SPAIN: BASQUE TERRORISM AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00316R000300110004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

STAT
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 Directorate of
Intelligence
Spain: Basque Terrorism
and Government Response
EUR 84-10229
November 1984
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Spain: Basque Terrorism
and Government Response
Chief, European Issues Division
the Office of European Analysis. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the
This paper was prepared by
Secret
EUR 84-10229
November 1984
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Secret
Spain: Basque Terrorism
and Government ResponseF____1 25X1
Key Judgments The Spanish Government has made considerable progress combating
Information available Euskadi to Askatasuna (ETA) in the last two years and may soon succeed
as of 15 October 1984 in breaking the back of organized Basque terrorism. 25X1
was used in this report. 1
ETA is plagued with ineffective leadership, inadequate funds, low 25X1
rank-and-file morale, and a dearth of new recruits. 25X1
The Socialist government of Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, which many
thought would be soft on terrorism, has shown an almost ruthless resolve to
eradicate ETA through a combination of political concessions to the
Basque minority and intensified law enforcement:
? The granting of limited autonomy to the Basque region has defused
separatist sentiment.
? Creation of special counterterrorist security and police units, along with
allocation of more funds and other resources, has strengthened the
government's hand.
? A tough new antiterrorist draft law that will broaden police and
government powers, stiffen penalties for terrorist crimes, and grant
leniency to repentants and collaborators, will also increase Madrid's
capabilities.
In addition, the French Government's decision to deny safehaven to Basque
terrorists and the murder of ETA members in France by Spanish
antiterrorist vigilantes have deprived ETA of operational bases in France.
ETA is not finished as a terrorist force, however. Indeed, as its members
become increasingly desperate, we believe they will perpetrate occasional
spectacular acts of violence against governmental and military installations
and personnel, including senior officials.
If the Spanish Government, in pursuing its antiterrorist campaign, should
again pay less heed to Basque nationalism-still a potent force-sympathy
for the terrorists probably would rise in the Basque region. And if the
French Government were once again to allow Basque terrorists safehaven,
ETA could begin rebuilding its infrastructure and restoring its operational
capability.
But so long as the positive factors mentioned above remain constant-and
available evidence suggests that they will-we believe ETA will continue to
decline. As the organization becomes increasingly preoccupied with its own
survival, it will have less time and money to undertake recruitment,
training, and propaganda-activities essential to a rebuilding effort.
Secret
EUR 84-10229
November 1984
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The Basque Region
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San
Sebastian -,C
Bilbao ti
Vizcaya Guipuzcoa
Basque COUntry
Spanish autonomous
region boundary
Autonomous region capital
Province boundary
Former French internal
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Secret
Spain: Basque Terrorism
and Government Response
Politically rooted violence has etched much of the
history of modern Spain. The most recent episodes-
leftist, rightist, and ethnic-have largely been the
bitter harvest of decades of Falangist rule following
the Civil War. In the post-Franco era, political terror-
ism poses the greatest threat to the youthful democra-
cy, due principally to the unremitting violence of the
separatist Basque terrorist group Euskadi to Askata-
suna (ETA) and its various factions.'
Motivated by deeply rooted Basque nationalism and a
desire for regional autonomy, Spanish Basques have
traditionally viewed Madrid as an oppressor. In re-
sponse to repression under Franco, ETA's founders
initially embraced political activism but resorted
eventually to terrorism. Despite the accession in re-
cent years of regimes in Madrid more sympathetic to
ethnic and regional grievances, ETA has continued its
terrorist campaign for an independent Euskadi-the
region's name in the Basque language. In fact, during
the tenure of the current Socialist government, ETA
periodically has escalated the number and ferocity of
its attacks against military and government targets.
the period immedi-
ately following the Socialists' electoral victory in
October 1982 saw the highest level of ETA terrorist
acts since the record number in autumn 1978.1
Since the late 1970s, Spanish governments have re-
sponded to terrorism with a dual strategy of conces-
sions intended to isolate ETA politically, and intensi-
fied police efforts aimed at reducing the group's
operational capabilities. Madrid's granting of degrees
of autonomy to the three Basque provinces (see map)
since 1979 and increased Basque participation in the
political process have combined to erode popular
support among Basques for ETA's terrorist tactics.
Squabbling within the ranks and recruiting problems
have contributed to the decline of ETA's principal
terrorist wing.
Deaths and Terrorist Incidents
Attributed to ETA, 1969-842
a Source: Spanish Press.
b Data for 1969-74 unavailable.
C Through June.
An increasing number of anti-ETA successes, stem-
ming from intensified police work, signal the govern-
ment's commitment to a tough antiterrorist line.
Indeed, late last year the Gonzalez administration
presented to Parliament a new package of laws that
will expand counterterrorist powers. Despite general
public approval for action against terrorism, recent
polls indicate a widespread preference for negotiations
between Madrid and regional groups to end terrorism.
The military, on the other hand, approves of the
government's inroads against terrorism and has had
many of its initial suspicions of a Socialist government
allayed.
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ETA may have as many as 500 members, a majority
of whom are believed to be based in France. Some
Spanish terrorism experts maintain, however, that by
late 1983 the organization had as few as 200 active
members. Although ETA/M traditionally has been
the smaller faction, it is more prone to violence than
ETA/PM. The two factions have separate organiza-
tions and operate autonomously, but they often ap-
ETA/M is divided into three well-coordinated com-
mands, military action
(terrorism), political action (information collection
propaganda), and international contacts.
ETA/M consists of self-con-
tained cells o three to six members, and includes
logistic support units, two false documentation
groups, a border-crossing assistance unit, and a fi-
nancial section. Since 1978, the radical Herri Bata-
suna (HB) Party has acted as the political front for
ETA/M.
This assessment examines the current strength and
capabilities of ETA and gauges the nature and suc-
cess of Madrid's efforts to combat terrorism. In so
doing, we weigh the impact on Basque terrorism of
several factors: the autonomy process, public attitudes
toward ETA, special security forces, counterterrorist
laws, and international cooperation against terrorism.
Finally, we consider the government's prospects for
containing or suppressing terrorism
A Spanish press report in 1979 provided further
insights into ETA/M's operational procedures and
organization, revealing details of the group's so-
called "legal" or "sleeper" commando units. A fully
compartmented system, the units have no contacts
with each other. These teams consist of youths-
often without police records and not necessarily
Basques-who lead outwardly normal lives as work-
ers or students, but also act as assassins at the
direction of the unit's leaders. Following a major
attack, the participants might never be used again.
ETA/M commandos who are compromised, however,
become "illegals" and go underground to work as
planners and eventually supervisors of the "legals. "
turn, are made up of village boards.
Although ETA/PM is not as strictly compartmented
as ETA/M, the political-military faction has a simi-
lar system of "legal" and "illegal" commandos, who
plan and carry out terrorist activities. The group
reportedly has several specialized bureaus: political,
foreign, intelligence and propaganda, logistics and
weapons, prisons, and cultural. Another section ex-
clusively for mass movement infiltration targets labor
and student groups. ETA/PM has two separate re-
gional boards for the Spanish and French Basque
areas, which consist of provincial boards, which, in
found in Marxist-Leninist ideology an alternative to
the more moderate approaches of the established
Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). The first decade of
ETA's activities was marked by efforts to wed this
ideology to Basque nationalism, but the organization's
diverse currents were unable to agree on a coherent
philosophical base.
Although ETA was comparatively nonviolent during
its formative period, many members eventually be-
came proficient professional terrorists. They estab-
lished contacts with terrorists of similar ideological
bent in other countries and began to travel abroad to
Young nationalistic students pledged to act against
the Franco regime on behalf of the Basque people
established ETA on 31 July 1959. Basque youth
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Sketches of ETA/M's Key Leaders
Domingo Iturbe Abasolo ("Txomin') ... born 1944
... active in organization since 1968 and leader since
1970s ... staunch advocate of Basque independence
... non-Marxist, politically "moderate, " and has
stated desire to free Euskadi of all outside influence
... explosives enthusiast feared even by his comrades
... survived assassination attempt in May 1979.. .
arrested by French police in June 1982 on weapons
charge, jailed, and released in March 1983.. .
subsequently exiled to northern France but then
eluded French authorities.
Eugenio Echeveste Arizguren (' Antxon ") ... born
1950... number-two man in ETA/M after Txomin,
chief spokesman, and leader of radicals in group ...
strong ideologue, firmly pro-Soviet, committed
Marxist-Leninist ... enjoys reputation as persuasive
and effective orator ... led ETA/M while Txomin in
French prison ... arrested in France last summer and
expelled to Dominican Republic ... influence likely
to diminish in his absence, but ETA/M probably will
keep up contacts with him.
train and solicit support. Some ETA members re-
ceived training in Cuba, Algeria, and South Yemen,
and the group reportedly may have secured some
financial support from Libyan leader Qadhafi. By the
time of Franco's death in 1975, ETA had killed at
least 45 people
ETA's assassination in December 1973 of Admiral
Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco's chosen successor, es-
tablished beyond doubt the group's terrorist creden-
tials and altered Spain's course. Major ideological
differences and disputes over strategy and tactics that
followed that killing, however, led to the formation of
two separate branches of ETA. ETA Politico-Militar
(ETA/PM) wanted to follow a strategy that combined
political action with military attacks. ETA Militar
(ETA/M) wanted to devote its resources exclusively to
attacking symbols of governmental authority (see the
inset).
adopted a traditional terrorist strategy of attempting
to antagonize the military to provoke a rightist coup.
According to press and academic observers, ETA
believed that renewed repression would revive support
for the group's terrorist tactics and its goal of inde-
pendence. Thus, even though the government became
less repressive, the number of terrorist attacks in-
creased and exceeded the levels experienced during
the Franco regime.
Beginning in 1978, ETA again escalated its level of
violence, and estimates of the number of victims
climbed through 1980. Violence began to recede in
February 1981, when ETA/PM proclaimed a unilat-
eral cease-fire, and observed it throughout that year.
In 1982-83 the violence resumed with several notable
assassinations, kidnapings, bank robberies, and
executions.
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In the face of better police work, vigilante counter-
violence, and a measure of autonomy for the Basque
country, ETA's efforts have gradually been stymied.
From its inception, ETA has espoused a revolutionary
doctrine rooted in Marxism to attain an independent
socialist Basque state. Adhering to this objective, 25X1
ETA has sought to portray Spain's democratic gov-
ernments as a continuation of Francoism. A growing
segment of the Basque population, which had support-
ed the group under Franco, however, now questions
the group's objectives, strategy, and tactics, according
to public opinion polls. ETA thus has found itself
increasingly isolated from its constituency, a van-
guard without a proletariat
A telling indicator of ETA's growing disrepute is that
more and more Basque businessmen in both Spain
and France are resisting or refusing to pay ETA's
traditional extortion of "revolutionary taxes" to fi-
nance terrorism, according to Spanish and French
press accounts. This has occurred largely because
ETA, which began by demanding money from
wealthy businessmen and landowners in the 1960s,
broadened its "tax base" to include small businessmen
with modest enterprises who could ill afford the
considerable sums the group sought. In a public
opinion poll among Basques in 1982, for example, one
With Franco's death and the onset of democratiza-
tion, ETA's leadership had to alter its strategy. In the
absence of a dictatorship to target, the group instead
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businessman, whose situation reportedly was not un-
common, stated that his firm was driven to insolvency
by ETA's draining of funds and demands that he
employ a number of terrorists. In an unprecedented
move, the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) helped
encourage resistance by enjoining its members in
early 1982 from paying ETA's "taxes" and declaring
its intention to defend those threatened by the terror-
ist group
Perhaps more important in the hardening of anti-ETA
views among Basques is widespread disgust and frus-
tration with violence on both sides of the Pyrenees.
The terrorist assassinations of innocent individuals
and popular public figures have prompted indignation
and revulsion, even among Basques previously sympa-
thetic to ETA. In particular, the murder in October
1983 of Capt. Martin Barrios, an apolitical Army
pharmacist of Basque descent, prompted widespread
concern and was the catalyst for Madrid's move to
toughen antiterrorist laws. The murder of Socialist
Senator Casas Vilas by ETA elements on the eve of
the February 1984 regional elections contributed to a
surge of sympathy votes for the Socialists. These
killings prompted the largest and most significant
anti-ETA demonstrations to date in Euskadi.
We believe these and other recent episodes of violence
mark an increasingly desperate and publicly unac-
ceptable departure in tactics for ETA. The group
traditionally targeted police and law enforcement
figures, members of the Civil Guard, and the military.
The assassination of Gen. Lago Roman in 1982 was
somehow "acceptable," or to be expected, in the
context of ETA's war against Madrid. The Casas and
Martin murders, however, reflected a change in
ETA's conventional strategy and went far to damage
the group's case in Basque eyes.
We believe the group is no longer fighting for an
independent Basque state. Rather, we see it struggling
for its survival as a revolutionary organization:
? In a recent press report, Spanish security services
claimed that ETA/M militants have signed an
agreement that they will remain in the organiza-
tion-an indication of the climate of mistrust and
fear pervading the group. In addition, the elitist
ETA/M has dropped its traditional reluctance to
accept recruits from other Basque terrorist groups.
According to the US Embassy, ETA/M reportedly
is accepting new members from other groups with
less discrimination and more desperation.
? The principal ETA factions reportedly have suffered
as well from poor morale, ineffective leadership, and
a notable lack of funds for the last few years. The
cost of maintaining up to 1,000 ETA members and
their dependents in France has been a financial
drain, and several Spanish press reports suggest that
the terrorists may be involved in drug trafficking as
a source of support.
Ithe ETA/PM leaders sent a
letter to imprisoned members early this year to
boost morale, promote solidarity, and discourage
them from accepting government offers of amnesty,
although disaffection among inmates already was
widespread.
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there is mounting
Table 1
Electoral Strength of Political Parties
in Euskadi-Results of the February 1984
Basque Regional Elections
friction between ETA/M members and the radical
French Basque community,
ETA/M may be wary of assisting its French breth-
ren for fear of provoking an even stronger response
from the French Government. The group's leaders
want to initiate new attacks in Spain to demonstrate
the group's viability and to permit it to negotiate
with the Spanish Government from a position of
strength.
A series of governmental initiatives, along with devel-
opments not entirely of the government's making,
have dealt serious if not fatal blows to Basque terror-
ism. Spain's autonomy statute of 1979 helped to
increase Basque political participation and, we be-
lieve, defuse separatist sentiments. The toughening of
antiterrorist laws, their aggressive enforcement, and
the formation of special counterterrorist units have
also been important factors in the fight against ETA.
The anti-ETA vigilante group known as GAL-which
the US Embassies in Madrid and Paris report may
have links with Spanish security services-has sown
fear and confusion among the terrorists and helped
reduce their operational effectiveness. The collective
impact of these factors has been to erode the populari-
ty, capabilities, and support for ETA's terrorism.
Autonomy and Public Opinion
Development of institutions of government under a
regional Basque government has been Madrid's key
means of enlisting the political participation and
support of the Basques. As Madrid has devolved more
and more powers of self-determination and self-gov-
ernment, ETA's raison d'etre of perceived centralized
oppression emanating from Madrid has lost
credibility.
Since 1979, when the Basque region attained limited
autonomy from Madrid, the Basque capital of Vitoria
Vote Share
(percent)
Character/ Ideology
PNV
41.7
Moderate Basque nationalist
HB
14.6
ETA-linked abertzale
separatist
EE
8.0
Basque nationalist
PCE
1.4
Spanish Communist
Other
1.6
Minor parties
has been trying to organize an effective government
for the Basque provinces. It has assumed some au-
thority in matters of regional importance, such as tax
collection, establishment of Basque language educa-
tional curriculums, and development of a Basque
police force. The regional parliament, elected for the
first time in 1979, consists predominantly of members
of Basque nationalist parties. Euskadi's leading party,
the relatively moderate PNV, outpolled the other
parties in the regional elections last February with
nearly 42 percent of the vote (see table 1). This, we
believe, indicates a growing public preference for
electoral politics, rather than terrorist violence, as a
means of asserting Basque control in regional affairs.
The progress in autonomy, along with the erosion of
ETA forces and capabilities, has undercut the Herri
Batasuna (HB) Party, a radical proindependence, or
abertzale group, that acts as the political arm of the
ETA/M faction. Although the HB probably benefits
from an indeterminate number of "protest" votes
from Basques unhappy with the tenor and pace of
autonomy concessions, we doubt that most such voters
truly support ETA's terrorism. Popular support for
the HB has declined slightly in the last few years to
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the extent that the party membership consists mainly
of those who reject mere autonomy, deride coopera-
tion with Madrid, and support armed violence to
attain independence for Euskadi. The HB's share of
the vote in the recent regional election declined
toward 14 percent from 16 percent in 1983.
The growing accessibility of political forums, in our
judgment, is a major factor in the erosion of popular
support for ETA's goals and methods, although
Basque nationalism remains strong. An opinion poll
by a reliable Spanish firm, for example, indicated that
support among Basques for regional independence
had declined from 26 percent in 1979 to 9 percent in
late 1983. Similarly, a poll in late 1982 charted a
steady increase among Basque respondents favoring
an autonomous regional government, up to 37 percent
from 31 percent in 1981. Moreover, public opinion
polls conducted for Spain's leading news magazine in
late 1982 indicated that 42 percent of Basques were
opposed to ETA, a significant increase from only 23
percent in 1981. This tendency has.continued, accord-
ing to press and US Embassy reports. Conversely,
only 8 percent of Basques voiced support for ETA-
half the level of 1981. Nonetheless, some 68 percent
of Basques felt themselves to be strongly or moderate-
ly nationalistic about Euskadi
An overwhelming majority of the Spanish public (86
percent) and the Basque population (97 percent) favors
direct negotiations among Madrid, the regional gov-
ernment, and ETA as the best means for ending
Basque violence, according to a poll in spring 1984.
For a proposal for negotiation to be supported by the
majority, all political and social forces in Euskadi
would have to participate, including the Herri Bata-
suna, and thus, by implication, ETA. The head of the
Basque government also appealed last July for a
negotiated solution to terrorism and urged Madrid to
stop short of physically eliminating ETA.
Currently, however, the Spanish Government may not
be particularly receptive to negotiations. The Socialist
government's initiative in early 1983, shortly after
taking office, to engage in a "peace table" dialogue
failed because of ETA's intransigence. Hardline lead-
ers in both ETA and the HB publicly opposed concili-
ation and would not agree to even a temporary cease-
fire, thus forcing collapse of the talks. Madrid
subsequently intensified police counterterrorist pro-
grams. We suspect it now believes the success of the
stepped-up police crackdown and a growing number
of ETA "repentants" obviate the need for talks.'
Counterterrorist Forces
The government's slow movements toward devolution
have been accompanied by a strong emphasis on
counterterrorist action. Spain's forces of public
order-as traditional targets of Basque terrorism-
have pursued their missions with particular zeal. They
enjoy an unprecedented degree of political and finan-
cial support. Counterterrorist responsibilities are
shared by the two principal law enforcement authori-
ties, the National Police and the Civil Guard, which
are both accountable to the Directorate General of
Security in the Interior Ministry. While Civil Guard
units in the Basque region over the years accrued de
facto counterterrorist duties, the development of spe-
cialized national counterterrorist forces has been com-
paratively recent and was prompted by nonethnic as
well as Basque terrorism.
Spain's principal counterterrorist action group, the
Grupo Especial de Operaciones (GEO), was estab-
lished within the National Police in January 1978
following a spate of terrorism that convinced authori-
ties to upgrade their operational counterterrorist ca-
pabilities. The GEO's first class completed training in
February 1979 and was deployed to the Basque
country a year later. By the end of 1982, after
screening, selection, and intensive training, the GEO
had some 150 qualified members, with 50 more in
training. The GEO's first operation was in Madrid in
May 1981, when its successful assault in a hostage/
barricade situation resulted in the freeing of the
hostages and the death or capture of the terrorists.
' Despite intermittent press rumors of "secret" talks between
government intermediaries and the terrorists, evidence of such
negotiations remains elusive, as does any indication of their pro-
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The GEO is modeled after the GSG-9 (West Germa-
ny's elite counterterrorist "SWAT" unit) in structure,
organization, training, weaponry, and equipment. In-
deed, the first class, and possibly subsequent groups,
trained in West Germany with the GSG-9. The GEO
is commanded by a National Police captain and
consists exclusively of volunteers. The unit is divided
into five tactical groups of 30 men each, which in turn
are broken into five teams of five members each and
one command detachment. Although each team mem-
ber has a specialty, such as sniping, explosives, com-
munications, or scuba diving, each member is trained
in all fields.
The Civil Guard also has a specialized, all-volunteer
counterterrorist assault team. Formed in early 1980,
this unit, the Unidad Especial de Intervencion (UEI),
has a rigorous training program for hostage/ barricade
and hijacking situations that results in an attrition
rate of up to 30 percent. The top graduates reportedly
are assigned to the Madrid detachment and the rest
are deployed in the Basque region. UEI members'
average age is 25 and all have served at least two
years in the Civil Guard and two years in the military.
According to defense attache reporting, the UEI's
activities are considered secret by ranking Civil
Guard officers. This sensitivity may be attributable in
part to competition; some US and Spanish military
officers view the formation of the UEI as the Civil
Guard's attempt not to be outdone by the National
Police and its GEO.
The government has tried to centralize its counterter-
rorist program, but the effort has been more effective
on the regional level. The Joint Antiterrorist Com-
mand was established in 1981 to encompass counter-
terrorist components of the military, Civil Guard, and
National Police under the command of the chief of
the internal security and intelligence service.
is likely, in our view, that turf conflicts were not
adequately resolved in this arrangement and the
military may have bridled under civilian command.
As a national command, the Mando Unico met only
three times its first year to coordinate efforts and
ordered only one major intervention in a terrorist
incident. In this instance, the Mando Unico in early
1982 orchestrated the GEO's freeing of Dr. Julio
Iglesias Puga from his ETA/PM kidnapers. For
organizational reasons, officials in Madrid decided in
1982 to relocate the headquarters of the Mando
Unico to Bilbao, where the various counterterrorist
forces have been able to concentrate more successfully
and purposefully on Basque terrorism.
Laws, Amnesties, and States of Exception
A variety of legal and security policies for combating
Basque terrorism and ensuring public security have
been used over the last two decades. Although several
general amnesties have been declared, they were not
aimed specifically at releasing imprisoned terrorists,
and, in cases where terrorists were released, had little
impact on reducing Basque terrorism. A so-called
state of exception, or state of emergency, under which
certain constitutional liberties may be suspended, was
declared frequently during the Franco era, but has not
been invoked since. Old antiterrorist laws intermit-
tently have been strengthened and tough new laws
have been enacted since 1960 (see the inset). A bill
proposing to expand the government's powers still
further is currently before Parliament and is the
subject of impassioned debate among leftists.
Frequent declarations of amnesty, in which convicted,
imprisoned terrorists were among those released, have
had little apparent impact on reducing terrorism and,
in one instance, have been followed by increases in
terrorist activity. There was little appreciable change
in the level of terrorism following two amnesties
declared by Franco. The early amnesties by King
Juan Carlos and the initial post-Franco governments
led to a slight decline in terrorism. The Spanish
Government's last amnesty offer in November 1977,
however, included the release of hundreds of convict-
ed Basque terrorists who subsequently took up arms in
a campaign of mounting violence to press Madrid for
major concessions on regional autonomy. The Social-
ist government is not disposed to use amnesties as a
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The package of laws currently before Parliament is
the first such move by the Socialist government of
Prime Minister Gonzalez, but is not Spain's first
effort to legislate against terrorism. Previous enact-
ments, under both Franco and successive democratic
regimes, were notable for tough provisions that often
swept aside broader concerns for civil liberties. A
1960 decree law gave the military jurisdiction over
terrorist crimes and mandated capital punishment in
cases of death resulting from terrorism. Trials for
terrorist offenses were conducted secretly, and de-
fense attorneys, who had to be active-duty military
officers, were allowed only minimal time to prepare
their cases. Moreover, the defense could not cross-
examine state witnesses or question state evidence
against defendants. A 1963 law removed adjudication
of terrorist crimes from military courts and suspend-
ed the death penalty, but an upsurge of violence in the
Basque provinces in early 1975 led to a reversal of
these changes. Summary court proceedings once
again were held in military courts, defense attorneys
had only four hours to prepare their cases, and the
death penalty was reinstated.
An upsurge in ETA activities in 1977 prompted the
government to assist the police by allowing for several
months' relatively unfettered house searches and
lengthy detention of suspects without benefit of habe-
as corpus. A decree law of June 1978 authorized
telephone wiretaps, mail intercepts, and, again, house
tool of counterterrorist policy. In public statements,
Prime Minister Gonzalez has voiced his opposition to
the concept and instead favors social rehabilitation in
cases not involving blood crimes. He also has stated
publicly that amnesties are illegal under the 1978
Constitution.
Even during periods of high terrorist activity, post-
Franco democratic regimes have tried to avoid states
of emergency that entail the suspension of civil liber-
ties. From 1968 to 1975, states of emergency lasting
90 days or more were declared on only three occa-
sions, specifically in response to ETA terrorism. Law
searches without warrants. Later that year, the deten-
tion limit was extended from three to 10 days, and, in
early 1980, a decree law broadened the definition of
terrorist crimes. Antiterrorist legislation passed in
October 1980 closely resembled the 1978 laws, and a
bill on "The Defense of the Constitution" in 1981
made changes in the penal code that stiffened the
1980 antiterrorist law.
A law enacted in June 1981 defined the circum-
stances and conditions governing the imposition of
states of exception and national emergencies, which
are understandably more restrictive than under Fa-
langist rule, in view of key provisions in the new
Constitution of 1978 to safeguard civil rights and
liberties. The death penalty was abolished, and habe-
as corpus and a 72-hour limit on detention are the
law.
Some press and human rights observers assert, how-
ever, that legal abuses and even torture-common-
place before 1976 persist in democratic Spain. In its
report covering 1982, Amnesty International charged
that torture is not uncommon in Spain, and other
human rights groups claim that police officials are
guilty of brutality, especially in cases involving ter-
rorist suspects. Although police excesses may occur
at the working level, we do not believe the Socialist
government condones any abusive acts brought to its
attention.
enforcement officials were able to round up extraordi-
nary numbers of terrorist suspects and hold them
incommunicado without benefit of habeas corpus.
Legal constraints on search and seizure were lifted
and torture of suspects was common, according to
authoritative studies. The present Socialist govern-
ment would find the imposition of a state of emergen-
cy-no matter how potentially effective against
ETA-objectionable because of its disregard for civil
liberties.
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Since early 1983, the government has attempted to
eradicate regional terrorism by implementing the so-
called Zen plan (for Zona especial norte) for the
Basque provinces. The plan, which was originally
conceived by the previous government and later en-
acted by the Gonzalez administration, is aimed at
suppressing the terrorists' operational capabilities
through the infusion of special funds and the more
effective deployment of manpower. A budget of about
$110 million was allocated for "Zen" in June 1983 to
cover:
? New undercover vehicles, weapons, helicopters, and
boats.
? Renovation of police facilities in the four Basque
provinces.
? Materiel for training members of Spanish law en-
forcement agencies in counterterrorist methods.
? Efforts to infiltrate ETA.
? Preparation and distribution of anti-ETA propagan-
da.
? A census of the Basque provinces to enable authori-
ties to identify collaborators, terrorist cells, and
safehouses more easily.
The upgrading of facilities and materiel almost cer-
tainly has improved counterterrorist capabilities, but
we consider the likelihood of success in infiltrating
ETA doubtful. Past efforts by authorities to penetrate
ETA have proved problematic due to language diffi-
culties and the closely knit nature of Basque culture
and society. Similarly, attempts to conduct a census
for the government in Madrid may well meet with
suspicion, hostility, and evasiveness on the part of the
Basque populace.
Spanish officials continue to nurture hopes for tough-
er legal instruments to fight terrorism. In the midst of
an intensified campaign of ETA violence, and spurred
by the murder of Captain Martin, the Gonzalez
government last fall submitted to Parliament a draft
package of antiterrorist legislation that would broad-
en police and government powers and stiffen penalties
for terrorist crimes. Provisions of the proposed bill
would:
? Impose prison terms of six to 12 years and 150,000-
to 750,000-peseta fines for any sort of association
with terrorists.
? Enforce a schedule of fines, prison terms, and an
eventual shutdown, for newspapers, electronic me-
dia, and their employees "deemed to express moral
support for terrorists on a regular basis."
? Enable judges to sanction police surveillance, such
as wiretaps, of terrorist suspects for up to three
months.
? Allow Spanish courts to adjudicate crimes commit-
ted by Spanish terrorists outside of Spain and apply
the principle of extraterritoriality to retry cases in
which sentences by foreign judges are less than
sentences under Spanish law for the same crimes.
? Grant judicial authority to dissolve political, cultur-
al, or social groups that have members who have
been convicted of terrorist crimes, if belonging to
the group may be shown to be "causally relevant" to
those members having committed terrorist acts.
? Establish penalties for abusing national symbols,
with heavier sentences for government or elected
officials who do so.
? Grant judicial authority to order solitary confine-
ment for prisoners or detainees before, during, or
after terrorist trials.
? Give permission to security forces to search, without
warrants, private residences where terrorists are
suspected of living or hiding, provided the Interior
Minister or the Director of State Security submits a
"detailed justification" to the local judge immedi-
ately thereafter.
? Institute a system for sentencing "repentant" terror-
ists that takes into account their cooperation with
authorities and willingness to renounce armed vio-
lence (see the inset).
Measures to broaden police powers for wiretaps and
surveillance would legalize practices that have often
been conducted in the past without legal sanction.
This article and the bill's provisions to levy penalties
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Perhaps the most politically and socially significant
provision of the government's draft legislation is a
series of inducements for "repentant" terrorists not
guilty of capital crimes to cooperate with authorities
in exchange for reduced sentences. Such consider-
ation would apply in cases where:
? A terrorist turns himself/herself in and confesses to
any crimes committed.
? A confession preempts or reduces the damage of a
pending terrorist operation, or leads to the identifi-
cation and capture of those involved.
? Jailed terrorists renounce past associations and
actions, cooperate with authorities, and thereby
obtain provisional liberty after completing from
one-third to one-half of their minimum five-year
sentences.
The government's interest in encouraging the reinte-
gration of "repentant" terrorists into society appears
inspired in part by Italy's experience with "repen-
tant" terrorists. If approved, the bill would be anoth-
er blow to ETA's dwindling support base as reluctant
activists abandon the group. A judiciously applied
"repentant" program, in our view, would also help
counter accusations from the political left and
Basque nationalists that the government is bent on
using violence to destroy ETA.
Determined to incorporate some conciliatory aspects
into official counterterrorist policy, the Spanish Gov-
ernment this year instituted a de facto "repentant"
program when Interior Minister Barrionuevo gave his
French counterpart a list of 200 Basque refugees
resident in France (200 more reportedly are to be
named) who are eligible to return to Spain without
fear of prosecution. Special telephone lines and ad-
dresses have been publicized in France for fugitive
terrorists who wish to apply for an official pardon
from the Spanish Government. Prospective candi-
dates probably were somewhat encouraged when the
cabinet approved pardons in July for five of 43
convicted guerrillas who petitioned, formally re-
nounced violence, and agreed to abide by the law.F_
on the media, permit searches without warrants, and
ban certain political groups have stirred opposition in
the Socialist Party's left wing, as well as among the
Communist and Basque nationalist parties in Parlia-
ment. The Herri Batasuna party, in its support capac-
ity for ETA/M, is acutely aware that it is the primary
target of government hopes to outlaw groups that
support terrorists.
The new package of laws, which is still in committee,
is likely to pass given the Socialist majority in Parlia-
ment. Nonetheless, the government will face opposi-
tion from the left wing of its party, where concern for
civil liberties runs high, and the new law will only
exacerbate the poor state of relations between Madrid
and Vitoria.
The GAL Factor
The emergence of the shadowy Antiterrorist Libera-
tion Group (GAL) and its impact on French attitudes
toward ETA are among the most important develop-
ments regarding Basque terrorism since the Socialist
government came to power. GAL, which first ap-
peared in December 1983, has taken reprisals against
known and suspected ETA terrorists and activists on
the French side of the Pyrenees, claimed at least nine
assassinations on French soil thus far, and sown fear
and disorganization in the ranks of fugitive etarras.'
GAL's operatives are of uncertain provenance-in
communiques they have claimed to be of several
nationalities, with alleged underworld, Secret Army
Organization (OAS), and French Foreign Legion
links-but many Spanish press and public observers
strongly suspect the group may be backed by the
Spanish Government (see table 2).
f Madrid's putative involvement
were confirmed, the democratic credentials of the
Spanish Government and the Socialist Party would be
seriously tarnished.
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Table 2
GAL Assassinations of
ETA Members in France
Total Basque
Country
Do you believe that assassinations of ETA members in France by the
so-called Anti-Terrorist Liberation Group (GAL) are justified?
Justified 17 0
Would you say that someone is behind GAL-that is, someone is
supporting it-or would you say that no one supports it?
Someone supports it 57 58
Although the tactic of fighting terrorism with terror-
ism is hardly new', the terrorists are even more on the
defensive since they now know that leaving Spain does
not ensure safety. GAL claims to have targeted
ranking etarras, but some Spanish press accounts
maintain that victims have been "small fish" rather
than leaders whose murders would decimate the
terrorist group. Vigilante targeting of rank-and-file
etarras may be a deterrent to prospective ETA re-
cruits, but some Basque politicians and press observ-
ers have argued that GAL's murders have simply
created new martyrs and have encouraged ETA re-
cruitment among Basque youth. In our view, other
factors-such as GAL's activities and the French
Government's crackdown on fugitives-militate
against sharp increases in the number of new ETA
members
' Other self-proclaimed antiterrorist vigilante groups have appeared
in Spain since 1975, including the Anti-ETA Terrorism (ATE), the
Anti-Communist Apostolic Alliance (AAA), and the Spanish
Basque Battalion (BVE). These groups aimed principally at pressing
Madrid to crack down harder on Basque terrorism in the years
The government of Prime Minister Gonzalez has
attempted, with some success, to elicit greater inter-
national cooperation in its fight against Basque terror-
ism. Although France traditionally has been reluctant
to work with Spain to stem the tide of Basque
terrorism, the Gonzalez government has succeeded in
convincing Paris that cooperation against ETA serves
both countries' interests. Spain's appeal to historical
ties with Latin American countries has persuaded
several to accept temporarily etarras deported from
France. Gonzalez also has demonstrated an interest in
strengthening counterterrorist links with other states
in his calls for an international conference on terror-
France
Counterterrorist cooperation with France, in particu-
lar, has improved markedly over the last two years
largely because of fraternal solidarity between the two
socialist governments and French recognition that
Spain's youthful democratic institutions cannot fully
take root in the face of persistent domestic terrorism.
French cooperation culminated most recently in the
unprecedented extradition of three ETA terrorists to
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ETA's various factions have developed and main-
tained links with other foreign terrorist groups and
supporters over many years, according to
numerous press reports. Among
West European groups, ETA's relations with the
radical French Basque Iparretarrak terrorists report-
edly have been strained since the official French
crackdown on ETA's activities in the cote basque.
According to early 1984 press accounts of a special
government report on ETA's international links,
Spanish officials believe ETA has enjoyed significant
and longstanding foreign support in the form of
training and probable financial aid. The report traces
ETA's foreign ties to the training of Basque terrorists
in Cuban camps 20 years ago and alleges similar,
later activities in Algeria, Lebanon, and South Ye-
men. ETA/PM allegedly began to train with the PLO
in late 1979, and ETA/M reportedly established ties
with the PFLP. The study also reasserts earlier
Spain, a move that took many French as well as
Spanish officials by surprise, according to press and
US Embassy reports.'
Although the French action was a major breakthrough, Belgium's
extradition of two ETA/PM members last spring was the first of its
official Spanish reports and press accounts of ties
between ETA and the IRA and the Red Brigades.
Although the nature and extent of ETA's contacts
with the Irish and Italians are not fully known, we
believe that their common guerrilla training camp
experiences in the Middle East at a minimum have
fostered `fraternal solidarity" among the groups.
the Caribbean basin.
Central America is the most recent focus of Spanish
Government concern about ETA's activities abroad
and foreign support for the group. According to US
Embassy reporting, a noted Spanish authority on
terrorism maintains that Venezuela and Mexico are
major centers for ETA activities, and that this has
been publicly discussed for several years. Nonethe-
less, allegations of ETA involvement in the assassina-
tion attempt against Nicaraguan rebel leader Eden
Pastora in Costa Rica in late 1983 further increased
official interest in Basque terrorist links throughout
Press) I reports indicate that, since
1979, more than 100 ETA/M members have trained
at Sandinista camps in Nicaragua. Moreover, the
Spanish Government's study of ETA's foreign links
asserts that Nicaragua is the base for ETA/M's
document forgery operations and that Salvadoran
rebels have received such documents, along with
weapons and money, from ETA. Other press reports
maintain that etarras arrested
in Costa Rica in late 1983 were part of a wider ETA-
Sandinista plot to assassinate anti-Sandinista lead-
ers resident in Costa Rica. These and other revela-
tions have taxed relations between Madrid and
Following the election of the Socialist government in
Spain, France began moving cautiously away from its
longstanding reservations about acting against fugi-
tive ETA members in France. The emergence of the
GAL vigilantes, however, apparently expedited
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French cooperation with Madrid. Paris publicly ex-
pressed its anger at extralegal actions on its territory
and, we believe, is fearful of an awakening of latent
Basque nationalism in France, ordered sweeping po-
lice roundups in the pays basque and stepped up the
irregularly enforced policy of relocating refugee
Basque activists to northern France. Paris is also
trying to discourage further GAL attacks by remov-
ing likely ETA targets from the border area. This
year France has expelled some 30 presumed ETA
leaders to countries in Latin America and Africa.
C'6ST CONTRAiRE Aux
DgoiTS D6 L. IdOMME .'
French counterterrorist measures were largely respon-
sible for the dissolution of ETA/PM in France, and
fewer than 20 PM members
remain there. Many of the ETA/PM members in
France, as well as some in prison in Spain, subse-
quently accepted amnesty offered by the Spanish
In an important development last June, Interior Min-
ister Barrionuevo and France's then Interior Minister
Defferre signed an agreement in Madrid for coopera-
tion against terrorism. Significantly, Defferre stated
that terrorists would no longer be considered political
refugees. Although the agreement did not entail
specific new plans so far as we know, it contained
pledges to strengthen law enforcement cooperation.
The present French Interior Minister, Pierre Joxe,
reaffirmed his intention to abide by the agreement
although he reminded Madrid that eliminating the
traditional French sanctuary for etarras will not by
itself solve the problem of Basque terrorism.
Nonetheless, the French Conseil d'Etat's decision this
October to let stand a lower court ruling to extradite
three etarras who were wanted in Spain on murder
charges is of major significance. Paris previously had
declined all Spanish requests for extradition. Madrid
greeted the terrorists' extradition as formal French
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"Extraditions are a violation of
human rights!"
acknowledgement of Spain's democratic credentials,
which President Mitterrand echoed during his 11-13
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also stated, however, that Spanish Basques who re-
spect the "contract" of asylum in France-that is,
who respect French law and refrain from using
French territory as a staging area for terrorist attacks
in Spain-will be protected by French law. In any
case, press and US Embassy observers believe the
extraditions may satisfy the forces behind GAL that
ETA lawlessness is finally being addressed. The
French Government's resolve in such matters will be
further tested when it is presented with as many as 95
extradition requests that Spain reportedly plans to
begin processing soon.
Paris, for its part, would like the Spanish Government
to obtain a cease-fire and begin talks with ETA as a
complement to French efforts against the group,
according to US Embassy reports. The outbreak of
ETA terrorist acts against French properties and
interests in France and Spain-both before and after
the Basque extraditions-ensure that France will
continue to pressure Madrid to adopt additional meas-
ures. Indeed, the Spanish Government's offer last
August to negotiate a cease-fire with ETA probably
took into account French sensibilities and domestic
political concerns.
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Latin America
Drawing on its historical ties to Latin America-and
probably offering financial incentives-Madrid has
persuaded several countries in the region to help
relocate more than 2 dozen terrorists expelled from
France:
? Panama has accepted the largest number of etarras,
but it has recently set a limit of 10 at one time and
refuses to grant them permanent residence.
? At strong French urging, Cuba has grudgingly
taken in some ETA members from Panama.
? The Venezuelan Government has also accepted
several terrorists but is reluctant to take in more for
fear they would create trouble in Venezuela's large
Basque community.
? In response to official Spanish and French requests,
the Dominican Republic granted refuge last August
to the second in command of ETA/M, the highest
ranking etarra expelled from France to date.
Madrid is sensitive to Latin American concerns,
however, and does not wish to exhaust good will.
Thus, the Spanish Government, along with Paris, has
been searching in recent months for countries that
will take in ETA members. This effort has resulted to
date in Togo's acceptance of four etarras. In ap-
proaches to other African countries, Madrid reported-
ly has offered to pay the living expenses and provide
security escorts for resettling expelled etarras.F__
Multilateral Organizations
The Gonzalez government has been trying recently to
display a more activist image in its efforts to combat
international terrorism. In his speech at the Council
of Europe in November 1983, Gonzalez called for an
international summit conference on terrorism. Al-
though the proposal has not yet been realized, a
number of his ideas on how to enhance regional
cooperation were reflected in a resolution the justice
ministers of the Council of Europe adopted in
June.
Various Spanish officials in the last few years have
raised the issue of cooperation in visits to Italy, West
Germany, and Israel. Madrid is a charter member of
the Western Mediterranean Club which includes
France, Italy, Morocco, and Tunisia in an interservice
group organized in late 1983 to counter common
threats from international terrorism. Although not a
member of the Club of Berne counterterrorist group,
Spain participates in the club's communications net-
works, which rapidly disseminate operational infor-
mation on terrorists. For several years, Spain has had
observer status with the EC's Trevi Group, which
consults on counterterrorism policies and practices in
the 10 member states. When Spain joins the EC,
probably in 1986, and thus attains full membership in
the Trevi Group, we believe Madrid will participate
actively in the group's proceedings.
fortunes of terrorism1
We believe that ETA will continue to decline in
strength and influence and that its operational capa-
bilities will suffer so long as Madrid and Paris adhere
to their current policies and actions, which hamper
ETA's ability to regroup and reorganize. Recent
government counterterrorist successes suggest that it
may be only a matter of a few more years before
organized Basque terrorism is fully routed. The ter-
rorists-particularly the ETA/M faction-will none-
theless remain dangerous and capable of random acts
of considerable violence against targets of opportunity
and may try further attacks on government and
military officials. Moreover, Basque nationalism is
certain to remain a powerful force despite the waning
The overall state of the autonomy process in the
Basque provinces augurs well for a future devoid of
ETA. Despite intermittent setbacks and squabbling
between Madrid and Vitoria, the regional institutions
created for an autonomous administration are playing
an important role in the economic revitalization of
Euskadi and the legitimizing of political participation
to convey nationalist sentiment, according to US
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Pro-ETA demonstrators under
the watchful eye of French
police in France's pays
Consulate reports. As economic conditions-especial-
ly unemployment-and the quality of life improve,
Basques are less likely, in our view, to welcome or
condone resurgent violence. Perhaps more important-
ly, the development of regional institutions, such as
Basque schools, which provide for the expression of
ethnic nationalism, will prompt Basque society in-
creasingly to abandon support for terrorism.
The French Government's determination to end use of
its territory as a safehaven for ETA will be key to the
fortunes of Basque terrorism. Even if Paris decides
not to extradite any more Spanish Basques, ETA
members no longer dare assume that Paris holds a
benign attitude toward their presence and activities in
France. Recent official French statements indicate
that regional law enforcement authorities will also try
to prevent the rebuilding of ETA's shattered infra-
structure, particularly the terrorists' communications
network in France, which is essential to operational
planning.
GAL will also continue to play a role in ETA's decline
although no ETA deaths have been attributed to GAL
since last summer. ETA members are conscious that
such vigilantes may strike again. Fugitive etarras,
uprooted from their previously unmolested bases in
southwestern France, will be compelled to keep mov-
ing to avoid both the police and GAL. For their part,
the French authorities probably will continue to de-
prive GAL and any similar groups of prospective
targets by moving resident etarras north.
Because the besieged ETA will be increasingly preoc-
cupied with its own survival, particularly when the
provisions of the new antiterrorist draft law are in
effect, it will, we believe, have less time and fewer
resources for recruitment, training, and propaganda
activities. Moreover, ETA's struggle to create a leftist
revolutionary-rather than strictly Basque-identity
probably will distance the group even more from its
traditional base of support. With "revolutionary tax-
es" drying up, along with the ability to collect them,
ETA is likely to be strapped for funds. In its despera-
tion, the group might turn to non-Basque terrorist
networks for financial support, and end up repaying
such debts through terrorist acts that further diminish
ETA's relevance to the cause of an independent
Euskadi.
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Whether Madrid succeeds in solving the problem of
Basque terrorism depends in large part on the govern-
ment's own actions. We believe that an erosion of
Madrid's concern for Basque sensitivities would in-
crease hostility toward the central government and
transform current antiterrorist victories into future
political problems. Basque nationalism remains a
powerful and pervasive force; opinion polls continue to
show that many Basques consider themselves Basques
first and Spaniards second. Basques also believe-
correctly-that many Spaniards consider them
second-class citizens, and they are quick to respond to
perceived or actual political slights.
Thus, while continued tough police actions against
ETA have general public support, Madrid will have to
be careful not to go too far. If the government
appeared to be seeking the physical elimination of
ETA, public sympathy for the group could rise and
political support for the Socialist Party, which has
made electoral gains in Euskadi this year, could
decline. Indeed, many of the acts of vandalism last
summer against French property and symbols in
Spain were undertaken spontaneously, according to
press accounts, by Basque youths not affiliated with
ETA. This suggests that a reservoir of latent sympa-
thy could readily be tapped and, under the right
circumstances, transformed into direct support for-
or participation in-ETA's terrorist actions.
The central government's relations with the PNV will
also be an important factor. The party would find it
very difficult to cooperate with a Spanish government
that appeared determined to crush ETA altogether.
The PNV currently holds power as a minority govern-
ment in Euskadi and, reluctant to lose any of its
nationalist constituency by approving or condoning
harsher actions against ETA, would not hesitate to
appeal to the radical fringe of the party in order to
maintain Basque political support. While the party
welcomes a decline in terrorism, it almost certainly
knows that-ironically-it has gotten more from au-
tonomy because of ETA's pressure on Madrid. The
Spanish government, for its part, missed a major
opportunity to gain Basque assistance against terror-
ism when it rejected the PNV's offer in 1983 to help
draft the new antiterrorism laws.
Two other factors could undermine the government's
antiterrorist campaign. If it became apparent that
Madrid had sponsored the vigilante actions of the
GAL, sympathy for ETA would rise markedly among
Basques. And if Paris, either because of bilateral
disputes with Madrid or because of a change of
government in either capital, were to once again allow
ETA to use France as a safehaven, the terrorists could
begin to rebuild their infrastructure and restore their
operational capability.
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