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• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: April 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of t
Intelligence
El Salvador:
Significant Political Actors
and Their Interaction
ALA 84-10039
CR 84-12039
April 1984
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 Intelligence
and Their Interaction
El Salvador:
Significant Political Actors
This paper was prepared by
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of African and Latin Ameri
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Reference, with a contribution from
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Office of Global Issues. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Middle
America-Caribbean Division, ALA
,Secret
ALA 84-10039
CR 84-12039
April 1984
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Secret
Summary
Information available
as of 9 April 1984
was used in this report.
El Salvador:
Significant Political Actors
and Their Interaction F
El Salvador's military establishment has dominated the country's political
system through most of this century. Although the military is helping to
move the country toward a civilian democracy, it is the final arbiter of most
key decisions, and its political instincts are rightist. Only the extreme left
strongly resists its authority. Prior to 1979 the military ran the government
under its own system of one-party rightist rule, which became increasingly
oppressive to most elements of Salvadoran society during the 1970s.
Fraudulent elections were accompanied by increasing repression of dissent-
ers, often in response to the actions of militant leftist opposition forces.
Entrenched wealthy interests resisted suggestions for even mild political
liberalization.
Fearing a civil war like that in neighboring Nicaragua, a group of military
officers sought to preempt the Salvadoran revolutionaries by mounting a
coup that established the Revolutionary Governing Junta in October 1979.
The junta was subjected to strong centrifugal pressures from both the right
and left, and a full internal conflict ensued. Nevertheless, the provisional
rulers of El Salvador were able to organize elections for a Constituent
Assembly in March 1982, and the Assembly drafted a new, reformist
Constitution and prepared the way for presidential elections in March
1984. These developments represented the tentative emergence of a
political center despite the efforts of the extreme left and right to dictate
events and party politics.
The emerging political center-dominated by the Christian Democratic
Party, led by Napoleon Duarte-has gained some ground at the expense of
both rightists and leftists, but has weaknesses that have prevented it from
achieving a durable unity:
? The Christian Democrats are supported mainly by a centrist labor
coalition, the Popular Democratic Union; we expect this support to
strengthen with the formal sanctioning of campesino (peasant) unions in
the new Constitution. Labor does not unanimously back the center,
however. Other unions, mainly associated with the Labor Unity Move-
ment of El Salvador, are heavily influenced by the leftist guerrilla
coalition.
? Nor is the church solidly behind the Christian Democrats. A number of
church activists, especially within the Jesuit Order, still sympathize with
the leftist guerrillas despite support for more centrist political views
within the church hierarchy.
iii Secret
ALA 84-10039
CR 84-12039
April 1984
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? The Christian Democrats may be able to form temporary coalitions with
the leaders of other centrist parties, but the rank and file in these parties
may resist such arrangements because of their traditional antipathy to
the Christian Democrats.
The extremists in El Salvador, both on the left and the right, are more co-
hesive and determined than groups and leaders closer to the center. The
leftists are controlled by the leaders of five guerrilla groups. Their
conditions for ending the internal conflict are stern: they demand a share of
power as an interim stage to the eventual establishment of a Marxist
regime and refuse to accept the legitimacy of elections or the Constitution.
The extreme rightists, led by Roberto D'Aubuisson and supported by most
wealthy Salvadorans and a few military officers, bear an enmity toward
the political center almost as great as their hatred of the left. They consider
the centrists to be virtual collaborators with Marxist groups. We believe
that the political order they seek to establish would resemble the authori-
tarian, single-party-dominated regime that existed prior to 1979.
In one way or another, all significant actors recognize that the role of the
United States in influencing the present and future of El Salvador is
crucial. The extreme left wants Washington to cede it a share (ultimately a
controlling share) in the government. The center-left believes that "dia-
logue" between the guerrillas and the government is more important than
elections; groups elsewhere in the political spectrum fear such a dialogue.
The extreme right also is hostile toward US "interference" designed to
correct human rights abuses. Elements in the center look to the United
States to provide material support, political protection, and a sense of
confidence that otherwise has been difficult for them to sustain.
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An Uneasy Consensus
1
The Broad Political Spectrum
6
Christian Democrats.(PDC)
6
Democratic Action Party (AD)
7
The FMLN/FDR
8
The Military High Command
12
The Extreme Right
Outlook and Implications for the United States
Politically Significant Organizations
Comprehensive Glossary of Salvadoran Organizations
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Figure 1
Boundary representation is
not necessarily euthoritetire~ ',
SAN SALVABOA
El Sal
Ei
La+Unitin
North MANAB
Pacific Ocean
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El Salvador:
Significant Political Actors
and Their Interaction
El Salvador is making a difficult transition toward
democracy. It has a new Constitution, formally ap-
proved in December 1983, and is choosing a new
president. A national assembly has evolved from the
body drafting the Constitution, and legislative elec-
tions are scheduled for 1985. These political mile-
stones have been erected despite four years of wide-
spread violence, economic deterioration, and social
upheaval. Whether El Salvador continues with the
transition will depend largely on the political system's
ability to nurture and sustain influential groups and
leaders-inside and outside government-who favor
democratic solutions. In the Salvadoran context, these
political actors tend to be found in or near the center
of the political spectrum. The results of the March
1984 presidential election, in which the Christian
Democratic Party (PDC) exceeded the plurality
achieved two years before in the Constitutional As-
sembly elections, suggest that the center is gaining
strength, at least for now.'
Regardless of the outcome of the presidential runoff
election scheduled for 6 May and the likely near-term
course of the military conflict, many individuals and
groups in El Salvador will continue to play political
roles of US policy interest. This paper seeks to
identify these actors in broad terms and to provide
some historical background on them. Those groups
nearest the center-for example the church-are the
most difficult to categorize because they show the
greatest potential for interaction; this study examines
ways in which they relate across the political gamut
from extreme. left to extreme right and draws general
implications for the United States. In appendixes A
through C we have offered capsule summaries on the
groups, as well as listing all known
organizations presently or recently active.
' Appendix A provides an alphabetical summary of the most
important Salvadoran organizations. There is a foldout table, A
Guide to Key Political Groups, at the end of the paper which
contains a list of the political organizations, with their abbreviation
An Uneasy Consensus
The Salvadoran political system traditionally has
been authoritarian and dominated by the military
establishment. In 1961 Col. Julio Alberto Rivera
ousted a junta of civilians and officers, replaced it
with another civil-military junta under his (and the
military's) control, and soon had himself named presi-
dent. With support of the military high command he
created the National Conciliation Party (PCN) as the
political vehicle for the candidacies of a succession of
senior military officers running for president.' Thus,
Colonel Rivera was succeeded by Gen. Fidel Sanchez
Hernandez in 1967, Col. Arturo Armando Molina in
1972, and Gen. Carlos Humberto Romero in 1977.
The coup of October 1979 that brought the Revolu-
tionary Governing Junta to power interrupted this
process.
For most Salvadorans, this system of rightist military
rule had grown increasingly oppressive, but rapid
economic expansion initially masked its harsher as-
pects. Bolstered by substantial US aid under the
Alliance for Progress and the formation of the Central
American Common Market in the early 1960s, the
crucial agricultural sector became the springboard for
rapid industrialization during much of the 1960s and
1970s. Consequently, most subsistence farmers and
squatters who previously had been evicted by land-
owners to make way for new plantations found jobs in
urban areas in neighboring Honduras-until the 1969
"Soccer War" limited that option-or as seasonal
farm migrants. Rural areas benefited from new roads,
schools, and public health facilities. As long as many
z The 1962 Constitution required officers to leave active service six
months prior to the election date, but they were allowed to wear
uniforms and be promoted in rank; and, of course, each president
had constitutional control over the military establishment.
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Salvadorans continued to prosper materially, the
PCN and the military establishment could plausibly
claim to be working in the public interest
Moreover, the determination of the military establish-
ment to maintain one-party control was not obvious
during the 1960s. The 1962 Constitution expressly
permitted the existence of "contesting political par-
ties." This provided breathing room for the Christian
Democrats and parties to the left of it. Thus, in 1964,
a group of socialists from the National University of
El Salvador formed the National Revolutionary
Movement (MNR). Even the illegal Salvadoran Com-
munist Party (PCES) functioned through a surrogate
party, the Nationalist Democratic Union (UDN),
formed in 1968. On the other hand, political freedoms
were limited in rural areas, where efforts were made
to mobilize campesino loyalties in support of the
regime rather than to represent legitimate campesino
interests. Campesinos were subject to considerable
abuse by the various security officials operating on the.
whims of landowners.
The Rise of Extremism
In retrospect, the 1969 "Soccer War" with Honduras
probably was an important contributor to the polar-
ization of Salvadoran politics, especially in rural
areas. The Salvadoran workers expelled from Hondu-
ras as a result of the conflict swelled the ranks of the
indigent. Although El Salvador sustained fairly rapid
economic growth for much of the 1970s, the majority
of the country's increasingly overcrowded population
gained scant benefits.
A serious split developed within the Communist Party
over whether to exploit the growing potential for
political unrest. The late Salvador Cayetano Carpio,
who had been secretary general of the PCES since
1964, urged the party to begin armed resistance in the
countryside in expectation that the campesinos would
join in. Failing to convince other key members of the
PCES to join him, Carpio in 1970 formed the Fara-
bundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), the
first guerrilla group to take the field. A main source
of recruits for the FPL in the 1970s proved to be a
group of campesinos first organized by the Christian
Democrats in the 1960s as the Federation of Salva-
doran Christian Peasants. As early as 1970 other
groups began to call for the expropriation of large
estates as a necessary solution to the country's socio-
economic problems. The more radical began to organ-
ize antiregime demonstrations at the University of El
Salvador.
Polarization increased dramatically following the
fraudulent presidential election of 1972. The PCN
and the military had already tampered with the 1970
National Assembly elections in order to decrease the
PDC's strength. Nevertheless, in 1972 the PDC
joined with the MNR and the Communist front, the
UDN, to form the National Opposition Union and
contest the PCN's candidate, Colonel Molina. The
ticket of Jose Napoleon Duarte of the PDC and
Guillermo Manuel Ungo of the MNR was clearly
ahead of the PCN ticket. Still, the electoral commis-
sion, under pressure from the military high command,
falsely announced that Molina was ahead and re-
ferred the election to the PCN-dominated Assembly,
which declared Molina the winner. Because of such
blatant fraud, the election, in our view, proved to be
the watershed for the political instability that has
gripped the country since the mid-1970s.
The 1972 election also sparked the formation of
guerrilla groups targeted directly on urban recruit-
ment. The People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), now
headed by Joaquin Villalobos, was formed in 1972
mainly by students and teachers. The Armed Forces
of National Resistance (FARN), now led by Ferman
Cienfuegos, along with its front group, the United
Popular Action Front (FAPU), emerged in 1974-75 as
a result of a violent dispute within the ERP. The ERP
contrived its own front group, the Popular Leagues of
28 February (LP-28) in 1977. The FPL shared with
the more urban=oriented FARN and ERP a charac-
teristic that both distinguished them from orthodox
Marxist-Leninist parties and made them similar to
the Sandinista groups in Nicaragua: a strong compo-
nent of church activists who justified their collabora-
tion with Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries on the ba-
sis of the so-called liberation theology.
Another revolutionary group formed in the mid-1970s
was the Central American Revolutionary Workers'
Party (PRTC). Founded in Costa Rica by Fabio
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Castillo, exrector of the University of El Salvador, it
has sought to appeal to those who believe that a leftist
revolution in one Central American country ultimate-
ly requires similar revolutions throughout the region
in order to be successful
Intensified repression from the right followed the
political agitation and the onset of mass protests by
these extreme leftists
we
generally agree with academic and journalistic ac-
counts that much of this repression was carried out by
the security services, particularly the National Guard.
During the mid-1960s, the Guard director, Gen. Jose
Medrano, had organized thousands of campesinos into
the Nationalist Democratic Organization (ORDEN).
In tandem with the Territorial Service-the armed
forces inactive reserve-ORDEN was committed at
first to projects such as road repair and the construc-
tion of health clinics. Gradually both were assigned
roles in political indoctrination, intelligence gathering
on suspected "subversives," and then direct support of
security force operations in the countryside. They
were compensated through monetary gifts from the
landowners, preferred status as jobseekers, a measure
of social prestige, and the same legal immunity as the
military establishment as a whole. In the late 1970s,
reporting of ORDEN brutalities began to reach the
US defense attache office; during the same period the
OAS Inter-American Human Rights Commission in-
vestigated ORDEN and strongly recommended that it
be abolished.
Violence associated with the political polarization
became extensive. The period since the late 1970s saw
the proliferation of death squads sponsored by the
security forces and by the private armies serving
wealthy families. In addition to maintaining their own
armed groups, wealthy Salvadorans mobilized to re-
sist economic reforms. Their principal instrument was
the National Association of Private Enterprise
(ANEP), which represented nearly all large legitimate
businesses and, therefore, most of the elite families in
El Salvador. In 1976, when even most PCN leaders
and the armed forces high command began to push
modest agrarian reform, ANEP and most large land-
holders balked; the PCN and high command backed
That combination of rightist intransigence, the hold-
ing of yet another fraudulent presidential election in
1977, and the increasing violence between leftist
guerrillas and rightist elements contributed to a grow-
ing perception among many military officers-some
reformists, other opportunists-that they would have
to act decisively to prevent a full-scale civil war. The
July 1979 victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua
convinced many Salvadorans that the outcome of such
a civil war might be a decisive victory for the left.
This concern deepened as the Marxist-Leninist nature
of the Sandinista leadership became evident. Conse-
quently, in October 1979 a group of junior and middle
grade officers overthrew the government of President
Romero.
Provisional Rule
The officers' coup led to the establishment of the
generally moderate Revolutionary Governing Junta,
which was the primary source of political authority
from October 1979 until the March 1982 Constituent
Assembly elections. During the junta's rule, however,
the country slipped into a full-scale internal conflict.
The leftist guerrilla groups and their associated front
organizations-with Soviet and Cuban prodding and
aid joined in a combat alliance, the Farabundo
Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and its
overt political arm, the Revolutionary Democratic
Front (FDR). The armed forces expanded in size with
US aid following the guerrillas' "final offensive" of
January 1981
the rightist death squads exterminated hun-
dreds-perhaps thousands-of suspected leftists or
sympathizers. Internal violence and capital flight
compounded the impact of deteriorating global condi-
tions to deal the economy devastating blows. Al-
though the guerrillas were held off, the reconstitution
of the junta three times indicated the prevailing
instability.
The replacement of the junta in March 1982 by the
Constituent Assembly and the executive elected by it
signaled a slight shift to the right. but also some
tentative emergence of centrist forces. A coalition
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The Revolutionary Governing Junta: Four Phases
The first junta, established in October 1979 as a
result of the officers' coup, consisted of Guillermo
Ungo of the MNR and Roman Mayorga, former
rector of the University of Central America, both
seeking to incorporate leftist elements in the new
government; Mario Andino, a businesman whose
acceptance of the need for economic reforms lost him
the backing of ANEP; and Colonels Jaime Abdul
Gutierrez and Adolfo Majano, the latter aggressively
committed to broad reforms and the ending of human
rights abuses.
In January 1980, two prominent Christian Demo-
crats-Hector Dada Hirezi and Jose Morales Ehr-
lich-and Jose Ramon Avalos, an independent, re-
placed Ungo, Mayorga, and Andino. The resignation
of moderate socialists from the regime at least
temporarily ended the Junta's chances for accommo-
dation with the extreme left (Ungo became president
of the FDR in late 1980). ANEP refused to recognize
that Avalos represented business interests and com-
plained about the "excessive" representation of the
PD
In March 1980 Dada Hirezi resigned after Attorney
General Mario Zamora, a PDC member, was assassi-
nated by a rightwing death squad. Jose Napoleon
Duarte replaced him, but Dada Hirezi, Zamora's
brother Ruben, and a few other PDC members defect-
ed from the party to form the Popular Social Chris-
tian Movement MPSC), which eventually joined the
FDRJ
In December 1980, Duarte and Gutierrez, by agree-
ment of the armed forces high command, became
President and Vice President, respectively; Majano
was ousted in order to appease rightwing critics
within the military and the private sector. The fourth
junta lasted until the March 1982 Constituent As-
sembly elections
headed by the extreme rightist Nationalist Republi-
can Alliance (ARENA) excluded the PDC from con-
trol of the Assembly. At the same time, the voluntary
retirement of General Gutierrez, a pragmatic right-
centrist willing to collaborate with the PDC but worn
out by the effort, weakened the PDC's influence in the
military establishment. Both Defense Minister Jose
Guillermo Garcia and his successor chosen in April
1983, Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova, stand political-
ly to the right of Gutierrez.
Nevertheless, the tenure of the Constituent Assembly
offered greater stability at the top than provided by
the junta. Moreover, the various parties managed to
collaborate on such important issues as the drafting of
a new Constitution and the preparation of presidential
elections. The reemergence of the PCN as a center-
right group added weight in the middle of the political
spectrum. On other fronts, President Magana used his
authority to initiate discussions with the militant left
and to attempt to correct human rights abuses in the
El Salvador's new Constitution, the 15th since the
country declared its independence in 1821, went into
effect in December 1983. At the same time, the
Constituent Assembly turned itself into a Legislative
Assembly until 1985, and presidential elections were
set for March 1984. The FMLN and the FDR,
however, have rejected the validity of the Constitution
and the March 1984 elections. Many on the right-
whose principal leader is Roberto D'Aubuisson of the
ARENA party-also seek to undo what progress has
been achieved in political liberalization since the 1979
coup.
The March 1984 elections produced a small relative
gain for the Christian Democrats over the March
1982 election, whereas most other parties held their
own or lost ground. Central Elections Council returns
indicate that the PDC won 43.4 percent of the valid
vote, compared with 40.3 percent two years before.
ARENA's total in both elections was just under 30
percent. The PCN won 19.3 percent, versus 19.0
percent in March 1982. On the other hand, Demo-
cratic Action (AD) obtained only 3.5 percent, com-
pared with 7.5 percent in 1982. Four small rightist
parties each obtained less than 2 percent.
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Figure 2
The Political Spectrum ?
Extreme left Center left
Center
Center right
Extreme right
Parties
FDR
PDC
PCN
ARENA
MNR
AD
PAISA
PPS
MPSC
MERECEN
MIPTES
POP
Paramilitaries
FMLN
ESA
PCES/FAL
MHM
FPL
CAS
RN/FARN
PRS/ERP
PRTC/FARLP
MORb
Front Group
CRM
UDN
BPR
FAPU
LP-28
MLP
Unions
MUSYGES
UPD
CNT
FECCAS
ACOPAI
FESTIAVTCES
CGS
FUSS
CGT
FSR?
CTS
FESTRAS
Private
CONAES
FUSADES
ANEP
ASI
CCIES
Official Bodies
CCE
EMC
GN
CDHES
DNI
PH
(governmental)
COPREFA
PN
FINATA
ISTA
Social Groups
CDHES (nongovernmental)
Socorro Juridico
Comite de Madres
UCA
UES
CEDES
Tutela Legal
a For discussion of these and other significant political organizations see appendix A.
b Not part of FMLN.
? Subordinate to MOR.
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PDC: The Strongest Political Group in El Salvador?
Jose Napoleon Duarte and his running mate, Rodolfo
Antonio Castillo, face the presidential runoff with
numerous advantages. The party has survived consid-
erable turbulence since its formation in 1960. It has
endured the deprivation of electoral victory by fraud
(in 1972 and 1977), the defection leftward to-the
MPSC of distinguished `democratic and progressive"
leaders in 1979 and 1980, and the assassination of 37
mayors and many party activists (Duarte claims
several hundred) since 1979 by rightist and leftist
death squads. It won more support-40 percent of the
valid votes-in the March 1982 Assembly elections
than any other party and exceeded that percentage in
the March 1984 presidential election. It also has
developed a strong organizational structure
Moreover, the PDC's prestige among other democrat-
ic parties in the region, notably in Venezuela and
Costa Rica, and among West European counterparts,
remains high. The US Embassy commented last
October that Duarte (and by extension his party)
"symbolizes change in El Salvador toward liberal
democracy, as conceived in the United States and
Western Europe, more clearly" than anyone else of
political prominence in that country.
The Embassy also noted that Duarte symbolizes that
kind of change more "controversially" than anyone
else. His enemies on the right will not forgive him for
The Broad Political Spectrum
The Center
Christian Democrats (PDC). Many leaders of the
Salvadoran political center are found in the PDC. The
US Embassy has summarized the PDC's economic
goals as "slightly socialistic," to be pursued, however,
gradually. Politically, the PDC favors a civilian-
dominated, pluralistic democracy with strong guaran-
tees for individual rights.
The PDC commitment to pluralism occasionally has
been stronger than the party's desire for power-a
rare quality among political parties. With Duarte as
President of the ruling junta, it prepared the way for
allying himself in the 1970s with the MNR (now
affiliated with the FDR) and the UDN (the front for
Shafik Handal's PCES). Many on the right and right
center, therefore, agree with D'Aubuissons caricature
of the PDC as the so-called watermelon party-green
(for the PDC's official color) outside, but red inside.
A book Duarte wrote in 1976 as a political exile in
Venezuela, Communitarianism for a More Humane
World, has fed rightist fears with its emphasis on the
sociopolitical activism urged by various recent papal
encyclicals. Its title also allows rightists in El Salva-
dor to equate Duarte's philosophy with communism.
Duarte may not have been the PDC's strongest
candidate. He is controversial compared with Foreign
Minister Fidel Chavez Mena, who is viewed in El
Salvador as more acceptable to the private sector
and, at the same time, perhaps more able than anyone
else in the PDC to entice leftist leaders in the FDR to
negotiate an end to the internal conflict. Chavez
Mena declined to serve on the ticket with Duarte,
probably because he did not want to be overshadowed
by the PDC's leader, and he seems to have provided
less-than-enthusiastic support during the campaign.
the March 1982 Constituent Assembly elections,
probably the most honest in El Salvador's history. The
PDC lost control of the government to the ARENA-
led coalition but accepted this setback gracefully. Its
24 Assembly delegates then set about contributing
positively to the drafting of the new Constitution.
Moreover, in order to gain some semblance of cooper-
ation from the two other major parties, ARENA and
PCN, the PDC voluntarily relinquished more than
two-thirds of its mayoralties and thereby a certain
amount of its grassroots strength.
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The PDC's prospects are tied closely to those of
Duarte, but the Embassy has identified a "strong
second tier" of youthful PDC leaders, many already
participating in government. Among them are Educa-
tion Minister Carlos Duarte (no relation to Jose
Napoleon); Subsecretary of Youth, Sports, and Cul-
ture Roberto Viera; Information Secretary Gerardo
Le Chevallier; Dr. Humberto Posada, the party's legal
adviser; and Assembly Deputy Maurico Mazier, who
has proved sufficiently articulate and worrisome to
the extreme right over'the past year to have attracted
a public death threat from that quarter.
Potentially, these new faces represent a plus and a
minus for the PDC's midterm prospects. With pre-
sumably fresh ideas for government and flexible
attitudes toward their implementation, the party may
find more allies or at least fewer enemies among the
other parties. Yet, the tensions between these young,
ambitious intellectuals and white-collar professionals
on the one hand, and the current generation of urban
and rural working-class leaders on the other, may lead
to a loss of mass support for the PDC, unless some of
the labor leaders also can advance within the party.
Democratic Action Party (AD). A small, moderate
party, the AD is led by Rene Fortin Magana and has
a constituency largely among middle-class profession-
als and intellectuals. Since the 1982 elections, in
which the AD gained nearly 8 percent of the valid
vote, the party has projected a more populist image
and received an informal endorsement from a small
labor union, FESTRAS. Fortin's running mate, Nel-
son Segovia, was at one time a member of the MNR,
which is now part of the leftist guerrilla front. Al-
though these new credentials might have made the
AD more attractive than the PDC to some leftist
voters during the 1984 presidential race, they also
alienated many of the AD's former supporters among
the middle and upper classes.
Labor. Salvadoran labor, theoretically a strong source
of support for the political center, traditionally has
been weak and politically divided. At least 30 percent
of the labor force of perhaps 2 million is unemployed,
and the vast majority.of those employed belong to no
labor group. Prior to the passage of the new Constitu-
tion, only 71,000 employees, none in agriculture or
government, belonged to the 125 officially "regis-
tered" unions. A larger number of workers and
campesinos-the US Embassy in October 1983 esti-
mated as many as 200,000-belonged to or were
influenced by various semilegal.labor "associations."
Personal and political rivalries, as well as persistent
intimidation by ruling conservative governments,
slowed the development of organized labor and.inhib-
ited it from political activities. Nevertheless, after the
1979 coup, the junta proclaimed "the right to union-
ize in all labor sectors." This encouraged pro-PDC
labor activists to build a centrist coalition of unions,
including campesinos, who comprise more than half
the labor force. As a result, the Popular Democratic
Union (UPD) was formed in September 1980, em-
bracing industrial and campesino associations and, for
a time, even a public employees' association. Samuel
Maldonado, a key leader of the Salvadoran Commu-
nal Union, a campesino federation, became its most
prominent spokesman. Jorge Camacho of the coopera-
tives' association, ACOPAI, also emerged as a strong
leader and sometime rival of Maldonado. The US
Embassy suggests that the formation of the UPD, by
undercutting leftist labor support for the guerrillas,
contributed significantly to the failure of their "final
offensive" in January 1981.
Following the March 1982 Constituent Assembly
elections, the PDC-controlled Labor Ministry formed
a labor reform commission that sought to achieve the
right of campesinos and public employees to form
registered unions. The new Constitution grants this
right to campesinos and some public employees. This,
in turn, bolsters the confidence of UPD leaders that
they can function more openly and even campaign
actively for political candidates. The PDC benefited
greatly from their help in the March 1984 election
and in return has promised the UPD several key posts
in a PDC government. For the longer term, the UPD's
greater visibility in the campaign may assist it in
drawing additional workers and campesinos into its
ranks, thereby increasing the organized strength of
the center.
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The extreme left of the labor movement, nevertheless,
recently made significant gains at the expense of the
center.. In late 1982, a loose association of three
Marxist-led labor federations subordinate to the
FMLN created MUSYGES, described by the Em-
bassy as "a leftist attempt to involve non-Marxist
labor unions more openly in politically related activi-
ties." The MUSYGES organizers persuaded six non-
Marxist groups with a combined membership of
perhaps 12,000 to join. They also nearly enticed the
leadership of the several thousand strong Central
Organization of Salvadoran Workers (CTS) into join-
ing MUSYGES in a 1983 May Day demonstration.
Although the CTS as a whole remains centrist, its
present Secretary General, Miguel Angel Vasquez,
appears to stand to the political left of the PDC and
receptive to offers of cooperation, from MUSYGES.
The Center Left
The Church.' The mainstream church in El Salvador
is in many respects inclined toward the political center
by its traditional conservatism and by its aversion to
the violence spawned by both left and right extremism
in the country. Church reaction against officially
sponsored brutalities occasionally made the hierarchy
sympathetic to the insurgent cause, however, particu-
larly when Archbishop Oscar Romero was the church
spokesman. His successor, Arturo Rivera y Damas,
has been generally evenhanded in criticizing sources
of violence, and nearly every church statement touch-
ing on politics calls for a dialogue among contending
parties.
At the same time, a vocal minority of activists in the
church-those associated with "liberation theol-
ogy"-openly sympathize with and in some cases
actively support the guerrillas. A few priests have
joined guerrilla factions as chaplains or propagandists
or in some cases as combatants. Many church activ-
ists in human rights organizations are well to the left
of center in their political orientation
Jesuit intellectuals have provided philosophic under-
pinning for radical elements in the church. Working
'There is no question that the church as a whole in El Salvador has
distanced itself from the extreme left since the death of Archbishop
Romero in March 1980. Some analysts within CIA would now
classify the church as basically centrist, rather than center leftist as
at the University of Central America, which they
founded in 1966, they have attempted to devise long-
term goals for El Salvador. Their views, as expressed
by the articulate and persuasive university rector,
Ignacio Ellacuria, tend toward the radical formulas of
the FMLN. Despite these extremist tendencies among
the clergy, however, we believe the church as an
institution has considerable potential to play a con-
structive role in El Salvador's crisis and would gener-
ally support an elected government committed to
gradual reform.
The Extreme Left
The FMLN/FDR FMLN/FDR leaders are ostensi-
bly optimistic about their prospects. The FMLN
claims that it has strengthened its overall military
position relative to the government particularly in the
eastern part of the country. It further alleges not only
that the Salvadoran armed forces are increasingly in
disarray, but that some Salvadoran commanders are
willing to enter peace negotiations with its representa-
tives. Publicly, FMLN propagandists speculate that
the time is fast approaching when Washington will
have to decide whether to commit US combat forces
to El Salvador or see the regime fall
Some of this exuberance may be feigned. The March
1982 Constituent Assembly election, with its large
voter turnout, represented a considerable propaganda
setback for the FMLN. The cumulative effects of
successful presidential elections, a legislative body
meeting regularly, and the rest of the government
beginning to function reasonably well under a new
Constitution could considerably damage the FMLN's
morale. Though the top leadership of the five member
groups is generally unified on basic aims and ideology,
serious disagreements still occur at that level, espe-
cially over tactics and matters of authority
In January 1984, the FMLN saw come and go the
third anniversary of what was supposed to have been
the "final offensive," but the FMLN leadership still
appears confident of victory. If it were not, we believe
it would offer a program more conciliatory to its
opposition. Instead, the February 1984 FMLN-FDR
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Figure 3
El Salvador: Organization of the Insurgent Alliance
Mixed .
0 Marxist-Leninist (Military)
Marxist-Leninist (Political)
Socialist, non-Marxist-Leninist
d
H
Farabundo Marti
National Liberation
Front (FMLN)
H
Popular Liberation
Forces (FPL)a
Unified Revolutionary
Directorate (DRU)
Popular RI l oluti nar
Bloc (B R)I
People's Revolutionary
Army(ERP)
Armed Forces of
National Resistance
(FARN)
Central American
Workers Revolutionary
Party (PRTC)
Communist Party-Armed
Forces of Liberation
(PCS-FAL)
a In December 1983 the Cayetano Carpio Revolutionary Workers Movement
(MOR) broke away from the FPL and FMLN, carrying part of the BPR with it.
Revoll i li i i Iry
Froni ( I DtR)I
Popular Leaguesll l
28 February (LPII I
III 11111111111
United #opular+ Action
Fro. iAli i l I I I l I
h
N
Revolutionar
Y
Coordinator
of the Masses (CRM)
IIIIIIIIIII
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In December 1983 the heads of the five guerrilla
groups constituting the FMLN publicly announced
that the fusion of these groups into a single party
would occur soon. Propagandists for the FMLN
immediately hailed this development as akin to the
unification of the three "tendencies" within the Nica-
raguan Sandinista National Liberation Front prior to
the overthrow of Somoza in 1979. Some interpreted
the Salvadoran guerrilla victories of 30 December
1983 and 1 January 1984 (overrunning the Salvador-
an Army base at El Paraiso and destroying the
Cuscatlan bridge) to mean that the FMLN's "victori-
ous horizon" was within reach.
Regardless of the military prospects, the forces tend-
ing to coalesce these roues are strong.
the Cubans have been pressing
for it since the Sandinista victory. The DRU, which
theoretically oversees the entire military political
alliance of which the FMLN comprises the military
component, was founded in Havana in 1980.
The second key factor has been the removal of a
major obstacle to unification, Salvador Cayetano
Carpio, the late commander in chief of the FPL
group, who insisted on the FPL's and his own prima-
cy. By early 1983, many of his FPL colleagues, led by
the FPL second in command, Melida Anaya Montes,
had taken a position for unity and against Carpio.
According to recent FPL accounts, he thereupon
ordered the assassination of Monies in April 1983.
When the assassins were arrested a few days later,
Carpio allegedly committed suicide.
The FPL then moved closer to the rest of the FMLN.
In September 1983, Leonel Gonzalez and Dimas
Rodriguez, both firmly pro-Cuban in our judgment,
took the places of Carpio and Montes. In December,
the FPL formally condemned Carpio.
Yet, the spirit of Carpio has not been exorcised. In
December, reacting to the FPL's condemnation of
Carpio, a group calling itself the Cayetano Carpio
Revolutionary Workers Movement (MOR) siphoned
off a substantial portion of the FPL's strength, in-
cluding the leadership of the leftist labor union, FSR.
Even if this new fissure is closed, the potential for
further internal wrangling is considerable. The
squabbling ostensibly will address strategic issues
concerning the conduct of the revolution, status and
objectives of negotiation, and the like. But we believe
the covert agenda-who is going to be in charge-will
always be significant and occasionally the dominant
issue over the near future.
Declaration published .in Mexico City is virtually a
copy of that announced in 1981 and treats all political
and economic changes made by the government since
that time as useless:
? As in 1981 the FMLN/FDR seeks to establish a
"broadbased" provisional government. To achieve
this in 1984, however, the FMLN/FDR proposes to:
abolish the 1983 Constitution; replace existing exec-
utive and legislative authorities with a "government
junta, ministerial cabinet, (and) advisory state coun-
cil"; and postpone the scheduled elections indefinite
? As in 1981 the FMLN/FDR would eliminate cer-
tain elements from this "broadbased" regime. These
are now identified as the ARENA; the "security
corps"; members of the armed forces, as well as
civilians "responsible for genocide" and various
"political crimes"; parts of the judiciary; the entire
"oligarchy"; and "sectors and persons opposed to
achieving the objectives of the provisional govern-
ment."
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Figure 4
FMLN/FDRe Representatives Abroad
aFMLN-Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front
FDR-Revolutionary Democratic Front
702028 (A04516) 4-84
North America
Chief Representative
Hector Oqueli Colindres
United States
Washington, D.C.
Alberto Arene
Francisco Altschul
New York City
(Fr.) Rafael Moreno
Canada
Dina Mendoza
Western Europe
Chief Representative
(Fr.) Luis de Sebastian
Austria
Francisco Herrera
Belgium
Roberto Castro
Roberto Guillen
Italy-unknown
Iberian Peninsula (Spain &
Portugal)
Antonio Martinez Uribe
Enrique Rubio
France
Roberto Lopez
Cesar Marti
Ruth Argandona
Netherlands-unknown
Scandinavia (Norway,
Sweden, Denmark, Finland)
Gabriel Lara
Switzerland
Francisco Galindo Velez
United Kingdom
Ana Maria Echeverria
Federal Republic of Germany
Luis Leandro Uzquiano
Mexico, Central America,
and Caribbean
Chief Representative
Guillermo Manuel Ungo
Eduardo Calles
Ruben Zamora
Mexico
Aronetta Diaz de Zamora
Jose Salvador Arias Pellate
Enrique Guatemala Garcia
(Iu~ Bapuhlic
Jamaica
...united,
Kingdon
Gen ma
yRetl
F.H.G.-Federal Republic of rermeny
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Mexico-continued
Jose Antonio Hernandez
Benito Tovar
Cuba
Norma Guevara
Margarita Gonzalez
Andres Martinez
Silvia. Martinez
Jorge Rodriguez
Pedro Fuentes
Costa Rica
Rolando Elias Julian Belloso
Jorge Alberto Villacorta
Carlos Alberto Molina
Panama
Jose Francisco Marroquin
Alfredo del Trdnsito Monge
Jaime Suarez
Dominican Republic
and Jamaica
Guido Vejar
Eastern Caribbean
Juan Ramon Cardona
South America
Chief Representative
Fidelina Martinez
Venezuela
Calixto Zelaya
Gerardo Godoy
Brazil
Rene Moreno
Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia,
Argentina, Chile, and
Uruguay
Francisco Diaz Rodriguez
Colombia
Carlos Calles
Africa
Chief Representative
Marisol Galindo Toledo
Libya
Nelson Arrietta
Algeria-unknown
Mozambique-unknown
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In 1981 the FMLN/FDR pledged that a new
government would promote small- and medium-
sized enterprises but would also seek "profound
social reforms." In 1984 the FMLN/FDR promises
a debt moratorium and unspecified financial assis-
tance to help businesses and pledges a "massive
literacy campaign." Its program, however, also gives
more attention than previous FMLN/FDR state-
ments to the need for economic restructuring. For
example, the FMLN/FDR implicitly threatens to
scrap the existing structures for agrarian reform
and for nationalized sugar and coffee trade and
banking and indicates that it would establish entire-
ly new ones.
In 1984, as in 1981, the FMLN/FDR proposes that
the new government be "nonaligned" in foreign
policy but pledges to "struggle against colonialism,
neocolonialism, Zionism, racial discrimination, and
apartheid."
We agree with the Embassy that in the February
1984 declaration the FMLN/FDR has provided no-
new basis for serious discussion with either its politi-
cal opponents or neutrals. The FMLN's intransigence
constitutes a rejection of the January 1984 public
appeal by the Salvadoran Government Peace Com-
mission to the FMLN/FDR to abandon the armed
struggle and join the electoral process
This intransigence raises the question of whether the
relative moderates within the FMLN/FDR coalition
have any current role in decisionmaking. The Embas-
sy believes that continuing tensions between soft and
hard liners can provoke serious disputes within the
coalition, but that on important policy decisions the
disputants are likely to settle for the hardline position.
This tendency may have been reflected not only in the
formulation of the FMLN/FDR program, but also in
the attempt to disrupt the March 1984 presidential
elections despite an earlier pledge to the contrary by
FDR spokesmen. As propagandists and front men for
the guerrillas, the political moderates nevertheless are
useful in advancing the notion that the leftist revolu-
tion is not just limited to hardcore Marxists.
March 1984 presidential elections, although the new
Constitution permits it. He also succeeded, for the
most part, in curbing the tendencies of officers with
extreme rightwing. sympathies to interfere in the
March 1984 campaign. The results suggest that the
few incidents of this kind were counterproductive for
the rightists themselves.
The military establishment as a whole, however,
continues to enjoy a specially privileged status within
Salvadoran society. It is still largely true that active
(and retired) military personnel, regardless of rank,
expect to enjoy virtual immunity from civil or crimi-
nal prosecution. The case of Capt. Eduardo Avila,
implicated in the -1981 assassination of two US labor
officials and a Salvadoran' labor leader, is illustrative.
the decisions to arrest
and detain Avila caused heated debates involving the
Defense Minister and a large group of senior com-
manders. (He has since been released.) In other cases
involving officers implicated in rights violations, Vides
has been willing to transfer the officer involved but
not to subject him to criminal prosecution. Clearly
Vides is concerned about the impact of legal penalties
on the morale of the officer corps.
The military's political orientation remains, as the
Embassy has described, "quintessentially conserva-
tive"; yet, the.armed forces leadership as a whole also
has distanced itself from the extreme right. In addi-
tion to supporting Magana for President in 1982, it
has since intervened to save Phase III of the land
reform by restoring illegally evicted campesinos; in-
deed, Col. Galileo Torres, the head of the Phase III
administrative agency, FINATA, has endured rightist
death threats and the opprobrium of extreme rightist
officers for vigorously defending campesino rights.
Moreover, there are indications that new Chief of
Staff Col. Adolfo Blandon, an erstwhile ARENA
supporter, now opposes ARENA's leader, D'Aubuis-
son. The rest of the General Staff appears to share his
present center-rightist orientation. In addition, after a
few false starts and much encouragement by Wash-
ington, Vides has appointed a credible unit to investi-
gate human rights abuses in the military. One note-
worthy source of moral support for the unit's efforts is
The Center Right
The Military High Command. Defense Minister
Vides Casanova has tried hard to ensure the nonparti-
sanship of the military establishment. He even for-
bade active duty military personnel from voting in the
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the Armed Forces' official spokesman, Lt. Col. Ricar-
do Cienfuegos, whose vigorous public attack on right-
ist death squad activities in late 1983 earned him
death threatsi
PCN and PAISA. Were an opinion survey conducted
among the officer corps, we strongly suspect it would
show an overwhelming majority favoring either the
traditional "officialist" PCN, whose presidential can-
didate is Francisco "Chachi" Guerrero, or its splinter
group that appeared after the 1982 Assembly elec-
tions, the Salvadoran Authentic Institutional Party
(PAISA), led by retired Col. Roberto Escobar Garcia.
Since the split, both PAISA and the PCN have shown
considerable political flexibility. As the new Constitu-
tion entered into force, PAISA broke with the
ARENA-led rightist coalition to cut a deal with the
PDC, allowing the two to gain control of the National
(that is, the post-Constituent) Assembly.' During the
presidential campaign, however, the PCN distanced
itself from ARENA-largely because of the unsavory
reputation of the ARENA presidential candidate,
Roberto D'Aubuisson
negotiated a tentative agreement to collabo-
rate with the PDC in a runoff presidential election.F
The PCN now appears to have better long-term
prospects than PAISA. PAISA's only real'strength
relative to the PCN is that the party does not bear a
name that conjures up an image of corruption and
vote fraud. The election results proved, however, that
the PCN has a stronger organizational structure at
the grassroots, which puts it in a better position to
bargain with other parties.
The Extreme Right
We have grouped at the right end of the political
spectrum the private-sector group ANEP, four politi-
cal parties, the death squads, and several extreme
rightist officers in the security forces. The extreme
right in this sense is not nearly as unified through
formal political structures as its opposite counterpart
' In the March 1982 Constituent Assembly elections, the PCN
obtained 14 seats and 19 percent of the valid vote; as a result of the
on the left. On the other hand, the role of personal
(especially family) connections is of far greater conse-
quence politically than in any other grouping along
that spectrum. And, unlike the other groups, the
extreme right has in D'Aubuisson a single dominant
personality clearly recognized by all members of the
extreme right
The Private Sector. Much has been written about the
level of power and control over national affairs exer-
cised by a tight network of families. Los catorce4the
14) is the journalistic euphemism referring to the key
families, but more than 50 families form the top of the
economic and social pyramid. These families maintain
collective influence through intermarriage-the
Regalado-Duenas connection, for example, has result-
ed in a family with controlling interest in 40 different
firms-as well as through a general policy of not
selling shares to "outsiders." They exert their political
power primarily through membership in ANEP, the
umbrella organization that coordinates activities of
more than two dozen private-sector associations repre-
senting various economic segments, including most of
the media. ANEP is led by Conrado Lopez Andreu
and as a group strongly supports ARENA's political
goals.
There are exceptions to this ARENA/ANEP pattern
of wealth mobilized behind rightist political extrem-
ism. Not all affluent businessmen are from the key
families. Many of these belong to CONAES, which is
much smaller and far less influential than ANEP.
CONAES politically supports the Christian Demo-
crats. Moreover, not all members of key families
support the politics of the extreme right. President
Magana, for example, has been an articulate critic of
the death squads, while his cousin heads the centrist
AD party. The president of the guerrillas' political
wing (FDR), Francisco Alvarez, murdered by a right-
ist death squad in November 1980, was heir to one of
the largest coffee fortunes in Central America and a
member of one of the country's oldest aristocratic
families.
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supporters rally to his three basic exhortations:
e Defeat the Communists and their sympathizers by
fair means or foul.
e Treat the Christian Democrats as if they were the
de facto allies of the Communists.
e Restore El Salvador to the days before the 1979
officers' coup.
There may be some ARENA stalwarts who shrink
from some of the operative conclusions implicit in
these messages-for example, death squad actions
targeted against even Christian Democrats-but they
remain in the party. D'Aubuisson's involvement in
rightwing terrorist activities has been alleged
since the
1970s. Moreover, over the past year, new information
has added credibility to past
In addition, the polarized politics of El Salvador have
created animosities within the leading families. The
Embassy has speculated that one reason for ANEP
leader Andreu's vigorous support of ARENA is his
desire to compensate for the fact that his brother-in-
law is Guillermo Ungo of the FDR. A few guerrilla
leaders bear distinguished pedigrees. An FMLN com-
bat brigade is named for a guerrilla from the wealthy,
politically rightist Zablah family.
ARENA. Aside from ARENA, extreme rightists have
relatively few political options. In addition to the
Salvadoran Popular Party (PPS), whose presidential
candidate is from the Quinonez family and the Popu-
lar Orientation Party (POP), founded by former Na-
tional Guard Commander Jose Medrano, there is an
equally small party, misleadingly named the Stable
Centrist Republican Movement (MERECEN).
MERECEN's presidential candidate, Juan Ramon
Rosales y Rosales, was the defense lawyer for a
wealthy businessman who, according to Embassy
records, probably was involved in the 1981 Sheraton
murders of two US labor leaders and a Salvadoran
unionist. In our judgment, MERECEN is simply a
device for enticing centrists to support the extreme
right.
ARENA reflects the personality of its presidential
candidate more closely than any other party. Its
sination of Archbishop Romero.
We note I that
he retains important contacts in the military estab-
lishment. We believe, nevertheless, that the recent
transfers of the intelligence chiefs of the National
Police and Treasury Police, and Hector Regalado's
removal from the post of security chief for the
Assembly, may have temporarily weakened D'Au-
buisson's ability to employ active duty military and
other government assets on behalf of ARENA.
Outlook and Implications for the United States
For the near term at least, most of the groups and
individuals we have discussed are likely to remain
about where they are now on the political spectrum.
Moreover, whether positively or negatively, they will
regard the US role in determining their country's
political future as crucial.
We believe that the extreme left and right are likely
to continue displaying qualities of cohesion and deter-
mination not as evident elsewhere along the political
spectrum. Faultlines within the leftist coalition presid-
ed over by the FMLN seem unlikely to induce the
leadership to moderate its conditions to end the
conflict. Meanwhile, FMLN propaganda is beginning
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to claim that a de facto government under its con-
trol-the term being used is Local People's Power-
already exists in portions of El Salvador. Some ex-
treme-right elements mirror the determination of the
left. They believe they have everything to lose if the
left wins. They increasingly resent US "interference"
with their efforts to wage an all-out struggle with the
left and those who would accommodate it.
The potential for political movement in the wake of
the presidential campaign-new fissures and alli-
ances-appears greatest on both the center right and
the center left. We believe the cohesion of the military
.establishment will be strained no matter what the
outcome of the presidential contest; many officers
privately have expressed deep concern about the
consequences of a PDC victory for the country's
ability to wage war against the guerrillas and for their
own careers, while others are strongly opposed to any
outcome-for example, a D'Aubuisson victory-that
would jeopardize US aid. Choosing between Duarte
and D'Aubuisson in the runoff election will strain
severely the cohesion of the PCN. The church, mean-
time, is subject to forces that could pull it either closer
to the center or further leftward.
We believe the groups in the center will continue to
place greatest reliance on US moral and material
support. Perhaps the most positive development in this
part of the spectrum for at least the near term is the
new assertiveness of centrist labor leaders such as
Samuel Maldonado of UPD. Their clout within El
Salvador can be strengthened through greater inter-
national visibility-for example, through additional
exposure to US and European politicians and the
media. In any society subject to prolonged political
crisis, especially one magnified by a drained economy,
centrist groups can become easily discouraged. Al-
most by definition they function only as well as "the
system" functions, whereas during a crisis the extrem-
ists, who know they want to change the system
radically and have decided how, are apt to be confi-
dent. Nevertheless, through more than four years of
assaults from both the left and the right the centrists
have expanded their ground.
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Appendix A
Politically Significant
Organizations
AGEUS
Association of Cooperatives of Integrated Ag-
ricultural Livestock Products
Jorge Ruiz Camacho (secretary general) a
Marcus Salazar
Mario Espinoza
Fermin Garcia
Rene Fortin Magana (secretary general) a
Dr. Luis Nelson Segovia
Ricardo Gonzalez Camacho
General Association of Salvadoran University
Students
Julio Portillo (secretary general) ,
Conrado Lopez Andreu (president) a
Miguel Angel Salaverria
Eduardo Furies Hartmann
Jose Ifantozzi
Juan Vicente Maldonado
Roberto Aquilar Papini
Adrian Esquino Lizco (secretary general)
Refugio Sanchez
Roberto D'Aubuisson (president) a
Armando Calderon Sol (secretary general)
Hugo Barrera a
Hector Regalado Cuellar
Jose Antonio Rodriguez Porth a
Mario Redaelli a
More than 17,000 members and about 25 cooperatives. Repre-
sents members of cooperatives and those involved in technical
assistance to cooperatives. A member of UPD. Centrist; gener-
ally supports PDC, but leader suspected of rightwing
sympathies.
Won two assembly seats in the March 1982 elections and about
7 percent of valid votes cast. Strongest in San Salvador.
Promises to provide adherents "with the professional legal
advice which they deserve." Basically centrist.
Student organization of UES. Came under control of BPR in
1979 when that organization's student group, UR-19, won
AGEUS's top positions in an uncontested election. Joined FDR
when it formed in April 1980. Relatively inactive since the
closure of UES in June 1980, but is prepared to resume
activities if UES is reopened.
Leftist teachers' union founded in 1965; member organization
of BPR; Melida Anaya Montes, former FPL deputy head
murdered in April 1983 in a factional dispute, was a founder
and past Secretary General of the organization. Democratic
elements split off in 1976.
Formed in 1967 as a fraternal association of businessmen,
rather than a business organization. Publicly committed to
strengthening free enterprise, determining priorities for national
investment and integration of foreign capital, and preserving
integrity of private sector. In fact, it serves the interests of the
50 or so key families in El Salvador. Composed of 32 member
groups run by these families controlling all key sectors of the
business community. A seven-member Joint Directory consti-
tutes the ruling body. Rightist.
Association of native Indian communal farms. About 1,800
members. Loosely affiliated with UCS. Several members of Las
Hojas farm killed by security forces in February 1983. Centrist.
Officially inaugurated in September 1981 with help of ultra-
rightist National Liberation Movement party of Guatemala.
Pledged to "save" El Salvador from Communism; equates PDC
with pro-Marxist forces. Supported by wealthy Salvadorans
who oppose land reform, by portions of military establishment
who oppose negotiations with guerrillas, and by exmembers of
rural vigilante force ORDEN. Gained 29-percent of valid vote
in March 1982 elections. Sponsors rightwing death squads,
including the ESA and probably the Maximiliano Hernandez
Martinez Brigade.
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Politically Significant
Organizations (continued)
Association of Industrial Sectors
Eduardo Menendez (president)
People's Revolutionary Bloc
Julio Flores (secretary general) a
Marco Antonio Portillo
Francisco Rebollo Estrada
No leader currently identified, but possibly
D'Aubuisson.
Armando Rodriguez Equizabal (president)
Roberto Meza Delgado
Eliseo Rovira Mixco
Jorge Hernandez
Jaime Trabanino Llovel
Enrique Hayem Moreno
Chamber of Commerce and Industry of El
Salvador
Conrado Lopez Andreu (president)s
Jose Antonio Rodriguez Porth a
Roberto Siman
Eugenio Leon (secretary general)
Human Rights Commission
Pedro Ramos
Saul Valentin Villalta a
Fernando Justo Mendez
Col. Carlos Reynaldo Lopez Nuila a
Monsignor Frederico ("Fredy") Delgado a
Mario Luis Velasco
Cristobal Aleman
Benjamin Cestoni
This industrialists' association joined AP when AP was formed
in 1980. Opposed labor reforms of Duarte government and
criticized Duarte government for seeking a "socialistic, coercive,
and collectivist system." Clearly rightist.
Militant front organization of the FPL founded in 1975.
Comprised of intellectuals, teachers, students, peasants, and
workers. Attained a membership of 50,000 to 70,000 and
conducted demonstrations, occupied government buildings and
foreign embassies, and promoted labor unrest. Since 1980
security constraints have greatly reduced its strength. Many
members have joined guerrillas and pulled back to safehaven
areas to do mass organization work.
Name used by a rightwing paramilitary group. In January 1984
publicly attacked the Defense Ministry for its efforts to curb
human rights abuses by security forces. Probably linked to
ARENA.
Runs elections in El Salvador. As a precondition for participat-
ing in the March 1982 elections, rightist political leaders
insisted that PDC members be removed from CCE. At a
November 1981 meeting of the Political Forum, a conference
composed of the six legal parties contested the election.
ARENA, supported by PCN, PPS, and the normally centrist
AD, succeeded in ousting the PDC members. Only POP sided
with the PDC. CCE among many others surprised by large
voter turnout in March 1982. In December 1982 the Constitu-
ent Assembly elected a new CCE with the PDC represented by
Roberto Meza Delgado. CCE had trouble developing registra-
tion procedures for the March 1984 presidential elections.
An important component from the business-sector ANEP mem-
ber groups. Its leader serves as President of ANEP. Very
rightist and supportive of ARENA. In October 1982, when the
US Ambassador publicly denounced rightist violence in El
Salvador, CCIES in the local press denounced the Ambassa-
dor's "interference in Salvadoran internal affairs." CCIES has
publicly attacked PDC leader Duarte on many issues.
BPR labor organization without legal recognition. Involved in
violent activities. Has taken over government buildings and
factories and has held hostages, including US citizens.
Nongovernmental
Established about 1978 and membership has included center
leftists and extreme leftists. Its documentation on human rights
abuses is suspect, and members engage in propaganda favoring
the guerrilla alliance. Most members reside abroad. No connec-
tion with governmental CDHES.
Governmental
Established in December 1982 by President Magana to recom-
mend procedures for curbing human rights abuses. No connec-
tion with nongovernmental CDHES.
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Secret
Politically Significant
Organizations (continued)
CEES (or CEDES) Episcopal Conference of El Salvador
Bishop Marco Antonio Revelo (president)s
Archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas (vice presi-
dent) a
Rev. Leopoldo Barreiro Gomez (secretary
general) .
CGS General Confederation of Trade Unions
Anibal Somoza (secretary general)
Composed of the Catholic bishops of El Salvador. As such it is a
component of the Central American Episcopal Conference
(SEDAC), which forms part of the Latin American Episcopal
Conference (CELAM). Periodically issues frank comments on
political and economic problems in El Salvador. Kept to the
right of the orientation of religious orders such as the Jesuits,
mainly through efforts of its former long-time secretary, Monsi-
gnor Delgado. The dominant political views. since Delgado's
departure are unclear.
Trade union confederation founded in 1958. Membership-
mainly seamen and textile, construction, food, and restaurant
workers-has fallen from nearly 10,000 to less than 6,000 in
last four years. Joined MUSYGES but may leave it soon.
Centrist, but Secretary General has joined National Council of
center-right party, PAISA.
Confederation of five unions, with combined membership of less
than 4,000, involved in municipal, commercial, and agricultural
activities. Formed in'March 1983 as a split from the CTS by the
loser in a CTS election. Supported by PDC, and seeking to join
UPD.
Domitila Juarez
Teresa Ayala
Vilma Sanchez
Graciela Payes
Maritza Ruiz
Julio Rivas Gallont a
Atilio Vieytez
CONIP National Conference of the Popular Church
Rev. Placido Erdozain (member coordinating
board)
Rev. Rogelio Poncel
Rev. Rutilio Sanchez
Human rights group formed in 1977 under the protection of the
Archbishop of San Salvador and generally leftist in orientation.
In January 1984, Archbishop Rivera y Damas expelled it and
the nongovernmental CDHES from their offices in the Archbi-
shopric's building. Demands a negotiated (power sharing) end to
the war, full investigation into the fate of missing persons,
freeing of all political prisoners, and "justice" for those
assassinated.
Formed in August 1982 as labor front for ARENA. Two
member unions-for construction and housing administration
workers-with a combined membership of perhaps 1,000. Its
first chief was expelled in 1981 from CGS and murdered in
December 1983. Rightist.
A pro-PDC counterweight to ANEP. Formed in October 1982.
Headed by brother of Salvadoran Ambassador to the United
States. Views ANEP as representing the reactionary leftovers
from the old-line hierarchy but is smaller numerically than
ANEP, weaker financially, and less influential in Salvadoran
politics and internationally.
A religiously oriented coalition of 12 groups. Issued a statement
in January 1981, just prior to the FMLN's "final offensive,"
urging that Christians acknowledge the "justice" of the guerril-
las' cause and "the legitimate right which moves them to
insurrection." The groups identified themselves as: Archdioce-
san Caritas; a committee from the Health Ministry; the Confer-
ence of Men and Women Religious of El Salvador; the Federa-
tion of Centers of Catholic Education; the Archdiocesan
Pastoral Council; the National Commission of Justice, Peace,
Faith, and Joy; Christian Life Communities; the Foundation of
Promoters of Cooperatives; the Federation of Cooperative Asso-
ciation of Agriculture/ Livestock Production; the Baptist As-
sembly; the Christian Student Movement.
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Politically Significant
Organizations (continued)
Fabio Castillo Figueroa a
Ana Guadalupe Martinez a
Jose Napoleon Rodriguez Ruiz a
Ruben Zamora a
Salvador Samayoa a
Mario Aguinada Carranza a
Guillermo Manuel Ungo a
Jose Leoncio Pichinte a
Marco Antonio Portillo a
Saul Valentin Villalta a
Mario Aguinada Carranza a
Miguel Angel Vazquez (secretary general)
Juan Aristedes Escobar
Unified Revolutionary Directorate
Joaquin Villalobos a
Jorge Antonio Melendez a
Juan Ramon Medrano a
Leonel Gonzalez a
Dimas Rodriguez a
Ferman Cienfuegos a
Eduardo Solorzano a
Roberto Roca a
Jose Venancio Salvatierra a
Shafik Jorge Handal a
Mario Aguinada Carranza a
Issues official statements on behalf of the armed forces. Inhibit-
ed from objective news reporting. For example, after denounc-
ing rightwing death squads last year, the COPREFA chief was
threatened by a death squad. Minister of Defense Vides Casa-
nova apparently wishes COPREFA to play down stories that
hurt the image of the military establishment.
Primary diplomatic organization of insurgent alliance. Seven-
member executive directorate has two representatives from
FDR and one from each of the guerrilla groups. Founded in
January 1981. In theory all seven share equal billing as
spokesmen; in fact Aguinada seems currently in charge.
Coalition of Marxist-Leninist front organizations, composed of
BPR, LP-28, FAPU, MLP, and UDN. Established in January
1980. Largely moribund since early 1981, as many front group
members have been integrated into parent armed wings. Proba-
bly still useful in transmitting DRU directives to noncombatant
supporters.
Perhaps 9,000 workers in Ministries of Agriculture and Public
Works and tourism and teachers and other professionals. Mem-
bers of UPD. Centrist; generally supports PDC, but with some
leftist sympathies.
In December 1983 the National Intelligence Agency (ANI) was
upgraded to directorate status. Its chief was scheduled to
become a member to allow him to flesh out the DNI and give it
more control over other military intelligence components. He
also was slated to have more authority to investigate human
rights abuses by members of the security forces. Not clear that
all these mandates are firm-to date he has not been added to
the EMC-and in any case the present DNI director was
Defense Ministry coordinator of ORDEN in the late 1970s,
when ORDEN was the source of many such abuses.
Executive body of the insurgency made up of three leaders from
each of the five main guerrilla groups: FPL, FARN, FAL,
ERP, and FARLP. Established in Havana in May 1980.
Not clear whether this is a group or a generic name used for
certain death squad actions that occurred, particularly in
western El Salvador. ESA claimed in June 1980 that EM had
been absorbed by ESA.
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Secret
Politically Significant
Organizations (continued)
Col. Adolfo Blandon (Chief of Staff)a
Lt. Col. Galileo Conde Vasquez (D-I,
personnel)
Lt. Col. Gilberto Rubio (D-II, intelligence)
Col. Miguel Antonio Mendez (D-III,
operations)
Col. Carlos Angel Aviles (D-IV, logistics)
Col. Ramon Morales Ruiz (D-V, civil affairs)
People's Revolutionary Army
Joaquin Villalobos (commander in chief) a
Claudio Rabindranath Armijo a
Juan Ramon Medrano a
Ana Guadalupe Martinez a
Jorge Antonio Melendez a
Ana Mercedes del Carmen Letona a
Ana Sonia Medina Arriola a
"Aquiles Baires"
"Adolfo Torres"
"Jorge Palomo"
Shafik Jorge Handal (commander in chief)a
Julio Cesar Castro (secretary general, Modes-
to Ramirez Front)
Saul Valentin Villalta a
Mario Ernesto Cabrera
Jose Napoleon Rodriguez Ruiz a
Popular Liberation Revolutionary Armed
Forces
Roberto Roca (commander in chief) a
Jose Venancio Salvatierra a
Miguel Mendoza
Jose Trinidad
Nidia Diaz
Pablo Uribe a
"Camilo Torres"
Rogelio Martinez
Juan Jose Obregon
Often referred to simply as the General Staff (Estado Major).
As of January 1984, there were plans to add another officer to
handle special counterintelligence responsibilities. EMC should
be distinguished from the loose term "high command" which
refers to the top six or so officers, including the Chief of Staff
but not his deputies. Political complexion of EMC is center
rightist; Blandon appears opposed to D'Aubuisson and Duarte.
By extension the dominant views of EMC probably reflect the
prevailing consensus within the military establishment.
Established in 1972 and operated initially as an anarchist-
terrorist group. Member of the FMLN. Fastest growing and
most aggressive of the rural guerrilla organizations. Has
strength of 3,000 to 3,500.
Long the name of a Guatemalan rightwing terrorist group, ESA
was formed in June 1980 in El Salvador by D'Aubuisson and
others. Combined several rightwing groups: UGB, ORDEN
(officially abolished in 1979); Mano Blanca; EM; OLC; Salva-
doran Anticommunist Brigade; and two transnational groups,
the Legion del Caribe and FALCA. Claimed credit in 1983 for
several attacks on suspected leftist activists. Linked to
ARENA's security force.
Military arm of PCES established after 1979 party decision to
enter insurgency. Member of the FMLN. Has strength of 1,160
to 1,325.
Created in 1974. Subsequently became front group for FARN.
Comprised of student, church, labor, and peasant organizations.
Staged demonstrations and occupied churches and public build-
ings. Had membership of 12,000 to 20,000 before 1980. Since
then, many members have joined guerrilla ranks; organization
further diminished by security constraints, defections, and
casualties of political violence.
Military arm of the Salvadoran branch of the PRTC, which was
founded in 1976. Began using current title in early 1983. Has
strength of 700 to 850. Member organization of FMLN.
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Politically Significant
Organizations (continued)
FESIN-
CONSTRANS
Eduardo Sancho Castaneda (also known as
Ferman Cienfuegos) a
Eduardo Solorzano a
Raul Hercules a
Misael Gallardo
Chano Guevara
Guillermo Ungo (president) a
Eduardo Calles (vice president) a
Ruben Zamora a
Luis de Sebastian a
Jorge Alberto Acosta
Bernabe Antonio Garcia
Imelda Lopez
Ricardo Hernandez
Salvadoran Workers' National Union
Federation
Fidel Alberto Palacios
Mario Cabrera
Bernabe Recinos (secretary general)
Ernesto Flores (acting secretary general)
Carlos Ernesto Vasquez Someta
Federation of Salvadoran Agrarian Reform
Cooperatives
Luis Felipe Aguilar (president)
Trade Union Federation of Construction,
Transportation, and Related Industries
Broke away from ERP in 1975. Perhaps the least doctrinaire of
FMLN groups. Has strength of 1,400 to 1,500.
Serves overseas as the principal diplomatic and overt political
organization of the insurgent alliance. Charged with propagan-
da and fundraising. Makes no major policy decision without
approval of the DRU. Formed in April 1980.
BPR peasant organization. Had reputation as strongest and
most militant peasant organization in country. Among opposi-
tion activities, involved in occupation of churches. Along with
UTC, its membership numbered about 7,000. Since 1980 most
members have become FMLN combatants.
More than 12,000 members, mainly fishermen, coffee and
textile workers, and campesinos. Originally part of the centrist
CGS, but has shifted leftward. Most of its members now
support FARN; the organization is part of the FARN front
group, FAPU. Leadership strongly leftist, but rank and file
have centrist tendencies. Secretary General is in jail.
Formed in 1982 as a result of Phase I of agrarian reform
enacted in 1980. Over 150,000 members. Strongly influenced by
UCS. Centrist. Leadership has distrusted UPD leaders and
therefore hesitated to join UPD.
Over 22,000 workers, nearly all in construction. Once part of
CGS, now in UPD. Centrist; supports PDC.
Juan Antonio Argueta
Salvador Carazo (secretary general)
Tito Castro (adviser)
FESTIAVTSCES Salvadoran National Trade Union Federation About 2,250 textile workers in these 11 unions. Founded in
of Workers of the Food, Clothing, Textile, and 1968. Mainly subordinate to the PCES. Part of the Committee
Related Industries of Union Unity (CUS) and of MUSYGES. Clearly leftist.
Trade Union Federation of Salvadoran
Workers
About 1,000 members, mainly workers in cement production.
No governmental recognition or international affiliation. Shows
both centrist and leftist sympathies. Helped bring CGS into
MUSYGES, but, like CGS, may leave MUSYGES. Supports
AD.
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Secret
Politically Significant
Organizations (continued)
Joaquin Villalobos a
Jorge Shafik Handal a
Ferman Cienfuegos a
Roberto Roca a
Leonel Gonzalez a
Leonel Gonzalez (commander in chief) a
Dimas Rodriguez (deputy commander) a
Salvador Guerra a
Ricardo Gutierrez
Milton (or Guillermo) Mendez
Salvador Samayoa (member, CPD)
Revolutionary Trade Union Federation
Jose Jeremias Pereira Amaya (secretary
general)
Gerardo Anaya
Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and
Social Development
Roberto Murray Meza (president)
Mario Cantizano
Unions Single Federation of Salvadoran
Trade
Created in 1980, as a result of Phase III (Decree 207-the
"land to the tiller program") of the agrarian reform, to process
applications for titles from tenants. Potentially more than
100,000 beneficiaries. Through political and military efforts,
evicted land claimants had been put back and new beneficiaries
signed up. Centrist; a thorn in the side to ARENA-led efforts to
undermine agrarian reform. FINATA chief has endured death
threats from rightists and the opprobrium of many military
colleagues.
Marxist-Leninist front established in November 1980. Umbrel-
la organization that directs military and political resistance
against government. Member organizations are ERP, FPL,
FARN, FAL, and FARLP and their associated party and front
groups. Military strength is 9,000 to 11,000.
Founded in 1970 as a radical splinter of the orthodox PCES and
is the oldest of El Salvador's insurgent groups. Evolved from its
origins as an urban terrorist group to a predominately rural
guerrilla movement. Was largest and most prestigious insurgent
organization until factional disputes beginning in 1982 caused a
split in the group in September 1983. Member of FMLN, had
2,800 to 3,500 troops before that rupture. Also called Popular
Liberation Armed Forces (FAPL).
A radical leftist labor union created in January 1980 by FPL's
front group, BPR, with some assistance from FARN. Claimed
strength of almost 5,000, and members said to be textile, metal,
and coffee workers. Now aligned with FPL breakaway organi-
zation, MOR.
Composed of a number of private-sector leaders, mostly
wealthy. Provides technical advice and other services to its
members particularly on matters related to Caribbean Basin
Initiative. Centrist compared to ANEP, which would like to
influence and control it. Denied membership to prominent
ARENA leader Hugo Barrera because he was considered "too
political." President of FUSADES criticized ANEP for not
denouncing more strongly the death squads.
About 4,000 members: fishermen, metalworkers, electricians,
entertainers. Part of the FARN front group, FAPU, but also
influenced by the PCES.
Maria Lopez Castro
Jorge Mendoza Santos
Cristina Marin
Col. Napoleon Aristedes Montes (director) a
Capt. Ricardo Arango Macay (chief of
intelligence)
Formed in 1912 as a rural constabulary. About 4,200 strong,
with companies assigned to each department. More vulnerable
to leftist guerrilla attacks because of the disposition of its forces
than other components of the security forces; more deeply
involved in sponsoring rightwing paramilitary activity
(ORDEN, UGB) against perceived enemies. Defense Minister
Vides tried to clean out some of the worst human rights
offenders when he led the GN.
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Politically Significant
Organizations (continued)
ISTA Salvadoran Institute of Agrarian
Transformation
Dr. Jorge Arturo Argueta (president)
Raul Gochez
Sergio Rene Canales Rodriguez
Dr. Juan Ramon Rosales y Rosales (president)
Dr. Luis Rolando Lopez Fortis
Anticommunist Alliance of El Salvador of the
Glorious Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez
Brigade
No leader currently identified, but D'Aubuis-
son at one time. was leader
MIPTES Independent Movement of Salvadoran
Professionals
Eduardo Calles (president) a
Carlos Alberto Molina Osegueda
People's Liberation Movement
Carlos Gomez
Alfredo Torres
Jose Mario Lopez a
Guillermo Manuel Ungo (president) a
No Primo Alvarenga
Italo Lopez Vallecillos
Hector Oqueli Colindres
David Guardon Valencia
Mauricio Domenech Velasquez
MOR Cayetano Carpio Revolutionary Workers
Movement
Established in 1975 by Molina government to distribute
150,000 acres of government-controlled land. This caused back-
lash from traditional oligarchy, including ANEP and FARO,
but won cautious approval from several figures now in the FDR.
Reconstituted in March 1980 to administer new decrees on
agrarian reform. Rightwing violence was directed at ISTA
officials and peasant beneficiaries of the program. (The Salva-
doran gunned down with two labor officials in the 1981
Sheraton murders was president of ISTA.) In wake of 1982
Assembly elections ISTA has been captured by ARENA and is
being used to undermine Phase I of reform and to recruit votes
for ARENA.
Small coalition of students, teachers, and peasants. Formed
after government shooting of demonstrators protesting fraudu-
lent 1977 presidential elections. Front group of ERP and now
largely integrated with it. Carried out terrorist activities and at
peak strength had about 1,000 members.
A party formed in 1983 to compete in March 1984 elections.
Claims to be centrist but appears to be close to ARENA on
most issues.
Rightwing death squad which claimed responsibility for killing
six FDR leaders in November 1980 and similar incidents in
1983. Named for general who ruled El Salvador 1931-44.
Probably linked to ARENA.
Formed in early 1980 as a moderate socialist movement.
Member organization of FDR, and its original membership was
about 200 to 400. Membership includes professionals-doctors,
lawyers, economists, engineers, and writers.
Created in 1979 as the political front for the PRTC. Many of its
small membership of students and teachers have been incorpo-
rated into FARLP and others serve in diplomatic positions for
insurgent alliance.
Small social democratic party founded in 1964. Belongs to the
SI. Member organization of the FDR, and its total strength is
perhaps 100 to 200 card-carrying members. Part of UNO
coalition, along with PDC and UDN, that took part in fraudu-
lent presidential elections of 1972 and 1977.
A splinter group that broke away from the FPL in December
1983. Has condemned and threatened the current FPL leader-
ship. Follows the divisionist policies of the former FPL leader,
the late Salvador Cayetano Carpio.
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Secret
Politically Significant
Organizations (continued)
An organization belonging to the FDR whose two dozen or so
original members broke with the PDC in March 1980.
Jorge Villacorta
Ruben Zamora (secretary general)a
Juan Jose Martel
Luis Antonio Menjivar Rivera
(also known as Roberto Arguello
or Roberto Mena)
Julio Cesar Saravia Avalos
Alberto Arene a
No leaders currently identified but, in effect,
FARN and FAPU probably are in charge
A leftist umbrella labor organization founded in late 1982.
Marxists and non-Marxists members, but Marxists predomi-
nate. Was to serve as an action arm in overall guerrilla plan to
create civil disturbance in urban areas in late 1983. Plans
shelved because of government success against subversives and
extreme right terrorism against members and sympathizers.
Roberto Escobar Garcia (secretary general) a
Dr. Maria Julia Castillo
Dr. Carmen Canas de Lazo
Angel Armando Alfaro
Napoleon Bonilla, Jr.
Dr. Carlos Arnulfo Crespin
Daniel Ramirez
Dr. Alfredo Marquez
Juan Francisco Puquirre
Shafik Jorge Handal (secretary general) a
Jorge Arias Gomez
Mario Aguinada Carranza a
Mario Americo Duran
Dagoberto Gutierrez Linares a
Miguel Saez Varela
Adan Chicas
Raul Molina Martinez (secretary general) a
Rafael Moran Castaneda
Francisco Jose Guerrero a
Arturo Mendez
Hugo Carrillo Corleto
Adolfo Ramirez Pena
Julio Rey Prendes (secretary general) a
Jose Napoleon Duarte a
Fidel Chavez Mena a
Rodolfo Antonio Castillo Claramount a
Dr. Pablo Mauricio Alvergue a .
Jose Antonio Morales Erlich a
Formed in October 1982 by nine deputies who had been elected
in March 1982 on the PCN ticket. Basically rightist, especially
in its willingness to blame all Salvadoran problems on what "the
Communists" have done since 1977. Nevertheless, publicly
supports issues such as land reform, advocacy of strong public
health service, and denunciation of rightist death squads.
Orthodox Communist party that follows Moscow line. Formally
established in 1930. After 1932 inspired peasant uprising, party
devoted efforts to political activism and rejected armed insur-
gency. Altered that course following 1979 decision to create an
armed wing, FAL. Also called Salvadoran Communist Party
(PCS).
Formed in 1961 and was the "official" party until 1979 coup.
Able to use governmental organs such as CCE and the security
forces to ensure election of its presidential candidates in 1967,
1972, and 1977. Finished a strong third in 1982 elections,
winning 14 Assembly seats. Since then, however, nine of its 14
Assembly members joined PAISA because they believed its
current leaders were shifting the party's orientation to the left.
Still commands political sympathies of many military officers
and some businessmen.
Largest party in terms of popular support. Centrist. (See profile
in text.)
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Politically Significant
Organizations (continued)
Comments
Treasury Police Security force of 1,800. Organized in 1926 for customs duties
and control of contraband. Operated primarily at airports,
Col. Nicolas Carranza (director) a seaports, and frontier areas to fulfill those duties, but in recent
Capt. Tomas Salvador Perdomo (acting chief years has targeted "political subversives." Members accused of
of intelligence) death squad activities, but PH also has tried on occasion-
honestly-to investigate other security forces' involvement in
such activities. Suspect in guerrilla killing of US military officer
was evidently tortured by PH to make him confess. Previous PH
intelligence chief was transferred abroad because of his associa-
tion with human rights abuses.
National Police Security force of about 5,500. Organized in its present form in
1945. The outgrowth of police forces intended for the protection
Col. Carlos Reynaldo Lopez Nuila (director) a of cities rather than rural areas (the responsibility of GN).
Captain Antonio Lopez Davila (chief of Incumbent chief not an ARENA supporter nor directly involved
intelligence) in rightwing extremist activities, but both characteristics prevail
just below his level. Previous chief of intelligence transferred
because of association with human rights abuses.
Jose Alberto Medrano Averred (president)
Rene Segovia (secretary general)
Dr. Carlos Terorio
Dr. Armando Pena Quezada
Dr. Juan Dono Altamirando
in the 1982 Assembly elections. Appealed to rural conservative
voters, who, nevertheless, voted for ARENA. POP won no
Assembly seats.
Salvadoran Popular Party Formed in 1965 by some disaffected PCN members and the
conservative remnant of the centrist PAR. The rest of PAR had
Jose Francisco "Chico" Quinonez (secretary been taken over by leftists led by Fabio Castillo, who is now a
general) a political front man for the guerrillas. PPS obtained less than 3
Dr. Edgardo Guerra Hinds percent of vote in the March 1982 elections and only one
Roberto Lahud Assembly seat. Ri htist? virtually indistinguishable from
Genaro Pastore ARENA.
PRS Salvadoran Revolutionary Party Party organization of the ERP formed in 1977. Name used in
leftist propaganda, but organization is indistinguishable from
Joaquin Villalobos (secretary general) a ERP.
PRTC Revolutionary Party of Central American Marxist-Leninist regional organization formed in 1976. Most
Workers active branch is in El Salvador, and until 1983 Salvadoran
guerrillas connected with organization used PRTC as designa-
Fabio Castillo a tion for military force, which is now known as FARLP.
Jose Mario Lopez a
Roberto Roca a
Christian Legal Aid Generally referred to as Socorro Juridico. Until May 1982 was
the human rights office of the Archdiocese of San Salvador.
Roberto Cuellar (executive director) Archbishop Rivera y Damas established Tutela Legal to take
over the task of monitoring human rights abuses for the
Archdiocese; He complained that Socorro Juridico focused on
political violence emanating only from the government. Socorro
Juridico, adding the adjective "Christian" to its name, has
continued to function as an independent human rights organiza-
tion located at the Jesuit high school, Externado San Jose.
Leftist in orientation.
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Secret
Politically Significant
Organizations (continued)
STIUSA Trade Union of United Textile Industries,
Inc.
Francisco Calles (secretary general)
SUTC United Trade Union of Construction Workers
Juan Antonio Argueta
TL (or) Tutela Legal Archbishop's Office of Legal Protection
Ignacio Ellacuria, S. J. (rector)
Luis de Sebastian, S. J. (former head,
Economic Department) a
Jon Sobrino, S. J. (head, Theology
Department)
Ramon Mayorga Quiros (former rector)
Ignacio Martin-Baro, S. J. (vice rector)
Italo Lopez Vallecillos (editor, ECA)
Ramon Aristides Mendoza
Samuel Maldonado a
Guillermo Blanco (secretary general)
Tito Castro (adviser)
Henry Santiago
Fidel Joya
Mario Aguinada Carranza (secretary
general) a
Dr. Miguel Angel Parada (rector)
Ricardo Calderon (secretary general)
Ernesto Vela (dean, Science and Humanities)
Miguel Angel Vazquez
Salvador Carazo
Orlando Echeverria
Samuel Maldonado a
Ramon Aristides Mendoza
Gabriel Pilona Araujo
Alejandro Escobar Cartagena
Juan Antonio Argueta
(all members of Political Commission)
a For biographic profiles, see appendix B; for Roberto D'Aubuisson,
see special profile in text.
1,000 unionized employees of the Industrias Unidas textile firm.
A founding member of the FDR, but has withdrawn from it and
moved toward a centrist position. Presently a non-Marxist
component of MUSYGES.
With over 20,000 construction workers, this union comprises 90
percent of total membership of FESINCONSTRANS. Cen-
trist; supports PDC.
Generally referred to as Tutela Legal. Established by Archbish-
op Rivera y Damas in May 1982, in place of Socorro Juridico,
to monitor political violence from all sources. More centrist in
orientation than Socorro Juridico, and its statistics are some-
what more reliable.
Jesuit university founded in 1966 ostensibly in part as a
counterweight to leftist influences at the older University of El
Salvador. Since then its faculty and publications, especially
Estudios Centroamericanos, have moved steadily leftward.
UCA supported the officers' coup of 1979-Mayorga was a
member of the first junta formed at that time- but by 1981
generally favored the program of the FMLN and FDR.
Over 50,000 members, including sharecroppers, tenant farmers,
and members of cooperatives. Founded in 1968. Strong ties to
its creator, the American Institute for Free Labor Development.
Influences other rural-based cooperative associations, in part by
providing technical assistance not readily forthcoming from
ISTA.
Front group of PCES formed in 1968 and built around trade
unions, student groups, and slumdweller organizations. Consid-
ered only legitimate Marxist party by government. Joined with
PDC and MNR in UNO coalition that contested presidential
elections of 1972 and 1977. Most of its activists have joined
FAL or left El Salvador.
The national university, sometimes called UN, with a peak
enrollment in the late 1970s of more than 20,000. Marxist-led
student organizations engaged in riots, which led to the closing
of UES by the government in June 1980. No definite date for
reopening has been set. Most of its faculty and administrators
are center leftist or leftist.
Umbrella organization of four labor associations with a total
membership of about 100,000: UCS, FESINCONSTRANS,
CTS, and ACOPAI. Two members of the UPD's Political
Commission represent each association. UPD is basically a
political lobby group. Centrist; linked to PDC.
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Secret
Appendix C
Comprehensive Glossary of Salvadoran Organizations
AAC
AAES a
AAES a
Asociaciones de Ahorro y Credito
Asociacion de Avicultores de El Salvador
Asociacion Azucarera de El Salvador
ABECAFE a Asociacion Salvadorena de Beneficiadores y Exporta-
dores de Cafe
ABS
ACESa
ACOPAIb
ADESa
ADMAI a
AEAS
AEME
AES
AGEAP
AGES a
AGEUSb
AGU
AMAD
AMES
AMOISS
AMPa
AMUS
ANA
ANDA
ANDES b
ANEP b
ANES
ANIS b
ANSESAL
ANTEL
Asociacion Bancaria Salvadorena
Asociacion Cafetalera de El Salvador
Asociacion de Cooperativas de Produccion Agropecuaria
Integradas
Asociacion de Distribuidores de El Salvador
Asociacion de Distribuidores de Maquinaria Agricola e
Industrial
Asociacion de Empresarios de Autobuses Salvadorenos
Asociacion de Empleados del Ministerio de Education
Asociacion de Estudiantes de Secundaria
Asociacion de Graduados de la Escuela Agricola Pana-
mericana
Asociacion General de Empleados Publicos y Munici-
pales
Asociacion de Ganaderos de El Salvador
Asociacion General de Estudiantes Universitarios Salva-
dorenos
Asamblea General Universitaria
Asociacion Magisterial de Accion Democratica
Asociacion de Mujeres de El Salvador
Asociacion Medical Odontologica del Instituto Salvador-
eno de Seguro Social
Asociacion de Medios Publicitarios Salvadorenos
Asociacion de Mujeres Universitarias Salvadorenas
Asociacion Nacional de Agricultores
Administracion Nacional de Acueductos y
Alcantarillados
Asociacion Nacional de Educadoras Salvadorenos
Asociacion Nacional de la Empresa Privada
Asociacion Nacional de Enfermeras Salvadorenas
Asociacion Nacional Indigena Salvadorena
Agencia Nacional de Servicios Especiales de El Salvador
Administracion Nacional de Telecomunicaciones
Savings and Loan Associations
Poultry Growers' Association of El Salvador
Sugar Association of El Salvador
Salvadoran Association of Coffee Processors and
Exporters
Salvadoran Banking Association
Association of Salvadoran Coffee Producers
Association of Cooperatives of Integrated Agricultural
Livestock Products
Distributors' Association of El Salvador
Association of Distributors of Agricultural and Industri-
al Machinery
Association of Salvadoran Bus Owners
Association of Education Ministry Employees
Association of Secondary School Students
Association of Graduates of the Pan-American Agricul-
ture School
Association of Salvadoran Cattlemen
General Association of Salvadoran University Students
University General Assembly
Teachers Association of Democratic Action
Association of Salvadoran Women
Medical-Dental Association of the Salvadoran Social
Security Institute
Association of Salvadoran Advertising Media
Association of Salvadoran University Women
National Association of Farmers
National Administration of Waterworks and Sewers
National Association of Salvadoran Teachers
National Association of Private Enterprise
National Association of Salvadoran Nurses
National Association of Salvadoran Indians
National Agency of Special Services of El Salvador
National Administration for Telecommunications
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Comprehensive Glossary of Salvadoran Organizations (continued)
AP
APA a
APCAESa
APES
APES a
APHESa
APLESa
APROCEL
ARENAb
ARS
ASA a
ASDERa
ASDVa
ASEIG a
ASIA
ASOB
ASPAS
ASR
ATACES
ATES
AUTMES a
BPR b
BPS
BRES
BTC
Alianza Productiva
Asociacion de Provedores Agricolas
Asociacion de Productores de Cana de Azucar de El
Salvador
Asociacion de Periodistas de El Salvador
Asociacion Pesquera de El Salvador
Asociacion de Productores de Henequen de El Salvador
Asociacion de Productores de Leche de El Salvador
Asociacion de Profesionales de la Comision Ejecutiva
Hidroelectrica del Rio Lempa
Accion Revolucionaria de Estudiantes de
Secundaria
Alianza Republicana Nacionalista
Accion Revolucionaria Salvadorena
Asociacion Salvadorena de Agricultores o Asociacion
Salvadorena Agropecuaria
Asociacion Salvadorena de Agencias de
Publicidad
Productive Alliance
Association of Agricultural Suppliers
Association of Salvadoran Sugarcane Producers
Association of Salvadoran Journalists
Salvadoran Fishing Association
Association of Henequen Producers of El Salvador
Milk Producers' Association of El Salvador
Professional Association of the Rio Lempa Hydroelectric
Executive Commission
Revolutionary Action of Secondary School Students
Nationalist Republican Alliance
Salvadoran Revolutionary Action
Salvadoran Association of Farmers or Salvadoran Agri-
cultural Association
Salvadoran Association of Advertising Agencies
Asociacion Salvadorena de Criadores de Ganado Regis- Salvadoran Association of Registered Cattle Breeders
trado
Asociacion Salvadorena de Radiodifusores
Asociacion Salvadorena de Distribuidores de Vehiculos
Asociacion Salvadorena de Empresarios de Industrias
Graficas
Salvadoran Association of Broadcasters
Salvadoran Association of Motor Vehicle Distributors
Salvadoran Association of Printing Industry Owners
Asociacion Salvadorena de Ejecutivos de Relaciones
Publicas
Asociacion de Sectores Industriales (o) Asociacion
Salvadorena de Industriales
Asociacion Salvadorena de Ingenieros y Arquitectos
Asociacion Salvadorena de Oficiales Bancarios
Asociacion Sindical de Pilotos Aviadores Salvadorenos
Asociacion Salvadorena de Radiodifusores
Asociacion de Trabajadores Agropecuarios y
Campesinos de El Salvador
Asociacion Salvadorena de Transportistas
Asociacion de Usarios de Transporte Maritimo de
El Salvador
Asociacion de Vendedores de Billetes de la Loteria
Nacional
Bloque Popular Revolucionario
Brigadas Proletarios Salvadorenas
Brigadas Revolucionarias Estudiantes Salvadorenas
Brigadas de Trabajadores del Campo
Association of the Industrial Sectors (or) Salvadoran
Industrialists' Association
Salvadoran Association of Engineers and Architects
Salvadoran Association of Banking Officials
Trade Union Association of Salvadoran Airline Pilots
Salvadoran Association of Radio Broadcasters
Association of Salvadoran Agricultural-Livestock
Workers and Peasants
Salvadoran Association of Drivers
Association of Maritime Transport Users of El Salvador
People's Revolutionary Bloc
Salvadoran Proletariat Brigades
Salvadoran Students Revolutionary Brigades
Workers Brigades of the Countryside
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Secret
Comprehensive Glossary of Salvadoran Organizations (continued)
CAESS Compania de Alumbrado Electrico de El Salvador
CAS b Comando Anticomunista Salvadorena
CASL Cooperativa Algondonera Salvadorena, Ltda.
CBO Comite de Bases Obreras
CCAES Camara de Comercio Americana de El Salvador
CCE b Consejo Central de Elecciones
CCEA Consejo Coordinador de Empresas Agropecuarios
CCIES a b
CCSb
CCS
CDHES b
CEDA
CEES (or
CEDES) b
Camara de Comercio e Industria de El Salvador
Comite Coordinador de Sindicatos
Centro de Campesinos Salvadorenos
Comision de Derechos Humanos de El Salvador
Centro de Desarrollo Agropecuario
Conferencia Episcopal de El Salvador
CEFA Centro de Estudios de las Fuerzas Armadas
CEL Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelectrica del Rio Lempa
CENAP Centro Nacional de Productividad
CENTA Centro Nacional de Tecnologia
CEPA Comision Ejecutiva Portuaria Autonoma
CESAH Comite Ecumenico Salvadoreno de Ayuda Humanitaria
CGS b Confederacion General de Sindicatos
CGT b Confederacion General de Trabajadores
CGTS Confederacion General de Trabajadores Salvadorenos
CIS Comite Inter-Sindical
Comite Comite de Madres y Familiares de Presos, Desapareci-
de Madres b dos y Asesinados Politicos de El Salvador Monsenor
Oscar Arnulfo Romero
CNE, Comite Nacional de Emergencia
CNT b Confederacion Nacional de Trabajadores
COMAPAN Cooperativa de Maestros Panaderos
CONAES b Consejo Nacional de Empresas Salvadorenas
CONAPLAN Consejo Nacional de Planificacion y Coordinacion
Economica
CONIP b Conferencia Nacional de la Iglesia Popular
CONSISAL Consejo Sindical Salvadoreno
COPEFA Consejo Permanente de las Fuerzas Armadas
COPREFA b Comite de Prensa de las Fuerzas Armadas
COSDO Consejo Sindical de Obreros
COSO Central Obrera Sindical de Occidente
CPD b Comision Politico-Diplomatico
Electric Light Company of El Salvador
Salvadoran Anticommunist Command
Salvadoran Cotton Cooperative, Ltd.
Workers Base Committee
American Chamber of Commerce of El Salvador
Central Electoral Council
Coordinating Council for Agricultural and Livestock
Enterprises
Chamber of Commerce and Industry of El Salvador
Trade Union Coordinating Committee
Salvadoran Peasants Center
Salvadoran Human Rights Commission (two commis-
sions with same name)
Center for Agricultural Development
Episcopal Conference of El Salvador
Armed Forces Study Center
Lempa River Hydroelectric Executive Commission
National Center for Productivity
National Center for Technology
Autonomous Executive Port Commission
Salvadoran Ecumenical Committee for Humanitarian
General Confederation of Trade Unions
General Confederation of Workers
General Confederation of Salvadoran Workers
Inter-Trade Union Committee
Archbishop Romero Salvadoran Committee of Mothers
and Relatives of Political Prisoners, Missing and
Assassinated Persons
National Emergency Committee
National Confederation of Workers
Cooperative of Master Bakers
National Council of Salvadoran Business
National Council for Economic Planning and
Coordination
National Conference of the Popular Church
Salvadoran Trade Union Council
Permanent Council of the Armed Forces
Press Committee of the Armed Forces
Trade Union Council of Workers
Trade Union Workers Central Organization of the West
Political-Diplomatic Commission
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 Comprehensive Glossary of Salvadoran Organizations (continued)
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CRM b
Coordinadora Revolucionaria de las Masas
Revolutionary Coordinator of the Masses
CSEN
Comite Sindical de Emergencia Nacional
Trade Union Committee of National Emergency
CSI
Consejo de Sindicatos Independientes
Council of Independent Trade Unions
CSIC
Camara Salvadorena de la Industria de Construccion
Salvadoran Chamber of the Construction Industry
CSO
Consejo Sindical de Oriente
Trade Union Council of the East
CST e
Camara Salvadorena de Turismo
Salvadoran Chamber of Tourism
CSU
Consejo Superior Universitario
University Higher Council
CTOS
Central de Trabajadores Organizados de El Salvador
Central Organization of Salvadoran Organized Workers
CTS b
Central De Trabajadores Salvadorenos
Central Organization of Salvadoran Workers
CUS
Comite de Unidad Sindical del Salvador
Committee for Salvadoran Trade Union Unity
CUTS
Confederacion Unitaria de Trabajadores Salvadorenos
United Confederation of Salvadoran Workers
DGEA
Direccion General de Economia'Agropecuario
General Directorate of Agricultural Economy
DGOR
Direccion General de Obras de Riego
General Directorate of Irrigation Works
DIDECO
Direccion de Desarrollo Comunal
Directorate of Communal Development
DIPPSA
Distribuidora de Productos de Petroleo
Petroleum Products Distributor Corporation
DNI b
Direccion Nacional de Inteligencia
National Directorate of Intelligence
DRUB
Direccion Revolucionaria Unificada
Unified Revolutionary Directorate
EMb
Escuadron de la Muerte
Death Squadron
EMCb
Estado Mayor Conjunto
Joint General Staff
ERP b
Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo
People's Revolutionary Army
ESA b
Ejercito Secreto Anticomunista
Secret Anticommunist Army
FAL b
Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion
Armed Forces of Liberation
FALANGE
Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion y Guerra de
Eliminacion
Armed Forces for Anticommunist Liberation and War
of Elimination
Frente Anticomunista de Liberacion-Guerra de
Eliminacion
Anticommunist Front of Liberation-War of
Elimination
Frente Anticomunista para la Liberacion de Centro
America
Anticommunist Front for the Liberation of Central
America
Frente Amplio Nacional
Broad National Front
Frente Anticomunista Nacional
National Anticommunist Front
FAPU b
Frente de Accion Popular Unida
United Popular Action Front
FARLPb
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Liberacion
Popular
Popular Liberation Revolutionary Armed Forces
FARN b
Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional
Armed Forces of National Resistance
FARO
Frente Agropecuario de la Region Oriental
Agricultural Front for the Eastern Region
FARP
Frente Accion Revolucionaria del Pueblo
People's Revolutionary Action Front
Frente de Accion de la Resistencia Popular
Popular Resistance Action Front
FAU
Frente de Accion Universitario
University Action Front
FD
Frente Democratico
Democratic Front
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Secret
Comprehensive Glossary of Salvadoran Organizations (continued)
FECAMCO Federacion de Camaras de Comercio del Istmo
Centroamericano
FEDECACES Federacion de Cooperativas de Ahorro y Credito de
El Salvador
FENAPES Federacion Nacional de la Pequena Empresa
Salvadorena
FENASTRAS b Federacion Nacional Sindical de Trabajadores
Salvadorenas
FESACORA b Federacion Salvadorena de Cooperativas de la Reforms
Agraria
FEPRO Federacion de Profesionales
FESIN- Federacion de Sindicatos de la Industria de la
CONSTRANS b Construccion, Transporte y Similares
FESINTEXIS Federacion de Sindicatos Textiles, Similares y Conexos
Federation of Chambers of Commerce of the Central
American Isthmus
Federation of Salvadoran Christian Salvadorenos
Peasants
Federation of Savings and Loan Cooperatives of
El Salvador
National Federation of Salvadoran Small Businesses
Federation of Professional Associations
Trade Union Federation of Construction, Transportation
and Related Industries
Trade Union Federation of Textile, Similar and Related
Industries
FESINTRABS Federacion de Sindicatos de Trabajadores de Alimentos Trade Union Federation of Food, Beverage and Related
Bebidas y Similares Industries
FESINTRI- Federacion de Sindicatos de Trabajadores en Varios
SEVA Industrias y Servicios
FESTIA- Federacion Nacional de Sindicatos de Trabajadores de
VTSCES b la Industria del Alimento, Vestido, Textil, Similares y
Conexos de El Salvador
FESTRAS b Federacion Sindical de Trabajadores Salvadorenos
FICTAS Federacion Internacional de Campesinos, Trabajadores
Agricolas y Similares
FINATA b Financiera Nacional de Tierras Agricolas
FLN Frente de Liberacion Nacional
FMLN b Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional
FMS Federacion Magisterial Salvadorena
FOCCO Fomento y Cooperacion Comunal con Esfuerzo Propio y
Ayuda Mutua
FPA Frente Politico Anticomunista
FPL b Fuerzas Populares de Liberacion
FRAP Fuerzas Revolucionarias Armadas Populares
FRTS Federacion Regional de Trabajadores Salvadorenos
FSR b Federacion Sindical Revolucionaria
FTC Federacion de Trabajadores del Campo
FUDI Frente Unido Democratico Independiente
Trade Union Federation of Workers in Various
Industries and Services
Salvadoran National Trade Union Federation of
Workers of the Food, Clothing, Textile, and Related
Industries
Trade Union Federation of Salvadoran Workers
International Federation of Peasants, Farm Workers and
Related Workers
National Financiers of Agricultural Lands
National Liberation Front
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
Federation of Salvadoran Teachers
Self-Help and Mutual Aid Communal Development and
Cooperation Program
Anticommunist Political Front
Popular Liberation Forces
People's Revolutionary Armed Forces
Regional Federation of Salvadoran Workers
Revolutionary Trade Union Federation
Federation of Farm Workers
United Independent Democratic Front
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Comprehensive Glossary of Salvadoran Organizations (continued)
FUERSA
Frente Unido de Estudiantes Revolucionarios Salvador
Allende
Salvador Allende United Front of Revolutionary
Students
FUNPROCOP
Fundacion Promotora de Cooperativas
Cooperatives Promotion Foundation
FUR-30
Frente Universitario Revolucionario 30 de Julio
30 July Revolutionary University Front
FUSADES b
Fundacion Salvadorena para Desarrollo Economico y
Social
Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social
Development
ICR
Instituto de Colonizacion Rural
Rural Settlement Institute
INACOP
Instituto Nacional de Cooperativas
National Institute of Cooperatives
INDES
Instituto Nacional de los Deportes de El Salvador.
National Sports Institute of El Salvador
INDEP
Instituto Nacional de Pensiones de los Empleados Publi-
cos
National Institute of Government Employee Pensions
INSAFI
Instituto Salvadoreno de Fomento Industrial
Salvadoran Institute for Industrial Development
INSAFOCOOP
Instituto Salvadoreno de Fomento Cooperativo
Salvadoran Institute of Cooperative Development
INSAFOP
Instituto Salvadoreno de Fomento de la Produccion
Salvadoran Institute for Production Development
IN-PRO
Instituto Salvadoreno de Productividad
Salvadoran Institute of Productivity
IRA
Instituto Regulador de Abastecimientos
Institute of Supply Regulation
ISCE
Instituto Salvadoreno de Comercio Exterior
Salvadoran Institute of Foreign Trade
ISIC
Instituto Salvadoreno de Investigaciones de Cafe
Salvadoran Institute of Coffee Research
ISSS
Instituto Salvadoreno de Seguro Social
Salvadoran Institute of Social Security
ISTA b
Instituto Salvadoreno de Transformacion Agraria
Salvadoran Institute of Agrarian Transformation
ISTU
Instituto Salvadoreno de Turismo
Salvadoran Institute of Tourism
IVU
Instituto de Vivienda Urbana
Institute of Urban Housing
JCS
Juventud Comunista de El Salvador
Communist Youth of El Salvador
JDC
Juventud Democrata Cristiana
Christian Democratic Youth
JRG
Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno
Revolutionary Governing Junta
LIGAS
Ligas Campesinas
Peasants Leagues
LL
Liga para la Liberacion
Liberation League
LP-28 b
Ligas Populares 28 de Febrero
Popular Leagues of 28 February
LPC
Ligas Populares Campesinos
Popular Peasant Leagues
LPO
Ligas Populares Obreras
Popular Workers Leagues
LPS
Ligas Populares de Secundaria
Popular Secondary School Leagues
LPU
Ligas Populares Universitarias
Popular University Leagues
MAG
Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganaderia
Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock
MAN
Movimiento Anticomunista Nacional
National Anticommunista Movement
MBS
Mano Blanca Salvadorena
Salvadoran White Hand
MERECEN b
Movimiento Estable Republicano Centrista
Stable Centrist Republican Movement
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Secret
Comprehensive Glossary of Salvadoran Organizations (continued)
Movimiento de Estudiantes Revolucionarios de Secun
daria
Alianza Anticomunista de El Salvador de la Gloriosa
Brigada de Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez
Movimiento Independiente de Profesionales Salvador-
enos
MLP b Movimiento de Liberacion Popular
MNR b Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario
MNS Movimiento Nacional Suprapartidista
MOR b Movimiento de Obreros Revolucionarios
MPSC b Movimiento Popular Social Cristiano
MRC Movimiento Revolucionario Campesino
MRS Movimiento Reformista Salvadoreno
MUN Movimiento de Unidad Nacional
MUP Movimiento de Unidad Popular
MUSYGES b Movimiento Unitario Sindicalista y Gremial de El Sal-
vador
OLC Organizacion para Liberacion de Comunismo
OMCOM Oficina de Mejoramiento Comunal
OMR Organizacion Magisterial Revolucionaria
ORDEN Organizacion Democratica Nacionalista
ORT Organizacion Revolucionaria de los Trabajadores
OSPA Oficina Sectorial de Planificacion Agropecuaria
PAR Partido Accion Renovadora
PAISA b Partido Autentico Institucional Salvadoreno
PCES b Partido Comunista de El Salvador
PCN b Partido Conciliacion Nacional
PDC b Partido Democrata Cristiano
PH b Policia de Hacienda
PLN Partido de Liberacion Nacional
PN b Policia Nacional
POP b Partido de Orientacion Popular
PPS b Partido Popular Salvadoreno
PRAM Partido Revolucionario Abril y Mayo
PRIDECO Programa Integral de Desarrollo Comunal
PROCANA Asociacion de Productores de Cana de Azucar
PRS b Partido de la Revolucion Salvadorena
PRTC b Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores
Centramericanos
PRUD
PSD
PUCA
Partido Revolucionario de Unificacion Democratica
Partido Social Democratico
Partido Unionista Centroamericano
Anticommunist Alliance of El Salvador of the Glorious
Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez Brigade
Independent Movement of Salvadoran Professionals
People's Liberation Movement
National Revolutionary Movement
National Supraparty Movement
Cayetano Carpio Revolutionary Workers Movement
Popular Social Christian Movement
Peasant's Revolutionary Movement
Salvadoran Reformist Movement
National Unity Movement
People's Unity Movement
Labor Unity Movement of El Salvador
Organization for Liberation from Communism
Community Improvement Office
Revolutionary Teachers Organization
Nationalist Democratic Organization
Revolutionary Organization of Workers
Area Office for Agricultural-Livestock Planning
Renovation Action Party
Salvadoran Authentic Institutional Party
Communist Party of El Salvador
National Conciliation Party
Christian Democratic Party
Treasury Police
Party of National Liberation
National Police
Popular Orientation Party
Salvadoran Popular Party
April-May Revolutionary Parrty
Integral Program of Community Development
Association of Sugarcane Producers
Salvadoran Revolutionary Party
Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers
Revolutionary Party of Democratic Unification
Social Democratic Party
Central American Unionist Party
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Secret
Comprehensive Glossary of Salvadoran Organizations (continued)
SAI
SEIS
Sindicato de Auxiliares de Ingenieria
Sociedad de Estudiantes de Ingenieria y Arquitectura
Salvadorenos
SELSA Sindicato de Empresa La Laguna, S. A.
SEMECA Sociedad de Estudiantes de Medicina Emilo Alvarez
SEUSS Sociedad de Estudiantes Universitarios San Salvador
SFES Sindicato de Fotografos de El Salvador
SGOPC Sindicato General de Obreros de Productos de Cemento
SGTICES Sindicato General de Trabajadores de la Industria de la
Construccion de El Salvador
SIADES Sociedad de Ingenieros Agronomos de El Salvador
SICAFE Sindicato de la Industria del Cafe
SICES Sindicato de la Industria del Cemento de El Salvador
SIES Sindicato de la Industria Electrica de El Salvador
SIGAC Sindicato de la Industria Gastronomica y Actividades
Conexas
Sindicato de la Industria General de Empresas Bancar-
ias y Asociaciones de Ahorro y Prestamo
Sindicato de la Industria de Muebles, Accesorios y
Similares
SINA Sindicato de la Industria Nacional del Azucar
SIP Sindicato de la Industria Pesquera
SIPALAC Sindicato de la Industria de Productos Alimenticos,
Lacteos y Actividades Conexas
SIPES Sindicato de la Industria Portuaria de El Salvador
SIT Sindicato Industria Textil
SITRACOCS Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Construccion y Conexas
Salvadorenas
SITUS Sindicato de Trabajadores Universitarios Salvadorenos
SJC b Socorro Juridico Cristiano
SNIC Sindicato Nacional de la Industria de la Carne
SNTIT Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Industria de
Transporte
SNTS Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores Sastres
SOTMES Sindicato Obrero Textil de Mejoramiento Social
STAG Sindicato de Trabajadores de Artes Graficas
STEES Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Educacion de
El Salvador
STIADES Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria Electrica
STIGCES Sindicato de Trabajadores de las Industrias Graficias y
Conexas de El Salvador
Trade Union of Engineering Assistance
Association of Salvadoran Engineering and Architecture
Students
Trade Union of the La Laguna Enterprise, Inc.
Emilio Alvarez Association of Medical Students
Association of San Salvador University Students
Trade Union of Salvadoran Photographers
Trade Union of Cement Products Workers
General Trade Union of Workers of the Salvadoran
Construction Industry
Association of Salvadoran Agricultural Engineers
Trade Union of the Coffee Industry
Trade Union of the Salvadoran Cement Industry
Trade Union of the Salvadoran Electrical Industry
Trade Union of Workers in the Restaurant Industry and
Related Activities
Trade Union of the General Industry of Banking and
Savings and Loans
Trade Union of the Furniture, Accessories and Related
Industries
Trade Union of the National Sugar Industry
Trade Union of the Fishing Industry
Trade Union of the Food, Dairy and Related Industries
Trade Union of Salvadoran Port Workers
Trade Union of the Textile Industry
Trade Union of Salvadoran Workers in Construction and
Related Activities
Trade Union of Salvadoran University Workers
Christian Legal Aid
National Trade Union of the Meat Industry
National Trade Union of Transportation Industry
Workers
National Trade Union of Tailors
Trade Union for Social Improvement of Textile Workers
Trade Union of Graphic Arts Workers
Trade Union of Salvadoran Education Workers
Trade Union of Electric Industry Workers
Trade Union of Salvadoran Graphics and Related
Industries
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I Secret
Comprehensive Glossary of Salvadoran Organizations (continued)
STIMBS Sindicato de Trabajadores de Industrias Metalicas
Basicas y Similares
STIMCES Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria Minera y
Conexas de El Salvador
STIMMB Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria Mecanica y
Metalicas
STIRTTES' Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria de Radig,
Teatro y Television de El Salvador
STISSS (or Sindicato de Trabajadores del Instituto Salvadoreno del
STISS) Seguro Social
STITASSC Sindicato de Trabajadores de Industrias Textil, Algodon,
Sinteticas, Similares y Conexas
STIUSA b Sindicato Textil Industrias Unidas, S. A.
SUTC b Sindicato Union de Trabajadores de la Construccion
TL (or) Tutela Oficina de Tutela Legal del Arzobispado, Comision
Legal b Arquidiocesana de Justicia y Paz
UCR
UCSb
UDES
UDN b
Union de Campesinos Revolucionarios
Union Comunal Salvadorena
Union de Directores de Empresa de El Salvador
Union Democratica Nacionalista
UES b Universidad de El Salvador
UFDC Union Femenina Democrata Cristiana
UGAASAL Union General de Artistas y Autores Salvadorenos
UGB Union Guerrera Blanca
UIT a Union de Industrias Textiles
UNJ. Union Nacional Jornalera
UNO Union Nacional de Oposicion
UNOC Union Nacional de Obreros Cristianos
UPI )b Union Popular Democratica
UPT Union de Pobladores de Tugurio
UR-19 Universitarios Revolucionarios 19 del Julio
UTC Union de Trabajadores del Campo
UTF Union de Trabajadores Ferrocarrileros
a Member of ANEP, which is discussed in the text and appendix A.
A few ANEP members also are separately listed in appendix A.
b For details see appendix A. A few organizations of historical
interest (for example, JRG, ORDEN) are described in the text.
Trade Union of Basic Metals and Related Industries
Workers
Trade Union of Salvadoran Mining and Related
Industries Workers
Trade Union of Mechanical and Basic Metals Industries
Workers
Trade Union of Salvadoran Radio, Theater and
Television Industry Workers
Trade Union of Salvadoran Social Security Institute
Workers
Trade Union of Textile, Cotton, Synthetic, Similar and
Related Industries Workers
Trade Union of United Textile Industries, Inc.
United Trade Union of Construction Workers
Archbishop's Office of Legal Protection, Archdiocesan
Justice and Peace Commission
Central American University (Jose Simeon Canas
Catholic University)
Revolutionary Peasants Union
Salvadoran Communal Union
Union of Directors of Enterprises of El Salvador
Nationalist Democratic Union
University of El Salvador
Christian Democratic Women's Union
General Union of Salvadoran Artists and Authors
White Warriors Union
Union of Textile Industries
Nationl Union of Laborers
National Union of Opposition
National Union of Christian Workers
Popular Democratic Union
Union of the Slum Dwellers
19 July Revolutionary University Students
Union of Farm Workers
Railroad Workers Union
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A Guide to Key Political Groups
ACOPAI
AD
ANEP
ARENA
CONAES
CTS
ERP
FAPU
FARN
FDR
FESTRAS
FINATA
FMLN
FPL
LP-28
MERECEN
MNR
MUSYGES
ORDEN
PAISA
PCES
PCN
PDC
POP
PPS
PRTC
UDN
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Association of Cooperatives of Integrated Livestock Products
Democratic Action Party
National Association of Private Enterprise
Nationalist Republican Alliance
National Council of Salvadoran Businesses
Central Organization of Salvadoran Workers
People's Revolutionary Army
United Popular Action Front
Armed Forces of National Resistance
Revolutionary Democratic Front
Trade Union Federation of Salvadoran Workers
National Financiers of Agricultural Lands
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces
Popular Leagues of 28 February
Stable Centrist Republican Movement
National Revolutionary Movement j
Labor Unity Movement of El Salvador
Nationalist Democratic Organization
Salvadoran Authentic Institutional Party
Salvadoran Communist Party
National Conciliation Party
Christian Democratic Party
Popular Orientation Party
Salvadoran Popular Party
Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers
National Democratic' Union
Centrist
Centrist
Extreme rightist
Extreme rightist
Centrist
Centrist
Extreme leftist
Extreme leftist
Extreme leftist
Extreme leftist
Centrist or center leftist
Centrist
Extreme leftist
Extreme leftist
Extreme leftist
Extreme rightist or rightist
Leftist
Leftist or extreme leftist
Extreme rightist
Center rightist or rightist
Extreme leftist
Center rightist
Centrist
Extreme rightist or rightist
Extreme rightist or rightist
Extreme leftist
Extreme leftist
25X1
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Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6