NICARAGUA: SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL ACTORS AND THEIR INTERACTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00317R000200090005-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: September 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Seer-et
Intelligence
Nicaragua:
Significant Political Actors
and Their Interaction
Secret-
ALA 84-10088
CR 84-13330
September 1984
Copy 4 4 5
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secret
Their Interaction, ALA 84-10088/CR 84-13330, september 1984.
Notice to recipients of Reference Aid: Nicaragua: Significant Political Actors and 25X1
The graphic on page 2 has incorrect colors. The attached is correct.
445
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Figure 2
Cuban and Nicaraguan Party Flags
mii4i"Ii
Augusto Cesar Sandino's Army in Defense of the National
Sovereignty of Nicaragua (EDSN), 1927-34.?
"Red and black, flags on many houses. As a Nicaraguan / am
happy. That flag was the.1/ag ofSandino. Fidel adopted the
Sandino flag for the '26th of July' movement, and so it became
the flag of the Cuban revolution. " Ernesto Cardenal, In Cuba
(/974).
Fidel Castro's 26th of July movement
(M-26-7 or 26 Julio)
" Information courtesy of US Marine Corps Historical Center,
Washington, D.C.
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Nicaragua:
Significant Political Actors
and Their Interactio~
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Division, ALA,
Secret
ALA 84-10088
CR 84-13330
September 1984
This paper was prepared byL
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25X1
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of African and Latin American Analysis, and
Office of Central Reference. It was
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Secret
Nicaragua:
Significant Political Actors
and Their Interaction
Summary Five years after the overthrow of President Anastasio Somoza Debayle,
Information available Nicaragua is ruled by the predominantly Marxist Sandinista National
as otf8 September 1984 Liberation Front (FSLN). The FSLN has reneged on its original promises
was used in this report.
to establish a pluralist political and economic system and to pursue a
nonaligned foreign policy-as long association with its principal foreign
mentor, Fidel Castro, suggested it would. Nevertheless, in response to
mounting domestic and foreign pressures, the FSLN has pledged to hold
elections in November 1984 for president, vice president, and assembly.
The overwhelming popularity in Nicaragua originally accorded the FSLN-
led coalition has eroded considerably. Most former allies have distanced
themselves from the FSLN in varying degrees. Some groups-such as the
Independent Liberal Party and the Popular Social Christian Party-while
ostensibly supporting the regime, have decided to compete in the election as
independent parties. Others, such as the Democratic Coordinator and the
Superior Council of Private Enterprise, have become part of a large,
unarmed, internal political opposition. Still others, most notably the
Nicaraguan Democratic Force and the Democratic Revolutionary Alli-
ance, including a few former members of the FSLN, have taken up arms
against it. Several opposition leaders have said that, in an electoral contest
meeting internationally acceptable standards of fairness, the FSLN would
win no more than 40 percent of the popular vote.
The FSLN's opponents, however, have been unable to take full advantage
of the FSLN's shrinking base of support. The political parties constituting
the legal opposition cooperate only with difficulty and are internally
divided, mainly over the extent to which they should confront the FSLN
directly. Their leaders are not particularly vigorous or adventuresome.
Some of them, doubtful that they can overcome the FSLN's advantages in
mass organization and propaganda and thus fearful of losing, may be
looking for an excuse to boycott the elections or may be hoping that the re-
gime will cancel them.
In comparison with the parties, other elements of the unarmed opposi-
tion-the private sector, independent unions, Catholic hierarchy and the
feisty newspaper La Prensa-are better led and seem to us more deter-
mined to confront the regime. Yet, the prospect of an FSLN regime
legitimized by an election is demoralizing for many in these sectors as well.
Secret
ALA 84-10088
CR 84-13330
September 1984
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The antiregime insurgents-the "contras"-have achieved significant
strength and confidence. The Somozist ingredient within their ranks now
represents no more than a tiny fraction of their total membership, and they
have developed good relations with the population in rural areas where they
operate. They have not yet achieved fully effective unification, although
there has been movement in this direction. They depend heavily on outside
support, and Sandinista control of densely populated western Nicaragua
has limited expression of popular support for them.
We expect the existing array of forces along the political spectrum to
remain essentially in place at least through the end of 1984. We do not ex-
pect the FSLN to acquire new political allies, nor is the center likely to de-
velop bold, unified leadership. Given the, weakness of many of the FSLN's
internal adversaries and its ability to control the election process, FSLN
victory seems a foregone conclusion. Claiming that the election has
conferred on it a new aura of legitimacy, the FSLN probably will proceed
with its increasing domination of Nicaraguan society.
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Summary
iii
Introduction
1
From National Consensus to Partisan Rule
The Regime and Its Supporters
6
The FSLN
6
Uneasy Allies
7
The Unarmed Opposition
9
Conservative Parties (PCD and PCDN)
10
Social Christian Party (PSC)
11
Social Democratic Party (PSD)
I 1
Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP)
11
Independent Labor
I1
The Catholic Church
13
La Prensa
15
The Contras
16
The FDN
16
ARDE
16
MISURA
18
Outlook
18
A.
Politically Significant Organizations
C.
Nicaraguan Organizations
2. Cuban and Nicaraguan Party Flags
3. Major Elements in the Political Spectrum
4. Map-Operating Areas of Insurgent Groups
1. Los Doce (The Twelve)
2. Cuba-Nicaragua: Some Similar Institutions
A Guide to Key Political Groups 67
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Figure 1
Costa
Rica
Caribbean Sea
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Cayman Islands
(U.K.)
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t
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Nicaragua:
Significant Political Actors
and Their Interaction
In July 1979 guerrillas of the Sandinista National
Liberation Front (FSLN), with broad popular support,
ousted the government of President Anastasio Somoza
Debayle. As it came to power, the FSLN promised to
establish a new society based on political pluralism, a
mixed economy, and observance of human rights.
Among the specific public commitments made by
FSLN leaders to the Organization of American
States shortly before Somoza's overthrow, and to the
Nicaraguan people on their first day in power, was a
pledge to hold free elections within a few months. The
FSLN reneged on this pledge, although in October
1982 the Sandinistas proclaimed a six-point plan to
institutionalize the revolution that included the pro-
mulgation of laws on political parties and elections.
The interim legislature, the Council of State, enacted
these laws in September 1983 and March 1984,
respectively, thereby setting the stage for elections for
president, vice president, and a 90-member assembly
to be held in November 1984.
The scheduling of elections focuses new attention on
the major political elements and dynamics in the
Nicaraguan political spectrum. In our view, the
steady erosion of the regime's legitimacy and its
original promises has been the basic determinant in
how these political actors have interacted since 1979
and how they approach the coming elections. As a
result, elements once firmly supporting the FSLN
now comprise uncertain allies, nonviolent opponents,
and armed insurgents. This paper identifies the key
individuals and groups, provides some background on
them, and examines the ways they interact. Appen-
dixes A through C offer capsule summaries on the key
groups as well as a list of all known
organizations presently or recently active.'
' There is foldout table, A Guide to Key Political Groups, at the
end of the paper that contains a list of the political organizations,
with their abbreviation and orientation, discussed in the text.
From National Consensus to Partisan Rule
Somoza's fall represented something close to a nation-
al triumph. The victorious elements spanned the
political spectrum from extreme left to center-right,
including not only Sandinistas and three smaller
Marxist splinter groups but conservatives, the private
sector and labor unions, virtually the entire Catholic
Church and most Protestant denominations, and even
former Somocistas. This broad coalition, most observ-
ers agree, was supported by perhaps 90 percent of the
Nicaraguan people. 25X1
The principal segments of the anti-Somoza coalition
included:
? The Sandinista National Liberation Front
(FSLN), composed of three factions or "tendencies"
(Popular Prolonged War, Proletarian, and Tercer-
ista or Insurrectionist). Led by pro-Cuban Marxists,
the tendencies had merged into a unified National
Directorate only in March 1979, after prodding by 25X1
Fidel Castro. The Sandinistas had mass support on
the left in the form of the United People's Move-
ment (MPU), but their links to non-Marxist sectors
were forged by the Terceristas, the largest of the
factions, whose own rank and file was generally
social democratic, nationalist, and Christian. The
Terceristas maintained covert control of Los Doce
(The Twelve), a group of ostensibly apolitical profes-
sionals formed in 1977, with strong connections to
other prominent Nicaraguans.
? The traditional conservative opposition to the
Somoza-dominated Liberal Party. This opposition 25X1
was linked mainly by a network of families, particu-
larly the Chamorros, who controlled the independ-
ent newspaper La Prensa. Its preferred political 25X1
party was the right-centrist Democratic Conserva-
tive Party (PCD). Its principal tie to other anti-
Somoza elements was the Democratic Union of
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Figure 2
Cuban and Nicaraguan Party Flags
Augusto Cesar Sandino's Army in Defense of the National
Sovereignty of Nicaragua (EDSN), 1927-34.?
'Red and black flags on many houses. As a Nicaraguan I am
happy. That flag was the flag of Sandino. Fidel adopted the
Sandino flag for the `26th of July' movement, and so it became
the flag of the Cuban revolution. "Ernesto Cardenal, In Cuba
(1974).
Fidel Castro's 26th of July. movement
(M-26-7 or 26 Julio)
z Information courtesy of US Marine Corps Historical Center,
Washington, D.C.
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Table 1
Los Doce (The Twelve)
Miguel D'Escoto Brockman
Maryknoll priest; publisher of Orbis Books,
Maryknoll, NY
Maryknoll priest; Nicaraguan Foreign
Minister
Fernando Cardenal Martinez
Jesuit priest; a leader of Revolutionary Christian
Movement which, according to US Embassy
Managua, had links with FSLN
Jesuit priest; Minister of Education
Joaquin Cuadra Chamorro
Corporation lawyer; exiled in Costa Rica
Finance Minister
Arturo Cruz Porras
Official with Inter-American Development Bank in
Washington
Prominent antiregime exile leader after serv-
ing as a member of GRN Junta and then as
Ambassador to the United States
Sergio Ramirez Mercado
Writer; Secretary General of the Higher Council of
the Central American University; according to US
Embassy Managua, a Marxist; in Costa Rica
Member GRN Junta
Emilio Baltodano Pallais
Businessman, active in human rights and Catholic
Church issues, exiled in Costa Rica
Nicaraguan Comptroller General
Felipe Mantica Abaunza
Businessman active in Catholic Church and charita-
ble causes; exiled in Costa Rica
Businessman
Ricardo Coronel Kautz
Large landowner; involved in agrarian cooperatives
and cattle development projects to help poor farmers;
exiled in Costa Rica
Vice Minister of Policy, Ministry of Agricul-
. tural-Livestock Development and Agrarian
Reform (MIDINRA)
Ernesto Castillo Martinez
Lawyer; professor at the National Autonomous Uni-
versity; identified as a friend of Mantica family; an
FSLN activist, probably in Costa Rica
Justice Minister
Casimiro Sotelo Rodriguez
Architect and businessman living in California;
FSLN member
Ambassador to Canada
Carlos Gutierrez Sotelo
Dentist; FSLN member; living in Mexico
As of 1981, official in Foreign Ministry
Note: In November 1977, this group issued a manifesto-"the
Document of Twelve"-asking for a national dialogue to seek
peaceful solutions to the crisis in Nicaragup. In February 1978, the
US Embassy in Managua judged them collectively "important as a
link between the FSLN and the private sector."
Liberation (UDEL), headed first by the publisher of
La Prensa, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Cardenal.
Chamorro's assassination in January 1978-widely
attributed in Nicaragua to Somoza's son Anasta-
sio-galvanized popular resistance to the dictator,
thereby aiding significantly the Sandinistas' final
offensive. More specifically, it made even the
staunchest non-Marxists in the PCD and UDEL
willing to collaborate with Los Doce, and thereby
the FSLN, to overthrow Somoza.
? The private sector, organized mainly around the
Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP).
This group opposed what it perceived as Somoza's
antibusiness policies, his efforts to accumulate
wealth for himself, and curbs on political liberties.
Following Chamorro's assassination, one of
COSEP's leaders, manufacturer Alfonso Robelo
Callejas, organized a political coalition of progres-
sive businessmen and professional and labor leaders
known as the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement
(MDN). The MDN then joined UDEL and Los
Doce to form the Broad Opposition Front (FAO).
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? The Catholic Church, led by Archbishop Miguel
Obando y Bravo.
by 1974 he was "firmly opposed to
the regime" of Somoza
he helped the FSLN
achieve power in at least three ways: as mediator in
important confrontations between the FSLN and
the regime, he achieved outcomes enhancing the
FSLN's prestige; he withheld episcopal censure of
church activists who became FSLN combatants;
and in August 1978 he and other bishops publicly
called upon Somoza to resign, implicitly justifying
violence against him if he refused. Several Protes-
tant organizations also opposed Somoza.
? Former members of Somoza's Liberal Party. The
small Independent Liberal Party (PLI), which had
broken away in the 1940s to protest Somoza family
dominance, was joined by other liberals in the late
1970s. The left-of-center PLI became virtually a
junior partner of the FSLN.
To solidify this partnership, FSLN spokesmen repeat-
edly promised that the post-Somoza regime would
respect political pluralism, provide guarantees for the
private sector, and pursue a nonaligned foreign policy.
Moreover, the Junta of the Government of National
Reconstruction (JGRN) established in July 1979 by
the FSLN and its allies as the interim government-
pending national elections-reinforced earlier Sandi-
nista pledges by decreeing that "all laws repressing
the free manifestation and communication of thought
and the freedom of information shall be abolished."
(c)
In addition to postponing elections, the FSLN since
then has sought to evade its other commitments to
pluralism. It has, for example:
? Seized nearly 90 percent of the media and heavily
censored the rest.
? Stacked the Council of State and key ministries
with FSLN loyalists.
? Turned the security forces and mass organizations
into Cuban-style instruments of intimidation direct-
ed against political activists, church officials, and
Atlantic coast minorities (mainly non-Spanish-
speaking Miskito, Sumu, and Rama Indians,
English-speaking Creoles, black Caribs, and some
Chinese).
? Circumvented normal judicial authority through
special tribunals and held thousands of political
prisoners.
? Undertaken public indoctrination to train Nicara-
guan youth in Marxism.
? Built up its own labor groups through fraudulent
elections, intimidation, and economic sanctions di-
rected against competing labor organizations.
? Embarked on what we believe to be the slow
strangulation of the private sector.'
? Applied political restrictions that, in the view of the
Permanent Human Rights Commission of Nicara-
gua established in 1977 in Managua, are more
severe than under Somoza.
FSLN supporters claim that the Sandinistas would
have kept their pledges were it not for the antiregime
violence by Somocista elements dating almost from
the time of Somoza's fall, although it seems to us
likely that a movement closely linked from its incep-
tion with the Cubans would have attempted to estab-
lish a somewhat similar political system. In addition,
evidence from FSLN documents indicates the inten-
tion of FSLN leaders to operate only temporarily
behind a facade of democracy.'
' For example, the April 1978 edition of the FSLN Bulletin insisted
that the "vanguard Sandinista nucleus should ... use Marxism-
Leninism as an absolute and unquestionable guide ... for the
transformation of society." In January 1979, Tercerista leader
Humberto Ortega, now Minister of Defense, wrote to a fellow
leader that "what we plan is a broad democratic and popular
government which, despite the participation of the bourgeosie, is a
means and not an end toward... socialism." The FSLN's design for
achieving heqemony over all other political movements was formal-
ized in a 36-page document presented by FSLN leaders to other
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The FSLN leadership's association with Fidel Castro
predates the formation of the party itself in 1961. A
pro-Sandinista source recorded in 1981 that a 'few
months" after Castro's victory in 1959, a multina-
tional guerrilla column was formed in the Honduran-
Nicaraguan border area "with strong moral support
from Che Guevara. " The column was ambushed by
local security forces and "several Nicaraguans and
Cubans died. " Carlos Fonseca Amador, later a co-
founder of the FSLN with Silvio Mayorga and
Tomas Borge, was seriously wounded in that battle.
He recuperated in Cuba, and later moved his family
to Havana, where they remained until Somoza's
downfall. Fonseca died in combat against Somoza's
National Guard in 1976.
During the 1960s and 1970s, the FSLN continued to
draw inspiration from the Castro regime. Borge, the
only surviving co-founder of the FSLN, recalled that,
during those years, 'for us, Fidel was the resurrec-
tion of Sandino. " Ernesto Cardenal, now Minister of
Culture, visited Cuba in 1970 and 1971 and his
published impressions (In Cuba, New York 1984)
imply that the new Nicaragua, in order to fulfill
Sandino's legacy, should look to Cuba as a model.
He particularly praised Castro's 1961 literacy cam-
paign, which combined teaching basic reading and
writing skills with socialist political indoctrination.
The Nicaraguan literacy campaign of 1980, adminis-
tered by Ernesto's brother Fernando, followed the
same pattern.
For their part, the Cubans during this period not only
cultivated potential Nicaraguan friends like Ernesto
Cardenal, but also eagerly repeated. FSLN state-
ments indicating solidarity with Cuba and its Com-
munist allies and hostility toward the United States.
The Cubans also welcomed FSLN achievements. In
1974 and 1978, when the FSLN kidnaped members of
the Somoza regime in order to free Sandinista prison-
ers and obtain money and publicity, the victorious
guerrillas were flown to Cuba where Castro greeted
them as heroes.
As the prospects for the overthrow of Somoza bright-
ened, Castro asserted his influence over the FSLN by
persuading the leaders of three separate "tendencies"
to unify in the FSLN National Directorate in return
for further Cuban material assistance. Castro had
already provided paramilitary training and safehaven
for FSLN cadres. For the final Sandinista offensive,
Cuba helped design the FSLN's military strategy,
provided 500 tons of weaponry, trained and transport-
ed combatants, and even sent as many as 50 advisers
to Nicaragua to accompany Sandinista units into the
field. 25X1
Since July 1979, the Cuban presence has expanded to
virtually all Nicaraguan public institutions.
to the sizable corps of Cuban advisers
stationed with the armed forces and the Interior
Ministry, as well as the thousands of Nicaraguans
sent to study in Cuba. Many key Nicaraguan institu-
tions clearly follow Cuban precedents
Humberto Belli, a former Sandinista now living in
exile, has stressed other aspects of the Cuban pres-
ence that may be less obvious to foreigners but grate
on Nicaraguan nerves: the gratuitous insults to Nica-
raguan religious sensibilities; the provision of Cuban
economic assistance that includes the dispatch of
Cuban construction workers to a country where seri-
ous unemployment exists in the construction indus-
try; and above all the sense that the Cubans are an
occupation force. After noting in a book published in
1983 that there appeared to be at least 8,000 Cubans
in Nicaragua (current Intelligence Community esti-
mates are even higher), Belli added that "8,000
Cubans is, for Nicaragua, what 800,000 would be for
a country the size of the United States.'
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Table 2
Cuba-Nicaragua: Some Similar Institutions a
CDR
Comite de Defensa de la Revolucion (Committee for
the Defense of the Revolution)
Comite de Defensa Sandinista (Sandinista Defense
Committee)
CPC
Consejo Provincial de Cultura (Provincial Council of
Culture)
CPC
Centros Populares de Cultura (People's Cultural
Centers)
CTC
Central de Trabajadores de Cuba (Central Organiza-
tion of Cuban Trade Unions)
CST
Central Sandinista de Trabajadores (Sandinista
Workers' Central)
DSE
Departamento de Seguridad del Estado (Department
of State Security)
DGSE
Direccion General de la Seguridad del Estado (Gen-
eral Directorate of State Security)
DOE
Departamento de Operaciones Especiales (Depart-
ment of Special Operations)
BOE
Buro de Operaciones Especiales (Bureau of Special
Operations)
DIM
Direccion de Inteligencia Militar (Military Intelli-
gence Directorate)
INRA
Instituto Nacional de la Reforma Agraria (National
Institute for Agrarian Reform)
Instituto Nacional de la Reforma Agraria (National
Institute for Agrarian Reform)
MICONS
Ministerio de la Construccion (Ministry of Construc-
tion)
MICONS
Ministerio de Construccion (Ministry of
Construction)
MTT
Milicias de Tropas Territoriales (Territorial Troops
Militia)
MPS
Milicias Populares Sandinistas (Sandinista People's
Militias)
Servicio Militar Patriotico (Patriotic Military
Service)
a Nicaragua's intelligence and security organizations not only
resemble their Cuban counterparts in name, structure, and func-
tions, but also have numerous Cuban (and other bloc) advisers from
counterpart organizations assigned to them. Ministries of construc-
tion are especially characteristic of the USSR and its allies-
reflecting at least in part the Marxist emphasis on "constructing a
new society"-and are infrequently found in non-Marxist regimes.
No other Hispanic country has milicias, which are effective
Marxist instruments for mobilizing and controlling populations.
Peru is the only other Latin American country with a servicio
militar and a CDR network. INRA is obsolete in Cuba and
Nicaragua, in each case having been absorbed by the relevant
ministry dealing with agricultural affairs once it had completed
nationalizing large farm properties.
Those Nicaraguans inclined to blame the FSLN for
the "deficiencies of the present"-restrictions on po-
litical freedoms, a sagging economy, and even the civil
turbulence-have grown considerably over the past
five years. As discussed below, however, there is
considerable disunity in sectors outside the FSLN.
Even those certain of what they oppose are uncertain
of what they favor or how to reach their political
goals.
The FSLN
The Sandinistas directly or indirectly control all key
public institutions in Nicaragua. The public record
shows that FSLN members occupy two of the three
posts in the Junta and at least 10 of the 13 top
commands in the armed forces. At least 40'of the 52
members comprising the Council of State openly
support the Sandinistas. Several of the FSLN-domi-
nated groups represented on the Council of State are.
mass organizations-for example, labor, women's and
youth groups, and defense committees (CDS)-with
considerable powers to surveil, control, and mobilize
the general public; the CDS, for example, issue ration
cards. Moreover, the regime's lowering of the voting
age to 16 has enfranchised a large portion of the
FSLN-dominated youth organization, JS-19J. With
this concentration of power, the FSLN has the means
to set and enforce public policy on major issues.
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The FSLN also controls much of the daily functioning
of government. Only 16 of the 33 Cabinet members
are known to belong to the FSLN, but they hold key
portfolios such as defense, interior, foreign affairs,
justice, planning, construction, culture, agriculture,
education, and local government. Several other posi-
tions (such as the minister of finance and the comp-
troller) are managed by individuals considered by
opposition leaders to have been co-opted by the
FSLN. In addition, the Council of Government,
which was installed in March 1981 to advise the
Junta on economic and social policy and which seems
? to function as a rump Cabinet on nonsecurity issues,
has an FSLN majority.'
The apparent exception to this pattern of FSLN
dominance of public bodies-the Supreme Court-
tends to prove the rule in practice. Only one of the
seven members of the Supreme Court is known to be
an FSLN member, and the Court occasionally has
acted independently, notably in freeing groups of
Atlantic coast minorities detained by Nicaraguan
security forces. But the Supreme Court orders must
be carried out by the FSLN-dominated Interior and
Justice Ministries. All judges below the Supreme
Court are appointed by the Junta-in effect, by
FSLN majority vote. Moreover, although a system of
popular courts set up in 1979 to handle "war crimes"
of the Somoza period was disbanded in 1981, new
tribunals aimed at perceived opponents of the FSLN
were established in May 1983. In addition, the Su-
preme Court lacks the power to rule on the constitu-
tionality of laws.
The FSLN's ability to work its will with the judiciary
and other public institutions presupposes that it main-
tains internal unity. Decisionmaking within the
FSLN centers in the nine-member National Director-
ate, the so-called comandantes, who-at least public-
ly-appear coequal. As long as these nine hold togeth-
er, the FSLN can act decisively. We see little
difference among them on fundamental ideology,
though they seem to have personal rivalries.
Although the commandantes are Marxists, the idea of
a truly collective leadership deviates from the organi-
zational practice of ruling Communist parties, which
usually are led by a party Politburo with a First or
General Secretary. We have had some indications
that Nicaragua's orthodox Communist allies hope this
Nicaraguan variant will end. Conceivably the election
of a Nicaraguan president could identify a first
among equals within the FSLN. Junta members
Daniel Ortega and Sergio Ramirez are the FSLN
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Next to the Directorate, the most important decision-
making body within the FSLN is the 80-member
Sandinista Assembly (Asamblea), the FSLN's equiva-
lent, in Communist terms, of a party Central Com-
mittee. Historical differences among the three FSLN
"tendencies" seem more likely to reemerge here than
in the Directorate. Some former Terceristas in the
Asamblea may be dissatisified with certain regime
tactics-moves against the Catholic Church, suppres-
sion of dissent, and too close identification with
Communist states-but, with the exception of Eden
Pastora and a few others, we have not yet seen
Tercerista defections, and we believe that the over-
whelming majority of Asamblea members are com-
mitted Marxists.
these groups.
Uneasy Allies
Among the groups that have been allied with the
FSLN are three small political parties and several
economic organizations represented on the Council of
State. The parties include the Moscow-line Nicara-
guan Socialist Party (PSN) and two parties of the
democratic left-the Independent Liberal Party (PLI)
and the Popular Social Christian Party (PPSC). The
most important economic organizations are two labor
confederations, the Sandinista Workers Central
(CST) and the Rural Workers Association (ATC), plus
the Union of Farmers and Cattlemen (UNAG),
formed by the Sandinistas after Somoza's overthrow
to represent new landowners created through agrarian
redistribution. In recent months indications of dissat-
isfaction with FSLN policies have surfaced in all of
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The Comandantes: Nicaragua's Decisionmakers
Formed in March 1979, the National Directorate of
the FSLN that has ruled Nicaragua since the Sandi-
nistas toppled the Somoza regime in July of that
year, has remained remarkably unified. Because the
Directorate's nine members led the insurrection that
overthrew Somoza, they are known as comandantes
de la revolucion (commanders of the revolution), the
highest honorary rank in Nicaragua. The Directorate
is the supreme decisionmaking body for the FSLN
and the Government of National Reconstruction
(GRN); comandantes hold key Cabinet posts, running
the Ministries of Defense, Interior, Planning, and
Agricultural-Livestock Development and Agrarian
Reform. Daniel Ortega holds the post of coordinator
of the GRN Junta, from which he communicates
Directorate decisions to the government.p
We believe that the comandantes, as committed
Marxists, view the world almost solely in political
terms. Most of their decisions, therefore, are aimed
at furthering the political power of the FSLN. For
example, Nicaraguan officials have told Embassy
officers that the FSLN/GRN has no long-term or
coordinated economic planning procedures and that
government economists have criticized the efficacy of
some Directorate decisions. Economic managers have
not participated in shaping land reform policy and
have criticized the agrarian reform program, among
others, as being manipulated to increase rural sup-
port for the FSLN at the expense of farm production.
The closed political environment and consistent pub-
lic display of unity make it difficult to assess how the
decisionmaking process works. We believe the Direc-
torate generally operates as a collegial body, making
decisions based on consensus. US Embassy officials
speculate that when disagreements emerge, there may
be an informal reckoning of strength rather than a
formal vote. In fast-breaking situations,. the more
powerful among the nine (Tomas Borge, Humberto
Ortega, and Daniel Ortega, for example) tend to
decide alone or with partial consultation. Because
public unity is the cardinal rule of the Directorate,
individual comandantes invariably do not dissent
publicly from any decision after it is reached; instead,
those linked with an unpopular decision tend to keep
a low public profile temporarily.
Several factors seem to influence decisionmakiniz in
the Directorate.
there have been some ideological
disagreements, . not on goals then on ways to achieve
them. Certainly there have been abrupt modifications
of decisions taken earlier for example, on electoral
procedures and censorship. Borge, Bayardo Arce, and
Henry Ruiz seem to hold relatively hardline views on
the direction of the revolution, advocating further
militarization, greater control of the opposition, and
a totalitarian Marxist-Leninist system. Victor Tir-
ado, too, has recently shown a relatively firm com-
mitment to orthodox Marxism-Leninism, at least
publicly. In contrast, the Ortega brothers-supported
by Carlos Nunez, Jaime Wheelock, and Luis Carri-
on-sometimes appear to take a more pragmatic
approach, as if willing to temper some Marxist goals
at home and abroad in order to ensure the viability of
the regime
The US Embassy reports that since 1983 the Ortegas
appear to have at least temporarily gained the upper
hand among the comandantes. To that extent the
ideological orientation of the regime may be less
rigidly orthodox Mdrxist than it would be if the
Borge line were dominant. These putative differences
in ideology should not be overemphasized, however,
the regime at least partly
erences for Western consumption.
Friendships, rivalries, and individual responsibilities
also influence decisionmaking in the Directorate.
Borge's vanity and unpredictability, for example,
have irritated other comandantes. Although Borge
probably expects deference from his colleagues be-
cause of his seniority and experience-as the only
surviving founder of the FSLN-the Ortegas appar-
ently have not always granted it. Moreover, Embassy
reporting indicates that Borge long wanted to be
president, yet he did not become the FSLN's choice.
Animosity also exists between Ruiz and Wheelock
because the overlapping economic functions of their
respective planning and agricultural ministries force
them to compete for limited financial resources to
accomplish their programs.
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Until February 1984, the three parties were joined to
the FSLN as part of a coalition, the Patriotic Front of
the Revolution (FPR). At its February convention,
however, the PLI announced its withdrawal from the
coalition in order to compete separately in the elec-
tions; the other two quickly followed suit. In July the
PLI and PSN nominated for president ex-Labor
Minister Virgilio Godoy and Council of State member
Domingo Sanchez Salgado, respectively. Two small
obscure leftist parties-the Popular Action Move-
ment-Marxist Leninist and the Communist Party of
Nicaragua, the latter a breakaway from the PSN
also nominated candidates. In their published state-
ments and private comments to US Embassy officials,
the PLI, PPSC, and even the PSN have criticized the
FSLN for curbing political dissent. In addition, the
PLI and PPSC have called for more guarantees to the
private sector and for a more nonaligned foreign
policy; the PLI wants Nicaragua to improve its
relations with its neighbors, while the PPSC advo-
cates better relations with the United States
Whereas the PSN's decision to run separately from
the FSLN may be of little consequence-its long-
term goals for Nicaragua are nearly identical to those
of the FSLN and its electoral support probably is
small-the defections of the PLI and PPSC could
prove costly. Politicians from parties on the center and
center-right have estimated to US officials that in a
reasonably fair election the two parties together might
garner 20 percent of the vote, with the FSLN winning
40 percent and their own parties the remainder.
Moreover, the PLI's alliance with the FSLN had
conferred some international prestige on the regime,
inasmuch as the PLI president is a respected vice
president of the Liberal International, an alliance of
liberal parties in several countries. The PPSC had
drawn its support mainly from Catholic Church activ-
ists-the so-called Popular Church-whose "libera-
tion theology" had led them to support leftist revolu-
tionary causes. Part of the PPSC, calling itself the
Authentic PPSC, has split off from the rest of the
party and joined the unarmed opposition.
Anti-FSLN grievances within economic organizations
are less specific, but-because these organizations
claim a combined membership of more than
275,000-the impact on the FSLN's popular support
is potentially greater. Much of the Sandinista Work-
ers Central rank and file, according to the US
Embassy, is more interested in bread-and-butter is-
sues than in the Marxist goals conveyed by its leaders
and the regime. As a result, a few member unions
have switched their affiliation to other labor confeder-
ations. The opposite also has occurred, however, and
some independent unions have been coerced by the
regime into joining the CST.
many Rural Workers Association
Enterprise.
members would prefer their leaders to spend more
time on improving rural conditions and less on urging
their members and families to join the Sandinista
militia or register for the draft. Discontent within the
National Union of Farmers and Cattlemen seems to
be prompted, according to the US Embassy, by its
members' new status as landowners; they have devel-
oped a vested interest in safeguarding the private
sector, and as a result some may be beginning to find
more in common with the union's erstwhile rival in
rural areas, the Superior Council of Private
Several major groups in Nicaragua that initially were
allied with the FSLN now stand in unarmed opposi-
tion to it. They include several political parties,
independent trade unions, the private sector, La
Prensa, and the Catholic hierarchy. Most of these
entities are represented in an umbrella group, the
Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinator (CDN)
The major political weakness of the CDN is the lack
of determination and disunity in the political parties.
Although many opposition party leaders claim they
could match the FSLN in a fair election, the US
Embassy reports that privately these leaders express
doubt that they could overcome the FSLN's advan-
tages gained through five years of massive propagan-
da and control of the state apparatus and mass
organizations-even if the campaign from now on
were to be-fair. Some of the parties, according to the
US Embassy, may therefore be looking for an excuse
to boycott the elections or may be hoping the regime
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Figure 3
Nicaragua: Major Elements in the Political Spectruma
Regime and Its
Unarmed Opposition
Contras
Perceived Supporters
Parties and
FSLN
PSD
ARDE d
Paramilitaries
PLI
PSC
MISURA
PPSC
PPSCAb
FDN
PSN
MLC
Armed forces commanders
PCD
PCDN`
Economic Interest
ATC
COSEP
Groups
UNAG
CTN
CST
CUS
Social Groups and
AMNLAE
CEN
Media
Barricada
La Prensa
CDS
END
JS-19J
UCA
CEPAD
x For disucssion of these and other significant political organizations, see
appendix A.
b Reportedly has joined PSC.
`Split with PCD because it decided not to compete in electoral campaign.
Is probably much larger than remnant of PCD.
d In July 1984 Eden Pastora and his followers withdrew from ARDE in
protest against unification of ARDE with FDN.
will cancel them altogether. In July, the CDN nomi-
nated a former Junta member and Ambassador to the
United States, Arturo Cruz, for president and Social
Christian Party leader Adan Fletes for vice president,
but the CDN has refused to register on the grounds
that the existing electoral procedures are unfair.F_
Conservative Parties (PCD and PCDN)
The Democratic Conservative Party (PCD) is the
descendant of Nicaragua's traditional conservative
opposition to the Somoza-dominated Liberal Party.
Under the present regime the PCD as a whole has
been pro-United States, proprivate sector, and anti-
Communist, and as of early 1984 the US Embassy
considered it the largest and best organized opposition
party. Its major weakness is a sharp internal split
regarding its basic relation with the FSLN and
participation in the elections. The leader of one
faction, Mario Rappaccioli, has been described by US
Embassy officials as seeking to undo virtually all that
the Sandinistas have done. Moreover, he repeatedly
threatened- to boycott the elections if he considered
the regime's promised electoral freedoms for the party
as unsatisfactory. Leaders of the second, and, in our
judgment, much smaller faction, Clemente Guido,
Enrique Sotelo, and Junta member Rafael Cordova
Rivas, argued that the PCD should work with the
government. In July 1984 this faction registered for
the election using the name PCD. Rappaccioli's fol-
lowers, using the name Democratic Conservative Par-
ty of Nicaragua (PCDN), have aligned themselves
with the CDN by refusing to participate in the
campaign
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Social Christian Party (PSC)
An active but minor player in the Nicaraguan politi-
cal scene for the past two decades, the PSC probably
commands more respect from abroad-and the
FSLN-than any other party in the internal opposi-
tion. It has strong ties to the independent Nicaraguan
Workers' Central, the Catholic hierarchy, and other
Social Christian and Christian Democratic parties in
Latin America and Western Europe. In March 1984
PSC leaders shifted from calling for dialogue among
all sectors, including the contras, to talks between the
FSLN and the unarmed democratic opposition. We
believe this decision may have been designed to
demonstrate the PSC's reasonableness vis-a-vis the
regime. Nonetheless, the move undercut the party's
allies in the CDN and differed from the position of
the church hierarchy, who in April 1984 included the
armed opponents in their proposal for dialogue. In
addition, the PSC has been more eager than other
opposition parties to participate in the campaign and
appears to have been strengthened by defections from
the PPSC in the form of the so-called Authentic
PPSC. PSC.leader Adan Fletes probably received the
CDN's vice presidential nomination in order to ensure
that the PSC would not openly differ with the other
CDN members on the question of boycotting the
election
Social Democratic Party (PSD)
Formed in 1979, the PSD identifies ideologically with
European Social Democrats. The party last Septem-
ber joined 'the small Democratic Action Party of El
Salvador and the Panamanian People's Action Party
to form Central American Social Democracy, an
organization designed to facilitate mutual support
among these parties. US Embassy officials have de-
scribed PSD leaders as being sometimes more aggres-
sive than perceptive. For example, having been admit-
ted to the Council of State in January 1984, the PSD
soon withdrew to protest the electoral law then under.
discussion. This precipitous withdrawal not only de-
prived the PSD of further opportunity to shape the
law but also diluted the protest because the move was
not coordinated with the other opposition parties.
Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP)
The Council is an umbrella group representing lower-
middle to upper-class members of the private sector.
Next to the church, it is the largest, most representa-
tive, and best organized opposition group. The Coun-
cil's energetic new leader, cotton grower Enrique
Bolanos, probably is second in importance to Arch-
bishop Obando y Bravo among the regime's oppo-
nents. COSEP cooperates with the opposition parties
and has pledged material support to them in order to
encourage unity during the electoral campaign. Ironi-
cally, however, the Council's demonstrated effective-
ness has aroused the envious resentment of some party
leaders. In addition, some Council members, accord-
ing to the US Embassy, are becoming increasingly
discouraged by the regime's growing control over the
economy and continuing threats of confiscation.
Independent Labor
Nicaragua's only independent labor unions, the Nica-
raguan Workers Central (CTN) and the Confedera-
tion for Labor Unification (CUS), have considerable
political potential, and some problems as well. Al-
though we do not have reliable data on their member-
ship, the two unions together probably are larger than
all the political parties combined. Their leaders seem
determined to stay politically active, despite consider-
able FSLN harassment. They also have sources of
moral and some financial support; CTN receives
assistance from the Latin American Workers Central,
a Christian Democratic regional labor organization,
while the Confederation has connections with the
American Institute for Free Labor Development and
other Western labor organizations
On the debit side, the Nicaraguan Workers Central is
hampered by an internal split, with one factional
leader, Carlos Huembes, regularly accusing the other,
Antonio Jarquin, of being an FSLN agent. The
Confederation's main problems, according to its sec-
retary general, Alvin Guthrie, are that it lacks money
and reliable domestic allies. Guthrie wants the Con-
federation to participate actively in the Nicaraguan
Democratic Coordinator alliance challenging the
FSLN candidate in the elections, and he-unrealisti-
cally, in our view-favors trying to persuade the
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The Catholic Church
The mainstream Catholic Church, according to the
US Embassy, is the strongest element in the unarmed
opposition, and Archbishop Obando y Bravo the most
popular leader. He and other members of the hierar-
chy were buoyed by the Pope's visit in March 1983
and seem more determined than ever to make the
church a bulwark against the Sandinistas' institution-
alization of Marxism. Moreover, the Vatican's deci-
sion to have Obando step down in September 1983
from president to vice president of the Nicaraguan
Episcopal Conference (CEN)-at first considered by
many observers as a Vatican concession to the Sandi-
nistas-has made it more difficult for the regime and
others to single him out for criticism. Now these
critics must take on the entire CEN as it proclaims
what previously Obando alone would have said. Un-
der its current president, Bishop Pablo Vega, the
Conference has boldly asserted its opposition to con-
scription and called for the regime to negotiate even
with its armed opponents. Enthusiastic attendance at
official church functions-marked on one recent oc-
casion by tens of thousands chanting "we are Chris-
tians, not Marxists"-suggests that the bishops' poli-
cies toward the regime reflect the aspirations of a
large majority of practicing Catholics.
Nevertheless, the church is politically divided. Mem-
bers of the so-called Popular Church, which draws
most of its strength from religious orders, such as the
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 Familial relationships traditionally have played a
prominent role in Nicaraguan politics. In the past, a
group of families centered in the city of Granada and
identified with the Conservative Party struggled for
political dominance over a similar group concentrat-
ed in Leon who supported the Liberal Party. Among
the leading Conservative Party families were the
Chamorros, who founded the newspaper La Prensa in
1926 as a voice in opposition to the Liberal Party
dominated by the Somoza.family.
The January 1978 assassination of Pedro Joaquin
Chamorro Cardenal, editor and publisher of La
Prensa, by Somoza security forces proved to be a
critical turning point in the movement to oust So-
moza. On one level it united Sandinistas and non-
Sandinistas against the dictator. On another level it
brought together Marxists and non-Marxists, the
latter led by families like the Chamorros and the
Cardenals. The latter alliance became the source of
subsequent political divisions within these families,
who remained united in what they opposed-
Somoza-but not in what they supported
Within the Chamorro family, Pedro Joaquin's broth-
er, Xavier, became the new editor of La Prensa.
Pedro's son Carlos Fernando began collaborating
directly with Sandinista combatants even while re-
taining his normal journalistic duties. When La
Prensa reopened after Somoza'sfall-Somoza's
forces had bombed it out of production earlier that
year-Carlos Fernando decided to ally himself more
directly with the new regime. He left the family
enterprise altogether to become Deputy Minister of
Culture and then editor of Barricada, the official
FSLN newspaper.
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That departure set offfurther reverberations at La
Prensa. Xavier resented the resistance of other family
members to the new regime. He led a walkout of most
of the top editors and reporters of La Prensa and
formed El Nuevo Diario, a newspaper supporting the
government. As a result, the widow of the assassinat-
ed Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Cardenal, Violeta-who
served as an early member of the Junta but became
disillusioned with the regime-became head of the
board of directors of La Prensa. Her son, Pedro
Joaquin Chamorro Barrios, became codirector of the
newspaper. An academic specialist on international
media has observed that all three dailies contain
acrimonious charges and countercharges about their
respective editorial stances. Moreover, two Chamorro
cousins of these journalists, Edmundo Chamorro
Rappaccioli and his brother Fernando, who fought
with the Sandinistas against Somoza, are now promi-
nent anti-Sandinista leaders with UDN-FARN.
The Cardenals are related to the Chamorros. Like
the Chamorros, they were largely conservative politi-
cally and today are divided in their loyalties. Two
brothers, the priests Ernesto and Fernando, serve as
government officials, and a relative, Vanesa Castro
Cardenal, is director of the FSLN's Party Affairs
Department and the wife of FSLN National Director-
ate member Jaime Wheelock. Businessman Jose
"Chicano" Cardenal, however, helped found the anti-
Sandinista FDN after becoming disillusioned with
the FSLN. Lucia Cardenal de Salazar, the widow of
a Nicaraguan businessman killed by Sandinista secu-
rity agents in 1980 and the cousin of Ernesto and
Fernando, is nowa member of the FDN leadership.
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Other families, also traditionally supporters of the
Conservative Party, are divided politically. One
member of the Cuadra family is a coeditor of La
Prensa; another is Minister of Finance under the
Sandinistas though not a Sandinista himself- a third
is the Chief of Staff of the Army and a member of the
FSLN. One member of the Coronel family, Carlos
Coronel Kautz, is a close adviser to anti-Sandinista
leader Eden Pastora; his brothers, Manuel and Ri-
cardo, hold vice ministerial posts in the Ministry of
Agricultural-Livestock Development and Agrarian
Reform. The Castillo family also is divided: Mario is
a close assistant to FSLN National Directorate mem-
ber Humberto Ortega; his brother Ernesto is Minister
of Justice and an FSLN member; their sister Maria
Isabel, however, is married to a prominent business-
man and staunchly opposes the Sandinista regime.
Some anti-Sandinista leaders are at odds politically
despite family connections. Alfonso Callejas Deshon
is a member of the FDN National Directorate and
uncle of Alfonso Robelo Callejas, a founder of
ARDE, which in the past has resisted formally
allying itself with the FDN. Steadman Fagoth of
MISURA is married to the sister of his political rival
for the allegiance of the Atlantic Coast peoples,
Brooklyn Rivera.
In theory some family relationships might eventually
contribute to a political reconciliation. According to a
December 1983 North American television documen-
tary, for example, most of the Chamorros are social-
lyfriendly despite political differences. The history of
most civil conflicts, however, suggests even a resolu-
tion of the political conflict would not quickly heal
the bitter personal divisions within families.
Jesuits, and from foreign priests-both groups outside
the direct control of the hierarchy-continue to sup-
port the Sandinistas even though the mainstream
church no longer does. Some serve the regime in
various official or semiofficial roles, thereby helping
to preserve the regime's credibility in countries with
large Catholic populations. The partnership of church
activists with the Sandinistas was important in mobi-
lizing popular support in Nicaragua against Somoza
and in presenting the Sandinistas abroad as a move-
ment dedicated to social justice and Christian values.
For those reasons, the tentative signs that the commit-
ment of some members of the Popular Church to the
regime is weakening-for example, the dissolution of
the proregime clerical association ACLEN last Janu-
ary-are equally important. In a book published in
1984, a generally pro-FSLN church activist estimated
that no more than 25 percent or so of the Catholic
clergy in Nicaragua remain "supportive of the revolu-
tion." The rest, he said, appeared to be "with the
bishops."
La Prensa
Once the clearest voice of the anti-Somoza opposition,
La Prensa now fulfills virtually the same role against .
the FSLN. It is a close ally of Obando y Bravo.
Although the Chamorro family, who owned it, is now
divided politically, its codirector and general manag-
er-both Chamorros-are leaders in two major oppo-
sition parties. Pedro Joaquin Chamorro is with the
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Democratic Conservative Party. We believe the news-
paper now is subject to greater censorship but com-
mands stronger international support than during the
Somoza era. Overall, we believe that La Prensa, like
the Episcopal Conference but unlike much of the rest
of the unarmed opposition, relishes its confrontation
with the FSLN and is generally optimistic about its
prospects for survival.
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The Contras
Over the past three years, world media and other
sources have identified at least 20 anti-Sandinista
exile organizations, most of which claim to have some
military capability. Nearly all have combined forces
or withered away for lack of popular and material
support. We believe only three "contra" organiza-
tions-with an estimated combined strength of about
15,000 insurgents-currently possess a recognizable
political leadership and demonstrated capacity to
conduct combat operations inside Nicaragua: The
Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN); the combined
forces of the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance
(ARDE); and the MISURA Revolutionary Front.
Together these organizations have achieved consider-
with human rights abuses during the civil war. He
currently serves as Directorate liaison to the FDN
general staff, whose five members served as National
Guard officers. A few ex-guardsmen occupy key
positions owing to their military qualifications, al-
though we estimate that less than five percent of FDN
combatants are former guardsmen, and this share is
declining as new recruits are added.
ARDE
Based in Costa Rica, ARDE was formed in Septem-
ber 1982, and is less rightist in orientation and has
stronger anti-Somoza credentials than the Nicara-
guan Democratic Force. Its principal components,
through June 1984, included:
able popular following in the largely rural areas where ? The Sandino Revolutionary Front (FRS), led by ex-
Nicaragua where most of the population is concen-
trated has greatly inhibited expressions of popular
support for them in those districts.
The FDN
Based in Honduras, the FDN is larger than the other
two groups combined. It was formed in 1981 and at
first had a heavily Somocista and National Guard
cast. In 1982, however, its Directorate was reorga-
nized to attract, successfully, additional prestigious
individuals not identified with Somoza:
? Adolfo Calero, leader of the Democratic Conserva-
tive Party until he went into exile in 1982.
? Alfonso Callejas, who resigned as Vice President of
Nicaragua in 1972 to protest Somoza's
authoritarianism.
? Lucia Cardenal de Salazar, widow of Jorge Salazar,
an anti-Somoza businessman killed in 1980 by
Sandinista security agents because of his opposition
to the regime.
? Indalecio Rodriguez, former leader of the Independ-
ent Liberal Party exiled in the 1960s for his opposi-
tion to Somoza
Few of the FDN's key civilian personnel-who con-
trol the organization's political and military affairs-
held positions in the Somoza government. Only one
present Directorate member, Enrique Bermudez, was
directly associated with Somoza. His position as
Nicaraguan defense attache in Washington from
1976-79 generally insulated him from association
Sandinista guerrilla commander Eden Pastora.
? The Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN),
led by Alfonso Robelo Callejas, one of the five
members of the original junta that replaced Somoza
in 1979.
? The Miskito, Sumu, Rama, Sandinista Unity orga-
nization (MISURASATA), led by Brooklyn Rivera.
MISURASATA was set up by the Sandinista re-
gime in 1979 to represent the Atlantic Coast popu-
lation but became anti-Sandinista in 1981 and a co-
founder of ARDE in September 1982. The regime
has created a new organization-with negligible
popular support to date-to preserve the facade of
loyalty from that quarter.
? The Christian Democratic Solidarity Front (FSDC),
under Jose Davila, professing an ideology similar to
that of most Christian Democratic parties in Cen-
tral America.
? Nicaraguan Democratic Workers Solidarity
(STDN), led by former labor leader Donald Castillo.
? The Nicaraguan Democratic Union-Revolutionary
Armed Forces (UDN-FARN) led by ex-Sandinista
fighters Edmundo and Fernando Chamorro Rap-
paccioli. UDN-FARN was one of the founders of
ARDE and rejoined it in January 1984 after a brief
alliance with FDN.
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Figure 4
Operating Areas of Insurgent Groups
Lago de
Nicaragua
Caribbean
Sea
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onduras
0V Q
Golfpde
Fonseca
North
Pacific
Ocean
Democratic Revolutionary Alliance-ARDE
and Sandino Revolutionar_y Front-FRS
(Eden Pastore)
Nicaraguan Democratic Force-FON
Misura Revolutionary Front
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ARDE has been beset with disputes over how far it
should go in collaborating with the Nicaraguan Dem-
ocratic Force, without compromising its anti-Somoza
legacy, and whether it can function effectively and
supply its combatants without such cooperation. For
several months the two principal Alliance leaders,
Pastora and Robelo, differed significantly on these
issues. Robelo was willing to commit the Alliance to a
formal coalition with the two other major contra
forces, but Pastora strongly objected. Pastora insisted
that the Democratic Force must first oust Bermu-
dez-which it is reluctant to do because of his
military abilities-and demanded guarantees that
ARDE's military requirements would be adequately
met as a result of an alliance. Adding to Pastora's
intransigence is his considerable ego; we believe that
Pastora wants to lead a united insurgent force and, if
the Sandinistas were overthrown, Nicaragua itself. In
early July, Pastora announced that he and his sup-
porters-constituting most of the southern-based in-
surgents-had withdrawn from ARDE to continue
the struggle as the "true" ARDE. In early September,
however, Pastora and Robelo agreed to collaborate on
"parallel paths" against the regime
MISURA
Led by Steadman Fagoth, MISURA was originally
part of the FDN, remained in regular contact with its
military leadership, and, as of June 1984, was ready
to join a unified insurgent coalition. MISURA's
strength is drawn mainly from Indian refugees who
fled to Honduras, but the organization claims to have
over 1,500 combatants operating in eastern Nicara-
gua. MISURA's political goals are limited to securing
greater autonomy for the native Indian and black
communities in the Atlantic Coast; it has little capa-
bility or interest in asserting its presence in the
Spanish-speaking areas of Nicaragua. Moreover, a
personal rivalry between Fagoth and the chief of
ARDE's MISURASATA organization Rivera limits
the effectiveness of resistance to Sandinista rule in the
Atlantic Coast area.
In late August leaders of the three organizations
(minus Pastora and. his followers) formed the Nicara-
guan Unity for Reconciliation (UNIR).This action in
itself does not portend any imminent threat to the
regime, in our judgment. The contra effort is not that
strong. Moreover, all three groups must depend heavi-
ly on outside assistance, both material and moral.
Nevertheless, the 1984 Easter appeal of the Nicara-
guan bishops for the regime to negotiate with the
insurgents provides one indication of popular sympa-
thy for their cause.
We believe that, in the near term, most groups and
individuals discussed in this paper will remain where
they are on the political spectrum. We expect the
FSLN leadership to continue to pay lipservice to
democratic ideals while building a Marxist state, and
to seek to control, intimidate, and discredit those
groups that oppose it. In our view, considering the
persistence of the armed anti-Sandinista movement
and the increasing internal dissatisfaction with the
regime-even among the revolutionary faithful-the
FSLN leadership's perception of its security situation
will continue to drive its actions. Individual policy
moves are likely to be pragmatic, at least in the sense
that the FSLN will seek to avoid a domestic or foreign
crisis-for example, by allowing the opposition to
have limited freedoms in the electoral campaign in
order to give the elections a democratic facade for
international consumption. In our opinion, although
Sandinista leaders realize that opposition participa-
tion in the elections would lend greater credence to
their claims of pluralism, the FSLN presently appears
intent on holding elections with or without such
participation, and then proceeding with its increasing
domination of society.
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Appendix A
Politically Significant Organizations
Luisa Amanda Espinoza Association of Nicaraguan
Women
Carlos Carrion Cruz (national coordinator,
Natan Sevilla Gomez (secretary general)
Alfonso Robelo Callejas
Eden Pastora Gomez
Brooklyn Rivera Bryan
Jose Davila Membreno
Donald Castillo
Edmundo Chamorro Rappaccioli
Fernando Chamorro Rappaccioli
A pro-Sandinista group representing the Popular Church
on Council of State. In January 1984 Father Arguello
withdrew from Council of State and ACLEN abolished
itself; probably responding to pressure from Vatican and
Nicaraguan bishops to disengage from politics. ACLEN
members who take religious vows also belong to
CONFER.
A mass organization set up by the Sandinistas. Original-
ly made up of urban middle-class women who had
formed committees during civil war to protest disappear-
ances; women who formed part of Sandinista fighting
force and combat support groups joined later. Encour-
ages women to participate in national affairs and to join
the military. Propagandizes middle-class women. Has
held discussions to redefine women's roles in Nicaragua,
established a commission to rewrite law code on mar-
riage, divorce, and property rights. Most important
function is to serve as a control mechanism for the
regime. All other significant women's organizations are
outgrowths of AMNLAE.
One of the most active Sandinista organizations. Affili-
ate of the Sandinista labor union CST; 14,000 members
involved from primary schools through universities. Not
in an adversary role to that of Minister of Education;
according to regime spokesmen, there "cannot exist
contradictions" in the ministry "now that education
serves the masses." ANDEN serves to control teachers'
economic demands and to monitor their ideology.
Apparently important only as a propaganda vehicle.
Specializes in indoctrination through hero worship, with
pilgrimages to the birthplaces of Sandino and Carlos
Fonseca Amador. Many parents accuse ANS of weaken-
ing family authority and teaching Marxism.
Coalition of anti-Sandinista groups formed in September
1982 by Pastora's Sandino Revolutionary Front (FRS),
Robelo's MDN, and Rivera's MISURASATA. Later
joined by Davila's Christian Democratic Solidarity
Front, Castillo's Nicaraguan Democratic Workers' Soli-
darity, and Chamorro's UDN-FARN. Based in Costa
Rica. Carries out guerrilla operations in southern Nica-
ragua. Represents itself as the voice of the revolution
betrayed. Calls for freeing Nicaragua from Cuban,
Soviet, and US influence. Also calls for free elections
and a mixed economy. Pastora's ties to the Socialist
International and his reluctance to see ARDE formally
ally with the FDN underscore ARDE's political orienta-
tion as somewhat left of the two other significant contra
groups. Pastora, Davila, and Castillo have withdrawn at
least temporarily from ARDE to set up a "true" ARDE.
Robelo's faction of ARDE is now united with the FDN
and MISURA in the organization UNIR.
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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)
80 FSLN members (for example, Director of State
Security Lenin Cerna, Junta member Sergio Ramirez,
Minister of Justice Ernesto Castillo, Foreign Minister
D'Escoto, Minister of Culture Ernesto Cardenal,
Barricade
Director Carlos Chamorro)
Edgardo Garcia (secretary general)
A consultative body to the FSLN National Directorate
that includes the top Sandinistas. Members hold impor-
tant government, mass organization, media, and party
positions. Has more power as a deliberative body than
the more publicized Council of State. Meets at least once
a year to approve FSLN policies. A forum where serious
disagreements within the FSLN are likely to be settled.
FSLN organization of farm laborers. During revolution,
grew out of groups of landless peasants organized in mid-
1970s by church activists. Early activities included orga-
nizing of land invasions and protest marches. Groups
fused in 1978 as ATC, which supported guerrillas and
sabotaged Somoza's National Guard operations. Origi-
nated on the Pacific coast but now in all parts of country.
Runs the Sandinista Agricultural Commune, which con-
sists of some peasants and also "represents" the workers
in the State Production Units-nationalized agricultural
estates. Ministry of Labor credits the ATC with over
30,000 full members in about 500 unions in 1982;
statistics may be inflated. Operates on state farms and
private holdings. Competes with farmworkers' unions
sponsored by non-Sandinista groups. Functions as a
source of Sandinista indoctrination through its rural
school of political formation. Organizes nonrural workers
for coffee harvests. Possibly because of its traditional
links with church activists, ATC has usually sent mem-
bers to Western Europe and North America rather than
to Cuba and the USSR. ATC not developing completely
the way the FSLN desires; many members seek to
defend own interests rather than FSLN cause.
The FSLN newspaper, known for its vivid support for
regime. Chamorro had been a Sandinista activist during
insurrection. When Junta set up special courts in 1979 to
try Somocistas, Barricada ran photos of defendants
under such headlines as "henchmen of the genocide."
Praises state security successes and impugns motives of
regime critics. When regime established a special tax to
pay for militias, Barricada stressed opposition of private
sector-implying that it was unpatriotic. In August 1982
participated in regime-staged public humiliation of
Archbishop Obando y Bravo's assistant, Rev. Bismarck
Carballo. Has continued to hew faithfully to FSLN line.
Has published international monthly editions in English
and Spanish since 1982.
Extreme leftist union not under direct control of CST
but linked to the Nicaraguan Communist Party (which is
not pro-Moscow). Strong among textile workers. Orga-
nized a strike of 2,000 factory workers in Managua in
1980, demanding a 100-percent wage increase; this
prompted FSLN leader Arce to declare that "these
Communists" were in league with CIA. CAUS's contin-
ued instigation of labor agitation led to imprisonment of
numerous CAUS officials in late 1981. Since their
release in 1982, CAUS has been fairly quiet. As of 1982,
had about 1,500 members in 14 affiliates.
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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)
CDN Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinator Umbrella group comprising the unarmed internal opposi-
Luis Rivas Leiva (president) tion to the Sandinista regime. Organized in 1981. In-
cludes PSC, PSD, MLC, CTN, CUS, COSEP,
CONAPRO, Chamber of Commerce, CADIN, and
UPANIC. Attempting to approach the November elec-
tions as a unified bloc.
CDS Sandinista Defense Committees (or Committee) A powerful instrument of social control in which author-
ity flows from the FSLN directorate through the CDS
Leticia Herrera (secretary general) structure to neighborhood committees. Modeled on the
Cuban Committees for Defense of Revolution. Original-
ly called Civil Defense Committees. Formed during the
insurrection-in large part from church activist groups
inspired by "liberation theology"-to mobilize popular
support for Somoza's overthrow and to aid Sandinista
combatants by serving as an intelligence and recruiting
network and source of logistic support. Also provided
emergency aid to the populace immediately after the
Sandinista victory. In 1982 the committees became
responsible for local defense under the authority of the
army high command. The chain of command is not
clearly outlined; considerable overlap exists at the na-
tional and local level between the CDS, the militia, and
other Sandinista organizations. Currently has authority
to issue ration cards and licenses and report on activities
of "counterrevolutionaries." Supervises some local elec-
tions. Tasks also include first aid, firefighting, emergen-
cy evacuation, vice control, assisting in literacy cam-
paigns, supplying loans and materials for housing.
CEN Nicaraguan Episcopal Conference Represents the authority of the nine Catholic bishops of
Nicaragua. Prior to the fall of Somoza issued a declara-
Bishop Pablo Antonio Vega Mantilla (chairman or tion justifying revolution, and early in Sandinista rule
president) cautiously approved regime's policies, including "social-
Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo (vice chairman ism." Has since become increasingly antiregime. Until
or vice president) recent months, at least one bishop, Lopez Ardon of
Esteli, was consistently pro-Sandinista. Speculation was
that Vatican substituted Vega for Obando as chairman
in September 1983 to reduce problems created by Oban-
do's confrontational style toward regime. However, un-
der Vega CEN has asserted itself boldly, notably by
continuing to oppose military conscription. In April 1984
all nine bishops issued a pastoral letter calling on the
regime to open negotiations with the Nicaraguan
insurgents.
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CEPAD Evangelical Committee for Development Aid Ecumenical but mainly Protestant organization general-
ly supportive of regime. Established after 1972 earth-
Gustavo Parajon quake by a Baptist doctor, Parajon, to aid earthquake
Benjamin Cortes victims and seek funds from congregations in Nicaragua
and from international church agencies to fund longer-
term development projects. Interest in human rights
issues brought it into confrontation with Somoza and
support for FSLN. Distributed food to needy after
Somoza's overthrow, and organized propaganda support
for regime in Nicaragua and abroad among Protestant
denominations, similar to the efforts of Catholic organi-
zations such as ACLEN, CONFER, and UCA to enlist
Catholic support for the FSLN. There is some indication
that CEPAD's loyalty, like that of some Catholic groups
affiliated with the Popular Church, may be shifting
away from the regime.
Independent General Labor Confederation
A Communist union, organized during the Somoza era
by the pro-Moscow Socialist Party of Nicaragua, which
joined in a general strike after the 1978 assassination of
La Prensa editor. The strike ended after violence and
repression by National Guard, but the forces it un-
leashed contributed to success of Sandinistas. CGTI
derives its strength mainly from the Managua Construc-
tion Workers Union. Because Socialist Party has been
allied with FSLN in government, CGTI generally has
supported Sandinistas but has resisted complete takeover
by FSLN. Lagging construction industry, however, has
hurt rank and file and led to some disagreement with
regime policies. Once claimed 15,000 members; US
Embassy now estimates less than 7,000.
COIP People's Industrial Corporation Established after Sandinistas took power to administer
the properties abandoned by or seized from the Somoza
Gilberto Guzman (director) family and their collaborators. Within a year controlled
109 industrial enterprises. Falls under Ministry of Indus-
try, and its director also holds title of Vice Minister of
Industry.
CONFER Conference of Religious Orders or National Conference CONFERs are found throughout Latin America and are
of Religious composed of individuals, such as Jesuits, Dominicans,
Capuchins, and other religious orders. CONFER has
Rev. Jose Manuel Guijo (president) been an important part of the so-called Popular Church
in Nicaragua. According to a 1982 internal Church
survey,of the Central American Church, CONFER was
"confronting" the Bishops' Conferences, including the
Nicaraguan CEN, with better organization and re-
sources, and many CONFER leaders were judged to be
"radicalized" or pro-Marxist. Some indication since
1982 that CONFER's political support for Sandinista
regime has been weakening.
Secret 22
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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)
COSEP Superior Council of Private Enterprise Private-sector umbrella organization established in 1972.
Includes Nicaraguan Development Institute/Nicara-
Enrique Bolanos Gayer (president) guan Development Foundation (INDE/FUNDE), Nica-
William Baez Sacasa raguan Chamber of Industries (CADIN), National Con-
Enrique Dreyfus Morales federation of Professional Associations (CONAPRO),
Chamber of Commerce, Chamber of Construction, and
Union of Agricultural and Livestock Producers of Nica-
ragua (UPANIC). Has always been politicized. Strong
supporter of 1979 revolution. Tried to work out accom-
modation with FSLN through mid-1980. Reluctantly
took six seats assigned to it in Council of State but would
have preferred an elected legislature. After security
forces killed its vice president, Jorge Salazar, in Novem-
ber 1980, COSEP left Council of State. Since 1981 has
become a voice for middle- and upper-income members
of the opposition. Much of COSEP's leadership sees
itself as representing the political and economic interests
of individuals, not just of private property. Has tended to
favor interests of big business, but recently has sought to
broaden its membership and has established a chapter in
nearly every town. Has encouraged political parties to
form an alliance for November elections using promise
of COSEP support as tool. Leaders belief that the key
political issue is survival, not democracy, tempers short-
term goals. Strategy is to not let any one leader become
so visible that regime targets him as it did Salazar.
Regime methods to attack COSEP include controlling
pricing and marketing of goods and declaring meetings
illegal; but COSEP retains some ability to affect regime
decisions if only because the private sector remains
critical to the country's economic health.
CPDH Permanent Commission on Human Rights Compiles information on deaths, disappearances, and
treatment of political prisoners in Nicaragua. Began
Marta Patricia Baltodano (coordinator) activities in 1977. Has a 15-member National Director-
ate with representatives from the church, business, and
labor and political parties. Before 1980 was relatively
free to investigate abuses. Then Sandinista regime initi-
ated campaign against CPDH and formed its own
organization, the National Commission for the Promo-
tion and Protection of Human Rights. CPDH no longer
allowed to enter jails or attend Popular Anti-Somocista
Tribunals. FSLN harasses members to prevent CPDH
from investigating abuses and publishing its findings.
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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)
CST Sandinista Workers Central Started in 1977 as a clandestine Sandinista movement.
By 1982, had enrolled 90,000 workers in over 500
Lucio Jimenez Guzman (secretary general) member unions, according to probably inflated statistics
of Ministry of Labor. Most are in Managua area. Not all
members are pro-Sandinista. Has held political seminars
to indoctrinate members in Sandinista ideology, mobi-
lized "volunteers" to aid in harvests, and sent workers to
Cuba and USSR for political indoctrination. In 1981
joined the Moscow-led World Federation of Trade
Unions; has cooperation agreements with Soviet Central
Council of Trade Unions. Not very active in seeking
worker benefits because of FSLN orders. Practicing
journalists supposedly are required to belong to CST
affiliate, UPN; and teachers, to the counterpart AN-
DEN. There is also a component for white-collar work-
ers, UNE.
CTN Nicaraguan Workers Central Outgrowth of Catholic Workers Youth from late 1950s.
Became Autonomous Labor Movement of Nicaragua,
Carlos Huembes (secretary general-one faction) then CTN. Has informal ties to PSC. Also affiliated
Antonio Jarquin Rodriquez (secretary general- with Latin American Workers Central (CLAT) and
dissident faction) dependent on CLAT assistance. Joined general strike
against Somoza after 1978 assassination of La Prensa
publisher. Much of its strength from textile, food pro-
cessing, and health sectors. Its farmworkers' affiliates
have competed with Sandinista-run ATC for rural loyal-
ties. Leaders claim that, during 1979-80, membership
tripled to 65,000 workers in more than 100 unions.
Leaders admit, however, that membership has since
declined because of FSLN pressure. Moreover, internal
dissension since 1982 has led to a factional split, with one
faction participating in the CDN and the other
abstaining.
CUS Confederation for Labor Unification An affiliate of the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the Inter-American Region-
Alvin Guthrie Rivers (secretary general) al Organization of Workers (ORIT), backed by AIFLD.
Has ties to the AFL-CIO. Played no significant role in
overthrow of Somoza. Joined Broad Opposition Front in
1980 with CTN and political parties opposed to Sandi-
nistas. In 1983 the Embassy credited the CUS with
10,000 members. Has about 35 affiliated unions in six
regional federations, with wide-ranging skills. Provides
vocational training. Organizationally strong but finan-
cially weak. State security harasses affiliated unions.
Not affiliated with any political party but belongs to
CDN. Leaders claim to be pressuring FSLN to hold
dialogue with CDN. Significant that this large, inde-
pendent union continues to exist under Sandinista rule.
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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)
El Nuevo Diario (The New Daily)
Xavier Chamorro Cardenal (director)
Adolfo Calero Portocarrero (president and
commander in chief)
Enrique Bermudez Varela (military commander)
Marco Zeledon Rosales
Alfonso Callejas Deshon
Lucia Cardenal de Salazar
Indalecio Rodriguez Alaniz
After assassination of La Prensa publisher Pedro Joa-
quin Chamorro, his brother Xavier took over. Xavier
quarreled with Pedro Joaquin's son and widow over
support for the Sandinista regime, and the two removed
him from his post in 1980. La Prensa's unionized
journalists and printers shut facilities; Xavier, along with
80 percent of the newspaper's editorial and technical
staff, established a competing daily, END. END suppos-?
edly is independent, but its editorial line is virtually
indistinguishable from that of the FSLN daily, Barri-
cada; often is even more extreme. Nevertheless, END is
subject to mild censorship.
Of historical interest, but now obsolete. Formed in July
1978 in wake of assassination of La Prensa publisher,
and in August called a general strike against Somoza
regime. Composed of 16 organizations-including three
labor unions, four factions of Conservative Party, two
socialist parties, Independent Liberal Party, Los Doce
(The Twelve, an exile group led by Father Miguel
D'Escoto and writer Sergio Ramirez Mercado) and the
Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN), led by Ro-
belo. Forces in this anti-Somoza coalition clearly repre-
sented a majority of Nicaraguans. In September 1978
announced formation of a three-member provisional
government (Ramirez, Robelo, and Rafael Cordova Ri-
vas, head of UDEL). FAO split into hardliners and
moderates in late 1978 over negotiations with Somoza.
Los Doce withdrew from negotiations and essentially
from FAO. Twenty political and union groups, most
linked with FSLN, formed the United People's Move-
ment (MPU), which later joined Los Doce to form the
National Patriotic Front (FPN); linked to FSLN. So-
moza imprisoned Robelo and several other leaders of
FAO and MPU in 1979, thus solidifying opposition
against him. In April 1980 Robelo resigned from the
Junta to protest regime delays in scheduling elections
and began to form a coalition of non-Marxist-Leninist
parties under the old rubric FAO (included were PSD,
PSC, PCD, and Robelo's MDN). Struggled to remain a
loyal opposition until death of Jorge Salazar in 1980,
when it withdrew from Council of State. FAO members
have since joined the anti-Sandinista insurgents or the
internal opposition.
Largest anti-Sandinista insurgent group, formed in Au-
gust 1981 and based in Honduras. Stated political
objectives for Nicaragua include nonalignment in foreign
affairs; free elections; establishment of freedom of press,
religion, and association; respect for human rights; and
expulsion of Cuban advisers. Politically somewhat to the
right of ARDE. Now united with Robelo's portion of
ARDE and with MISURA in the new alliance, UNIR.
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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)
Nicaraguan Internal Front
Comdr. Julio Zelaya Rojas
Capt. Misael Brenes
Comdr. Alejandro Martinez Saenz
Engineer Edwin Duarte
Dr. Sergio Prado
Comdr. Eduardo Sanchez
Comdr. Rafael Mayorga
Francis Mena Bonilla
Leaders of FSLN, PLI, PSN, and PPSC
Nine-member directorate, with three members from
each of the three tendencies
Pro-Sandinista union, though leadership claims it is not
controlled by the regime. Formed in 1963, expanded
considerably after 1972 earthquake. Participated in 1978
general strike against Somoza, and staffed clandestine
hospitals for anti-Somoza combatants. Has pressed for a
coherent government policy on minimum wages and
working conditions for health workers and improved
public health standards. Leadership claims membership
of more than 16,000 of Nicaragua's 20,000 health care
workers.
Anti-Sandinista group that announced its formation in
April 1984. Seeks to promote establishment of a demo-
cratic system, characterized by free, secret and periodic
elections and "socioeconomic justice with respect for
private enterprise." Pledged to struggle against Marxist-
Leninist system of the FSLN. Not clear that this is
much more than a paper organization.
To counter the reconstitution of the FAO in 1980, the
Sandinistas formed a progovernment front comprising
the FSLN; the Independent Liberal Party (PLI), a
remnant of anti-Somoza Liberals; the Nicaraguan So-
cialist Party (PSN), a Communist, pro-Soviet group; and
the Popular Social Christian Party (PPSC), a leftist
splinter from the PSC. All these parties held positions in
government and were represented in Council of State. To
date has exercised no authority independent of Sandinis-
tas. In spring 1984 the three parties allied with FSLN
announced they would run their own candidates in 1984
election. Status of FPR therefore unclear.
In 1959 a group of students opposed to Somoza orga-
nized the National Liberation Front. They instigated an
uprising in Leon; many were killed, but some survivors
went to Cuba to prepare for another effort against
Somoza. Following the Bay of Pigs invasion, Castro
encouraged the reformation of the group in 1961, as the
FSLN under leadership of Carlos Fonseca Amador.
Tried terrorism and guerrilla attacks but to little avail at
first. Fonseca was arrested in 1969 on bank robbery
charges; Sandinistas hijacked an airliner to gain his
release. In 1974 the Sandinistas took several hostages,
including mayor of Managua and Nicaraguan Ambassa-
dor to US; through the mediation of Archbishop Obando
y Bravo the Sandinistas received $5 million, 14 political
prisoners, and a trip to Havana. FSLN began to stage
effective raids around the country but did not gain a
decisive edge until 1978 murder of La Prensa publisher.
This galvanized anti-Somoza opposition into willingness
to collaborate with FSLN.
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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)
INDE/FUNDE Nicaraguan Development Institute/Nicaraguan Works with business (as INDE) and provides educational
Development Foundation loans and credit to private sector (as FUNDE). Originat-
ed in 1963, became a prime mover in creation of COSEP
Enrique Bolanos Gayer (president) in 1972. Active in recovery efforts after 1972 earth-
William,Baez Sacasa (executive secretary) quake. In 1973 began to help small businessmen form
cooperatives. Became an active opponent of Somoza in
mid-1970s, and since July 1979 has increasingly opposed
the Sandinista regime. Uses its cooperatives-which, it
claims, have grown from 8,000 organizations before
1979 to more than 30,000 at present-to block FSLN
efforts to smother the private sector.
INNICA Nicaraguan Institute of the Atlantic Coast Established by the Sandinista regime to encourage the
immigration of Spanish-speaking, pro-Sandinista campe-
William Ramirez Solorzano (minister) sinos to the Atlantic coast. Seeks to encourage economic
development of region and to reinforce control of indige-
nous population.
JS-19J 19 July Sandinista Youth Formed out of the Sandinista-led Nicaraguan Revolu-
tionary Youth, active in anti-Somoza insurgency. De-
signed as an organization of secondary school and uni-
Carlos Carrion Cruz (national coordinator) versity students; its purpose is indoctrination, to achieve
unconditional support for the FSLN. Provided "volun-
teers" for coffee harvest and played a large part in the
literacy campaign. In 1980 a JS-19J group sacked
Robelo's MDN headquarters in Managua with no hin-
drance from police and later attacked other opposition
party headquarters. Linked, along with other Sandinista
mass organizations, to CDS. Provides intelligence to the
Ministries of Defense and Interior, and serves as con-
duits for mass mobilization and ad hoc recruitment as
the regime requires. Has no support from non-Sandinista
groups.
MDN Nicaraguan Democratic Movement Originally an anti-Somoza organization from the private
sector. Joined with 15 other groups in 1978 to form the
Alfonso Robelo Callejas FAO. Less inclined than other private-sector groups to
accept concessions from Somoza and made an informal
alliance with groups linked to FSLN by end of 1978. In
April 1980, after Robelo resigned from the governing
Junta, MDN joined PSD, PSC, and PCD to form a
coalition of non-Marxist-Leninist parties, the reconsti-
tuted FAO. An MDN rally scheduled for November
1980 was banned by Borge on grounds it violated decree
prohibiting political activity until 1984, and the Sandi-
nista youth group JS-19J sacked MDN headquarters.
Moreover, in March 1981 the Sandinista-controlled
CDS blocked plans by the MDN to hold a political rally
even though Ministry of Interior had given permission.
Since then, MDN has strongly opposed the regime. In
March 1982, Robelo left Nicaragua and in September
1982 founded ARDE with Eden Pastora.
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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)
MISURA MISURA Revolutionary Front (or Force) Contra group based in Honduras and operating mainly
in northeastern Nicaragua. Originally composed of dissi-
Steadman Fagoth Muller dent members of MISURASATA. Renamed MISURA
Wycliffe Diego in May 1983. Claims to have about 2,800 armed com-
Teofilo Archibald batants, recruited from native Indian tribes and English-
Roger Hermann speaking Creoles. Allied with FDN and Robelo's portion
of ARDE in the new alliance, UNIR.
MISURASATA Miskito, Sumu, Rama, and Sandinista Unity Sometimes called Miskitos, Sumus, Ramas and Sandi-
nistas United. Based on Atlantic coast. Founded in 1979
by FSLN as a replacement for a Somoza-supported
organization called ALPROMISA, whose leaders and
representatives were mostly community lay pastors rep-
resenting Miskito interests. MISURASATA was sup-
posed to have broader ethnic representation, but exclud-
ed Creoles, Black Caribs, and Chinese. Granted a seat
on the Council of State. Cooperated in regime-sponsored
literacy campaign, but resisted regime efforts to encour-
age migration of Spanish-speaking (and pro-Sandinista)
campesinos to Atlantic coast. Several prominent
MISURASATA members have joined contras-either
the MISURA Revolutionary Front or the MISURA-
SATA group in ARDE.
MLC Liberal Constitutionalist Party (or Constitutional A splinter group of Somoza's Liberal Party, which broke
Liberal Party) away in 1968. By 1981 had become generally critical of
regime. Currently weak though it continues to be part of
Mario Oviedo Reyes (secretary general) legal opposition.
MPS Sandinista People's Militia Founded in 1980 as an adjunct to the regular armed
forces. Eden Pastora was the first commander. Effective
as a means of regime control over the population.
Emphasizes projects designed more for "keeping up the
revolutionary spirit" than for creating an effective com-
bat force. For example, after the US intervened in
Grenada in October 1983, MPS personnel dug trenches
in Managua which, according to our defense attaches
there, were useless militarily; yet the campaign served to
rally people symbolically "in the defense of the
revolution."
appointed in June 1979, a month before the FSLN
victory. He is no longer a member. Many former MPU
and mass organizations on the left, most linked with
FSLN, joined to form the MPU. The presence of Los
Doce in the MPU and the FAO linked the Sandinistas
and anti-Sandinistas. In this way the Sandinistas broad-
ened the base of opposition to Somoza. Hassan Morales
was the MPU representative on the first governing Junta
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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)
PCD (and PCDN) Democratic Conservative Party (and Democratic Con- Center-rightist party now seriously divided. Traditional
servative Party of Nicaragua) opponents of Somoza's Liberal Party but not strongly
against him until murder of La Prensa publisher. In
Rafael Cordova Rivas (Junta member) 1980 joined the coalition of non-Marxist-Leninist par-
Clemente Guido (pro-Cordova faction) ties, the reconstituted FAO. Could have been the largest
Enrique Sotelo (pro-Cordova faction). and most effective legal opposition party. Nevertheless,
Mario Rappaccioli (anti-Cordova faction) split into factions. Anti-Cordova faction has signed
Myriam Arguello (anti-Cordova faction) agreement with CDN to form an alliance in preparation
for the November elections. Nevertheless, party leaders
say they will not participate in electoral process without
guaranteed freedoms. In July 1984 the pro-Cordova
faction registered for the elections using the traditional
name (PCD). The remainder of the original PCD, appar-
ently by far the largest part, at least temporarily adopted
the name PCN (or PCDN), became aligned with the
CDN, and refused to participate in the elections.
PLI Independent Liberal Party A. small but prestigious remnant of anti-Somoza Liber-
als, formed in 1944 under the leadership of Gen. Carlos
Virgilio Godoy Reyes (president) Pasos, to protest Somoza's efforts to have Liberal Party
endorse a proposed constitutional amendment to elimi-
nate prohibition against reelection of president. Joined
conservative-led legal opposition to Somoza in mid-
1960s. After brief stay in the FAO, joined Sandinista-
controlled FPN in 1979. In April 1980 joined FPR,
formed by Sandinistas to counter the coalition of non-
Marxist-Leninist parties, FAO. PLI members hold a few
positions in government and PLI is represented on
Council of State, but has little real authority. At its
February convention the PLI withdrew from the FPR to
run in the November elections. PLI leaders have ex-
pressed concern about government confiscations of pri-
vate property and the party's inability to dissent from
FSLN in the media.
influenced by Popular Church to seek "revolutionary
change." Has close personal contacts with the CTN and
Mauricio Diaz Davila (secretary general) some Catholic bishops. All party work is voluntary. In
1980, joined the FPR, a Sandinista-engineered coalition
designed to counter the opposition FAO. In spring 1984
left FPR to run own candidates in November elections.
In June 1984 a faction of the PPSC, calling itself the
"Authentic" PPSC and headed by Armando Sanchez
Vasquez, agreed to collaborate with the PSC; this
PPSCA may have joined the PSC.
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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)
La Prensa Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Barrios (codirector) Founded in 1926. Nicaragua's largest circulation daily
Pablo Antonio Cuadra Cardenal (codirector) and only independent newspaper. Strong defender of the
Jaime Chamorro (general manager) press. A strong opponent of Somoza before it became the
Roberto Cardenal (chairman, editorial board) major voice of opposition to the FSLN. Several staff
members were Sandinista leaders. On several occasions
since the fall of Somoza, the regime has closed it briefly
and currently censors every issue. Because censorship
allows paper to blame errors on government, reporting
has sometimes been sloppy and inaccurate. Cooperates
with and is backed by COSEP and legal opposition
forces. Usually manages to have its important censored
items published elsewhere, especially in Costa Rica.
Occasionally manages to conduct accurate public opin-
ion polls showing popular support for Archbishop
Obando y Bravo and popular opposition to regime.
PS Sandinista Police Organized after fall of Somoza for duty primarily in
urban areas. PS and State Security elements were
Walter Ferreti Fonseca (national commander) integrated into the military command structure of EPS,
although they were to be administratively controlled by
Ministry of Interior. In 1979-80, Barricada ran numer-
ous stories on irregularities by lower-ranking police
officers. In doing so, presumably the FSLN was trying to
limit Panamanian influence in Nicaragua during the
brief period when Panamanian National Guard advisers
were assigned to PS and Panama was donating vehicles
and equipment to the PS and training Sandinistas in
Panama's Police Training Acadc my. When abuses be-
come known, policemen responsible sometimes are prose-
cuted. Members sometimes are tapped for such "volun-
teer" duties as road repair and harvesting. In 1980
Interior Minister Borge claimed that the PS eventually
would reach 30,000 in strength. Of political significance
mainly because Borge appears to consider PS part of his
personal power base.
PSC Social Christian Party Founded in the late 1950s and middle class in composi-
tion. Nicaraguan equivalent of the centrist Christian
Agustin Jarquin Anaya (president) Democratic Party in El Salvador, but comparatively
Adan Fletes much weaker. Leaders claim a membership of 3,000.
Prior to July 1979 often joined anti-Somoza coalition
with Conservatives and Independent Liberals. In 1980
joined the reconstituted FAO. An affiliate of the World
Union of Christian Democrats. Advocates social democ-
racy system with political pluralism and a viable private
sector-and a "national dialogue of reconcilation" to
achieve those objectives. In March 1984, however, party
leaders showed a willingness to exclude armed opponents
of the regime from the dialogue.
A centrist group formed in 1979 by Conservative Party
dissidents who identified with European Social Demo-
crats. In 1980 joined FAO. In September 1983 joined
parties from El Salvador (Democratic Action) and Pana-
ma (People's Action Party) to form the Central Ameri-
can Social Democracy. Joined Council of State in Janu-
ary 1984 but withdrew in March to protest Electoral
Law.
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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)
PSN Nicaraguan Socialist Party A Moscow-line Communist party. Moving force behind
the CGTI, based largely on construction workers. Coop-
Luis Sanchez Sancho (secretary general) erated with FSLN during insurrection against Somoza.
Joined the pro-Sandinista coalition FPR in mid-1980.
Claims to agree with FSLN's stated goals but not with
some means used to achieve them, such as censorship
and restrictions on civil liberties. Some alleged differ-
ences between FSLN and PSN may be contrived al-
though at other times it appears that PSN has differ-
ences with FSLN on tactics. Plans to run candidates
independent of FSLN in November elections, but in
effect votes for the PSN will augment the FSLN total.
UCA Central American University Headquartered in Managua. One of several Jesuit insti-
tutions founded in Latin America in 1960s. All at first
Cesar Jerez, S. J. were perceived by conservative elements in these coun-
Alvaro Arguello, S. J. (director, Central American tries to be less radical than state-run universities, but
Historical Institute) many became more radical due to recent church doc-
trines and the rise of "liberation theology" justifying
Christian collaboration with Marxists. UCA in Mana-
gua has become a propaganda center on behalf of the
Sandinista regime, particularly through its Central
American Historical Institute, which spreads pro-Sandi-
nista messages throughout the Catholic Church outside
Nicaragua.
UDN-FARN Nicaraguan Democratic Union-Revolutionary Armed Anti-Sandinista armed group composed mainly of disil-
Forces lusioned supporters of the revolution. Based in Costa
Rica. Cardenal had been anti-Somoza since at least
Edmundo Chamorro Rappaccioli 1978. Cardenal became vice president of Council of
Fernando Chamorro Rappaccioli State in 1980 but left Nicaragua soon afterward de-
Jose Francisco Cardenal nouncing the regime as "Communist." In 1981 leaders
announced that group was conducting forays from Hon-
duras into the Nicaraguan department of Jinotega.
Joined ARDE in September 1982, later joined FDN. By
January 1984 had left FDN and rejoined ARDE.
UNAG National Union of Farmers and Cattlemen In April 1981 the Sandinista regime established a new
organization of small- and medium-sized agricultural
Wilberto Lara Aguirre (president) and livestock producers. As of late 1982, UNAG claimed
to represent more than 75,000 members in more than
1,700 chapters. Has representatives on the Council of
State. From the regime's standpoint, UNAG is supposed
to work harmoniously with ATC, but there are indica-
tions that its policies often tilt toward the particular
interests of its membership. Leaders claim they are as
much a private-sector group as a government organiza-
tion. Its political orientation is center-leftist and becom-
ing more centrist. Is supposed to rival COSEP in rural
areas, but some in COSEP-with reason-view them as
potential allies.
A component of the Sandinista-controlled labor federa-
tion CST. Members are white-collar workers. Its exist-
ence demonstrates extent to which FSLN seeks to
establish a foothold in all important sectors of economy
and society.
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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)
UNIR Nicaraguan Unity for Reconciliation Formed in late August 1984 as an alliance of the FDN,
Alfonso Robelo Callejas Robelo's portion of ARDE, and MISURA. Robelo
Adolfo Calero Portocarrero describes UNIR as the first step to achieve a "great
Wycliffe Diego alliance'.' that will lead to creation of "a government of
national unity" in Nicaragua. .
Formed in 1978, operated underground until the fall of
Somoza. An affiliate of the Sandinista-run CST. Under
the regime's August 1979 press law, all practicing
journalists in any medium are required to belong to it; in
fact the regime has been unable to enforce this ruling
rigidly and some journalists remain outside UPN.
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Appendix C
ACLEN a
ACM
Asociacion Nacional del Clero
Asociacion de Comerciantes Mayoristas
National Association of the Clergy
Wholesalers Association
ACOPROBAMA Asociacion de Comerciantes de Productos Basicos de Association of Managua Merchants of Basic Goods
Managua
ADACH
ADADO
ADAL
ADREN
AERONICA
AFENIC
AGROMEC
AMANIC
AMNLAE a
ANAP
ANAPROFAR
ANAR
ANCS
ANDEN
ANDIPET
ANIA
ANN
ANPAF
ANPP
ANPROBA
ANVPROSOR
ANSa
Asociacion de Algodoneros de Chinandega
Asociacion de Algodoneros de Oriente
Asociacion de Algodoneros de Leon
Alianza Democratica Revolucionaria Nicaraguense
Aerolineas Nicaraguense
Asociacion de Ferreteros de Nicaragua
Empresa Nacional de Agromecomizacion
Agencias Maritimas y Aduaneras de Nicaragua
Asociacion de Mujeres Nicaraguenses Luisa
Amanda Espinoza
Asociacion Nacional de Mujeres ante la Problema-
tica Nacional
Association of Chinandega Cotton Growers
Association of Eastern Cotton Growers
Association of Leon Cotton Growers
Nicaraguan Democratic Revolutionary Alliance
Nicaraguan Airlines
Association of Nicaraguan Hardware Dealers
Agricultural Machinery Enterprise
Nicaraguan Shipping and Customs Agencies
Luisa Amanda Espinoza Association of Nicaraguan
Women
National Association of Women Concerned With the
Nation's Problems
Asociacion Nicaraguense de Administracion Publica Nicaraguan Association of Public Administration
Asociacion Nicaraguense de Propietarios de Nicaraguan Association of Pharmacy Owners
Farmacias
Asociacion Nicaraguense de Amistad con los Paises
Socialistas
Asociacion de Arroceros de Nicaragua
Asociacion Nicaraguense de Comunidades Sumus
Asociacion Nacional de Educadores de Nicaragua
Asociacion Nicaraguense de Distribuidores de
Productos de Petroleo
Nicaraguan Association of Friendship With Socialist
Countries
Association of Nicaraguan Rice Growers
Nicaraguan Association of Sumu Communities
Nicaraguan National Association of Educators
Nicaraguan Association of Petroleum Products Dealers
Asociacion Nicaraguense de Distribuidores de
Vehiculos Automotrices
Asociacion Nicaraguense de Ingenieros y Arquitectos
Agencia de Noticias Nueva Nicaragua
Asociacion Nacional de Padres de Familia
Asamblea Nacional de Partidos Politicos
Asociacion Nacional de Productores de Banano
Asociacion Nacional de Productores de Sorgo
Asociacion de Ninos Sandinistas Luis Alfonso
Velasquez
Nicaraguan Association of Engineers and Architects
New Nicaraguan News Agency
National Association of Heads of Families
National Assembly of Political Parties
National Association of Banana Producers
National Association of Sorghum Producers
Association of Sandinista Children
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Nicaraguan Organizations (continued)
ANTC
Asociacion Nicaraguense de Transportistas de Carga
Nicaraguan Association of Cargo Carriers
ANUDE
Asamblea Nicaraguense de Unidad Democratica
Nicaraguan Assembly of Democratic Unity
APP
Area de Propiedad dei Pueblo
People's Ownership Sector
ARDEa
Alianza Revolucionaria Democratica
Democratic Revolutionary Alliance
Asamblea a
Asamblea Sandinista
Sandinista Assembly
ASCANIC
Asociacion de Caneros de Nicaragua
Nicaraguan Association of Sugar Producers
ASTC
Asociacion Sandinista de Trabajadores de la Cultura
Sandinista Association of Cultural Workers
ATC a
Asociacion de Trabajadores del Campo
Rural Workers Association
BANANIC
Empresa Nicaraguense del Banano
Nicaraguan Banana Enterprise
BANIC
Banco Nicaraguense
Nicaraguan Bank
BCN
Banco Central de Nicaragua
Central Bank of Nicaragua
BND
Banco Nacional de Desarrollo
National Development Bank
CAAN
Confederacion de Asociaciones Algodoneras de
Nicaragua
Nicaraguan Cotton Associations Confederation
CADIN
Camara de Industrias de Nicaragua
Nicaraguan Chamber of Industries
CAM
Centro de Abastecimiento Medico
Medical Supplies Center
CAP
Comites de Accion Popular
People's Action Committees
CAUS a
Central de Accion y Unidad Sindical
Center for Labor Action and Unity
CAV
Centro Antonio Valdivieso
Antonio Valdivieso Center
CBS
Comite de Barrio Sandinista
Sandinista Neighborhood Committee
CC
or (CNC)
Camara de la Construccion (or Camara
Nicaraguense de la Construccion)
Chamber of Construction (or
Nicaraguan Chamber of Construction)
CCC
Confederacion de Camara de Comercio
Chamber of Commerce Confederation
CCN
Compania Cervecera de Nicaragua
Nicaraguan Brewery Company
CDDN
Comite de Defensa de la Democracia en Nicaragua
Committee for the Defense of Democracy in Nicaragua
CDI
Centro de Desarrollo Infantil
Child Development Center
CDN a
Coordinadora Democratica Nicaraguense
Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinator
CDR
Comite Directivo Regional
Regional Directive Committee
CDSa
Comite de Defensa Sandinista
Sandinista Defense Committee
CDT
Comites de Defensa de los Trabajadores
Committees for the Defense of Workers
CEN a
Conferencia Episcopal Nicaraguense
Nicaraguan Episcopal Conference
CENIT
Centro Nicaraguense de Informacion Tecnologica
Nicaraguan Center for Technological Information
CEP
Centros de Educacion Popular .
Popular Education Centers
Centro de Educacion y Promocion Agraria or Comite
Evangelico Pro Promocion Agraria
Agrarian Education and Promotion Center or Evangeli-
cal Committee for Agrarian Advancement
Centro Experimental de Produccion Agropecuaria
Center for Agricultural-Livestock Experimental
Production
CEPAD a
Comite Evangelico Pro Ayuda al Desarrollo
Evangelical Committee for Development Aid
CGTI a
Confederacion General del Trabajo Independiente
Independent General Labor Confederation
CLS
Comites de Lucha Sindical
Union Struggle Committees
CLT
Comite de Lucha de los Trabajadores
Workers Struggle Committees
CNA
Comite Nacional de Abastos
National Supply Committee
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Nicaraguan Organizations (continued)
Consejo Nacional de Evaluacion, Programacion y
Capacitacion Educative
National Council of Educational Evaluation, Program-
ing and Training
CNES
Consejo Nacional de Educacion Superior
National Council of Higher Education
CNI
Comision Nacional Intersindical
National Inter-Trade Union Commission
CNPP
Consejo Nacional de Partidos Politicos
National Council of Political Parties
CNPPA
Comite, Nacional de la Pequena Produccion
Agropecuaria
National Committee of Small Agricultural-Livestock
Producers
CNSP
Comite Nicaraguense de Solidaridad con los Pueblos
Nicaraguan Committee of Solidarity With Peoples
CNTD
Confederacion Nacionalista de'Trabajadores
Democraticos
Nationalist Confederation of Democratic Workers
COES
Centro Obrero de Estudios Sociales
Worker Center for Social Studies
COIP a
Corporacion Industrial del Pueblo
People's Industrial Corporation
COMNOMET
Corporacion Nicaraguense de Minerales No
Metalicos
Nicaraguan Corporation of Nonmetallic Minerals
Colegio Nicaraguense de Administradores de
Empresa
CONAL
Comision Nacional de Algodon
National Commission for Cotton
CONAPRO
Confederacion Nacional de Asociaciones
Profesionales
National Confederation of Professional Associations
CONDEMINA
Corporacion Nicaraguense de Minas
Nicaraguan Corporation of Mines
CONFER a
Confederacion de los Religiosos
Confederation of Religious Orders
CONIBIR
Corporacion Nicaraguense de Bienes Raices
Nicaraguan Corporation of Real Estate
CONIPAZ
Comite Nicaraguense de la Paz
Nicaraguan Peace Committee
CORADEP
Corporacion de Radiodifusion del Pueblo
People's Radiobroadcasting Corporation
CORCOP
Corporacion Comercial del Pueblo
People's Commercial Corporation
CORFIN
Corporacion Financiera de Nicaragua
Nicaraguan Financial Corporation
.CORFOP
Corporacion Forestal del Pueblo
People's Forestry Products Corporation
COSEPa
Consejo Superior de la Empresa Privada
Superior Council of Private Enterprise
CNPPDH
Comision Nacional de Promocion y Promovacion de
Derechos Humanos
National Commission for the Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights
CPC
Centros Populares de Cultura
People's Cultural Centers
CPDH a
Comision Permanente de Derechos Humanos
Permanent Commission on Human Rights
CSE
Consejo Superior Electoral
Supreme Electoral Council
CSN
Coordinadora Sindical Nacional
National Trade Union Coordinating Board
CST a
Central Sandinista de Trabajadores Jose Benito
Escobar
Jose Benito Escobar Sandinista Workers Central
CSUCA
Consejo Superior Universitario Centroamericano
Higher Council of the Central American University
CTN a
Central de Trabajadores de Nicaragua
Nicaraguan Workers Central
CUSa _
Confederacion de Unificacion Sindicalista
Confederation for Labor Unification
CUUN
Centro Universitario de la Universidad Nacional
Autonoma de Nicaragua
University Center of the National Autonomous Universi-
ty of Nicaragua
DAST
Division Administrativa de Servicios de Transporte
Note: Footnote at end of table.
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Nicaraguan Organizations (continued)
DEPE
Division de Ejecucion de Proyectos Educativos
Division for the Implementation of Educational Projects
DEPEP
Departamento de Propaganda y Educacion Politics
Department of Propaganda and Political Education
DGA
Direccion General de Aduanas
General Directorate of Customs
DGSE
Direccion General de la Seguridad del Estado
General Directorate of State Security
DNI
Departamento Nacional de Investigaciones
National Department of Investigations
DORMA
Departamento de Organizacion y Masas
Department of Organization and the Masses
DRI
Departamento de Relaciones Internacionales
International Relations Department
EDUCA
Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana
Central American University Publishing House
EEBI
Escuela de Entrenamiento Basico de Infanteria
Infantry Basic Training School
ELN
Ejercito de Liberacion Nicaraguense
Nicaraguan Liberation Army
EMPO
Equipos Modernos de Oficina
Modern Office Equipment
ENA
Empresa Nacional del Arroz
National Rice Enterprise
ENABAS
Empresa Nicaraguense de Alimentos Basicos
Nicaraguan Enterprise for Staple Foods
ENABUS
Empresa Nacional de Buses
National Bus Enterprise
ENAG
Escuela Nacional de Agricultura y Ganaderia
National School of Agriculture and Livestock
ENAL
Empresa Nicaraguense del Algodon
Nicaraguan Cotton Enterprise
ENALUF
Empresa Nacional de Luz y Fuerza
National Enterprise for Light and Power
ENAP
Empresa Nacional de Puertos .
National Ports Enterprise
ENCA
Empresa Nacional del Cafe
National Coffee Enterprise
ENCAFE
Empresa Nicaraguense del Cafe
Nicaraguan Coffee Enterprise
ENCAR
Empresa Nicaraguense de la Carne
Nicaraguan Meat Enterprise
END a
El Nuevo Diario
(The New Newspaper)
ENE
Escuela Nacional de Enfermeria
National School of Nursing
ENIA
Empresa Nicaraguense de Insumos Agropecuarios
Nicaraguan Enterprise for Agricultural-Livestock Inputs
ENICAB
Empresa Nicaraguense de Cabotaje
Nicaraguan, Enterprise for Coastal Shipping
ENIMPORT
Empresa Nicaraguense de Importaciones
Nicaraguan Imports Enterprise
ENIPREX
Empresa Nicaraguense de Promocion de
Exportaciones
ENM
Empresa Nacional de Mataderos
National Slaughterhouse Enterprise
ENMAR
Empresa Nicaraguense del Marisco
Nicaraguan Seafood Enterprise
EPA
Ejercito Popular de Alfabetizacion
People's Literacy Army
EPS
Ejercito Popular Sandinista
Sandinista People's Army
ETSA
Empresa de Transportes y Servicios Aereos
Air Transportation and Service Enterprise
FAD
Fuerzas Armadas Democraticas
Democratic Armed Forces
FAGANIC
Federacion de Asociaciones Ganaderas de Nicaragua
Federation of Nicaraguan Cattlemen's Associations
FAO a
Frente Amplio de Oposicion
Broad Opposition Front
FAS
Fuerza Aerea Sandinista
Sandinista Air Force
FDN a
Fuerza Democratica Nicaraguense
Nicaraguan Democratic Force
Note: Footnote at end of table.
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Secret
Nicaraguan Organizations (continued)
English
FECANIC
Federacion de Cooperativas de Ahorro y Credito
Federation of Savings and Loan Cooperatives
FECOONIC
Federacion de Cooperativas de Nicaragua
Federation of Nicaraguan Cooperatives
FED
Fondo Especial de Desarrollo
Special Development Fund
FENEC
Federacion Nacional de Educadores Catolicos
National Federation of Catholic Teachers
FER
Frente Estudiantil Revolucionario
Revolutionary Student Front
FESGAS
Fuerzas Especiales de Guerrillas Anticomunistas
Special Forces of Anti-Communist Guerrillas
FESOMENIC
Federacion de Sociedades Medicas de Nicaragua
Federation of Nicaraguan Medical Societies
FETSALUD a
Federacion de Trabajadores de la Salud
Health Workers Federation
FINAPRI
Financiera de Preinversion
Preinvestment Financing Enterprise
FIR
Fondo Internacional de Reconstruccion
International Reconstruction Fund
FONDILAC
Fondo de Desarrollo de la Industria Lactea
Dairy Industry Development Fund
FPN
Frente Patriotico Nacional
National Patriotic Front
FSDC
Frente de Solidaridad Democratica Cristiana
Christian Democratic Solidarity Front
FSLN
Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional
Sandinista National Liberation Front
FSM
Federacion Sindical de Managua
Trade. Union Federation of Managua
FTM
Federacion de Trabajadores de Managua
GPP
Guerra Popular Prolongada
Popular Prolonged War
Government of National Reconstruction
INAA
Instituto Nicaraguense de Acueductos
Alcantarillados
Nicaraguan Institute of Aqueducts and Canals
INAP
Instituto Nicaraguense de Administracion Publica
Nicaraguan Public Administration Institute
INAPI
Institute Nacional de Prevencion Contra Incendios
National Institute of Fire Prevention
INCINE
Instituto Nicaraguense del Cine
Nicaraguan Film Institute
IND
Instituto Nacional de Deportes
National Institute of Sports
INDE-FUNDE a
Instituto Nicaraguense de
Desarrollo-Fundacion Nicaraguense de Desarrollo
Nicaraguan Development Institute/
Nicaraguan Development Foundation
INE
Instituto Nicaraguense de Energia
Nicaraguan Institute of Energy
INEC
Instituto Nicaraguense de Estadistica y Censos
Nicaraguan Institute of Statistics and Census
INETER
Instituto Nicaraguense de Estudios Territoriales
Nicaraguan Institute of Territorial Studies
INFONAC
Instituto de Fomento Nacional
National Development Institute
INIES-CRIES
Instituto de Investigaciones Economicas y Sociales-
Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Economi-
cal y Sociales
Economic and Social Research Institute-Regional Coor-
dinating Board for-Economic and Social Research
INMINEH
Instituto Nicaraguense de Minas e Hidrocarburos
Nicaraguan Institute of Mines and Hydrocarbons
INNICA a
Instituto Nicaraguense de la Costa Atlantica
Nicaraguan Institute of the Atlantic Coast
INPESCA
Instituto Nicaraguense de la Pesca
Nicaraguan Institute of Fisheries
INPRHU
Instituto de Promocion Humana
Institute for Human Development
INRA
Instituto Nacional de la Reforma Agraria
Note: Footnote at end of table.
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Nicaraguan Organizations (continued)
Instituto Nicaraguense de Seguridad Social y
Bienestar
Nicaraguan Institute of Social Security and Social
Welfare
INTURISMO
Instituto Nicaraguense de Turismo y del Ambiente
Nicaraguan Tourism Institute
IRENA
Instituto Nicaraguense de Recursos Naturales y del
Ambiente
Nicaraguan Instutute of Natural Resources and
Environment
ITESNIC
Instituto Tecnologico Nicaraguense
Nicaraguan Technological Institute
JGRN
Junta del Gobierno de Reconstruccion Nacional
Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction
JLR
Junta Local de Reconstruccion
Local Reconstruction Board
JRM
Junta de Reconstruccion de Managua
Managua Reconstruction Board
JS-19J a
Juventud Sandinista 19 de Julio
19 July Sandinista Youth
JSN
Juventud Socialista Nicaraguense
Nicaraguan Socialist Youth
M-3
Media Tercera
Third Path Movement
MAP
Movimiento de Accion Popular
Popular Action Movement
MCR
Movimiento Cristiano Revolucionario
Revolutionary Christian Movement
MDNa
Movimiento Democratico Nicaraguense
Nicaraguan Democratic Movement
MED
Ministerio de Educacion
Ministry of Education
MICE
Ministerio de Comercio del Exterior
Ministry of Foreign Trade
MICOIN
Ministerio de Comercio Interior
Ministry of Domestic Trade
MICONS
Ministerio de Construccion
Ministry of Construction
MIDINRA
Ministerio de Desarrollo Agropecuario y Reforma
Agraria
Ministry of Agricultural-Livestock Development and
Agrarian Reform
MIFIN
Ministerio de Finanzas
Ministry of Finance
MIND
Ministerio de Industria
Ministry of Industry
MININT (or MINT)
Ministerio del Interior
Ministry of the Interior
MINSA
Ministerio de Salud
Ministry of Health
MINVAH
Ministerio de la Vivienda y Asentamientos Humanos
Ministry of Housing and Human Services
MIPLAN
Ministerio de Planificacion
Ministry of Planning
MISURA a
Fuerza Revolucionaria MISURA
MISURA Revolutionary Front (or Force)
MISURASATAa
Unidad Sandinista de Miskitos, Sumus y Ramas
Miskito, Sumo, and Rama Sandinista Unity
MITRAB
Ministerio de Trabajo
Ministry of Labor
MITRANS
Ministerio de Transporte
Ministry of Transportation
MLCa
Movirniento Liberal Constitucionalista
Liberal Constitutionalist Party
MOA
Milicias Obreras de la Alfabetizacion
Literacy Workers' Militias
MOC
Movimiento Obrero Cristiano de Nicaragua
Christian Worker Movement of Nicaragua
MORE
Movimiento Obrero Revolucionario
Revolutionary Workers' Movement
MPR
Movimiento Popular Revolucionario
Revolutionary People's Movement
MPS a
Milicias Populares Sandinistas
Sandinista People's Militias
MPU a
Movimiento Pueblo Unido
United People's Movement
MSPT
Movimientos Sindicales del Pueblo Trabajador
Trade Union Movement of the Working People
PAN
Programs Alimentario Nacional
National Food Program
PAR
Partido Accion Revolucionaria
Revolutionary Action Party
PC de N (or PCN)
Partido Comunista de Nicaragua
Communist Party of Nicaragua
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Secret
Nicaraguan Organizations (continued)
Acronym
Spanish Title
PC de N (or PCN)
Partido Comunista de Nicaragua
Communist Party of Nicaragua
PCD a (PCDN) a
Partido Conservador Democrata
(Partido Conservador Democrata de Nicaragua)
Democratic Conservative Party
(Democratic Conservative Party of Nicaragua)
PETRONIC
Empresa Nicaraguense del Petroleo
Nicaraguan Petroleum Enterprise
PGE
Proveeduria General del Estado
State General Supplier
PLD
Partido Liberal Democratico
Democratic Liberal Party
PLI a
Partido Liberal Independiente
Independent Liberal Party
PODERI
Programa de Desarrollo Rural Integral
Integral Rural Development Program
PPSC a
Partido Popular Social Cristiano
Popular Social Christian Party
PPSCA a
Partido Popular Social Cristiano Autentico
Authentic Popular Social Christian Party
PRAI
Proyecto de Reconstruccion y Accion Inmediata
Reconstruction and Immediate Action Program
PROCANA
Asociacion de Productores de Cana de Azucar
Sugarcane Producers Association
PRODECO
Programa de Promocion Educativa Comunal
Program for the Promotion of Community Education
Ps a
Policia Sandinista
Sandinista Police
PSC a
Partido Social Cristiano
Social Christian Party
PSD a
Partido Social Democrata
Social Democratic Party
PSN a
Partido Socialista Nicaraguense
Nicaraguan Socialist Party
RIDEN
Resistencia Interna Democratica Nicaraguense
Nicaraguan Democratic Internal Resistance
RIN
Resistencia Interna Nacional
National Internal Resistance
SIMOTUR
Sindicato de Motoristas del Transporte Urbano
Trade Union of Urban Transporation Drivers
SINACOI
Sistema Nacional Contra Incendios
National Fire Prevention System
SINAFORP
Sistema Nacional de Formacion Profesional
National System for Professional Training
SITRAICE
Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria Ceramica
,Trade Union of Ceramic Industry Workers
SITRAIM
Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria de Mue-
bles
Trade Union of Furniture Industry Workers
SITRATEX
Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria Textil
Trade Union of Textile Industry Workers
SITRECO
Sindicato de Trabajadores de Empresas Comerciales
Trade Union of Commercial Enterprise Workers
SMMM
Sindicato de Mecanicos y Metalurgicos de Managua
Trade Union of Managua Mechanics and Metalworkers
SNEM
Servicio Nacional de Erradicacion de la Malaria
National Service for Malaria Eradication
Secretaria Nacional de Propaganda y Educacion
Politica
National Secretariat for Propaganda and Political
Education
SNUS
Sistema Nacional Unico de Salud
Unitary National Health System
SSTV
Sistema Sandinista de Television
Sandinista Television System
STAI
Sindicato de Trabajadores Agroindustriales
Trade Union of Agro-Industrial Workers
STDN
Solidaridad de Trabajadores Democraticos
Nicaraguan Democratic Workers Solidarity
STIES
Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria Electrome-
canica y Similares
Trade Union of Electricians and Related Trades
Workers
STIP
Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria Plastica
Note: Footnote at end of table.
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Nicaraguan Organizations (continued)
SUMAGRO
SUTRA
TANIC
TELCOR
TEPCE
TISA
UACAS
UCN
UDEL
UDN-FARN a
UJC
UMV
UNAGa
UNAN
UNCAFENIC
UNE a
UNIR a
UNO
UPANIC
UPE
UPES
UPN a
UPOLI
URN
VIMEDA
Empresa de Suministros Agroindustriales
Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores
Tabacalera Nicaraguense, S. A.
Telecomunicaciones y Correos'de Nicaragua
Talleres de Evaluacion, Programacion y
Capacitacion Educativa
Transportadora Internacional, S. A.
Unidades de Abastecimiento para las Comunas
Agricolas Sandinistas
Union de Campesinos Nicaraguenses
Union Democratica de Liberacion
Union Democratica Nicaraguense-Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias
Union de Jovenes Comunistas
Union de Mujeres de Vanguardia
Union Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos
Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Nicaragua
Union Nacional de Cafecultores de Nicaragua
Union Nacional de Empleados
Unidad Nicaraguense de Reconciliacion
Union Nacional Opositora
Union de Productores Agropecuarios de Nicaragua
Unidades de Produccion Estatal
Unidades de Produccion Estatal Sandinista
Union de Periodistas Nicaraguenses
Universidad Politecnica de Nicaragua
Union Republicana Nicaraguense
Vice Ministerio de Educacion para Adultos
Agro-Industrial Purchasing Agency
Sole Trade Union of Workers
Nicaraguan Tobacco Company, Inc.
Nicaraguan Telecommunications and Postal Services
Educational Evaluation, Programming and Training
Workshops
International Transport Company, Inc.
Supply Units for the Sandinista Agricultural Communes
Nicaraguan Peasants' Union
Democratic Union of Liberation
Nicaraguan Democratic Union-Revolutionary Armed
Forces
Union of Young Communists
Vanguard Women's Union
National Union of Farmers and Cattlemen
National Autonomous University of Nicaragua
National Union of Nicaraguan Coffeegrowers
National Union of Employees
Nicaraguan Unity for Reconciliation
Union of Agricultural and Livestock Producers of
Nicaragua
State Production Units
Sandinista State Production Units
Union of Nicaraguan Journalists
Nicaraguan Polytechnical University
Nicaraguan Republican Union
Vice Ministry of Adult Education
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JGRN Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction Proregime
PCD Democratic Conservative Party ostensibly part of unarmed opposition but
willing to participate in elections
PCN (or PCDN) Nicaraguan Conservative Party (or Democratic Conservative Party Unarmed opposition
of Nicaragua)
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Secret
Secret
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