BULGARIA: COPING WITH THE PAPAL ASSASSINATION SCANDAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00316R000300150003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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ESE Directorate of
Bulgaria:
Coping With the
Papal Assassination Scandal
Top Seeret
FUR 84-10251C
December 1984
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Ef Directorate of
Bulgaria:
Coping With the
Papal Assassination Scandal
Office of European Analysis. It was coordinated with
the Directorate of Operations
This paper was prepared by
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Eastern Europe Division,
EURA,
Top Secret
EUR 84-10251 C
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Bulgaria:
Coping With the
Papal Assassination Scandal
Key Judgments Bulgaria has been trying hard to minimize damage from Italian allegations
Information available of its complicity in the 1981 papal assassination attempt. To prevent
as of 15 November 1984 further tarnishing of its already poor international image, now that
was used in this report.
indictments have been handed down against three Bulgarian officials,
Sofia plans a strong legal defense and a propaganda campaign blaming the
United States for creating the scandal. At the same time, the regime may
also make limited new gestures to improve its image in the West. Even if
the trial affirms Bulgarian complicity, Sofia probably expects to weather
the ensuing, short-lived international condemnation. We suspect, however,
the scandal will contribute to debates at home about the costs of
maintaining Bulgaria's reputation as a blindly loyal Soviet surrogate--at a
time when Moscow is already having trouble enforcing unity and discipline
in Eastern Europe.
The case initially threatened Bulgaria's efforts to expand international ties,
complicated its relations with the USSR, and focused attention on its other
illegal activities, such as narcotics smuggling:
? After the arrest of Sergey Antonov in Rome in November 1982, Italy re-
called its Ambassador, and several other Western governments were
reluctant to pursue high-level political contacts with Bulgaria.
As the investigation dragged on, however, tensions with European coun-
tries over the assassination attempt eased, Italy and Bulgaria returned
their respective ambassadors, and most Western governments resumed
active contacts with Sofia pending the outcome of the trial.
Sofia's current strategy is to highlight any contradictions in Agca's
testimony, blame the United States for creating an "anti-Bulgarian
campaign," and prepare a strong legal defense in anticipation of a trial. As
the Italian trial approaches, we expect Bulgaria to be more assertive in
arguing its case in a variety of forums and to rely more on active measures
against Italy and the United States to establish a case for Bulgarian
innocence. Sofia may also be prepared to make token gestures toward
cooperation on issues such as international terrorism or narcotics smug-
gling to foster good will in the West
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EUR 84-10251 C
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In the worst case for Bulgaria-conviction of Antonov based on evidence
corroborating Agca's claims or the revelation of sensitive intelligence
matters by Antonov-Sofia is likely to remain adamant in protesting its
innocence in hopes that the criticism will pass without coordinated Western
sanctions. The regime would most likely concentrate its displeasure on the
United States. In our opinion, Bulgaria would continue, however, to
cultivate other Western countries such as Japan and West Germany that
are important to its overall economic strategy. If the United States and
other Western countries tried to isolate Bulgaria, we believe Sofia would
try to exploit any divisions in the West over the imposition of sanctions and
seek Soviet economic assistance to compensate for any losses in Western
trade.
Whatever the outcome of the trial, the scandal is likely to sharpen divisions
within the Bulgarian leadership between conservatives and moderates as
they maneuver between the pursuit of national interests and the reality of
Soviet dominance. Hardliners will argue that the West's "anti-Bulgarian
campaign" illustrates the need for even greater vigilance and closer ties
with the Bloc. Pragmatic nationalist elements, however, may question
whether the benefits of subservience to Moscow are worth the costs of
estrangement from the West. Although there are clear limitations on
Bulgaria's autonomy from the USSR, there is sufficient room for maneu-
ver to allow for a debate between hardliners and moderates as they prepare
for Zhivkov's eventual departure.
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Introduction
Skirting Diplomatic Isolation
The Bulgarian Response
Soviet Support and Criticism
Outlook: The Trial and Its Aftermath
Domestic Implications
8
9
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1979
1 February Mehmet Ali Agca assassinates Turkish journalist Abdi Ipekci.
June Agca arrested and imprisoned for Ipekci assassination.
25 November Agca escapes from Turkish prison and two days later sends letter to Turkish
newspaper threatening to kill the Pope during 28-30 November trip to Turkey.
1980
Mid-July-31 August Agca in Bulgaria.
1981
13 May Agca shoots Pope John Paul II in Rome.
1982
May
the Pope.
25 November Bulgarian airline official Sergey Antonov arrested by Italian police based on
statements from Agca. Subsequently, arrest warrants issued for two Bulgarian
diplomats-Todor Ayvasov and Zhelyo Vasilov-who had returned to
Bulgaria.
host press conference for foreign journalists.
1984
April
and six Turks is leaked to Western press.
Turks.
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Mehmet Ali Agca shoots Pope
John Paul II on 13 May 1981
at St. Peter's Square in Rome.
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Top Secret
Bulgaria:
Coping With the
Papal Assassination Scandal
Bulgaria has been struggling for two years with the
fallout from its alleged complicity in the 1981 papal
assassination attempt, and it now faces renewed nega-
tive publicity as the trial date approaches. In Novem-
ber 1982 Italian authorities in Rome arrested the
Balkan Airline manager, Sergey Antonov, after the
papal assailant, Mehmet Ali Agca, identified him as
one of several coconspirators in the attempt to take
the life of Pope John Paul 11. After a three-year
investigation into allegations of an international con-
spiracy in the attack, investigating Magistrate Ilario
Martella in late October 1984 formally indicted An-
tonov, two other Bulgarian officials currently in Sofia,
and four Turks. The trial probably will begin some-
time in 1985.
This Intelligence Assessment analyzes how Sofia has
coped with allegations about its involvement in the
assassination attempt and considers how it plans to
contain any future damage resulting from the scan-
dal. It also assesses some of the longer term implica-
tions for Bulgaria for its relations with the East and
West and its involvement in other illicit activities,
such as arms and narcotics smuggling and foreign
intelligence operations. This paper does not treat the
ultimate question of Bulgaria's guilt or innocence in
the affair and does not weigh the voluminous and
frequently contradictory information concerning this
controversial case. This paper therefore focuses on
Bulgarian and-to some extent-Soviet policy reac-
tions to the affair, on the key elements of Sofia's
defense strategy, and on the broader policy implica-
tions of the scandal for Bulgaria.
waning Soviet economic support.' The ensuing inter-
national publicity further tarnished Bulgaria's already
unsavory image and drew attention to its links to some
terrorist groups and to arms and narcotics smuggling.
Many journalists, for example, also cited the bizarre
1978 murder of emigre dissident Georgi Markov in 25X1
London as corroborating evidence of the heavyhanded
tactics used by the Bulgarian Intelligence Service
(Durzhavna Sigurnost (DS)
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The arrest of Sergey Antonov seriously embarrassed
the Zhivkov regime and threatened to undermine
Bulgaria's push for improved relations with the
West-a strategy intended in large part to offset
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Mehmet Ali Agca, having escaped from a Turkish
prison in 1979, spent six weeks in Sofia during the
summer of 1980 in the company of Turkish smug-
glers known to be in collusion with Bulgarian intelli-
gence officials. It was apparently Agca's contacts with
these underworld figures in Turkey that brought him
to Sofia and ultimately led to the Italian allegations
linking Bulgaria to the papal attack. Sofia, for all its
propaganda assaults on Agca as a credible witness,
has not satisfactorily answered Western accusations
based on this fact. For the most part, Bulgaria tries
to ignore it or deny they knew Agca's true identity
while he was in Sofia.
Since at least the 1960s, the Bulgarian Intelligence
Service (DS) has provided a safehaven and assistance
to an international smuggling network dominated by
the Turkish underworld. Some arms and narcotics
traffickers openly settled in Sofia, while others freely
transited Bulgaria to conduct business through their
Sofia-based intermediaries. Because the DS main-
tains extensive surveillance throughout the country,
we are confident high-level Bulgarian officials knew
this network was at work.
'he
Bulgarian foreign trade organization, "Kintex, " coor-
dinates the smuggling activities to earn hard curren-
cy. Kintex,
also brokers arms deals and acquires embargoed
There is evidence that the Bulgarians have tightened
controls over the smuggling community over the past
year, but we do not believe that the regime has
eliminated the profitable smuggling operation alto-
gether. According to US
Embassy contacts, there was a noticeable crackdown
in Bulgarian smuggling activities as a result of the
international publicity and Soviet criticism in the
wake of Agca's revelations. Bulgarian authorities
ordered at least some of the traffickers out of Sofia
to more remote locations, in some cases outside
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Agca's allegations immediately became an inter-
national cause celebre, reinforcing Bulgarias
reputation as a Soviet puppet willing to carry out
These disclosures temporarily set back Sofia's foreign
policy objectives by:
? Reinforcing the Western perception of Bulgaria as a
Soviet puppet willing to engage indiscriminately in
efforts to destabilize democratic governments.
? Undermining Sofia's efforts to portray itself as a
pragmatic, cooperative economic partner-much as
the Kadar regime in Hungary.
? Making the leaders of some Third World countries,
particularly those with large Catholic populations,
more suspicious that subversive intentions dominate
Bulgaria's political and economic initiatives.'
Initially most Western governments reacted by resist-
ing Bulgarian overtures for high-level political ex-
changes. The scandal badly strained relations with
Italy, and both countries immediately recalled their
ambassadors after Antonov's arrest. Major Western
countries also responded coolly to Bulgarian requests
for political dialogue, acting out of loyalty to Italy or
a desire to postpone potentially embarrassing contacts
with Sofia until the case was resolved. In addition, the
European Parliament passed a resolution in January
1983 expressing concern at Bulgaria's alleged involve-
ment in the attempted assassination and urging closer
cooperation against terrorism.
' In Colombia, for example, press coverage of a Bulgarian trade
delegation in early 1983 focused largely on the scandal, and a
journalist for the most influential newspaper pointedly asked why
Despite the initial burst of bad publicity, diplomatic
setbacks, and potential economic threats, Bulgaria to
date has not experienced any durable sanctions im-
posed as a result of the papal affair. As the Italian
investigation progressed, West European governments
gradually resumed a relations-as-usual attitude to-
ward Bulgaria. Most refrained from official com-
ments or actions on the case pending the findings of
Italy's judicial proceedings. Beyond this circumspect
approach, we also suspect that Western leaders view
the case as a messy and unwelcome complication in
already strained East-West relations. We believe key
West European governments, such as West Germany
and France, are eager to encourage Bulgaria to tilt
toward the West, and they welcome opportunities for
expanded economic ties.
A series of conciliatory gestures in Bulgarian-Italian
relations over the past year-including papal audi-
ences with Bulgarian cultural delegations and the
exchange of new Bulgarian and Italian ambassadors
to their respective posts in April 1984-also have
encouraged other Western governments to resume
Italian charges against Bulgaria, Chancellor Helmut
Kohl was planning to host Bulgarian General Secre-
tary Todor Zhivkov in Bonn last September until
Moscow-in the view of the US Embassy-forced a
postponement of the visit. Austrian Chancellor
Sinowatz did visit Bulgaria in September. In early
1985 Zhivkov is scheduled to visit Japan, and, accord-
ing to French Embassy officials in Sofia, President
Mitterrand has accepted an invitation to visit the
Bulgarian capital.
Frequent high-level political and economic exchanges
with Third World countries suggest Bulgaria has not
suffered significant setbacks in this area. The level of
commercial activities-especially arms sales and con-
struction projects-continues to rise, particularly in
the Middle East and Africa. Bulgaria's major Third
World trading partners-Libya, Iraq, and Iran--
maintain a high demand for arms and, in any case,
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are not likely to be concerned about Bulgarian guilt or Sofia also has taken pains to make sure that Bulgari-
innocence in the papal assassination attempt. Trade an officials abroad hew to the "official line" on the
with the Third World is important to Sofia's overall case.
economic strategy as a source of hard currency to
finance Western technology imports and an alterna-
tive source of energy and raw materials.
Bulgaria immediately responded to the Italian allega-
tions with sharp denials and diplomatic protests, and
Sofia put its massive propaganda machine into high
gear at home and abroad to profess its innocence.
Bulgaria's defensive strategy has been to maintain
consistently that Agca is lying about his alleged
contacts with Bulgarian officials, and that he was
"fed" information about them as part of a US-led
campaign to destabilize Bulgaria and socialism.
From the outset, Bulgaria stridently denied any con-
nection to Agca's attempt against the Pope and, by
asserting numerous inconsistencies in Agca's story,
has attacked his credibility as the sole witness against
them. With this goal in mind, Sofia's unrelenting
propaganda has tried to prove that the "Bulgarian
connection" is part of a US-inspired campaign against
Communism. Sofia's "offensive defense" has
included:
addition to influencing Western opinion, we believe
that the Bulgarian leadership was also extremely
concerned that some of its diplomats stationed abroad
might wonder about Bulgarian involvement in the
Sofia also has lobbied its case in meetings with
Western officials and politicians. On several occasions
Bulgarian officials have argued their innocence with
their US counterparts and stressed that bilateral
? A flood of newspaper articles, pamphlets, and books relations could improve if the United States used its
influence to pressure Italy to drop the case.
? Mobilization of Bulgarian officials abroad to dis-
credit the allegations in their contacts with
foreigners.
? Two carefully managed press conferences in Sofia
in December 1982 where Western journalists were
allowed to question some of Agca's alleged accom-
plices who are not likely to return for the trial in
Rome.'
? Cooperation with the Italian investigation by host-
ing investigating Magistrate Martella in June 1983
and allowing him to interview key witnesses.
' These included Antonov's wife, the two Bulgarian diplomats
Todor Ayvazov and Zhelyo Vasilev, and Turkish smuggling mag-
nate-and Agca's alleged paymaster-Bekir Celenk.F
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While Sofia's propaganda barrage, in our view, did
little by itself to convince most Western observers of
Bulgaria's innocence, many of the points raised by the
Bulgarians found resonance in a variety of Western
publications. On some points the Western press iden-
tified weaknesses in the case even before the Bulgari-
an press. We have no evidence of Bulgarian collusion
in planting these articles, but it cannot be ruled out,
especially since Sofia has cited several Western arti-
cles in its own press to bolster its position.
The Bulgarian regime also has tried to avoid any new
embarrassments by reducing-but not eliminating-
its active involvement in other sensitive operations.
This prudence, however, has not extended to Bulgar-
ia's aggressive approach to illicit acquisitions of
COCOM-embargoed technology or to its smuggling
activities altogether. The arrest in September 1983 of
a Bulgarian trade representative in the United States,
the expulsion of a Bulgarian official in Japan-both
for espionage-and the seizure last May by Greek
officials of a secret arms shipment from Bulgaria
indicate that Sofia is still very active in such opera-
tions.
Bulgaria also has continued overt support for Soviet
international policies and may even be adopting a
larger role in politically sensitive areas as part of the
role assigned Bulgaria in the Warsaw Pact:
? Sofia's arms sales in the Third World are up
sharply, including six major shipments to Nicaragua
since 1982.' Bulgarian officials have stated that
they will not discontinue this policy because it
represents legitimate government-to-government
arms sales.
? Bulgaria has hosted an array of radical Palestinian
leaders in support of Soviet policies in the Middle
East (for example, George Habbash of the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine-PFLP) and
maintains friendly relations with Libya, Syria, Iraq,
and Iran, all known supporters of international
terrorism.
Thus, Sofia's concern with restoring its image to date
has not induced it to make any significant foreign
policy adjustments in order to mollify Western critics.
Immediately after Antonov's arrest, Moscow took an
active hand in assisting Sofia. In December 1982 the
Soviet Charge in Rome officially threatened to freeze
high-level bilateral contacts if the Italian campaign
continued. At the same time, the Soviet Charge in
Washington delivered an unusually harsh protest,
charging that the allegations were part of a slander-
ous US campaign against Bulgaria and the USSR.
According to the US Embassy in Paris, Moscow
apparently also enlisted the support of the French
Communist Party to offset the negative international
publicity. In separate but coordinated attacks in late
1982, the French Communist Party and the Soviet
Embassy in Paris harshly criticized the French media
for "slandering" the USSR and its allies
The KGB apparently also used active measures to
help its ally. For example, in mid-1983 a leftwing
Italian magazine published two forged US Embassy
cables-similar in pattern to other KGB forgeries.
They alleged that a US "operation" existed even
before Antonov's arrest to link the Bulgarians to the
papal attack.
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While Moscow was publicly defending "Bulgaria's
honor," however, there were hints that the scandal
may have created new strains in Bulgarian-Soviet
relations:
? Zhivkov's first meeting with Yuriy Andropov as the
new General Secretary at the celebration of the
60th anniversary of the USSR in Moscow in De-
cember 1982-a month after Antonov's arrest-
drew considerably lower billing in the Soviet media
than those of other East European leaders on the
same day.' While Andropov may simply have want-
ed to convey this message in light of global head-
lines about Bulgaria's role, the snub was no less real
to the Bulgarians.
? Eight months after that apparent snub, Zhivkov
implied to the US Ambassador in Sofia that West-
ern allegations of Bulgarian complicity in the papal
attack had complicated his relations with the new
Soviet leader.
Andropov probably was especially sensitive on this
point because he had been head of the KGB at the
time of the attack, and was directly implicated in
press speculation as the prime sponsor of the assassi-
nation attempt. The massive publicity surrounding
Antonov's arrest roughly coincided with Andropov's
election to General Secretary. Moreover, given his
intelligence experience, Andropov probably had little
tolerance for the slipshod security procedures-espe-
cially regarding the Turkish mafia-that put Bulgaria
in the international spotlight.
Soviet diplomatic pressure in support of Bulgaria
appeared to decline somewhat as the international
publicity waned. In addition, Moscow's other interna-
tional priorities, in some instances, apparently pre-
vented the USSR from giving Bulgaria as much
support as it wanted. Sofia reportedly appealed to
Moscow in the spring of 1984 to use its influence to
press Rome to resolve the Antonov affair. Moscow,
` Pravda gave front page coverage to Andropov's meeting with the
leaders from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Bul-
garia. While the names of the other three leaders were featured
prominently in the headline, Zhivkov's was conspicuously absent. In
addition, the Soviet army newspaper used noticeably smaller print
for the Bulgarian headline. As Dean of the Warsaw Pact and a
loyal Soviet ally, Zhivkov should have received at least equal
treatment. We view the press coverage as a deliberate slight by the
International media speculation directly implicated the then new
Soviet General Secretary Yuriy Andropov as the ultimate sponsor
of the attack, adding new strains to Bulgarian-Soviet relations. F
although sympathetic, was reportedly reluctant to
become overly involved because it assigned higher
priority to getting Prime Minister Craxi to break the
NATO consensus on INF deployment. Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko did raise the issue with Italian
Foreign Minister Andreotti during the latter's visit to
Moscow last spring. Gromyko apparently applied
relatively low-key pressure and repeated charges that
the accusations were baseless and should be dropped.
There is no firm evidence that the Bulgarians took
serious umbrage at the extent of Soviet support, but
we suspect that some Bulgarian officials privately
believed Moscow should have adopted a more active
role in pressuring the Italians.
Any friction over the fallout from the Papal assassina-
tion issue and priorities and tactics to deal with it has
added to the broader strains in Soviet-Bulgarian
relations, which have become increasingly evident in
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Moscow's decision to force Zhivkov to postpone his
visit to Bonn a few days later-part of an overall
tougher Soviet line on high-level East European con-
tacts with West Germany-undoubtedly aggravated
Zhivkov's frustration. We believe he placed high
personal importance on the trip, calculating that a
meeting with a major Western leader would help
refurbish his regime's tarnished international image.
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Now that the Italian magistrate has confirmed that
the case will go to trial, Sofia appears to be preparing
a comprehensive legal defense and an intensified
propaganda blitz to attack Agca's credibility. In its
propaganda campaign, Bulgaria has stressed the
following:
? Allegations that US officials, identified in the Bul-
garian press by name in several cases, were directly
involved in creating the anti-Bulgarian campaign.
? The contradictions, retractions, and inconsistencies
in Agca's testimony.
? Failure by Italian authorities to keep Agca in
isolation which, Sofia argues, allowed him to be
"coached" in his testimony.
? Compromises of the judicial process due to leaks of
the prosecutor's secret report to the press
In addition to undermining Agca's credibility, the
Bulgarian defense probably will concentrate sharply
on "proving" its contention that Agca was "coached"
by Italian Intelligence officials. Sofia, for example,
has challenged Agca's claim that he learned some
details about Antonov's apartment from the press. In
its own press Sofia argues the Italian media did not
report such information until after Agca disclosed it
to Italian investigators. Sofia maintains this is the
"Achilles heel" of the Italian case and will undoubt-
edly attempt to show that Agca is not only a liar but
that he could only have obtained this information
through coaching. F___-]
Bulgaria is also intensifying propaganda and diplo-
matic pressure on Italy to drop the case against
Antonov. We suspect that the Bulgarians are frustrat-
ed about their inability to influence the Italian legal
process, especially as Rome has already proved unre-
sponsive to their efforts to halt the trial. Since Sep-
tember the Bulgarians have taken a number of new
initiatives:
? Two books were published by a French lawyer and a
Greek journalist supporting Bulgarian innocence
and blaming the case on the West. We believe Sofia
had an active hand in these publications to give the
impression of international support.
? According to the Bulgarian press, an October 1984
conference of the International Association of Dem-
ocratic Lawyers in Athens agreed to organize an
international commission to investigate the Antonov
case-no doubt at Sofia's behest.
In this pretrial period, Sofia probably is also counting
on Soviet support. Because the USSR is closely linked
to the accusations against Bulgaria, Moscow probably
will closely monitor the planning and execution of
Bulgarian defensive tactics, provide support through
private diplomatic channels, and continue the propa-
ganda campaign. At the same time, however, Bulgar-
ia's concern over the case is more acute, and potential
differences with Moscow over how to handle the trial
and the international attention it will draw may
further strain bilateral relations-especially if Mos-
cow's other international priorities prevent it from
meeting Bulgarian requests. For example, Moscow's
recently expressed interest in improving East-West
ties may conflict with Sofia's desire for strong Soviet
public and diplomatic support.
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Another aspect of Sofia's strategy is the preparation
of its own "countertrial" of Agca for slander against
Bulgaria and its citizens. These quasi-legal proceed-
ings would publicize Sofia's defense and attempt to
counter the expected resurgence of negative publicity
Sofia is
making inquiries that might give the Bulgarian coun-
tertrial and its defense in Rome a gloss of internation-
al participation. Bulgaria has asked for assistance
from the United Kingdom, West Germany, France,
Turkey, and Austria in interviewing persons that
Agca has identified as associates. Sofia's precise
expectations in these requests are murky but it appar-
ently hopes it can gain some useful information to be
used to discredit Agca, and if it is denied access to
witnesses-it can claim the West refused to cooper-
ate.'
While ~ Bulgarian officials
are optimistic that the evidence established so far will
not prove Antonov guilty, Sofia is extremely worried
over the numerous uncertainties associated with the
possible fallout from the trial. Sofia probably is deeply
concerned that the judicial process will take a longer
time than projected, bring more bad publicity, and
' In one strange approach, Sofia requested that London grant
Bulgarian investigators an interview with Vladimir Kuzichkin-a
KGB officer who defected to the United Kingdom in 1982
according to British diplomats in Sofia. Agca told Bulgarian
investigators in Rome in 1983 that in Iran in 1979-80 Kuzichkin
put him in contact with Bulgarian intelligence officials to plan the
assassination. London has informed Sofia that Kuzichkin denied
any knowledge of the assassination attempt or meeting Agca and
that he would not meet with the Bulgarians. Bulgarian officials
have since used Kuzichkin's assertion that he never met Agca to
perhaps reveal new, embarrassing information. Its
leaders undoubtedly feel particularly vulnerable be-
cause the Italian judicial process could convict An-
tonov based solely on Agca's testimony. In addition,
they are worried that Antonov might not stand up
well to the stress of the trial.
especially vulnerable defendant.
(some Bulgarian offi-
cials feared that Antonov might be persuaded to
confess to "trumped up" charges. The effects of two
years in custody, the drain of a long and uncertain
trial, an impending divorce, and poor career prospects
in Bulgaria-even if released-make Antonov an
We have also detected signs of nervousness in Bulgar-
ia that Antonov's revelations of his other activities as
an intelligence officer might cause a new scandal.
might be inclined to trade information for clemency.
Guilty or innocent, Antonov might even confess.
From now until the end of the trial, we believe Sofia
will be more assertive behind the scenes than at any
time since Antonov's arrest. Within its limited ability
to influence developments, it will use a mixture of
diplomatic pressure, disinformation, and conciliatory
gestures to shape developments in Rome and influ-
ence world public opinion.
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Sofia's current vulnerability over the Antonov
affair might also induce it to make unexpected ges-
tures of cooperation in areas of special concern to the
West. The regime, for example, could share sensitive
information with Western governments on narcotics
smugglers or some terrorist activities. Such gestures
would be crafted for maximum propaganda value, and
verification would be a key problem for the West.
Sofia would have to ensure that it did not make
gestures that conflict with overall Soviet objectives.
Within its limited maneuvering room, Sofia's need to
improve its image could serve Western interests! In
our view, however, it can not go so far as to alter the
basic thrust of its pro-Soviet foreign policy
At the trial itself, we believe Sofia might react to
various possible outcomes in the following ways:
? U, in the outcome most preferred by Bulgaria,
Antonov is acquitted, Sofia would quickly and
firmly press Italy officially to terminate the case lest
loose ends perpetuate the scandal. We would also
expect a strong blast at the United States, with
Sofia reaffirming that the United States was the
main instigator behind the scandal. The anti-US
rhetoric, however, probably would ease relatively
soon because Bulgaria's interests would better be
served by resuming normal diplomatic relations and
especially its pursuit of expanded economic relations
with the United States.
? If the court convicts Antonov based solely on Agca's
largely uncorroborated testimony, Sofia probably
would begin a lengthy appeals process, increase
diplomatic pressure on Italy, and continue its propa-
ganda efforts. In addition to the probable staging of
a "countertrial," we would expect the Bulgarians to:
Argue that the West should maintain relations
on a normal basis pending decisions on its
appeal.
- Seek Soviet pressure on those Western govern-
ments most concerned about East-West ten-
sions.
' For example, in 1978 Zhivkov extradited four Baader Meinhof
terrorists to West Germany in a move designed to improve bilateral
We believe that Bulgaria would expect such offensive
measures to increase Western divisions on the case
and Sofia, with Soviet help, probably would try to
isolate the United States from others in the West by
placing Washington at the center of a deliberate
"anti-Bulgarian provocation."
? If the court convicts Antonov based on decisive new
documentary evidence or testimony of surprise wit-
nesses, we would expect considerably sharper repri-
sals from Sofia, including:
Breaking diplomatic relations with Rome and
reducing diplomatic contacts with Washington.
- Asking Moscow to apply concerted pressure
abroad to raise the case as a major, US-
instigated effort to destroy East-West relations.
Sofia would be extremely concerned that the United
States would urge coordinated Western trade sanc-
tions against Bulgaria and would intensify efforts to
cultivate important Western partners-like Japan and
The papal assassination scandal is unlikely to have
much impact on the normally passive, non-Catholic
Bulgarian population and will not weaken the re-
gime's grip on the instruments of power. At the same
time, we believe that it will deepen cynicism about
Bulgaria's subservience to the USSR and undermine
the legitimacy of the party leadership.
The secretive, conspiratorial nature of the system in
Bulgaria assures that only a few officials would know
if Sofia did actually have a role in the assassination
attempt. The rest, we believe, may calculate that
either Bulgaria:
? May have had a role, but only because Moscow
ordered the operation for its own separate reasons.
? Had no role, but its unfailing loyalty to Moscow
buttressed the general assumption of its guilt.
? Was simply a pawn of the Soviets who directed
Agca, perhaps even using Bulgarian agents or assets
without informing Sofia.
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The cumulative impact of the scandal may provide
additional ammunition to those in the leadership who
already question the costs of unswerving loyalty to the
USSR. If so, the incident could add to existing strains
between pragmatists, who advocate economic reform
and closer ties to the West, and old-guard pro-Soviets
as they prepare for the succession struggle to the 73-
year-old Zhivkov.
The traditional pro-Soviet forces in the leadership-
epitomized by Prime Minister Grisha Filipov-are
likely to argue that the scandal proves that Sofia
should not gamble on cooperation with a basically
hostile West. They are likely to press for even closer
Bloc integration, loyalty to Moscow, and resistance to
Western influence, while using the regime's anti-US
propaganda as a lever to seek favor in Moscow and to
compromise the pragmatist program at home. These
forces would use the possible isolation of Bulgaria and
Western economic sanctions to bolster its argument.
Pragmatists-like the younger technocrats exempli-
fied by Ognyan Doynov-might argue that Bulgaria
needs closer ties with the West and reduced economic
dependence on the USSR in order to improve econom-
ic growth prospects. Some may press to reassess and
reduce activities that are most offensive to the West
and bring little long-term benefit to Bulgaria-like
arms deliveries to Nicaragua. This debate will influ-
ence the balance of power between the conservatives
and pragmatists as individual leaders try to strength-
en their own positions and policies in preparation for
Zhivkov's eventual departure.
Zhivkov may personally endorse continued efforts to
expand ties with the West-including the United
States-and may grow more impatient with the de-
mands of his subservient role in Moscow. At the same
time, he is not likely to challenge the USSR directly.
We think that his heirs, however, will eventually
strike their own balance between the costs and bene-
fits of close ties to Moscow. The next generation is
likely to be more aware than its predecessors of the
costs and less appreciative of what Soviet support has
meant in the past. As a result of experiences like the
papal assassination scandal, they may be inclined to
carve a more autonomous, international niche for
their country, one that could from time to time
conflict with Soviet priorities.
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