THE ISRAELI PRESENCE IN BLACK AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00317R000200010008-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2010
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: July 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
in Black Africa
The Israeli Presence
ALA 84-10068
July 1984
Copy 4 0 8
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The Israeli Presence
in Black Africa
25X1 j
This assessment was prepared by
of the Office of African and Latin American Analysis
with a contribution from
f the
Office of Near Eastern and out Asian Analysis
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
25X1
directed to the Chief, Regional Issues Branch, Africa
Division, ALA,
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Secret
ALA 84-10068
July 1984
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The Israeli Presence
in Black Africa F_
Key Judgments Israel has been a pariah in Sub-Saharan Africa since the Arab-Israeli war
Information available of October 1973, but Tel Aviv has never ceased to consider the region an
as of 10 July 1984 important arena in which it could promote trade and security assistance,
was used in this report.
recoup political influence, and ultimately ease its diplomatic isolation.
Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir has long been among the principal
champions of an active Israeli policy in Africa. This policy achieved a
major breakthrough by the reestablishment of diplomatic ties with Zaire
two years ago.
Although Liberia followed Kinshasa's lead by resuming relations last
August, since then Israel's diplomatic momentum in black Africa has
stalled. Israel's official presence is thus limited to long-established diplo-
matic ties with three states closely linked to South Africa-Malawi,
Lesotho, and Swaziland-and to the recently reestablished relations with
'two countries closely associated with the United States: Zaire and Liberia.
Tel Aviv has intensified its efforts for formal relations, particularly among
pro-Western states in French-speaking West Africa, but we doubt that
Israel will achieve significant success any time soon in its efforts to renew
diplomatic links. Nonetheless, Tel Aviv has important informal economic
and security ties with several African states, including Ivory Coast,
Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, Togo, Central African Republic, Cameroon,
Gabon, Botswana, and Ghana.
A number of factors weigh against Israel's chances of strengthening or
expanding full-scale diplomatic relations:
? Arab and Islamic pressures, especially important among African states
with large Muslim populations and those that are dependent on the
Arabs for oil or desire Arab economic assistance.
? African disapproval of Israeli policies in the Middle East, particularly
Israeli occupation of Arab lands and opposition to a Palestinian
homeland.
? African resentment of Israel's ties with South Africa because of Pre-
toria's systematic subordination of blacks.
? French resistance to the reestablishment of an Israeli diplomatic presence
in Francophone Africa.
? Israel's economic problems, which limit Tel Aviv's ability to provide aid.
Several factors are working in Israel's favor, but, in our judgment, they are
insufficient to persuade more than one or two other African states to
resume or expand official relations:
iii Secret
ALA 84-10068
July 1984
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? African disillusionment with unfulfilled Arab promises of economic
assistance and with fear of Libyan interference.
? Fond memories of Israeli technical and security assistance up to 1973.
? The lure of potential international Jewish investment and trade.
? The informal ties that Israel has already established in several black
African countries through trade, technical and security assistance, and
political contacts.
In our judgment, Israel's diplomatic prospects are best in Ivory Coast and
Togo. We believe that both would prefer to act as part of a larger group,
however, rather than reestablish diplomatic relations with Israel individ-
ually.
Israel will continue to build upon its business and labor connections in
Africa. Because of a persistent lack of economic assistance resources, the
government will attempt to promote trade and private investment as
alternatives to official aid.
We believe that Tel Aviv will continue to look to Washington to play a key
role in helping to restore Israel's presence in black Africa. The Israelis, in
our view, will ask US diplomatic missions to continue to serve as channels
of communication for them in countries where the United States has good
access to the head of state. Tel Aviv will also want Washington to elicit
French and Egyptian support for Israeli efforts to reestablish diplomatic
ties. In addition, the Israeli economic situation probably will continue to
impel Tel Aviv to request US help in financing military and development
projects it hopes to provide African states. Zaire in particular has suffered
a large net loss of Arab aid by renewing diplomatic ties and will be looking
to Israel to make good the difference through what Kinshasa views as Tel
Washington's close identification with Israel is likely to help US bilateral
relations with pro-Western black African states who benefit from Israeli
assistance, but US Embassy reporting indicates that this identification
hinders relations with such states as Nigeria and Senegal where Islamic
ties and anti-South African views both play major roles in foreign policy
formulation. In such states as Zambia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, where
Tel Aviv's close ties with South Africa are probably the decisive factor in
opposition to Israel, Washington's identification with Israel could also
damage US bilateral relations.
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Tel Aviv's Policy Apparatus for Africa
Factors Affecting Israeli Prospects
Implications for the United States 7
B. African Relations With Israel and the Arab States
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importance, or influence with other black African
states and the rest, according to the US Embassy in
Tel Aviv. Of the important states, Tel Aviv believes
that diplomatic progress is most likely in the near
term in Ivory Coast, while among the less important
countries it sees good prospects in Togo, Cameroon,
and possibly Ghana and Guinea. In these countries,
Tel Aviv is holding out the prospect of international
Jewish investment and offering technical and security
assistance in exchange for beginning a process that
will lead to the reestablishment of diplomatic rela-
tions. Because the other, more important states have
shown little interest in formal ties, the Embassy
believes Israel is content for now simply to maintain
quiet lines of communication.
Tel Aviv's Policy Apparatus for Africa
The driving force behind Israel's policy toward Africa
is Avi Primor, who heads the Foreign Ministry's
Africa Division. We believe Primor has wide latitude
in setting the strategy and tactics that support Israel's
objectives in Africa. According to the US Embassy in
Tel Aviv, Primor enjoys the full confidence of his
superiors, including the Foreign Ministry's Director
General, David Kimche, who shares Primor's keen
interest in developing the Israeli presence in black
Africa. In an effort to promote formal diplomatic ties,
Primor has visited a number of African capitals over
the past year to suggest ways in which they might
benefit from Israeli security and technical assistance,
according to reports from US Embassies in the region.
The Foreign Ministry's leading role in formulating
and executing Tel Aviv's policies in Africa is a recent
development. While he was Defense Minister, Ariel
.Sharon had taken the lead in Israeli activities in
Africa, aggressively cultivating several Central Afri-
can countries and dangling offers of security assist-
ance to Zaire in return for the restoration of formal
ties. Following Sharon's resignation as Defense Minis-
ter, Yitzhak Shamir-then Foreign Minister-reas-
serted the primacy of the Foreign Ministry over Tel
Aviv's policies in Africa. We believe Shamir has
remained actively involved in African policy since
becoming Prime Minister last October.
Foreign Ministry officials periodically have had to
compete with colleagues in the Finance and Defense
Ministries for the limited economic and military
resources that are critical to Israel's diplomatic efforts
in Africa. Primor has told US Embassy officers that
he has no economic assistance budget. and that high-
level officials have had to intervene personally to
obtain even a limited amount of funding for one
agricultural project in Zaire. Primor has a little more
flexibility with respect to military assistance, but the
Defense Ministry's own budgetary problems limit
Israel's ability to offer sizable arms aid. We believe,
however, that the Israeli services and the Foreign
Ministry cooperate fully in efforts to train and devel-
op the security services in several African countries.
Outside the Horn of Africa, Israel maintains govern-
ment-to-government contacts through the activities
and travels of Israeli diplomats accredited to the five
countries with which Tel Aviv has formal relations
(Malawi, Swaziland, Lesotho, Zaire, and Liberia) or
serving in Israeli Interests Sections in various Europe-
an embassies in four other states (Ivory Coast, Togo,
Ghana, and Kenya). The diplomat in charge of the
Israeli Interests Section at the Belgian Embassy in
Abidjan, for example, enjoys direct access to Ivorian
President Houphouet-Boigny with greater frequency
than some accredited ambassadors, according to the
US Embassy there. He also is responsible for Tel
Aviv's dealings with the Governments of Upper Volta,
Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Gabon.
Israel considers its stake in the Horn of Africa to be
so sensitive that it has assigned the task of handling
its relations with Ethiopia to the Israeli intelligence
community rather than the Foreign Ministry, accord-
ing to the US Embassy in Tel Aviv. The area is of
major strategic importance to Israel because of the
potential for Arab control of the Red Sea and Tel
Aviv's need to ensure safe passage for its ships
through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.
Tel Aviv has long encouraged trade and investment by
private Israeli businessmen as an alternative to offi-
cial assistance. As a result, Israeli business interests
are an active force in developing relations in Africa.
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the US Embassy in Tel Aviv.
Israeli businessmen often serve as informal represent-
atives of the government, meeting regularly with
political leaders and diplomats. The vast majority of
Israelis living in Africa-including the 2,500 in Nige-
ria, 1,000 in the Ivory Coast, and several hundred in
Kenya-are private Israeli businessmen, according to
much of Africa, according to press reports.
Tel Aviv's encouragement and support throughout
Israel's trade union federation, the Histadrut, has an
important role in maintaining and developing exten-
sive Israeli ties in more than 20 African countries. Its
Afro-Asian Institute provides training for some 250
African labor leaders a year in such subjects as
management, cooperative movements, and leadership.
The Histadrut also owns several companies such as
the large conglomerate, Koor Industries, and the
construction firm, Solel Boneh, which operate with
influence of African-Arab relations.
tages are overshadowed, however, by the dominant
Factors Affecting Israeli Prospects
Several factors work in Israel's favor in black Africa.
These include Tel Aviv's record of effective and
timely assistance over a period of years, early ties of
friendship with several generations of African leaders,
and the likelihood that some African states would be
as pragmatic in seeking to restore relations as they
were in breaking them earlier. The lure of potential
international Jewish investment and trade is also
strong. Finally, Israel can present itself as an ally and
benefactor that is not a superpower and that is itself a
small, recently created state. These clear-cut advan-
African-Arab Relations. Potentially the most impor-
tant factor supporting Israel's diplomatic return to
black Africa is general African disillusionment with
unfulfilled promises of Arab aid, trade, and invest-
ment. Published trade and aid data indicate that Arab
states and investors have not committed surplus oil
revenues to African development projects at the level
Africans had expected in return for their diplomatic
break with Israel in 1973 and as compensation for the
subsequent oil price spiral set off by the Arab oil
embargo. As of 1983, Arab donors accounted for only
10 percent of total capital inflows to the region and
ranked well below Western sources of official assist-
ance, according to press reports. Moreover, Arab aid
tends to be concentrated in a few states with sizable
Muslim populations-especially Somalia, Senegal,
and Guinea-and is channeled mainly into such
projects as the construction of mosques and Islamic
schools. Trade prospects between Arab and black 25X1
African states are poor because neither group pro-
duces substantial quantities of manufactured goods,
processed commodities, or foodstuffs for the other's
markets.
Moreover, apart from Muslim influence in certain
African states, there is little cultural, political, or
economic basis for African-Arab solidarity. African
memories of Arab slaving and military interventions
south of the Sahara in past centuries have stood in the
way of closer relations even in the postindependence
era, according to a number of press reports and
academic studies. More recently, the Libyans' enthu-
siastic support for Idi Amin in Uganda during the
1970s, Egyptian help for Somalia, Persian Gulf states'
interference on behalf of Eritrean insurgents against
Ethiopia, Libyan backing of Chadian rebels against
the N'Djamena government, and the disarray in the
OAU in the past five years have provoked public
questions among African leaders as to the value of too
close ties with the Arab states. In West and Central
Africa, particularly, fears of Libyan subversion have
enhanced the Israeli position as a supplier of internal
security assistance, according to US Embassy
reporting.
Still, Africans have not rushed to supplant Arab ties
by turning to Israel. Disappointment aside, we believe
that the need for Arab aid, however paltry, and the
continuing hope of receiving concessional terms on oil
purchases-long promised but rarely realized, accord-
ing to oil industry reports-remain for many black
African countries disincentives to reestablishing ties 25X1
with Israel. Such hard-pressed states as Ghana and
the Central African Republic continue to hope that
the Saudis, Libyans, or other oil producers will sign
long-term concessional agreements for oil, according
to US Embassy reports. In particular, we believe
West African countries with dismal economies find it
difficult to turn away any potential donor even when
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past promises have been largely unfulfilled. For
drought-plagued Senegal, for example, Arab financ-
ing of two major dam projects is too important to
jeopardize by moving closer to Israel, according to US
Embassy sources.
Fear of Arab economic reprisal is also a factor, in our
judgment. Delegations from the Arab League, the
Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Saudis
and Tunisians have gone to a number of African
states to urge the case against expanding ties with
Israel, according to press and US Embassy reports.
The Khartoum-based Arab Bank for Economic De-
velopment in Africa, which had provided Kinshasa
with $422.4 million in aid between 1974 and 1981,
suspended its activities in Zaire. The Gulf Coopera-
tion Council of Foreign and Economic Ministers,'
which had supplied approximately $2 billion in aid to
black African countries, announced that it would
sever all relations-including economic-with govern-
ments that resume ties with Israel.
In our view, most African states will probably choose
not to open up to Israel, citing the Israeli invasion of
Lebanon, the Israeli military presence there, and the
absence of progress toward resolving the Palestinian
issue. We believe that for some African states, such as
Niger and the Central African Republic, these rea-
sons will be merely excuses; for others, such as
Muslim-dominated Senegal, they are matters of deep
conviction among intellectual, government, and politi-
cal elites.
Israel's Ties With South Arica. African leaders
usually cite publicly Israel's relationship with South
Africa as the principal reason for their unwillingness
to renew diplomatic relations. Although Pretoria's .
recent rapprochement with Mozambique may remove
some of the stigma in some quarters, we believe that
Tel Aviv's political, economic, and military ties with
Pretoria will continue to complicate Israel's campaign
to rebuild a diplomatic presence in black Africa.
The Israeli-South African relationship has deep his-
torical roots dating back to South African support for
the Balfour Declaration in 1917 and to Pretoria's
early recognition of Israel in 1948. The relationship
rests in part on the countries' mutual identification as
"pariah" states and on the influence of South Africa's
Jewish community with its heavily Zionist leanings
and extensive ties with Israel. Israeli President Her-
zog made a point during his visits to Kinshasa and
Monrovia early this year publicly to justify Tel Aviv's
ties with Pretoria in terms of Israel's obligation to
protect the Jewish communit in South Africa, which
has about 120,000 members.
grown considerably.
Although relations cooled during the 1960s when
Israel adopted an antiapartheid stance as part of its
efforts to win black African allies, the rupture of
Israeli relations with black Africa in the early 1970s
apparently led Tel Aviv to conclude that it had little
to lose from cultivating its relationship with Pretoria.
Under Israeli governments since then-particularly
that of Prime Minister Begin, who was once president
of the Israeli-South African Friendship League-
bilateral economic, scientific, and military links have
For most black African leaders, Israel's economic
relations with South Africa are a continuing provoca-
tion. South Africa is Israel's leading commercial
partner in Africa. The $245 million trade between
them, according to Israeli statistics, is small in terms
of each country's total trade, but we believe this
figure is understated because it excludes diamonds
and military equipment. South Africa provides Israel
a market for high-grade chemicals, clothing, and
sophisticated engineering products and is a major
source of rough diamonds, ores, and metals for Israeli
manufacturers.
Black Africans tend to believe the worst about the
Israeli-South African connection, according to Em-
bassy and press assessments. They are convinced, for
example, that scientific and military exchanges be-
tween Israel and South Africa include secret coopera-
tion in nuclear technology for weapons programs in
both countries. African suspicions have been fueled
further in the past year by a rash of rumors and Soviet
disinformation efforts linking South Africa, Zaire, the
'The Gulf Cooperation Council is comprised of Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates.
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United States, and Israel in alleged plots to destabi-
lize southern Africa, according to US Embassy re-
porting. The Angolans, for example, are convinced
that Israeli military advisers in Zaire are helping
Jonas Savimbi's South African-backed National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola
according to Embassy reports. The Israelis will play a
major role in the operation of an educational televi-
sion service in Bophuthatswana and also in commer-
cial television to a lesser degree, according to US
Embassy sources
(UNITA), according to press reports.
In addition, Tel Aviv has been embarrassed by public-
ity involving its relations with some of the black
"homelands" that South Africa has created in support
of apartheid-Pretoria's policy of systematic separa-
tion of the races based on white supremacy. The
homeland governments often distort the scope and
significance of their dealings with Israel in their
eagerness to exploit even the vaguest manifestation of
legitimacy. Several homeland leaders have traveled to
Israel on private visits that they have publicized as
"official."
Although Israeli representatives disavow official rec-
ognition of the homelands and reaffirm Tel Aviv's
official abhorrence of apartheid, Israel is providing
security assistance to at least one homeland. Accord-
ing to the US Embassy in Pretoria, Ciskei sent 24
pilot trainees to Israel last November, and private
Israelis have tried to help Ciskei purchase six
Mooney-type aircraft from the United States.' The
Ciskei Armaments Corporation (Ciskor) was estab-
lished last year with the assistance of Israel and West
Germany, according to the US Embassy in Pretoria.
Private Israeli firms are also active in the industrial
and agricultural development of Ciskei and
Bophuthatswana, according to US Embassy reporting
from Pretoria. Ciskei President Sebe has also publi-
cized Israeli investor interest in the homeland. This
includes a $1.6 million clothing factory, a joint ven-
ture involving two major Israeli companies. The Di-
rector of the Ciskei People's Development Bank
claims to have received applications for 13 other
Israeli investment projects totaling about $6 million,
Z According to Israeli press reports, Foreign Ministry Director
General Kimche was particularly upset about the publicity given a
visit to the Ciskei last October by a retired Israeli general who for
years had been the military secretary to Prime Ministers Rabin and
Begin. Ciskei's President, Lennox Sebe, told a news conference that
a general, whom he did not identify by name, had come to evaluate
Tel Aviv and Pretoria are both seeking to deempha-
size the closeness of their relationship. US Embassy
reports indicate South African officials are sympa-
thetic to Israel's efforts to reestablish itself in black
Africa because they would view Israel's return as an
indicator of greater political pragmatism by the black
African states. These officials see this as beneficial to
South Africa in the long run by laying the ground-
work for a similar growth of a South African presence
in the region. 25X1
against resuming relations with Israel.
The French. Kimche, Primor, and other key Israeli
policymakers are concerned about what they perceive
as an anti-Israel bias on the part of members of the 25X1
French Foreign Ministry, diplomatic service, and
French communities in Africa, according to the US
Embassy in Paris. Some of them suspect that key
French officials regard Tel Aviv's activities in Franco-
phone Africa as part of a thinly disguised US effort to
displace or weaken the French presence there, accord-
ing to the Embassy. The Israelis see French influence
working against them particularly in Ivory Coast,
Central African Republic, Gabon, and Togo. Accord-
ing to the Israeli officials cited above, French pressure 25X1
on Tunisian President Bourguiba may have caused
him to advise Ivorian leader Houphouet-Boigny
We believe that France is wary of any group that
might supplant its influence in Africa. According to
US Embassy sources in the French Foreign Ministry
and presidency, Paris does not favor the reestablish-
ment of diplomatic relations between Francophone
African states and Israel because French officials fear
that such a move would cut off such states from Arab
economic assistance and make them more dependent
on France. Although our experience suggests that
French commercial interests are hostile to any com-
petitors in "their" African markets, the same French
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officials insist that the French Government does not
oppose the continuation of Israel's informal ties in
Africa, particularly those involving trade and invest-
ment. Furthermore, they even claim to welcome Tel
Aviv's low-profile assistance programs as a supple-
ment to French aid because of the constraints on
France's own budget.
impel those African leaders who may be considering a
renewal of relations to postpone action.
Any further progress in restoring diplomatic relations
with Israel would probably have to be based on some
form of joint action by two or more African leaders.
In the near term, there seems little chance that such a
group initiative will materialize because we believe
Domestic Economic Constraints. Israel's economic
problems' have forced Tel Aviv to reduce its assist-
ance budget for Africa, causing the Foreign Ministry
to seek funding for its development programs from
third parties. Officials have. obtained supplemental
aid from Canada, the Netherlands, and Sweden for
Israeli-directed projects and encouraged international
Jewish businesses to invest in programs for which
Israel can provide the expertise. The most that the
Israelis can offer to black Africa is technical assist-
ance, and in each case the programs are small,
employing only a handful of technicians. Only Kenya,
Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland, Liberia, and Zaire have
received official Israeli technical assistance over the
past few years, according to the US Embassy in Tel
Aviv.
The same economic constraints apply to military
assistance. According to US Embassy reporting, Tel
Aviv is embarrassed by its inability to furnish more
than a token amount of the military assistance re-
quested by Liberia and to fulfill its offer, quoted at
various times as high as $10-20 million, to equip
Zaire's Kamanyola Division in Shaba Region.
Outlook
In our judgment, Tel Aviv's official diplomatic rela-
tions with black Africa will remain stalemated for at
least the next several years. We believe that fear of
Libyan retaliation, pressure from the Arab League-
particularly from the Saudis-or disapproval of Israe-
li military actions in the Middle East will continue to
there are no compelling reasons to do so.
Moreover, we estimate that even the present modest
degree of African sympathy and friendship for Israel
will weaken as members of the older generation of
African leaders who are sympathetic toward Israel-
such as Houphouet and Eyadema-pass from the
scene. Even the thus-far sturdy tie with Malawi is
likely to be lost when President Banda dies.
The Israeli economic situation will, in our view,
compel Tel Aviv increasingly to seek third-party
participation in development schemes involving its
technical expertise. If successful, this will limit Tel
Aviv's flexibility and reduce even further the effec-
tiveness of the Israeli tactic of offering technical and
military support in exchange for diplomatic relations.
Previous experience in Liberia and Zaire indicates,
however, that third-party support is difficult to attract
and usually limited to small ventures.
by an export slump and debt servicing needs.
Israeli commercial ties will probably also suffer from
the worsening economic conditions in black Africa.
Many African states are having to pare their imports
because of shortages of foreign exchange brought on
We believe Tel Aviv's links with South Africa will
continue to complicate Israel's future in black Africa,
particularly if their military and scientific exchanges
receive publicity. Indeed, over the long run, Israel
may have to choose between its substantial interests in
South Africa and any hope of a diplomatic presence in
black Africa
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Implications for the United States
We expect that Israel will continue to request US
diplomatic help in restoring its position in black
Africa. As in the past, Tel Aviv will be likely to ask
US diplomatic missions to serve as channels of com-
munication in countries such as Cameroon, Botswana,
and Togo where the United States has good access to
the head of state. Tel Aviv will also ask the United
States to encourage other states, such as France and
Egypt, to support the establishment of diplomatic ties.
Moreover, Israel will look to the United States to be
active on its behalf among black African governments
during the yearly ritual of Arab and radical Muslim
challenges to Israeli credentials before the United
On the other hand, the close identification between
Washington and Tel Aviv will continue to hamper
African-US relations in states like Nigeria and Sene-
gal where Islamic ties and anti-South African views
both play major roles in foreign policy formulation. In
such states as Zambia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe,
where Tel Aviv's close ties with South Africa are
probably the decisive factor in opposition to Israel,
Washington's identification with Israel is likely to
damage US bilateral relations.
Nations and other international organizations
According to the US Embassy in Tel Aviv, Israel will
continue to request US financial help for military and
development projects it hopes to provide key African
states, particularly Liberia and Zaire. Unless Israel is
able to fulfill its commitments to Zaire and Liberia in
the near future; those relationships will be increasing-
ly stressful. Zaire in particular has suffered a large
net loss of Arab aid by renewing diplomatic ties and
will be looking to Israel to make good the difference
through what Kinshasa views, according to US Em-
bassy reporting, as Tel Aviv's influence in the United
States.
The close identification of Israel with the United
States in the eyes of many black African leaders will
have a positive effect on African-US relations where
this identification is associated with welcome forms of
bilateral assistance from either country. For some
moderate states, Israel's strong connection with the
United States is likely in itself to be an influential
argument for establishing closer ties with Tel Aviv.
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Appendix A
Israel in Africa:
Country Surveys ?
Long-Established Diplomatic Ties
Only three black African states have maintained
diplomatic links with Israel for the entire period since
1973-Malawi, Lesotho, and Swaziland. Each is far
from the mainstream of black African politics. What
they have in common, apart from their longstanding
relationship with Israel, are close political or geo-
graphic ties with South Africa.
Malawi. Malawi, the only black African state that
maintains full diplomatic relations with South Africa,
is Israel's most consistent supporter in black Africa.
Lilongwe's stance reflects the powerful personal influ-
ence of President Banda, whose relationship with Tel
Aviv goes back to Malawi's independence in 1964.
Israel's interest in Malawi centers around the political
value of diplomatic recognition but also includes small
amounts of trade and aid. Because there is no signifi-
cant public support for Israel in Malawi, we judge
that Lilongwe's relationship with Israel is likely to
change after Banda-who is in his eighties-dies or
retires.
Lesotho. Israel's relations with Lesotho were initially
an adjunct of Israel's close ties with Pretoria and a
reflection of Maseru's anti-Communist, pro-Western
orientation. During the past year, however, partly in
response to the South African attack in December
1982 on alleged safehouses of the African National
Congress in Maseru, Prime Minister Jonathan has
sought to establish Lesotho's nonaligned credentials
by opening diplomatic relations with China, the Sovi-
et Union, and North Korea. This move and the
souring of Maseru's relationship with South Africa
probably preclude any significant expansion of Leso-
tho's ties with Israel. Jonathan backed away from
entertaining Israeli President Herzog during the Tat-
ter's trip to Africa in January 1984 to avoid security
problems and unwelcome publicity, according to US
Embassy reporting from Maseru.
Israel's principal importance to Lesotho is as a suppli-
er of arms and ammunition, which Maseru purchases 25X1
periodically on a cash-and-carry basis. The advantage
to Maseru in this arrangement, apart from reasonable
prices, is that Tel Aviv's close ties with Pretoria
Swaziland. Like Malawi, Swaziland has a close work- usually enable Israel to facilitate the shipment of such 25X1
ing relationship with Pretoria and has no diplomatic goods through South African territory. Because of the
relations with any Marxist government except its deterioration in Lesotho-South African relations
neighbor, Mozambique. Israel has had relations with since the 1982 attack, however, Pretoria has held up
and a resident diplomatic mission in Mbabane since Israeli shipments of armored cars, land rovers, heli-
1972; its Ambassador there is also accredited to copter spares, and small arms, according to the US
Lesotho and responsible for informal Israeli relations Embassy in Pretoria.
with Botswana and for courting Mozambique.
"ecently Formalized Relationships
Tel.Aviv provides a modest amount of technical
training to the Swazis, and it has sold Mbabane two
military transport aircraft. At least four Swazi pilots
are training in Israel at Mbabane's expense, and the
Israelis have also provided some aircraft maintenance
instruction in Swaziland. In addition, several senior
Swazi officials have visited Israel, including the pres-
ent Prime Minister.
Israel began to crack the diplomatic logjam in its
relations with the rest of black Africa in 1982 as it
prepared to end its military occupation of the Sinai.
Tel Aviv assiduously cultivated Zaire and Liberia,
which it regarded as among the most promising
candidates for resuming relations because of their
close ties with the United States and their need for
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security assistance. According to the US Embassy
sources in Tel Aviv, Israeli policymakers hoped that
other black African leaders would follow suit once one
or more sub-Saharan states took the lead.
Zaire. Zaire became the first black African state to
reestablish diplomatic ties with Israel in May 1982
because President Mobutu believed this would lead to
increased levels of US aid as well as to Israeli
assistance, according to the US Embassy in Kinshasa.
At the time, members of the US Congress were
calling for major cuts in US aid to Zaire because of
human rights violations and corruption in the govern-
ment. According to US Embassy reporting, the Israe-
lis emphasized the alleged influence of "their" lobby
on Capitol Hill as an important selling point in
persuading Kinshasa of the advantages of reestablish-
ing relations. Notwithstanding Tel Aviv's hints
Kinshasa's hopes, US aid to Zaire has grown only
slightly, from $31 million in 1982 to an estimated
$37.5 million in 1984. According to the US Embassy
in Kinshasa, Mobutu has been disappointed by the
lack of US response.
A desire for Israeli security assistance also played an
important role in Mobutu's decision, according to the
According to the Embassy, he was
influenced by concern for his own safety and by fears
of internal instability and of incursions by dissidents
or mercenaries from across Zaire's borders. He asked
for substantial Israeli assistance both in training and
materiel for his personal bodyguard and for the troops
protecting Shaba Region, the principal source of
Zaire's copper wealth. One of Mobutu's closest advis-
ers is an Israeli, and he trusts the Israelis enough to
place them in positions of influence with his palace
The US Embassy in Kinshasa reports that Israeli
economic assistance to Zaire is limited to technical
advisers and that Tel Aviv provides no financial
assistance. Israeli agricultural experts have been
working at Mobutu's presidential experimental farms
near Lubumbashi, Gbadolite, and Kinshasa since
before the establishment of diplomatic relations.
The resumption of ties with Israel damaged Zaire's
relations with a number of Arab states and cost it
valuable financial support. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates closed their
embassies in Kinshasa and immediately cut their aid,
which averaged more than $30 million a year through
1981. The Arab states of North Africa generally
reacted more cautiously. Only Libya broke relations;
it also stepped up support for anti-Mobutu dissident
groups in exile.
Kinshasa is looking for ways to restore Arab ties with
an eye toward regaining Arab aid. The Zairian
Foreign Minister urged his Egyptian and Sudanese
counterparts to put Kinshasa back in touch with the
' An Israeli proposal to train a Chadian elite military force in Zaire
has reached a dead end, according to US Embassy reporting. Funds
have not been found for the program, and President Mobutu has
not given it a clear endorsement.
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Arab Bank for Economic Development last Novem-
ber, according to US Embassy reporting. The US
Embassy in Kinshasa assumes that Mobutu also
discussed renewing relations with Saudi Arabia dur-
ing his meeting last summer with Saudi tycoon Ka-
shoggi and that he probably also asked Egyptian
President Mubarak for help during Mubarak's visit to
Zaire earlier this year. Mobutu publicly urged Tel
Aviv to modify its policy toward the Palestinians
during the visit of Israeli President Herzog to Zaire in
January.
The future of Zaire's relations with Israel could well
hinge on Israel's ability to secure additional financial
aid for Kinshasa. Israel has tried to persuade the
United States, West Germany, and possibly other
Western governments to provide financial support for
its assistance programs in Zaire, but these efforts
have failed thus far, according to US Embassy report-
ing. We believe that Mobutu will be watching US
Congressional reaction to President Reagan's pro-
posed assistance package of $59 million for Kinshasa
for fiscal year 1985 as a sign not only of the future
direction of US policy but also of the value of Israeli
support.
Liberia. Liberia's renewal of relations with Israel in
August 1983 and Head of State Doe's visit to Jerusa-
lem in the same month-the first by an African head
of state in over a decade-were the result of a
combination of factors. According to the US Embassy
in Monrovia, Doe was anxious to obtain Israeli techni-
cal and security assistance because of his fears of
Libyan subversion; he also saw the move as a way of
improving his image as an important actor in regional
politics; and he believed that relations with Israel
would provide a small counterbalance to the over-
whelminc presence of the United States in Liberia.
Although Monrovia obviously expected the United
States to react positively to the reestablishment of
relations with Israel, the Embassy believes that this
was not the prime motivating factor. Most Liberians
saw the move as an assertion of their sovereignty and
their ability to find assistance from sources other than
the United States, according to the Embassy. At the
same time, the Embassy acknowledges that Doe's
government would be pleased if the Jewish communi-
ty in the United States were to respond positively to
Monrovia's initiative and seek to invest in Liberia. We
also believe that Doe would not react adversely if Tel
Aviv were to support Liberia's pleas for greater US
aid.
Doe viewed President Herzog's state visit to Monrovia
in January as a major diplomatic accomplishment,
according to US Embassy sources, notwithstanding 25X1
Israel's embarrassment over its inability to provide
more than a token amount of the military assistance
Doe has requested. Liberia had approached Tel Aviv
with a long list of military equipment, but US Embas-
sy reports from Tel Aviv indicate that the Israelis thus
far have ducked most of the request, claiming they
must first consult their American colleagues. The US
Embassy believes, however, that the Israelis promised
some ammunition to Liberia during Herzog's visit.
US officials have suggested that Israel's greatest
contribution could come in police training, a field that
US law bars from US foreign assistance. Twelve
Liberian police officers went to Israel in January for a
month's training in riot control. The Israelis have also
agreed to provide training for Liberia's elite presiden-
tial guard.
Israel has also provided some intelligence assistance
to the Liberian Government, but the extent of this
cooperation is not clear. According to the US Embas-
sy, the Liberians have an exaggerated fear of Libyan
interference in Liberia's internal affairs and believe
that the Israelis can help them guard against subver-
sive threats. 25X1
Liberian officials are apparently pleased by recent
Israeli interest in a number of private investment
projects.
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Monrovia is also looking to Israel for technical assist-
ance, according to US Embassy reports. Several
Israeli agricultural technicians are working at the
Firestone plantation, and one or two Israelis work in
the diamond business. The Liberians have requested
aid in health care and are discussing with the Israelis
the establishment of an ophthalmologic medical cen-
ter. Finally, both the Governor of the National Bank
of Liberia and the Finance Minister have visited
Israel's Central Bank within the past year to obtain
technical advice.
Despite this flurry of activity, most Israeli assistance
projects in 'Liberia are still in the planning stage, and
US Embassy sources have reported Israeli frustration
over the lack of progress. The Israeli community in
Liberia probably still numbers less than 25 people.F
two countries.
them to counter any potential Muslim political threat,
particularly one that might be associated with Libyan
activity. The newly founded Liberian-Israeli Friend-
ship Organization aims to promote ties between the
Tel Aviv.
Liberia's renewal of relations with Israel has had only
slight effect on its relations with Arab states, from
whom Monrovia had not received much aid even
before 1973. Liberia is not directly dependent on
Arab oil because it generally buys oil on the spot
market through European brokers. No Arab states
withdrew their missions, and Libya has done nothing
to retaliate. Liberia feared for a time that the Arab
states might boycott Liberian-flag vessels if Monrovia
opened its Embassy in Jerusalem, but this pressure
abated when Doe decided to locate the Embassy in
Tel Aviv and Monrovia probably will continue to try
to enlist US financial support for Israel's assistance
program. The US response thus far has been limited
to offers of equipment for the proposed Israeli-trained
Executive Mansion Guard. We believe that Monro-
via's requests will increase in urgency as the disparity
grows between Liberia's needs and what Israel can
afford.
Countries of Major Interest to Israel
Israel seeks to cultivate the friendship of a few
particularly influential African states and to develop
discreet contacts with them. Of the four discussed
below, we believe that only Ivory Coast is a candidate
for reestablishing relations any time soon.
Ivory Coast. Aged President Houphouet-Boigny is one
of Israel's most enduring and best friends in Africa.
His close ties go back before Ivorian independence to
the 1950s, and he was one of the last African leaders
to break relations in 1973. Houphouet has for years
given Tel Aviv indications of his willingness to rees-
tablish formal ties and, on several occasions, has led
Israeli representatives to believe that only the timing
Even so, Monrovia's restoration of ties with Tel Aviv
has met with widespread approval within Liberia,
according to US Embassy sources. The most political-
ly active segments of the population are conservative
Christians who are concerned about Qadhafi's activi-
ties in the region and the slow expansion of Islam in
the interior. They believe that Israeli support will help
of such a move remained to be decided.
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Because Houphouet is one of Francophone Africa's
influential senior statesmen, the Israelis are eager to
gain his active support for their diplomatic campaign
in Africa. They believe that other pro-Western Fran-
cophone states would follow his lead if he would
renew diplomatic relations. According to US Embassy
reporting, Houphouet had planned to discuss the
renewal of Israeli ties with other pro-Western African
leaders-most likely the Presidents of Togo, Gabon,
and Central African Republic-after the OAU sum-
mit, which had been tentatively scheduled for Cona-
kry in May. The death of Guinean President Toure
and the subsequent military coup in Guinea have
made the timing and venue of the next summit
uncertain, however, and reduced the likelihood of
Houphouet taking an initiative to organize a concert-
ed diplomatic move toward Tel Aviv.
The Israeli Interests Section at the Belgian Embassy
in Abidjan is staffed by a senior diplomat, Benad
Avital, who has the title of Second Secretary. He has
been joined recently by an assistant, according to the
US Embassy in Abidjan. Avital travels freely in and
out of the country and within Ivory Coast. Houphouet
himself meets periodically with senior Israeli officials
during his visits to Western Europe, according to US
Embassy reporting. He held secret talks-later re-
ported in the British press-with Shamir in Geneva in
July 1983, for example, when Shamir was Foreign
Minister.
A number of well-established economic links exist,
between Israel and Ivory Coast. The Israeli communi-
ty of about 1,000 is primarily involved in the construc-
tion industry and export-import firms, according to
US Embassy reports from Abidjan. Many are former
technical advisers who stayed on after 1973 to work
on contract for the Ivorian Government or in private
business. Israel does not now provide technical assist-
ance to Ivory Coast, but Tel Aviv has raised the
possibility of establishing a program if diplomatic
relations are resumed, the US Embassy in Abidjan
reports.
Security considerations also play a part in Hou-
phouet's interest in developing formal ties with Israel,
according to the US Embassy in Abidjan. Although
Tel Aviv is providing some limited security assistance
to Abidjan, Houphouet probably would welcome more
Israeli aid. He is concerned about Libyan activities in
neighboring Upper Volta and Ghana as well as else-
where in the region, and we believe he would like to
have a small counterbalance to the overwhelming
French presence in Ivory Coast's security sector.
There are already signs of increased interest in Ivory
Coast among American investors that are at least 25X1
partially attributable to Abidjan's links with Israel,
according to the US Embassy in Abidjan. A group of
Jewish-American businessmen planned an investment
mission to Ivory Coast in late 1983, but the visit was
canceled at the last minute. According to the Embas-
sy, the visit apparently will be rescheduled this year.
Several factors complicate the Israeli effort to renew
formal ties with Abidjan. First, Houphouet has close
ties with the Arab-oriented states in Francophone 25X1
Africa that have significant Muslim populations. Sec-
ond, we believe he continues to be troubled by what he
views as aggressive Israeli actions and policies in the
Middle East. Third, Ivorian Foreign Minister Ake is
opposed to reestablishing formal ties with Tel Aviv
and favors a Third World foreign policy orientation,
according to the US Embassy.
On the other hand, Abidjan has been able to ignore
the most blatant Arab pressures against its dealings
with Israel because it is nearly self-sufficient in oil.
Houphouet has paid a price, however, for steadfastly
refusing to accept a boycott of Israeli firms as a
condition of Arab aid: construction of the Soubre
Dam, the country's largest investment project, has
been postponed indefinitely because of a shortfall in
Arab funding.
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As long as Houphouet is in power, Ivory Coast will
remain one of Israel's best prospects for another
diplomatic breakthrough. Houphouet's death or re-
tirement would reduce Tel Aviv's chances in Abidjan,
however, because a successor regime would probably
wish to avoid controversial foreign policy ventures and
concentrate on consolidating domestic support.
Nigeria. Nigeria is of major interest to the Israelis
because of its size, large market, and influence with
other OAU states. As the region's principal oil pro-
ducer and a prime mover behind the Economic Com-
munity of West African States, Lagos carries consid-
erable weight among its neighbors
Nigeria has long been Israel's largest trading partner
in black Africa, although Israeli businessmen are
suffering because of Nigeria's economic crisis. In the
past, Israel exported mainly chemicals, medicine, and
agricultural products to Nigeria-totaling $43.3 mil-
lion in 1982-and provided technical expertise
An Israeli community of about 2,500 lives in the
country. Most are businessmen primarily involved in
trading and construction, many working on short-
term contracts. Some companies are openly identified
as Israeli, such as Solel Boneh or Dizengoff. Others,
according to academic observers, are registered else-
where-such as Reynolds Construction Company in
the United States and Afro-Continental in Switzer-
land-but are staffed almost entirely by Israeli per-
sonnel.
Israeli construction firms secured contracts worth $1
billion in 1981. According to information gathered by
the US Embassy in Lagos, most contracts have been
undertaken in Nigeria's southern states-for houses
in and around Lagos, buildings for the government's
ministeries and parastatals, and roads-but Solel
Boneh has been awarded a substantial contract to
work at Abuja, the site of the new federal capital in
central Nigeria.
Tel Aviv's strongest supporters in Nigeria have long
been the predominantly Christian communities in the
southern part of the country, according to published
US academic studies. Pro-Israeli sentiment among
them stems from personal ties that developed during
the 1960s between southern Nigerian leaders and Tel
Aviv in reaction against the Pan-Islamic links that
had developed between Nigerian Muslims and Egypt.
Until late last year, the two southern-based Nigerian
parties-the Unity Party of Nigeria of Obafemi
Awolowo and the Nigerian People's Party of Nnamde
Azikiwe-favored renewing diplomatic relations with
Israel. Nigeria's new military government has banned
these parties, however, and greatly reduced the influ-
ence of their leaders.
According to US Embassy sources in Tel Aviv, Israeli
officials believe, nonetheless, that the new military
government may be more positively inclined toward
Tel Aviv than its predecessor, even though it is also
dominated by northern Muslims. The previous gov-
ernment had taken a consistently firm public stand
against diplomatic relations because of Israeli policies
toward the Palestinians.
We doubt that the military government will move
closer to Israel, however, because it is trying to obtain
loans from Saudi Arabia, to increase its official
OPEC oil production quota, and to maintain support
among the Muslim majority in northern Nigeria. The
Nigerian Foreign Minister told the press in late
January that it was not yet time to reestablish
relations, particularly in light of Israel's trade and
military exchanges with South Africa.
Members of the Israeli community in Nigeria them-
selves doubt the value of restoring diplomatic rela-
tions, according to US Embassy reporting. They fear
that it would endanger them personally and their
business prospects by putting them in the spotlight.
Kenya. There is a long history of close Kenyan-Israeli
ties, particularly during the presidency, 1964-78, of
the late Jomo Kenyatta. Kenyatta's personal links
with Tel Aviv dated back before independence, and in
1973 he severed formal relations with the greatest
reluctance. Afterward, Kenyatta allowed Israeli dip-
lomats to maintain an Interests Section at the Danish
Embassy in Nairobi
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The durability of the Kenyan-Israeli
connection was dramatized in 1976 by Tel Aviv's use
of the Nairobi airport during the operation that
rescued Israeli hostages from Entebbe, Uganda, and
by a subsequent step-up of Israeli military assistance.
Kenya's Israeli connection cooled considerably after
President Moi came to power in 1978. During Moi's
chairmanship of the OAU, the organization roundly
condemned Israel for its policies in the Middle East.
Moi has concentrated on expanding Kenya's ties with
Kenya last summer when Moi forced Constitutional
Affairs Minister Charles Njonjo out of his govern-
ment for reasons unrelated to Nionio's links with Tel
Kenya, nonetheless, is one of Israel's largest commer-
cial partners in black Africa, and several hundred
Israelis live there, almost all connected with private
business. According to IMF figures, Israeli exports to
Kenya in 1982 were over $8 million, consisting princi-
pally of chemicals, construction and agricultural
equipment, and medicine. El Al has continued its air
service to Nairobi, including stopovers for weekly
flights to South Africa.
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We believe that Nairobi is satisfied for now with the
Ethiopia. Israel has had a long historical connection
with Ethiopia, largely because of Tel Aviv's strategic 25X1
interest in the Horn of Africa. The Israelis developed
a close relationship with prerevolutionary Ethiopia
under the late Emperor Haile Selassie during the
1960s when Tel Aviv played an influential role in
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training the Ethiopian Army, paramilitary police, and 25X1
intelligence service. About 50 Israeli military-security
advisers served in the country during the late 1960s, 25X1
and Tel Aviv continued to maintain a small military
advisory presence until 1977 despite the break in 25X1
relations in 1973, according to US press reports.
Officials of Haile Selassie's government said privately
to a US Embassy source that the main reason for the
diplomatic break was that Tel Aviv had not done
enough to get the United States to provide more
military assistance to Addis Ababa, although we
believe that a need to ensure Arab neutrality in the
event of hostilities between Ethiopia and Somalia and 25X1
a desire to persuade the Arabs to stop assisting
Eritrean dissidents were also factors.
The Mengistu regime has been officially hostile to Tel 25X1
Aviv for years, but it has not cut off contact with
Israel.
The Israelis do a modest business with Ethiopia in a 25X1
variety of goods such as agricultural machinery and
chemicals, soft drink bottles and blankets, communi-
cations equipment, and spare parts for the Ethiopian
Army, according to the US Embassy in Addis Ababa.
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Tel Aviv fakes a special interest in the well-being of
Ethiopia's 25,000-member indigenous Jewish commu-
nity, the "Falashas," whom Addis Ababa largely
ignores. Several thousand Falashas have emigrated to
Israel illegally through Sudan and other neighboring
states, according to US press reporting.
The Mengistu regime's close links with the Soviets,
who are adamantly opposed to Israeli influence in
Ethiopia, make a rapprochement between Tel Aviv
and Addis Ababa unlikely any time soon. At the same
time, Ethiopia's anger over Arab support for Eritrean
dissidents and the continuity of Addis Ababa's long-
standing links with Tel Aviv are factors that could
work in Israel's favor over the longer term. Even now,
some senior Ethiopian officials are surreptitiously
friendly to Israel, and most of the influential Amharic
population is unabashedly friendly, according to US
Embassy reporting.
Other Targets
Tel Aviv believes that if any influential English- or
French-speaking black African states-such as Ivory
Coast, Nigeria, or Kenya-could be persuaded to
resume relations with Israel, others would follow. It
has expended considerable effort over the past year in
cultivating a number of smaller African countries
Togo. Togo has maintained informal ties with Israel
since breaking relations in 1973. An Israeli diplomat
stationed in the Israeli Interests Section at the Swiss
Embassy in Ghana is attached formally to the Belgian
Embassy in Lome and has good access to Togolese
officials. In addition, Maurice Assor, a Jewish busi-
nessman of Moroccan origin is one of President
Eyadema's closest advisers on official and personal
financial matters and, according to US Embassy
sources, has been a valuable and sympathetic contact
for Tel Aviv.
Eyadema is a pragmatist who personally decides the
government's foreign policy positions, but he has not
made up his mind about restoring relations with
Israel, according to the US Embassy in Lome. He is
concerned about Libyan destabilization in the region
and irritated that the moderate Arab states have done
nothing to restrain Qadhafi, according to the US
Embassy. He told US officials last October that he
might join other pro-Western African leaders in a
concerted action to renew ties with Tel Aviv. -Like
Houphouet, he would prefer to postpone discussion of
renewed Israeli ties until after the next OAU summit.
Lome is less vulnerable than many African states to
Arab pressure because Togo has diversified its sources
of imported oil. The US Embassy in Lome reports
that a group of American Jewish investors interested
in promoting Togo-Israeli relations plan to investigate
investment possibilities in Togo and elsewhere in West
Africa this year.
On the negative side, we believe that Eyadema would
be reluctant to close the door on Arab trade and
economic assistance or to provoke Libya. Togo sells
cotton worth almost $5 million annually to Morocco
and Tunisia and imports goods valued near $9 million
annually from Arab states; by contrast, Israeli trade
with Togo is inconsequential. An Arab League dele-
gation left Lome last November convinced that Togo
would not renew relations with Israel until the OAU
rescinds the resolution under which members agreed
to boycott Israel, according to US Embassy sources.
In our view, such a withdrawal is unlikely. Moreover,
the US Embassy reports that Eyadema believes that
Tel Aviv wrongfully pursues a policy of hegemony in
the Middle East, and he personally supports Palestin-
ian self-determination.
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with which it already had informal ties.
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Central African Republic. With the overthrow of
Emperor Bokassa in late 1979 and the installation of
the David Dacko regime, the Israelis began to negoti-
ate a renewal of their ties with Bangui, which had
been severed in 1973. According to US Embassy
sources, the two countries had tentatively agreed to
exchange ambassadors, just before President Dacko
was overthrown by General Kolingba in 1981. An
Israeli delegation met with Kolingba a few weeks
later, according to the US Embassy in Bangui, hoping
to move ahead swiftly on reestablishing relations, but
the new President demurred, pleading the insecurity
of his position as a new head of state. Until recently,
US Embassy reporting indicates a number of feelers
put out by the Israelis have been met by consistent
procrastination, although Kolingba has been willing
to consider Tel Aviv's overtures in principle.
We believe that Bangui's reluctance is based on
apprehensions about Arab reactions to restored ties
with Israel. Although Bangui is not dependent on the
Arabs for oil-its main supplier is Gabon-the CAR
is in dire economic straits and does not want to
jeopardize Arab assistance. Moreover, we believe
Bangui does not wish to give Libya any further
pretext for stepping up subversion against the
Kolingba government.
Although US Embassy sources report Kolingba would
like the Israelis to resume agricultural assistance and
a youth training program and would welcome the
establishment of a joint venture for the exploitation of
diamonds in the CAR, the Israelis have tied these and
other inducements-such as promises to attract pri-
vate Jewish investment to the CAR-to a formal
publicized announcement of renewed relations. We
believe Kolingba, an extremely cautious and prudent
person, has not found the incentives worth the risk.
Cameroon. Since 1982, when a government dominat-
ed by Muslim northerners was replaced by one led by
Christian southerners, Israel has targeted Cameroon
for special attention, according to US Embassy re-
porting from Tel Aviv. Although President Biya's
position is delicate following a failed coup attempt in
April by the then Muslim-dominated Presidential
Guard, the same sources indicate that Israeli officials
speculate that the abortive coup might sharpen Cam-
eroonian interest in obtaining security assistance from
Tel Aviv. In our view, however, Biya or any other non-
Muslim Cameroonian will have to proceed cautiously
in exploring closer ties with Israel to avoid sowing
further unrest among northern Cameroonians already
fearful of domination by Christians in the south.
Director General Kimche of the Israeli Foreign Min-
istry made a secret visit, later reported in the Israeli
media, to Yaounde in March to discuss possible
cooperation in security, agriculture, and construction.
Biya expressed concern about the loyalty of Muslim
tribes in the north and about a possible threat of
News of the meeting was leaked to the Israeli
press, and a scheduled visit by a Cameroonian delega-
tion to Tel Aviv in April was canceled by Yaounde,
which was embarrassed by the publicity.
Gabon. Israel hopes that President Bongo would
follow Ivorian President Houphouet's lead should the
latter decide to reestablish ties with Tel Aviv, accord-
ing to the US Embassy in Libreville, but we believe
Bongo's negative view of Israel's military presence in
Lebanon makes an early resumption of relations
impossible. Bongo has also publicly criticized Israel's
position on the Palestinian issue and Jerusalem, al-
though he supports the Camp David accords. More-
over, we believe he does not want to give Libya any
excuse to interfere in Gabon.
Bongo is interested, however, in expanding Israel's
role in Gabon's economic development, according to
US Embassy reporting. Gabonese-Israeli trade has
increased over the past few years, and Bongo would be
likely to welcome Israeli investment and agricultural
development. Although Saudi Arabia and Morocco
have provided financial support for the trans-Gabon
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railroad and other development projects, Gabon is less
vulnerable than most African states to Arab pressure
because it is self-sufficient in oil production.
Botswana. Tel Aviv's informal relations with Botswa-
na are handled by the Israeli Ambassador in Swazi-
land. The previous Ambassador in Mbabane, Em-
manuel Galbar, had visited Botswana every three or
four months but, according to the US Embassy,
generally had been unable to obtain appointments
with senior officials until 1982 when Washington
suggested that Tel Aviv might be able to supply rifles
to the country's national police force. Botswana had
first requested such weapons from the United States,
but US regulations prevented it from meeting Gabo-
Notwithstanding this burgeoning relationship, the US
Embassy in Gaborone doubts that Botswana will
normalize relations with Tel Aviv unless a number of
other OAU members, including some key states such
as Nigeria or Kenya, take the lead. Botswana's
Minister of External Affairs, Archie Mogwe, is an
outspoken opponent of closer ties with Israel. For the
present, according to US Embassy sources, Botswana
prefers to maintain some distance between itself and
Israel in order to establish credibility in Third World
forums, particularly as Israel is perceived by many
African countries to be working hand in glove with
South Africa in the region.
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rone's request.
Gaborone reacted negatively to Galbar's rather ham-
handed offer to exchange the rifles for normalizing
relations, according to US Embassy reporting. Tel
Aviv then backtracked and offered to give Gaborone
the weapons with no strings attached. Galbar worked
out the details with the help of the Israeli military
attache in Pretoria.
The deal led to an improved climate between Gabo-
rone and Tel Aviv and made possible closer ties
between Israel and the Botswana armed forces. Briga-
dier Ian Khama, the Deputy Commander of the Army
and the son of Botswana's first president-the late
Seretse Khama-visited Israel in November 1983.
The head of the Army, General Merafhe,
is expecte to visit Israel later this year, according to
the US Embassy. Discussions have also been conduct-
ed about the possibility of the Botswana military
receiving Israeli training in the use of mortars and
commando tactics.
According to US Embassy reporting from Gaborone,
Tel Aviv has also offered scholarships to bring Bots-
wanan students to Israel and has proposed programs
for developing dry-land agriculture and irrigation
techniques. The same sources report Israeli officials
have also discussed assistance in desalinization, cloud
seeding, and the extraction of mineral byproducts
from mining. In addition, Tel Aviv is considering a
Ghana. Israel's diplomatic prospects in Ghana have
been poor since Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings
took power in 1981 and immediately developed ties
with Libya. Although Libyan-Ghanaian relations
have deteriorated recently, we doubt that Accra will
break relations or turn to Israel any time soon.
Moreover, Accra's continuing hope of obtaining low-
priced petroleum from Libya or other Arab states
makes a renewal of diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv
unlikely.
Nevertheless, longstanding informal links exist be-
tween Ghana and Israel. Tel Aviv has maintained an
Interests Section at the Swiss Embassy in Accra since
Ghana severed relations in 1973. Zim Israel Naviga-
tion Company, Ltd. (Zim Lines), a government-owned
corporation, also has a representative in Accra, ac-
cording to US Embassy reports. Zim Lines organized
and supervised Ghana's shipping line, Black Star,
from the time of the country's independence in 1957
until Accra broke diplomatic relations in 1973. Zim
Lines was invited to renew its relationship with Black
Star in 1981, but the Israelis turned down the offer,
preferring to maintain the present level of operations
in Ghana until diplomatic ties are renewed. Still,
Israeli-flag vessels call in Ghana on an average of one
request for construction of an eye clinic in Gaborone.
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Other Israeli activity in Ghana includes investments
by the firm of Dizengoff, which supplies communica-
tions equipment to the government, and by Tahal,
which is engaged in water and road construction
projects with World Bank financing. Ghana's de-
pressed economy has caused a sharp reduction in
Israeli commercial operations and in the numbers of
Israeli nationals based in Accra. Nonetheless, Israel
provides short-term training in agriculture, shipping,
and port management. When the Nigerians expelled
large numbers of Ghanaian citizens in 1983, Tel Aviv
provided advice and liaison assistance to them at
Ghana's request through the Zim Lines office in
Lagos, according to the US Embassy there.
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Appendix B
Broke relations in November 1973. None.
Deals informally through Israeli
Ambassador in Swaziland.
Central African Broke relations in October 1973. Negligible.
Republic
Ethiopia Broke relations in October 1973. $4 million in 1982, including agri- $4.1 million in 1982, including ag-
cultural products, engine parts. ricultural machinery, chemicals,
manufactured goods, communica-
tions equipment, and spare parts
for the Ethiopian Army.
Broke relations in October 1973. $10 million in 1982, chiefly wood $0.8 million in 1982, principally
The Israelis maintained an Inter- and wood products. glass, tools, and parts.
ests Section in Libreville until
1982; they are now represented by
the Israeli Interests Section at the
Belgian Embassy in Abidjan.
Broke relations in October 1973. $0.3 million in 1982, principally $0.6 million in 1982, including ag-
Israel maintains a one-man Inter- cocoa cake. ricultural products, medicines, and
ests Section in the Swiss Embassy parts.
in Accra.
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$40 million soda ash mining and
processing facility at planning
stage.
In 1982 Botswana received a total of $6.2 million in aid
disbursements from OPEC states. Only Libya has a diplomatic
mission, but it exercises only modest influence. Saudis and
Kuwaitis have given concessionary assistance for airport con-
struction and a coal project.
Receiving development aid from Libya and negotiating for
assistance from Algeria. The Abu Dhabi Fund, Kuwait, the
Arab Development Bank, and the Saudis have provided modest
levels of assistance.
As of December 1983, the OPEC Development Fund has
provided $6 million for road construction; Kuwait, $5.7 million
for roads; BADEA, $3.4 million for cotton development and
$1.5 million for roads; Egypt, $2 million for technical assist-
ance; and Morocco, 1,012 scholarships yearly. Iraq promised an
unknown amount of crude as balance-of-payments support, but
none has been delivered. President Kolingba visited Khartoum
and Cairo in May 1984 seeking further support.
PLO maintains an office in Brazzaville with full diplomatic
privileges. Total debt to Arab sources in 1983: Arab Develop-
ment Fund, $280,000; Iraq, $360,168; Libya, $350,000; and
OPEC Fund, $80,000. OPEC bilateral aid disbursements for
1982, $7.6 million; multilateral, $4.8 million.
One businessman and his non- Addis Ababa is hostile to Egyptian military assistance to
resident assistant. Somalia and to Sudanese and Saudi support for Eritrean
insurgents, but trades with Arab neighbors. OPEC bilateral aid
disbursements for 1982; $0.1 million.
Zim Israel Navigation Company Around 10.
continues to maintain its own rep-
resentative in Ghana. Israeli ships
call regularly at Tema. Dizengoff
West Africa, a trading company,
and Motorola (Israel) working in
communications, operating out of
Accra. The Israeli construction
firm TAHAL is engaged in water
and road projects with World Bank
financing.
Gabon is a member of the Islamic League; and President
Bongo, a convert to Islam. Gabon has received Saudi financing
for the trans-Gabon railway. OPEC bilateral aid disbursements
in 1982, $0.7 million.
The close Libyan connection has dimin-ished because of Ghana-
ian disappointment with the level of Libyan assistance. OPEC
bilateral aid disbursements in 1982 were $6.5 million; multilat-
eral, $1.3 million.
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African Relations With Israel and the Arab States (continued)
Guinea Broke relations in June 1967. Tel Negligible. $1.1 million in 1982, including dis-
Aviv is now represented by the infectants and tires.
Israeli Interests Section in the Bel-
gian Embassy in Abidjan.
Ivory Coast Broke relations in November 1973. $7.1 million in 1982, principally $2.7 million in 1982, chiefly insec-
Israel maintains an Interests Sec- coffee, cocoa, and forest products. ticides and refrigeration and air
tion in the Belgian Embassy in conditioning equipment.
Abidjan.
Kenya Broke relations in November 1973. $2.2 million in 1982, principally $8.5 million in 1982, chiefly agri-
Israel has an Interests Section in agricultural products. cultural equipment, fertilizers,
the Danish Embassy in Nairobi. medicines, chemicals, plastics, ve-
hicles, and parts.
Lesotho Diplomatic relations since indepen- None. Negligible. Some purchases of
Bence in 1966. Israel is represented small arms and ammunition.
by its Ambassador to Swaziland.
Broke relations in November 1973. Negligible. $0.1 million in 1982, chiefly agri-
Renewed diplomatic ties in August cultural and communications
1983. equipment and medicines.
Maintained relations since inde- Negligible. $1 million in 1982, chiefly fertiliz-
pendence in 1964. . ers, glass products, and medicines.
Nigeria Broke relations in October 1973. Negligible. $43.3 million in 1982, principally
food, animal feed, medicines,
chemicals, fertilizers, plastics, as-
bestos, rubber and glass products,
equipment, and parts.
Senegal Broke relations in October 1973. Negligible. $0.1 million in 1982, mostly food
and machinery.
Sierra Leone Broke relations in October 1973. Negligible.
Israelis now represented by an In-
terests Section in the Belgian Em-
bassy, Abidjan.
Swaziland A resident Israeli Ambassador Negligible.
since 1972 also accredited to Leso-
tho and keeps an eye on Botswana
and Mozambique.
Tanzania Broke relations in October 1973. $0.5 million in 1982, nuts, coffee, $4.3 million in 1982, chiefly agri-
and spices. cultural products, medicines, and
chemicals.
Broke relations in September 1973. Negligible. $0.1 million in 1982, chiefly manu-
Israel represented by Interests Sec- factured goods and agricultural
tion in Belgian Embassy, Abidjan. products.
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None. None. The late President Sekou Toure was a leader of the Islamic
Conference. Saudi Arabia recently completed one of the world's
largest mosques in Guinea. In 1982 Guinea received $4.2
million in bilateral aid disbursements from OPEC countries and
$1.8 million in multilateral disbursements.
Around 1,000, most in con- In 1982 Ivorian exports of forest products, coffee, and cocoa to
struction and export/import Arab countries (primarily Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia)
firms in capital city region. totaled nearly $55 million while Ivorian imports, mostly crude
oil, from Arab states (primarily Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Libya)
totaled $213 million or 10 percent of total Ivorian imports.
Some construction contracts. Several hundred. OPEC bilateral aid disbursements for 1982 were about $5.7
million; multilateral disbursements, $8.5 million.
None. Less than 10. Kuwait is continuing some $15 million support for Maseru's
new international airport. Egypt is the only Arab state to
maintain diplomatic relations.
No major holdings. Less than 25. Receives little Arab assistance; in 1982 OPEC countries dis-
bursed $1.5 million bilaterally and $3.9 million multilaterally,
mostly in concessional oil from Kuwait.
Malawi Less than 15. Negligible.
None.
Major investments primarily in About 2,500, mostly business- A member of OPEC and a major petroleum exporter. Saudis
trading companies, engineering, men, technical and office per- provided $400 million loan last year. In 1982 over 80,000
and construction. Principal inves- sonnel, and families concentrat- Nigerians made a pilgrimage to Mecca.
tors include Solel Boneh and ed in Lagos and Ibadan.
Dizengoff.
Unknown. Unknown. Senegal is one of the major beneficiaries of Arab aid in black
Africa. In 1982 Senegal received $119 million in bilateral aid
disbursements from OPEC countries, mainly to finance two
major dams on the Senegal River.
Negligible. Unknown. In 1982 Sierra Leone received $0.3 million in bilateral aid
disbursements from the OPEC states and $1.1 million in
multilateral disbursements.
None. About 25. Tanzania is a staunch supporter of the PLO and increasingly
dependent on Libya and Algeria for oil. Over the past two years,
Tanzania has made a major effort to strengthen ties with
Persian Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia.
None. Less than 10. During the 1980s Libya has invested $3 million in Togo's
fishing industry and built a mosque and cultural center. The
Saudis have invested $16 million in construction and agricul-
ture. The Saudis supply about 26 percent of Togo's heavy fuel
oil needs.
Unknown. Unknown. In 1982 the OPEC states provided $1.4 million in bilateral aid
and nearly $5 million in multilateral aid.
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African Relations With Israel and the Arab States (continued)
Diplomatic Relations With Israel
Exports to Israel
Broke relations in October 1973.
Reestablished relations in May
1982.
Negligible.
Zambia
Broke relations in October 1973.
$0.1 million in 1982, principally
coffee.
Never established relations.
Imports From Israel
$3.2 million in 1982, principally
agricultural products, communica-
tions equipment, and insulation.
$4.7 million in 1982, principally
farm machinery, chemicals, fab-
rics, glass, and parts.
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Israeli Commercial Presence
Israeli Residents
Negligible.
About 28 families.
Middle Eastern Arab states broke relations and cut off aid in
1982 when Zaire resumed diplomatic ties with Israel. Of the
North African Arab countries, only Libya broke relations.
Negligible.
About 40.
In 1982 Zambia's largest sources of bilateral external assistance
were the Saudi Arabia Fund for Development ($49 million) and
Iraq ($48 million). Zambia is dependent on the Middle Eastern
Arab states for oil.
About 100, of which a number
are successful businessmen,
lawyers, and doctors.
The government maintains close ties with the PLO. Zimbabwe
buys nearly all its oil from Algeria and Persian Gulf Arab
states. In 1982 OPEC states gave $44 million aid bilaterally and
$10.1 million through multilateral organizations.
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Secret
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