CUBA: SOVIET MILITARY DELIVERIES IN 1983

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: June 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of -%, eer -et.
Intelligence
Cuba: Soviet Military
Deliveries in 1983
ALA 84-10054D
GI 84-10101D
June 1984
Copy 3 0 2
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NOFORN
Errata Notice to recipients of Intelligence Assessment: Cuba: Soviet Militar Deliveries
in 1983, ALA 84-10054D/Gl 84-lOlO1D, 25X1
The last half of table 2 on page 7 is incorrect. Please replace it with the new table
attached
Secret
ALA 84-10054D
GI 84-10101D
June 1984
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Table 2 `
Soviet Military Deliveries to Cuba:
Selected Weapons Systems and Equipment, 1976-83 (continued)
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Total
Observed
1976-83
Missile attack boat, Osa-I1 class
1
1
3
2
2
4
13
Hydrofoil patrol craft, Turya-class
2
2
2
3
9
Patrol boat, Zhuk-class
2
4
6
12
Inshore minewseeper, Yevgenya- class
2
1
2
2
2
1
10
Degaussing ship, Pelym-class
1
1
Landing Ship, medium, Polnocny-class
2
2
Included are estimates of the most significant items by quantity. Absence of data for ground force equipment delivered in 1982 is
Numbers are minimum counts and include only items confirmed on due largely to increased Cuban concealment and deception meas-
imagery. Totals for some equipment, such as T-62 tanks and ures. The increase in data for ground force equipment delivered in
BM-21 multiple rocket launchers, include deliveries both to Cuban 1983 may be the result of a relaxation of those measures.
forces and, possibly, to the Soviet brigade there.
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- ' Intelligence
Cuba: Soviet Military
Deliveries in 1983
This paper was prepared b Office of
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African and Latin American Analysis, and 0
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Office of Global
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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Divison, ALA,
ALA 84-10054D
G184-10101D
June 1984
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7C1:lCl
Cuba: Soviet Military
Deliveries in 1983 F__] 25X1
Key Judgments In 1983, for the third year in a row, the Soviet Union delivered a large
Information Available quantity of military goods to Cuba. Moscow shipped a significantly higher
as of 1 April 1984 tonnage of arms than in 1982, but this volume was more than offset by a
was used in this report.
large decline in deliveries of military-associated goods. All told, the volume
of deliveries in 1983 was off nearly 20 percent from the previous year.
Key features of the 1983 deliveries were:
? Shipments of combat arms rose to 38,400 tons-up from 24,540 tons in
1982 but somewhat below the 20-year high of 45,000 tons sent in 1981.
? Shipments of military-associated goods fell substantially to less than
13,000 tons from the high of 35,000 tons registered in 1982.
? The most important items delivered were 180 tanks and more than 200
artillery pieces to help modernize and expand Cuba's ground forces.
? The Cuban Navy and Air Force also benefited from the delivery of three
MIG-23 and six MIG-21 fighter aircraft and 19 new helicopters,
including four MI-14 Haze, Cuba's first antisubmarine warfare aircraft.
The increased tonnage of arms since 1982 is almost certainly a result of the
higher mix of such heavy ground force weapons as tanks and artillery, as
opposed to the fighter aircraft that made up the bulk of the shipments in
1982.
We do not view the large reduction in the tonnage of military-associated
items shipped in 1983 as a significant reduction in the level of Soviet
support. Large fluctuations in Soviet deliveries of military-associated
equipment from year to year probably are normal. Furthermore, a larger
volume-some 5,000 tons-of military-associated items was sent to Cuba
by East European shippers in 1983. These indirect shipments are not
included in our tonnage calculations.
Even without taking hostile action, Cuba's regular armed forces could have
a significant impact on the allocation of US naval and air forces in time of
war or crisis by threatening merchant shipping and troop convoys entering
and exiting the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico. Soviet deliveries
also are gradually improving Cuba's defensive capabilities and raising the
potential cost to the United States of any attempt to neutralize Cuban
forces by invasion, airstrike, or blockade. Cuba's small but growing
potential for intervention and power projection in the Caribbean and
Central America also threaten US interests because most of the states of
the region have little ability to defend themselves and would look to the
United States for protection.
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ALA 84-10054D
G184-1010 ID
June 1984
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The bulk of the military goods delivered to Cuba probably has remained in
that country. Cuba
continues to serve as a conduit for the clandestine transfer of some Soviet
military equipment to other Third World countries, particularly Nicaragua
and Angola.
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Contents
Key Judgments
Major Arms Deliveries 2
Military-Associated Equipment 3
Shipments From Soviet Allies 4
Funneling Arms to Others 4
Impact on Cuba's Armed Forces 5
Prospects for Future Deliveries 7
Implications for the United States 8
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Pacific
------------
Ocean
Costa
Rica Pa
Camaguey
Santiago.
de Cuba
Antigua
St. Christopher and\aarbUda
and Nevis
Dominiea'a ..
Guantanamo
(U.S. Naval Base)
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Gulf
of
Mexico
uo. Cayman Islands
(U.K.)
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Cuba: Soviet Military
Deliveries in 1983 0
This paper details the available information on ship-
ments of arms and military-associated equipment
from the Soviet Union to Cuba during 1983, identifies
trends in those shipments, and assesses the impact of
delivered equipment on Cuban military capabilities.'
It also identifies some of the measures the Cubans and
Soviets have taken to deny us information on precisely
what items are being shipped.
The reader needs to keep in mind that there are
certain limitations to the completeness of the data:
Delivered tonnage figures are derived through a
careful compilation of confirmed shipment data.
While this procedure may result in some underesti-
mation of the flow of arms and supplies because of
the deliberate exclusion of small lots or fragmentary
evidence from tenuous sources, we believe-based
on more than 20 years of observation-that our
procedures assure meaningful comparability across
the years.
? Specific items of equipment are tabulated from
observations at the sending and receiving, ports, or of
the decks of ships en route. Some items are added
only after they are first seen at a Cuban garrison,
rather than tracked through shipping.
Cuba: Soviet Military Deliveries,
1982 and 1983
Tons
Jan 3,570
2,260
Feb 6,750
3,920
Mar 3,830
3,855
Apr 114,725
2,715
May 3,510
4,575
Jun 6,305
2,060
Jul 15,155
035
Aug 110,295
5,490
Sep si6~~ 9,420
Oct - 1,020
810
Nov w 2,630
3,735
Dec 6,460
10,495
Our highest confidence in identifying delivered - 1982
items attends the acquisition of naval vessels and 1983
aircraft. Tank and artillery counts have a somewhat
lower reliability. We cannot be certain of the
amount of ammunition or small arms delivered, nor 302880 (A04696) 6-64
of the detailed composition of military-associated
equipment. for the previous two years, (table 1).2 We estimate that
51,400 metric tons were shipped on 54 Soviet-flag
voyages in 1983 as compared with almost 64,000 tons
eliveries in 1983 aboard 64 voyages in 1982.' Total tonnage delivered
Broad Patterns
The overall tonnage of Soviet seaborne military deliv-
eries to Cuba in 1983 was about 20 percent less than
' "Arms" or "military equipment" include weapon systems, ammu-
nition, and naval vessels; "military-associated equipment" includes
items such parts, trucks, bulldozers, and field kitchens.
All tons referred to in this paper are metric tons.
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Table 1
Soviet Deliveries of Military Goods to Cuba
Identified
Military
Deliveries a
Military-
Associated
Deliveries b
Naval
Ship
Deliveries c
Ships
1962
125
250,000
250,000
1965
5
10,800
10,800
1970
8
11,300
11,300
1975
8
13,900
13,900
1976
13
19,500
19,500
1977
10
21,600
21,600
1978
12
22,200
22,200
1979
12
17,300
17,300
1980
14
20,900
20,900
1981
24
45,500
18,200
63,700
1982
15
24,540
35,465
6 d
3,730
63,735
1983
20
37,690
12,970
2 d
710
51,370
c Incorporated in 1982 estimates for the first time as a separate
category; includes patrol craft carried on deck, which were included
in prior-year tonnages; also includes for the first time naval ships
delivered under tow or their own power.
d Number of delivery voyages. In some cases, a merchant ship
carried two patrol boats as cargo.
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per month during the first seven months of 1983
averaged just over 3,000 tons but rose to 6,000 tons
per month from August to yearend. The peak deliver-
ies in the months of September and December of
9,420 tons and 10,495 tons, respectively, represented
nearly 40 percent of all identified military equipment
deliveries to Cuba last year (figure 1).
Cuba receives all of its military equipment from the
Soviet Union free of charge. We estimate the market
value of the equipment received in 1983 at US $650
million. Compared with the $4.1 billion in economic
aid and subsidies Cuba received from the USSR last
year, this is not an awesome amount for the Soviets to
provide to ensure effective Cuban participation in
Communist military activities in the Third World.
Major Arms Deliveries
In 1983 Soviet shipments of combat arms to Cuba
from 24,500 tons shipped in 19821 The
tonnage of naval vessels delivered fell from 3,730 tons
to 710. Excluding deliveries during the Cuban missile
crisis of 1962, the tonnage of arms in 1983 is second
only to the 45,500 tons delivered in 1981. The number
of delivery voyages carrying arms increased from 15
in 1982 to 20 in 1983,
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The increased arms delivery tonnage in
1983 is attributable primarily to an emphasis this year
on upgrading ground force equipment in response to
Cuban perceptions of a growing offensive military
threat posed by the United States.
Among the most important items delivered in 1983
were at least 180 tanks-107 T-62s and 73
T54/55s-and more than 200 pieces of artillery. The
Cuban Air Force received three MIG-23 and six
MIG-21 fighters and 15 MI-17 helicopters. The Navy
obtained a new capability with the delivery of four
MI-14 antisubmarine warfare (ASW) helicopters.
Three hydrofoil torpedo boats were also provided to
the Navy (table 2).
Military-Associated Equipment
While combat arms shipments increased by more
than half from 1982 to 1983, shipments of military-
associated goods such as spare parts, trucks, and other
support equipment decreased by more than 60 per-
cent, to a level below that for 1981. In 1983, 12,970
tons of military-associated goods were delivered on 32
ship voyages.s
By compar-
ison, in 1982 military-associated items were delivered
in 46 ship voyages carrying a total of 35,475 tons.
' One voyage, from the Baltic port of Klaipeda, consisted of a
2,700-ton-floating drydock towed by two Cuban tugs. While a
fifth of the total tonnage of military-associated equipment delivered
in 1983. This delivery illustrates the need for caution in interpreting
short-term trends and shows how some items of military-associated
equipment can have a dramatic and disproportionate impact on
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With only a three-year historical data base for such
items, we are not entirely confident that we under-
stand the factors that affect the volume of these
first quarter of 1983.
Preliminary data for the first three months of 1984
indicate that deliveries of military equipment are
considerably higher than for the comparable period in
1983. Some 19,260 tons-more than 15,000 tons of
which are arms-have been delivered in the first
quarter of 1984 compared with 10,085 tons in the
siles, launchers, and radars.
The most notable new deliveries are a Koni-class
frigate-Cuba's second-and an F-class subma-
rine-Cuba's third. Cuba's ground forces received 31
amphibious armored personnel carriers and at least 7
D-30 122-mm howitzers. The Air and Air Defense
Force received large shipments of surface-to-air mis-
normal.
shipments.6 Large fluctuations in shipments of
military-associated equipment year to year may be
L-39 jet trainers delivered from Czechoslovakia.
Shipments From Soviet Allies
In 1983 a growing volume of significant military and
military-associated items, not included in the tonnage
figures presented here, were delivered by East Euro-
pean suppliers. Shipments from Romania, East Ger-
many, and Bulgaria in 1983 totaled about 5,000
tons-mostly trucks, ammunition, and telecommuni-
cations equipment. More than a dozen other ship-
ments were noted from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and
Hungary, each of less than 100 tons. These included
optical devices, parachutes, helmets, spare parts, and
aviation goods. In 1982 we noted only some 500 tons
of East European military equipment consisting of 30
Funneling Arms to Others
Cuba continues to serve as a conduit for military
equipment to other Soviet clients in the Third World.
For example, documents found by US forces in
Grenada indicate all but a small portion of the
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Concealment and Deception Practices
The Soviets publish no figures on their volume of
military shipments and attempt to disguise their
nature and frustrate attempts to track them. Both
Cuba and the USSR continued to use routine con-
cealment and deception measures in handling arms
shipments during 1983, including false declarations
of cargo and destination when queried and perform-
ing some unloading operations under cover of dark-
stockpiles of Soviet-made arms, ammunition, and
military vehicles delivered to that country was to
come by way of Cuba. Although Soviet and East
European ships made a number of military deliveries
directly to Nicaragua in 1983,
Cuba continues to send
military equipment and supplies there as well using
both ships and aircraft.
Cuba also was more active in 1983 in delivering
Soviet-built military equipment to Angola. Cuban
merchant ships were noted transporting 33 T-54
tanks, trucks, and at least two AN-2 light transport
aircraft to Angola last summer. We cannot quantify
what percentage of Soviet military shipments to Cuba
in 1983 have been sent to other countries, but we
believe that the vast majority have remained in Cuba.
Impact on Cuba's Armed Forces
The military equipment delivered in 1983 will en-
hance Cuba's ground force capabilities and support an
expansion and upgrading of its ground-based air
defenses.
Ground Forces
Cuba's ground forces, which are the least modern of
the three services, received the bulk of the equipment
delivered in 1983. The delivery of some 180 T-62 and
T-54 or T-55 tanks has allowed Cuba to retire the last
80 World War II vintage T-34s from active units, to
replace 33 T-54 tanks the Cubans shipped to Angola,
and to form at least one new tank regiment
were seen with a Cuban unit in 1983.
The 210 artillery pieces delivered in 1983 consist
predominantly of old-model antitank guns, all of
which have been in the Cuban inventory for many 25X1
years, but also include enough 130-mm field guns to 25X1
equip two new artillery battalions. A battalion of 12
D-30 122-mm howitzers, the most common artillery
support weapon in Soviet ground force units, was seen
for the first time with a Cuban unit in Cuba in early
1983. We did not observe the delivery of these
weapons. Eight additional SA-9 short-range air de-
fense launchers whose delivery also was not observed
Air Defenses
We noted a widespread expansion of Cuban surface-
to-air missile defenses in 1983. SA-3 sites were
permanently deployed to central Cuba for the first
time, construction of two new sites in western Cuba
was nearly completed, and two new SA-2 sites were
begun near Santiago de Cuba in the east. Although
only a relatively few missiles were seen being deliv-
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ered at Cuban ports in 1983, we noted a large 25X1
shipment of SA-3s in late December 1982. Consider-
ing the amount of construction, in all likelihood we
saw only a small percentage of the missiles and
launch-related equipment that were delivered.
Eight electronics vans that are components of the
Soviet-built Vozdukh-1 air defense command and
control communications system also were delivered to
Cuba for the first time in 1983. This semiautomated 25X1
system can be used to integrate and disseminate air.
surveillance tracking data from a number of outlying
radar stations to weapons controllers at air defense
headquarters. Until now, Cuba has had to rely on
manual plotting and the passing of position reports by
voice radio to surface-to-air missile sites, a procedure
that significantly slows reaction times. 25X1
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Table 2
Soviet Military Deliveries to Cuba:
Selected Weapons Systems and Equipment, 1976-83
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Total
Observed
1976-83
Tank, T-54/55, medium
30
73
103
Tank, T-62, medium, 115-mm
50
10
107
167
APC, BTR-60, 60P, 60PB
45
26
71
24
6
9
39
Antitank gun, 57-mm, M1943, ZIS-2
71
82
153
Antitank gun, 85-mm, M-45
29
40
69
Air defense artillery, self-propelled,
23-mm, ZSU-23-4
15
7
22
Air defense artillery, 23-mm, ZU-23
17
17
Air defense artillery, 57-mm, S-60
36
36
Field artillery, rocket launcher, 122-
mm, BM-21
40,
12
52
Field artillery, howitzer, self-propelled,
122-mm, M1974
Field artillery, howitzer, 122-mm,
D-30
12
12
Field artillery, field gun, 130-mm,
M-46
12
24
36
Field artillery, howitzer, self-propelled,
152-mm, M1973
Fighter, MIG-21, Fishbed/Mongol
3
13
14
2
21
26
35
6
120
Fighter, MIG-23, Flogger
12
4
20
3
39
Transport, AN-26, Curl
5
15
4
2
26
Helicopter, MI-17, Hip H
15
15
Helicopter, MI-24, Hind
12
12
Missile launcher, SAM, SA-3, Goa
9
3
6
18
Missile,.SAM, SA-2, Guideline
46
Missile, SAM, SA-3
230
14
244
Missile, SAM, SA-6
20
Missile, SAM, SA-9, TEL
3
8
11
Electronic warfare equipment, Turn
Cut/Turn Pole
Electronic warfare equipment, Turn
Twist/Spike
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Table 2
Soviet Military Deliveries to Cuba:
Selected Weapons Systems and Equipment, 1976-83 (continued)
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Total
Observed
1976-83
Hydrofoil patrol craft, Turya-class
2
2
2
3
9
Patrol boat, Zhuk-class
2
4
6
12
Coastal minesweeper, Sonya-class
2
1
1
1
19
Inshore minewseeper, Yevgenya- class
Included are estimates of the most significant items by quantity.
Numbers are minimum counts and include only items confirmed on
imagery. Totals for some equipment, such as T-62 tanks and
BM-21 multiple rocket launchers, include deliveries both to Cuban
forces and, possibly, to the Soviet brigade there.
Air and Naval Forces
The Soviets delivered only nine fighter aircraft and
three hydrofoil torpedo boats to Cuba in 1983, down
substantially from the major shipments to the Navy
and Air Force in the previous two years. Both of these
services have already been extensively modernized,
with more than three-fourths of their combat equip-
ment delivered since the mid-1970s.
The most significant deliveries to the Air Force and
Navy in 1983 were helicopters. A new helicopter
regiment is being formed near Camaguey with 15 new
MI-17 Hip H models received during the year. These
helicopters are armed with machineguns, and can
carry both troops and weapons pylons. Four MI-14
Haze A helicopters delivered to the Navy will give
Cuba its first ASW aircraft. They are now stationed
at Mariel Naval Air Station, just west of Havana.
Absence of data for ground force equipment delivered in 1982 is
due largely to increased Cuban concealment and deception meas-
ures. The increase in data for ground force equipment delivered in
1983 may be the result of a relaxation of those measures.
Prospects for Future Deliveries
We expect Cuba will continue modernizing its armed
forces over the next several years. Because Havana
does not pay for any of the equipment it receives from
the USSR, the further growth in its military capabili-
ties is dependent on how closely Cuban policy meshes
with Soviet aims and on Moscow's evaluation of the
risk of provoking the United States. In our view,
Soviet deliveries to Cuba over the past few years
indicate that Moscow is firmly committed to strength-
ening Cuba's defenses against a possible attack or
blockade but understands that introducing offensive
weapons such as medium bombers would cause a
serious crisis. The Soviets also appear willing to make
some improvements in Cuba's regional intervention
capabilities, but probably will move slowly and cau-
tiously to gauge US reactions.
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The volume of Soviet arms shipments to Cuba proba-
bly will continue at about the same rate as in 1983.
The expansion of surface-to-air missile defenses in
eastern and central Cuba and the improvements in
command and control systems will require the deliv-
ery of more radars, missiles, and communications
equipment. In our view, Cuba's ground forces need
more modern artillery weapons, and an announced
doubling of the size of the Territorial Militia may
require the delivery of additional large quantities of
small arms and ammunition
Ground-based air defense probably will be the area of
greatest concentration in the next few years. In
addition to the SA-2 and SA-3 systems being added,
Cuba may receive additional mobile SA-6 and SA-9
launchers for low-altitude air defense. Cuban forces in
Angola may be operating another Soviet low-altitude
system-the SA-8-and Cuba might receive some of
these as well. Another but less likely possibility would
be the SA-5, a long-range, high-altitude system the
Soviets installed in Syria in late 1982. Such a system
would be capable of denying US SR-71 overflights,
and could potentially threaten aircraft operating in
southern Florida and the Keys.
We expect Cuba's inventory of fighter aircraft to
remain relatively stable for the next five years. Be-
cause the Air Force has just completed a massive
reequipment and retraining program, we doubt it
would undertake another large turnover so soon. One
possible addition, if Moscow were willing to provide it,
would be a few MIG-25 Foxbat high-altitude fighters.
Havana's public and private protests to US officials
indicate it is seriously nettled over US SR-71 over-
flights and might want a weapon to challenge them. A
reconnaissance version of the MIG-25 also is avail-
able, which the Cubans might use to fly over and
around US borders in retaliation for US reconnais-
sance flights.
The most likely additions to Cuba's air inventory in
the next few years will be more helicopters and
transport aircraft. Cuba probably will be filling out
the new helicopter regiment formed in 1983 with
additional MI-17s and may add more ASW aircraft.
Cuba's transport fleet currently lacks a heavy cargo-
carrying aircraft. Delivery of five or six Soviet-built
IL-76s would enable Havana to move heavy or bulky
equipment to Africa or Nicaragua on a quick-reaction
basis, though Cuba would still be dependent on the
USSR for any large-scale redeployment of forces.
The Cuban Navy is continuing to expand in both size
and capability, as delivery of a second Koni-class
frigate and a third F-class submarine in early 1984
indicate. The pattern of Soviet naval deliveries over
the past six years and our projections of what recently
completed port facilities will support suggest that
Cuba will receive as many as three additional subma-
rines and possibly two more amphibious landing ships
through 1987. A total of six submarines would make
the Cuban Navy a considerable threat to merchant
shipping and convoys. Concerns about the possibility
of a naval blockade or mining of Cuban ports might
lead to the delivery of additional minesweepers.
In time of war or crisis, Cuba's regular armed forces
could threaten merchant shipping passing through the
Caribbean or exiting the Gulf of Mexico and, even
without taking hostile action, would be likely to cause
the diversion of many US air and naval assets to
protect troop convoys bound for Europe. The major
quantitative and qualitative improvements in air and
sea defenses over the past three years would consider-
ably raise the cost to the United States of any attempt
to neutralize Cuban forces.
Cuba's small but growing amphibious offensive capa-
bility and the military airfields the Cubans are help-
ing to build or upgrade in Nicaragua also pose a
significant threat of intervention and intimidation to
their neighbors in the Caribbean and Central Ameri-
ca. Many of these countries have no conventional
armed forces, and we believe they would either look to
the United States for protection from Cuban threats
or try to reach some accommodation with the Castro
regime.
25X1
14
25X1
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