TURKEY: IMPACT OF POPULATION GROWTH

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• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 22, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Confidential
Turkey:
Impact of Population Growth
Confidential
EUR 84-10239
December 1984
245
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Aegean Branch, EURA
This paper was prepared by Office
of European Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Iberia-
Confidential
EUR 84-10239
December 1984
Intelligence 25X1
Directorate of
Turkey:
Impact of Population Growth
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Turkey:
Impact of Population Growth) 25X1
Key Judgments Turkey's new civilian government under Turgut Ozal is trying to restruc-
Information available ture the economy along free market lines, a controversial experiment that
as of 23 November 1984 has begun to erode the traditionally dominant role of the state. This
was used in this report.
government and its successors will have to cope with large population
growth and massive youth unemployment for the remainder of this
century. Because joblessness among youth-combined with the pressures
of rapid social and economic change-was a critical factor in the unrest
and violence that brought down the last civilian government in September
1980, we believe the potential for serious disturbances in Turkey will
remain great.
Although Turkey's population growth is slowing as a result of declining
fertility, over the next 15 years we expect:
? Total population will grow roughly 46 percent over 1980-an annual
average of 1.9 percent-to 67 million; the number of Turks aged 15 to 24
will increase from 9 million to 13 million.
? Job creation at best probably will only match labor force growth; some
1.8 million Turks may be without jobs in the year 2000-compared with
1.9 million in 1980 and a peak of 2.2 million in 1985.
? Turks in the 15-to-24 age group may account for 60 percent of the
unemployed by the year 2000. The unemployment rate for this group is
likely to reach 25 percent-compared with 21 percent in 1980.
? Only one-sixth of new jobs will be created on farms; nonfarm employ-
ment will nearly double to 57 percent of the total.
? The urban population will nearly double to 40 million and boost its share
of total population to 60 percent; metropolitan Istanbul will have some 9
million residents by the end of the century.
? The number of secondary school graduates in the labor force will double
to 3 million; reducing the unemployment rate significantly for this group
from 1980's 28 percent will pose a major challenge for Ankara.
These trends will profoundly affect the Turkish political scene. Increasing
urbanization and better education will not only lessen the influence of
traditional rural conservatism but will also raise expectations. The increase
in the nonagricultural labor force is likely to expand greatly the size and in-
fluence of organized labor, raising the potential for labor-government
confrontations.
iii Confidential
EUR 84-10239
December 1984
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Although the Ozal government has made impressive beginnings in institut-
ing reforms to accommodate the problems that demographic change will
bring, both the political and economic reforms could unravel. Turkey's
democratic institutions are fragile and vulnerable to political instability
and terrorism. Many of the economic and social problems associated with
rapid population growth will take years to correct, even under the best of
circumstances. In particular, the prospect of prolonged massive unemploy-
ment among the nation's youth raises the specter of a renewal of unrest and
violence in the years ahead, which could once again bring the military "out
of the barracks" to install authoritarian government.
In our view, this is the most likely alternative to a continued evolution
toward democracy if Turkey's leaders prove unable to cope with the
pressures of demographic change. In the light of the country's history and
the challenges it will confront, there is a very high probability that an
episode of military rule-perhaps a prolonged one-will recur by the end
of the century. Other alternatives-such as a move toward Islamic
radicalism-are also conceivable but not very likely, in our view, largely
because the military is almost certain to retain the strength and will to sup-
press them.
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Key Judgments
Emergence of the Demographic Issue
Surging Population Growth
I
Lagging Job Creation
2
Rising Unemployment
2
Urbanization
4
Government Responses to Population Growth
5
Birth Control Programs
5
Modernization
5
Prospects for Future Population Growth
7
Impact on the Labor Force
8
Impact on Employment
9
Impact on Urbanization
12
Prospects for External Migration
12
Social and Political Implications
14
Unemployment
14
Urbanization
15
Potential for Unrest and Violence
15
Outlook: Can the System Cope?
18
Military Intervention
19
The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism
19
Dictatorship of the Left
19
Dictatorship of the Right
20
Turkish Statistics
21
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Turkey:
Impact of Population Growth
Introduction
Turkey in the past two decades has been shaken by
political, religious, and labor unrest. Political violence
has twice precipitated military intervention. The mili-
tary imposed partial martial law from March 1971 to
September 1973 and took full control from September
1980 to December 1983. The most recent episode was
triggered by a wave of unrest and violence that
reached a peak in 1979-80 with some 3,200 killings in
the 21 months before the imposition of military rule.
Although the unrest and violence are in part the
product of tensions involving unassimilated ethnic and
religious minorities, political violence accelerated af-
ter a period of rapid population growth and sociologi-
cal change that severely strained the country's politi-
cal institutions and economic structure.
Table I
Turkey: Socioeconomic Indicators
Persons per physician
Person per auxiliary
health worker
Urban-rural differences in
vital statistics
Births per 1,000
population
Deaths per 1,000
population
This research paper will review the demographic
trends that have formed the backdrop to violence and
military rule in Turkey and analyze the links between
them. In addition, it will project population trends,
analyze their social implications, and assess the ability
of the political and economic institutions to deal with
the challenges they will face.
Emergence of the Demographic Issue
Demographic trends have added enormously to the
problems that Turkish policymakers have had to
confront since the end of World War II. The popula-
tion explosion that took place in these four decades
intensified the challenges that Turkey as a developing
country would have had to face in any event:
? Providing enough services to satisfy the basic needs
of the rural masses flooding into the new and old
urban centers.
? Providing enough jobs to hold unemployment within
socially tolerable levels.
? Coping with the social tensions inherent in the
mingling of disparate ethnic and religious groups in
the industrial centers of modern Turkey.
Life expectancy at birth
(years)
Infant mortality
(per 10,000 live births)
Literacy rate, age 10
and over
Of which, urban
Literacy rate, age 10-14
Of which, urban
Graduates as a share of
population age 15 and over
Primary
Middle and secondary
Of which, secondary
College
3,298 a
3,435
2,528
1,964 b
3,479
1,881
1,073
636 b
34
41
58
68
NA
65
73
NA
48
55
77
85
NA
83
88
NA
4.2
5.5
7.2
14.5
NA
NA
3.7
7.2
0.6
0.7
1.3
2.6
a 1951.
b 1979.
c Dentists, registered nurses, midwives, and health administrators.
d 1955-60.
e 1960-65.
r1965-70.
g 1967.
h 1974-75.
Surging Population Growth. The population jumped
from roughly 19 million to 46 million from 1945 to
1980, an average annual growth of 2.6 percent. The
current (1981-85 average) population growth rate is
2.2 percent annually, but the number of Turks still is
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Table 2
Turkey: Labor Force and Employment by Economic Sector
Transport and 237 232 5
communications
increasing by about 1 million annually-a rate second
only to Iran in the region. Improving public health
services are a main factor behind current growth, with
the death rate falling more quickly than the birth rate
(table 1).
Lagging Job Creation. Job creation over the past 20
years has been sluggish in the face of growing needs,
mainly because of shrinking employment opportuni-
ties in agriculture. As a result of rapidly expanding
mechanization and increasing use of fertilizers and
improved seed, the virtual doubling of agricultural
output between 1960 and 1980 was accomplished
without any increase in the work force. In fact, farm
employment fell 1.2 percent during these years. Di-
minished employment opportunities in agriculture
have hurt mainly landless sharecroppers, particularly
in the Black Sea, West Anatolia, Marmara, and
Central Anatolia Regions.
Turkish governments have sought unsuccessfully to
take up the slack with large industrial and infrastruc-
tural investments and policies intended to stimulate
private nonagricultural investments. Job creation in
industry, nonetheless, has been disappointingly low,
accounting for only about one-third of the 4-percent
annual gain in urban employment during the 1961-80
period. Other sectors-principally services, and in-
cluding the armed forces-accounted for 60 percent
of the increase. By 1980, nonagricultural activity
accounted for 42 percent of total employment, up
from 25 percent in 1960 (table 2).
Rising Unemployment. Unemployment has climbed
steadily for the last two decades. In 1970, 6.4 percent
of the labor force was unemployed, up from 1 percent
in 1960. At the end of the 1979/80 recession, some
1.9 million Turkish workers, 10.7 percent of the active
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Table 3
Turkey: Unemployment Rates by Sex,
Age Group, and Level of Education,
1980
Figure 1
Turkey: Population and Labor Force,
1930-2000
Secondary school 28.4 23.5 43.5
graduates
All other educational
levels
labor force, were without jobs.' Persons in the 15-to-
24 age group, particularly those with secondary school
diplomas, have borne the brunt of unemployment,
with a 1980 jobless rate almost double the national
average (table 3). Nearly 60 percent of the unem-
ployed in 1980 were in this age group, most (including
discharged military conscripts Z) seeking first jobs. A
sizable number of the jobless, however, now are
experienced industrial workers who lost their jobs
during the 1979/80 recession. The jobless are concen-
trated in urban areas, where unemployed students and
workers have been joined by the rural unemployed in
search of jobs in growing urban industries.
' The unemployment estimates used in this paper are those of the
author and represent his calculation of the "core" unemployment
rate. They are considerably lower than the commonly accepted
estimates of Turkish unemployment, which ranged as high as 20
percent of the labor force in 1980. These figures, in the author's
view, are based on the inclusion of some questionable categories in
the labor force, such as housewives and urban males over 50 who
have not worked for prolonged periods, who probably cannot be
counted as unemployed in the sense of actively seeking jobs. In fact,
Turkish official statistics vary widely, depending on the issuing
office or agency. The Turkish Census, for example, reported
unemployment figures in 1980 that went as low as 4.5 percent in
October. This excessively low estimate apparently included all
persons who had done any work-even casual labor or odd jobs-in
the week preceding enumeration as "employed."
' About 80 percent of the 750,000 members of the Turkish armed
forces in 1980 were conscripts. Males are drafted at age 20
(educational deferments to age 32 are permitted) and serve for a
period of 22 months. Turnover, thus, is roughly 330,000 conscripts
0 1930 80 2000
The unemployment situation would be worse if not for
the slow growth of the labor force-only 1.7 percent
annually during 1961-80. The apparent discrepancy
between slow labor force growth and rapid growth in
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Table 4
Turkey: Labor Force Participation Rates, 1980
the working-age population, particularly among the
15-to-24 year-old population, reflects in large part the
withdrawal of women from the labor force. The
decline in working women largely is a result of rising
agricultural productivity resulting from increased
mechanization, which has reduced the need for wom-
en to work on family farms. It is also a byproduct of
the migration from rural to urban areas where-in
common with most Muslim countries-jobs for wom-
en are scarce. The trek to the cities also has produced
a decline in average male participation rates because
of enhanced educational opportunities for those in the
15-to-24 age group and scarcer job opportunities for
those 50 and over (see table 4).3 Despite the low
growth rate, however, the labor force expanded by
some 300,000 persons annually during the 1970s,
reaching 18.1 million persons in 1980.
The decline in Turkey's male labor force participation rate during
the past 20 years has been well below the average for the country's
neighbors in the north and east Mediterranean region. Turkey's
female participation rate, on the other hand, has declined substan-
tially more than the average, being exceeded only by that of Syria.
See table A-1 for comparative labor force statistics for 12 of
Turkey's neighbors in the north and east Mediterranean region.
Another factor helping to dampen labor force growth
during the last two decades has been the migration of
skilled and semiskilled Turkish workers abroad. The
Turkish State Planning Organization estimates the
net outflow from 1963 to 1980 at 42,000 to 46,000
workers annually (excluding dependents) -roughly
equivalent to 15 percent of the increment in the
Turkish labor force during the period. From 1963 to
1974, most went to Western Europe-mainly West
Germany-under guest worker agreements between
the Turkish Employment Service and West European
governments.4 Following heavy restrictions on new
migrants by the West European countries after 1974,
most Turkish workers have since gone to Libya and
other Middle Eastern countries.
Urbanization. Agricultural mechanization and the
rapid growth of the industrial and service sectors have
stimulated urbanization. Urban population growth
? Under the agreements, Turkish workers had to be at least 25 years
old and to have at least primary school diplomas to qualify for the
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has averaged about 4.7 percent annually in the last
two decades, with about one-half of it the result of
rural-urban migration, as (mostly young) people
moved to the cities in search of jobs. Urban expan-
sion-some 740,000 persons annually in the 1970s-
has raised the urban population (residents of cities and
towns of 10,000 or more) from 30 percent of the total
in 1960 to 45 percent in 1980-a figure that is still
well below the level in most other countries in the
region.'
The expansion of urban housing has fallen far behind
population growth. A growing share of urbanites live
in shantytowns (gecekondus) surrounding the cities.
An extreme example is Ankara, where close to one-
half of the city's 1.9 million people (1980) live in such
shantytowns.
On the brighter side, impressive progress has been
made in health and education, despite Turkey's limit-
ed funds and administrative resources. Gains in medi-
cal care, provision of potable water supplies, and
sanitation improvements have continued to lower the
death rate and to increase life expectancy. At the
same time, substantial increases in school enrollment
rates have greatly reduced illiteracy and improved the
skill level of the labor force.
The countryside has been left well behind and has
more in common with Turkey's Asian than European
neighbors.' Rural infant mortality remains far higher
than in urban areas, and life expectancy averages 56
years, compared with 64 years in the cities (table 1).
The persisting lag in rural primary education, espe-
cially in the eastern half of the country, is responsible
for the very slow decline in the number of illiterates.
' We use the Turkish Government's definition of urban areas.
According to the conventional UN definition-residents of cities
and towns of 20,000 or more-40 percent of Turkey's population
resided in urban areas in 1980.
6 College enrollment has lagged, owe' h ver. Although the government
embarked on a program in the late 1970s to greatly expand college
facilities, it is nowhere near satisfying the demand for college
places. In 1980, 467,000 applicants competed in entrance exams for
' See table A-2, for comparative socioeconomic statistics for 12 of
Turkey's neighbors in the north and east Mediterranean region.
Government Responses to Population Growth
Birth Control Programs. The government has sought
to improve living standards by preventing a return to
the 3-percent annual population growth rates of the
1950s. A family planning program was begun in 1965
to provide birth control information and services, and
abortion was authorized in 1967 for a broad range of
medical causes. By 1971, nearly 5,000 medical per-
sonnel were participating in the birth control pro-
gram, and more than 500 birth control clinics were in
operation throughout the country. The government
has made extensive use of the communications media
to promote family planning, and its efforts have been
supplemented by those of the private Turkish Family
Planning Association, founded in 1963.
The program has had a substantial impact. By 1968,
one-third of women at risk of pregnancy were practic-
ing birth control, and by 1978 the figure had risen to
one-half. As a consequence, the total fertility rate (the
number of children an average woman would have
during her childbearing years) dropped from 5.2 in
1975 to 4.4 in 1980. City dwellers have been most
responsive to family planning; in rural areas, a large
family still tends to be viewed as an economic asset as
well as a demonstration of virility. The total fertility
rate for urban women stood at 3.5 in 1980 compared
with 4.4 in 1975, whereas that for rural women had
only dropped to 5.4 from 5.8
Modernization. At the founding of the Turkish Re-
public, Istanbul was the economic-as well as the
governmental and social-cultural-center of the coun-
try. The Ataturk government's decision to shift the
capital to Ankara in Central Anatolia was indicative
of its commitment to extend industrial development
and modern infrastructure, as well as health, educa-
tional, and other socioeconomic services, throughout
the country. One major means of extending industri-
alization has been the establishment of State Econom-
ic Enterprises (SEEs), which in 1980 accounted for
some 20 percent of employment (and 30 percent of
value added) in manufacturing and about 10 percent
of total nonagricultural jobs. The government has
located many of the SEEs in the east in an effort to
offset the tendency of private firms to locate in the
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Table 5
Turkey: Regional Distribution of Labor Force,
Employment, and Unemployment, 1980, and
Average Annual Growth Rates, 1961-80 a
Total Labor
Force
Unemployment Total
Employed
Agriculture
Non-
agriculture
Of Which,
Industrial
Distri-
bution
Growth Distri-
bution
Rate b
Distri-
bution
Growth Distri-
bution
Growth Distri-
bution
Growth Distri-
bution
Growth
Turkey (67 provinces)
100.0
1.8
100.0
10.7
100.0
1.2
100.0
-0.1
100.0
4.0
100.0
3.4
Marmara (8)
19.6
5.8
22.4
12.2
19.2
2.0
11.0
-0.5
30.5
4.0
36.3
4.8
Of which, Istanbul
9.1
4.0
11.2
13.2
8.8
3.7
0.1
-0.7
19.7
4.1
25.8
5.4
Aegean (4)
10.4
2.4
10.1
10.4
10.5
1.9
10.1
0.9
11.0
3.6
9.1
1.3
Of which, Izmir
5.0
3.4
4.6
9.9
5.1
3.0
3.7
1.9
6.9
4.1
4.9
1.2
West Anatolia (8)
7.8
1.0
7.5
10.2
7.9
0.4
8.4
-0.7
7.1
3.1
8.4
2.3
Black Sea (10)
13.8
0.9
15.1
11.8
13.6
0.2
15.9
-0.9
10.5
4.1
11.7
2.7
Mediterranean (4)
8.4
2.8
8.2
10.3
8.5
2.3
9.0
1.3
7.8
4.7
8.6
4.9
Of which, Adana
3.0
3.2
3.2
11.1
3.0
2.7
3.1
1.7
3.0
4.4
3.7
5.2
Central Anatolia (15)
23.4
1.4
24.6
11.3
23.2
0.9
24.0
-0.6
22.2
4.5
16.9
2.8
Of which, Ankara
5.8
3.1
5.0
9.3
5.9
2.9
2.5
-0.8
10.4
5.1
6.5
3.8
East Anatolia (13) b
11.6
1.3
8.4
7.7
12.0
0.9
15.6
0.3
7.1
3.5
5.7
3.6
Southeast Anatolia (5) c
5.0
1.6
3.7
7.9
5.1
1.2
6.0
0.3
3.9
4.0
3.5
3.3
Istanbul, Izmir, Adana, and
Ankara
22.9
3.5
24.0
11.2
22.8
3.2
10.2
0.8
40.1
4.4
40.9
4.4
a For a listing of the provinces in each region, see table A-3.
b Of the nonagricultural labor force in East Anatolia, about one-
third represent the armed forces.
c Of the nonagricultural labor force in Southeast Anatolia, about
one-fifth represent the armed forces.
west. It has made considerable progress in these
efforts, but average levels of industrial and socioeco-
nomic development and per capita income remain
substantially higher in the west.' Indeed, Istanbul's
share of total industrial employment actually has
risen since 1960 (table 5).
There are some striking contrasts. Although only 52nd in level of
urban literacy, Gaziantep Province in Southeast Anatolia ranks
seventh among Turkey's 67 provinces in level of industrialization,
fourth in urbanization, and 16th in the percent of households with
electricity. Moreover, three provinces each in the Marmara and
Black Sea Regions and eight in Central Anatolia are closer to the
provinces of East and Southeast Anatolia than to other western and
central provinces in levels of industrialization and urbanization,
although their socioeconomic levels average somewhat higher. For a
comparison of urbanization, industrialization, and socioeconomic
In spite of Ankara's efforts to spread the wealth, there
remain significant disparities between those provinces
best endowed with agricultural, energy, and other
natural resources and those generally lacking in them.
Job opportunities continue to vary widely within as
well as among geographic regions, triggering substan-
tial internal migratory flows-mostly in westward and
southwestward directions-over the past 20 years (see
map). For example, the 18 provinces with the poorest
employment records during 1961-80 grew by only 1.2
percent annually. On the other hand, the 25 provinces
with the greatest employment gains during the peri-
od-reflecting increases in both agricultural and non-
agricultural employment-grew by 4.1 percent annu-
ally during the period. The Mediterranean and
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Table 6
Turkey: Regional Distribution of Total
and Urban Population, 1980, and Average
Annual Growth Rates, 1961-80 a
Percent Kurdish Population Growth
Total
Population
Urban
Population
Urban
Distri-
bution
Growth Distri-
bution
Growth
Turkey (67 provinces) 100.0
2.5
100.0
4.7
45.4
Marmara (8)
19.7
3.4
30.7
4.9
70.6
Of which,
Istanbul
8.9
5.0
22.0
5.3
92.6
Aegean (4)
8.9
2.6
10.2
3.9
51.9
Of which, Izmir
4.4
3.3
7.0
4.2
71.8
West Anatolia (8)
7.2
1.7
5.2
3.9
32.7
Black Sea (10)
13.4
1.9
7.5
4.0
25.4
Mediterranean (4)
8.8
3.5
9.6
5.2
49.8
Of which, Adana
3.3
3.6
4.3
5.1
58.3
Central Anatolia (15)
24.5
2.5
24.4
5.0
45.2
Of which, Ankara
6.4
4.1
11.0
5.7
78.6
East Anatolia (13)
11.8
2.3
6.8
4.8
26.0
Southeast Anatolia (5)
5.7
3.0
5.6
5.2
44.2
Istanbul, Izmir,
Adana, and Ankara
24.9
4.3
44.3
5.2
80.7
Marmara Regions headed the list, with the slowest
growth in the West Anatolia, Black Sea, and East
Anatolia Regions' (table 6).
Prospects for Future Population Growth
Despite the reduction in fertility rates in the last 10 to
15 years, Turkey's population problems will remain
formidable in the years ahead. We estimate the
population will grow to between 65.4 million and 68.2
million by the end of the century, with a midrange
projection of 66.9 million. In other words, we believe
Turkey's population will grow by about 1 million
' For statistical comparisons among these 43 provinces, see tables
A-4 and A-5. The correlation between gains in industrialization and
socioeconomic categories and the rate of job creation attained
during 1961-80 is surprisingly low. For example, of the 16 provinces
having the highest levels of industrialization, only 10 are among the
25 provinces with the highest employment growth during 1961-80,
while three are among the 18 provinces with the poorest employ-
ment records. On the other hand, five provinces from among the 27
with the lowest levels of industrialization rank among those with
the highest employment growth during the period
We project that the growth of the Kurdish popula-
tion-Turkey's most restive ethnic minority-will
keep pace with the growth of the general population.
Under our high projection, the Kurdish population
will rise from an estimated 4.6 million in 1980 to 6.6
million in 2000. Under our low projection, the Kurd-
ish population will reach 5.6 million. Our projections
are based on the number of Turks speaking Kurdish
as either a first or second language (2.65 million or
8.5 percent of the total population) as counted in the
census of 1965, the last census in which such irffor-
mation was published. (Ankara maintains that the
Kurds are not an ethnic minority and, therefore, does
not publish official statistics on them.) Our high
projection assumes that, because of many Kurds'
reluctance to disclose their ethnic origins, the 1965
enumeration constitutes an undercount and that their
true number was more like 10 percent of the 1965
population of 31 million. Our low projection does not
make this assumption.
Although conventional wisdom in Turkey has it that
rural Kurdish women have higher fertility rates than
other rural women, there are no fertility studies or
other reliable data to substantiate this. Because 96
percent of the Kurds lived in rural areas in 1965, we
projected both 1965figures to 1980 by the rate of
natural increase of Turkey's total rural population,
and to the year 2000 by the natural increase in our
high projection.
persons yearly through this century, compared with
900,000 persons annually during 1961-80 (table 7).10
10 Our projections are based on the assumption that the fertility rate
will decline somewhat faster in the years ahead than in the recent
past. In our high-growth scenario (1.1 million persons annually), we
assume that the reduction in the fertility rate for rural women will
drop only slightly faster than in 1976-80. Under the low-growth
scenario (970,000 persons annually), we assume that the govern-
ment's family planning program will help to bring down fertility
somewhat more rapidly among rural women than under the high-
growth scenario. In both scenarios, we assume that Turkish govern-
ments will continue to improve health care, nutrition, and potable
water supplies. Under these circumstances, we expect infant mor-
tality to drop roughly in half and life expectancy to rise to 69 years
by the year 2000 (table 8). The small range between our high and
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Table 7
Turkey: Assumed Fertility and Mortality
Rates for Population Projections,
1980-2000
Table 8
Turkey:
Labor Force Participation Rates
Total fertility rate (per woman)
High growth
4.4
3.4
2.8
Low growth
4.4
3.0
2.4
Infant mortality
(per 1,000 live births)
Derived measures
Birthrate (per 1,000)
High growth
32.9
27.5
23.0
Low growth
32.9
24.6
20.6
Death rate (per 1,000)
High growth
10.6
7.8
6.6
Low growth
10.6
7.7
6.6
2.2
2.0
2.2
1.7
Impact on the Labor Force. We expect the working-
age population to expand by only 2.7 percent a year in
the 1980s-down from 3 percent annually in the
1970s-because of past declines in fertility. A con-
tinuing deceleration in the 1990s is likely, with the
working-age population expanding at an average 2.4
percent annually. Our estimates remain essentially
the same under both our high and low projections for
total population because those who will be entering
the labor force over the next 15 years or so have
already been born. Thus, the size and composition of
the labor force in the years ahead will be determined
largely by future trends in participation rates.
We expect rising demand for farm labor to slow the
decline in female participation in the 1980s.11 The
11 Rising demand for farm labor would contrast with the normal
pattern of development in industrializing countries, where demand
for farm labor usually drops steadily. The author's more optimistic
forecasts are based on the conclusions of a World Bank study,
which projected that demand for farm labor would rise if Turkish
success in increasing agricultural exports (particularly to the Mid-
dle East) continues, and if Turkish governments continue to support
1990
2000
72.4
64.5
62.4
60.4
93.7
90.4
84.2
80.4
79.8
54.3
43.5
39.2
37.2
72.9
66.6
60.3
54.7
59.8
Men
78.6
74.0
69.3
64.0
60.0
Women
66.2
58.2
50.2
45.2
47.2
20 and older
81.1
74.5
65.5
61.5
59.8
Men
96.5
92.0
87.6
83.5
83.0
65.8
54.0
42.1
38.0
35.5
decline probably will slow further in the 1990s as
younger and better educated females become increas-
ingly accepted into nonagricultural sectors of the
economy. We also expect the declines in male labor
force participation of recent decades to slow by the
number of men in the prime working ages. Neverthe-
less, overall participation by men still will probably
drop 4 to 5 percentage points over the next two
decades, and that by women 6 to 7 percentage points
(table 9).
We expect some 4 million persons to be added to the
labor force during 1981-90-an average annual in-
crease of 2.0 percent, compared with 1.9 percent
annually in the 1970s.12 For the full 20-year period,
the labor force should increase by 9.3-9.4 million
persons. Our projected totals for the labor force for
the year 2000, thus, are 27.4-27.5 million.
We expect Turkey to continue making good progress
in increasing the educational level of the labor force.
12 The share of labor force members in the 15-to-24 age group
should slip from 34 percent in 1980 to 32 percent in 1985 and to 27
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Table 9
Turkey: Output, Employment, and
Productivity Growth Rates for 1961-80,
and Projections Through 2000
Average annual
percent change
1980. This will reduce the share of illiterates in the
labor force to about 6 percent and their share in the
total population (15 and over) to about 18 percent in
2000, compared with 30 percent in 1980.
Impact on Employment. The substantial growth of
the working-age population in the coming two decades
will test the ability of future Turkish governments to
encourage the necessary job creation. The number of
jobs created will depend not only on the overall rate of
economic growth but also on the job-creating capacity
1981-85
4.4
1.8
2.6
Agriculture
2.7
0.5
2.2
Industry
5.3
3.4
1.8
Other sectors
4.7
3.4
1.3
Agriculture
2.8
1.0
1.8
Industry
8.2
4.6
3.4
Other sectors
6.1
4.1
1.9
Intermediate growth
5.7
2.3
3.3
Agriculture
2.2
0.8
1.4
6.8
4.1
2.6
1.8
2.5
Agriculture
1.5
0.5
1.0
Industry
3.7
1.8
1.9
Other sectors
5.6
3.8
1.7
Because we expect the school-age population to grow
only 1 percent annually from 1981 to 2000-only
about one-third the rate of 1961-80-Ankara should
be able to expand enrollment rates substantially with-
out significantly increasing education's share of the
central government budget. Aided by the large recent
expansion of college facilities, the share of college
graduates in the labor force should more than dou-
ble-reaching, however, only 6 to 7 percent. At the
same time, secondary school graduates-whom we
define as skilled workers-should increase by nearly
three-fifths, to some 11 percent of the work force. The
overall literacy rate should rise to 82 percent for
persons 15 and over (92 percent for males and 71
percent for females), compared with 68 percent in
of the economic sectors driving growth.
The Turkish economy is recovering from the 1979/80
recession, aided by a fundamental restructuring de-
signed to make it more responsive to market forces
and more oriented to export markets. Real GDP,
which fell 2 percent in 1980, rose an average of 4
percent annually in 1981-83. We project average
annual growth in 1984-85 at 5 percent, giving an
average for the five-year period of 4.4 percent. This
projection assumes that:
? Ankara will maintain the international competitive-
ness of the lira achieved by the large devaluation in
January 1980 and continued exchange rate adjust-
ments since.
? The government will stick to the main features of
the 1980-83 financial stabilization program: re-
stricting government spending, maintaining realistic
interest rates, and curbing subsidies to State Eco-
nomic Enterprises. The chances for this are en-
hanced by the fact that Prime Minister Turgut
Ozal's Motherland Party won a parliamentary ma-
jority in the 6 November 1983 election, and Ozal is
the principal architect of the current economic
program.
? Turkish businessmen will retain their new outward
orientation and exploit the new exchange rate poli-
cies to develop external markets.
We calculate that economic growth of 4.4 percent
annually through 1985 will generate only about
300,000 new jobs a year compared with our projected
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To assess the job market through 1985, we have
projected growth on the basis of consensus estimates
by several authorities. To evaluate job market condi-
tions in the 1986-2000 period, we have examined
three alternative economic growth scenarios put for-
ward by the World Bank: (1) high growth, which
assumes that Turkey will continue to grow at rates
only a little below its exceptionally strong perform-
ance during 1971-77; (2) intermediate growth, which
corresponds to average performance during the 20-
year period 1961-80; and (3) low growth, which
constitutes an estimate of the downside risks that the
Turkish economy is most likely to face in the years
ahead:
assumes that domestic political exigencies, or ex-
ternal shocks, will induce occasional departures
from high-growth policies-as has been the case
three times in the past 30 years.
? Our low-growth scenario is services led. It projects
4.3 percent economic growth and assumes that a
combination of domestic political difficulties and
external shocks will consistently prevent Turkish
governments from maintaining the competitiveness
of the lira and domestic financial stability. We
believe these to be the most likely downside risks to
which the economy might be subjected in the years
ahead.
? The high-growth scenario, which specifies an indus-
try-led, 6.2-percent economic growth rate during
the period, assumes that the economic stabilization
program will remain basically intact, that frequent
exchange rate adjustments will keep the lira com-
petitive, and that businessmen will retain their new
external orientation. In these circumstances, Tur-
key could expect to enjoy a favorable current
account balance while maintaining a high level of
government and private investment expenditures-
largely domestically financed. In view of the econo-
my's demonstrated dynamism, such a regimen
could produce an even higher growth rate.
? Our intermediate scenario is also industry led. It
projects 5.7 percent GDP growth annually and dif-
fers from the high-growth scenario only in that it
labor force growth of 390,000 persons annually. A
little more than one-half of the gain in jobs will, we
believe, come from services and related sectors, while
industrial expansion probably will absorb another 30
percent. Agriculture can be expected to absorb the
remainder. The job shortfall will push up the unem-
ployment rate to about 12 percent by 1985.'
Looking ahead, we believe that a growth rate of about
5.7 percent annually-our intermediate projection-is
" In fact, because of the slower growth of job creation in the first
half of the period, the unemployment rate probably will substantial-
The scenarios contain two fundamental job-creation
assumptions which were also incorporated into our
1984-85 projections. First, we assume that maintain-
ing competitive lira exchange rates-as incorporated
in our high- and intermediate-growth scenarios-will
raise the cost of capital goods and induce industry to
use more labor-intensive production methods than in
the recent past. Specifically, we assume that the job-
creation ratio for industry will reach a level similar
to that of other countries in comparable economic
situations and rise by I percentage point over the rate
attained during 1961-80. Second, we assume higher
future costs for farm equipment and labor. Our
specific estimates for expansion of farm output and
employment for 1986-2000 are based on those of a
World Bank study mission to Turkey in May-June
1982 covering the period through 1990.
the highest that Turkey is likely to be able to sustain
for the last 15 years of the century. We therefore
think it likely that future governments will face
domestic and external pressures comparable to those
of the past and probably will respond to them in
familiar ways. The temptation to respond to unem-
ployment with expensive job creation programs and to
foreign competition with trade barriers will be high. F_
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Figure 2
Turkey: Growth of Total Population,
Working Age Population, Labor Force,
and Total Employment, 1961-2000
Total
1961-70
population
71 80
77
81-85
86-90
-7T7
, :`
T
777
777
91-2000
Working age
population
Total
Ages 15-24
Labor force
Total
employment
If Turkey can maintain this growth rate, however, the
economy will do a far better job of meeting employ-
ment needs than it did during 1961-80 (figure 2).
Economic growth at these levels would generate some
490,000 jobs annually during 1986 to 2000, virtually
equal to projected labor force growth (table 10) even if
not cutting into the numbers of unemployed. Slightly
more than one-half of the new jobs would come from
services and other sectors, 15 to 20 percent from
agriculture, and the remainder from industry. With
industrial growth averaging 6.8 percent annually,
industrial jobs would employ more than 5 million
persons by 2000; nonagricultural employment would
Table 10
Turkey: Labor Force, Employment, and
Unemployment Projections to 2000
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 Agriculture
Total employed
16,186
17,654
Unemployed
1,936
2,420
Labor force
18,122
20,074
Unemployment rate (percent)
10.7
12.1
Industry
2,818
3,529
5,532
Other sectors
5,240
6,406
9,574
Total employed
17,654
20,020
26,247
Unemployed
2,420
2,120
1,199
Labor force
20,074
22,140
27,446
Unemployment rate (percent)
12.1
9.6
4.4
Intermediate growth
Agriculture
9,596
9,986
10,814
Industry
2,818
3,445
5,149
Other sectors
5,240
6,284
9,037
Total employed
17,654
19,715
25,000
Unemployed
2,420
2,425
2,446
Labor force
20,074
22,140
27,446
Unemployment rate (percent)
12.1
11.0
8.9
Low growth
Agriculture
9,596
9,838
10,341
2,818
3,081
3,683
5,240
6,314
9,168
a Labor force, and thus unemployment, projections are based on the
medium projection for the total population, excluding external
migration. Because of the very slight differences among the high,
low, and medium labor force projections, we have not shown
separate unemployment projections for the high and low labor force
projections.
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show a 4-percent annual gain and would account for
57 percent of total jobs, up from 42 percent in 1980.
Under these positive conditions and in the absence of
external migration, the unemployment rate would
decline by about one-fourth to around 9 percent at the
end of the century (although the total number of
unemployed would remain approximately constant).
Economic growth at the high-growth, 6.2-percent
level-which we judge unlikely-would largely elimi-
nate unemployment by the late 1990s; the unemploy-
ment rate might dip to as low as 4 percent. Economic
growth at the low, 4.3-percent level, on the other
hand, would seriously intensify unemployment, with
the rate for the active labor force climbing to 15 to 16
percent by the year 2000.
Given the demographic realities, a relatively modest
change in the economic growth rate thus could have
major social and political implications for Turkey.
Impact on Urbanization. We expect urban population
growth to average 3.3 percent annually to the end of
the century, with the number of urbanites approxi-
mately doubling to 40 million and accounting for
about 60 percent of the population. With rising job
opportunities in agriculture and slower total popula-
tion growth, we expect rural-urban migration to be
somewhat lower than during the 1960s and 1970s.
Nevertheless, more than one-third of urban growth
will still be attributable to rural-urban migration.
Rural population growth will slip to 0.3 percent
annually, compared with 1.3 percent during the past
20-year period.
Economic growth and urban expansion are likely to
flourish in areas where natural resources are concen-
trated and where transportation, electric power, and
communications networks already exist. We expect
the four large metropolitan provinces-Istanbul, An-
kara, Izmir, and Adana-which together accounted
for about 40 percent of new nonagricultural jobs and
more than 45 percent of urban population growth
during 1961-80-to absorb roughly similar shares in
the years ahead.
The absolute increase in population will almost cer-
tainly continue to be greatest in Istanbul Province,
while the growth rate probably will continue to be
most rapid in Ankara Province. Based on past and
prospective trends, we expect the population of the
Istanbul metropolitan area to climb to 6.4 million by
1990 and to perhaps 9 million by the year 2000. Most
of the growth will take place in the contiguous
suburbs, which grew 12 percent annually in the past
two decades. By 1990, the population of Ankara
should hit 2.8 million, followed by the Izmir metropol-
itan area with 1.7 million, and Adana with 0.8 million
(table 11).
In the nonmetropolitan provinces, urban growth will
probably be the greatest in absolute terms in the
Central Anatolia and Marmara Regions-which en-
joyed the greatest absolute growth in both urban
population and nonagricultural jobs during 1961-80-
and the most rapid in percentage terms in the Medi-
terranean Region. Urban expansion in the Aegean,
Black Sea, and West Anatolia Regions will continue
to lag the rest of the country.
Cities of 100,000 to 500,000 population as a group
have been the most dynamic since 1960; they should
continue to show the greatest percentage growth
rates. The industrial city of Kirikkale in Ankara
Province, Turkey's most rapidly growing large city,
should top the 300,000 mark by 1990. Other dynamic
cities with strong nonagricultural employment
growth-Bursa and Izmit in the Marmara Region,
Antalya and Mersin in the Mediterranean Region,
Maras in Central Anatolia, Diyarbakir in East
Anatolia, and Gaziantep in Southeast Anatolia-
should all show population gains of 45 percent or
more during the 10-year period. Much of this growth
will come-as during 1961-80-from the migration of
young people from smaller cities and rural areas of
eastern and northern provinces.
Prospects for External Migration. Prospects seem
fairly good that foreign demand will support a net
outflow of Turkish workers for the next two years or
so at close to the 42,000-46,000 rate of 1962-80.
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Table 11
Turkey: Population Projections for
Cities of 100,000 and Over
1960
1980
1990
Projected
Balikesir
60
128
149
Bursa
152
458
684
Istanbul metropolitan area
1,614
4,477
6,388
Contiguous suburbs
161
1,624
Izmit (Kocaeli Province)
72
195
283
Izmir metropolitan area
502
1,255
1,720
Contiguous suburbs
145
475
West Anatolia Region
Denizli
49
139
200
Eskisehir
152
318
411
Black Sea Region
Adapazari (Sakarya Province)
78
135
163
Samsun
87
205
276
Trabzon
52
111
145
Zonguldak
53
112
145
Adana
230
590
816
Antalya
51
179
274
Iskenderun (Hatay Province)
61
129
166
Mersin (Icel Province)
67
222
334
Tarsus (Icel Province)
51
124
168
Central Anatolia Region
102
289
412
119
338
482
79
243
356
59
147
200
89
195
254
Southeast Anatolia Region
Gaziantep
Urfa
Beyond then, the odds are that Turkey can count on a
net migration of only some 20,000 to 30,000 workers
annually during the final 15 years or so of this century
because of growing inhospitability to Turkish workers
in Western Europe. However, the estimative range for
the later years is great. 25X1
The success of Turkish construction firms in garner-
ing contracts in Libya, Saudi Arabia, and other oil-
rich Arab states brought new jobs in the Middle East
for some 35,000 to 45,000 Turks annually during
1981-83. This flow should be sustained for a couple
more years, even though construction programs have
leveled off because of reduced oil revenues and the
completion of the construction phases of development
programs. At the same time, the number of Turkish
workers in Western Europe-principally West Ger-
many-apparently has been increasing by several
thousand (net) annually despite negative public and
official attitudes toward Turkish workers. This has
been mainly the result of West German willingness to
allow the children of Turkish workers to join their
families in West Germany as they approach working
ages.
West German policy may become more restrictive in
the next several years, given current high levels of
West German unemployment. The Kohl government
probably would like those Turks in West Germany
unwilling to become German citizens to leave, but
differences within Kohl's coalition have prevented
Bonn from implementing a program to reduce their
numbers significantly." In late 1983, for example, a
bill to cut the age at which the children of Turkish
workers living in Turkey could rejoin their families
was shelved, and a bill offering financial incentives to
unemployed Turkish workers to return home was
made so restrictive that only a few thousand could
qualify.
"The liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP)-the junior partner in
Chancellor Kohl's coalition-has strongly resisted restrictive meas-
ures against Turkish workers. The FDP traditionally has cultivated
an image of tolerance, and any deviation from this posture in regard
to Turkish workers could cause major disaffection within its ranks
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Beyond the mid-1980s, the prospects for foreign
demand for Turkish workers become increasingly
conjectural. Even if Turkey were to become a full-
fledged member of the European Community, it is
unlikely that Turkish workers would be granted the
full rights of free movement within the EC that apply
to workers in present EC member countries-at least
not for several years. Moreover, the course of world
oil prices will become an increasingly important deter-
minant of labor demand in the oil states. If oil
revenues continue to decline, demand for Turkish
workers will probably disappear.
On the other hand, if oil prices stabilize, Arab efforts
to continue diversifying the sources of expatriate
workers probably could sustain a net demand for
Turkish workers of some 10,000 to 20,000 per year
more or less indefinitely. And if renewed shortages
were to cause oil prices to soar in the years ahead, the
extent of net migration of Turkish workers to the
Middle East probably would be limited only by
conditions on the supply side. Finally, when West
Germany's native labor force begins to decline in the
1990s, it will again be forced to recruit foreign labor,
perhaps finding room for another 10,000 to 20,000
Turkish workers annually during the decade.F_~
Social and Political Implications
If our projections are accurate, future governments
will continue to face major obstacles in meeting the
needs of the Turkish people, even though long-term
trends are improving. Total and urban population
growth are both slowing, outflows of Turkish workers
to foreign lands will continue, and the growth of the
15-to-24 age group is slowing as well.
However, the working-age population will continue to
grow at rates substantially above that of the total
population throughout the rest of this century. Labor
force participation rates are unlikely to drop as sharp-
ly as they did during the 1960s, and labor force
growth will probably be sustained in the years ahead
at close to the pace of the 1970s, even if external
migration continues. The unemployment rate is still
rising and will remain close to present levels through-
out the 1980s, even though we expect it to fall fairly
sharply during the 1990s (figure 3). Meanwhile, al-
though the rate of urban expansion is slowing, the
absolute increase in the number of urbanites will be
larger than ever before
Figure 3
Turkey: Unemployment Rates Based
on Projected Foreign Demand for
Turkish Workers, 1960-2000
Percent
Unemployment. There is very little the government
can do in the years ahead to bring down unemploy-
ment at a rate faster than we have projected. Admin-
istrative efforts to force employers to use more labor-
intensive production methods or to take on unneeded
workers could endanger financial stability and lead to
even more serious problems. Similarly, a forced ex-
pansion of secondary school and college training
facilities or of military conscription could quickly
bring down unemployment in the 15-to-24 age group,
but such steps would be only temporary palliatives.F
We believe the most that Turkish governments can do
to cope with unemployment is to ensure that the
policy requirements for achieving economic growth at
the 5.7-percent level or better are maintained. As
noted above, a satisfactory rate of job creation will
require that the lira be competitive to keep the cost of
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imported equipment high and induce more labor-
intensive production methods. If this requirement is
not fully met, the job-creation capacity of industry
could slip back to 1961-80 levels. This would reduce
our midrange employment projection for 2000 by
700,000 jobs and raise our projected unemployment
rate to 8.9 percent. A competitive lira, and the
accompanying outward orientation of Turkish con-
struction firms, probably is also indispensable for
sustaining the flow of Turkish workers to the Middle
East.
Urbanization. In our judgment, it is unlikely that
Turkish governments will attempt to slow the growth
of the major urban conglomerations by directing
nonagricultural investment to smaller cities or to less
urbanized regions. This would run counter to their
need to ensure that the job-creating potential of new
investment is fully exploited. They are likely to rely
heavily on market forces to determine the geographic
distribution of new nonagricultural investment. Most
future nonfarm investment probably will continue to
be distributed regionally very much as in the recent
past. Any government probably will ensure for politi-
cal reasons that the far eastern provinces continue to
receive a significant share of new investment, but
governments are likely to rely more on the growing
mobility of Turkish workers to take them where the
new jobs are.
Despite the increasing absolute size of Turkey's urban
concentrations, the initial shock of urbanization is
already past; future governments should be able to
maintain and possibly even improve the provision of
basic health and educational services to urbanites.
Housing will be another matter, as the share of
urbanites living in shantytowns unquestionably will
rise substantially. Ankara has made significant efforts
to improve the livability of the gecekondus by provid-
ing electric power, potable water, sewer connections,
and other services. These programs almost certainly
will continue, and even modest progress could pay
considerable dividends in terms of limiting unrest and
boosting support for the government.
Potential for Unrest and Violence
The economic and demographic developments we
project will make Turkey a very different place to live
by the year 2000:
? About 14 million people-a bit more than one-half
of a labor force of 27 million-will have nonagricul-
tural jobs; most of the growth in nonagricultural
employment will take place in the 16 provinces that
had the greatest growth in both employment and
total population in the 1960s and 1970s.
? Approximately 40 million Turks-60 percent of the
total-will live in cities; again, much of this growth
will be concentrated in Turkey's 16 most dynamic
provinces.
? Slightly more than 80 percent of the population in
the 15-and-over age group will be literate.
? Ethnic Kurds will number some 6.6 million, about
10 percent of the population; we expect an increas-
ing share to join the westward and southwestward
flow of job-seeking young migrants.
? Unemployment will remain high-only slightly
down from 2.2 million in 1985 and 2.1 million in
1990; more than 60 percent of the unemployed will
be in the 15-to-24 age group, and the great majority
will most likely continue to be secondary school
graduates
These developments are likely, we believe, to erode
traditional conservative political forces in Turkey.
Rising urbanization will reduce the share of the
population directly subject to traditional rural client-
patron relationships and over time lessen the influence
of traditional rural conservatism. In the case of the
Kurds, the domination of the agas-tribal leaders and
large landowners-is likely to begin to slip. Higher
literacy rates also will tend to make the average Turk
better informed of conditions inside and outside Tur-
key and more demanding of government. Expansion
of the nonagricultural labor force will undoubtedly
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Political and Religious Unrest and Violence
The high correlation in recent years between rising
unemployment among the 15-to-24 age group in
Turkey and increased antisocial activity provides
circumstantial evidence that the two phenomena are
closely related. This age group has created problems
in many societies, although it is usually more prone
to common criminality than organized political
crime. The lack of opportunity to fulfill their career
aspirations has borne heavily on young men with
secondary school educations. Unemployment rates
for this group were extremely high and the path to
university training was blocked for most by the
woeful lack of college facilities. Thus, it seems likely
that a substantial share of the `political'-and,
perhaps to a lesser extent, religious-unrest and
violence of recent years is traceable to the large
increase in the number of frustrated young men with
too much time on their hands.
The experience of most other countries has, neverthe-
less, demonstrated that high unemployment rates are
not in themselves sufficient to explain unrest and
violence. This also appears to be confirmed by the
Turkish experience. To examine this connection, we
compared unemployment rates for 15-to-24 year-old
males and for male secondary school graduates in the
violence prone provinces with those for provinces in
which little or no violence has been reported. For
example, we compared Istanbul and Adana, where
extensive "political" violence occurred, with the con-
trol provinces of Bursa and Kocaeli, where little or
none was reported. In the case of Kurdish separatist
agitation, we have compared seven provinces having
the most reported Kurdish disturbances with four
other provinces reporting Kurdish majorities or near-
majorities in the 1965 census.
Our results (table 12) clearly demonstrate that fac-
tors other than high unemployment were involved in
producing unrest and violence. Although unemploy-
ment rates in the violence prone provinces generally
averaged a little higher than those in the control
provinces, there are a number of exceptions. In any
case, the differences appear too small to be signifi-
cant. We believe our results may partly reflect migra-
tion of young men from relatively peaceful provinces
to provinces where organized terrorist gangs were
already in existence. In sum, we believe unrest and
violence can only be understood in the light of the full
range of social and economic pressures to which
Turkey has been subject.
produce a large rise in labor union membership,
commensurately increasing the influence of organized
labor. The growing number of persons with secondary
school diplomas and college degrees will place new
and greater demands on government for jobs com-
mensurate with their skills and expectations.
A brief review of the driving impulses of the violence
of the 1960s and 1970s suggests that these develop-
ments carry high risks of social and political instabil-
ity. The violence of the period can be broken down
into three component categories:
? Political unrest and violence, which involved rival
terrorist groups with radical political and social
goals. These groups were divided along leftist (most-
ly Marxist, including the Kurdish separatist agita-
tors) and rightist lines. These groups warred mainly
on each other, but also mounted attacks against
public officials and other prominent persons, as well
as the general public. In our view, they presented
the major threat to Turkish stability and did the
most to provoke subsequent military intervention.
? Religious unrest and violence, which arose from
conflicts between the majority Sunnis and Alevi
Muslims. The Alevis, who are estimated to number
about 12 million, or one-fourth of the total popula-
tion, belong to a branch of Shiism and have differ-
ent religious beliefs and practices from the Sunnis.
They have been identified in the public mind as
leftists. Unrest and violence involving them usually
took the form of mob action by Sunnis, who tended
to blame the Alevis indiscriminately for atrocities
allegedly committed by leftist terrorists.
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Table 12
Turkey: Unemployment Rates for
Males Over 15, 15 to 24, and Secondary
School Graduates, 1980 a
Over 15 15 to 24 Secondary
School
Graduates
All other violence-
prone provinces (14) b
All other control
provinces (16) b
Violence
prone (3)
Kurdish
Provinces: d
Violence
prone (7)
12.9
19.3
23.9
10.6
16.4
23.2
14.1
22.2
24.8
12.8
19.2
25.6
a Includes only the 34 provinces for which detailed 1980 data are
available; these provinces are listed in table A-3.
b Data for these provinces have been adjusted to exclude the armed
forces since their presence exerts a dampening influence on unem-
ployment rates.
c The four Alevi Provinces are: (violence-prone) Elazig, Erzincan,
Malatya, and (control) Yozgat.
d The 11 Kurdish Provinces are (violence-prone) Adiyaman, Agri,
Bingol, Diyarbakir, Mardin, Siirt, Urfa, and (control) Bitlis, Hak-
kiri, Mus, and Van.
The unrest and violence were overwhelmingly urban
phenomena. Young men 15 to 24 were responsible for
more than 80 percent of the "political" violence. As a
group, political terrorists were far better educated
than the general Turkish populace but predominantly
of lower-middle-class or lower-class origin." Men
from the 15-to-24 age group also played important
roles in religious and labor unrest and violence, but
age, education, and class origin were not distinguish-
ing features of the latter two forms of unrest. Apart
from the Kurds, Turkey's several ethnic minority
groups 16 did not play significant roles in the unrest
and violence. Even in the case of the Kurds, there is
no evidence that the young, mostly Marxist activists
ever received significant support from the general
Kurdish population.
"Political" and labor unrest and violence were con-
centrated in the four large metropolitan provinces of
Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Adana. Diyarbakir and
several other eastern provinces were the main centers
of Kurdish separatist agitation. Religious unrest and
violence were largely confined to several eastern
provinces containing large concentrations of Alevis."
? Labor unrest and massive strikes, which took place
in support of demands that went beyond customary
bread-and-butter issues. Labor acted to enforce its
views on issues to embrace wider issues such as
labor participation in management and the repeal of
legislation unfavorable to organized labor. Relative-
ly little violence actually took place, although the
threat was clear in the public mind.
Mardin, Urfa, and Siirt Provinces; Zazas, concentrated in Diyarba-
kir, Bingol, Elazig, and Urfa Provinces; Circassians, concentrated
in Kayseri Province; Greeks and Armenians, concentrated in
Istanbul; and Georgians and Laz, concentrated in Artvin, Rize,
Sakarya, and Ordu Provinces.
" Largely because of the apparen reluctance ot The Turkish press
to accurately identify instances of sectarian violence, we are not
certain as to how much of the unrest and violence in the Alevi
Provinces was religious and how much would be more accurately
termed "political.' I
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Outlook: Can the System Cope?
Turkey is at a turning point. The military took power
in 1980 because previous democratic governments
were unable to control the mounting violence which
was a product of social and economic change. It has
returned power to a democratic, civilian government,
but progress toward a strengthening of democratic
institutions and procedures will be slow. A multiparty
system is struggling to emerge, the Grand National
Assembly has regained its legislative function, and
civilian courts have assumed some of their former
judicial authority. Nevertheless, the executive func-
tion is still shared between a president who represents
military interests and a civilian prime minister.
The need to reform and rebuild the Turkish economy
in the face of major demographic change makes the
democratic experiment even more fragile. The Ozal
government is trying to restructure the economy along
free market lines, a revolutionary and controversial
experiment that has begun to move Turkey away from
its traditional adherence to the statist philosophy of
Kemal Ataturk. The goals are to encourage economic
growth, provide more jobs, and make Turkey more
self-reliant and competitive. A beginning has been
made on eliminating some of the bureaucratic and
administrative constraints on the private sector of the
economy and on shifting investment resources from
the state sector to the private sector. Private enter-
prises have responded with an impressive show of
dynamism-exports are on the rise, industrial produc-
tion is growing, and inflation has begun to moderate.
Success, however, is far from complete-unemploy-
ment, in particular, continues to be discouragingly
high
Any fundamental resolution of Turkey's problems will
require considerable time and a sustained commit-
ment on the part of this and future governments. Such
a commitment will be extremely difficult to main-
tain-perhaps impossible, over the time frame of this
paper. The free market reforms the present govern-
ment is promoting strike at the interests of a substan-
tial share of the political and bureaucratic elites-
indeed, there has already been considerable grum-
bling among them. Below the level of the elites, there
are bound to be some painful dislocations as what has
been a sheltered economy is exposed to the forces of
the free market. In addition, to a considerable degree
the health of the Turkish economy is linked to that of
the world economy and thus is beyond the control of
Turkish policymakers. Finally, whatever degree of
success Turkish governments may have in expanding
economic opportunity and essential services to meet
growing needs, the expectations of an increasingly
literate and urbanized population may be rising faster
than the system's ability to meet them.
The ability of Turkish governments to meet the
multiple challenges with which economic development
and demographic change will confront them are vital
to the future of democracy in Turkey. Looking ahead
to the end of the century, we find it difficult to be very
confident. The patterns and habits of authoritarian
rule have deep roots, which go back to the long
centuries of Ottoman rule and which remain, despite
the counteracting development of democratic institu-
tions and traditions in this century.
The founder of the Turkish republic, Kemal Ataturk,
established the pattern of modern Turkish politics, in
which periods of democratic government have alter-
nated with interludes of authoritarian or military rule.
Ataturk himself, although a convinced advocate of
democratic and "Western" institutions, intervened
forcefully whenever he thought it necessary to correct
the "excesses" or "errors" of parliamentary govern-
ments. More recently, Turkish military leaders inter-
vened in 1960, 1971, and 1980 to overturn or restrict
parliamentary governments which they believed were
incapable of dealing with political factionalism, eco-
nomic problems, or terrorism.
In the meantime, the pressures likely to be created in
the years ahead by the demographic changes sketched
in this paper will be at least as severe as those that
have led to the collapse of previous democratic gov-
ernments. Indeed, if democratic government cannot
cope with the changes, terrorism is almost certain to
resurface as a significant problem, and increasingly
serious urban disturbances could occur. Although
urban unrest on a massive scale has not yet made its
appearance on the modern Turkish scene, the growth
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of urbanization makes it a more likely prospect for the
future. We believe that four alternatives are possible
if democratic government collapses in the face of
rapid social and economic change.
Military Intervention. In our view, another military
intervention is the most likely outcome of a failure of
democratic government. Military intervention is a
time-honored tradition in periods of crisis, and the
military is the most powerful and respected force in
the country. The bulk of the population, as well as the
military itself, would expect the armed forces to come
to the country's aid if democracy were to "fail." The
military, moreover, is obedient and relatively free of
extremists. During a crisis it would act to preempt the
extremist groups by seizing power itself and restoring
order as quickly as possible. It probably would at-
tempt initially to prop up existing democratic institu-
tions until a new government could be appointed or
elected. If this did not work, however, the military
almost certainly would assume power directly, insti-
tuting martial law and dissolving the National Assem-
bly, political parties, and the cabinet. The intent, as in
the past, probably would be a short period of direct
rule and a gradual restoration of democracy. If the
military takes power again, however, it could be years
before democratic government returns.
The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism. We believe
that other alternatives to democracy are much less
likely than military intervention. A takeover by Islam-
ic fundamentalists is perhaps the most conceivable of
these relatively unlikely contingencies. Even though
Turkey has been a secular state in both fact and
theory since the founding of the republic in 1924,
Islam has always retained a strong foothold. During
the last few years there have been some signs of a
rejuvenation of religious influence on Turkey's official
life. Prime Minister Ozal is himself a devout Muslim,
and an influential faction in his Motherland Party has
its origins in the now-banned National Salvation
Party, which had represented the interests of Islamic
conservatism before 1980.
There are, however, formidable obstacles to any ex-
pansion of Islamic influence beyond its present mod-
est proportions. Unlike Iran, Turkey has no estab-
lished hierarchy of religious leaders with the strength
and inclination to vie for power. Indeed, the political
influence of Islam in Turkey has declined steadily
since the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924. In
addition, a commitment to secularism is deeply en-
grained in the political and military elites and in large
segments of the population. Most important, military
commanders repeatedly have shown themselves to be
strongly opposed to any alteration of the secular
orientation of the Turkish state. There is little reason
to doubt that they would react forcefully to any
upsurge in Islamic radicalism, particularly if spon-
sored from abroad. Even without the opposition of the
military, there would appear to be little future for
Khomeinism in Turkey-with its Shiite origins it is
suspect in the eyes of the Sunnis, who comprise the
vast bulk of Turkish Muslims.
Dictatorship of the Left. Leftwing terrorism, support-
ed by a plethora of various Marxist parties, has been a
common feature of the Turkish political scene for
many years. Although currently under control, leftist
terrorism has not been eliminated. We expect it to
become more prevalent during the next couple of
years under any circumstances, but an inability of
democratic government to cope with demographic
change clearly would provide the violent left with both
the justification and Opportunity to increase terrorist
activities. If the state appeared to be weakening, the
many different and antagonistic groups of the left
might be induced to cooperate-at least temporar-
ily-in a bid to seize power. These groups almost
certainly could count on some Soviet and East Euro-
pean help, although precedent suggests it would be
covert and of relatively modest dimensions. Even with
outside help, however, it is unlikely that the radical
left would be able to take power. Despite their
propaganda and effectiveness as terrorists, the radical
left has a very narrow base of support in Turkey.
Marxism's link with the hereditary Russian foe limits
its appeal, and Marxism in any variant violates the
principles and traditional values of Islam that remain
so important in Turkey. Most importantly, the mili-
tary would crush, in bloody fashion if necessary, any
attempt by the left to seize power.
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Dictatorship of the Right. Rightwing terrorism has
been almost as prevalent as leftwing terrorism over
the past decade, but has been directed even more
against the left than against governing institutions. If
leftwing terrorism begins to grow again, rightwing
radicals almost certainly will respond, attempting not
only to retaliate against the left, but also trying to
build support among military officers, Islamic funda-
mentalists, and rightwing political parties. Any at-
tempt by the radical right to seize power, however,
would face almost as many obstacles as would an
attempt from the left. In addition to military opposi-
tion, rightwing terrorists have no significant outside
source of support, and their degree of internal sup-
port, although potentially greater than that of the
extreme left, does not appear to be enough to pull off
a successful coup.
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Appendix
Table A-1
North and East Mediterranean Region:
Comparative Labor Force Statistics a
Total
Population
(million)
Total
Labor Force
(million)
Agriculture
(percent)
Labor Force Participation
(percent)
Annual Average Change in
Participation Rates 1961-80
(percent)
All
Women
Total
Men
Women
France
54.6
23.0
8
NA
55
69
42
-0.55
0.85
Greece
9.9
3.3
33
44
48
68
28
-1.37
-1.70
Italy
56.3
22.8
13
14
50
70
32
-0.64
1.34
Portugal
10.0
4.4
24
53
61
79
47
NA
NA
Spain
38.2
13.0
25c
13c
48
70
27
NA
NA
East European states
Albania
2.8
0.6
NA
NA
71
84
57
-1.08
-1.44
Bulgaria
8.9
4.4
24
26
69
79
58
0.41
NEGL
Yugoslavia
22.8
9.2
45c
53,
56
74
39
-0.80
-0.52
Arab states
Iraq
14.5
3.1
NA
NA
45
86
4
-0.66
NEGL
Jordan
3.4
0.8
10
NA
44
81
5
0.77
1.37
Syria
9.7
2.2
32
58
45
76
13
-0.38
-3.00
Iran
42.5
12.0
37
41
49
83
13
-0.86
NEGL
Turkey
49.2
18.1
58
82
64
84
44
-0.53
-2.05
a Population data are for 1983; remaining data range from 1975 to
1981 unless otherwise indicated.
b Ages 15 and over.
c Data are for 1970-71.
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Table A-2
North and East Mediterranean Region:
Comparative Socioeconomic and
Demographic Statisticsa
Per Capita
GNP
(US $)
Urbani-
zation
(percent)
Literacy
Rate
(percent)
Life
Expectancy
(years)
Infant
Mortality
(per 1,000)
Death
Rate
(per 1,000)
Population
Growth
(percent)
France
11,000
73
99
74
10
10
0.5
Greece
3,900
53
95
72
18
9
0.9
Italy
6,100
60
95
73
14
10
0.1
Portugal
2,400
26
70
69
26
10
0.4
Spain
5,000
66
97
73
10
8
0.6
East European states
Albania
830
33
75
66
87
8
2.1
Bulgaria
3,800
63
95
70
20
11
0.3
Yugoslavia
3,300
35
85
68
33
9
0.8
Arab states
Iraq
2,300
68
30
55
NA
13
3.3
Jordan
1,400
60
70
58
88
11
3.9
Syria
1,700
48
50
62
81
9
3.4
Other Muslim states
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Table A-3
Turkey: Urbanization, Industrialization, and
Socioeconomic Levels by Province, 1980
Urban
Employment a
Literacy Rate b
Households With C
Nonfarm Industry
Province Urban
Rural
Electric- Running
ity Water
Denizli
29.7
37.3
18.1
70
76
65
67
40
Eskisehir
57.3
50.2
20.8
81
83
74
72
48
Isparta*
34.2
53.3
23.8
69
80
65
77
53
Kutahya
30.1
30.5
16.1
67
79
59
50
34
Usak*
29.1
36.0
16.9
60
72
56
48
36
Black Sea (10)
Zonguldak*
39.5
56.9
34.3
63
78
54
57
46
Adana
58.3
41.3
18.0
69
74
61
68
61
Hatay
47.9
40.6
18.5
63
72
57
54
62
Central Anatolia (15)
Ankara*
78.6
75.0
16.2
78
82
63
84
73
Kayseri*
51.5
49.8
16.6
66
72
60
65
45
Gaziantep
61.7
47.2
19.1
58
68
46
61
56
Aydin
32.5
33.7
14.0
70
79
66
66
55
Izmir*
71.8
57.8
13.6
67
81
71
79
74
Manisa*
41.1
30.6
11.1
64
71
59
64
49
Mugla*
13.9
30.4
8.2
69
79
67
38
31
Afyon*
23.1
31.6
7.6
61
73
56
55
31
Bilecek
12.6
33.3
13.0
76
85
72
55
29
Burdur*
27.3
32.7
9.2
66
76
63
58
41
Black Sea (10)
16.3
33.7
9.3
67
80
65
55
38
15.8
23.5
7.6
56
76
53
32
36
33.4
26.8
10.7
62
75
55
46
45
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Table A-3
Turkey: Urbanization, Industrialization, and
Socioeconomic Levels by Province, 1980 (continued)
Urban
Employment a
Literacy Rate b
Households With c
Nonfarm Industry
Province Urban
Rural
Electric- Running
ity Water
Kirsehir*
29.6
29.3
8.0
59
69
55
58
33
Konya*
41.7
33.0
9.8
67
67
67
57
40
Malatya
35.4
30.5
11.3
61
72
53
39
43
Nevsehir*
14.4
32.6
7.6
66
72
65
88
50
Sivas*
31.5
28.9
8.8
56
73
49
35
31
East Anatolia (13)
Artvin
10.6
24.3
9.3
70
83
67
29
67
Diyarbakir
41.9
30.0
8.4
41
53
28
36
36
Elazig
32.8
34.9
13.7
58
70
48
52
38
Erzincan
25.5
34.5
9.7
68
79
61
39
34
Canakkale*
22.1
31.0
6.5
70
81
67
42
28
Edirne*
35.8
39.3
5.1
72
77
69
58
39
Kirklareli*
23.4
41.1
6.4
75
81
73
53
41
Black Sea (10)
Kastamonu*
12.1
21.9
4.7
53
72
50
27
31
Ordu*
17.8
22.3
6.8
50
70
46
23
27
Sinop*
11.6
21.3
3.7
54
81
52
21
28
Central Anatolia (15)
Adiyaman
28.8
17.8
7.0
44
59
37
20
20
Amasya*
35.3
28.6
6.8
62
72
57
48
40
Cankiri
13.6
19.5
7.1
64
78
58
30
24
Corum
26.2
22.4
5.2
54
68
50
28
23
Maras*
36.6
29.7
6.6
52
64
46
31
30
Nigde
26.2
26.8
7.4
62
76
57
49
27
Tokat*
29.9
19.6
5.1
57
67
53
41
29
Yozgat
19.5
17.8
6.9
60
75
56
34
21
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C;ontidential
Table A-3 (continued)
Urban
Employment a
Literacy Rate b
Households With
Nonfarm Industry
Province Urban
Rural
Electric- Running
ity Water
Agri
23.5
22.8
4.4
39
60
30
27
20
Bingol
12.3
16.0
4.9
44
62
39
23
23
Bitlis
34.0
20.7
5.7
38
56
28
28
24
Erzurum
33.7
27.9
7.4
57
71
48
38
26
Gumushane
13.1
18.3
7.0
62
80
59
18
23
Kars
19.3
21.0
4.1
57
73
51
26
19
Mus
18.3
16.5
4.6
42
61
35
19
13
Tunceli*
8.6
22.0
4.0
53
70
54
14
14
Van
28.2
23.3
5.4
37
56
26
24
20
Hakkari
20.8
18.3
5.0
32
54
22
14
14
Mardin
27.7
23.3
5.3
36
57
25
26
22
Siirt
36.0
24.1
6.9
36
55
25
33
31
Urfa
48.4
30.7
6.9
38
50
27
36
40
a Figures for provinces marked with an asterisk are estimated from
1975 data.
b Age 9 and over. Figures for provinces marked with an asterisk are
for 1975.
c All data on electricity and running water are for 1975.
Approved For Release 2008/12/29: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000300130002-3
 Approved For Release 2008/12/29: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000300130002-3
Table A-4
Turkey: Provinces With the Poorest
Employment Records, 1961-80
Province b
Total
Employment a
Total
Population
1980
Unemployment
Farm
Nonfarm
Industry
Labor Force
Rate a
Turkey
1.2
-0.1
4.0
3.4
1.8
2.6
10.7
Marmara (7)
0.9
-0.5
3.8
3.5
1.5
2.0
11.5
Canakkale*
-0.4
-1.0
1.2
0
0.2
0.9
12.0
Aegean (3)
1.1
0.4
2.9
1.4
1.6
2.0
10.9
Usak*
-0.1
-1.2
3.2
2.0
0.7
1.6
13.6
Black Sea (10)
0.2
-0.9
4.1
2.7
0.9
1.9
11.8
Giresun*
-0.4
-1.2
3.8
2.5
0.5
1.3
17.5
Kastamonu*
-1.0
-1.8
3.3
0
-0.2
0.4
15.8
Rize*
-0.9
-2.6
3.3
2.5
0
2.0
16.5
Sinop*
-1.0
-1.8
4.2
0
-0.2
0.7
13.6
Trabzon*
0
-1.0
4.0
1.1
0.6
1.8
11.3
Corum*
-0.3
-1.0
4.1
0.5
0.6
1.4
15.3
Kirsehir*
-0.2
-1.2
4.0
2.0
0.5
1.8
12.8
Sivas*
-1.2
-2.2
2.7
1.9
-0.4
0.8
15.3
Yozgat
-0.1
-0.5
4.8
6.5
0.4
1.3
6.0
East Anatolia (13)
0.9
0.3
3.5
3.6
1.3
2.3
7.7
Erzincan
-0.2
-1.3
3.1
3.1
0.2
0.9
6.6
a Figures for provinces marked with an asterisk are estimated from
1975. Because of the extreme sensitivity of the unemployment rate
to small changes in labor force and employment data, the 1980
unemployment rates for these provinces are subject to substantial
margins of error.
b Regional averages in this table exclude the four large metropoli-
tan provinces-Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Adana.
Approved For Release 2008/12/29: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000300130002-3
 Approved For Release 2008/12/29: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000300130002-3
Confidential
Table A-5
Turkey: Provinces With the Highest
Employment Growth, 1961-80
Province a
Total
Employment a
Total
Population
1980
Unemployment
Farm Nonfarm
Industry
Labor Force
Rate a
Turkey (67 provinces)
1.2
-0.1
4.0
3.4
1.8
2.6
10.7
Marmara (8)
2.0
-0.5
4.0
4.8
5.8
3.4
12.2
Bursa
1.9
-0.1
5.2
4.8
2.3
2.7
8.8
Aegean (4)
1.9
0.9
3.6
1.3
2.4
2.6
10.4
Aydin
1.1
0.4
2.8
2.0
1.5
1.9
7.5
Antalya
2.4
1.5
5.9
4.8
2.8
3.2
7.4
Hatay
2.1
1.1
3.9
6.8
2.6
3.6
9.6
Icel?
1.8
0.3
5.2
2.4
2.5
3.4
13.1
a Figures for provinces marked with an asterisk are estimated from
1975. Because of the extreme sensitivity of the unemployment rate
to small changes in labor force and employment data, the 1980
unemployment rates for these provinces are subject to substantial
margins of error.
Approved For Release 2008/12/29: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000300130002-3
 Figure 4
Impact of Population Growth in Turkey
Approved For Release 2008/12/29: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000300130002-3
A OKlrklareli \'mnop
~.?~ Kastamonu ,c I I
Soviet t
(Isla b _- SAKARV~ Zonguldak 0 ph /1 0. I
Tekirdag ut
~ Samsun Arturo
'Bolu .Gankm .,\AmpYa \. Ghesun / fi /'j ; Karp
kka
a
l t. Ooursa ? -.r? .?r~.~ r 0 -?. / bumusaane ? v
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0 Eskisehir *Ankara OYozgar '? Erzincan? 5 ` OKarakoe
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)
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0
BIngot
s
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Manise '?~ OAf on -0 (`~? ?a.. ~.l 1 0 S
~Van
~`'Ifv l' r,,.../?~ e O
Ka
seri h
k
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/ ~
sa
r~,
y
EIaz.g
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i I Ja
Izmu ?^~. ~1,-~ Marv Nevs a G. Malatya J -1 0 If L
P, 7 3\ l, isL
I, 1~?~ Denizli ?' / Nlgde ./ TKAHRAM?Nj Diyarbakir 0
I V
~?Y ?A dln ` Isparta 0 ~.?~'? 0 J K MARAS f \ 0 Siirt .~.:^
i.7 f r 0 ~. Konya \ Kahromalamara< n 1 !?:r,.va- ,.
sea 0 l ! 1
1~_ .. t j .~M. gll J?I ibK n"-\ `~ s~: f.-i o
ua Antalya ""It a un,
Adana L, UrfaO
Guhaf jJ \ r HATAYI
Ant
l
` ~.
ya
a
I .., J, .. ~/ Antio h0
Cyprus
Mcos'ra
Potential for Religious and
Political Unrest and Violence
Syria
ion
International boundary
Geographic region boundary
-?- Province (II) boundary
National capital
Province (II) center
Provinces ((Ile) have the same names as their
centers except where otherwise noted.
0 100 200 Kilometers
0 100 200 Miles
Province prone to violence
Province predominately Alevi
=Province predominately Kurdish
Industrialization and Employment
Growth Trends, 1961-80
Internal Migration and
Urbanization, 1961-80
Province with high employment growth
Province with poor employment record
Province with high level of industrialization
Province with low level of industrialization
Sending province
Receiving province
Approved For Release 2008/12/29: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000300130002-3
 Confidential
Confidential
Approved For Release 2008/12/29: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000300130002-3
Approved For Release 2008/12/29: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000300130002-3