FRANCE: THE DECLINE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: November 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate oI
Intelligence
France: The Decline of the
Communist Party
EUR 84-10220
November 1984
Copy 322
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
France: The Decline of the
Communist Party
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
This paper was prepared by (Office
of European Analysis. Comments and queries are
Western Europe Division, EURA
Secret
EUR 84-10220
November 1984
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Secret
Communist Party
Key Judgments The once-powerful French Communist Party (PCF) has suffered grave
Information available setbacks in recent years. Contrary to the expectations of PCF leaders,
as of 29 October 1984 Communist participation until this summer in the Socialist-led government
was used in this report.
of President Mitterrand contributed to the party's continued electoral
decline and to the demoralization of Communist militants.
The limits of PCF influence on Mitterrand's policies-particularly in the
economic domain-probably account for much of the disaffection permeat-
ing the Communist rank and file. The policy zigzags of party leader
Marchais, the resistance of top PCF officials to internal demands for
reform, the party's generally staunch support for the Soviet Union, and the
declining attraction of Marxism among French intellectuals also have
contributed to the party's malaise.
The Communists' increasingly strident criticism of Socialist policies
heightens the risk of labor unrest this fall and winter, but we strongly
doubt Mitterrand will yield to Communist demands to resume expansion-
ary economic policies and to alter significantly his industrial restructuring
program. Although a Communist strategy of attacking Mitterrand from
the left might enable the PCF to regain a portion of its pre-1981 strength
in the legislative elections scheduled for 1986, we believe that at least for
the near term the PCF will continue what many French political observ-
ers-including some Communists-have characterized as a "historic de-
cline."
The PCF's weakness contributes significantly to the decline of the left as a
whole and probably enhances prospects for a return to conservative
government in Paris. From recent election results it appears that even a
united left currently could poll only one-third of the vote. The PCF's
weakness, on the other hand, does give Mitterrand maneuvering room in
his continuing attempts to broaden his appeal among centrist voters.
iii Secret
EUR 84-10220
November 1984
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Increased Communist sniping almost certainly will not significantly affect
French foreign policy, especially Mitterrand's support for the Alliance and
his firm stand on East-West security issues. On the contrary, we believe the
PCF's diminishing influence on French politics and society as a whole will
further isolate the only major party that does not fundamentally support
democratic principles or maintenance of a substantial contribution to
Western collective defense. This reduced influence will not necessarily lead
to marked improvement in French-US relations; the Mitterrand govern-
ment's perception of French national interests will continue to set France
on a collision course with the United States from time to time, especially on
economic issues. Nevertheless, the PCF's diminished voice on the left
almost certainly will ensure a more pragmatic consideration by the French
Government of US policies across the board.
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Secret
Key Judgments
Recent Symptoms of Decline
Waning Public Support
2
Disillusioned Membership
3
Declining Media Influence
4
"Fossilized" Leadership
5
Confused Policies
5
Little Policy Influence
6
Support for the Soviet Union
7
Decline of Marxist Appeal
8
Slim Prospects
8
Search for a Strategy
8
Factionalism
9
Membership Problems
10
Implications
10
Electoral Arithmetic
10
Government Policies
11
Key Communist Party Officials
13
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Secret
France: The Decline of the
Communist Party
Introduction
During its 64-year history, the French Communist
Party (PCF) has participated only twice-and for
brief periods-in national governments. Nonetheless,
the party's strong base in the working class, its
attraction for prominent intellectuals and artists, and
its close ties to the Soviet Union have enabled it to
exercise significant indirect influence on a broad
The Communists' domination of the left made them a
force to be reckoned with and feared. The party's
strength in the electorate, unions, and municipal
governments gave it at least an indirect influence on
important aspects of both domestic and foreign policy.
Many knowledgeable observers have suggested, for
example, that efforts by de Gaulle, Pompidou, and
Giscard to improve relations with the Soviets were at
least in part motivated by their hope that Moscow
spectrum of French administrations.
In recent years the PCF has suffered major electoral
setbacks and a drop in party morale that have called
into question its ability to reclaim its once undisputed
leadership of the French left. Indeed, even Commu-
nist officials recently have publicly raised the specter
of their party's "historic decline" and eventual "mar-
ginalization."
A Turbulent History
Since its founding in 1920 the PCF has played an
important role in French political life. The party grew
slowly initially, but by the mid-1930s it was the
undisputed voice of the radical left and of much of the
working class. Partly in recognition of its major role in
the Resistance and partly in hopes of maintaining
labor peace, General de Gaulle appointed several
Communists to important posts in his Cabinet in
1945-46. After breaking with Prime Minister Rama-
dier's economic policies, the Communist ministers
were dismissed in 1947.
During the postwar period, PCF leaders used their
strength in labor to expand the party organization at
the local level, to win municipal elections in important
cities, and to promote the Communist-dominated
General Confederation of Labor (CGT) into France's
largest and most powerful trade union. Having con-
solidated effective control over union labor in the
1950s and having entrenched itself as the perennial
voice of antiestablishment discontent, the PCF rose to
command about 25 percent of the vote in the 1960s.
would help keep the PCF in check domestically.
The PCF was not immune to serious setbacks during
the Gaullist era, as evidenced by defections of party
loyalists following Soviet repression in Hungary in
1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Still, it was not
until Georges Marchais became the PCF's General
Secretary in 1972 that the party's resilience began to
come gradually into question. Outflanked internation-
ally by the Gaullists' "special relationship" with the
Soviets, Marchais also was challenged domestically
by Francois Mitterrand's dogged efforts to rebuild the
Socialist Party.
Marchais' response was to zigzag between gestures of
moderation-such as playing down revolutionary and
pro-Soviet rhetoric and signing the "Common Pro-
gram" with the Socialists-and a hardline approach
exemplified by his scuttling of the leftist voting
alliance in 1977 and vocal defense of the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in early 1980. Following the
PCF's disastrous showing in the presidential and
legislative elections in 1981, Marchais reversed course
again and accepted Mitterrand's offer of a junior role
in the Cabinet. (See the appendix for biographical
sketches of key PCF officials.
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Evolution of Public Opinion
Regarding the Communist Party
and Georges Marchais a
Opinion Regarding Desire To See
Communist Party Marchais Play
Important Role
Positive Negative No Opinion in French Politics
1973
33
48
19
1975
30
54
16
24
1976
31
50
19
26
1977
30
55
15
28
1978
29
58
13
26
1979
28
58
14
25
1980
23
63
14
20
1981
25
62
13
23
1982
24
64
12
18
1983
21
66
13
16
1984
18
70
12
15
u Data for 1973-83 are from SOFRES, Opinion Publique, Enquetes
et Commentaires, 1984 (Paris, 1984). The 1984 figure is an average
of monthly surveys through June.
According to a wide variety of press sources and party
insiders, the Communists hoped to gain a number of
important advantages from their participation in the
leftist coalition. PCF leaders-especially Marchais-
reportedly argued that participation would:
? Increase the Communists' prestige by demonstrat-
ing their ability to govern.
? Enable the PCF to bolster the CGT's influence
within the government and state-run industries,
increasing the CGT's appeal to workers.
? Allow the Communists to help shape electoral re-
forms-such as proportional representation-to re-
cover the PCF's pre-1981 voting strength.
? Open doors for Communist infiltration of the gov-
ernment bureaucracy.
Recent Symptoms of Decline
Contrary to the expectations of the Communist lead-
ership in 1981, we believe several key indicators
demonstrate that the PCF has fallen steadily toward a
much-diminished and perhaps marginal role in
French political life.
Waning Public Support. The party's decline has been
most apparent in dismal voter turnout, especially in
local elections in which the PCF used to do well. In
1977 the Communists controlled 72 of France's 232
largest cities, but in nationwide municipal elections
last year their share dropped to 56. The Communists
have since lost an additional 13 city halls in court-
ordered elections resulting from PCF vote fraud.
Reduced control over large cities is particularly dam-
aging for the PCF since it entails:
? Loss of patronage jobs for Communist functionar-
ies, who customarily hand over their salaries to the
party in return for "proletarian wages."
? Loss of kickbacks and lucrative contracts for party-
affiliated and party-owned businesses.
? Loss of public subsidies to a wide range of PCF
organizations such as sports associations and radio
stations.
? Loss of the prestige that comes with governing.
Other recent election results suggest that the PCF's
decline has accelerated nationwide, notably in former
Communist strongholds. The PCF polled 11.2 percent
of the vote in the European Parliament election in
June-its worst showing since 1932. Party candidates
scored over 20 percent in only five of France's 97
departments, and three of these high scores were in
thinly populated regions of traditional PCF support.
The party's share of the vote dropped significantly in
its long-established bastions in the industrialized
north, in the "Red Belt" around Paris, and in the
Marseilles region. According to the US Embassy,
results of recent municipal and European Parliament
elections demonstrate that Communist strength in
Paris has become negligible.
Opinion polls by respected private institutes confirm
the downward trend in PCF prestige, particularly
among Communist backers. In 1979, 11 percent of a
national survey considered the PCF the "most capa-
ble" of all parties in managing the economy effective-
ly; only 5 percent felt the same in 1983. In response to
a question likely to indicate opinion of the Commu-
nists, the 1979 survey found that 16 percent of the
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Figure 1
Evolution of the Communist Vote,
1924-84
? Legislative elections
? Presidential elections
? European elections
0 1924 28 32 36 45 51 5658 62 6769 73 78 8184
46 68 79
sample believed the PCF was the party "most capable
of defending the interests of folks like you," whereas
in 1983 only 9 percent believed this. Another respect-
ed poll indicated recently that 15 percent of Commu-
nists believe the party and its leaders consistently
"defend outmoded ideas."
Comparison of PCF and FN Approval Ratings
Comparisons of PCF party and leadership approval
ratings with those of the extreme-right National
Front (FN)-a party that unabashedly mobilizes
racist feelings for its anti-immigrant program-indi-
cate that most Frenchmen see the two parties as
equally objectionable. Figaro magazine's SOFRES
survey last spring asked a national sample which
leaders they "would wish to see play an important
role in the months and years to come. " Of the group,
16 percent approved FN leader Jean-Marie Le Pen
and 15 percent backed Marchais. The same survey
showed that whereas 52 percent "would not vote "for
the FN "in any case" 58 percent would not accept the
PCF. In the most recent survey, the Communists'
rejection rate had risen 12 percentage points, and that
of the FN, 8, over the 1979 results.
Disillusioned Membership. Widespread reports indi-
cate that PCF leaders are very concerned about
declining membership, flagging cell activity, stagnat-
ing organizational initiatives, and an air of pessimism
and disillusionment that they sense has settled over
the party. Membership probably has fallen considera-
bly since the leftist victory in 1981.' Party leaders
recently have reorganized many of the cells to dis-
guise decreasing membership.
We believe the membership drop reflects serious
disillusionment among Communist militants who
have complained about the party leadership's con-
fused policies, the recent series of Communist elector-
al defeats, and the PCF's failure to influence govern-
ment policies significantly-particularly on economic
' Precise figures on membership are closely guarded by the PCF
leadership. Self-serving party claims of increasing membership,
inflated figures of over 700,000 militants, and tactics to obscure
thinning ranks-such as issuing membership cards for multiple
years-have failed to prevent widely publicized accounts of the
party's difficult straits. Well-informed journalists and political
observers estimate that membership probably is 200,000 to
250,000. This would represent a drop of about 300,000 members in
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 these indications of continued decline have angered
CGT leaders, who argue that PCF participation in the
government has, on balance, tied the CGT's hands.
issues. Party leaders appear well aware of these
reasons.
la large majority
of militants had abstained in the European Parlia-
ment election because of dissatisfaction with the
party's line and its bleak prospects.
many party functionaries
also are disgruntled and blame the leadership's deci-
sion to participate in the government for the PCF's
recent electoral defeats. In an unusual public airing of
views within the PCF's upper echelons, Central Com-
mittee member and Revolution editor Guy Hermier
recently summed up the party's lack of direction:
"Today we know well what we no longer are, what we
no longer want to be. But we are at pains to outline
clearly ... what we are and what we want for French
society."
The Communist-controlled CGT also has fallen on
hard times. The CGT's serious losses to rival
independent and pro-Socialist unions in social security
elections in 1983, its inability to exploit Communist
ministerial entree to prevent the determined Socialist
government from cutting jobs in restructured indus-
tries, and its generally lackluster performance in
organizing labor protests have cast into bold relief the
diminished strength of the once-feared union.' Ac-
cording to various press and US Embassy reports,
' Exact membership figures for the CGT are closely held. Some
measure of its eroding membership can be found, however, in its
declining vote in annual elections for labor conciliation boards. In
1966 it received slightly over 50 percent of worker votes; by 1983 its
share had fallen to about 30 percent. The union's newspaper
claimed membership of 2.0 million in 1976 and 1.6 million in 1980.
Since then it has made no new claims. Membership now has
probably fallen to well under 1 million. Claude Marmel, who has
written extensively on the CGT, suggests that the leadership can
mobilize only about 120,000 militants, "almost all of whom are
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also in serious trouble-which is partly a symptom
and partly a cause of the PCF's other difficulties.
in late 1983 a party
report bemoaned the declining number and financial
health of PCF radio stations, resulting partly from the
loss of subsidies from municipal governments that the
party no longer controls. Sales of party newspapers
also have fallen since the leftist coalition was formed.
Revolution, the Central Committee's own organ, may
be forced to close because of financial difficulties, and
already hard-pressed party journalists had to wait
months recently for what turned out to be meager
salary raises. financial
problems also have forced the party's principal daily,
L'Humanite, to close most of its foreign bureaus.
While its own media have entered a period of re-
trenchment, the PCF appears to have failed to gain
much influence over the non-Communist French me-
dia-one of the party's goals in joining the leftist
coalition. PCF National Assembly members tried to
apply pressure on the government in 1981-without
apparent success-to clamp down on the television
networks, complaining that the greater freedom en-
joyed by journalists under the Socialists had enabled
"rightist media" to attack the government, the Social-
ists, and the PCF. Communist minister Charles Fiter-
man reportedly urged Mitterrand in 1982 to appoint
Communists to prominent media jobs and complained
that the PCF was not receiving enough television
time. party
journalists placed in the national radio-television net-
works have been "neutralized" by their superiors.
Similarly, a PCF journalist has told US Embassy
officials that the Socialists have been careful to
restrict Communist access to midlevel positions of
media direction.
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because of declining readership.
In 1952 the PCF had 16 daily newspapers, three of
them national and 13 regional. Today, only four
remain and only one, L'Humanite, is distributed
nationally. Although some dailies almost certainly
disappeared because of PCF media consolidation or
were replaced by Communist radio, others vanished
tion, have a national following.
The PCF also published 82 weeklies in 1952. Al-
though it is unclear how many it now controls, there
are probably far fewer. Only seven, including Revolu-
ate internal demands for reform.
Causes of Decline
Although Mitterrand has in many cases skillfully out-
maneuvered the Communists, most of the causes of
the party's decline, in our view, stem from its dogged
pursuit of anachronistic policies, its penchant for
abrupt and confusing changes in tactics, and its
apparent inability to accommodate critics and medi-
"Fossilized"Leadership. PCF leaders, we believe,
continue to meet demands for change with isolation
tactics and expulsions. The Central Committee has
used the principle of "democratic centralism"-a
Leninist concept calling for the party to speak with a
single voice through its leadership-to prevent or
crush internal dissent. Marchais and the older-
"fossilized," according to critics-generation of party
leaders such as L'Humanite boss Roland Leroy and
party organization director Gaston Plissonnier have
allowed no questioning of this principle. For example,
party leaders recently have moved to silence internal
dissent in the wake of the PCF's electoral defeat and
departure from the government. According to the US
Embassy in Paris, former Vocational Training Minis-
ter Marcel Rigout and the like-minded Civil Service
Minister Anicet Le Pors have virtually disappeared
from public view. Other reformists-such as party
spokesman Pierre Juquin-are increasingly isolated
within the party hierarchy. Daniel Karlin-a Com-
munist intellectual, television commentator, and party
representative on a state media board-attempted to
publish a letter in L'Humanite calling for a full-scale
Figure 3
L'Humanite Sales, 1968-83
I I I I I I I I I I 1 1 I 1
110 1968 70 75 80
Source: Le Monde, 9 August 1984 (citing official figures
from the Office de Justification de la Diffusion).
u
83
debate on the party's policies and future. Its publica-
tion was refused, as Leroy explained, "by order of the
party, that is to say by Georges Marchais."
Confused Policies. Under Marchais, the leadership
also has failed to hold the PC to a consistent policy.
Indeed, it has relied on party discipline to sanction
abrupt policy shifts that have left even the most
dedicated militants bewildered
Changes in attitude toward the Socialists and the goal
of leftist unity have probably created the most confu-
sion. After signing the "Common Program" in
1972-when the PCF was still the dominant party on
the left-Marchais became progressively more
alarmed at rapid Socialist gains. Shifting his fire from
the right to his Socialist "allies," Marchais effectively
torpedoed the leftist alliance in 1977-a move that we
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Figure 5. Gaston Plissonnier,
PCF organizational director.
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believe led to the left's defeat in the legislative
election in 1978. During the presidential campaign of
1981, Marchais leveled his most bitter attacks against
Mitterrand and reportedly attempted to engineer
Giscard's victory in the second round of voting. Only
after the Socialist landslide in the parliamentary
elections of June 1981 did Marchais reverse course
and once again espouse the strategy of leftist unity.
Mitterrand, in order to forestall PCF criticisms and to
buy labor peace, invited the Communists to join his
government; Marchais accepted, although halfheart-
edly. During the three years of Communist participa-
tion in the Mitterrand government, party leaders
maintained that, despite disagreements with specific
policies, the PCF was in the coalition to stay and that
participation boosted the party's "legitimacy." These
arguments won wide approval among the rank and
file. Although its disagreements with the Socialists at
first seemed manageable, the party ultimately adopt-
ed a more hostile and irreconcilable attitude toward
Mitterrand's policies, particularly his austerity pro-
gram. This confusing policy of "participation without
support" was then followed, after the party aban-
doned the coalition last July, by a policy of "selective
support," leaving many Communists to wonder how
the party's new role differs from its previous position
in the government.'
According to polls conducted shortly before the coali-
tion's breakup, more than 70 percent of militants
favored participation and said they would be dis-
pleased by a leadership decision to withdraw. Some
' The clearest example of the PCF's confusing attitude toward the
government came last spring. After lambasting the government's
policies in the National Assembly and press, it voted confidence in
dissidents within the party recently have charged,
moreover, that the PCF's failure to cooperate with the
Socialists wrecked the coalition and undermined pos-
sible Communist gains from participation. Former
Minister Rigout has gone as far as to charge publicly
that Marchais is personally to blame, stating that
"the responsibility [for such failure] is collective but,
Marchais has become a man of failure."
for a part of the [Communist] electorate, Georges
Little Policy Influence. In our judgment, another
reason for the PC F's recent decline is its inability to
show that its participation in the government resulted
in significant influence on Mitterrand's key domestic
policies.' The increasing shrillness of PCF criticisms
of the Mitterrand administration and the apparently
cool reaction of the new Socialist Prime Minister
Laurent Fabius to Communist demands for economic
expansion and jobs programs have only underscored
the PCF's impotence in this regard.
In our view the PCF, largely excluded from cabinet
discussions of foreign policy, also had very little
influence on Mitterrand's foreign policy. Government
officials simply ignored the PCF's strictures on East-
West relations and on security issues-for example,
its suggestion that French nuclear forces be counted
in US-Soviet arms control talks. Its criticisms of
French involvement in Chad and Lebanon, mean-
while, were openly condemned by Socialist Party
officials as being blind to French national interests
and disloyal to the leftist coalition.
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Figure 6. "The Blind Leading the Blind. " Georges Marchais leads
fellow politbureau members through a barrage of ballot boxes,
complaining letters, and assorted fruit. "Hey! It seems to be
In one respect, however, the PCF probably has had
some success in achieving its goal. The appointment of
Communist ministers opened the way for more PCF
members to enter the government and the administra-
tions of some state-run enterprises. According to a
variety of US Embassy and press reports, the Com-
munist ministers staffed their cabinets with faithful
party functionaries and probably encouraged the hir-
ing of party members in their civil service bureaucra-
cies. New hiring regulations prohibiting disclosures of
party affiliation as a condition of public employment
undoubtedly aided this process and probably will
make it difficult to identify PCF civil servants in the
future. According to a press report last year, the party
was especially active and successful in placing mili-
tants in the state-owned National Railroad System,
then under the control of PCF Transport Minister
Fiterman.
Although some of these gains probably will survive
the coalition's breakup, perpetuating at least indirect
Communist influence in the public administration, we
expect the new Socialist ministers to move quickly to
replace or sidetrack many known or suspected Com-
munists. Moreover, reduced Communist access to
government positions may demoralize some younger
militants who had hoped that their party loyalty
would be rewarded with more prestigious employ-
Figure 7. Georges Marchais, flanked by Charles Fiterman, an-
nounces the rupture in the leftist coalition, 19 July 1984
Support for the Soviet Union. Widespread reports
suggest the PCF also has suffered from close identifi-
cation with Soviet foreign policies and objectives in an
era when the French public is increasingly critical of
Moscow's actions. The PCF, for example, has main-
tained that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is
merely assistance to a friendly and threatened neigh-
bor and that the "excesses" of the Solidarity trade
union movement in Poland justified the imposition of
martial law. When Soviet behavior has been indefen-
sible even for the PCF-the downing of the South
Korean airliner in 1983 is one example-Communist
spokesmen have shrugged off criticism of Moscow
with the argument that "on the whole" the USSR is a
force for good in the world.
The PCF leadership's often unabashed support of
Soviet foreign policy has bred disaffection within the
party's ranks. According to various press reports, even
some party militants objected to Marchais' public
support for Soviet actions in Afghanistan in a broad-
cast from Moscow in 1979. Some Communist offi-
cials, moreover, have openly suggested that the pro-
Soviet party line has alienated many of the party's
faithful, and especially its youth. For example, in a
recent interview, Rigout charged that "for the young,
the party often comes down to the equation
P.C. [PCF] = USSR = gulag."
ment.
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Figure 8. Marcel Rigout, for-
mer PCF Minister of Vocation-
al Training.
Decline of Marxist Appeal. Although it is difficult to
document, we believe structural changes in society are
affecting profoundly those parts of the population
traditionally influenced by the PCF. According to a
variety of studies by French political scientists and
sociologists, industrial restructuring and the advent of
a high-technology and service economy are reducing
the size of the old industrial proletariat on which the
PCF and CGT depended. Similar studies also show
that French workers, especially the young, are more
literate, sophisticated, and independent minded than
the older generation. PCF leaders publicly dismiss
such findings as "bourgeois sociology" and insist that
the party has not lost its proletarian moorings. None-
theless, a survey of PCF members by a reputable
conservative magazine shows that PCF membership is
shifting from blue-collar toward service and white-
collar employees and is suffering numerically in the
process
Meanwhile, the PCF and Marxism apparently no
longer have their traditional appeal to rebellious
youth and idealistic intellectuals.' The Communist
youth organization is shrinking in size and enthusi-
asm, and, since the death of the Communist poet
Louis Aragon last year, no distinguished intellectuals
' French intellectual life has spawned a number of attractive,
critical alternatives to Marxism-especially in philosophy, anthro-
pology, and the new social sciences-where structuralists and the
Annales school have emphasized testing authorities and questioning
comprehensive theories. Marxist intellectual formulations-in par-
ticular assumptions about the historical development of social
structure and the nature of social change-are now more often used
remain in the party. According to Embassy and press
reports, both intellectuals and young people have been
particularly alienated by PCF support for Soviet and
Eastern Bloc repressions. Some intellectuals who
might formerly have joined the PCF now maintain a
discreet distance from all party affiliation. Many
others have apparently found political moorings
among the parties of the center and center-right,
creating what some observers have described as an
intellectual renaissance on the right.
Slim Prospects
Having withdrawn from the coalition, the PCF now
must define a new strategy to regain its stature. Given
the major fissures in the party and the serious difficul-
ties of attracting new members, especially youth, we
believe the party's near-term prospects are bleak.
Search for a Strategy. After its break with the
Socialists in mid-July, the Communist leadership
announced a cautious policy of continued selective
support for government proposals and refused to
discount the possibility of returning to the govern-
ment. Nevertheless, various party and CGT officials
have gradually stepped up criticism of Socialist poli-
cies, and Communist deputies for the first time since
leaving the government abstained in a parliamentary
vote of confidence. This measured pace in moving
toward opposition appears designed to win back hard-
liners who left the party because of its cooperation
with the Socialists, without at the same time confus-
ing, demoralizing, or alienating further the majority
of party members who favored continued participa-
tion in the coalition.
We believe that proponents of increasingly open at-
tacks on government policies will gain the upper hand
in PCF leadership circles.
party hardliners argue that the rank
and file needs more clarity and simplicity in party
policy explanations-an implicit rejection of the "se-
lective support" approach. CGT officials, meanwhile,
reportedly are eager for a "fall offensive" against the
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Figure 9. Anicet Le Pors, for-
mer PCF Secretary of State to
the Prime Minister for Civil
Service and Administrative Re-
form.
government's economic program and may even re-
place CGT head Henri Krasucki in the hope of
attracting new militants. Moreover, if the economy-
and especially the unemployment situation-worsens
or improves only slowly, US Embassy sources report
that party leaders are counting on their opposition to
Mitterrand to draw leftwing support away from the
Socialists and permit the PCF to show a credible
improvement in the 1986 balloting.
Factionalism. In our view, this "back to the ghetto"
strategy will further split the party between "reform-
ers" and "conservatives." Although serious internal
bickerin is not new for the PCF
lin re-
cent years it has reached unprecedented levels. The
"reformist" faction-which represents perhaps one-
fourth of the Central Committee and is usually
identified with Marcel Rigout, Anicet Le Pors, and
Guy Hermier-has openly questioned Marchais' fit-
ness, called for more open debate on party strategy,
and applauded the achievements of the more
independent-minded Italian Communist Party. On
the other side, the "conservative" faction-closely
identified with Roland Leroy and Gaston Plisson-
nier-has consistently disparaged cooperation with
the Socialists (except on PCF terms), demanded the
maintenance of party discipline through "democratic
centralism," and stressed the importance of close
relations with Moscow.
We expect these internal tensions to mount as the
February party congress approaches
Figure 10. Andre Lajoinie,
president of the Communist
group in the National Assem-
Secretary General, but many influential "conserva-
tives" evidently regard him as mediocre and ineffec-
tive. Marchais may fear that hardliners will try to
replace him, but
government has mollified them for now.
Many "reformers," on the other hand, reportedly view
Fiterman as the most capable and intelligent alterna-
tive to Marchais. Fiterman almost certainly would
like to succeed Marchais but realizes that he must
proceed carefully, especially because influential "con-
servatives" fear that he would shake up the PCF
apparatus too much and prove to be uncontrollable.
In our view, Fiterman would not solve the PCF's
problems. Although party "reformers" might gain
greater influence, we see little prospect that they
could effectively displace the "conservatives" now
holding sway in both the Central Committee and
Politburo. This results in part from the influence of a
younger generation of conservative-minded appara-
tchiks-including party economist Philippe Herzog
and PCF National Assembly leader Andre Lajoinie-
who essentially share their elder patrons' views on
"democratic centralism" and the dangers of "Euro-
communism." Moreover, although Fiterman probably
favors sweeping changes in the party apparatus, we do
not believe that he actually supports the kinds of
changes-open debate and greater distance from
Moscow-reformers seek.
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Membership Problems. PCF leaders also face the
serious problem of mobilizing the party's remaining
strength among workers. Although CGT leaders
chafed under the restraints imposed by PCF partici-
pation in the leftist coalition, US Embassy and press
reports indicate that union bosses may be overestimat-
ing the militancy of their members. As evidenced by
the relatively low turnout and enthusiasm of CGT-led
workers in the "March on Paris" last spring to protest
the government's steel restructuring plan, the union
rank and file apparently remain reluctant to join in
all-out opposition to a leftist government, especially
when such tactics play directly into the hands of the
right. Although the PCF almost certainly would try to
capitalize on spontaneous labor disturbances-most
likely to erupt if the economy worsens considerably-
the party would probably be unable to foment wide-
spread disruptions on its own.
The party faces similar problems in recruiting and
mobilizing youth and intellectuals. It devoted scarce
resources to funding the peace movement, for exam-
ple, but failed to attract youth. Similarly, according to
US diplomats in Paris, the much-ballyhooed Commu-
nist Youth Movement demonstration last spring
against US policy in Nicaragua drew fewer than 100
protestors and fizzled after a half hour of unenthu-
siastic chanting.
Many French political commentators, including Com-
munists, seem pessimistic about the party's ability to
recover. One disgruntled Communist journalist has
predicted in the press that "with the disappearance of
the old generation of party faithful and the arrival of
a new generation who vote for anything but the
Communists, [the PCF] will fall to 8 percent [of the
vote] in five years and to 4 or 5 percent within 10
years." Rigout has noted publicly that the party
captured only 6 percent of the youth vote in the recent
Euroelections. A recent survey, moreover, noted that
both the Communist leadership and older supporters
are out of step with youthful opinions on a wide
variety of key issues, such as the government's indus-
trial policy and the effectiveness of the CGT.
PCF's slide, for example, has contributed substantial-
ly to the erosion of the entire left. Although some
evidence suggests that disgruntled Communist voters
have switched to the Socialists and vice versa, it also
indicates significant flight of defectors toward the
right. According to recent election results, the Social-
ist Party and PCF combined now command no more
than 35 percent of the electorate-down over 20
percentage points from the Socialist tally in 1981 and
far short of the strength necessary to retain for the
left a legislative plurality in 1986 or the presidency in
1988.
This erosion of strength enhances prospects for a more
centrist government in 1986 and perhaps for a return
to a conservative government in 1988. Recent election
results, together with growing Communist weakness
and indications that leftwing Socialists have moderat-
ed their criticisms of the government, will encourage
Mitterrand and Fabius to try to counter the right's
advantage by adopting policies attractive to centrist
voters who backed the Socialists in 1981. Fabius has
already called for cooperation between the govern-
ment and the center-right parties on issues such as
social security reform.
Over the longer term, the PCF's deterioration could
widen differences in Communist ranks even further,
particularly along "reformist" and "conservative"
lines. Because reformist defections and splintering
would remove most of the internal demands for
reform, they might at first strengthen the hand of the
hardliners within the party. If splinter groups increase
in size and solidify, however, this would intensify and
institutionalize the bickering among the Communists
and, in the long term, could even raise the prospect of
competing Communist parties, as in Spain.
The PCF's decline does not guarantee a rightist
victory. Indeed, it presents some complications, par-
ticularly by encouraging rightwing parties to try go-it-
alone strategies against the left in the 1986 National
Assembly election. The Gaullists, for example, may
decide to break off their current limited cooperation
with the extreme right National Front-which made
impressive gains in the European Parliament voting in
Implications
Electoral Arithmetic. The Communist Party's decline
and its growing opposition to the Socialist government
will have a notable effect on the political scene. The
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June and in regional elections in Corsica in July.
Moreover, if the Socialists follow through with the
widely expected introduction of proportional represen-
tation before the 1986 elections-a move that would
increase the ability of small parties to win representa-
tion-we believe this would encourage the small
center-right parties of the Giscardian Union pour la
Democratie Francaise (UDF) also to resist joining the
electoral coalitions that they formed in the European
Parliament election. Thus, although at this point we
expect the conservative parties to win a majority in
the 1986 elections, the proper combination of rightist
complacency, internal bickering, and small-party in-
dependence would allow the left to maintain power-
perhaps in coalition with the center and center-right.6
Government Policies. The PCF withdrawal from the
coalition, its declining strength, and its escalating
criticisms of the government are unlikely to have
much influence on the Mitterrand government's do-
mestic or foreign policies. Nor are they likely to have
more than a marginal influence on US interests. The
Socialist government, which will retain a parliamenta-
ry majority at least until 1986, appears committed to
continue its austerity program and even to strengthen
it in significant ways, according to a variety of press
and Embassy reports. The government will feel even
less intimidated by threats from a PCF that is weaker
than before. Communist opposition to Socialist poli-
cies heightens somewhat the risk of CGT-instigated
labor unrest this fall and winter, but we strongly
doubt Mitterrand will yield to Communist demands to
resume expansionary economic policies and to alter in
any major way his industrial restructuring program.
with West Germany-these criticisms would not, in
our view, alter French policies, especially where East-
West issues are concerned:
? Mitterrand previously has undercut criticisms of his
foreign policies by direct appeals to the public, and
his firm stance toward the Soviets has broad sup-
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? Moreover, having allowed the PCF no voice in
formulating foreign policy while the party was in
the coalition, he is unlikely to be diverted by its
criticisms while it is in opposition.
By the same token, the PCF's shift to the opposition is
not likely to lead to marked improvement in French-
US relations. The Mitterrand government's percep-
tion of French national interests will continue to
generate loud complaints about US interest rates,
what the government sees as self-serving technology
transfer policies, and US protectionism generally.
French officials will still blame US economic policies
for Third World and French economic ills.
We believe, however, that the PCF's diminishing
influence in French politics and society can only
benefit US interests in the long term by further
isolating the one major party in France that does not
fundamentally support democratic principles or main-
tenance of a substantial contribution to Western
collective defense. If, as we expect, the PCF's influ-
ence continues to decline, this will almost certainly
ensure a more pragmatic consideration of a broad
range of US policies by the French left and will
strengthen the hand of those on the left who already
approve of US positions
Mitterrand is even less vulnerable in matters of
foreign policy because the French Constitution vests
such personal power over external relations in the
president and because of the strong public consensus
that supports his efforts. Although the PCF will assail
any government moves toward closer identification
with the Alliance-including enhanced practical co-
operation with NATO and improved bilateral ties
6 Mitterrand already enjoys formal support from the largest center
parties-the Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche (MRG) and the
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Appendix
Key Communist
Party Officials
Georges Marchais
Secretary General of the PCF since 1972, Georges
Marchais has served as a deputy in the National
Assembly since 1973 and in the European Parliament
since 1979. He was a skilled metalworker and a
member of the CGT in France's nationalized aircraft
industry from 1938 until 1951. During World War II
he worked (some evidence suggests voluntarily), in a
Bavarian aircraft factory. Marchais joined the PCF in
1947 and in 1951 became a full-time CGT official.
Elected to the Political Bureau in 1959, he headed the
organization sector throughout the 1960s and was
deputy secretary general during 1970-72. According
to press reports, Marchais, 64, has suffered two heart
attacks.
Henri Krasucki
Henri Krasucki has been Secretary General of the
General Confederation of Labor (CGT) since 1982
and a member of the PCF Political Bureau since
1964. Krasucki, the son of Polish Jewish immigrants
who were also Communists, joined the PCF in 1938.
During World War II he fought in the Resistance
before being deported to concentration camps at
Auschwitz and later Buchenwald. After the war he
worked as a pipefitter and joined the CGT and the
PCF. Since the 1950s he has risen steadily within the
ranks of both organizations. Krasucki is 60 years old.
Charles Fiterman
The second-ranking official in the PCF, Charles
Fiterman served as Minister of Transportation from
May 1981 to July 1984. Fiterman, an electrician,
joined the CGT and PCF in the early 1950s. He later
directed the PCF's Central School for training party
officials and served on the staff of then Secretary
General Emile Waldeck Rochet. Elected to the Politi-
cal Bureau in 1976, Fiterman took over the party's
economic sector. He directed the party journal Econo-
mie et Politique from 1976 until 1979, when he
assumed responsibility for propaganda. He was a
deputy in the National Assembly from 1978 until he
Roland Leroy
Roland Leroy has been director of the official PCF
newspaper L'Humanite since 1974. A hardliner, he
has long been at odds with the more moderate PCF
Secretary General, Georges Marchais. The son of a
railroad worker, Leroy worked for the French Nation-
al Railroad Company in the mid-1940s. He joined the
PCF shortly thereafter, rising through the ranks to
become secretary of the Central Committee in 1960
and a member of the Political Bureau in 1967. From
1967 until 1974 he was responsible for the party's
intellectual sector. He was a deputy in the National
Assembly during 1956-58 and 1967-8 1. Because of
differences with Marchais, Leroy was removed from
the PCF Secretariat in 1979, although he retained his
position as director of L'Humanite. He has been
president of the France-USSR Association since
1959. Leroy, 58, is the author of several books on
Marxism-Leninism.
Gaston Plissonnier
Organizational coordinator of the PCF since 1970,
Gaston Plissonnier is responsible for party administra-
tion. Plissonnier, 71,
may retire from his party position at the PCF con-
gress in February 1985. A longtime Communist,
Plissonnier left school at the age of 12 and became
active in the Communist Youth. During World War
II he fought in the Resistance near Toulouse. During
the 1950s he served first as a liaison between the PCF
and illegal Communist parties, such as that in Spain,
and then was the Central Committee's secretary of
administration. Elected to the Political Bureau in
1964, he was party spokesman for general policies
during the late 1960s.
joined the Cabinet. Fiterman is 50 years old.
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Anicet Le Pors
A member of the PCF Central Committee since 1979,
Anicet Le Pors was Minister-Delegate to the Prime
Minister in charge of Civil Service and Administra-
tive Reform during 1981-83 and Secretary of State
for Civil Service and Administrative Reform from
March 1983 until the Communists left the govern-
ment in July 1984. He holds degrees in meteorology
and law and a doctorate in economics. In 1955 he
joined the CGT, and three years later he became a
member of the PCF. Elected to the Senate in 1977,
Le Pors gave up his seat in 1981 when President
Mitterrand appointed him to the Cabinet. Le Pors is
53 years old.
Marcel Rigout
Minister of Professional Training from June 1981 to
July 1984, Marcel Rigout is a PCF moderate who has
publicly indicated some sympathy with the Italian
brand of Eurocommunism and a desire for the party
to cut its "umbilical cord" with the Soviet Union.
Rigout, a former metalworker, joined the PCF in
1944 while serving in the Resistance. He was elected
to the Central Committee in 1961. He served in the
National Assembly during 1967-68 and 1973-81; he
gave up his seat when he joined the Cabinet. Rigout
has been an active and popular local politician. He
was political director of a local Communist newspaper
in central France and was a,party spokesman for
agricultural affairs. Rigout, 56, suffered a heart
Guy Hermier
Guy Hermier has directed the PCF weekly Revolu-
tion since its creation in 1980 and is considered one of
the front-runners to take over direction of L'Human-
ite when Roland Leroy retires. According to US
Embassy and press reporting, Hermier appears to be
an opportunist who has risen in the PCF on the
strength of his loyalty and efficiency. A party member
since 1958, he was largely responsible for instilling
ideological purity in the Communist Students Union
during the 1960s. He was responsible for PCF youth
and publications during 1974-78 and has directed the
intellectual sector since at least 1981. Since 1974
Hermier has headed the important Bouches-du-
Rhone party federation, and since 1978 he has been a
deputy in the National Assembly, where he serves on
the National Defense and Armed Forces Committee.
He is 44 years old.
Philippe Herzog
PCF hardliner Philippe Herzog has been the party's
chief economic spokesman since at least 1979, when
he was elected to the Political. Bureau. A graduate of
the Ecole Polytechnique, Herzog teaches economics at
the University of Paris at Nanterre. He has worked on
short-term economic forecasting at the National Insti-
tute of Statistics and Economic Studies and has been
deputy editor in chief of.the PCF journal Economie et
Politique. Herzog, 44, often lectures at US universi-
ties and institutions and speaks some English.
Andre Lajoinie
A deputy in the National Assembly since 1978, Andre
Lajoinie has served as president of the Communist
group in that body since 19.82
Lajoinie's influence within the party leadership-and
thus his chances of becoming secretary general-were
declining. Lajoinie was a farmer until 1954, when he
became a PCF official. During the 1960s he studied
philosophy and political economics in Moscow. Elect-
ed to the PCF Political Bureau in 1976, he has
specialized in agricultural affairs, directing a Com-
munist weekly for farmers since 1977. Lajoinie is 54.
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