THE MOZAMBIQUE-ZIMBABWE PIPELINE: HARARE'S THREATENED LIFELINE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00317R000100020001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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NGA Review Complete
Secret
ALA 84-10034
April 1984
copy 2 ~]
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The Mozambique-Zimbabwe Pipeline:
Harare's Threatened Lifeline
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11 Intelligence
The Mozambique-Zimbabwe Pipeline:
Harare's Threatened Lifeline
This paper was prepared by -]Office
of African and Latin American Analysis, with a
major contribution from
LA, and
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations
Division, ALA
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Regional Issues Branch, Africa
Secret
ALA 84-10034
April 1984
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The Mozambique-Zimbabwe Pipeline:
Harare's Threatened Lifeline 25X1
Summary This reference aid provides basic information on the petroleum pipeline
Information available that runs from the Mozambican port of Beira to landlocked Zimbabwe,
as of 22 March 1984 and discusses the stockpiling and other measures Zimbabwe has taken to
was used in this report.
cushion the impact of sabotage and reduce the pipeline's vulnerability to
attack.
The pipeline is vital to Zimbabwe and economically important to Mozam-
bique. Zimbabwe gets over 90 percent of its petroleum products via the
pipeline, and fees from the line are an important source of revenues for the
financially strapped regime in Maputo. 25X1
The pipeline has great symbolic value in the evolving relationship between
South Africa and its black-ruled neighbors. Because Zimbabwe's only
feasible alternative for meeting its petroleum needs is through South
Africa's rail, road, and port network, the pipeline is one of the few means
that give substance to the desire of southern Africa's black states to lessen
their economic dependence on South Africa. In our judgment, South
Africa's periodic sabotage of the pipeline since October 1981 reflects
Pretoria's efforts to preserve its regional hegemony and economic leverage.
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We believe that the easing of attacks on the pipeline over the past year
partly reflects the introduction of about 2,000 Zimbabwean troops into
Mozambique to guard the pipeline and Pretoria's satisfaction with the
modus vivendi it has been working out with Mozambique and to a lesser
extent Zimbabwe. The lull might also reflect Pretoria's desire not to create
sympathy for Zimbabwe or to incur US displeasure. The understandings
between Pretoria and Harare and Maputo are fragile, however, and a
breakdown in them could easily lead to a surge in sabotage of the pipeline.
Moreover, the pipeline could also be targeted by the South African-
fostered Mozambican resistance organization, RENAMO, which has the
capability and motivation to act as a spoiler to the thaw at the government-
to-government level. As a result, we believe the status of the pipeline will
remain a measure of the complex currents at work in the region.
iii Secret
ALA 84-10034
April 1984
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Contents
The Setting
Zimbabwe's Dependence
Genesis of the Pipeline
1
Geography of the Pipeline
Vulnerability to Sabotage
4
History of Sabotage
7
South African Attacks and Contingency Planning
7
Insurgent Harassment
9
Recent Developments and Outlook
10
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The Mozambique-Zimbabwe Pipeline:
Harare's Threatened Lifeline
The Setting
Zimbabwe's Dependence
The petroleum pipeline from the Mozambican port of
Beira to the town of Mutare in eastern Zimbabwe has
the capacity-20,000 barrels per day-to deliver over
90 percent of the petroleum products that Zimbabwe
needs, including all of its gasoline, diesel oil, and
aviation fuel. The remainder, small amounts of paraf-
fin, butane, and motor oil, is transported by rail
through South Africa because the quantities are too
small for the pipeline and because the two rail lines to
Zimbabwe from Mozambique are in disrepair, poorly
managed, and frequently sabotaged.
Harare's primary alternative to reliance on the pipe-
line is to import fuel from or through South Africa.
Zimbabwe could purchase petroleum products from
the South African Coal, Oil, and Gas Corporation
(SASOL) or transport them by rail from the South
African port of Durban or from Maputo via South
Africa, but these options are two to four times more
costly than use of the pipeline,
We believe that Zimbabwe has not
purchased supplies from the small refinery in neigh-
boring Zambia because its prices are as much as three
times higher than at major world refining centers.
Genesis of the Pipeline
The pipeline, which is owned by the London Rhodesia
Corporation (Lonrho), a British firm, and operated by
its subsidiary, the Companhia de Pipeline Mozam-
bique-Zimbabwe (CPMZ), first opened in February
1965 to supply crude oil to Zimbabwe's now inopera-
ble refinery at Feruka near Umtali (now Mutare). The
refinery, which is owned by a consortium of seven
international oil companies, opened in April 1965 but
operated for only a few months. In late 1965 the
British Government prevailed on Lonrho to shut down
the pipeline in order to comply with UN economic
sanctions against Rhodesia. This also put the refinery
out of business. Both facilities remained closed
throughout the Rhodesian civil war, which formally
Sanctions were lifted shortly thereafter, and the gov-
ernment headed by Robert Mugabe that came to
power in April 1980 encouraged Lonrho to renovate
the pipeline to carry refined products while Harare
considered the feasibility of reopening the refinery.
Although the line was originally scheduled to reopen
in late 1981, South African sabotage and the inability
of Harare, Lonrho, and Maputo to reach agreement
on transport fees and on responsibility for paying
insurance premiums on the pipeline delayed opera-
tions until June 1982. Since that time, the storage
tanks at the Feruka refinery have been used to store 25X1
petroleum delivered through the pipeline. The refinery
itself remains inoperable.
The dispute over transport fees was resolved to Zim-
babwe's satisfaction. After initial demands that Zim-
babwe pay over $40 per ton in fees, Mozambique and
Lonrho agreed to ship fuel on the pipeline for $24 a
ton Compared with 25X1
railway charges of about $60 per ton from Maputo
and almost $100 per ton from Durban, this rate
represents a substantial savings for Harare.
Mozambique's stake in having the pipeline in opera-
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tion is considerably smaller than Zimbabwe's. I 25X1
the Mozambican Govern- 25X1
ment earned about $10 million in foreign exchange
from operation of the pipeline in 1983. Although 25X1
small, these earnings are important because of the
country's desperate need for foreign exchange.
Lonrho is anxious to improve the delivery system. The
firm's chief executive, Tiny Rowland, recently pro-
posed rebuilding the oil storage tanks at Beira, recon-
ditioning related port facilities there, and building
new storage facilities at the pipeline's terminus in
Mutare,
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Figure 1
Zimbabwe's Fuel Consumption Rates and Imports by Pipeline
Mining-300
Manufacturing- 1,500
Note: These figures include gasoline, diesel oil, aviation fuel, and
domestically produced ethanol. They were derived from a study published
by the World Bank in June 1982, which was. based on data available
through 1980. We judge that comparable 1984 figures will be only slightly
higher because of the stagnation of the Zimbabwean economy over the past
two years.
Average shipments via pipeline
Total: 12,100
the Feruka refinery could be made operable at a cost
of about $40 million. We estimate that the actual
expense would be more than double this figure,
however, because the refinery would have to be
modified to produce greater quantities of diesel fuel
and less gasoline to meet current consumption pat-
terns and to process heavier oil than the Iranian light
crude for which it was designed. Even then, the small
size of the Zimbabwean market might raise operating
costs to a level well above the price of imported
products.
We believe Harare eventually may restore and nation-
alize the refinery despite the high cost as part of its
effort to lessen its dependence on South Africa for
refined products. In the event that the pipeline is cut,
an operable refinery would allow Zimbabwe to import
crude oil (which is not produced in South Africa) from
overseas suppliers, although it probably would still
have to rely on South Africa for transport
Average national consumption
Total: 13,300
Harare took over responsibility for procuring the
country's fuel supply in 1983. A parastatal purchasing
agent, the National Oil Company, replaced the Zim-
babwe Oil Procurement Consortium (ZOPCO), which
was made up of Mobil, Caltex, British Petroleum, and
Shell.
The pipeline, which is 288 kilometers long and 27
centimeters (10.6 inches) in diameter, follows a high-
way and railroad along the shortest route from the sea
to Zimbabwe (see map at end of text). Beginning at
sea level at Beira, the line-which for most of its
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Harare's Petroleum Stockpile
Zimbabwe created a strategic stockpile of petroleum
in 1983 to reduce its vulnerability to a disruption of
supply. the goal is a 90-
-day supply of gasoline and diesel oil; no arrange-
ments have been made for stockpiling aviation fuel.
The oil has been dispersed around the country to
storage tanks in Harare, Mu tare, Gweru, and other
cities, making it more difficult for saboteurs to
destroy the reserve. This is cheaper than constructing
new facilities, but Harare has spent much of its
scarce foreign exchange on the fuel itself.
The stockpile reached its highest levels in early
October 1983-a 97-day supply of gasoline and an
82-day supply of diesel uel-bu has Aped since
then, Recent for-
eign exchange constraints have forced Harare to
reduce oil imports and to consume fuel from the
stockpile. Fuel levels diminished to a 57-day supply
of gasoline and a 71-day supply of diesel fuel in early
February 1984.
length is underground-first passes through the wet
plains of central Mozambique and then rises 1,000
meters through the western highlands to reach the
Zimbabwean border at Mutare. It crosses two major
rivers: the Pungue, approximately 65 kilometers from
Beira, and the Revue near the border. Several towns
and numerous small villages dot the course of the line
through the sparsely populated countryside. Signifi-
cant roads intersect the route at only three points: the
national highway from Maputo crosses at Inchope
near the midpoint of the pipeline; lesser roads con-
verge or cross near Beira and at Chimoio in the west.
Beira is Mozambique's second-largest city and port,
and its harbor is in the mouth of the.Pungue River.
The port facilities have suffered from Mozambique's
inability to replace the skills lost with the departure of
the Portuguese at the time of independence in 1975
and from neglect by a regime preoccupied with
combating insurgency. Silting from the river requires
regular dredging of channels to permit medium-sized
oil tankers to enter. When the pipeline was scheduled
to reopen in late 1981, the port was so clogged with
silt that Maputo had to insist that vessels delivering
petroleum unload within a four-hour period at high
nearly impossible to meet. he harbor has been
dredged since then, but the port continues to suffer 25X1
from inefficiency, deterioration, shortages of techni-
cians, and sabotage. 25X1
The pumping station and storage tanks near the
harbor constitute the first of three major facilities
along the pipeline. The tanks-half of which were
sabotaged by a South African raid in December
1982-can be bypassed by pumping petroleum direct- 25X1
ly from ships into the pipeline 25X1
The smooth operation of the line 25X1
throughout most of 1983 indicates that the limited
storage capacity at Beira is not a bottleneck.
For the first third of its length, the pipeline runs
northwest of Beira through swamps and broadleaf
evergreen forests. The course parallels the Pungue
River and passes through areas of sugarcane, ba- 25X1
nanas, and timber operations. The river and swamps
flood to reach their maximum extent in January and
February. The line crosses the Pungue River attached
to a highway bridge and continues through marshy
countryside.
The swamps end near the town of Vila Machado, and
the next one-sixth of the pipeline passes through dry
savanna grasslands. The plains give way to forested
hills near the midpoint of the line, where the climb
toward the border begins. The evergreen forests be-
come dense in the higher and wetter altitudes.F_
Not long after entering the hills, the pipeline reaches
the pumping station near Maforga-the second major
facility along the line this is a small 25X1
installation, consisting of fence-secured pump houses
and several dwellings for technicians. It is located
about 3 kilometers from the highway, the railroad,
and the small town of Maforga.
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The western half of the pipeline beyond Maforga
passes through increasingly rugged hills and dense
foliage. Peaks near the border in this area are nearly
2,000 meters high, and slopes are steep. The line
crosses the Revue River and Reservoir-apparently
attached to two major highway bridges-approxi-
mately 30 kilometers before reaching the border.
Once in Zimbabwe, the line passes south of Mutare to
end at the last major facility along the pipeline, the
storage tanks of the now inoperable refinery in Mu-
tare's western suburb of Feruka. From there the fuel
is shipped onward by road or rail.
Vulnerability to Sabotage
The system's vulnerability to sabotage depends on the
terrain, the deployments of Mozambican and Zim-
babwean troops, and the proximity of insurgents of
the National Resistance of Mozambique
(RENAMO)' and commandos from South Africa:
? Isolated sections of the line are vulnerable to attacks
that could shut down the system for days at a time.
' RENAMO is a Portuguese acronym for the National Resistance
of Mozambique, an insurgent group that since late 1977 has been
fighting the Mozambican Government and attacking economic
targets. It consists of about 12,000 guerrillas-6,000 to 8,000 of
them armed-operating in at least nine of Mozambique's 10
provinces. The group originally received aid from the white regime
in Salisbury, but after Zimbabwean independence Pretoria took
over its sponsorship. Although RENAMO has failed to develop an
effective political organization, it has been able to maintain the
? Critical facilities-the pumping stations, bridges,
and storage tanks-probably are all guarded suffi-
ciently to deter or thwart small insurgent attacks
not directly aided by South Africa.
? Virtually any point along the line could be destroyed
by a large insurgent force or a determined South
African attack.
The central and western portions of the pipeline pass
through traditional RENAMO strongholds. Less than
100 kilometers north of the center of the line, for
example, is Gorongosa mountain, the site of
RENAMO's first base deep inside Mozambique. The
guerrillas' mountaintop camp there was overrun by
Mozambican troops in October 1979, but the insur-
gents remain active in the surrounding area.
Most of the pipeline is underground in relative safety.
some sections are difficult to patrol on t e
ground and would have to be monitored from helicop-
ters.
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The western half of the line is the most vulnerable to
covert attack. The dense forests provide good conceal-
ment for attackers, and the steep hills and mountains
afford them the relative safety of inaccessible terrain.
Conditions along most of the eastern portion of the
line also generally favor sabotage, especially during
the November-March rainy season when the cloud
cover increases and the ground is less passable. Only
in the central grasslands do conditions favor the
pipeline's defenders, particularly during the dry sea-
son when the withered grass provides little conceal-
ment.
The most critical points are the pumping stations at
Beira and Maforga, without which the pipeline cannot
operate. An attack on the pumps at Beira, however,
would risk a rapid response by nearby Mozambican
forces, and escape from that populated and patrolled
area probably would be difficult. An attack at Ma-
forga would be more damaging because of the greater
difficulty and time required to get new pumps or parts
he pumps are surrounded by
a double fence, but the military positions are poorly
placed for guarding the pumps. Moreover, the site's
location would facilitate escape by the saboteurs.
Next in importance are the three major bridges over
the Pungue River and the Revue Reservoir, and
numerous other small bridges, where lengths of pipe
are exposed and the bridges are essential to support
the line.
Some storage tanks at the pipeline's western terminus
at Mutare are essential to receive and temporarily
hold the fuel, but an attack against them would not be
easy. The Zimbabwean 3rd Brigade nearby has an
estimated six battalions with which to protect the
depot, even though it has contributed two of the three
battalions now in Mozambique.
The remaining oil tanks in Zimbabwe and at Beira
are important parts of the system, but it would be
almost impossible to destroy enough of them to affect
the operation of the pipeline
Defenses
The Mozambican Army protects the eastern portions
of the pipeline and has 1,000 or more troops in the
general area. The headquarters of the 5th Motorized
Infantry Brigade and at least one subordinate battal-
ion are located in Beira, although tactical units
operate elsewhere from time to time. Also in Beira is
the Sofala Province Command, which has control of
the 5th Brigade's units and several other battalions.
Mozambique has other military forces near the center
section of the pipeline. The 3rd Motorized Infantry
Brigade and at least one battalion are stationed 'at
Chimoio, capital of Manica Province and only 25
kilometers west of the pumps at Maforga. The Man-
ica Province Command and the headquarters of the
1st Border Guard Brigade, whose troops are mostly
located along the Zimbabwean border, are also in
Chimoio.
We believe that the units used to guard the pipeline
may be understrength. The province commands have
the authority to dispatch forces to a scene of trouble
quickly because Maputo has recently decentralized
responsibility for counterinsurgency operations.
Mozambican units generally move by road, and
RENAMO in the past has successfully ambushed
reinforcements rushing to the location of an attack.
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As many as 2,000 Zimbabwean troops in Mozam-
bique defend roughly the western half of the pipeline
and have proved to be aggressive and reasonably
effective fighters, at least against the lightly armed
RENAMO. Zimbabwe sent its own units to guard the
pipeline in November 1982 when the overextended 25X1
Mozambican Army proved unable to stop the sabo-
tage. Three battalions were formed to defend the line
and portions of the Zimbabwean border with Mozam-
bique's Tete Province to the north
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Most of the Zimbabwean
units probably are positioned along the pipeline in
company- and platoon-size units (100 and 30 men
respectively). In addition, elements of Zimbabwe's 25X1
Parachute Group-the former Selous Scouts-were
used as a cross-border, quick-reaction force against
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RENAMO in August 1983
and may have been sent to patrol the
ince in January 1984
History of Sabotage
South African Attacks and Contingency Planning
a team of South
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African commandos carrie -out the first major attack
on the pipeline on 29 October 1981, shortly before it
was to reopen following the long closure during the
Rhodesian conflict. By destroying the center span of
the major highway bridge-which supports the pipe-
line-over the Pungue River about 65 kilometers
northwest of Beira, the commandos kept the pipeline
were as low as $10 million. Zimbabwe's in-country
fuel stocks were so low at the time of the attack that
massive dislocations to transportation and industry
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Although RENAMO publicly claimed credit for the
attack, the saboteurs demonstrated more technical
skill than we believe the insurgents could muster, and
we believe the South Africans were responsible.[
about 300 meters of pipe were wrecked by the co apse
of the bridge, which was a sturdy structure of compos-
ite steel and reinforced concrete.
The second major attack, on 9 December 1982,
destroyed at least half of the oil storage tanks near
Beira harbor, closing the pipeline for a month=
]t least 28 tanks had
been ruined, and journalists who inspected the area
reported that as many as 40 tanks had been hit.
Extinguishing the blaze required several days. A
senior Zimbabwean official estimated the replace-
ment cost of the tanks and 900 meters of damaged
pipes at about $25 million, although other estimates
resulted.
We believe that Pretoria also was responsible for this
attack. Although RENAMO again publicly claimed
credit for the raid,
As in the demolition of the
bridges, the attack demonstrated more technical skill
than was likely to have been available to the insur-
gents. The saboteurs cut through the metal fence on
the seaward side of the facility and expertly attached
explosives and timed detonators to selected tanks,
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The South African military has long been prepared to 25X1
disable the pipeline permanently if ordered to do so.
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South Africa has other options for future attacks.
Should Pretoria be willing to attack the line openly,
with no chance of plausibly denying responsibility, it
could use airstrikes to knock out a pumping station,
tank farm, or-with greater difficulty-a bridge. The
pipeline is approximately 450 kilometers from the
South African border, and a sabotage team could be
delivered by a transport aircraft, helicopter, or naval
vessel.
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Insurgent Harassment
In the 13 months between the raids on the Pungue
River bridge and Beira, we believe that RENAMO
carried out at least six successful attacks on the
pipeline, shutting it down for periods ranging from
one day to a month and event all forcing Zimbabwe
to deploy troops to Mozambique.
an insurgent attack in
September 1982 so unnerved technicians at the Ma-
forga pumping station that they refused to return
until Mozambique promised to station 50 soldiers
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there. The troops never arrived-or they left quick-
ly-because on 10 October 1982 RENAMO again
sabotaged the facility and kidnaped three Portuguese
technicians with their families. Refusing to accept
Mozambican guards, Lonrho then demanded Zim-
babwean protection.
Although neither the attack on the bridges nor the
one at Beira forced Harare to soften its rhetoric or to
police officials now meet every three months
participate in publicized ministerial-level meetings
with South Africa, Mugabe did allow Pretoria to
station representatives of its civilian and military
intelligence agencies in Harare. Delegations of South
African and Zimbabwean intelligence, military, and
Pretoria has even publicized
Although RENAMO did sabo-
tage the line in March and tried to do so in April, we
have no other confirmed reports of attacks until
January 1984, when another attack occurred. A
RENAMO press release claimed that the insurgents
hit the line about 75 kilometers east of Maforga on 21
November 1983, but we detected no signs at the time
of problems in operating the system
Motives
In our view, Pretoria has regarded attacking the
pipeline as an effective way of reminding Harare of its
ability to wreak havoc and of keeping Zimbabwe
weak and economically dependent on South Africa.
The attacks make Zimbabwean leaders apprehensive
and insecure, force Harare to spend more on defense
and to defer programs that might otherwise strength-
en the country politically and economically, and en-
hance South African profits from the sale and trans-
port, of petroleum.
Zimbabweans.
one of these meetings, much to the discomfort of the
These developments suggest that the sabotage and
implicit threat of further attacks on the pipeline have
contributed to South African success in gaining con-
cessions from Zimbabwe that are important to South
African security and political interests. Pretoria ap-
pears relatively satisfied with the liaison channels that
have been established and with Harare's tight reins on
the ANC in Zimbabwe. For the time being at least,
South Africa evidently views as less important the
direct control over Zimbabwe's fuel supply and the
profits that could be gained by disrupting the pipeline
again.
Zimbabwe's concessions-and the presence of Zim-
babwean troops in Mozambique, which increase the
costs and risks of attacking the pipeline-are only two
of the factors that may explain South Africa's evident
restraint with regard to the pipeline throughout 1983.
The lull might also reflect Pretoria's desire not to
create sympathy for Zimbabwe or to incur US dis-
pleasure at a time when Harare's own actions-for
example, harsh treatment of the country's large Nde-
bele minority and anti-US positions at the UN-were
undercutting support for Zimbabwe in the West.
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The lull in attacks on the pipeline was broken on 29
January 1984. A RENAMO force estimated by the
Zimbabweans to total 100 insurgents routed 30 Zim-
babwean troops camped beside the pipeline 10 kilome-
ters from the Maforga pumping station and blew up a
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and repairs apparently took four or five days.
We have been unable to fix responsibility for the
attack, but RENAMO could have acted on its own in
order to demonstrate its independence of South Afri-
ca. The attack occurred just after the first of a series
of meetings between South African and Mozambican
officials on economic and security issues, which in-
cluded a proposal by Maputo for reciprocal restraints
on RENAMO and the ANC. RENAMO publicly
threatened before the attack that it would step up its
sabotage if it were not included in the bilateral
negotiations.
The deliberate destruction of the valve connection and
the overall effectiveness of the attack, however, smack
of South African involvement. The attack roughly
coincided with two recent South African demarches
in Harare; this fit the pattern of past South African
behavior in combining negotiations, threats, and
If the attack in late January reflects a decision by
Pretoria to end its moratorium on sabotage of the
pipeline, the Zimbabwean and Mozambican armed
forces deployed near the line probably could not stop
the South Africans. Pretoria would have to plan
future operations carefully, however, and allot more
resources than were necessary in the past. We believe
that the skills of the South Africans, the probable
support of the insurgents, and the likelihood that the
attackers would be able to capitalize on surprise
would be sufficient to overpower the defenders. The
insurgents probably would not attempt a single crip-
pling attack on their own, but they could easily
sustain a campaign of frequent, small-scale sabotage.
In the event of a disabling attack on the pipeline, the
shock would be cushioned initially by Zimbabwe's
stockpile of diesel fuel and gasoline. Although we do 25X1
not know how long it would take to repair or replace
the pumps at Maforga or Beira, we doubt that the
facilities could be restored promptly enough to enable
Harare to avoid exhausting its stockpile or having to
turn to South Africa for additional supplies. Longer
term ef&ts would depend on the duration of the
shutdown and Pretoria's willingness to allow deliveries
through South Africa.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/07/29: CIA-RDP85S00317R000100020001-7
 Approved For Release 2009/07/29 : CIA-RDP85S00317R000100020001-7
7O79O (542623) 384
Approved For Release 2009/07/29 : CIA-RDP85S00317R000100020001-7
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Approved For Release 2009/07/29: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100020001-7
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Approved For Release 2009/07/29: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100020001-7