NORDIC FORCES IN THE 1980S

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• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

AM - STAT
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Directorate of
Intelligence
in the 1980s
Nordic Forces
A Research Paper
)Y,
EUR 84-10207
November 1984
copy 399
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Directorate of co,..e,
in the 1980s
Nordic Forces
A Research Paper
European Issues Division, EURA,
Office of European Analysis. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
This paper was prepared by
Secret
EUR 84-10207
November 1984
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Summary
Information available
as of 1 September 1984
was used in this report.
Nordic Forces
in the 1980s1 25X1
Although their concern about the Soviet threat has increased in recent
years, the Nordic countries have only a limited ability-without outside
assistance-to defend themselves against a Warsaw Pact attack. Under a
concept of in-depth homeland defense, which involves virtually the entire
population, the Nordics maintain only small active forces in peacetime and
are heavily dependent on rapid and timely mobilization of reserves.
Moreover, inadequate training time, the slow pace of force modernization,
and low stocks of missiles, ammunition, spare parts, and fuel have
combined to degrade both readiness and sustainability.
We estimate the individual capabilities of the Nordic countries to be as
follows:
? Norway has key weaknesses in ground-based air defenses, fighter and
reconnaissance aircraft, and ammunition stockpiles, although it is im-
proving its capabilities to receive and support NATO ground and air
reinforcements.
? Denmark would have to depend almost entirely on Allied reinforcements
because of its lack of personnel readiness, and it has only a limited
capability to mine the Danish Straits.
? Because of their strategy of aggressive territorial defense, the Finns hope
that potential aggressors will conclude that, in the long run, the costs of
combating Finnish forces and securing Finnish territory would be too
high. Although Finnish forces are too small to secure Finland's border,
they probably would be effective in harassing Soviet forces en route to
Norway and in disrupting Soviet supply lines.
? The Swedes probably could fend off a limited Warsaw Pact assault if
they received sufficient warning. Sweden deploys the largest and best
equipped ground forces of the Nordic countries, but the capability of its
Air Force and Navy to meet an aggressor far beyond Swedish borders is
declining.
Prospects for increased defense spending in Scandinavia are not good. In
general, the Nordic countries are reluctant to insulate their defense
budgets from financial cuts made necessary by general economic belt-
tightening. Moreover, governments must divide limited defense funds
between capital investments and expenditures for personnel and training.
Secret
EUR 84-10207
November 1984
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Personnel costs claim much of the defense budget in Norway, Denmark,
and Sweden because military unions and social welfare laws mandate high
salaries and overtime pay. As a result, force modernization almost
certainly will continue to be hamstrung by insufficient funding.
Although Norway has one of NATO's highest projected annual real
growth rates in defense spending (3.5 percent), high personnel costs-and
political decisions not to overheat the economy with North Sea oil money-
have restricted procurement funding to those programs with the greatest
priority, such as air defense (the purchased F-16s and I-HAWKs), the pre-
positioning of equipment for NATO reinforcements, and submarine pro-
curement. In Denmark, where social welfare spending has the highest
priority, defense spending has stagnated since 1981 and will probably show
little if any real growth for several years. In Sweden and Finland, the
perceived needs to pursue an activist neutral foreign policy and to maintain
stable relations with the Soviet Union combine with economic factors to
constrain defense spending. Real growth in Swedish defense budgets
probably will be close to zero through 1987, while Finnish real growth
probably will amount to little more than 1 percent.
If Sweden and Finland-non-NATO states-fail to modernize their
forces, their ability to resist a sustained Soviet offensive will suffer
significantly. They could face the prospect of either yielding to Soviet
pressures for transit or basing rights or submitting to Soviet occupation,
thus markedly increasing the vulnerability of the NATO states in the
region. There is a chance that Sweden could increase its security coopera-
tion with the West if East-West relations in the region deteriorate, but it is
doubtful that Sweden would go beyond seeking armaments cooperation
agreements and limited joint wartime contingency planning.
Because the prospects are poor for substantial improvements in Nordic
capabilities, NATO reinforcements to Norway and Denmark will be
increasingly necessary to fill gaps in Nordic defenses. But a number of
problems make it doubtful that reinforcements could be provided soon
enough in sufficient numbers to be effective:
? Inadequate Norwegian, Danish, and NATO funding will continue to
delay pre-positioning of equipment for reinforcements.
? All potential NATO reinforcing units except one Canadian brigade are
tasked only provisionally to aid Norway and Denmark and could be
needed elsewhere in' a crisis, leaving NATO's northern flank vulnerable.
? The key reinforcing nations of Canada, the United Kingdom, and the
Netherlands face economic problems of their own that threaten their
capability to aid Norway or Denmark.
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Thus, Norway and Denmark may increasingly expect the United States to
provide military assistance before or during a crisis. The air- and ground-
based firepower that US Marines would bring to Norway would be
invaluable both as a deterrent and as a symbol of US commitment. Unlike
other NATO reinforcements, the Marines also would bring transport and
ground support aircraft and helicopters. Oslo and Copenhagen also are
likely to seek greater US funding assistance for pre-positioning efforts,
especially for US Air Force reinforcements under the Colocated Operating
Bases Program.
Deficiencies in Nordic antitank and air defense weapons, in mine warfare
vessels, in defense against chemical-biological-radiological weapons, and in
reserve training will continue to undermine the viability of a conventional
defense of Scandinavia. At the same time, antinuclear sentiment in the
Nordic countries hampers the application of NATO's doctrine of flexible
response in the region. Consequently, NATO could well find itself unable
to stop a Warsaw Pact advance through Scandinavia because of insuffi-
cient or nonexistent preparations for both conventional and nuclear
defense. NATO reinforcements moving into Norway and Denmark in time
of war probably would have the capability to deliver tactical nuclear
weapons; however, if the Danish and Norwegian Governments prohibited
the use of such weapons, NATO would be faced with the prospect of the
collapse of its northern flank.
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Uvt#I Vt
Summary
Perceptions of the Threat
1
Defense Policy, Strategy, and Force Posture
4
Defense Policy and Strategy
6
Norwegian Forces
10
Defense Policy and Strategy
15
Defense Policy and Strategy
17
Defense Spending
20
Defense Spending
27
Defense Spending
29
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Army, Air Force, and Navy Equipment Inventories
33
1.
Relative Status of Forces: Soviet Forces Opposing Norway,
Sweden, and Finland
4
2.
Relative Status of Forces: Soviet Forces Opposing Denmark
5
3.
Conscript Service Time and Reserve Refresher Training
7
4.
NATO Reinforcements for Norway and Denmark and
Pre-Positioning
5.
Current and Projected Combat Days of Stored Ammunition
12
7.
Selected Norwegian Modernization Programs
8.
Selected Danish Modernization Programs
9.
Selected Swedish Modernization Programs
10.
Selected Finnish Modernization Programs
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Nordic Forces
in the 1980s l-
World War II taught the Nordics' that neutrality,
unless backed by substantial armed strength, is inef-
fective protection whenever "great power" interest
turns to Scandinavia. For Norway and Denmark, the
Soviet threat after 1945 was sufficiently clear that
they abandoned their traditional neutrality and joined
NATO. Sweden chose to keep out of superpower
alliances and build its own credible defense. Finland
signed a mutual assistance treaty with the USSR but
also signaled its intention to use force against any
aggressor.
While the Nordic countries have drawn different
conclusions from their recent history, there is an
underlying interdependence in their defense policies.
Defense planners in both Norway and Denmark
expect Finland and Sweden to delay initially a Soviet
advance. The Swedes and Finns stress peacetime
neutrality and wartime nonbelligerency, yet defense
planning in both countries assumes that their territory
would be violated in an East-West military confronta-
tion.
Perceptions of the Threat
All four Nordic countries see themselves becoming
peripherally involved in a NATO-Warsaw Pact war
that would have Central Europe as its main battle-
ground. Norway, Sweden, and Finland envision a
Soviet offensive out of the Leningrad Military District
and Kola Peninsula into northern Norway. The Danes
envision a Warsaw Pact campaign by Polish and
possibly Soviet forces on the ground into the Jutland
Peninsula in conjunction with amphibious and air
assaults across the Baltic Sea (see figure 1).
Threat to the North
Neither the Finns nor the Swedes believe their coun-
tries would be primary targets in a NATO-Warsaw
Pact conflict. Nonetheless, both recognize that, in
' For the purposes of this paper, the terms "Scandinavia" and
"Nordics" refer to Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and
Greenland. Greenland is not discussed in detail in this paper
because its defense policy is controlled by Denmark. Iceland,
although considered part of Scandinavia, is not discussed because it
conjunction with an invasion of Central Europe, two
major Soviet objectives would be to protect the flanks
of the Soviet Northern Fleet while attempting to
achieve control over the Norwegian and Barents Seas
and to deny NATO use of its bases in northern
Norway. We expect the Soviets would move on the
bases either by direct assault across the Soviet-
Norwegian border or through Finland.
In exercises conducted by the Soviets, their forces
routinely simulate entering Finnish territory to en-
gage NATO forces, suggesting that the USSR would
violate Finnish territory in a real engagement if
Moscow considered it a military necessity. We have
not seen the Soviets use an exercise scenario in which
their forces go through Sweden to reach the Atlantic,
but we believe they might do so in wartime, particu-
larly if their advance in northern Finland and Norway
were impeded.
Norwegian officials believe that the area of the
greatest Soviet threat is the northern province of
Troms, where most of Norway's standing forces are
deployed and important airfields and ports are located
(see figure 1 and inset, "Norway and Denmark: Views
of an Increased Soviet Threat"). Soviet operations in
this region would be designed to occupy the coast as
far south as Narvik and to seize, or deny NATO the
use of, the airfields at Kirkenes, Banak, Alta, Tromso,
Bardufoss, Andoya, Narvik, and Bodo. Oslo also
anticipates major airborne and amphibious assaults
along the coast in addition to ground operations out of
the so-called Finnish Wedge.
Central and southern Norway are of less strategic
importance than the north, although both contain key
targets: central Norway is the major reception area
for NATO reinforcements and a transit area for
troops and supplies moving north; southern Norway is
adjacent to the Baltic exits to the North Sea and
Atlantic Ocean, is heavily populated, and contains a
large concentration of industry and important mili-
tary installations.
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Figure 1
Potential Warsaw Pact Operations Against Scandinavia
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MOSCOW*
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Norway and Denmark:
Views of an Increased Soviet Threat
Oslo's perception that the Soviet threat is increasing
is based on new deployments and upgrading of Soviet
forces on the Kola Peninsula, as well as on periodic
Soviet activities that Norway considers intimidating.
These activities include:
? Soviet naval exercises in the Baltic and Norwegian
Seas, including the most comprehensive naval exer-
cise to date by the Northern and Baltic Fleets, in
late March and early April 1984.
? Intrusions by submarines and minisubmersibles,
presumed to be Soviet, into Norwegian and Swedish
waters.
? Major flights of Backfire bombers over the Norwe-
gian Sea in 1981, 1982, and 1984, maneuvering just
outside of Norwegian airspace.
? Intransigent behavior by the Soviets regarding their
treaty rights in the Svalbard Archipelago.
? Soviet resistance to reaching agreement on jurisdic-
tional boundaries on the continental shelf in the
Barents Sea.
Copenhagen is concerned over the growth in Soviet
air and naval activity in recent years. Danish officials
have noted:
? Soviet reinforcement of its Baltic Fleet with
nuclear-armed submarines.
? Soviet amphibious landing exercises in areas geo-
graphically similar to the Danish coastline.
? Gradual movement of Warsaw Pact air and naval
activity westward and into the North Sea.
? Stationing of Pact amphibious troop units along the
Baltic Sea coast.
? Construction of new facilities or expansion of old
ports along the Warsaw Pact coastline in the Baltic.
? Suspected intrusions by Soviet minisubmersibles
into Swedish waters.
Soviet forces (see table 1) could move into southern
Finland in the direction of Helsinki both to deny this
area to NATO forces and to protect the exit from the
Gulf of Finland into the Baltic. An invasion of
southern Sweden, either by ground forces from the
north or by amphibious/airborne forces out of the
Baltic Military District, is less likely but might be
attempted-particularly in conjunction with opera-
tions against Denmark-to gain control of the
Oresund Strait, the only strait not controlled exclu-
sively by Denmark (see figure 1).
Soviet air operations by fighter-bomber and recon-
naissance aircraft in Norway, Finland, and Sweden
probably would primarily support ground operations
into northern Norway or Finland and into southern
Finland. The small size of the peacetime Soviet
ground attack force, its base area in the southwest,
and the presence of large numbers of fighter-intercep-
tors indicate that the primary emphasis in such an
invasion would be on defensive air operations. None-
theless, the Soviets could use Strategic Aviation
bombers to destroy or suppress land-based NATO air
defense forces in southern and central Norway, pri-
marily to clear a path for naval aircraft flying against
NATO carrier forces and submarines in the Norwe-
gian Sea.
Threat to Denmark
Denmark anticipates that, if the Soviets invade West- 25X1
ern Europe, they will attempt to dominate the Baltic
and North Seas and their approaches. The invasion
would include ground, amphibious, and airborne oper-
ations against the Jutland Peninsula and Danish
islands and naval operations in the western Baltic.
The Danes believe the Soviets would use captured air-
bases on Jutland to attack North Atlantic convoys
and other parts of Western Europe.
We believe the major responsibility for operations
against the Danish forces in northern West Germany
and on the Jutland Peninsula would fall to the Polish
ground forces-the 1st Army out of Pomerania and
the 2nd Army out of Silesia-possibly supported by
Soviet ground forces from the Baltic Military District
and some East German forces (see table 2). Key 25X1
objectives would be to isolate Hamburg and then
move north seizing the Kiel Canal, the Jutland Penin-
sula, and the Danish Straits.
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Table 1
Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the USSR:
The Relative Status of Forces
M+15
147,000
+75,000 Home Guard
600,000
+ 110,000 Home Guard
200,000
131,200 b
32 training regiments
8 brigades
6 regiments
47 regiments
2 brigades b
29 brigades +
8 brigades
6 regiments
47 regiments
2 brigades b
Tanks, light and medium
218
1,085
204
1,600
Artillery, 100 mm and larger
396
943
1,284
1,400
Armored personnel carriers and
infantry fighting vehicles
222 c
912 a
114 a
2,640
30 d
Fighter-bombers/ground
attack
42 d
Note: M+15-Fifteen days after mobilization begins.
a Additional resources would be provided by the Soviet Northern
Fleet and sea landing assets-naval infantry.
b The manpower and unit numbers reflect maneuver units with the
addition of an artillery division.
Includes mortar carriers with 81-mm or larger guns and armored
command posts.
d Includes aircraft with a primary role as interceptors or fighter-
bombers/ground attack aircraft and also includes trainer aircraft
that have secondary roles in those missions.
e Includes 74 land-based medium bombers configured for antiship
strikes and 31 VTOL fighter-bombers from Northern Fleet naval
aviation.
Ground operations in northern Germany and Jutland
would be coordinated with airborne/amphibious oper-
ations against the Danish Straits. The Danish island
of Bornholm probably would be an initial target
After gaining control of the
Straits, amphibious forces could be available for
landings in other areas, such as in southern Norway.
Assault forces would be composed of Soviet, Polish,
and some East German troops trained in amphibious
assault, including the Soviet Baltic Fleet naval infan-
try brigade at Baltiysk and the Polish sea landing
division at Gdansk.
The defense strategies and force postures of the
Scandinavian countries reflect their inability or un-
willingness to maintain large standing forces in peace-
time. In a crisis, the Nordics would rely on rapid
mobilization of. reservists; Norway and Denmark
would depend on NATO reinforcements also. Nordic
defense strategists take advantage of geography, ter-
rain, and climate in their planning, and all. four
countries-but especially Sweden and Finland-have
in-depth homeland defense programs that would in-
volve virtually the entire populace of their countries.
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Table 2
Denmark and the Warsaw Pact:
The Relative Status of Forces
Peacetime 17,900 56,800 (Note: Polish forces only)
M+15 72,000 71,300 (Note: Polish forces only)
+ 60,000 Home Guard
Armored personnel carriers and infantry 553 b
fighting vehicles
Note: M + 15 = Fifteen days after mobilization begins.
a This assumes a purely Polish front on the Jutland axis. If Polish
forces run into difficulty, the Soviets would most probably provide
assistance from the Baltic and/or Belorussian Military Districts. If
the Soviets were to commit elements of a tank army, they would
increase the status of forces accordingly:
Manpower: +60,000 peacetime; + 16,000 at M+ 15.
Tanks: + 1,050.
Artillery: +500.
Armored personnel carriers: +850.
b Includes mortar carriers with 81-mm or larger guns and armored
command posts.
c Includes aircraft with a primary role as interceptors or fighter-
bombers/ground attack aircraft and also includes trainer aircraft
that have secondary roles in those missions.
d Soviet interceptor aircraft in Poland, East Germany, and the
Baltic Military District.
c Soviet fighter-bombers in Poland, East Germany, and the Baltic
Military District.
f Soviet Baltic Fleet naval aviation, including 97 land-based medi-
um bombers configured for antiship strikes and 38 fighter-bombers.
23 regiments (six divisions)
4 airborne battalions
27 regiments (seven divisions)
4 airborne battalions
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Although there is a great disparity in peacetime
between Warsaw Pact forces in the Jutland area and
those in the far north (see tables 1 and 2), in general
the force posture of the Pact in the Nordic region has
substantial advantages.' Soviet and Pact forces, al-
though at reduced strength in peacetime, have active
combat units, support structures, and a command,
control, and communications infrastructure that are
fully established and exercised frequently. The Nordic
countries, on the other hand, have far smaller stand-
ing combat forces and only a limited support infra-
structure in peacetime. The Nordics would require
substantial mobilization of reserves to defend them-
selves. Their capabilities are further constrained by
cutbacks made for budgetary reasons in reserve train-
ing programs (see table 3).
After mobilization, Pact forces would still have an
overall advantage in combat forces, but they would
have to contend with large Home Guard and local
defense forces in all four Nordic countries. These
forces would fight in their own neighborhoods, using
stockpiled weapons and equipment. They thus would
be familiar with terrain and key installations (military
facilities, roads, bridges, and so forth) and could be
expected to mount a fierce defense. Nevertheless, the
capabilities of these forces are limited and the suc-
cessful defense of Norway and Denmark is dependent
on rapid NATO reinforcement (see table 4). For their
part, both neutral Sweden and Finland count on their
well-publicized determination to defend their territo-
rial integrity with all means at their disposal to deter
potential aggressors.
In general, the armed forces of the Scandinavian
countries have shown similar trends over the past
decade. Overall manpower levels have remained sta-
ble (Finland and Norway) or have declined (Sweden
and Denmark) (see figure 2). The ground forces have
' Different organizational structures preclude a direct comparison
of Nordic and Soviet ground-combat maneuver units. Soviet ground
forces are organized into 11 divisions, including an airborne
division, each with four maneuver regiments. Norwegian forces do
not have an operational division structure. Norway's maneuver
forces are organized into independent brigades, battalions, and
companies of varying sizes. Finland's eight brigades probably would
be subordinate to two field army headquarters and five army
corpsheadquarters. Sweden would have 26 brigades subordinate to
about 10 divisions, plus three independent brigades. Upon mobiliza-
tion, five of Denmark's six brigades would form two divisions, with
the sixth brigade deploying independently. Most Danish, Norwe-
gian, Swedish, and Finnish units are either inactive or are manned
improved their antiarmor capabilities but still lack
adequate air defenses. Air Force fighters have de-
clined in number as the Nordic states have procured
fewer new fighters-with advanced weapon systems
and an all-weather capability-to replace older, less
capable aircraft. The number of large naval vessels in
their fleets also has declined, and increasing emphasis
has been placed on missile attack boats and (except
for Finland) on submarines.
NATO Members: Norway and Denmark
Norway and Denmark have pivotal roles in NATO's
Northern Flank strategy, which recognizes that main-
taining the integrity of the Nordic region is critical to
the successful defense of Central Europe. Both coun-
tries rely on universal conscription, small standing
forces, readily mobilized reserves, and the promise of
NATO reinforcements
Defense Policy and Strategy. Norway's location
makes the country essential to NATO's maritime
strategy of protecting the Alliance's ability to rein-
force and resupply Europe by denying Soviet naval
forces access to the Norwegian Sea and the North
NATO AWACS ' aircraft also began flying
from an airbase in central Norway in 1984. Norwe-
gian forces, therefore, are expected to hold Norwegian
territory until Allied reinforcements arrive, and to
provide for the reception, protection, and support of
those reinforcements.
Denmark's strategic position at the mouth of the
Baltic dictates a strong Danish role in containing the
Soviet Baltic Fleet and other Warsaw Pact naval units
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Table 3
Conscript Service Time and
Reserve Refresher Training
15 months
12 months for
Coast Artillery
9 to 15 months
18 days every
4 years
18 days every
4 years
36,000 to 40,000
men per year a
Infrequent 14-day periods for armored
infantry units, five-day periods for
combat and support personnel
21 days every
3 years
Equivalent of
18 days every
4 years b
Air Force
Minimal
18 days every
4 years
a Refresher training for Finnish reservists is limited by the Paris
Peace Treaty (1947), which requires reservists on active duty to be
counted against the total authorized strengths of the Finnish
Defense Forces (Army: 34,400; Navy: 4,500; Air Force: 3,000).
b Five periods of refresher training, each lasting 18 days, taken
from about age 20 to age 47.
and amphibious forces in the area. Danish forces-
together with those of West Germany-have the
mission of mining the Straits, defending Danish terri-
tory until NATO reinforcements arrive, and providing
the bulk of the defense of Schleswig-Holstein, thereby
securing the Northern Flank of NATO's Central
Region and preventing an early attack on southern
Norway. In addition, Bornholm, Greenland, and the
Faroes provide unique intelligence and early warning
facilities for the Alliance.
Norway and Denmark count on Sweden and Finland
to delay the Soviets initially and give warning of an
attack. According to the US defense attache in Oslo,
senior Norwegian military commanders believe the
Finns would fight but ultimately would be ineffective
against greater Soviet forces, while the Swedish Air
Force initially would delay Soviet attempts to transit
Sweden en route to Norway. The US defense attache
in Copenhagen reported that the Chief of the Danish
Defense Staff believes it is "nearly certain" that the
Soviet Union would occupy Finland in the initial
phase of a NATO-Pact war, and that this would draw
Sweden into the war. He believes that Sweden has
capable ground and air forces that could not be
defeated without the diversion of major Warsaw Pact
units from Central Europe.
Both Norway and Denmark base their strategy on
maintaining sufficient national forces to resist and
impede an attack by Soviet and Warsaw Pact ground,
amphibious, and airborne forces and to provide time
for NATO reinforcements to arrive. In peacetime,
however, they maintain limited active duty forces that
perform primarily training and support functions. For
these forces to perform their wartime role, the re-
serves and Home Guards would have to be mobilized
quickly.
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NATO Reinforcement for Norway and
Denmark, and Pre-Positioning
Regional reinforcement
for AFNORTH b
Ground
United Kingdom Mobile
Force (UKMF) c
Canadian Air Sea
Transportable Combat
Group c (CAST CG)
Air
13 US squadrons
2 Canadian squadrons
Regional amphibious as-
sault reinforcements for
AFNORTH
UK/NL amphibious
force
US II MAF (Marine
Amphibious Force)
SACEUR's strategic
reserve
US 9th Infantry
Division d
US 5th Mechanized In-
fantry Division d
US 24th Mechanized
Infantry Division
US 101st Air Assault
Divisions
AMF (land) Units from Belgium,
Canada, West Germany,
Italy, Luxembourg,
United Kingdom, and
United States
AMF (air) Squadrons from Bel-
gium, Canada, West
Germany, Italy, Nether-
lands, United Kingdom,
and United States
UK 1st Infantry Brigade (13,500 men)
and supporting elements
4,000 to 5,000 men, light infantry
force trained in mountain arctic
warfare
289 aircraft
20 aircraft
3rd Commando Brigade Royal Ma-
rines (UK); "Whiskey" company and
the 1st Amphibious Combat Group of
Royal Netherlands Marines
One MAB (Marine Amphibious Bri-
gade) has approximately 14,000 per-
sonnel and includes infantry, artillery,
combat services support equipment,
and an organic aviation combat force
including two air defense squadrons,
two close support squadrons, and 75
heavy transport and light support
helicopters.
180 aircraft, including F-111, F- 16,
F15E, A-10, A-7, F/RF-4
5 to 8 frigates/destroyers
2 to 4 aircraft carriers and 140 to 380
combat aircraft
Approximately the size of a heavily
reinforced brigade, including combat
support and combat service support
units.
a Availability: The number of days required from the day of
mobilization before the units are placed at the disposal of a NATO
commander in the area of his command.
b AFNORTH: Allied Forces Northern Europe, headquartered near
Oslo, Norway; includes territory of Norway, Denmark, Schleswig-
Holstein, and Baltic approaches.
Earmarked for Denmark but could be
deployed elsewhere
Assigned to Norway; will arrive in the
Narvik-Bardufoss area.
,5 squadrons to Denmark
8 squadrons to Norway
2 squadrons to Denmark
1 squadron to Norway
2 squadrons to Norway
Earmarked for Norway, Narvik-
Bardufoss area, but could be deployed
elsewhere.
4th MAB earmarked for Norway
(Trondheim) area. Remainder of II
MAF would be sent to Norway or
Denmark, as determined by
CINCNORTH. (One MAU-Marine
Amphibious Unit-is deployed with
US Sixth Fleet) (one MAB would de-
ploy to Iceland.)
AFNORTH has planning priority over
AFCENT and AFSOUTH.
AFNORTH has lowest priority for
these forces.
Norway or Denmark or elsewhere in
the Alliance.
Could be deployed to Norwegian Sea
to provide carrier air support to North
Norway or to North Sea to support
BALTAP and AFCENT.
Would deploy either to Northern or
Southern Flank, but not both. Could
deploy to Norway or Denmark, al-
though Norway has first priority.
Simultaneous deployment to both
flanks is possible. Could deploy to Nor-
way or Denmark.
c The composition of these units would vary according to the
wartime scenario and other needs, because portions of these units
would be contributed to NATO's AMF (land) forces.
d These US forces also have national contingency plans, which
could make them unavailable for their possible NATO mission of
reinforcing Western Europe.
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Table 4 (continued)
Method of Transport Availability (Transmit Time
Included) a
POL, ammunition, drop tanks, and maintenance equipment are Air
stocked at eight Norwegian airfields, six of which will be protected
by I-HAWK air defense missile systems leased from the United
States. Denmark prestocks ammunition for US air squadrons and is
negotiating to do the same for UK squadrons.
All-terrain vehicles, snowmobiles, and equipment prestocked in Sea
northern Norway.
3 weeks (14 days plus 7 days
warning)
Following is being pre-positioned for MAB that is earmarked for MAB to Norway By air: 5 to 6 days (given pre-
Norway: 24 155-mm howitzers, bridging equipment, 250 trucks, positioning equipment and supplies)
100 trailers, ammunition, food, and fuel (30 days of these latter By sea: 18 days
supplies). Norway will provide approximately 150 all-terrain vehi-
cles, two motor transport companies, one ambulance company, one
refueler section, and engineering and airbase support equipment.
Remainder of MAF to AF 60 days
NORTH via sea and airlift
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Figure 2
Active Duty Military Personnel, 1970-83
I I I I I I I I I I I
0 1970 75 80
303787 10-84
Norway and Denmark reason that the deterrent value
of their armed forces and NATO reinforcements,
combined with their restricted peacetime NATO roles
in NATO, enable them to provide for their defense
without unnecessarily arousing Soviet threat percep-
tions. They prohibit the stationing of foreign troops
and the storage of nuclear or chemical weapons in
their countries in peacetime. In addition, Norway
prohibits foreign troops from exercising in Finn-
mark-the province adjacent to the USSR-and for-
eign reconnaissance aircraft and ships from leaving
Norwegian bases to operate east of 24 degrees east
longitude
Norwegian Forces. The Norwegian Army is basically
a light-infantry force. The only active duty unit-
Brigade North-is located in the north where initial
conflict is expected to occur (see figure 3). In the event
of a crisis, three brigades will mobilize in the south
and deploy northward; nine other brigades will mobi-
lize in central and southern parts of the country.
Norwegian planners expect their Home Guard forces
to mobilize within four hours and to act as covering
forces while regular army units are mobilized.
Norway has been hampered by insufficient funding
both for maintaining adequate peacetime strength
and reserve training programs and for modernizing its
forces with advanced weaponry. A lack of funds in the
1984 budget, for example, caused three units of
Brigade North to be eliminated in peacetime, weaken-
ing the brigade's armor and artillery readiness. The
small Norwegian standing forces would be heavily
dependent in wartime on rapid mobilization of well-
trained reserves to mount a defense until NATO
reinforcements arrived. The potential diversion of US
reinforcements, normally earmarked for NATO, to
areas outside of NATO Europe has resulted in Allied
agreement on the need to organize additional reserve
combat units and to increase the readiness of existing
reserve forces. Norway, however, not only is not
planning to organize new reserve combat units but
also has allowed further cuts in its standing forces and
has overlooked critical deficiencies in reserve training
programs.
Personnel costs increasingly are creating problems for
the Norwegian armed forces, especially for the
manpower-intensive army. The US Embassy in Oslo
reported in May 1984 that "the liberal and costly
legislation of Norway's welfare state," when applied
to the armed forces, created a situation in which
personnel costs would skyrocket if unchecked. Specifi-
cally, the Work Environment Law, first applied to the
civilian economy in 1977, was extended to the mili-
tary in 1981 with bipartisan support. The new law
reduced working hours, raised pay scales, and in-
creased overtime and sick leave compensation. Other
costly measures instituted in recent years include a
new and expensive officer assignment system and an
increase from four to five per year in the number of
free trips home for all military personnel based in
northern Norway. As a result of these social welfare
laws, the military has ceased wherever possible all
overtime and weekend assignments and has limited
training
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Figure 3
Probable Disposition of Tactical Wartime Combat Units
Infantry brigade
Infantry battalion
Border guard
Armor brigade
Armor battalion
Mechanized infantry
brigade
4 Airfield
Probable area for
operations
0 50 100 150 Kilometers
I l 'l i
0 50 100 150 Miles
' '1
f
Gavle
i If HELSINKI .~'
r~*SSOCKHOLM Tallinn
ijf
A Oiih
sea-
COPENHAGEN
r Bornholm
Gotland
~(Sweden)
Denmark \ .11r
Jutland..' Kristinsstian
tad 3alriC SeEZ
German
Soviet
Union
The United States Government has not recognized
the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation
is not necessarily authoritative.
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Increased personnel costs also have made it difficult
Table 5
for the government to allocate sufficient funds to
Current and Projected Combat
procure new weapon systems, whose prices also have
Days of Stored Ammunition a
escalated. Moreover, it is more and more expensive
for Norway to maintain, operate, and upgrade the
l
Th
ff
d
to rep
ace.
e
or
obsolescent equipment it cannot a
net effect of all of these pressures is that Norway has
made little progress in modernizing its ground forces
with advanced weapon systems: 155 mm 11.2
13.2
81-mm mortar 18.6
21.0
? Norway has procured small numbers of advanced TOW missiles 18.9
17.1
antitank guided-missile (ATGM) systems-the US-
made TOW system-but still relies heavily on 105 mm 10.0
8.9
obsolescent rocket launchers and recoilless rifles for 155 mm 8.8
11.0
most of its antitank capability. For each of certain 203 mm 9.4
8.4
key munitions, Norway has no more than 60 percent Mortar ammunition 17.3
14.9
of the number of combat days of supply required by (81 mm, 120 mm)
NATO (see table 5). TOW missiles 15.0
30.0 b
a The NATO requirement is 30 days. Current and projected days of
? While the Norwegians have procured most of the supply are based on NATO estimates-developed in 1982-of
electronic warfare equipment for existing ground
they have not formed
forces called for by NATO
average ammunition expenditure
b According to Danish projection
rates in combat.
s but subject to available funds.
,
additional electronic warfare units because of a lack
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The Norwegian Air Force's primary missions in war-
time include anti-invasion-primarily antishipping-
and air defense tasks. The Air Force has some 70
attack and air defense aircraft in four operational
squadrons. The Norwegians have no plans to form
additional combat squadrons through mobilization;
most reservists would augment air defense artillery
units, serve in general work companies, and perform
security duties. Civilian airlines and private aircraft
would greatly enhance the Air Force's transport
capabilities, although it is unknown how the aircraft
holdings of Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) would be
divided among the three SAS participants-Norway,
Denmark, and Sweden
Norway has procured F-16 aircraft but has not
replaced older aircraft on a 1-for-1 basis. In 1970, for
example, Norway had 95 F-104Gs and F-5s, but these
have been replaced with only 72 F-16s. Good pro-
gress, however, has been made in implementing a
program to upgrade key command and control net-
works and thereby to increase the F-16's effectiveness.
Norway awarded a contract in late 1983 to develop
and produce a command and control information
system (CCIS) that will provide northern European
commanders with timely and accurate data for im-
proved air defense command and control and battle
management. The CCIS will support offensive air
operations by supplying timely data on logistics and
the status of communications networks, aircraft main-
tenance, and fighting forces within the commanders'
areas of responsibility.
The Norwegian Navy is responsible for defending the
coast from amphibious attack, protecting Allied and
coastal shipping, and operating coastal artillery guns.
The Navy has 14 coastal submarines (only 10 of
which are operational) and eight frigates, but most of
the fleet consists of small combatants such as patrol
boats and missile attack boats. Upon mobilization,
some Navy reservists would be recalled to bring ship
complements up to strength, but the majority of them
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would be used for coastal defense. The Navy has no
reserve fleet, although civilian vessels-coastal steam-
ers, trawlers, fishing boats, and ferries-would be
mobilized for use as minelayers and transports. Ves-
sels belonging to the small coastal shipping companies
located along the extensive Norwegian coastline
would be mobilized to move men and equipment,
including US Marines, from southern and central
Norway to the north.
In recent years, Norway has substantially increased
its fleet of missile attack boats with the addition of 20
Hauk- and Snoegg-class boats (see figure 4). These
missile boats, equipped with Penguin II antiship
missiles, probably would be effective against Soviet
amphibious forces. In the estimation of the US de-
fense attache office in Oslo, however, the Norwegian
Navy eventually would be unable to stop an opposing
naval force because of insufficient numbers of anti-
ship missiles.
Danish Forces. Denmark's peacetime ground forces-
with some 18,000 men-consist of three under-
strength brigades, which would be expanded to two
divisions with a total of six brigades after mobiliza-
tion. The Danes also have a Home Guard that, like
the Norwegian Home Guard, would engage in guer-
rilla operations and perform surveillance, reconnais-
sance, bridge and road demolition, traffic control, and
civilian evacuation duties. In wartime, the primary
mission of the Danish ground forces is to defend
Danish territory and to participate in the defense of
Schleswig-Holstein.
The Danish Army is hampered by its small size and
inadequate reserve training, and its dependence on
reserves has increased substantially as the standing
army's strength has fallen by about 25 percent since
the early 1970s. Despite NATO requirements to
organize additional reserve combat units and to in-
crease the readiness of existing reserve forces, Den-
mark has no plans to form additional reserve combat
units and plans only small improvements in reserve
refresher training
50 percent of NATO requirements for TOW ATGMs
in 1982. The most critical shortfall in ammunition
reserves-which should amount to enough for 30
combat days-is in the army's artillery ammunition
(see table 5)
The Danish Air Force, one of the smallest in NATO
with about 90 combat aircraft, would have only a
limited role in wartime. It would be expected to
defend Danish airspace, protect additional airspace as
directed by NATO, provide airlift and air-sea rescue
support, and provide a control and warning system for
the Danish Defense Command. As in the case of
Norway, Danish F-16s, which now number 55 and
will reach 67 by 1989, will not replace older aircraft
on a 1-for-1 basis. Denmark, however, has decided to
improve its air defense command and control abilities
with CCIS. Further, Denmark became in late 1983
one of the first countries in the Alliance to inaugurate
a special radar/ground control station (known as
NAEGIS) for AWACS aircraft.
The Danish Navy is tasked with mining the Baltic
Straits and defending the coasts of Denmark. Its fleet
consists primarily of smaller combatants-corvettes
and missile and patrol boats-and mine warfare
vessels. As in Norway, some naval reservists would be
used to bring ships to full strength, and passenger
vessels could be used for troop transport and logistic
support.
The focus of NATO recommendations for Danish
naval forces has been on improving survivability and
combat effectiveness. Unless critical shortfalls in the
number of combatants are rectified, however, we
believe any improvements will have little effect (see
figure 4). Denmark is especially weak in an area
where it should play a coequal role with the West
German Navy: minelaying. Only one of Denmark's
four minelaying-capable vessels is designed as a mine-
layer. Two other vessels are out of commission, and
the fourth is a training ship. Further, US officials in
Copenhagen believe that the lack of skilled personnel
Denmark has tried to avoid firm commitments to
specific procurement projects, and Danish defense
planners have deferred crucial decisions from year to
year. As a result, ammunition and munitions stock-
piles are deficient. For example, the Danes met only
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Figure 4
Norwegian and Danish Naval Combatants, 1970 and 1984
a Frigates, corvettes, and large patrol ships.
b Missile attack craft, torpedo boats, and patrol craft.
a Minesweepers, minehunters, and minelayers.
d Includes three Coast Guard Nordkapp-class Frigates.
at Danish mine depots-and the impending retire-
ment of many of the mine specialists-already have
caused the Danes to institute unsafe practices in
storing and handling their mines. Denmark also has
no air-droppable mine capability, and its minehunting
capability ended in 1980 when maintenance of mine-
hunting equipment was discontinued.
Cooperation With NATO. Norwegian and Danish
programs designed to support NATO wartime rein-
forcements have had mixed results. Both countries
have committed merchant ships and domestic civil
aircraft to assist in implementing NATO's Rapid
Reinforcement Plan and to facilitate the arrival of
troops and equipment. However, only Norway has
made substantial progress in pre-positioning weapons
and supplies for ground forces.
Norway provides temporary storage space for US
Marine pre-positioned equipment near Trondheim
and has partially financed construction for permanent
sites. Negotiations are still under way with the United
States and NATO over who will supply the remaining
funds necessary to blast rock caverns near Trondheim
to create permanent storage sites. Norway also stores
some equipment for Canadian, British, and Dutch
troop reinforcements. As part of the compromise in
which central Norway was chosen as the location for
pre-positioned equipment for US troops, Oslo obligat-
ed itself to prestock equipment in northern Norway
for additional Norwegian forces that would reinforce
the north in a crisis. Denmark does not yet pre-
position supplies for US ground forces.
Both Norway and Denmark participate in the Colo-
cated Operating Bases (COB) program, in which
NATO fuel, spare parts, and ammunition are stored
at their airfields for use by reinforcing NATO air
squadrons. The Danes began building stores of am-
munition for seven NATO air squadrons in 1982, and
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we expect them to complete stores for US air rein-
forcements this year. The ammunition for the COB
program currently is being stored away from Danish
airbases because no NATO funding has been avail-
able to construct ammunition depots on bases. The
requirement for jet fuel stocks sufficient for seven
days of combat has been almost totally met at
Norway's eight COB bases, but COB ammunition
stocks are largely inadequate. Oslo and Copenhagen
reason that pre-positioning enables more rapid air
reinforcement and increases the risk for the Soviets of
early US involvement in a conflict.
Both Denmark and Norway also participate in joint
Allied naval, air, and ground exercises in their coun-
tries. In late 1983, more than 11,000 troops of the
Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force
(AMF) 6 took part in a four-week field exercise in
Denmark. This exercise is conducted annually and
demonstrates the AMF's ability to deploy to Denmark
rapidly and to conduct joint defensive operations with
the Danish military. An AMF amphibious exercise
also is conducted biennally' in late winter in northern
Norway with British, Dutch, Canadian, US, Italian,
and West German forces. The most recent in the
series of NATO exercises took place in February and
March 1984 with the 36th US Marine Amphibious
Brigade participating. With 25,000 troops involved, it
was the largest military exercise in Norway since
World War II and was designed to demonstrate
NATO solidarity and resolve.
Sweden
Unlike the Nordic NATO countries, Sweden has no
promised military reinforcements from outside the
country. The Swedes instead place high value on
projecting the image of a neutral state that-while
nonthreatening to its neighbors-is independently ca-
pable of seriously injuring a potential aggressor. Un-
der the concept of "total defense," all facets of
Swedish society have a role in ensuring military, civil,
'The AMF, formed in 1960, is NATO's highly mobile, convention-
ally armed, immediate reaction force. The force, with land and air
components, is designed to be able to deploy quickly to a threatened
' In alternate years with no AMF exercises, the Norwegians hold
extensive national amphibious exercises with US, British, and
Dutch forces. Following the large-scale AMF or national Norwe-
gian exercises each year, British and Dutch forces also participate
economic, and psychological preparedness.'
Defense Policy and Strategy. In peacetime, Sweden is
strictly nonaligned and conducts an often activist
foreign policy committed to disarmament and arms
control. In wartime, according to Stockholm's official
policy, Sweden would remain neutral in any conflict
unless there were an invasion or attempted transit of
Swedish territory or airspace.
In Stockholm's judgment a conventional war between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact would be fought largely
in Central Europe, and the resources that either side
could employ for operations on Swedish territory
would be limited. Swedish planners recognize that the
primary threat is posed by the Warsaw Pact and
believe that, given adequate warning, their forces
would be capable of inflicting heavy losses on Pact
forces and perhaps even of repulsing the attack.
A forward defense doctrine is a key aspect of Swe-
den's defense plans. This doctrine, also referred to as
"peripheral defense," stresses reliance on high-tech-
nology air and naval units to meet an attacker early
with massive firepower at and beyond Swedish bor-
ders. Another defense doctrine that now has vocal but
limited political support is "territorial defense." This
concept holds that Sweden should rely on a large
conscript army that would be equipped with inexpen-
sive but efficient weapons and would harass the
enemy throughout the country, causing attrition and
an eventual enemy withdrawal. This concept would
limit Swedish air and naval power and not attempt to
stop an aggressor at the borders. The US Embassy in
Stockholm reported in late 1982 that the territorial
doctrine had support primarily in the Social Demo-
cratic Party. Even if Swedish defense planners do not
now support territorial defense, the high costs of
forward defense eventually could become unmanage-
able and lead to greater interest in this doctrine
' The "total defense" concept is the mobilization of all available
resistance forces, including local defense forces, the Home Guard,
civil defense units, and general resistance by the civilian population.
Local defense forces are generally older reservists who, when
recalled to active duty, serve near their home city, town, or village.
The Home Guard is a paramilitary organization composed mostly
of volunteers who are trained by the armed forces to perform
surveillance, reconnaissance, guerrilla, bridge and road demolition,
rear-area security, traffic control, and civilian evacuation duties.
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Although Sweden maintains no official or military
ties with NATO, unofficial bilateral military coopera-
tion takes place with Norway and Denmark as well as
with the United States. It is largely confined to
sharing information on each other's military capabili-
ties and those of the Warsaw Pact, and to arms sales
agreements. Despite these limited arrangements,
there are indications that Sweden at least tacitly
would rely on NATO in a crisis.
attache reporting in late 1982 also indicated that a
Soviet invasion of Finnish Lapland en route to Nor-
way would result in Swedish mobilization and the
deployment of forces to northern Sweden. At the
prospect of such an invasion, Sweden also planned to
hint at an interest in NATO membership to deter a
Soviet attack on Sweden. We believe it is more likely
that, in such circumstances, Sweden simply would
cautiously enhance its military cooperation with the
Nordic NATO states.
Forces. The small standing Swedish Army-some
46,000 men-is responsible in peacetime for training
conscripts and is not designed to form the nucleus of
the wartime army. Instead, combat and support units
would be organized and mobilized fully within seven
days, according to the Swedes, although they admit
this could take longer if no suitable civilian transpor-
tation and communications were provided.
The Army is completing a major reorganization and
modernization. It is reequipping 11 of 19 wartime
infantry brigades with field and antiaircraft artillery,
antitank missile systems, and tracked and over-snow
vehicles. Since 1970, the Army has received several
capability to defend northern Sweden.
new weapon systems, including the TOW ATGM and
155-millimeter (mm) howitzers. These systems, to-
gether with additional armor and all-terrain and over-
snow vehicles, have enhanced the Army's firepower
and mobility. After the standard infantry brigades
have been modernized, Sweden's four Norrland bri-
gades' will be similarly equipped to enhance their
The Army's reorganization and weapons purchases
support a war-fighting doctrine that is moving away
from massed, defensive operations in favor of more
mobile, extended, and independent operations in diffi-
cult terrain. According to US defense attaches in
Stockholm, however, major ground force deficiencies
still exist in chemical-biological-radiological (CBR)
defense-particularly in chemical defense-and in
night operations. The Army also continues to be
inadequately funded for training. US military observ-
ers of Swedish exercises have reported that squad-
and platoon-level training appears credible, but that
training at battalion and brigade levels is rare. Spend-
ing limitations also preclude training in joint opera-
tions.
Sweden's Air Force, with over 400 combat aircraft, is
the largest in Scandinavia. Mobilization is expected to
provide enough pilots and navigators within three
days to man each operational combat aircraft. Other
mobilization personnel would be used to fully man
and protect the Air Force's wartime dispersal airfields
and road runways
Swedish air defense capabilities have been enhanced
by the Air Force's procurement of the Viggen multir-
ole combat aircraft, which is replacing older,
J-35 Draken aircraft in both interceptor and ground
attack roles. The Air Force also is benefiting from
radar improvements in its air command and control
and surveillance system and from preparation of
additional highways to serve as dispersal runways.
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The Swedish Navy is a coastal force based primarily
on submarines and patrol boats. Navy and coast
artillery forces are responsible for defending Sweden
against seaborne invasion and for protecting coastal
shipping. Naval planning is based on the immediate
dispersal of ships in wartime and on the rapid expan-
sion of operational forces through mobilization, with
full mobilization to be accomplished within 30 days.
Most smaller vessels probably could be manned for
dispersal within hours of an alert and by full mobiliza-
tion crews within two to three days. The Navy's two
older and larger destroyers, stored in nonoperational
"ready reserve" in peacetime, would require at least
one month for mobilization and shakedown training.
According to the US defense attache in Stockholm,
the Navy has evolved since the early 1970s from a
blue-water force of large oceangoing vessels to a
small-unit fleet centered around submarines and mis-
sile attack boats, and emphasis on antishipping war-
fare has increased. The number of submarines, how-
ever, has been cut in half to 12, and the force of 16
destroyers, cruisers, frigates, and corvettes has been
reduced to two Halland-class destroyers. These 16
surface combatants are being replaced with new
classes of missile attack boats-25 are currently in
the inventory-armed with a Swedish-built RBS-15
antiship missile system, and with new mine warfare
vessels.
Finland
Because of Finland's strategic location between East
and West, the goal of its operational doctrine is
deterrence; the Finns hope that potential aggressors
will conclude that, in the long run, the costs of
combating Finnish forces would be too high. Finnish
defense strategy is based on a territorial defense
concept. Finland has a small standing army and
would rely on its Border Guard force to delay an
enemy advance while ground force units were mobi-
lized. Finnish soldiers generally are well trained in
individual military skills and are highly motivated.
The small Air Force is organized and equipped pri-
marily for air defense operations. The Navy, which
also would require substantial mobilization, is essen-
tially a coastal defense force made up largely of
missile-equipped patrol boats.
Defense Policy and Strategy. Finnish defense policy
has been affected by the special relationship between
Helsinki and Moscow, stemming from their Friend-
ship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (FCMA)
Treaty signed in 1948 and renewed periodically. The
treaty obliges Finland to employ "all the means at her
disposal for the defense of the inviolability of her
territory on land, on sea, and in the air ... with the
assistance, in case of need, of the Soviet Union, or
jointly with the latter" in the event that Finland, or
the Soviet Union through Finnish territory, is at-
tacked by West Germany or a West German ally. The
treaty calls for consultations between Helsinki and
Moscow if the threat of such an attack arises.
Regardless of the treaty, the Finns-apart from arms
purchases-have remained firmly opposed to any
military collaboration with the USSR, and such con-
sultations have never been held. The Finns prefer to
characterize the FCMA Treaty as differing markedly
from a military alliance, pointing out that it preserves
their sovereignty and independence of action and that
it is defensive in nature-aimed at preventing the
aggravation of any crisis in the region. Nevertheless,
Helsinki remains sensitive to any new developments-
including NATO intermediate-range nuclear force
(INF) modernization in Western Europe 10-that con-
ceivably could cause Moscow to become uneasy and
invoke the treaty.
Finnish sensitivity to Moscow's concerns over military
activities in the Nordic area has been responsible for
Helsinki's stress on both nonalignment and arms
control. Finnish diplomats are active in arms control
and disarmament discussions in and outside of the
United Nations; Helsinki, for example, was the site of
10 The Finns fear that NATO deployment of air- or sea-launched
cruise missiles in the Norwegian Sea could cause Moscow to call for
military consultations under the terms of the treaty. Helsinki's
greatest worry is that the Soviets might try to install forward air
defense batteries in Finland, on the grounds that Finland is not
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the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Eu-
rope (CSCE) negotiations in 1975 and of the prepara-
tory meetings for the Conference on Disarmament in
Europe (CDE) in 1983. Finland also has promoted in
principle an ongoing dialogue over the past two
decades concerning a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free
zone as a confidence-building measure in northern
Europe.
The US defense attache in Helsinki reports that most
Finnish defense planners believe that the greatest
threat to Finnish security would be air or ground
transit of Finnish territory by an aggressor, en route
to a third state. Finnish tactical doctrine does not call
for a massed, conventional, peripheral defense at the
border because the Finns assume that Soviet forces-
the most likely aggressor-would be superior in fire-
power and mobility. Instead, the Finns would rely on
a strategy of area defense, similar to the territorial
defense doctrine espoused by some Swedes. The Finns
plan to make an invasion as costly as possible by
deploying their major ground forces to protect essen-
tial areas and by conducting guerrilla warfare in
occupied areas. Key areas are population centers,
especially Helsinki, or terrain deemed critical for
defending the population centers
The Border Guard-the only fully manned peacetime
ground units and the first line of defense against an
invasion-would be expanded from company to bat-
talion size with reservists. Its job would be to delay an
enemy advance as long as possible and provide a
covering force to allow the Army to mobilize. The
Border Guard also would identify the main thrusts of
an invasion. Thereafter, Army, Border Guard, and
local defense forces would conduct small-scale opera-
tions-rarely above platoon size-using guerrilla war-
fare tactics to delay the enemy's advance, cut his lines
of communication, and divert as much of the enemy
force as possible to rear-area security and occupation
tasks. Finnish forces would be concentrated only
where the enemy had been weakened and could be
engaged in decisive battles. Finnish tactics would take
advantage of the country's difficult terrain, harsh
climate, and limited road network: Finnish soldiers
are highly skilled outdoorsmen and skiers and would
make extensive use of camouflage, road mining, and
ambushes. The Finnish Navy, which would rely heavi-
ly on mobilized reservists, is expected to support
ground force activities through limited amphibious
operations and to carry out defensive minelaying and
minesweeping, patrol and escort tasks, and antisub-
marine operations. The Air Force would attempt to
provide surveillance and air defense against intruding 25X1
aircraft and missiles, with primary emphasis on de-
fending population centers and important government
and military facilities
Forces. The Finnish Army has been held constant
over the years at about 31,000 men, by international
treaty. The Army's one armor and seven infantry
brigades are manned in peacetime with a skeleton
cadre responsible for training conscripts. To improve
the Army's ability to respond rapidly and effectively
to invading ground forces, the Finns have brought into
their inventory a substantial number of domestic,
Swedish, Norwegian, and French antiarmor weapons
and new domestic armored vehicles. They also have
acquired additional Soviet T-55 tanks and have
bought-but have not yet received-an unknown
number of T-72 tanks from the Soviets. The Finns,
recognizing the strategic value of the north, are
strengthening firepower and support elements of some
units in Lapland. The Army still suffers, however,
from a lack of mechanization and mobility, limited
numbers of air defense and antitank weapons, the age
of these weapons, poor CBR defenses, and a short
conscription period. Unit training above platoon or
company levels is rare, and reserve training, while
improving, is still infrequent. The diversity of equip-
ment sources-the Soviet Union, Sweden, and various
NATO countries-also has caused logistics problems.
The Air Force modernization program has focused on
improving both air defense and tactical support capa-
bilities. The air defense force has been improved by
the acquisition of Soviet MIG-21bis Fishbed-N all-
weather fighters, which have replaced obsolescent
MIG-21F Fishbed-C/E day fighters; the Finns also
are buying 20 secondhand Draken fighter-bombers
from Sweden. Obsolete trainers and tactical support
aircraft are being replaced with Finnish- and British-
made aircraft. The Finnish air defense radar system is
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being upgraded to improve air surveillance capabili-
ties. Despite its air defense improvements, however,
the Finnish Air Force is unable to counter Soviet
fighter and helicopter support of Soviet assault forces.
The Air Force also has a minimal transport capabili-
ty, even if civilian resources are mobilized.
The Finns, like the Swedes, are planning for a Navy
based essentially on missile attack boats." Over the
next several years the aging combatant fleet will
continue to be replaced by a new force of small, fast
patrol boats armed with Swedish antiship missiles.
The first missile attack boat of a squadron of four has
been delivered; the Finns hope to build a total of three
squadrons in the coming decade. Finnish minelaying
capabilities also have been improved by fitting mine-
laying equipment to a number of vessels that are not
normally used for minelaying, including 13 fast patrol
craft and nine utility landing craft. Overall, a short
operating season,'2 infrequent reserve training, and
rapid turnover of conscripts limit the Navy essentially
to a coastal surveillance and protection role. Surviv-
ability is further reduced by the lack of air cover for
sea operations, limited CBR defenses, and little or no
electronic warfare capability.
Nordic defenses will continue to suffer well into the
next decade from the shortfalls that exist today: the
need to upgrade their forces with advanced weaponry,
to improve their logistic support structures and stock-
piles of ammunition and spare equipment, and to
enhance combat effectiveness through more compre-
hensive and frequent reserve training. At the same
time, we expect governments will continue operating
in a political environment that makes allocating more
money to defense difficult. Within constrained de-
fense budgets, governments will have to make hard
choices between capital improvements and expendi-
tures for personnel and training. Personnel costs are
especially burdensome in Norway, Denmark, and
Sweden because military personnel are paid competi-
tively with civilians as a result of pressure from
military unions and laws providing for overtime
compensation.
acquiring a submarine force.
December through March
Norway and Denmark
Both countries face difficult choices in allocating
defense resources, but Oslo seems in a better position
than Copenhagen to bear the political and economic
costs of force modernization. At the least, all major
Norwegian parties agree that Norway must not be-
come-like Denmark-a "footnote" member of the
Alliance.
Political Factors. In both Norway and Denmark
there is wide support for NATO membership though
not for increased spending to support NATO goals. A
poll in Denmark in May and June 1984, for example,
showed that 64 percent of those polled supported
NATO membership. The poll also suggested, howev-
er, that support for NATO does not translate into
support for improving Danish defense capabilities,
even if the improvements would raise the nuclear
threshold: only 36 percent of respondents favored
increased defense expenditures even if it would reduce
dependence on nuclear weapons. About 65 percent of
the respondents to a similar Norwegian poll in early
1983 agreed that NATO membership contributes to
Norwegian security, but a far smaller percentage of
Norwegians would back a defense spending increase
larger than the currently planned real growth rate of
3.5 percent. A nationwide poll in February 1984
found that only 32 percent of the respondents felt
defense expenditures should be increased in response
to the exposure of Are Treholt as a Soviet spy.
Conflict over INF policy appears to have created a
climate for further controversy over other security
issues. For example, leftist and opposition press and
academic articles in Norway in the last year or so
have criticized alleged US pressure on NATO to
adopt a new, more offensive strategy in the north,
including cruise missile deployments in the Norwe-
gian Sea. These articles have claimed that any such
changes in NATO strategy are a shift toward an
offensive posture impinging on Norway's longstanding
policy of keeping tension low throughout Scandinavia
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but especially in northern Norway. In Denmark, some
Social Democrats seem prepared to push for a Nordic
nuclear-weapons-free zone, despite the tacit assump-
tion on the part of the Danish and Norwegian Govern-
ments, as well as other NATO members, that NATO
reinforcements would bring tactical nuclear weapons
with them to the Northern Flank in a crisis.
Although controversy over security issues is sure to
continue, the lack of clear alternatives to NATO's
collective security makes it unlikely that either coun-
try's membership in the Alliance will be questioned by
parties in power, the major opposition parties, or the
public over the next several years. Even though the
major opposition parties in both countries have used
anti-INF resolutions to attack their ruling govern-
ments, they all have prodefense factions that probably
will prevent radical departures from current security
arrangements. In May, for example, moderates in the
Danish Social Democratic Party were able to soften a
proposed party resolution that in its original form
would have banned nuclear weapons from Danish soil
even in wartime; the final version of the resolution-
adopted by Parliament-called on the government to
work within NATO for a Nordic nuclear-free zone.
Also in May, moderates in the Norwegian Labor
Party were able to agree with the government on a
new security policy consensus: the agreement called
for government efforts to support leftist objectives like
a nuclear freeze and nuclear-free zones but also
preserved enough flexibility to permit continued back-
ing for NATO nuclear policy.
Defense Spending. Until last year, Oslo had planned
4-percent real increases in annual defense budget
growth between 1982 and 1987. The conservative
coalition government, however, reduced the goal to
3.5 percent in response to pressure by the smaller
coalition parties to commit additional funds to civil
defense-which were not part of the defense budget.
Even this goal could prove difficult to meet because
Norway has no provision for automatic increases for
higher-than-expected inflation, relying instead on
Parliament to pass supplementary allocations. More-
over, the opposition Labor Party has indicated public-
ly that it would reduce the real growth rate to 3
percent if it is returned to power in the general
election in September 1985. US officials in NATO
estimate that even 4-percent annual real growth in
defense spending would not have allowed Norway to
complete its national military modernization plans or
to achieve NATO goals before the late 1990s.
Norway's limited defense funding has resulted from
political restraints placed on real growth in the de-
fense budget-not, as shown by growing government
receipts from North Sea oil production, from a lack of
financial resources for government programs. There
has been a gradual decline since the early 1970s in the
percentage of the total Norwegian national budget
used for defense. Denmark, on the other hand, has
borrowed heavily to finance national expenditures and
maintain "the good life." Cutbacks in Danish Govern-
ment spending, when deemed necessary, cause con-
sternation among Danes primarily because of their
effect on social welfare spending and only secondarily
because of their impact on defense spending. The
proportion of the Danish national budget spent on
defense has not declined as precipitately as that of
Norway, but it still ranks below the Norwegian
defense budget (see figure 5).
In April 1984 NATO officials estimated that Den-
mark would require a real growth rate of 2.3 percent
through 1990 in its defense spending to enable Copen-
hagen to meet its most important force goals. In late
June the government and opposition parties reached
agreement on a three-year defense program that will
reaffirm perceptions within NATO that Denmark is
not fulfilling its financial commitments to the Alli-
ance. Current Danish projections show that the real
growth of defense budgets for 1985-87 will be only 0.1
to 0.6 percent; in addition, according to US attache
reporting, previous procedures for fully adjusting the
defense budget for inflation and exchange rates will
be changed to cover only material and equipment
procured outside Denmark. Allocations for material
procured in Denmark and operations and mainte-
nance expenses will be adjusted for only 2-percent
inflation, although inflation is currently at about 7
percent in Denmark. This practice could result in
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Figure 5
Defense Spending Trends, 1973-84a
- Norway
? Sweden b
- Finland
? Denmark
Dashed lines indicate estimate
Annual Defense Budget Defense Budget as a Percentage of Defense Budget as a Percentage of
500 0.5
ICI I I.I.
0 1973 75 80 0 1973 75
a Fiscal year.
b Fiscal year July through June.
5
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
80 0 1973 75 80
slightly negative real growth in defense spending, but
the decrease probably will be no greater than earlier
in the decade (see table 6); for example, the 1981-84
Danish defense spending plan called for an annual
average real growth in the defense budget of 1.5
percent, while cuts in actual defense budgets during
the period resulted in real growth of less than 1
percent.
Impact on Programs. Norway faces severe problems
in establishing priorities among its modernization
programs, particularly in making trade-offs in the
allocation of scarce resources for high-technology,
high-cost weapon systems to replace equipment ob-
tained from the United States in the 1950s and 1960s
(see table 7). Norwegian officials are planning to
increase the capital investment share of the defense
budget from 20 to 25 percent by 1988 and to 30
percent by 1993 by limiting the growth of operations
and maintenance expenditures. US military officials
expect the trade-off between investment and opera-
tions to require more restrictions on training and thus
to reduce overall operational readiness
Funding problems for the Army have delayed from
1990 until at least 1998 the reorganization and
modernization-to the "Brigade 90" standard (see
inset, "Changes in the Norwegian Brigade Struc-
ture")-of nine of Norway's 13 standing and reserve
brigades and have caused cancellation of improve-
ments for another three brigades. In the near term,
only one Army unit-Brigade North-will be im- 25X1
proved to the Brigade 90 standard by receiving addi-
tional infantry and artillery units and antitank and air
defense weapons. The US defense attache in Oslo has
reported that pre-positioning for Norwegian forces
that would reinforce the north has been delayed by a
lack of funds for new equipment. It now appears that
the Army will pre-position a mix of new and old
equipment, some of which may be provided by dis-
banding one brigade in the south.
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Table 6
Real Growth in Defense Expenditures
1984
3.5c
-0.6 c
1.0c
0 c
1983
4.0
0.8
9.0 c,d
-6.7 c
1982
4.1
-0.3
2.0
0.2
1981
2.7
0.6
1.3
-3.0
1980
1.8
0.7
8.1
-0.5
1979
1.9
0.2
4.8
10.1
1978
7.8
4.1
5.6
-0.8
1977
1.5
3.3
3.1
-0.4
1976
0.4
1.8
2.5
8.2
1975
5.2
2.4
5.0
-1.6
1974
-3.6
1.6
-0.3
-1.2
1973
1.9
-2.8
-0.5
NA
a Does not include funding for the Border Guard, which in peace-
time falls under the Ministry of the Interior.
b The Swedish fiscal year is July through June; 1984 figure, for
example, is for the 1983-84 fiscal year.
c Estimates.
d This figure resulted from a decision to make up for earlier, leaner
years with increased defense funding, including two supplements in
1983.
The Army faces additional problems. The US defense
attache in Oslo estimated in March 1984 that, be-
cause of reserve training deficiencies, about two weeks
of combat training would be essential for any Norwe-
gian brigade before committing it to combat. Ammu-
nition stockpiles continue to be low; Oslo will not have
a 30-day war reserve stock until 1989, even though
NATO set this standard in 1967 and has since revised
it upward. In addition, Oslo has no plans to meet
midterm or long-term NATO requirements for an-
tiarmor helicopters. Plans to modernize 78 Leopard I
tanks have been suspended because of lack of funds.
NATO has urged Oslo to establish a force strength of
90 NATO-committed F-16 aircraft as replacements
for its F-104s and F-5s, but Oslo is unlikely to add
more than eight to 12 F- 16s to the 70 F-16s already in
its inventory. Moreover, pilot retention problems have
forced Norway to scale down the number of opera-
tional F-16 aircraft in its NATO-committed squad-
rons from 64 to 58. The all-weather capability of the
F-16 in its air defense mission will be unusable
because the Air Force does not have radar-guided air-
to-air missiles. Moreover, the F-16's anti-invasion/an-
tishipping mission will continue to be undermined by
a less-than-30-day supply of air-to-surface munitions
until the new Penguin III missiles become operational
in the late 1990s. Norway also has told NATO that
by 1988 it will have to rely almost totally on US
reinforcements for fighter reconnaissance because it
will have only two operational RF-5A aircraft by that
time and does not plan to replace them.
One bright spot in future Air Force capabilities is the
measures Norway has taken to improve air defense
protection of bases where US equipment is pre-
positioned for NATO reinforcements. Oslo agreed in
1983 to lease six I-HAWK " batteries (18 launchers)
from the United States and to buy new acquisition
radars and fire control equipment. The batteries will
be operational in 1987 and will be deployed at
Andoya, Bardufoss, Evenes, Bodo, Orland, and
Vaernes.
Except for its missile attack boats, Norway's surface
fleet and submarine force are aging. While replace-
ment,programs are planned, most have been deferred
because of inadequate funding: the first of six new
coastal submarines to replace 14 Kobben-class sub-
marines will not be delivered until 1989; the startup of
a program to modernize and extend the service life of
Oslo-class frigates was delayed from 1983 to this
year; replacement of fast patrol boats has been de-
ferred until the 1990s; and construction of new mine-
sweepers and minehunters will not begin until after
1988. Moreover, plans to procure twelve 120-mm
guns for the coast artillery were reduced in 1983 to
eight guns. To save on fuel and personnel costs, naval
vessels are being placed in reduced readiness status.
For example, a fourth Kobben-class submarine will be
decommissioned and placed in a nonoperational con-
dition, leaving only 10 operational submarines. A
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Table 7
Selected Norwegian Modernization Programs
72/US and European
consortium
Delivery to be completed in 1984. Two have been
destroyed in crashes.
6 batteries/leased from United
States
For airfield air defense. Operational in 1987.
Option for two additional batteries.
Acquisition radar and fire control equipment
24 radars/to be produced by
United States and Norway
18 for I-HAWK; 6 for L-70 antiaircraft artillery.
Submarine
6/West Germany
Delivery from 1989-93, with option for two addi-
tional submarines. West German Type 210 sub-
marines; Norwegian designation is Type 6071.
120-mm gun
8/Sweden
First of three coastal defense batteries to be
operational in 1987.
105-mm gun
38/United States
Upgrade for M-48 tank, completion by 1988.
SAM RBS-70
6 batteries/Sweden
Total of 108 firing units and 1,296 missiles by
1988. Two batteries already delivered.
BV-206 all-terrain vehicle
205/Sweden
Up to 150 probably will be placed at disposal of
US reinforcements.
Modernization of Oslo-class frigates
5 ships
Sonar, fire control system (radar, communica-
tions), engineering, and hull modifications.
Modernization of Sleipner-class corvettes
2 ships
Sonar improvements.
Penguin III
Domestic
Air-to-surface antiship missile under development
and designed for use on Norwegian F-16s.
second frigate is being decommissioned as well, leav-
ing only three operational. Norway has decided to
install improved Penguin antiship missiles in its Oslo-
class frigates but will not modernize its current
minesweeper/minehunter force until the late 1980s.
Norway's P-3B maritime surveillance aircraft suffer
from serious electronics failures and technician short-
ages that, according to Norwegian assessments, could
force Olso to deactivate the squadron by 1986 or
1987. Because Norway does not allow other countries
to fly reconnaissance missions from Norwegian bases
over the Barents Sea east of 24 degrees east longitude,
the P-3B force is critical for surveillance of Soviet
naval movements from the Kola Peninsula. The US
Embassy in Oslo reported in March that the Norwe-
gians were leaning toward extending the service lives
of its P-3B aircraft rather than buying an updated
model, the P-3C.
The Norwegian Chief of Defense has admitted that
Norway will not be able to maintain its defense
capabilities relative either to a Warsaw Pact attack or
to previous Norwegian standards. Frigate moderniza-
tion, pre-positioning for US Marines and Norwegian
troops, and the acquisition of F-16s, I-HAWKs, and
submarines represent crucial first steps in the im-
provement of Norway's ability to receive, support, and
defend NATO reinforcements. Nevertheless, Oslo has
committed itself only to the highest priority programs,
passing other pressing defense requirements to rein-
forcing nations-for example, the US Marine Am-
phibious Brigade will bring its own transport helicop-
ters and ground attack aircraft. Finally, shortfalls in
training, war reserve stocks of ammunition, CBR
defense equipment, and electronic warfare equipment
probably will continue to hamper Norway's ability to
mount a sustained defense against a Warsaw Pact
attack.
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Changes in the Norwegian Brigade Structure
Current Infantry Brigade
3 infantry battalions
? 3 rifle companies
? I support company
-1 mortar platoon
- I antitank platoon
- I engineer platoon
? 1 headquarters company
1field artillery battalion
? 3 batteries
1 headquarters company
1 reconnaissance company
1 armored antitank company
1 engineer company
I air defense artillery company
1 signal company
1 military police platoon
1 service battalion
a This structure represents a typical infantry brigade; actual
organization may vary from brigade to brigade.
b The Norwegians envision that, if operationally necessary, Brigade
90 units could be reinforced by a fourth infantry battalion. Norway
also has plans to add a tank battalion to Brigades North, South,
and 12.
Brigade 90 b
3 infantry battalions
? 4 rifle companies
? I support company
- 2 mortar platoons
- 2 antitank platoons
-1 strengthened engineer platoon
? 1 headquarters company
I field artillery battalion
? 4 batteries
No change
Denmark's poor compliance with NATO goals and its
deferral of crucial procurement programs suggest that
the Danes are minimizing their self-defense efforts
and are consciously increasing their reliance on Allied
reinforcements (see table 8). Moreover, even if force
improvement plans for the Army were implemented,
we believe the Army would have serious difficulty
holding ground until NATO reinforcements arrived.
The Danish defense agreement-between government
and opposition parties-for 1985-87 reportedly will
give more resources to the Danish Army than it has
received in the past. The period of training for
conscripts in combat and engineer units will be in-
creased from nine to 12 months, but this increase
probably will do little to improve the Army's readiness
because peacetime manning of the two Zealand and
three Jutland brigades is only 21 to 34 percent of
wartime authorized strength. The Danes also plan to
increase gradually the number of conscripts undergo-
ing initial training and to provide more reserve re-
fresher training afterward; these improvements in
training will be slow because Denmark is well below
current NATO goals for reserve training. These
measures apparently will take place at the expense of
recruiting and retaining regular enlisted personnel
and the manning of the peacetime army will decline.
The US defense attache in Copenhagen estimates that
personnel reductions could cause the Army to become
uncomfortably reliant for manpower on mobilization,
while the number of professional regulars on which
the mobilization forces can build will be smaller.
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Table 8
Selected Danish Modernization Programs
Standard Flex 300 program. Patrol, minelaying,
countermeasures, surveillance vessels. Funding
and schedule uncertain.
Funding and timing uncertain; leasing from West
Germany being considered.
Delivery completed in 1983. Three have been
destroyed in crashes.
F-16 aircraft
12/US and European consortium
Follow-on buy, to be completed by mid-1989.
AIM-9L air-to-air missile
200 planned/ European consortium
Fuze and test equipment would be obtained from
United States.
Surface-to-air missile system for air defense of
air bases.
The defense agreement contains few specifics on
procurement plans, and prospects are not bright.
Plans to acquire additional 155-mm howitzer ammu-
nition, for example, are subject to conclusion of a joint
purchase from the United States by Norway, Sweden,
and Denmark. Details of the purchase of a new
lightweight antitank weapon have not been finalized.
The Danes have not yet decided what model of short-
range air defense system to procure. Plans for replac-
ing Centurion main battle tanks have been delayed
until 1988, and decisions to buy new antitank helicop-
ters and armored personnel carriers have not yet been
made. Denmark continues to depend on antiquated
antiaircraft gun systems for air defense: the Army is
equipped only with the US Redeye man-portable
surface-to-air missile (SAM) and older gun systems.
The Danish Air Force has too few fighters to mount
effective air defense operations. Denmark has a total
of 55 F-16s in its inventory and has agreed to a
follgw-on purchase of 12 more. At a total strength of
67 aircraft, the Danish inventory will remain well
below the NATO requirement of 80. To reduce fuel
costs, Denmark also has limited annual pilot training
to 180 flying hours (the minimum recommended by
NATO). In fact, Danish pilots had an average of only
147 hours of flying time in 1983, and the US defense
attache in Copenhagen reports that the Danish Air
Force is pessimistic about meeting the NATO goal in
1984 or thereafter
Despite the Danes' intentions to buy Sidewinder air-
to-air missiles and electronic warfare defense equip-
ment, the Danish defense agreement contains no
details about specific plans. Denmark also is likely to
stretch out procurement of air-to-surface missiles,
despite its current inability to maintain a full 30-day
supply. Reconnaissance capabilities also are likely to
worsen. Denmark's three Gulfstream aircraft are not
sufficient to patrol all of Danish territorial waters, but
the purchase of more surveillance aircraft has been
ruled out for lack of funds.
The Danish Navy is faced with a slow but persistent
decline in the size of its submarine and surface fleets:
? Two of Denmark's four submarines (down from five
in 1970) are scheduled for retirement by 1988 with
no firm replacement plans. As an interim measure,
a decision to lease three new submarines was made
this year as part of the new defense agreement.
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? Beginning in 1985, almost a dozen obsolete ships
will be decommissioned or scrapped. In particular, a
program to extend the service life of Denmark's six
Sund-class minesweepers, which was already de-
layed one year from 1984 to 1985, has been further
cut in that only two vessels will be modernized and
the remaining four will be scrapped.
? Denmark's two frigates will not be modernized or
replaced, and no new crew will be trained for these
ships after 1986, when they will be placed in reserve
storage.
The US naval attache in Copenhagen has reported
that some Danes view a program for a new vessel-
the Standard Flex 300"--as a means of eliminating
some types of Danish navy vessels and reducing the
Navy to a one-boat-class fleet. The Social Demo-
crats have apparently offered tentative support for
the program if Danish defense planners would agree
to eliminate the submarine force. NATO has ex-
pressed concern, however, that the Standard Flex
vessels will begin to enter service only after the
vessels they are replacing have been scrapped, leav-
ing a gap in Danish naval capabilities in the late
1980s and early 1990s.
We have serious doubts about Denmark's ability to
carry out its NATO missions through the rest of the
decade. The Army's weaknesses almost certainly
mean that West Germany could expect little support
from Denmark in defending southern Jutland, which
lies across the approaches to Hamburg-a presumed
key target for Pact forces. Moreover, the decline in
the number of minelayers, patrol ships, minesweepers,
and submarines will seriously degrade NATO's ef-
forts to control and monitor the Danish straits, or to
mine the straits speedily before hostilities occur. The
West Germans in particular have spoken out publicly
about their uneasiness over being left by Denmark
with the only viable NATO submarine and minelay-
ing forces in the Baltic
" Danish development plans describe the Standard Flex 300 as a
multipurpose, modularized patrol craft designed to conduct mine-
laying, minesweeping, minehunting, surveillance, patrol, or antiship
missions through its ability to accept a variety of weapons payload
Sweden
Despite national concern over Soviet submarine incur-
sions and calls from opposition moderates for in-
creased defense spending, Sweden's poor economic
prospects will constrain the government's ability to
implement force modernization plans designed to
compensate for the small size of its standing forces.
Political Factors. Although there is no perceptible
move in Sweden to abandon neutrality, the controver-
sy surrounding the highly publicized Soviet submarine
incursions has led to the first thoroughgoing public
debate about Swedish security policy since World
War II. Prime Minister Palme has come under attack
in recent months for playing down the Soviet threat-
to stabilize Swedish-Soviet relations-in the face of
demonstrated Soviet indifference to Swedish protests
over the intrusions.
Opposition moderates-headed by Member of Parlia-
ment Carl Bildt-charge that the Swedish Govern-
ment has been underestimating the Soviet threat and
claim that the submarine incursions show that Mos-
cow is actively preparing for war against Sweden.
They call for correction of the "structural error" in
Swedish security thinking about the USSR, charging
that the heart of Swedish neutrality policy-its ability
to defend its territory-is in serious doubt. To redress
the decline in Swedish capabilities, they call for
increased defense spending. Swedish military officers,
who generally tend to be discreetly pro-West or even
pro-NATO, also believe that the threat presented by
intruding Soviet submarines will not disappear. Al-
though no one is suggesting that Sweden abruptly
abandon its neutrality, talk of closer ties with
NATO-in the Swedish press and in academic dis-
cussions-is no longer immediately dismissed.
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Some members of the Swedish Government are con-
cerned that even unofficial conjecture about Sweden
seeking membership in or a military agreement with
NATO would severely damage the credibility of
Swedish neutrality. They fear that Moscow would
perceive an increased Swedish threat to the Soviet
northern flank and plan to invade Sweden early in a
Defense Spending. In real terms, Stockholm's defense
budget increased only slightly through the 1970s; the
parliamentary defense decision of June 1982 dictated
a decrease in funds through 1992. The military
initially was optimistic about accommodating the
reductions without seriously jeopardizing force readi-
ness. However, the 16-percent devaluation of the
kronor in late 1982, higher-than-expected inflation,
and continued application of the value-added tax to
military purchases have resulted in a loss in buying
power for 1982-87 of at least 5 percent as estimated
by the Swedish defense establishment. The Social
Democratic government and center-right opposition
parties agreed in March 1984 to supplement the
defense budget through 1987 to compensate partially
for the costs caused by these factors; nonetheless, real
growth in the defense budget still is expected to be
about zero. The inflation rate for 1984 also is expect-
ed to be higher than the government forecast of 4
percent, the maximum for which the government has
committed compensation.
Impact on Programs. In spite of recent declines in the
size of its military, Sweden continues to deploy the
largest and best-equipped armed force in Scandinavia.
With little or no real growth in defense budget
resources, however, Stockholm will face a real chal-
lenge in implementing ambitious modernization plans
intended to compensate for the smaller force Sweden
fields today. The Swedes believe that increasing reli-
ance on high-technology weapon systems, together
with extended use of existing equipment, will enable
them to maintain their defense capability (see table 9).
Most basic equipment will continue to be produced
domestically, but acquisitions of advanced weapons-
especially missiles and aircraft-may suffer because
of high costs of research and development
Planned acquisitions include the following:
? The new JAS-39 Gripen multirole combat aircraft
is the key to modernization of the Air Force and will
preserve its principal role in Sweden's peripheral
defense strategy. By the year 2000, 140 Gripen are
to be acquired, with another 100 to 200 fighters to
follow. Because about one-third of the aircraft's
components come from foreign sources, however,
currency fluctuations could affect the cost of the
program and lead to smaller production runs. If the
program's spending ceiling is reached, legislation
calls for a shortened production run, use of simula-
tors instead of aircraft for pilot training, and less
weaponry on the attack version of the aircraft.
There already are indications that the Gripen's costs
will be trimmed by using less sophisticated electron-
ics, which Sweden has had to buy from the United
States. Another Air Force project involves improv-
ing command, control, and communications capabil-
ities and includes the development of an airborne
early warning capability-far less capable than the
US AWACS-to supplement ground-based radars.
? New submarines, mine warfare vessels, and missile
attack boats will maintain the Navy's ability to
fulfill its coastal anti-invasion mission. Extra appro-
priations for antisubmarine warfare (ASW) equip-
ment are likely to improve the ASW inventory,
including Navy and Air Force ASW helicopters, but
Sweden's ability to improve its ASW training and
expertise probably will be crucial in determining the
Swedes' ability to detect, pinpoint, and intercept
future intruders.
? The Swedish Army is planning new acquisitions to
improve its capabilities, including antitank helicop-
ters and more effective antitank weapons (the TOW,
RB-56 BILL, and Swedish AT-4 ATGMs) and
small arms (new assault rifles from Belgium). The
Swedes also have decided to develop a new infantry
fighting vehicle, equipped with antitank weapons,
which should enter production in the early 1990s.
However, development of an experimental articulat-
ed armored combat vehicle, the UDES-XX20, was
canceled this year because it was too expensive and
the vehicle was too heavy for operations in northern
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Table 9
Selected Swedish Modernization Programs
J-39 Gripen
140 by year 2000/domestic
Multirole combat fighter.
Air-to-air missile
800/United States
Sidewinder AIM-9L missiles for JA-37 Viggen.
Diesel attack submarine
4/domestic
A-17/Vaestergotland class. Delivery by late 1980s.
Mine countermeasures vessels
6/domestic
M-80/Landsort-class combined minesweeper/hunter.
Missile attack boat
2/domestic
Spica-3/Stockholm class. Planned delivery by 1985-86.
Missile attack boat
4/domestic
Goeteborg class. In design stage; may have minelaying and some
ASW capabilities.
Malin ASW weapon
Domestic
Magnetized acoustic detection device. In production.
Elma ASW weapon
Domestic
Depth charge/mine designed to disable submarine. In production.
BV-206 all-terrain vehicle
4,500/domestic
Transport, antitank, and mobile command post missions.
BILL
Domestic
ATGM in test stage.
ATGM. Approximately 250 launchers and 2,900 missiles have been
received. Total missile buy may reach approximately 4,500.
Improved RBS-70
Domestic
Surface-to-air missile system to be produced in the late 1980s.
Total number unknown.
AT-4
Domestic
84-mm ATGM system being tested.
BO-105 antitank helicopter
20/West Germany
Will be armed with TOW. Delivery by 1987.
The expense of operating large surface combatants
already has caused Sweden to mothball its once-
extensive frigate and destroyer fleet. Similarly, the
cost of high technology for Air Force weapon systems
could result in reduced capabilities for the JAS
aircraft. The net result would be an erosion of Swe-
den's capability, in accordance with its forward de-
fense strategy, to meet an aggressor beyond its bor-
ders at sea or in the air. The coming decade therefore
could bring increased emphasis on Army moderniza-
tion and a strategy more akin to Finland's.
Finland
Although Finnish financial resources for defense are
smaller than those of other Nordics, Helsinki appears
determined to demonstrate Finnish commitment to
the defense of Lapland. There is a strong consensus
for strengthening air defense forces in the north, and
the Army's Lappi Brigade has priority in receiving
new equipment.
Political Factors. Public discussion of security policy
in Finland usually focuses on foreign perceptions of
Finnish intentions and capabilities-for example,
Finnish ability to defend Lapland or take measures
against cruise missiles-rather than on possible
changes in the tenets of Finnish security policy-
independence, neutrality, and good relations with the
USSR. Approximately 94 percent of Finnish respond-
ents to a poll in the fall of 1983 believed that Finnish
foreign policy was well managed. The consensus on
security issues extends across virtually the entire
political spectrum, although the Communist-front
People's Democratic League has been absent from the
government coalition since December 1982 because of
its objections to a modest increase in the 1983 defense
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budget. There seems to be little public inclination in
Finland to cut defense spending; about half of the
respondents to the poll approved of current Finnish
defense expenditures while approximately one in three
favored an increase and one in seven favored a
decrease in the defense budget. More recently, Finn-
ish newspapers reported that 81 percent of 18- to 25-
year-old Finns polled in May 1984 believed defense
forces were necessary. Nearly one-half believed that
the Army was insufficiently equipped and could not
guarantee the security of Finland.
Defense Spending. Since the early 1970s the Finnish
defense budget has remained fairly constant at rough-
ly 1.5 percent of the gross domestic product and 5.4
percent of the total national budget.15 The govern-
ment's 1984 budget bill-and two supplementary
appropriations-did not call for an increase in re-
sources for defense. It provided insufficient funds to
implement fully the recommendation of the Third
Parliamentary Defense Committee in 1981 to up-
grade all the services by 1986. The Finnish armed
forces reportedly believe that the budget will at least
fund initial production and delivery of crucial pro-
grams currently under multiyear contracts. Other
programs probably will be stretched out rather than
canceled.
Impact on Programs. Finland has a small force
modernization program extending through the rest of
the decade and the Finns have a good chance of
meeting their limited goals (see table 10). Finnish
modernization plans call primarily for replacement of
obsolescent equipment and not for significant en-
hancement of defense capabilities. The US defense
attache in Helsinki reported last October that the
Finns will complete their modernization programs for
the Navy and Air Force in this decade and will begin
modernization for the Army before 1990. Low fund-
ing levels are expected to result in procurement delays
but not in cancellations.
" US defense attaches in Helsinki point out, however, that some
defense expenditures are covered by the budgets of other govern-
ment ministries. Retirement pay for the military, for example,
comes out of the social welfare budget. Moreover, personnel costs
are lower than for the other Nordic countries because Finnish
conscripts are paid very little
Despite improvements in both air defense and tactical
support capabilities, we believe the Air Force will still
face severe difficulties in attempting to defend Finn-
ish airspace against hostile aircraft and cruise mis-
siles, largely because of gaps in the low-altitude radar
network and an inadequate aircraft control and warn-
ing system.
The Navy will continue to be limited by inadequate
training and CBR equipment and by its small size,
although its mine warfare capabilities will be
strengthened by the acquisition of new minesweepers
and naval mines. The Navy would also benefit if all
12 missile attack boats were built, although only four
are planned.
The major weaknesses of the Finnish Army are a lack
of mechanization and mobility and insufficient anti-
tank and air defense weapons. To make up for these
deficiencies, the Finns are stressing mobility and
antiarmor improvements over the next several years.
Armored personnel carriers, 155-mm howitzers, and
over-snow and adverse-terrain vehicles are being pro-
cured. Other planned purchases include night-vision
devices and communications equipment.
We believe Finland's efforts before the late 1980s to
redress deficiencies will not upgrade its defense forces
enough to deter the Soviets if Moscow were deter-
mined to invade the country en route to Norway. The
lessons of the Winter and Continuation Wars of the
early 1940s notwithstanding, Finnish "spirit" cannot
compensate for defense forces that simply are too
small-with too few resources-to present a credible
threat to a superpower determined to use Finnish
territory or airspace. Nevertheless, the Soviets would
have to weigh carefully their objectives in light of
Finnish guerrilla resistance, which probably would be
fierce
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Table 10
Selected Finnish Modernization Programs
Item
Quantity/Source
HAWK trainer aircraft
4/United Kingdom; 46/copro-
duced with United Kingdom
J-35F Draken
20/Sweden
Refurbished aircraft to be used for air surveillance. Delivery in
1985.
Missile attack boat
4/domestic
Helsinki-class prototype delivered. Others to be delivered by 1986.
RBS-70 missile
Sweden
Surface-to-surface antiship missile for Helsinki-class ships.
Patrol boat
7/domestic
For Sea Guard. First boat received in early 1983.
T-72 tank
Approximately 150/USSR
Exact number and delivery schedule uncertain.
Armored personnel carrier
300 to 500/largely domestic
but some may be obtained from
the USSR
50 from a Finnish firm. Decision on remainder expected in 1984.
Two Finnish firms are top contenders.
155-mm howitzer
20/domestic
Delivery by 1987.
AIM-9-P-2
100-200/Sweden
Air-to-air missile for Draken and Hawk aircraft.
TOW
20/United States
ATGM. Additional purchase of 40 under consideration.
Radar
United Kingdom/United
States/domestic
Modernization of surveillance and air traffic control radar.
BTR-60 PU command vehicle
USSR
Implications for the United States and NATO
NATO has traditionally focused its attention on
Central Europe, while largely ignoring the flanks.
Recently, however, military strategists have come to
recognize the strategic implications of a weak Scandi-
navia, and there is growing concern that the region
might be drawn into a European confrontation. From
Moscow's point of view, seizure of northern Norway
and the Danish straits would be critical to safeguard-
ing the access of its Northern and Baltic Fleets to the
Norwegian and North Sea and to protecting Soviet
forces in the region. Occupation of strategic airfields
and ports in Norway and Denmark would enable
Soviet forces to attack targets in Central Europe and
interrupt NATO's reinforcement lines across the At-
The declining ability of Sweden and Finland to
modernize their forces increases the vulnerability of
NATO states in the region. Given their inability to
repel Soviet forces in the long run, Sweden and
Finland could face occupation or falter in their politi-
cal will to resist Soviet pressures for transit or basing
rights. Finland probably is more susceptible than
Sweden to these pressures because of its comparative-
ly weaker forces, its long border with the Soviet
Union, and its obligations under the FCMA Treaty.
The ability of Norway and Denmark to compensate
for a weakening Swedish-Finnish buffer, or even to
redress fundamental deficiencies in their own de-
fenses, will continue to be constrained by domestic
political and economic considerations.
Stockholm may see some advantage to increasing
security cooperation with the West, but decisions to
do so will depend on whether Soviet violations of
Swedish territory continue and on how Stockholm
views provocative and cavalier Soviet responses to
Swedish protests. Constraints on improving Swedish
defense capabilities also could prod Stockholm to
strengthen its ties to Western defense. In the near-to-
middle term, however, it is doubtful that Swedish
moves would extend beyond seeking armaments coop-
eration agreements and limited joint wartime contin-
gency planning.
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Crucial gaps exist in the capabilities of Nordic air
defense, ground, and naval forces despite limited
efforts in all four countries to procure SAMs, combat
fighters, artillery, missile attack boats, mine warfare
vessels, and antitank weapons. Unless substantial
initiatives are programed and funded in the next two
to three years-which is highly unlikely-major force
improvements cannot take place before the end of the
decade because of the long leadtime needed for
funding, weapons development, and procurement.
Furthermore, because of insufficient manpower,
training time, and low stocks of missiles, spare parts,
and fuel, the Nordics would suffer to varying degrees
from readiness and sustainability problems.
As a result of these gaps in their capabilities, success-
ful defense of Norway and Denmark probably will
become more critically dependent on the early com-
mitment and arrival of NATO air and ground rein-
forcements. But there are several obstacles to the
timely arrival of effective aid:
? Pre-positioning of equipment in northern Norway
for Norwegian reinforcements has been slowed be-
cause of a lack of national and NATO funds for
building permanent storage sites. The Danes also
are experiencing problems in securing national and
NATO funding for storing supplies for reinforcing
air squadrons.
? With the exception of one Canadian brigade,
NATO reinforcements are not tasked solely with
aiding Norway and Denmark. If they were needed
elsewhere during a crisis, the Northern Flank would
be all the more vulnerable.
? The key non-US NATO nations expected to provide
reinforcements-the United Kingdom, the Nether-
lands, and Canada-face economic problems of
their own that threaten their capability to aid
Norway or Denmark.
These problems mean that Norway and Denmark will
probably increasingly expect the United States to
provide assistance in times of crisis. Under current
plans, the 14,000-man US Marine Amphibious Bri-
gade would deploy to Norway with considerable air-
and ground-based firepower-air defense and close-
support aircraft, helicopters, artillery, infantry, and
antitank weapons. The United States might well come
under increasing pressure to earmark additional
ground reinforcements. Oslo or Copenhagen also may
ask the United States to increase its pre-positioning
aid, most likely in the form of extra funding.
In the coming years, NATO will continue to empha-
size major improvements in its conventional weapons
to lessen reliance on nuclear weapons and reestablish
confidence in current NATO strategy. Norway and
Denmark, however, are not planning substantial im-
provements in their forces, and their capabilities in
conventional warfare are likely to decline. Thus, both
countries could be bringing on themselves a dilemma
neither would wish to face. NATO planners may
conclude that nuclear weapons are critical to both
deterrence and defense in the region. But any consid-
eration in peacetime of strategies for the Northern
Flank that include use of nuclear weapons-except as
a last resort-is politically out of the question in both
Norway and Denmark."' There is a long history in
these countries of strong antinuclear sentiment across
the political spectrum, and the conservative govern-
ments now in power would be reluctant to sanction
such strategies. The return to power of a Labor
government in Norway or a Social Democratic gov-
ernment in Denmark would guarantee strong official
opposition.
16 Oslo and Copenhagen accept in principle NATO's strategy of
flexible response, but they do not believe that a war necessarily can
be fought better using nuclear weapons than conventional weapons.
US 155-mm howitzers pre-positioned in Norway are nuclear
capable (but not certified for nuclear missions), and Marine Corps
A-6 Intruder aircraft can deliver nuclear weapons. For the past
several years, NATO military authorities have been strongly urging
that Denmark's 155-mm howitzer units be nuclear certified, but
Copenhagen has declined for political reasons. In past training,
some Danish artillery crews simulated procedures for storing and
handling nuclear ordnance, but this training no longer occurs
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Thus, NATO could find itself unable to defend
Scandinavia either conventionally because force im-
provement programs were incomplete and sufficient
reinforcements were unavailable, or with nuclear
weapons because prior planning had not occurred and
because the Danish and Norwegian Governments
would be extremely reluctant to sanction the use of
such weapons. Nonetheless, NATO reinforcements
moving into Norway and Denmark in time of war
probably would have the capability to deliver tactical
nuclear weapons. If the Danish and Norwegian Gov-
ernments prohibited the use of such weapons, NATO
would be faced with the prospect of the collapse of its
Northern Flank.
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Appendix
1,249
1,064
1,064
1,116
938
938
133
126
126
Antitank weapons
4,863
11,956
11,378
Rocket launcher (2.36, 3.5
inch)
3,597
2,557
2,557
Recoilless rifle (57, 75,
84 mm)
M-40 106-mm launcher
280
296
296
ENTAC ATGM launcher
0
28
0
TOW ATGM launcher
0
288
288
Missile
0
5,900
5,350
Field and air defense artillery
(ADA)
Howitzer (105, 155 mm)
312
402
402
ADA (20 mm)
0
312
312
L60/70 ADA (40 mm)
210
128
128
RBS-70 SAM launcher
0
33
108
Missile
0
360
1,296
I-HAWK SAM launch
unit
0
0
18
346
570
570
148
139
139
25
78
78
173
353
353
10,701
13,318
13,445
9,862
10,077
10,077
80
167
167
759
344
344
Over-snow vehicle
(BV-202)
0
2,200
2,200
All-terrain vehicle
(BV-206)
Tank transport
0
2
2
Cross-country vehicle
(Mercedes 240GD)
0
450
450
Army aviation
47
40
40
Utility aircraft
28
25
25
Helicopter
19
15
15
a Estimates.
b Includes armored personnel carriers, armored command vehicles,
mortar carriers, armored recovery vehicles, and scout cars.
All-weather fighters
21
0
0
F-104G Starfighter
19
0
0
TF-104G
2
0
0
Fighter-bombers
0
100
82
F-16A
0
58 b
58
F-5A
0
56 c
24
Day fighter CF-104s
0
13
0
Attack
74
0
0
F-5A
64 c
0
0
F-5B
lo d
0
0
13
11
2
5
7e
7
21
25
25
Saab-91B Safir
21
0
0
F-16B
0
12
12
F-5B
0
13 d
13
6
9
9
6
6
6
0
3
3
Transport short range
8
4
4
DHC-6 Twin Otter
4
4
4
C-47A
4
0
0
Medium-lift support helicopters
0
39
39
UH1B Iroquois
0
23
23
Sea King MK 43 (SAR)
0
10
10
MK86 Lynx (SAR-ASW)
0
6
6
Utility helicopters
21
0
0
OH-13K Sioux
2
0
0
UH-1 Iroquois
19
0
0
Utility
38
39
39
O-IE Bird Dog
27
15
15
Piper L-18
11
8
8
MFI-15
0
16
16
36
36
54
Nike Hercules launchers
36
36
36
Improved HAWK launchers
0
0
18
a Estimates.
b Total F-16 buy would have been 60 F-16A and 12 F-16B, but 2 A
models have crashed.
c Role has changed.
d Role has changed.
e Two are Coast Guard assets.
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Table A-3 Table A-4
Norway: Naval Inventory Denmark: Army Equipment Inventory
15
14
10
5
8
8
Oslo class
5
5
5
Nordkapp class
(Coast Guard)
0
3
3
Patrol escorts
Patrol ships
0
11
11
Vadso class
0
1
1
Farm class
0
2
2
Nornen class Coast Guard
0
1
1
Leased vessels
0
7
7
Missile attack boats
20
39
39
Storm class
20
19
19
Hauk class
0
14
14
Snoegg class
0
6
6
Torpedo boats
26
8
0
Tjeld class
20
8
0
Rapp class
6
0
0
Bluebird class
10
10
10
Minelayers
5
3
3
Raven (modified)
4
0
0
Vidar
0
2
2
Utility landing craft
0
8
8
Auxiliary/yard service craft
7
8
8
Mortars
2,276
1,812
1,812
Light (51, 60, 80, 81 mm)
1,946
1,482
1,482
Heavy (4.2 inch, 120 mm)
330
330
330
Antitank weapons
6,891
24,851
26,985
Rocket launcher (3.5 inch,
66 mm)
2,360
21,700
21,700
Recoilless rifle (75, 84,
106 mm)
531
958
958
M-10 76 mm antitank gun
0
23
23
COBRA ATGM launcher
NA
40
NA
Rocket
4,000
NA
NA
TOW ATGM launcher
0
60
154
Missile
0
2,070
4,150
Field and Air Defense Artillery
(ADA)
819
953
953
Rocket launcher (762 mm
Honest John)
8
8
8
Howitzer (105, 155 mm)
386
353
353
Gun (155 mm)
24
24
24
Howitzer (203 mm)
12
12
12
Gun (25 pounder)
69
0
0
L60/70 ADA (40 mm)
320
36
36
Redeye SAM launcher
0
520
520
Armor
1,161
1,043
1,043
Tank (75, 76, 84 mm)
272
171
171
Tank (Centurion 105 mm)
100
88
88
Tank (Leopard 105 mm)
0
120
120
Armored vehicles b
789
664
664
Transport
13,845
6,669
6,669
Truck (1/4 to 20 tons)
13,820
6,664
6,664
Trailer
25
25
25
Army aviation
2
36
36
Utility helicopter
(Hughes 500)
0
16
16
Utility aircraft (L-18, T017)
2
20
20
a Estimates.
b Includes self-propelled guns, mortar carriers, armored recovery
vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and scout cars.
25X1
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ocUret
Table A-5
Denmark: Air Force Inventory
All-weather fighters
28
30
0
F104G Starfighter
24
30
0
TF104G
4 c
0
0
Fighter-bombers
0
59
67
F-16A
0
44 b
52
F-35 Draken
0
15
15
Day fighters
Hunter F-51
21
0
0
Attack
37
20
20
F-100D Super Solve
37
0
0
Saab MFI-17
0
20
20
Reconnaissance
16
17
17
RF-84F Thunderflash
16
0
0
RF-35 Draken
0
17
17
Trainers
45
30
24
Hunter T-53
2
0
0
T-33
19
0
0
DHC-1 Chipmunk
22
0
0
Harvard T-6
2
0
0
F-16B
0
11
15
0
10c
0
0
9
9
5
6
6
5
0
0
0
3
3
0
3
3
Sikorsky S-61A
0
8
8
Utility aircraft
12
0
0
KZ-VII
8
0
0
PBY-61A
4
0
0
I-HAWK launchers (six per squadron)
0
24
48
a Estimates.
b Total F-16 buy: 46 F-16A, two of which have crashed; 12 F-16B,
one of which has crashed.
c Role has changed.
Table A-6
Denmark: Naval Inventory
Submarines
5
4
2
Delfinen class
5
2
0
Narvhalen class
0
2
2
Frigates
Peder Skram class
2
2
2
Corvettes
4
3
3
Airone class
4
0
0
Niels Juel class
0
3
3
Patrol ships
4
5
1
Hvidbjoernen class
4
4
0
Beskyttevren class
0
1
1
Missile attack boats
Willemoes class
0
10
10
Torpedo boats
16
6
2
Brave
6
0
0
Falken
4
0
0
S- 100 (modified)
6
0
0
Soloven
0
6
2
Daphne class
9
8
8
Minesweepers
12
6
2
Sund class (MSC-60)
8
6
2
Asvig
4
0
0
Minelayers
4
7
6
Falster
4
4
4
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Table A-7
Sweden: Army Equipment Inventory
Rocket launcher (74, 80 mm) 1,000
16,500
16,500
TOW ATGM launcher
0
250
250
Missile
0
2,898
5,000
Field and air defense artillery
(ADA)
864
1,713
1,713+
Gun (75 mm, 105 mm, 6 inch)
224
74
74
Howitzer (105, 155 mm)
240
919
919+
ADA (20 mm)
0
120
120
L60/70 ADA (40 mm)
400
600
600
Field and air defense artillery
(ADA)
324
6,110
6,110
I-HAWK SAM launch unit
NA
16
16
Missile
114
122
122
Armor
1,333
5,797
9,297
Light tank (M-74, IKV-71)
400
600
600
Tank (Centurion 84 mm)
320
110
110
Tank (Centurion 105 mm)
0
240
240
Tank ("S-tank" 105 mm)
246
335
335
Tank destroyer (IKV-91
90 mm)
0
284
284+
Armored vehicle b
367
968
968
Over-snow vehicle (BV-202)
0
2,260
2,260
All-terrain vehicle (BV-206)
0
1,000
4,500
Army aviation
48
67
87
Utility aircraft
12
31
31
Helicopter
36
36
56
a Estimates.
b Includes armored personnel carriers and armored recovery
vehicles.
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Table A-8
Sweden: Air Force Inventory
Multirole combat aircraft
Trainers
245
229
229
JA-37 Viggen
0
40
149
SK-35C Draken
20
18
18
All-weather fighters
370
0
0
SK-60A (Saab-105)
120
129
129
J-32B Lansen
30 b
0
0
SK-50 (Safir 91 B/C)
60c
0
0
J-35B Draken _
50
0
0
T-6 Texan
45
0
0
J-35D Draken
100 C
0
0
Beagle Bulldog
0
50
50
J-35F Draken
190 d
0
0
Sabreliner 40 SER
0
2
2
Fighter-bombers
0
164
144
SK-60B (Saab-105)
0
15
15
J-35D Draken
0
44 c
44
SK-37 Viggen
0
15
15
J-35F Draken
0
120 d
100
Intermediate-range transport
2
10
10
Utility Aircraft Canberra B-15s
2
0
0
C-130E Hercules
2
8
8
Day fighters
61
0
0
SE-210 Caravelle
0
2
2
J-35A Draken
35
0
0
Short-range transport
26
0
0
J-29F
26
0
0
C-47 Dakota
7
0
0
Attack
150
105
105
Vickers Varsity
1
0
0
A-32A Lansen
150
0
0
HS Dove (DH 104)
1
0
0
AJ-37 Viggen
0
81
81
Pembroke C-52
17
0
0
J-32B Lansen
0
24 b
24
Medium-lift support helicopters
Reconnaissance
91
58
58
Augusta-Bell 204B
6
8
8
S-32C Lansen
36
0
0
Utility helicopters
S-35E Draken
55
0
0
Alouette II
0
6
6
SH-37 Viggen
0
39
39
Utility aircraft
SF-37 Viggen
0
19
19
SK-50 Safir
0
50e
50
ASW helicopters
HKP-4 (Vertol 107)
a Estimates.
b c d e Role changes.
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Table A-9
Sweden: Naval Inventory
Submarines
24
12
12
Minesweepers/minehunters
34
28
29
Draken class
6
4
0
M-57 class
12
0
0
Hajen class
6
0
0
M-15 class
6
8
8
Sjoeorman class
5
5
5
M-51 class
6
0
0
Abborren class
6
0
0
Miscellaneous
7
0
0
Naecken class
0
3
3
Arholma class
1
0
0
Spiggen class
1
0
0
Orust class
2
0
0
(minisubmarine)
Arkoe class
0
10
10
Vaestergotland class
0
0
4
M-31 class
0
3
3
Destroyers
10
2
0
M-44/47 class
0
7
7
Oeland class
2
0
0
Landsort class
0
0
1
Destergotland class
4
0
0
Minelayers
1
12
12
Visby class
2
0
0
Alvsnabben
1
0
0
Halland class
2
2
0
Aelvsborg class
0
2
2
Light cruisers
Carlscrona
0
1
1
MUL-11
0
1
1
MUL-12
0
8
8
0
12
12
0
8
8
2
0
0
0
4
4
42
10
0
Intelligence collection ships
T-102 class
11
0
0
Orion
0
T-121 class (Spica I)
6
6
0
Submarine rescue ships
0
1
1
T-32
25
0
0
Auxiliary/yard and service craft
1
8
8
Norrkoping (Spica II) (T-31)
0
4
0
Helicopters
23
26
28
Missile attack boats
0
25
32
Vertol 107 (ASW)
3
10
12
Hugin class
0
16
16
Alouette II (utility)
10
6
6
Jaegaren class
0
1
1
Augusta-Bell 206A
10
10
10
Norrkoping (Spica II) (R-131)
0
8
12
(light-lift support)
Stockholm class (Spica III)
0
0
2
Goeteborg class
0
0
1
a Estimates.
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Table A-10
Finland: Army Equipment Inventory
Mortars
1,751
1,595
1,595
Light (60, 81, 82 mm)
1,162
987
987
Heavy (107, 120, 160 mm)
589
608
608
Antitank weapons
713
10,980+
10,980+
Antitank missile (Vigilant)
250
0
0
Gun (75 mm)
183
0
0
Recoilless rifle (55, 95 mm)
100
780
780
Rocket launcher (66, 74 mm)
0
10,000+
10,000+
ATGM launchers
180
200
200
Field and air defense artillery
(ADA)
2,013
1,909
1,909
Gun (75, 76, 90 mm)
706
594
594
Gun (107, 122, 130,
152, 155 mm)
189
285
285
Howitzer (105, 122, 150, 152,
155, 210 mm; 4.5 inch, 8 inch)
1,118
1,030
1,030
Armor
205
318
868
Amphibious light tank
(76 mm)
12
15
15
Medium tank (77, 84, 85,
100 mm)
155
189
189
Medium tank (T-72 125 mm)
0
0
150 b
Armored vehicle c
38
114
514 d
Transport
Finland has in its inventory a
wide variety of trucks, utility,
and over-snow vehicles, but in-
formation regarding the exact
number of Finnish holdings is
not available.
a Estimates.
b Finland reportedly is to receive 150 T-72 tanks from the USSR,
but the exact number and timetable are uncertain.
c Includes armored personnel carriers, armored infantry fighting
vehicles, and armored cars.
d Finland is procuring roughly 400 armored personnel carriers; the
total number to be obtained could be as low as 300 or as high as
500.
Table A-11
Finland: Air Force Inventory
All-weather fighters
Fishbed N
0
28
28
Fighter-bombers
0
24
44
J-35S Draken
0
24
24
J-35F Draken
0
0
20
Day fighters
28
22
22
Fishbed C/E
19
22
22
Gnat (Folland)
9
0
0
102
101
87
69
40
0
4
0
0
Mongol
2
4
4
Saab-91 Safir
27
0
0
TF-35 Draken
0
3
3
HAWK T-1
0
24
50
Valmet Vinka
0
30
30
Intermediate-range transport
Gates Learjet 35A
0
3
3
Short-range transport
6
7
3
Douglas Skytrain
6
4
0
Fokker F-27
0
3
3
Medium-lift support helicopters
3
10
10
Hound
3
0
0
Hip
0
9
9
Bell Model 212
Light-lift support helicopters
Augusta-Bell AB 206A
0
1
1
Utility helicopters
3
2
2
Hughes Model 500
0
2
2
Alouette II
2
0
0
AB 206A Jetranger
1
0
0
4
13
15
2
0
0
Hunting Pembroke
2
0
0
Piper Chieftain
0
4
6
Piper Cherokee
0
9
9
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Table A-12
Finland: Naval Inventory
Matti Kurki (UK Bay class)
1
0
0
Fast patrol craft
15
13
8
Dark class
2
lb
1
Nuoli class
13
1lb
6
Hurja class
0
lb
1
Missile attack boats
0
6
9
Helsinki class
0
1
4
Tuima/Osa II class
0
4
4
Isku class
0
1
1
R class
0
5
5
Minesweepers
5
6
12
Raisio class
4
0
0
Rymattyla class
1
0
0
Kuha class
0
6
6
Unknown class
0
0
6
Minelayers
2
3
3
Keihassalmi class
1
0
0
Ruotsinsalmi class
1
0
0
Pohjanma class
0
1
1
Miscellaneous
0
1
1
Utility landing craft
0
9 c
9
Auxiliary/yard service craft
2
9
15
a Estimates.
b Probably have minelaying capabilities.
c Also have minelaying capabilities.
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Secret
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