
on urban operations and terrorism. Insurgent activity probably will
increase in western El Salvador, if only to relieve pressure on FMLN forces
and supply corridors elsewhere in the country.
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Even if guerrilla degradation is more rapid than we presently foresee and
circumstances strongly favor government initiatives, we doubt that insur-
gent force levels would drop by more than half in the next two years.
Several thousand insurgents have now spent a minimum of two years in the
field and seem likely to persist even under extremely adverse circum-
stances. Havana and Managua might decide to reduce aid but probably
could provide enough assistance to sustain at least 6,000 experienced
combatants. We believe such a hard core of well-armed, combat-experi-
enced guerrillas operating mostly from traditional strongholds along the
Honduran border would continue to pose major problems for the govern-
ment. Insurgent base areas in the west and, to a lesser extent, in
southeastern El Salvador would be far more vulnerable to government
operations.
Should trends unexpectedly favor the guerrillas during the next two years,
we judge that logistic constraints and their small popular base would still
prevent the FMLN from achieving a final military victory. The guerrillas
probably could field a few thousand more combatants, but they would be
confronting a Salvadoran military that would be over three times their size
and more than their match if equipped at present levels. The guerrillas
most likely would expand operations in urban areas and western El
Salvador, while consolidating their position in the east. Cuba and Nicara-
gua probably would accelerate assistance under these circumstances in an
effort to help the FMLN cement its gains.
The guerrillas will watch the US election closely and probably reassess
their strategy in late 1984. Whether they decide to emphasize a two-
pronged negotiate-and-fight strategy or opt primarily for a military
approach will depend largely on their reading of the next administration's
willingness to make concessions.
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Key Judgments
Scope Note
Shifting Guerrilla Strategy
Force Development and Capabilities
3
Popular Support
4
The Performance Record
11
Projecting Near-Term Capabilities
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Substantial Guerrilla Decline
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The Guerrillas Regain Momentum
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Guerrilla Intentions and Implications for the United States
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Insurgent Strategy Beyond the US Election
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C. FMLN Force Capabilities
D. Guerrilla Weapons Inventory
E. External Assistance: The Cuba-Nicaragua Pipeline
F. Methodology for Tracking Guerrilla Performance
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Scope Note This assessment examines current guerrilla strengths and weaknesses and
the likely course of insurgent activity and strategy over the next year or
two. The paper does not systematically compare the performance of the
guerrillas against the Salvadoran military, although it identifies tensions
within, and between, the Salvadoran Government and the military as a key
factor in projecting guerrilla prospects.
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Figure 1
Guerrilla Operating Areas
Guatemala ~/
* s~S Honduras
rEMAIA
SAN SALVADO ~*
El Salvo s
Guerrilla front boundary
Traditional guerrilla base area
i Area of relatively free guerrilla
movement
Road
0 50
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authontat,ve.
Punta
Cosiguina
Potosi`
Nicaragua
Puerto
Arturo
La Pelota
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El Salvador: Guerrilla
Capabilities and Prospects
Over the Next Two Years r
Front (FMLN) was founded in 1980, the tactical
initiative in the guerrilla war has shifted periodically
from one side to the other. During the past year,
however, problems within guerrilla ranks and the
improved performance of the Salvadoran military
have kept the guerrillas on the defensive.
FMLN leaders have had
difficulty developing a cohesive, long-term strategy
and coping with declining popular support, internal
factionalism, and supply shortages. Nevertheless, the
FMLN remains a formidable foe, and its top leaders
recognize the need to launch another offensive to
restore military credibility. This paper examines cur-
rent insurgent capabilities, explores to what extent
and under what conditions the military balance could
shift in the next two years, and assesses the implica-
tions for the United States.
The guerrillas have adopted four different approaches
to the war, depending on their capabilities at the time
and their expectations of success. From 1979 to 1981,
the guerrillas conducted mostly isolated, uncoordinat-
ed attacks involving small numbers of fighters. At the
same time, they worked to build a military organiza-
tion and develop broad popular support, especially in
the labor movement, the universities, and urban cen-
ters. This phase, which was aimed at inciting a
Nicaragua-style insurrection, culminated in the un-
successful "final offensive" in January 1981.
The second phase, which lasted until the March 1982
assembly election, took the war to the countryside.
The number of people involved in guerrilla attack
units grew from tens to often hundreds, and coordi-
nated tactical planning became the rule.
many guerrilla
leaders believed that by expanding the war in this way
they could achieve sufficient momentum to shift the
military and political balance decisively in their favor.
The Salvadoran military's success in foiling guerrilla
efforts to disrupt the 1982 election, however, deflated
insurgent morale and prospects. Apparently recogniz-
ing that Salvadoran military capabilities were improv-
ing and that popular support was insufficient to
achieve a quick victory, the FMLN opted for a war of
attrition-emphasizing attacks on the nation's eco-
nomic fabric while seeking simultaneously to negoti-
ate a power-sharing agreement. During this third
phase, relatively low levels of US aid and political
infighting at senior levels in the Salvadoran military
and government worked to the guerrillas' advantage,
and a stalemate resulted.
The fourth phase of guerrilla operations began with a
major offensive in the fall of 1983. It was marked by
increasingly larger and better coordinated operations
by both sides. The FMLN attacked key strategic
targets and large military units, such as the light
infantry hunter battalions. This strategy brought the
guerrillas two spectacular successes when on
30 December 1983 they destroyed a major bridge and
overran a large military garrison.
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Insurgent hopes to build on these victories and regain
momentum, however, were dashed in March and May
of this year when the Salvadoran military kept the 25X1
guerrillas from seriously disrupting the elections, en-
abling over 80 percent of the Salvadoran electorate to
go to the polls.
the guerrillas were unable to agree on a basic
strategy for the elections campaign, and that they now
are in search of a new strategic plan. Meanwhile,
most insurgent leaders continue to stress the impor-
tance of concentrating their forces to attack key
economic and military targets in order to undermine
military morale and press the Duarte government to
negotiate. Some also want to concentrate more heavi-
ly on the earlier strategy of establishing front groups
among labor, students, and the masses, and promoting
urban terrorism.
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Figure 2
Components of the Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front (FMLN)
Force Strengths
Total, September 1984=9,000-11,000
FPL ERP
(2,800- / (3,000-
3,500) 3,500)
MOR
(100)
FARN
(1,400-1,550)
People's Revolutionary Eastern Front
Army(ERP)
Popular Liberation Northern, Central,
Forces (FPL) and Paracentral
Fronts
Armed Forces of Central and
Liberation (FAL) Paracentral Fronts
Armed Forces of Central znd
National Resistance Paracentral Fronts
(FARN)
Revolutionary Party Paracentral and
of Central American Eastern Fronts
Workers (PRTC)
Revolutionary
Workers' Movement
(MOR)
? The rive factions that comprise the FMLN are organized into five
geographic fronts (see Figure 1).
A guerrilla document captured in June 1984 typifies
the recurrent themes in FMLN documents and com-
munications and provides insight into how the insur-
gents view their capabilities and the task ahead. The
document-a September 1983 report of a plenary
session of the Revolutionary Council of the FPL
(figure 2)-details the goals and objectives that reflect
the four basic pillars of guerrilla strategy:'
? Intensification of the armed struggle. Guerrilla
forces need to be increased and strengthened, their
areas of operations expanded, and the level of
conflict raised.
Most active militarily;
operates relatively
independently of other
factions.
Dominant group until
top leaders murdered in
early 1983.
Military arm of
Communist Party; forces
becoming increasingly
integrated into FPL.
Least doctrinaire; also
cooperating more closely
with FPL.
Least influential;
emphasis on urban
operations.
Small urban terrorist
group that split from
FPL in late 1983; not a
recognized FMLN faction.
? Unity. Coordination and cooperation among the five
military factions must be improved, and the creation
of a single Marxist-Leninist party with its own
political front organization is a key task.
? Development of Popular Support. A broad social
base must be developed, organized, and consolidat-
ed, focusing special attention on the "worker-farmer
alliance" and the labor sector.
? Diplomatic/Political Initiatives. Ties to Cuba, Nic-
aragua, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union should be
strengthened, while diplomacy and propaganda
should be used to break down the ranks of the
enemy and discredit the US and Salvadoran Gov-
ernments; negotiations and dialogue must be en-
couraged as a means of achieving power and reduc-
ing the chances of armed US intervention.
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Figure 3
El Salvador: Guerrilla Force Levels,
1978 to 1984
Well-trained
and well-armed
insurgents
The total number of guerrilla and militia forces grew
from about 2,000 in 1978 to some 10,000 in 1982
(figure 3).2 Since then, force levels have remained
fairly constant, totaling from 9,000 to 11,000 insur-
gents. However, the proportion of this force that is
well-armed, well-trained, and combat-experienced has
increased markedly. This rise is attributable mostly to
the fuller integration of militia forces into combat
units and the acquisition through capture and sus-
tained infiltration in 1982 and 1983 of enough mod-
ern weapons-mostly automatic rifles-to arm all
combatants.
We estimate
that the FMLN has impressed as many as 3,000
'Appendix B deals with factionalism among and within the guerril-
la forces, and a detailed discussion of guerrilla capabilities and
people-mostly youths-into their ranks in 1984, but
that at least an equivalent number have defected,
been captured, or died in combat.
We believe that 25X1
large numbers of insurgents also have deserted but not
turned themselves over to Salvadoran authorities.
During the past five years, the FMLN has developed
a highly mobile and well-ordered force structure.
Despite harsh living conditions,
most guerrillas continue to
demonstrate great tenacity and an abiding commit-
ment to the guerrilla struggle. Although there are
occasional reports of poor treatment by unit com-
manders, guerrilla leaders in the field generally fight
alongside and command the respect of their forces.
We judge the combat effectiveness of the guerrilla
forces to be high. Tactical war-fighting doctrine
appears sound and the flexibility and mobility of
battlefield units allow them to be deployed efficiently.
Increased Salvadoran military patrolling and sweep
activity have kept the guerrillas off balance through-
out much of this year, but the guerrillas still dictate
the terms and pace of most tactical encounters and
are able to avoid major engagements except at times
and places of their choosing.
The guerrillas are well-armed with a variety of mostly
Western-manufactured light-infantry and crew-
served weapons.'
bout 70
percent of the FARN's 500 to 600 combatants in the
Guazapa Front had M-16 rifles. Although the guerril-
las have captured over 5,000 weapons since March
1982, the availability of weapons appears to differ
among and within the FMLN factions, F_
'A list of weapons known to be in the guerrilla arms inventory
appears in appendix D.
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The lack of antiaircraft weapons
also is a major problem, but in recent months cap-
tured guerrillas have said that the FMLN would soon
deploy SA-7 shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles to El
Salvador.
Comments by numerous captured guerrillas and de-
fectors in recent months establish that at least the
major FMLN factions have developed fairly extensive
training programs. Guerrillas continue to be sent to
Nicaragua, Cuba, and other friendly countries for
extensive training, and instruction is given in El
Salvador at schools accommodating as many as 300
students. Within El Salvador, course length varies
from three days to several months and subject matter
ranges from basic literacy to instruction in artillery
and demolition techniques.
Key Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities
Although the guerrillas have developed an imposing
military capability over the past five years, their
success to date and their prospects for further gains
have been impaired by their lack of unity and their
inability to develop a broad base of popular support.
The FMLN's continuing dependence on Nicaragua
and Cuba for ammunition, supplies, and other assist-
ance is another potential vulnerability, especially in
the wake of signs that began to appear in late 1983
that Nicaragua and Cuba might reduce future assist-
sharply during the past year.
Basic Needs
The lack of funds and basic necessities-such as
medicine, food, shoes, and clothing-has posed seri-
ous problems for the guerrillas. The FMLN depends
on local farmers and villagers as well as foreign
sources including Nicaragua and Cuba for the bulk of
these supplies. The insurgents cannot grow enough
crops to feed their combatants, and much of what is
smuggled across the Honduran border consists of food
and other basic necessities. The insurgents often
establish roadblocks on major highways to extort
money, shoes, clothing, medicine, and food-some-
times taking only half of what is available and
justifying their action as a "war tax." Moreover,
thefts from stores and pharmacies have increased
the
lack of food and medicine has badly hurt morale in
some guerrilla units and is becoming a growing
concern for their leaders. Several deserters have said
such problems would have caused many more guerril-
las to defect if they had known the Salvadoran
military would not mistreat them or that reprisals
would not be taken against their families. It is
questionable, however, whether such conditions have
had a major impact on established guerrilla ranks; so
far the bulk of those who have deserted were forcibly
recruited and spent little time with the guerrillas.
Popular Support
Most observers and the guerrillas themselves-ac-
cording to captured documents-believe that low
popular support for the insurgents is a critical prob-
lem.' Embassy officials in San Salvador estimate that
a political party representing the FMLN or acting as
its front in a national election would attract only 5 to
10 percent of the vote. Several recent public opinion
polls support the Embassy's assessment.
In a nationwide poll of 2,000 Salvadorans conducted
in May and June of 1983, 68 percent of the respon-
dents said that most Salvadorans think the Army had
ance.
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"many sympathizers" and only 9 percent that the
guerrillas had "many sympathizers."5 When asked
which group-the Army or the guerrillas-had been
gaining sympathizers in recent months, 65 percent
cited the Army and only 7 percent the guerrillas. In a
similar poll conducted in September and October of
1983, 77 percent of the respondents said the Salvador-
an people supported the Army in the war against the
guerrillas; 14 percent said that Salvadorans do not
care for either side; and 7 percent did not answer,
presumably because most were guerrilla supporters.
The unpopularity of the guerrillas can be traced in
part to the FMLN's inability to provide security and
offer viable alternative economic and social services,
as well as to the government's progress in implement-
ing social programs and its growing commitment to
democracy. More important, forced recruitment, at-
tacks on farm cooperatives, constant guerrilla harass-
ment, and the expropriation of foodstuffs and other
basic necessities have hurt the guerrillas' image and
alienated much of the population.
In a guerrilla document captured in March, a People's
Revolutionary Army (ERP) commander noted that
townspeople failed to respond to calls to join the
revolution and complained openly that the insurgents
were harming their lives, jobs, and property. More-
over, the document characterizes campesinos in areas
under ERP "control" as too politically naive to under-
stand how an FMLN victory would justify the depri-
vations they must suffer.
This problem was vividly illustrated in mid-1984
when according to US Embassy officials and press
reports as many as 6,000 refugees fled northern
Morazan, in some instances over guerrilla-mined
roads, and crossed into Honduras. They sought help in
returning to parts of El Salvador under government
control and resisted resettlement in UNHCR refugee
camps in Honduras where the inhabitants generally
are believed to be sympathetic to the FMLN and
' The poll was sponsored by the Venezuelan Christian Democratic
Party and approved by the Salvadoran Government. It was based
on interviews conducted with 1,500 people in six departments
designated as "nonconflict areas" and 500 people living in the
capital cities of the remaining eight departments designated as
The Church Speaks Out
The Catholic hierarchy-which over the past three
years has judiciously balanced its criticism of abuses
by the left and the right-has become increasingly
outspoken in its condemnation of the guerrillas'
forced recruitment drive and sabotage activities. In
one of the more eloquent appeals made by senior
Church officials in mid-1984, Bishop Rosa Chavez
pleaded in his homily of 1 July for the return of
hundreds of youths who remained in guerrilla en- 25X1
campments against their will, noting in particular the
case of a boy who could go blind if he did not receive
proper treatment for an eye disease.
The Bishop also said that, no matter how the guerril-
las justified their acts of sabotage, "it is the people
who suffer when the guerrillas down the electric
pylons; it is the people who suffer when the guerrillas
dynamite telephone installations, ... kidnap, demand
their famous war tax, or devote themselves to burn-
ing vehicles as they did recently. If they continue 25X1
along that path, as they increase in military strength,
the weaker they will be politically and will have even
less space in the heart of the people. Therefore, I ask
myself in whose favor are they really fighting? "I 25X1
The guerrillas, in a response broadcast on Radio
Venceremos, labeled the Bishop a "reactionary and
partial" man "who wants to sit at the table of both
the rich and the poor, and that is not possible. "F_
where some guerrilla reprisals have taken place. The
refugees said they fled primarily to escape forced
recruitment into guerrilla ranks, but they also com-
plained of growing insurgent demands and the confis-
cation of village food supplies. An FMLN propaganda
campaign urging peasants to remain on their land and
not leave their native villages apparently had little
effect.
Popular support for the guerrillas has been eroded by
other FMLN practices, such as the use of roadblocks
to collect war taxes, obtaining protection money from
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Figure 4
El Salvador: Municipalities Where Voting Did Not
Take Place on May 6, 1984
La Libertad
0 Morazdn
O e
-~ r ~
Usulutdn f San Miguel? La Unidn
?o San Miguel`
-?- Departamento boundary
0 30 Kilometers
p 0 Miles
Boundary representation Is
not necessarily authoritative
Location and photo
of destroyed village in
Arambala municipality.
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Santa Ana
Chalatenango
r \Cuscat1atOT
r t(? Cabanas
Ahuachapdn( Sano e
(Salve o '~-
l
d
?
S
S
a
va
o
an
~~^, Sonsonate '
l San Vicente
L Paz
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commercial farmers and sugar mill owners, and re-
cent attacks on farm cooperatives. The kidnaping of
civilians, including the Defense Minister's brother in
June, appears to be on the rise again despite public
statements by the FMLN that it would not attack the
relatives of foes. Moreover, the sharp increase in
forced recruitment, including many schoolchildren,
probably has done serious and lasting damage to the
guerrilla cause.
National elections in March 1982 and the spring of
1984 have helped build popular support for the gov-
ernment. Despite insurgent appeals to boycott the
"imperialist farce," the turnout in both elections
exceeded 80 percent, and guerrilla efforts to sabotage
the elections generally proved counterproductive. In
San Miguel Department-a traditional guerrilla
stronghold in eastern El Salvador-the turnout in the
May runoff balloting was 15 percent higher than in
the March election despite guerrilla attacks in the
interim that were designed to inhibit the voting.
Voting patterns in the 1984 elections, however, dem-
onstrate the insurgents' impact in more isolated rural
areas. On 6 May, the government did not conduct
balloting in 53 out of 261 municipalities; most of these
towns were in longstanding guerrilla strongholds in
Chalatenango, Morazan, San Miguel, and La Union
Departments (figure 4). Nonetheless, the fact that 20
percent of the municipalities did not vote is potentially
misleading because most of the areas where little
voting occurred are mountainous and sparsely popu-
lated. In Morazan and Chalatenango Departments-
where 36 municipalities did not vote
More-
over, in 10 locations voters were allowed to cast
ballots in other towns not under guerrilla control.
The agrarian reform program, launched in March
1980, also has hurt the guerrillas and helped improve
the government's image. Approximately 22 percent of
the country's farmland has been handed over to
private farmers and members of cooperatives, and so
far about 570,000 Salvadorans-including family
members-have benefited. Nevertheless, recent inter-
views with refugees from all 14 departments reveal
that few were aware of specific details of the land
reform program, suggesting that a more effective
communications effort might gain the government
The government's National Plan to rebuild San Vi-
cente and Usulutan-two agriculturally important
departments-and to win "the hearts and minds of
the people" has had mixed success. According to the
US Embassy officials, many civilians appear enthusi-
astic to take up arms to protect their villages once the
guerrillas are driven away, but chronic weapons short-
ages and the Army's inability to provide adequate
support often have forced them to remain neutral, if
only to survive. Less than 15 percent of local civilian
security personnel now carry rifles. A new govern-
ment civil defense program should help, but weapons
shortages are constraining this effort as well.
Factionalism
Fundamental differences in policy and strategy and
personal rivalries have beset the FMLN from the
start and continue to impede its political and military
effectiveness.6 Differences among the five factions
center on the most fundamental issue: the purpose and
conduct of the armed struggle. The FPL faction, for 25X1
example, has consistently advocated a strategy of
"prolonged popular war" that emphasizes the gradual
development of popular support and a prolonged war
of attrition. The ERP and the FARN, on the other
hand, generally adhere to the line that frequent armed
attacks will incite the masses to overthrow the govern-
ment.
Differences over negotiating strategy also are com-
mon and criticism of other factions frequently is 25X1
reported within the guerrilla ranks.
the ERP and its leader, 25X1
Joaquin Villalobos, often are faulted by other guerril- 25X1
la commanders for being ruthless, opportunistic, and 25X1
bellicose. The FPL is criticized by other guerrilla
factions as too ideological, and the FARN as too
willing to negotiate and too nationalistic. Some 25X1
FMLN leaders also are reported to have dismissed the
PRTC as no more than terrorists and the FAL as
lackeys of Moscow and Havana. 25X1
increased support.
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Antagonisms have emerged within most guerrilla
factions as well.
during the past year serious tensions have
developed between the rank and file and the senior
leadership of both the PRTC and the FARN. Evi-
dence of a far more serious rift within FPL ranks
surfaced publicly in April 1983 when deputy com-
mander Melida Anaya Montes, known as "Ana Ma-
ria," was murdered by followers of top commander
Salvador Cayetano Carpio, who then allegedly com-
mitted suicide. Carpio's successor, Leonel Gonzalez,
has since moved the FPL toward increased military
coordination and political cooperation with other fac-
tions and has adopted a more flexible attitude on
negotiations. This led several of Carpio's hardline
supporters in late 1983 to form a splinter group-the
Revolutionary Workers' Movement (MOR)-which
has conducted a number of sabotage and terrorist
acts, mostly in San Salvador.
Since last year, some progress has been made, al-
though the ERP continues to operate relatively inde-
pendently. Major strides in coordinating tactical mili-
tary operations have been made by the FPL and the
FAL. Their success in conducting more joint opera-
tions in northern and western El Salvador has allowed
them to mass forces for larger operations against
important strategic targets such as the Fourth Bri-
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tion and other supplies.
Arms and Ammunition. The insurgents remain heavi-
ly dependent on Havana and Managua for ammuni- 25X1
we estimate that roughly three-
Foreign Assistance
Although Cuba, Nicaragua, and other foreign sup-
porters continue to provide arms, ammunition, train-
ing, funds, and other assistance to the Salvadoran
guerrillas, during the past year their relations with the
FMLN have been affected by concerns over a poten-
tial increased US role in the region.'
'Additional information on Nicaraguan, Cuban, and other foreign
assistance efforts; guerrilla arms acquisitions and losses; and infil-
tration routes appear in appendix E.
fourths of guerrilla ammunition needs and substantial
amounts of basic necessities are met by external
supply. Between May 1982 and June 1983, it appears
that the FMLN infiltrated about as man arms as it
captured, but since then
Ithe guerrillas have
infiltrated far fewer weapons than they have captured
(table 1).1
We believe the substantial drop in the flow of infil-
trated weapons since mid-1983 reflects both a re-
duced insurgent need for additional weapons follow-
ing a substantial influx of arms in 1982 and 1983 as
well as guerrilla success in capturing over 5,000
individual and crew-served weapons from the Salva-
doran military mostly during those same years.
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Training. Nicaragua and Cuba continue to play a
major role in training Salvadoran insurgents, despite
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the presence of numerous training facilities in El
Financing. Although information on guerrilla financ-
ing is sketchy, we believe the FMLN obtains much of
its funding from foreign countries and humanitarian
organizations. In recent months,
a steady decrease in financial
assistance received from West European sources and
international organizations.
European donors have cited the
insurgents' use of funds earmarked for humanitarian
purposes to purchase arms and the misappropriation
of sizable amounts of money by individual FMLN
members as reasons for reducing aid. As a result,
FMLN finances have suffered
Sandinista insurrection-individuals and small units
from every Central American country, Mexico, North
and South America, Cuba, and the Caribbean have
served as combatants and support personnel with the
guerrillas in El Salvador at one time or another
during the past four years.
West Europeans also have served with the guerrillas
in medical and other capacities. Such involvement
was dramatically underscored in June when a Spanish
doctor was killed in a firefight near a refugee camp in
Honduras. The doctor had worked as a volunteer in a
Honduran refugee camp for a few months before
joining the guerrillas in June 1983. During the past
year, unconfirmed reports of foreigners also serving as
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instructors, squad leaders, and even camp command-
ers have appeared in Salvadoran debriefings of cap-
tured guerrillas and defectors.
An analysis of guerrilla-initiated actions from Janu-
ary 1981 through June 1984 illuminates several basic
trends in guerrilla strategy and capabilities. The
overall level of insurgent activity peaked in early 1982
at the time of the national election. Since then it has
remained fairly steady at a reduced level, reflecting
both the guerrillas' underlying strengths and weak-
nesses. Guerrilla actions against civilian targets have
increased, but the number of attacks against military
targets has not-suggesting that insurgent unity and
supply shortages as well as more aggressive Army
tactics continue to inhibit military progress.
We have sought to measure basic guerrilla military
behavior by counting the number of attacks the
guerrillas have launched against stationary targets
each week since January 1981. Common targets
include military facilities and guardposts, towns,
bridges, and public buildings-especially utilities. The
data, compiled by the Central America Joint Intelli-
gence Team (CAJIT) in the Department of Defense,
show that the number of military attacks escalated
dramatically during the 1982 election campaign but
since has fallen to a lower level (figure 5, Military
Attacks)." Almost 80 attacks were registered in the
week before the March 1982 election, but the highest
number reported in any given week during the spring
1984 elections was 20. The number of guerrilla
ambushes-defined as attacks against moving tar-
gets-shows a similar pattern, with a major surge in
early 1982 and a lower level of activity since then
(figure 5, Ambush Incidents).
Some observers have attributed the lack of an appre-
ciable upward trend in military attacks and ambushes
since 1982 to an FMLN decision to conduct fewer
small-scale actions and create larger military units to
attack important military and strategic targets. We
believe the guerrillas hoped-unrealistically, as it
'? Details on the data base, definitions, and methodology used in
turned out-that such a strategy would undermine
the morale of the Salvadoran military and the popula-
tion as a whole. Since January 1982, however, the 25X1
number of major military attacks-involving compa-
ny-sized guerrilla units consisting of 120 or more
combatants-has never exceeded eight in one week,
and the average number of major military attacks, as
distinct from total military actions, for the first half of
1984 is lower than that in 1983 (figure 5, Major
Military Attacks). Some of this decline may reflect
frictions and supply problems within guerrilla ranks,
but most of it probably is due to the Salvadoran
military's growing ability to take the war to the
insurgents, especially in eastern El Salvador. By
frequently sweeping traditional base areas and supply
corridors, the military has kept the guerrillas off
balance and made it increasingly difficult for them to
gather the supplies and forces needed to launch major
Evidence of a change in guerrilla strategy is suggested
by a comparison of the number of insurgent actions
aimed at civilian targets with actions directed at
military targets (figure 6). In 1981, the number of
incidents involving civilian targets-such as robberies,
kidnapings, assassinations, sabotage, and road
blocks-roughly equaled that involving military tar-
gets. Beginning in 1982, however, the number of
incidents against civilians soared. During the March
1982 election campaign two-thirds of all incidents
were against civilians and even higher civilian rates
prevailed during the March 1984 election campaign.
The trend in kidnapings and robberies is even more
striking (figure 5, Kidnaping and Robbery Incidents).
The dramatic increase in kidnappings in 1984 reflects
growing guerrilla reliance on forced recruitment as
well as efforts to obtain ransom and impress farmers 25X1
and villagers to transport guerrilla supplies and casu-
alties. The number of robberies-mostly involving the
theft of clothes, shoes, and medicine from local stores
and pharmacies-has also surged, indicating that
guerrilla supply problems are becoming increasingly
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Figure 5
El Salvador: Guerrilla-Initiated Incidents,
January 1981 to July 1984
Five-week moving
average
f W \ ruin vY~W
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Figure 5 (continued)
Five-week moving
average
Kidnaping Incidents
0
1981
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Figure 6
El Salvador: Guerrilla Actions Against Military
and Civilian Targets, January 1981 to July 1984
Figure 7
El Salvador: Guerrilla Assassination
Incidents, January 1981 to July 1984
1,000
800
600
f1
400
200
I
11 III
IV 1
II III IV I II 111 IV l
II
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I
The data on guerrilla killings for political purposes
also appear to reflect basic shifts in insurgent strategy
(figure 7). In the first quarter of 1982, 31 incidents
were recorded involving the murder of national legis-
lators, mayors, military officers, and other security
force personnel. At that time the guerrillas still were
emphasizing urban warfare, and the resurgence of
killings of prominent individuals in early 1984 sug-
gests a possible return to this strategy. The small
number of such murders in the intervening period
might also reflect the government's success in uproot-
ing much of the FMLN's urban apparatus as well as
the elimination of thousands of leftist sympathizers
and potential assassins by rightwing death squads.
Projecting Near-Term Capabilities
In assessing insurgent capabilities and prospects over
the next year or two, four major variables stand out:
popular support, external assistance, guerrilla unity,
and the performance of the Salvadoran military and
government:
? Popular support will continue to be critical because
it directly affects the FMLN's ability to recruit and
retain combatants, provision its forces, and bring
pressure on the government.
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? Foreign assistance levels will determine whether the
guerrillas have enough ammunition, sufficient
weapons to equip additional forces, and a political
and propaganda apparatus that portrays the guerril-
las in the best light at home and abroad.
? How the insurgents deal with factionalism in their
ranks will affect their ability to coordinate military
operations and formulate an attractive political
program as well as a coherent, long-term military
strategy.
? The guerrillas' prospects will continue to turn on
whether the Salvadoran Government and military
avoid political infighting, control death squad activi-
ty, and keep their attention focused on winning the
war.
Most Likely Outcome
Taking the guerrillas' current overall strengths and
weaknesses into account, we believe insurgent force
strength is likely to drop by 1,000 to 3,000 over the
next two years, especially if the Duarte government
implements an effective amnesty program. Most de-
fections probably will come from the ranks of those
We judge desertions will continue largely be-
cause insurgent leaders can offer few inducements to
their fighters.
FMLN commanders in-
creasingly are threatening to take reprisals against the
guerrillas and their families if they desert.
We judge, nonetheless, that the guerrillas' overall
force capabilities are unlikely to diminish significant-
ly. The FMLN probably will be able to capture or
infiltrate all of the arms it needs, and
more sophisticated
weapons, such as SA-7 shoulder-fired antiaircraft
missiles, may be introduced shortly. If this system
proves effective against El Salvador's small Air Force,
the government's ability to redeploy forces, reinforce
units, and evacuate wounded will be seriously im-
paired. The FMLN would continue to depend on
foreign suppliers for ammunition and basic necessi-
ties, but, even with attrition of some forces, shortages
of such supplies probably would affect the pace more
than the intensity of the fighting.
The FMLN will continue, in our view, to operate from
all of its traditional base areas, maintaining its strong-
est presence along the Honduran border.
emphasis on urban
operations and terrorism will be renewed and that
military activity might pick up in western El Salva-
dor, if only to relieve pressure on guerrilla forces and
supply corridors elsewhere in the country. To the
extent that government sweeps and interdiction ef-
forts complicate resupply efforts, the guerrillas will
have to give more attention to conserving resources.
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FMLN leaders probably will become more selective in 25X1
choosing targets to attack and more cautious in
mapping out basic strategy.
Ideological differences and rivalries are likely to
continue hampering interfactional cooperation. Al-
though the FAL and the FPL-and to a lesser extent
the FARN and the PRTC-are moving toward more
integrated military operations, the ERP probably will
continue as in the past to operate relatively independ-
ently of the other factions. Efforts by the Duarte
government to engage the FMLN in a dialogue or to
entice some of its members into the legitimate politi-
cal process probably would exacerbate internal fric-
tions and further complicate efforts to improve tacti-
cal coordination.
Considering their growing concerns, guerrilla leaders
probably will increasingly emphasize the need to
strengthen popular support, but their prospects for
much success are dim largely because they are work-
ing from such a small base of supporters. The insur-
gents might make significant inroads in some labor
unions and peasant organizations, however, especially
if the Duarte administration adopts more confronta-
tional tactics in response to growing labor demands.
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Substantial Guerrilla Decline
Even if circumstances are substantially worse for the
guerrillas and defections jump significantly, we be-
lieve insurgent force strengths would not drop below
6,000 in the next two years. Substantial defections
could occur if the insurgents were unable to launch a
credible fall offensive and it became increasingly
apparent that the FMLN no longer was capable of
winning the war. Additional guerrillas also might be
tempted to leave if a new and better publicized
amnesty program was coupled with the development
of a legitimate left willing and able to participate in
municipal and legislative elections scheduled in 1985
or to prepare for such elections in 1988. Those who
chose to reenter legitimate political life probably
would become major targets of the extreme right or
left, just as those who were associated with the
reformist government in 1979 were targets of far right
violence.
Nonetheless, we doubt that any top FMLN leaders
would defect. A hard core of well-armed, combat-
experienced insurgents also would remain, determined
to continue the struggle over the foreseeable future.
About 6,000 insurgents now have been in the field for
two years or more, and they seem likely to persist even
under extremely adverse circumstances.
With such reduced force levels, we believe the FMLN
might lose some of its traditional base areas but would
retain a dominant position in strongholds along the
Honduran border. Base areas in western El Salvador
and in the Guazapa region might be more vulnerable,
especially if large numbers of guerrillas from the less
doctrinaire FAL or FARN defected. Guerrilla strong-
holds in southeastern El Salvador also might come
under increased pressure, particularly if the Salvador-
an military intensified efforts to interdict seaborne
infiltration across the Gulf of Fonseca.
More aggressive operations by the Salvadoran mili-
tary would make insurgent base areas throughout the
country less secure, thereby complicating guerrilla
supply efforts. The need for weapons and basic neces-
sities might pose less of a problem than at present
because fewer guerrillas would have to be armed, fed,
and clothed. Nevertheless, the guerrillas would be
operating out of sparsely populated areas, making it
more difficult for them to acquire goods and supplies
If the guerrillas saw their situation steadily deterio-
rating, some leaders-particularly those within the
ERP-might be tempted to push a "go-for-broke"
strategy or try to establish a liberated zone in the east.
Such a strategy would give the movement a tempo-
rary psychological boost and help restore insurgent
credibility at home and abroad. The military risk,
however, would be severe as the preponderance of
their forces could be lost in the fighting. A more likely
guerrilla response would be to place even greater
emphasis on urban terrorism, particularly assassina-
tion efforts aimed at senior Salvadoran officials and
US personnel.
A more fruitful strategy for the guerrillas would be to
continue the war at a reduced pace while attempting
over a period of years to rebuild a popular and
political base, resolve internal unity problems, and
restore their standing in the international community.
In such circumstances, Havana and Managua might
moderate their assistance until the guerrillas complet-
ed their retrenchment and could seriously challenge
the government.
The Guerrillas Regain Momentum
Should trends unexpectedly favor the guerrillas and
they begin to work together more closely, we believe
the FMLN still would be unlikely to add more than
2,000 combatants to its ranks in the next two years.
The FMLN would need more time to develop a
substantial popular base, and a major force expansion
would add to logistic problems. Although the guerril-
las probably have, or could acquire, enough weapons
to arm several thousand additional fighters, they
would have to rely increasingly on infiltration or
robbery and extortion to obtain additional ammuni-
tion and supplies. As a result, popular support would
be further eroded, making recruitment even more
difficult.
We believe a resurgent guerrilla force would first seek
to consolidate its position in eastern El Salvador.
Because the guerrillas already are well-entrenched in
parts of Usulutan, San Miguel, and Morazan Depart-
ments, further consolidation in the east would allow
locally.
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the FMLN. to secure several of its primary infiltration
routes. The guerrillas might be able to close portions
of the Pan American Highway. This not only would
facilitate infiltration efforts but deal a major psycho-
logical and economic blow to the Salvadoran Govern-
ment-much in the same way Angolan rebels have
ravaged the Luanda regime by shutting down the
Benguela Railroad."
Guerrilla activity in urban areas and western parts of
the country would grow in our view, affecting even the
most western Departments.
nsurgent strategy would be to
spread the government forces out, draw them away
from the east, and demonstrate that the guerrilla
struggle is a nationwide effort. Base areas and more
extensive resupply corridors probably would be devel-
oped in western Chalatenango and Santa Ana Depart-
ments to support such operations as well as new
infiltration routes along the western coast of El
Salvador. We believe the guerrillas would try to
infiltrate a growing proportion of arms and equipment
by sea and air because of the relative slowness of
overland deliveries.
Despite what would be their growing strength, we
believe many guerrilla leaders would remain reluctant
to declare a liberated zone. Such a declaration would
give the guerrillas a propaganda boost, but they would
be taking a major military risk by consolidating their
forces and requiring them to defend territory. More-
over, a liberated zone would be feasible only in
northeastern El Salvador where the ERP is dominant,
and the leaders of most other factions would want to
avoid any action that tended to increase the ERP's
standing within the alliance.
If the FMLN regained momentum, we judge its
foreign supporters almost certainly would try to accel-
erate shipments of arms and equipment and establish
new supply routes in an effort to consolidate insurgent
advances and propel the FMLN toward a final vic-
tory. Even then, the guerrillas probably would not
emerge victorious over the Duarte government in the
" The Benguela Railroad, which bisects Angola, had great econom-
ic and symbolic importance in that it was an integral part of the
regional transportation system and a key foreign exchange earner
next year or two largely because they would be
working from a relatively small popular base. More-
over, as in the past, internal frictions most likely
would persist or intensify with any improvement in
guerrilla prospects. Under these circumstances, we
doubt a guerrilla force with as many as 13,000
combatants could overwhelm a Salvadoran military
more than three times its size. The FMLN would be 25X1
able to achieve power only in the event that the
political system collapsed and the Salvadoran military
fell into disarray.
Guerrilla Intentions and Implications
for the United States
since early this year the guer-
rillas have been preparing a major offensive for the
summer or fall of 1984 to restore their military
credibility and to undercut the Reagan administra-
tion's electoral prospects in November. The Cubans
appear to have been especially active in urging and
planning this strategy, but
some guerrilla leaders may have resisted a
and trained manpower. Guerrilla leaders,
also were concerned that a
major offensive would give the US Government an
excuse to intervene directly or the justification it
needed to convince the US Congress to approve a
large military and economic assistance program for El
Salvador.
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The FMLN, in our view, can and will intensify
military activity in the next month or so, most likely
by mounting swift, intensive operations against highly
visible, strategic targets such as dams, bridges, air-
fields, oil refineries, port complexes, or departmental
capitals. At the same time, we believe efforts to harass
transport routes, impede the harvest, and increase
urban terrorism will continue. Nonetheless, we judge
that the guerrillas are incapable of sustaining a
nationwide offensive that could substantially alter the
military balance. The Salvadoran military's continued
sweeps, especially east of the Lempa River, have
disrupted the guerrillas' resupply activity this summer
and, probably will
continue to hamper guerrilla operations. Moreover,
the guer-
rillas still lack the strategic vision necessary to formu-
late a general plan and the coordinating mechanisms
needed to implement it at the tactical level.
Insurgent Strategy Beyond the US Election
Guerrilla strategy over the next year or two will be
influenced strongly by the outcome of the US Presi-
leaders would interpret a Reagan administration vic-
tory as a prelude to a US invasion of El Salvador.
If President Reagan is reelected, the FMLN probably
will continue to pursue a two-track policy, maintain-
ing military pressure on the Salvadoran Government
while seeking to engage the Duarte government in a
dialogue-primarily as a ploy to gain time in order to
rebuild popular support, develop stronger ties to labor
and peasant organizations, and strengthen their mili-
tary position." We believe FMLN leaders would
consider their chances of winning a total military
victory to be minimal but would seek to ensure that
they would be in a position to seize power in the event
that serious conflicts within the Salvadoran Govern-
ment or military threatened a collapse.
We judge that FMLN leaders would view continuing
US military and economic assistance to El Salvador
as a key obstacle to their winning the war. As a result,
they would be likely to give at least as much attention
to undercutting US public and Congressional support
Should President Reagan lose the election, we believe
the FMLN would pursue the negotiating track much
more vigorously, while preparing to step up military
activity after the new administration is in place. We
judge the FMLN would push hard to engage the new
administration and the Salvadoran Government in
serious negotiations in the hope this would open the
door to a power-sharing arrangement. Moreover, in-
surgent leaders almost certainly would expect the
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initiation of talks to enhance their credibility interna-
tionally, complicate Washington's relations with the
Salvadoran Government, and create serious problems
for Duarte in his dealings with the military and
conservative business sectors.
FMLN leaders probably would not increase the fight-
ing in late 1984; in our view, out of fear this might
provoke the outgoing administration to escalate US
involvement in the struggle. Nevertheless, we judge
the military struggle would receive greater emphasis
if it appeared the new administration in Washington
was unwilling to make meaningful concessions on the
negotiating front. By stepping up the fighting, the
guerrillas would hope to demonstrate the costs and
futility of continuing US support to the Duarte gov-
ernment. Moreover, from the guerrillas' perspective,
increased military activity would generate more pres-
sure for negotiations and help prepare the way for an
eventual military victory.
Regardless of who wins the US election, guerrilla
prospects are likely to continue to wax and wane in
tandem with the capability of the Salvadoran Govern-
ment and military. When the Salvadoran military has
lost the initiative in the past and political infighting
has broken out among senior officers, the guerrillas
traditionally have responded by holding back to see
who would come out on top and how the military and
political balance would be affected. The guerrillas
also may have refrained from escalating the fighting
because they believed this would inspire the military
to put aside its differences and focus on the war.
When the military has gone on the offensive, the
guerrillas usually have tried to meet the challenge,
striking back in order to show their foreign supporters
and the Salvadoran armed forces that they cannot be
easily vanquished. Since January, however, the Salva-
doran military has kept the guerrillas off balance
throughout much of the country and disrupted their
supply networks. If the military can maintain the
tactical initiative, keep the insurgents on the move,
and reduce the flow of infiltrated weapons, ammuni-
tions, and supplies, we judge the FMLN's ability to
rebound will be severely inhibited.
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Appendix A
The FMLN's Five and One-Half Factions
The People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)
The ERP was founded in 1972 as an urban terrorist
organization made up largely of radical Marxist
students and some Christian socialists bent on vio-
lence. The ERP, led by Joaquin Villalobos, is the
largest and most aggressive of the guerrilla groups
and often functions in the role of military tactician for
the alliance.
The ERP is an opportunistic organization with shal-
low ideological roots. Although in 1977 it created the
Salvadoran Revolutionary Party (PRS) and a front
group, the Popular Leagues of 28 February (LP-28),
the ERP has paid far less attention to political
organization and propagandizing than the military
aspects of the struggle.
The ERP, with an estimated strength of 3,000 to
3,500 combatants, was the first guerrilla faction to
establish large, conventional size units in an effort to
regularize command and control and give the guerril-
las a counterbalance to the government's immediate
Radio Venceremos, a clandestine radio station that
usually transmits from northern Morazan Depart-
ment, is operated by the ERP.
Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces (FPL)
The FPL was founded in 1970 when Salvador Caye-
tano Carpio broke with the Communist Party of El
Salvador because, in his view, it did not give sufficient
emphasis to the armed struggle. It began as an urban
terrorist group and evolved into a predominantly rural
Under Carpio's leadership, the FPL was the largest
and most prestigious of the guerrilla groups. The
military arm of the FPL is often referred to as the
Popular Armed Forces of Liberation (FAPL). Its
associated mass organization, the Popular Revolution-
ary Bloc (BPR), was founded in 1975.
Following the death of Carpio and his deputy in the
spring of 1983, a more conciliatory leadership took
power. The FPL's new chief, Leonel Gonzalez, had
spent much of his time at FPL headquarters in
Nicaragua where he coordinated logistic, political,
and military activities. His deputy, Dimas Rodriguez,
previously commanded the FPL's northern front.
Gonzalez and Rodriguez restructured the FAPL in
order to improve combat capabilities and to facilitate
coordination with other factions. As of July 1984 at
least four infantry battalions had been formed, con-
sisting of some 400 combatants and 100 support
personnel each. These battalions comprise the Felipe
Pena Mendoza Brigade which operates in the Central
The FPL broadcasts clandestinely over Radio Fara-
bundo Marti, which usually is based in Las Vueltas,
Chalatenango Department.
The Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN)
The FARN and its party organization, the National
Resistance (RN), were established in 1975 by a
dissident group that split from the ERP after their
leader, noted poet and former Communist Party
guerrilla movement.
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member Roque Dalton, was murdered by ERP mili-
tants. The dissidents opposed the ERP's emphasis on
terrorism and its failure to organize the masses.
In 1975 the FARN affiliated itself with the already
existing United Popular Action Front (FAPU), which
is now the FARN front organization. FAPU, which
was created in 1974, was the second largest Marxist
front organization at that time.
Ferman Cienfuegos became head of the FARN and
the RN in September 1980 when his predecessor
reportedly was killed in a plane crash in Panama.
Some believe that his death also occurred under
suspicious circumstances. Under Cienfuegos' direc-
tion, the FARN has gained the reputation in El
Salvador and internationally as the least doctrinaire
and most nationalistic of the five factions.
The FARN, which now has an estimated 1,400 to
1,550 combatants, was the last of the factions to
restructure its combat forces, creating at least two
battalions or "columns" in 1983.
The Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL)
The FAL is the military arm of the Moscow-support-
ed Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES). The
party was founded in 1930 and exerts substantial
influence over its military counterpart. The Commu-
nist Party's front organization, the Nationalist Demo-
cratic Union (UDN), was founded in 1968, and the
FAL was established in 1979 after the party decided
to join the insurgency.
Shafik Handal has been general secretary of the party
since the early 1970s and now helps direct the guerril-
la movement.
Moscow and Havana would like to see Handal's
faction dominate any future government established
by the guerrillas. Much of the group's influence is due
to continued Soviet and Cuban support.
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number between 1,160 and 1,325 insurgents. Their
units have become increasingly integrated into the
FPL's military structure.
The Revolutionary Party of Central American
Workers (PRTC)
The PRTC was founded as a regional party organiza-
tion in Costa Rica and has branches in all Central
American countries. The Salvadoran branch, headed
posts.
The PRTC is the smallest, least influential faction in
the FMLN and has claimed responsibility for many
bombings and assassinations. It has close ties to the
Cubans and the Nicaraguans. According to several
defectors, Nicaraguans have served in leadership
Military operations were conducted under the name
of the PRTC until a separate military organization,
the Revolutionary Armed Forces for Popular Libera-
tion (FARLP), was created following the March 1982
election. The PRTC's mass organization, the Popular
Liberation Movement (MLP), was founded in 1979.
The PRTC's estimated 700 to 850 insurgents are
organized into the mobile Luis Adalberto Diaz De-
tachment with three columns of about 115 combat-
ants each, and 300 to 450 territorial and militia troops
subordinate to commands in the Central and Paracen-
tral Fronts and in the northern and southern portions
of the Eastern Front.
Revolutionary Workers' Movement (MOR)
In a communique published in December 1983, the
FPL announced that a splinter group had emerged in
San Salvador calling itself the Salvador Cayetano
Carpio Revolutionary Workers' Movement (MOR).
The communique said this group was pledged to
follow the more dogmatic line of former FPL com-
mander Carpio and noted that the FPL needed to
espouse a less fanatical ideology.
In late 1983, another
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by Roberto Roca, is the most active.
renegade FP group, the Clara Elizabeth Ramirez
Front (CER), was conducting terrorist operations in
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Former FPL commander
Filomeno Ramirez appears to be in charge of the
MOR.
The MOR and the CER have been described as a
group of about 100 dangerous, well-trained terrorists
operating in San Salvador and, to a lesser extent, in
Usulutan, San Miguel, and Santa Ana.
On several occasions the FPL has publicly disassociat-
ed itself from the MOR and the CER, and only the
PRTC among the other insurgent factions has shown
any willingness to cooperate with the dissidents. F7
view of its small size and internal problems, the
FMLN leadership is not likely to recognize the MOR
as a legitimate guerrilla faction.
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Appendix B
Common goals and personal backgrounds have helped
to hold the guerrillas together, but at the same time
serious rifts have always existed as a result of funda-
mental differences over policy and strategy and per-
sonal rivalries. Presently existing components of the
movement date from the 1970s, as one group after
another was formed by extreme leftists, many of
whom originally were members of the Communist
Party of El Salvador. In late 1980, owing largely to
pressure from Havana and Moscow, the five groups
united under the umbrella of the FMLN, but contin-
ued factionalism and a lack of coordination contribut-
ed significantly to the failure of the guerrilla's Janu-
ary 1981 "final offensive."
In the four years since the FMLN was created, it has
had little success implementing directives intended to
be binding on all member organizations. For example,
two guerrilla factions were unprepared for the
FMLN's "final offensive" in 1981, and the FPL did
not participate in the general offensive that took ?lace
at the time of the March 1982 election.
)
One of the many issues that has sparked debate
within the movement has been the distribution of
funds provided by international humanitarian agen-
Such antagonism has appeared within as well as
between the guerrilla factions. In 1982, differences
within the FPL over the conduct of the war and
negotiating strategy provoked a major rift when some
young FPL leaders and deputy commander Melida
Anaya Montes-"Ana Maria"-began to press then
top commander Salvador Cayetano Carpio to be more
accommodating or to give way to younger, more
flexible leaders. The dispute surfaced openly in April
1983 when Ana Maria was murdered by a group of
Carpio's followers and Carpio then allegedly commit-
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manders in the FPL's Clara Elizabeth Ramirez Front
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access to houses, cars, food, and liquor. Living condi-
tions are harsh for guerrillas for all factions and such
rank-and-file dissatisfaction with the Nicaraguan-
based leadership extends well beyond the FARN.
This spring
urban units of the PRTC were
showing a ten ency to disobey orders from guerrilla
leaders in Nicaragua. In May, a top PRTC leader was
dispatched to El Salvador to reestablish discipline and
to dissuade urban units from new killings, but they
apparently ignored his instructions
Despite such efforts, the guerrillas have been relative-
ly inactive during much of this year.
a coordinated military strategy.
the guerrillas' failure to
disrupt the March an May elections largely reflected
internal policy differences and an inability to agree on
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Appendix C
FMLN Force Capabilities
Force Size
As of mid-1984, the FMLN had developed an effec-
tive combat strength of some 9,000 to 11,000 armed
insurgents, including its militia forces." Of this num-
ber, we estimate that some 6,000 to 8,000 are well-
armed, well-trained, and combat experienced.F_
Senior Salvadoran military officials have said that the
guerrillas were trying to build a total force of some
14,000 insurgents in preparation for a fall 1984
offensive, but we believe insurgent leaders have en-
countered major problems in meeting this target.
Salvadoran authorities estimate that from March
through July 1984 the guerrillas had impressed over
1,500 people, mostly youths in eastern portions of El
Salvador; the total number of Salvadorans forcibly
recruited in 1984 could well exceed 3,000.
that what they were doing was wrong. Large numbers
of guerrillas probably also have deserted without
notifying Salvadoran authorities.
of medical care.
In addition, guerrilla ranks have been depleted by
combat losses, but we cannot obtain accurate figures
on casualty rates. The Salvadoran military estimates
that over 1,250 guerrillas were killed from 1 January
to 20 August this year. These figures may be exagger-
ated because they count guerrilla sympathizers and
other civilians killed in the crossfire. The guerrillas
also are known to retrieve the bodies and weapons of
many, if not most, of their comrades killed in action.
Guerrilla losses due to inadequate medical care are
high. For example, a 16-year-old guerrilla deserter
who had been forcibly recruited early this year cited
three incidents in one month where 10, 12, and 15
guerrillas wounded in firefights died because of a lack
substantial
attrition of guerrilla ranks in 1984. In an interview
last May, Army Chief of Staff Colonel Blandon said
there had been 900 guerrilla desertions since Decem-
ber 1983, compared to only a few dozen in the
previous six months. Between August 1983 and Sep-
tember 1984, some 175 guerrillas had responded to a
government amnesty program offering a bounty of
about $250 for turning themselves in with their
weapons. Other reasons cited by guerrillas for defect-
ing include hunger, cold, lack of pay, and the belief
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Training
Nicaragua, Cuba, and other countries friendly to the
FMLN continue to play an important role in training
guerrillas from all factions are continuing and possi-
bly expanding in Nicaragua.
a military camp under
construction on the Cosiguina Peninsula in northwest-
ern Nicaragua was used training camp for
Salvadoran insurgents
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=three antiaircraft sites-possibly for SA-7
training-nearby protected by sawtooth trenching,
firing ranges, an obstacle course, a baseball field,
people in military formation. and at least 11 small
barracks-tune buildings.
Substantial training activity a ears to be taking
place in El Salvador
have revealed the presence o
training camps accommodating as many as 300 guer-
rillas at various locations in northern San Miguel and
Morazan, eastern Chalatenango, and southern Usulu-
tan Departments. The courses last from a few weeks
to three months and usually include physical trainin
military instruction, and political indoctrination.
Foreign Advisers
Many of the foreigners who are working with the
insurgents in El Salvador appear to be serving as
doctors, nurses, or medics. During the past four years,
however, foreigners also have served as combatants,
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instructors, military advisers, and even as camp com-
manders or squad leaders,
defected in March said that early this year 24 Cubans
spent a month at an insurgent camp near Corinto,
Morazan Department, where they provided instruc-
tion in the use of small arms and lectured on how the
Cuban revolution applied to El Salvador.
near El Column, Chalatenango Department, that was
under the command of a Cuban, "Commandante
Guillermo.'
at a base camp near Los Mangos, Chalatenango; he
said one of the Cubans was in charge of physical
instruction and the other was a squad leader. Another
Cuba camp near San Augustin
in Usulutan Department. According to press reports,
a kidnap victim from San Vicente said he encountered
12 Cuban weapons instructors at the insurgent camp
where he was held captive for several days in July.
During the past year there have been occasional
reports of Nicaraguans operating with the guerrillas
in El Salvador as well. An ERP insurgent who
deserted in August 1983 identified a Nicaraguan
named Williams, also called "Negro," as a column
commander for the elite BRAZ brigade and another
Nicaraguan as a column commander and director of a
military school. An ERP insurgent who defected in
January 1984 also referred to a Nicaraguan called
"Negro William" who he said had commanded a
camp near La Corina in San Miguel Department. He
added that a Cuban was in charge of political indoc-
trination at the camp.
We believe that most guerrilla funding comes from
foreign donors such as international organizations and
sympathetic governments,
funds also are
obtained locally by robbing banks, kidnaping wealthy
individuals for ransom, cattle rustling, or by setting
up roadblocks to collect "war taxes." The FMLN
publicly admitted that four men who tried to rob a
bank in Soyapango-a suburb of San Salvador-in
August were FAL members and that the attack was
justified by the guerrillas' need for funds.
Basic Necessities
The lack of medicine, food, shoes, and clothing ap-
pears as a growing complaint in guerrilla communica-
tions and interrogation reports, probably due in large
part to more aggressive activities of the Salvadoran
military in disrupting the insurgents' traditional base
areas. Although some defectors describe the condi-
tions under which they operate as difficult but man-
ageable, others have spoken of desperation and low
morale due to harsh living conditions in their camps.
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two other Honduran refugee camps in Colomonca ua
and San Antonio. in
early 1984 the ERP's BRAZ brigade obtained most of
its food, medicine, and supplies from Colomoncagua.
living in the immediate vicinity.
The guerrillas appear to obtain most of their basic
necessities from the populace either through donations
or extortion. Robbery and roadblocks seems to be the
most frequent means of expropriating goods; grocery
stores and pharmacies are frequently broken into and
buses and private vehicles are constantly stopped
along major roads to extort money, shoes, clothing,
and food. Because such actions undermine popular
support for their cause, the guerrillas purchase food
and clothing from local storekeepers when funds are
available.
Substantial quantities of supplies also are smuggled
into the country from Honduras, Nicaragua, and
Guatemala. According to a guerrilla who guarded an
FPL safehouse in Honduras and was captured in
March 1984, food and medicine were brought to this
house from Tegucigalpa twice a month and then
smuggled across the border into Chalatenango De-
partment. Other guerrilla defectors have reported
regular deliveries of supplies to other parts of El
Salvador from Honduras, using pack animals or
trucks, and from Nicaragua using boats.
Insurgents in eastern El Salvador appear to be more
dependent on nonguerrilla sources for their basic food
requirements than their counterparts in western base
areas. Although some peasant sympathizers provide
food voluntarily to the guerrillas, an insurgent who
deserted from the ERP in late 1983 said that in some
parts of eastern El Salvador villagers were forced to
cultivate corn, rice, and beans to supplement guerrilla
food supplies
the guerrillas were paying farmers in several
departments to buy seeds and fertilizer with the
understanding that half of the harvest would go to the
insurgents. The FPL defector also said the guerrillas
often require peasants to turn over half their crops to
the guerrillas.
The guerrillas are known to have large plots of land
under cultivation in the Guazapa area and in western
Cabanas Department.
production unit" growing corn, beans, and rice for
guerrillas based in northern Morazan. Plots of land
that have been identified near guerrilla base camps in
eastern El Salvador during the past year, however, do
not appear large enough to feed more than those
Moreover, there is growing evidence that refugee
camps near the Salvadoran border in Honduras some-
times serve as supply bases for Salvadoran insurgent
forces. In June the US defense attache in Tegucigalpa
reported that Honduran military officers had discov-
ered a guerrilla supply corridor from the UN-spon-
sored refugee camp at Mesa Grande to Chalatenango
Department. Honduran military investigators have
determined that sympathizers in that camp repaired
equipment and clothing for the Salvadoran guerrillas,
and that insurgents used the camp for rest and
medical care. In mid-June, Honduran soldiers clashed
with armed guerrillas who had left the camp to rob
nearby houses. According to the Hondurans, such
incidents were increasing.
Salvadoran guerrillas in northern San Miguel and
Morazan Departments reportedly have used at least
The guerrillas seem to have developed no more than
rudimentary medical facilities to support their com-
batants.
medical personnel with no more than basic training
accompany combat units in the field. Captured guer-
rillas and defectors also have reported the presence of
clandestine "hospitals" in most guerrilla base areas,
but we doubt such facilities are well equipped or well
supplied.
the insurgents rely heavily on foreign
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Appendix D
Guerrilla Weapons Inventory
Light infantry weapons .357 MAG revolver
Automatic rifles .45-caliber revolver
5.56-mm M-16 (including AR-15) .25 caliber
5.56-mm GALIL 9-mm pistol
5.56-mm CAL assault .32 caliber
7.62-mm FAL Crew-served weapons
.30-caliber M-1 Garand .50 caliber
.30-caliber Browning automatic (BAR) .30 caliber
.30-caliber M-1 carbine 7.62-mm M-60
.30-caliber M-2 carbine 5.56-mm or 7.62-mm HK-21 light machinegun
Other rifles Grenade rocket launchers
.22 caliber hunting rifle (30.06) M-79 grenade launcher
Czechoslovak manufacture shotguns (12, 16, and 20 gauge) M-72 (LAW-light antitank weapon)
Submachineguns RPG-2 (rocket launcher)
9-mm H&K MP-5 (HK52) RPG-7 (rocket launcher)
9-mm UZI Recoilless rifles
.45-caliber M-3 (Grease Gun) 75 mm
.45-caliber Thompson 90 mm
9-mm Sterling (Police Carbine Mark 4) or 9x19-mm Mortars
NATO L2A3 60 mm
Pistols
81 mm
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Appendix E
External Support: The Cuba-
Nicaragua Pipeline
most reports available to us from defectors
prior to mid-1983.'
the insurgents remain
heavily dependent on Cuba and Nicaragua for ammu-
nition and supplies, although their need for small
arms has diminished.
ing to infiltrate materiel from Nicaragua into El
Salvador by air, land, and sea, had sufficient weapons
to arm their combatants and were therefore primarily
infiltrating munitions, spare parts, medicines, and
clothing. Reinforcing the emphasis on ammunition,
few weapons were being sent to El Salvador because
the guerrillas had sufficient arms and the Nicara-
guans had a greater need for the weapons them-
selves-apparently a reference to the increasing mili-
tary challenge directed against Managua by the
anti-Sandinista insurgents.
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large pockets of disputed territory restricts Salvador-
an and Honduran military activity in those areas.
the insurgents
cache weapons in refugee camps in Honduras and use
these camps for resupply and other support activities.
coast of El Salvador.
Seaborne deliveries probably equal or exceed overland
infiltration. About a dozen suspected infiltration
points have been identified along the southeastern
supplies generally leave Nicaragua on board
for later distribution.
large boats or canoes and are transferred to smaller
crafts in the Gulf of Fonseca at night and ferried to
the beaches where they are picked up by the guerrillas
dot eastern El Salvador.
Lesser amounts of materiel also continue to be para-
dropped or delivered to a myriad of dirt airstrips that
arms, ammunition, and other
that arms and supplies enter El Salvador
through at least four infiltration corridors from Gua-
temala and at least nine routes from Honduras (figure
9). Most of the arms that are purchased on the
international black market appear to be funneled
through Guatemala. Overland shipments by truck,
pack animal, or human porter through Honduras
probably remain the most consistent method of resup-
ply. Rugged terrain makes the Honduran frontier
difficult to patrol, and the presence of a number of
the FPL has decided that, if any problems are
encountered with this mode of delivery, it would
resort once again to bringing arms and ammunition
regularly based in Nicaragua.
supplies were being flown into Honduras from Nica-
ragua and then transported into El Salvador. The
aircraft used reportedly belong to the FPL and are
into the country by sea.
The sophistication of the guerrillas' delivery system is
complemented by their flexible distribution networks,
We believe most internal transshipment points are
located east of the Lempa River, where the insurgents
are strongest and geographically nearest Nicaragua.
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Toll) Secret
Figure 9
Arms Infiltration
C Overland infiltration corridor
?- Seaborne infiltration point
In May, the Salvadoran military discovered and
destroyed 34 canoes, each more than 5 meters long, at
the mouth of the Lempa River.
Recently captured documents also attest to the exten-
siveness of the distribution network as reflected in
hand-drawn maps depicting insurgent-controlled lo-
gistics corridors in the coastal areas, 10 nearby air-
strips, and the locations of Salvadoran military units.
columns of 30 to
300 men have been used to transport materials. In
Traditional guerrilla base area
Area of relatively free guerrilla
movement
Road
o 50
Guatemala
w
rEMALA t
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Honduras
TEGUCIGALPA
Units
-r ..
addition, the Salvadoran Army recently identified
what it believes are several guerrilla warehouses and
distribution centers in southern and southeastern El
Salvador.
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Table 3
El Salvador: Trace Information on
M-16?Rifles in Guerrilla Hands a
M-16 Rifles As a Share
(number) of Total
(percent)
Other Foreign Suppliers
Probably delivered to 372
Vietnam
other suppliers are active, including countries in the
Soviet Bloc, the Middle East, and Vietnam. For
instance, analysis of 7.62-mm ammunition captured
in May strongly suggests Bulgarian manufacture, and
similar ammunition recently was discovered in a
guerrilla arms cache. Since late 1982, Bulgaria has
shipped large quantities of military materiel to Nica-
ragua, some of which we believe may have been
earmarked for delivery to. the Salvadoran guerrillas or
intended to replenish items the Sandinistas took from
their own stocks and sent to the insurgents. F_
Originally sent to Vietnam 202 44
by United States
Traced to US military units 90
or depots in the 1960s with
probable delivery to
Vietnam
Produced by US manufac- 80
turers during the Vietnam
era with probable delivery
to Vietnam
Probably delivered 91 20
elsewhere
Originally sent to 68 15
El Salvador
Originally sent to the 9
Somoza government in
Nicaragua
a As of 26 July 1984, 471 M-16s had been captured from the
insurgents and 264 had been identified from captured documents.
Trace information is available for 463 of these M-16s, including
252 that were captured and 211 that were listed in documents.
(S NF)
Regarding the Vietnamese connection, the US de-
fense attache reports the Salvadoran Army recently
captured an 82-mm mortar sight with Vietnamese
markings. Eighty percent of the traceable M-16 rifles
that were captured from the insurgents or that are
still in guerrilla hands, according to captured docu-
ments, probably were sent to Vietnam over a decade
ago, according to the US Embassy (table 3). We
believe most of the equipment furnished by Hanoi was
delivered in the early 1980s.
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25X1
Appendix F
Methodology for Tracking
Salvadoran Guerrilla
Performance
The analysis of guerrilla performance is based on
data base of daily counts of guerrilla-
initiated incidents from January 1981 to July 1984.
The data base-developed by CAJIT in an effort to
better understand insurgent activities, tactics, and
strategies-currently contains over 11,000 incidents
ranging from major attacks to minor civil distur-
bances.
For each incident, CAJIT recorded the following
information:
? Incident type (table 4).
? Target type (table 5).
? Date.
? Place name.
? Coordinates.
? Guerrilla faction.
? Source, report number, and date of report.
? Comments, which include number of casualties.
Table 4
El Salvador: Incident Types
in the Guerrilla Data Base
AMB
ARS
MUR
ASL
ATK
BAR
BMB
CNT
CON
DIV
ENG
EXE
FIR
GDF
HAR
HOS
KID
LOG
OCC
PRO
RAI
RAN
REC
BLK
ROB
SAB
STR
TAX
THW
VAN
GUR
GOV
CIV
OTH
Ambush
Arson
Assassination
Assault
Attack
Barricade
Bombing
Continuation
Containment
Diversion
Engagement
Execution
Firefight/ Confrontation
Groundfire
Harassment
Hostage
Kidnaping
Logistics
Occupation
Propaganda
Raid
Ransom
Recruitment
Roadblock
Robbery
Sabotage
Strike
Taxation
Thwarted attempt
Vandalism
Guerrillas killed
Government killed
Civilians killed
Other
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2bAl
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Table 5
El Salvador: Target Types
in the Guerrilla Data Base
AGR
BRD
BUS
CIV
CLO
COM
CUL
CAM
DIP
DOC
ECO
EDU
EQP
FAC
FOD
FOR
GOV
INF
LIV
LOG
MTL
MED
MIL
MON
PAR
PER
PLC
PET
POL
POW
RAL
RLG
RD W
STR
STU
TWN
TRN
W AT
OTH
Agriculture
Bridge
Business
Civilian
Clothing
Communications
Cultural
Dam
Diplomatic
Documents
Economic
Education
Equipment
Facility
Foodstuffs
Foreign
Government
Infrastructure
Livestock
Logistics
Materiel
Medical
Military
Money
Paramilitary
Personnel
Police
Petroleum
Political
Power
Rail
Religious
Roadway
Storage
Student
Town
Transportation
Water
Other
Primary and Secondary Incident Types and Target
Types
Each incident is classified by a primary and an
optional secondary incident type. The 21 incident
types often are paired such as roadblocks and robbery,
bombings and sabotage, and attacks resulting in
occupations (table 9).
CAJIT coded certain incident types under more than
one name (table 7). Incident types were combined as
follows:
? An attack and an assault.
? Engagements, firefights, and confrontations.
? Robbery and taxation.
? Barricade and containment.
For the purposes of our analysis, an incident was
counted only when it appeared as a primary type.
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Table 7
Definitions and Comments on Incident Types
A forceful hostile action against a station-
ary government force (also called an
assault).
A military action against a moving gov-
ernmental force.
A military action to obtain supplies for
current needs.
Harassment Military actions such as sniping, lobbing a
small number of shells, or similar actions
which seem intended to hamper govern-
mental operations rather than to defeat
them. Harassments also include the mak-
ing of threats.
A military action to divert governmental
forces from other activities.
Groundfire Guerrilla fire directed against aircraft. The data points on the graphs represent the number of
Engagements Unplanned, opportunistic. hostilities (also incidents per week. The weekly level of aggregation
called confrontations and firefights). 1 h 11
t
d
Occupation
Barricade
Sometimes used as a secondary incident
type to identify unsuccessful incidents.
Seizure of territory.
Targets also are classified by 15 primary and 39
optional secondary target types with frequent combi-
nations including military personnel, civilian person-
nel, civilian transportation, communications infra-
structure, power infrastructure, and military facilities
(table 10). Facilities and infrastructure are differenti-
ated by size and importance. For example, destroying
a telephone switch box is an attack on a facility, but
destroying a powerline is an attack on the entire
power network.
Analytic Methods
Graphical. The number of guerrilla incidents of a
particular type fluctuated greatly on a daily and even
a weekly basis. The graphs that appear in this assess-
ment are drawn to reflect the broad trends and the
short-term fluctuations.
revea s
e overa tren
s to the data, which can be
submerged in daily variations. The smooth lines are
five-week moving averages of the weekly data. A
moving average is a technique for smoothing a curve.
The value of the continuous curve at a particular week
The embargoing of an area (also called a represents the average of five weeks of activity,
containment). centered about the given week.
Roadblock The deliberate blockage of a road by any
means. If the roadblock is part of a barri-
cade, the incident is coded as a barricade.
Robbery May also be reported as taxation, depend-
ing on the source.
Kidnaping The forcible impressment of a person into
guerrilla ranks or to perform services such
as transporting guerrillas to another town.
Assassination The deliberate killing of a politically
prominent individual.
The disruption of offices, property, etc.,
without major destruction.
When activity levels for two consecutive weeks were
very close, the two data points were merged into a
single point on the graph for ease of readability. Thus,
a year on a graph may contain less than 52 points. In
all analysis, of course, the full set of data were used.
The bar chart showing the number of assassinations
(figure 7) reflects total incidents per quarter from
The deliberate killing of a nonprominent January 1981 to July 1984. Figure 6, which compares
individual. guerrilla incidents involving civilian versus military
Sabotage The destruction of facilities which support targets, also is calculated on a quarterly basis. In
governmental military operations or the order to construct this graph, the data first had to be
economy.
The detonation of any kind of a bomb
except a leaflet bomb. If the bombing
occurs in an ambush, attack, or other
combat category, it is coded in that
category.
such as leaflets and briefings. Dramatic
actions without verbal content are not
considered propaganda.
Self-explanatory.
partitioned into military- and civilian-related inci-
dents. Any incident labeled as military or civilian in
the primary or secondary target type was treated as
such. This procedure classified roughly half of the
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Toa Secret
Table 8
Classification of Incidents by
Secondary Target Type
Agricultural
Bridge
Business
Communications
Cultural
Dam
Diplomatic
Economic
Educational
Foodstuffs
Foreign
Government
Infrastructure
Livestock
Logistics
Money
Petroleum
Political
Power
Rail
Roadway
Religious
Student
Town
Water
Documents
Equipment
Materiel
Paramilitary
Police
Clothing
Facilities
Medical
Other
Personnel
Storage
The remaining incidents were classified on the basis
of their secondary target type (the more specific target
type). Some types clearly indicate civilian targets (for
example, agriculture, and cultural). Others, such as
logistics, are more problematic. For these, the CAJIT
coder's comments were examined to determine the
overall impact of the category. A few categories could
not be classified as either civilian or military. These
578 incidents were excluded from the graph. The
classification of each secondary target type appears in
table 8.
Statistical. A trend analysis was performed on each
incident type, with the objective of determining the
presence or absence of a significant overall trend over
the four-year period. No significant overall trend was
found in a majority of the incident types. Even in
those cases with a significant overall trend, the inter-
pretation and practical significance of each result was
clouded by the following factors:
? Offensives and elections prompted peaks of guerrilla
activity. These significantly affected the overall
trend, thus obscuring changes in the underlying
baseline.
? The overall variability of the data, plus sharp
changes in the level of the variability, weakened the
meaningfulness of statistical trend assessments.
? A different trend is sometimes evident in different
years, thus weakening the interpretability of the
overall trend.
As a result, overall trend analyses of the incident data
are not very meaningful. Each incident type should be
examined on a year-to-year basis, taking into account
the effects of significant events such as elections.
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Table 9
El Salvador: Primary Versus
Secondary Incident Type
Roadblock 2 19 1 15 1 13 1 18 6 6 24 ,.fr 358 16 11 241 732
Robbery 4 1 1 2 5 5 2 1 5 4 2 748 780
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Table 10
El Salvador: Primary Versus Secondary Target Type
Target Type
Primary
Secondary
AGR BRD
BUS
CIV CLO COM
CUL
DAM
DIP
DOC ECO
EDU
EQP FAC
FOD
FOR
GOV
INF LIV LOG
Business
1
Civilian
2
2
1
Communications
Economic
18
1
1
Equipment
8
2
1
Facility
55
94
80 77
4
14
1
7
50
2 9
Government
1
Infrastructure
4 171
1
3 78
12
3
6
Logistics
8
1
1 16 6
2
8 8
89
3 129
Military
1
3
3
Other
Personnel
48
13
2,055 3
3
9
6
13
9;
Political
Storage
Transportation
28
16
334 2
3
3
7
10 2
None
Total
169 171
127
2,473 16 169
4
12
17
1 6
16
8 18
90
9~
70
16 129 30
MED MIL
MON MTL OTH PAR
PER
PET
PLC
POL POW
RAL
RDW RLG
STR
.:f
STU
TRN
TWN WAT None Total
Business
1
Civilian
1
4 10
Communications
1 1
Economic
3
1 24
Equipment
1
6 2
20
Facility
9 408
51
2
17
27
13 123
4
4
14
6
1 1 5 1,078
Government
1
Infrastructure
1
2 1
9
3
632
12
70
220
1,146 24 2 2,400
Logistics
23 3
573
31 28
2
2
1
152
1 99 1,186
Military
12
19
Other
1 1
Personnel
14 3,004
296
179
31 2
4
7
31
15 5,742
Political
1
1
Storage
1
1
Transportation.
3 93
12
2
1
80
3
1 11 611
None
- 1 t
Total
49 3,509
573
32 31 348
38
25
207
50 760
96
73 8
14
7
412
1,148 26 140 11,097
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