NAMIBIA: SWAPO'S ARMY-ORGANIZATION, TACTICS, AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00317R000300030002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Namibia: SWAPO's Army
Organization, Tactics,
and Prospects
ALA 84-10103
October 1984
343
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 Namibia: SWAPO's Army
Organization, Tactics,
and Prospects
Africa Division, ALA,
directed to the Chief, Southern Africa Branch,
This paper was prepared by I (Office
of African and Latin American Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
Secret
ALA 84-10103
October 1984
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~.E ?E~ Directorate of secret
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Secret
Namibia: SWAPO's Army-
Organization, Tactics,
and Prospects F_~
Key Judgments Since 1966, the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) has
Information available waged an externally based, low-intensity insurgent campaign designed to
as ofI September 1984 undermine South Africa's determination to control Namibia. Although
was used in this report.
SWAPO's guerrilla force-the People's Liberation Army of Namibia
(PLAN)-has between 7,000 and 8,000 armed men, it commits only about
10 percent of them to combat operations in Namibia at any time. The
annual cycle of insurgent activity usually begins with a major infiltration
and hit-and-run attacks on the South African and Namibian forces during
the rainy season that extends from November to April. With the onset of
dry weather, the reduced concealment and dwindling stocks of ammunition
force most of the guerrillas to return to Angola. Those who remain in
Namibia generally disperse and conduct isolated terrorist attacks on
civilian targets.
Since PLAN relocated from Zambia to Angola in the mid-1970s, the
Soviet Bloc has provided the vast majority of the insurgents' weapons,
equipment, and training. Moscow has supplied infantry arms and ammuni-
tion, SA-7 missiles and antiaircraft guns, trucks, and even a few armored
vehicles. Cuban instructors provide SWAPO with military training in
Angola, and insurgents are sent to the USSR, Eastern Europe, Cuba, and a
number of African countries for training.
The insurgents have never attempted to defeat the South Africans
militarily-something we are confident they cannot do-but they have
increased the costs to Pretoria of maintaining control of Namibia. They
force Pretoria to maintain between 15,000 and 20,000 full-time troops
there, have overcome South African raids on their bases in Angola, and
have maintained their personnel strength despite suffering heavy casual-
ties. With few exceptions, however, Pretoria has contained guerrilla
operations in northern Namibia, away from the politically sensitive, white-
populated areas farther south. Moreover, SWAPO's guerrillas have never
overturned Pretoria's control of any portion of Namibian territory.
The South Africans benefit from ethnic divisions and geographic obstacles
that tend to contain the insurgency to north-central Namibia. They have
also exploited tribal divisions among the insurgents to weaken PLAN. The
release from prison last February of SWAPO cofounder Andimba (Her-
man) Toivo ja Toivo was intended to produce a challenge to SWAPO
President Sam Nujoma's leadership and possibly split the insurgent group
along tribal lines.
Secret
ALA 84-10103
October 1984
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SWAPO may now be facing its most serious challenge ever. The Angolan-
South African troop disengagement agreement signed at Lusaka on 16
February 1984 commits Luanda to restrain SWAPO in exchange for a
phased withdrawal of South African forces from southern Angola. The
agreement has reduced the insurgents' infiltration and resupply, although
Pretoria insists that Luanda is not meeting its commitment fully.
The real test of Angolan willingness to enforce the agreement could come
during the rainy season beginning in late 1984 when conditions again favor
a major infiltration of Namibia. If Luanda were to bar SWAPO from
using its territory, the insurgents would have no suitable place from which
to stage guerrilla operations. SWAPO has no bases within Namibia. While
some installations do exist in Zambia, in our judgment, neither that
country nor Botswana would risk South African retaliation by permitting
large-scale insurgent infiltration of Namibia from its territory. Barring
significant progress on the Namibian settlement negotiations, however, we
believe the disengagement agreement will crumble gradually and the war
will return to about the intensity of recent years.
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Secret
Key Judgments
The People's Liberation Army of Namibia
1
Strength and Organization
1
Geographic and Societal Obstacles to Insurgency
7
South African Response to the Insurgency
10
Exploiting Tribalism Within SWAPO
11
Disengagement of Forces Agreement
12
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Figure 1
SWAPO Operations
Attar tic
Cccan
Congo
Brazzaltijle
Lobito
Benguelal
administrative
headquarters
'Ruacana \Oshikango
\ Oshakati' .Ondangwa
Kaokoland ?\ Owambo
'6ubango ce} /\-
1l t assin
erve
aade
oper tion l
hea, qua
Jumb
C
armored car
unit
Major SWAPO infiltration
route
SWAPO operational area
in Namibia
Magisterial district boundary
in northern Namibia
0 100 200 Kilometers
0 100 200 Miles
Zaire
camps
(guerrillas temporarily
relocated at Kai7ra in
central Zambia)
,~,Senanga
not n.c..ssfIy.ulnp,l(.,IY.
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Namibia: SWAPO's Army-
Organization, Tactics,
and Prospects
SWAPO's long-exiled leaders have relied primarily
on their externally based guerrilla force-the People's
Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN)-in their bid to
force South Africa to cede control over Namibia. In
our judgment, insurgent leaders recognized from the
beginning that they could not defeat South Africa
militarily, and they have consistently followed a strat-
egy of protracted insurgency to increase the costs of
Pretoria's occupation, eventually exhaust South Afri-
ca's will to fight, and intimidate those Namibians who
might collaborate with Pretoria.
The Angolan-South African troop disengagement
agreement of February 1984, which commits Angola
to restrain SWAPO in exchange for a phased with-
drawal of South African forces from southern Angola,
has reduced-but not eliminated-guerrilla infiltra-
tion and supply. Because the insurgents depend upon
their Angolan sanctuaries for recruitment, training,
rest and recuperation, as well as for supporting opera-
tions in Namibia, a complete Angolan clampdown
would cripple SWAPO's ability to wage war. The real
test of Angola's willingness to continue to restrain
SWAPO could come during the rainy season later this
year when conditions are again favorable for a major
infiltration of Namibia.
Strength and Organization
PLAN has 7,000 to 8,000 armed personnel, about
half of whom are assigned to combat units, according
to South African estimates.' Others are engaged in
training, administration, and maintenance of equip-
ment and bases.
SWAPO's political headquarters is in Luanda and its
military headquarters is near Lubango in southern
Angola (figure 1). SWAPO President Sam Nujoma is
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nominally the Commander in Chief of the armed
forces and the Secretary of Defense, but he seldom
visits military headquarters and does not directly
control operations,
Acting Secretary of Defense Richard Ka-
3 Relations between PLAN and SWAPO's political wing apparent-
ly are harmonious. The Secretary of Defense, the Military Com-
mander, the Deputy Commander, and the Political Commissar-
all members of PLAN-traditionally have been members of
SWAPO's top political body, the 17-member National Executive
Committee (NEC). They also serve in the NEC's military subcom-
mittee. PLAN's representatives to these committees have acted
more as observers than active participants during political strategy
sessions, and the political leadership has deferred to the PLAN
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Two key officials are rivals for PLANS top post of
Secretary of Defense, vacant since the death of Peter
Nanyemba in April 1983. Richard Kapelwa is cur-
rently Acting Defense Secretary, although Nujoma
formally holds the defense portfolio. Dimo Amambo
is the Military Commander and should soon be
returning from military training in Ghana.
In our view, Kapelwa holds his prestigious position
largely because he is a Caprivian-an ethnic group
distrusted by the Owambos in control of SWAPO. He
was selected to become Deputy Secretary of Defense
in 1977 because the group's leaders wanted to moni-
tor the activities of influential non-Owambos, as well
as help to ensure the loyalty of SWAPO's Caprivian
members, Kapelwa
solidi ied his position in 1980 when he denounced
several senior Caprivians then being expelled from
the group. He is respected by fellow members of the
National Executive Committee-SWAPO 's Politbu-
ro-as a bright, able administrator,
Dimo Amambo is a professional soldier trained in the
Soviet Union, Cuba, Libya, Tanzania, Algeria, Egypt,
and Ghana,
military rather than political issues.
Amambo as a dedicated offi-
cer, having earned the respect of his troops by
demonstrating personal leadership. His promotions
have been due to personal popularity, heroism, and
the support of fellow Kwanyamas. With only three or
four years of civilian education, he speaks limited
English, is inarticulate in debate, and is an indiffer-
military wing. He heads PLAN's administrative
headquarters at Lubango and supervises military
planning, training, recruitment, supply, and SWA-
PO's reserve units. He has no operational control over
troops.
PLAN maintains a complex of bases at Lubango that
includes its principal training facilities (figure 2). The
complex is located astride SWAPO's supply lifeline,
the Mocamedes railway from the port at Namibe, and
close to Angolan and Cuban garrisons. SWAPO
recruits receive basic military training at the Ongu-
lumbashe base and go on to more advanced instruc-
tion at the "THTC" camp, according to the US
defense attache in Pretoria. SWAPO's Special Unit,
which is assembled each year for a major infiltration
into Namibia, receives its final three-to-six-months
training in sabotage and minelaying techniques at the
Volcano base.
PLAN's Military Commander, Dimo Amambo, con-
trols operations into Namibia from the operational
headquarters near Jamba, 300 kilometers east of
Lubango.3 His command post has a commander and
deputy, a political commissar and deputy, a chief of
staff, and staff sections with responsibilities for opera-
tions, intelligence, logistics, and communications.
Four or five guerrilla battalions-some 1,200 to 1,500
personnel-guard the Jamba bases and the roads
leading from them toward Namibia.
The Jamba complex-which is near the Mocamedes
railway-includes PLAN's Katanga logistics base, a
medical facility, and the Typhoon base used to house
guerrillas of the Special Unit who arrive there each
year from Lubango prior to infiltrating Namibia,
according to the US defense attache in Pretoria.
Cuban instructors train the insureents at Jamba
two Cuban garrisons are nearby.
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PLAN divides responsibility for guerrilla operations
in Namibia among three regional commands,
These commands
move their headquarters periodically to enhance secu-
rity. As of June 1984, the Western Command, which
is responsible for infiltration and attacks in Kaoko-
land and western Owambo, was located south of
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military staff course in Ghana since at least mid-1983,F____1
Secretary upon his return. Deputy Commander Salomon Hawala
probably has exercised temporary command of PLAN's forces in
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 0 Base or Headquarters
0 Combat Unit
Figure 2
The South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN)
0 Administrative
Headquarters
Lubango
PLAN
Headquarters
Lubango
Q Ongulumbashe 0 THTC
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SWAPO
Headquarters
Luanda
0 Operational
Headquarters
Jamba
X
Volcano 0 Conventional 4-5 Guard
basic training advanced training pre-mission Brigade Battalions
training approx. 300 men each
Z
I I
^ Special Unit
up to 1,000 men
2 Motorized
^
Infantry
Battalions
approx. ,00 men each
Katanga Medical
logistics Clinic
e Forces in
Zambia
? Senanga ? Nyango
II II
? Western Central 10 Eastern ^ Guerrilla ^ Guerrilla
Command Command Command Unit Unit
approx. 400 men approx. 400 men
^ Armored 4-5 Guerrilla 4-5 Guerrilla
Car Unit Detachments Detachments
/0 BRDM cars 50-100 men each 50-100 men each
4-5 Guerrilla
Detachments
50-100 men each
In Namibia
50-?00 men
3 Secret
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Lubango near Chibemba. The Central Command was
south of Jamba near Kassinga and responsible for
operations in central Owambo as well as deeper
penetrations into central Namibia. The Eastern Com-
mand that oversees operations in Kavango and eastern
Owambo was located north of Kassinga.
Each of the regional commands supervises typically
four mobile guerrilla detachments of 50 to 100 men
each, according to reports from the US defense
attache in Pretoria. These troops are separate from
the Special Unit and available year round for missions
in northern Namibia. They totaled about 900 guerril-
las as of June 1984.
another 50 to 200 insurgents remain in Namibia
throughout the year, most of them in Owamboland.
Reserve Forces. SWAPO maintains one conventional-
ly trained and organized brigade of 1,500 to 2,000
men in central Angola. The brigade is PLAN's most
powerful unit and includes two partially motorized
infantry battalions located about 500 kilometers
southeast of Luanda and some 600 kilometers north of
Namibia. The brigade also has an element of 10
Soviet-manufactured BRDM armored cars 400 kilo-
PLAN officials maintain that the brigade is being
held in reserve until the insurgents are capable of
taking on the South Africans in conventional combat,
In practice,
this reserve force has been committed to protecting
Namibian refugee camps and nearby towns, bridges,
and roads from attacks by Angolan insurgents of the
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA). In January 1984, additional PLAN person-
nel were brought north from Lubango to reinforce the
Another 400 to 800 PLAN personnel are held in
reserve in Zambia-where SWAPO has had military
bases since 1966-but these forces have conducted
few if any operations into Namibia in recent years.
Some of their troops participated in an anti-UNITA operation with
the Angolans just north of the Mocamedes rail line in June 1984,
Secret
Table 1
PLAN's Manpower and Missions
Number of persons
Combat troops
3,000-5,000
Conventional Reserve (opposing UNITA)
1,500-2,000
Guerrillas
Available for Namibian operations
(Special Unit and detachments)
1,000-2,000
Opposing UNITA
600-900
Training, support, and uncommitted
reserves
2,000-5,000
In Angola
1,500-4,000
In Zambia
400-800
Abroad for training
400
Total personnel a
7,000-8,000
a PLAN's combat units probably are at their lowest strength at
midyear when many personnel are in training and before new
recruits arrive to replace casualties suffered during the just-ended
rainy season. Combat units probably are at their greatest strength
at yearend when ready for an imminent major infiltration. The
estimate of PLAN's total personnel strength adjusts for these
fluctuations by adding the low estimate for combat troops to the
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The insurgents are usually in camps near Senanga
and Nyango in the southwest. In order to prevent 25X1
them from launching any cross-border operations that
might disrupt the delicate South African-Angolan
negotiations earlier this year, however, the Zambians 25X1
apparently moved the insurgents several hundred
kilometers farther from the Namibian border. 0
Zambia was
training a 400-man SWAPO battalion at Kabwe
north of Lusaka. We expect the guerrillas to return to
Senanga and Nyango when the training is finished.
Recruitment. SWAPO recruits primarily in Angola's
Namibian refugee camps and among the Kwanyama
Owambos living on both sides of the Angola-Namibia
border. The Angolan press claims that the refugee
camps southeast of Luanda and near Lubango and
Jamba contain 70,000 Namibian refugees. They pro-
duce about 1,000 youths of military age annually,
PLAN also
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recruits from among the several hundred youths who
flee Namibia each year or are abducted by the
insurgents. The implementation by South Africa of
conscription in Namibia in 1981 resulted in a surge of
new recruits for PLAN. PLAN's marginal growth
over recent years in our view indicates that recruit-
ment probably equals the group's annual losses of
several hundred who are killed or captured or who
desert.
Tactics
A review of PLAN operations over the past several
years shows that an annual cycle of guerrilla opera-
tions in Namibia begins about the midpoint of each
rainy season-generally lasting from November to
April-with large-scale infiltration along four prima-
ry routes from SWAPO's Angolan bases. At that time
dense foliage and clouds provide good concealment,
and the rains quickly wash away the guerrillas' tracks.
The softened soil limits the mobility of the govern-
ment's vehicles. From Lubango in the west, the
insurgents travel by truck through Cahama to enter
Kaokoland on foot. In the central region, there are
two routes into Owamboland. The first extends from
Matala on the Mocamedes rail line to the vicinity of
Ruacana, and the second runs from Jamba to the
border near Oshikango. The guerrillas also travel
southeast from Jamba along the Cubango River to
western Kavango.s
The guerrillas initially concentrate on hit-and-run
assaults on the government forces. Attacks on mili-
tary and police camps with mortars and rockets fired
from a safe distance and indiscriminate mining of the
roadways are common. PLAN typically avoids fire-
fights and tries to be safely away from the scene of an
attack before the government can react.
PLAN's inability to resupply its units in Namibia
limits the scope of operations each year. Although the
South Africans claim that PLAN moves limited
amounts of supplies across the border in the dry
season to guerrillas already in Namibia, we believe
that most of the insurgents carry all their weapons
and ammunition when they infiltrate. By the onset of
' South African occupation of a salient in south-central Angola
after mid-1981 reduced the insurgents' heavy infiltration into
Owamboland and diverted it to Kaokoland and especially Kavango,
which previously experienced low levels of insurgent activity,
the dry season, their dwindling stocks of heavy-caliber
ammunition and mines and the diminishing conceal-
ment as the foliage withers compel most of the
guerrillas to return to Angola. Those who remain in
Namibia disperse and turn gradually to terrorist
attacks on civilian targets.
Civilian targets have tended to be village headmen,
teachers, other local symbols of authority, and black
property owners accused of collaborating with the
government. The South African Minister of Law and
Order Louis Le Grange claims publicly that SWAPO
has deliberately murdered nearly 400 Namibians
since the mid-1970s. SWAPO also abducts nearly 300
Namibians each year, according to official statistics.
This year PLAN began infiltrating in January; guer-
rilla contacts peaked in March; and the insurgents
turned to urban bombings in mid-April, according to
statistics the South Africans provided to the US
defense attache. An attack on a police camp in
February with 30 82-mm mortar rounds probably
required a dozen or more guerrillas to carry the heavy
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The South Africans assert-correctly in our view-
that Soviet and Cuban officers also help direct
PLAN's military operations.
weapon and ammunition. Increasingly short of sup-
plies and forced to disperse, individuals or small teams
exploded bombs in five northern towns and Windhoek
in late April and May, and PLAN killed, injured, or
abducted 52 civilians during that period, according to
government announcements.
Foreign Aid
PLAN is dependent on foreign aid for weapons,
training, and even operational planning. Since
SWAPO's relocation from Zambia to Angola in the
mid-1970s, the Soviets have provided the vast major-
ity of the insurgents' arms and equipment. According
to the South Africans-who have publicly displayed
equipment captured from PLAN-Moscow's deliver-
ies have included small arms and ammunition, mor-
tars, rocket launchers, antiaircraft guns, SA-7
surface-to-air missiles, mines and explosives, commu-
nications equipment, some trucks, and a few armored
vehicles.
We believe that Cuban instructors provide most of the
military training that PLAN does not do for itself.
Cubans are present at
both the Lubango and Jamba complexes, and over
400 SWAPO youths were undergoing weapons train-
ing on Cuba's Isle of Youth in 1983,
East Germans also help to
and PLAN has sent a few people to
China provided arms to the insurgents in 1983 for the
first time in five years,
We believe the Chinese acted to
ensure some influence with a future Namibia under
SWAPO rule. Nujoma had approached Chinese For-
eign Minister Huang Hua at the Zimbabwe independ-
ence celebrations in 1980 to ask for a resumption of
aid, and two years
later Nujoma visited Beijing. A Chinese ship deliv-
ered the arms to the Congo in July 1983,
Despite what appears to be adequate organization,
manpower, weapons, and foreign support, SWAPO's
army faces serious geographic and societal obstacles
in Namibia that make effective insurgent operations
extremely difficult (figure 3). Namibia is almost
entirely surrounded by natural barriers. To the west,
the treacherous waters of the Skeleton Coast and the
towering sand dunes of the Namib Desert effectively
prevent seaborne infiltration. In the east, the vast
Kalahari Desert stretches hundreds of kilometers into
Botswana and provides no water or concealment.
Because southern Namibia borders on South Africa,
only the northern boundary with Angola and Zambia
offers potential for infiltration.
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African countries for training.
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Secret
Figure 3
Southwestern Africa
Angola
1C
B oo n tlary re pro sent anon is
not nocoss o n ly autftontat o
South Africa
Walvis Bay
Zaire
Namibia
a Lusaka
Lake
Kariba
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Secret
The Border Operational Area (BOA)
The Border Operational Area is a South African-
controlled military zone in Namibia, over 100 kilo-
meters deep and extending the length of the northern
border.
Manmade barriers mark the frontier. All along the
Owambo border in the central area, the population
and much of the vegetation has been removed from a
kilometer-wide strip bounded by fences, laced with
landmines, and overlooked by military watchtowers,
Physical and other obstacles hinder access along
much of the northern frontier. In the west, Kaoko-
land's barren and rugged mountains are difficult to
traverse. To reach Kavango and western Caprivi Oos
in the east, the insurgents must cross territory firmly
controlled by UNITA. In the extreme east, the
Caprivi Strip jutting between Botswana and Zambia
is cut off from the remainder of Namibia by vast
swamps that are virtually impassable for much of the
year.
Only the central portion of the Angolan-Namibian
border favors infiltration. This 450-kilometer-long
area north of Owambo is mostly flat grassland with
brush and scattered forests that provide adequate
concealment for guerrilla operations during the rainy
season. Although there are no perennial rivers within
Namibia, the insurgents find plentiful water during
the rainy months in seasonal streams and pools.
Inside the BOA, the South Africans have implement-
ed strict physical security. They have set up vehicle
checkpoints, cleared the brush away from main roads
to make ambushes difficult, and organized traffic
into convoys protected by well-armed troops in ar-
mored vehicles, according to US officials in Namibia.
The paved surface of major roads is doubly thick in
most places to discourage the guerrillas from emplac-
ing landmines, and patrols frequently inspect the
major routes.
South African soldiers control entry to the BOA from
the south. A military checkpoint requires vehicles to
stop and be searched, and a permit is required to
enter the zone, according to officers of the US Liaison
Office in Windhoek. Every car or truck that passes is
recorded in a log book. The gate closes at 1800 hours
daily when the BOA's nighttime curfew goes into
effect.
Ethnic divisions within Namibia reinforce the geo-
graphic obstacles that tend to contain the insurgency
to north-central Namibia. SWAPO's popular support
is greatest among the Owambos whose tribal area
offers the most favorable terrain for guerrilla opera-
tions. Among the Owambos, the largest subtribe is the
Kwanyamas, who make up the most numerous ethni-
cally distinct group in SWAPO.' Kwanyamas com-
prise a majority of the 100,000 or so Owambos in
southern Angola, and within Namibia they are con-
centrated in Owamboland between the Angolan bor-
der and the military garrison towns of Oshakati and
Ondangwa. East and west of Owamboland, popula-
tion densities and support for SWAPO diminish. The
insurgents also lack solid support in the 80 percent of
Namibia south of the northern homelands, which is
sparsely populated and socially fragmented.
PLAN also is hampered by the distance from the
northern border of their most lucrative targets-the
white populace and their property. The capital and
headquarters for the government's armed forces at
Windhoek are 600 kilometers to the south, and the
major port of Walvis Bay is slightly farther away. The
railway ends 200 kilometers south of the border at
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Tsumeb and Grootfontein, an area of white-owned
mines and farms. Targets close to the border are
limited to well-armed military units and installations,
government officials and offices, public utilities, and
persons suspected of being government collaborators.
South Africa has responded to PLAN operations on
several fronts. Pretoria has committed enough forces
to check insurgent progress in Namibia while mini-
mizing the risks to South African troops. Pretoria has
tried to weaken SWAPO and PLAN internally by
exploiting strong ethnic divisions and rivalries within
the insurgent group. Finally, Pretoria has tried to
prevent SWAPO's army from operating out of Ango-
la, and this year was successful in getting Angola to
agree to restrain its support for SWAPO.
Military Commitment
The SWAPO insurgency has forced South Africa to
increase its military commitment in northern Namib-
ia. From 8,500 in 1978, we estimate that there now
are 15,000 to 20,000 full-time troops stationed in the
territory! Several thousand more have been used
during major incursions into Angola. Prime Minister
Botha has complained publicly that South Africa
spent about $300 million in fiscal year 1985 to
maintain these forces in Namibia. This represents
about 10 percent of South Africa's defense budget.
From an organizational standpoint, all South African
and territorial military units are under the command
of a South African general in Windhoek.
a forward command post is
located in each of the four northern "homelands."
The forces are organized in successive echelons and
oriented to protect Namibia against SWAPO or
conventional attack from the north:
? Three all-volunteer units led by South Africans and
composed mostly of non-South African veterans of
the Rhodesian Army, SWAPO, and other insurgent
' This excludes the approximately 2,000 South African troops in
Walvis Bay, which is administered as part of South Africa.F_
groups man the border and conduct hot pursuit and
preemptive strikes into Angola.'
? Ten territorial battalions-six ethnically distinct
Namibian units and four of mixed Namibian and
South African troops-patrol northern Namibia
and guard installations, convoys, and civil servants.
? Foward elements of a South African mechanized
infantry group at Operet and a Namibian brigade of
reservists near Windhoek are the territory's strate-
gic reserve.
? At least 24 territorial force units-part-time home-
guards-perform counterinsurgency duties in most
towns and white farming areas.
Although SWAPO has forced South Africa to enlarge
its military commitment in Namibia, Pretoria in-
creasingly has relied on non-South African forces to
minimize the political costs of the protracted war at
home. Only one-third to one-half of the total security
force manpower in Namibia consists of South African
Defense Force and South African Police personnel,
Moreover, the most
dangerous counterinsurgency duties are usually per-
formed by units of non-South Africans led by profes-
sional South African volunteers. Pretoria also has
made heavy use of reservists to minimize the number
of South Africans permanently stationed in Namibia.
The skeleton-strength 61st Mechanized Infantry
Group at Operet, for example, has its equipment pre-
positioned and flies in reservists to mobilize the unit
whenever needed.'?
Pretoria's repeated attacks on SWAPO's Angolan
bases have disrupted but not ended the infiltration.
' The South African Defense Force's 5th Reconnaissance Comman-
dos and 32nd "Buffalo" Battalion and the South African Security
Police Koevoet paramilitary unit account for an estimated 80
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The South Africans destroyed PLAN's Command
Headquarters in May 1978 and June 1980, and they
bombed the Lubango bases several times, most re-
cently in December 1983 during the Askari operation.
A SWAPO official reported that Operation Protea in
August 1981 destroyed 80 percent of the insurgents'
Angolan installations,
South African troops thereafter contin-
ued to occupy a salient of Angolan territory north of
Owamboland, which forced SWAPO to relocate its
bases 200 kilometers farther north and to redirect
most infiltration to avoid the occupied zone.
South Africa's greatest success, in our view, has been
its ability to confine most guerrilla attacks to areas
away from the white South African and Namibian
population. We also believe that South African statis-
tics indicating reduced insurgent attacks on civilian
targets since 1980 or 1981 accurately reflect the
diminished intensity of the fighting in Namibia."
Exploiting Tribalism Within SWAPO
While confronting SWAPO's army militarily, South
Africa also is working to weaken PLAN from within
by exploiting the strong ethnic divisions that exist
Table 2
SWAPO Attacks on Civilians
Local population killed in
landmine incidents
54
125
65
44
15
Local population injured
in landmine incidents
98
173
144
70
30
Local population murdered
88
48
95
70
76
Local population abducted
474
308
113
171
278
among the insurgents. Kwanyama Ovambos dominate
the group and discriminate against both non-Ovambos
and other Ovambo subtribes,
They support President Nujoma even though
he is a member of a minor Ovambo subgroup. Their
greatest rivals are the Ndonga Ovambos, including
SWAPO cofounder, Andimba (Herman) Toivo ja
South Africa released Toivo from 16 years in prison
last March in hopes that he would challenge Nujo-
ma's leadership,
Appointed Secretary General at a meeting of
SWAPO's Central Committee in early August, he is
now the party's second-ranking official.
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In our judgment, an open Nujoma-Toivo breach
might split the guerrilla army. SWAPO has survived
tribal-based upheavals in the past-including the
ouster in 1980 of most of the minority Caprivians- 25X1
but this time the dominant Owambos would be divid-
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yama and Ndonga factions in PLAN support Military
Commander Amambo (a Kwanyama) and Acting
Secretary of Defense Kapelwa (a Caprivian), respec-
tively-two powerful rivals for ultimate control of the
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military wing. Moreover,
SWAPO arrested hundreds of Owambo members of
PLAN in July 1984 allegedly for spying on behalf of
South Africa. Kwanyama-
Ndonga animosity might be the real cause of the
arrests.
Disengagement of Forces Agreement
SWAPO may have suffered its greatest setback when
Angola and South Africa agreed at Lusaka on 16
February 1984 to disengage forces. The agreement
committed Angola to restrain SWAPO in exchange
for a phased withdrawal of South African forces in
southern Angola. It established a joint headquarters
and military patrols to prevent SWAPO from moving
into the area vacated by the South Africans.
The Angolan-South African patrols initially engaged
the insurgents in firefights, although more recently
Luanda has done little more than turn a blind eye
toward unilateral South African operations in south-
grown increasingly frustrated that SWAPO's political
leaders cannot arrange a settlement and end the war.
South African military headquarters in Windhoek in
June went so far as to call PLAN a "spent force," and
it said that dry weather was forcing those guerrillas
already in Namibia to move toward populated areas
and known waterholes where they became easier
targets for the government forces.
Nonetheless, some insurgents still manage to infiltrate
northern Namibia and stage attacks. South African
military officers have accused Angola of complicity,
insisting that SWAPO prisoners have admitted being
told by the Angolans to keep a low profile temporarily
until the South African troop withdrawal is complet-
ed.
After 18 years of fighting, SWAPO's insurgency
persists but without prospects for dramatic gains.
infiltration and attacks.
PLAN has been contained in northern Namibia and
with few exceptions prevented from reaching the
politically sensitive white areas farther south. Pre-
toria, however, has failed in repeated attempts to
eradicate the insurgents and their bases in southern
Angola, and it cannot completely end the guerrilla
PLAN has been hurt by the Angolan-South African
disengagement of forces agreement, but the resilient
guerrillas have recovered from setbacks in the past.
Although Angola has cooperated somewhat in re-
straining SWAPO since the agreement was signed,
the South Africans allege Angolan-SWAPO collusion
and insist that Luanda has not moved forcefully to
shut down guerrilla infiltration. In our view, Luanda
does not want to be seen as the gendarmerie of the
South Africans and will not seriously restrain
SWAPO in the absence of progress on a Namibian
settlement.
The real test of Angola's willingness to restrain
SWAPO could come during the rainy season begin-
ning in late 1984 when conditions are again favorable
for a major infiltration of Namibia. At that time
SWAPO may try to send its guerrillas south to
reinforce its claim as a legitimate participant in
Namibian negotiations or to derail any Angolan-
South African arrangement that does not appear to be
leading toward implementation of the UN plan for
Namibian independence. A major infiltration would
set back Angolan-South African negotiations and
could lead Pretoria to retaliate militarily against
SWAPO's installations in Angola.
On the other hand, were Angola successfully to bar
SWAPO from using its territory, we believe PLAN
could not continue guerrilla operations in Namibia,
and would be capable of little more than sporadic
small-scale terrorist attacks. Only Angola provides
direct access to Owambo, which provides favorable
terrain and popular support to the insurgents. PLAN
has no bases in Namibia, and the insurgents were
crippled during the years they operated from Zambia
by great distances, swamps, South African patrols,
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and Zambian interference. Although PLAN has test-
ed infiltration routes through Botswana and set up
temporary camps there from time to time, Gaborone
is unwilling to accept permanent guerrilla bases that
would invite South African attacks.
Unless there is significant progress on the Namibian
settlement negotiations, we believe the Angolan-
South African disengagement agreement will crumble
gradually and the war will return to about the
intensity of recent years. We believe that SWAPO is
currently recruiting and training personnel and would
be able to resume the offensive. Although the guerril-
las want a cease-fire and a respite from the fighting,
they probably will continue military operations at
least until Pretoria agrees to Namibian independence.
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