TURKEY: THE THREAT OF RESURGENT TERRORISM

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: September 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence 25X1
Turkey: The Threat of
Resurgent Terrorism
EUR 84-10190
September 1984
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Turkey: The Threat of
Resurgent Terrorism
This paper was prepared b Office
of European Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Western Europe Division, EURA
Secret
EUR 84-10190
September 1984
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Secret
Turkey: The Threat of
Resurgent Terrorism r
Key Judgments Despite a drastic reduction in the incidence of violence and the decimation
Information available of a number of clandestine terrorist groups under the three years of
as of 1 September 1984 military rule that ended last November, we do not believe Turkey's effort
was used in this report.
to put an end to terrorism has succeeded:
? Turkish security forces continue to find and confiscate significant
quantities of weapons and make arrests.
? In the last several months, there has been a recurrence of small-scale
violence.
? Kurdish dissident raids in August resulted in several deaths and demon-
strated that this problem remains alive.
Foreign support for Turkish terrorism continues. The Turks see Damas-
cus-an ideological and historical rival-as their main antagonist.
We believe the Soviets also lend support to terrorist groups, but
they have been extremely discreet, and there is limited evidence of their ac-
tivities. In our view, they rely on intermediaries, such as the Bulgarians and
Syrians, whose role is better documented. In addition, Arab and Iranian
terrorist groups have begun targeting each other and Western targets in
Turkey.
Eliminating foreign support would not halt terrorism in Turkey. In our
judgment, Turkish terrorism has its roots in the sweeping demographic,
economic, and sociological changes that have occurred over the last three
decades. Until significant improvements can be achieved in dealing with
the resulting problems-unemployment, inequitable land and income
distribution, overtaxed urban facilities, and festering religious and ethnic
tensions-terrorism will remain a threat.
We expect a gradual resurgence of violence, but we do not expect it to take
on dimensions serious enough to threaten political stability over the next
year or two. Despite the return to civilian rule in November 1983, martial
law remains in force throughout most of the country. Moreover, Turkish
security forces have been strengthened by improved training and financial
resources.
Secret
EUR 84-10190
September 1984
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The strength of the resurgence will also depend on the willingness of
civilian and military authorities-now represented by Prime Minister Ozal
and President Evren-to work together. We believe the competing political
and institutional interests of these two men will complicate their relation-
ship and perhaps weaken the security services and the government's ability
to contain terrorism.
Even a moderate upsurge in terrorism could threaten US facilities and
personnel in the country. The United States is seen as the principal patron
of the Turkish Government and United States servicemen could again
become the target of terrorists
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Secret
The Foreign Dimension
4
Police Capabilities
8
Ozal, Evren, and Security Prerogatives
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Secret
Turkey: The Threat of
Resurgent Terrorism
Introduction
The transition from military to civilian rule over the
past year has taken place quietly, and the national
election which brought Prime Minister Turgut Ozal
to power last November was relatively trouble free.
Nevertheless, we are convinced that the threat posed
by leftist-and to a lesser degree, rightist and Islam-
Indeed, in our judg-
ment, one motivation for the generals to step back was
a belief that only a popularly elected, competent
civilian regime would have any hope of implementing
the social and economic programs necessary to eradi-
cate the sources of extremism and violence. As such,
the move is a gamble, and the outcome could be
decisive for the immediate future of democracy in
Turkey.
Terrorism: Roots and Responses
Sources of Political Violence. The inadequacies of
governmental structures and underlying social ten-
sions in Turkey gave rise to a growing wave of
violence which started in the late 1950s and culminat-
ed in military interventions in 1960, 1971, and Sep-
tember 1980. The violence and terrorism have their
roots in the sweeping demographic, economic, and
sociological changes that have occurred over the last
three decades. While the strains resulting from eco-
nomic change, population growth, internal migration,
urbanization, and ethnic/ religious changes are com-
mon in the Third World, they have been acute in
Turkey:
? Turkey's population of 50 million is nearly double
that of 30 years ago. It grew at an average annual
rate of 2.7 percent between 1950 and 1975-one of
the highest rates in the world.
? The urban population has grown even more rapidly
than the population as a whole. In 1960, 25 percent
of the population lived in cities; by 1980, the portion
had risen to 50 percent. This has thrown together
diverse and sometimes antagonistic ethnic and reli-
gious groups in unfamiliar city neighborhoods with
sometimes violent consequences. For example, the
southeastern city of Kahramanmaras, the scene of
large-scale rioting in December 1978, had perhaps
the highest rate of growth in Turkey during the
1970s.
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? The current official unemployment rate of about 20
percent has dropped only slightly from levels in the
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1970s. Underemployment has been variously esti-
mated as high as 70 percent of the working popula-
tion in the sprawling shantytowns surrounding cities
such as Ankara and Izmir.
? Income distribution is badly skewed: two prominent
Turkish scholars claimed in 1980 that 70 percent of
the population was below the average income level.
? Rural workers account for half the working popula-
tion but only 28 percent of the national income, and
much of this is concentrated among a few individ-
uals. Land distribution also has become less equita-
ble over time]
Violence also has its roots in Turkey's serious minor-
ity problems. Most troublesome are the Kurds in the
southeastern provinces, who are second only to ethnic
Turks in supplying recruits to radical leftist groups.
The estrangement of this community, which makes up
10 percent or more of the population, is due in large
part to Turkish laws that prohibit Kurdish language,
literature, and ethnic organizational activity; indeed,
Turkish officials deny the existence of a Kurdish
minority. The Alevi community, concentrated in east-
ern Turkey and comprising perhaps 15 percent of the
population, is another significant minority. Alevis-
ethnic Turks who practice a version of Islam that
draws from both Sunni and Shia doctrine, as well as
elements of shamanism and Christianity-are viewed
with suspicion, intolerance, and open hostility by the
Sunni majority. Violence has flared frequently be-
tween these groups.
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The complexity of the causes of violence is matched
by the diversity of terrorist groups which sprung up in
Turkey. A feature of terrorism in Turkey is the
plethora of leftist organizations. More than 50 such
groups were in existence before the 1980 coup, and
there was no trace of a common organization. The
fragmentation of these groups reflects their highly
personalized leadership and undeveloped ideological
ideas. Beyond fuzzy Marxist notions, they appear to
have only a vague concept of the type of state they
wish to establish, and an anarchistic bent which has
prevented the development of a widespread base of
support. Their fragmentation, small size, and tight
cell structure, however, do afford these militant
groups a defense against police operations
Violence and Weak Government. The emergence of
social and economic problems coincided with and
contributed to a period of weak government when a
series of internally divided coalition governments
proved unable to agree on the causes of or solutions to
Turkey's problems. Parliamentary governments in
Turkey have not measured up well to the challenges
posed sporadically by political violence. When terror-
ist violence first emerged as a serious problem in the
late 1950s, the political institutions left by Ataturk
had already been discredited by corrupt and arbitrary
rule. Added to this was a succession of weak and
internally divided coalition governments, as no single
party was able to win a parliamentary majority.
Terrorism first took on significant dimensions under
the conservative and authoritarian Menderes govern-
ment, whose misrule led to a military coup by a cabal
of reformist Army colonels in May 1960. Their
temporary government produced a highly liberal con-
stitution which opened the way to hitherto-repressed
political and social forces. Radical political parties
and interest groups began to organize openly. Trade
unions were granted the right to strike, and labor
unrest began to grow. In this atmosphere of ferment,
political radicalism took hold in the student communi-
ty. The major political parties-the social democratic
Republican People's Party and the conservative Jus-
tice Party-were preoccupied with internal power
struggles and unable to cooperate to reduce the
influence of these dangerous new forces.
The politicization of the universities and factories led
to street demonstrations and violence during the late
1960s and early 1970s and the emergence of clandes-
tine, radical groups. In 1971 the military hierarchy
intervened again, bloodlessly deposing the conserva-
tive Demirel government. The government of techno-
crats that followed, and subsequent elected cabinets
as well, proved weak and equally incapable of contain-
ing the unrest. Between the 1971 and 1980 military
interventions, governments were debilitated by the
switching of party allegiances by deputies and even
cabinet ministers, the need to seek coalition partners
among extremist groups, rampant corruption, and the
lack of consistent economic and political decision
making. Foreign developments, such as the 1973/74
oil price hikes and the 1974 Cyprus conflict, produced
new economic difficulties and anti-Western emotions
that contributed to the growth of radicalism. Dissatis-
faction with the United States, the rise of Islamic
fundamentalism throughout the Middle East, and the
rise of formidable leftist groups prompted the emer-
gence in turn of Islamic and neofascist groups.'
The first large-scale violence occurred in Kahraman-
maras in December 1978 between Sunnis and Alevis.
The killing of more than 100 people there led the left-
of-center Ecevit government to impose martial law in
13 provinces, including the major urban areas. Never-
theless, the situation deteriorated rapidly, partly be-
cause the major political parties were themselves
riddled with extremists and unwilling to cooperate
against terrorism. By 1980, up to 20 Turks were dying
every day in terrorist attacks. The victims included a
former premier, a deputy party chief, a trade union
leader, the country's foremost journalist, and senior
security officials. The military, concerned that the
situation was fast approaching civil war, finally inter-
vened on 12 September 1980 and imposed military
rule.
' While the emergence of the rightwing terrorist group, the "Grey
Wolves" of Alpaslan Turkes, was a major destabilizing factor
before the coup, Islamic-oriented extremist groups have not been
potent compared to other Turkish militants or even Islamic funda-
mentalist organizations in neighboring countries. Most Turks-
leftist and rightist extremists, as well as mainstream politicians-
support the idea of a secular state despite otherwise intense political
differences and interpretations of Kemalism. Turkey is an over-
whelmingly Sunni nation, and the only significant religious minor-
ity, the Alevis, does not have the dynamic clergy associated with the
Shias. The government historically has kept religious leaders of all
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Secret
Table I
Turkish Violence, 1978-82 a
1978-12
1980-11
September 1980 September 1982
9,090
737
Explosions
6,365
370
Riots
1,163
68
Robberies
3,014
1,491
Student demonstrations
2,532
60
Other demonstrations
3,836
860
Wounded
10,427
850
Security officials killed
164
72
Terrorists killed
146
215
a This table is a representative picture of the scope of violence in
Turkey before and after the military takeover. The figures were
compiled from government communiques.
Results of Military Rule. Three years of military rule
produced significant gains in the battle against terror-
ism. According to official claims and press reports,
political killings dropped from 5,000 during the nine
months before the coup in 1980 to 442 in the follow-
ing year. Incidents of political violence were down
from 33,000 to 5,673 during the same period. Security
forces confiscated more than 0.5 million pistols and
rifles, about 2.2 million rounds of ammunition, nearly
10,000 explosive devices, 21 rocket launchers, and one
mortar during the first year of military rule alone (see
table 1).
The number of suspect terrorists arrested is more
difficult to calculate but definitely reached into the
tens of thousands. Some Turkish newspapers have
alleged that arrests of suspected terrorists and sympa-
thizers since the initial imposition of martial law in
1978 may have been as high as 125,000, although
many of these were subsequently released or acquit-
ted. A senior official of Ozal's party told the press last
spring that there are still 100,000 people in jail,
including 20,000 people in military prisons.'
'A majority of these prisoners are described by the Turkish
Government as leftists, followed by those of "uncertain persua-
sions," and, lastly, Kurds. Most of the Turks arrested were
In handing over power last year, the military tried to
ensure it would retain the means to deal with any
resurgence of terrorism. It kept the presidency in its
own hands, in the person of Gen. Kenan Evren, the
former Chairman of the National Security Council.
The new constitution enhances the powers of the
president, who now has wide authority to act in
emergencies and can control the selection and disci-
pline of civil servants. The military also imposed new
laws restricting party and electoral activity, banning
former party leaders from participation in politics for
10 years, imposing sanctions for references to past
political quarrels, and setting stiff penalties for viola-
tions of limits on labor and religious activity.
A cornerstone of the military's program to strengthen
the hand of the government is the State of Emergency
Law, which was passed by the NSC last October. It
offers a mechanism for the government to deal with
disorder without implementing martial law. The NSC
also established new state security courts to deal with
offenses against the "integrity" of the country. These
courts are staffed by civilians but have military judges
and prosecutors. They can try cases falling under the
anti-Communist provisions of the civil code, as well as
violations related to labor laws, illegal demonstrations
and associations, and smuggling (see inset, "State of
Emergency Law").
In practice, the new law has served as a vehicle for
shifting administrative responsibility from military to
civilian authorities. Of the 26 provinces without mili-
tary rule, 11 have been placed under a state of
emergency. Martial law was extended in June in the
remaining 41 provinces.
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Terrorism: Dead or Alive?
Despite the military's crackdown on radical groups,
and the current relative calm, practically all observers
agree that violence has not been eliminated. F 25X1
Domestic Groups. The government claimed in 1983
that nearly half of the illegal groups active at the time
of the coup were still in operation. Last August, in an
unusual announcement regarding the status of clan-
destine organizations, the martial law command in
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The new State of Emergency Law gives the govern-
ment power to issue laws by decree, detain suspects
for extended periods, impose curfews, and ban public
meetings or publications for a period of up to six
months in the event of a disruption of public order or
natural disaster. Parliament has the responsibility of
approving the decision and of extending the emergen-
cy in four-month increments.
During normal circumstances, when neither martial
law nor a state of emergency is in effect, public
prosecutors and the police have enhanced powers to
arrest and detain suspects and prosecute defendants.
Legislation passed by the former National Security
Council expanded or redefined the list of offenses
listed in the criminal code. Even so, the effectiveness
of the new civilian system will depend on the cohe-
siveness of the state apparatus and the government's
ability to maintain a well-disciplined and competent
judicial and police system.
Ankara said that 25 groups had been practically
eliminated but three groups were still engaged in
violence and 17 others had increased their activities.
The command also announced that almost 6,000
suspects were still at large (see table 2).
the most active and dangerous
organizations appear to be the same ones that were
notorious before the 1980 coup. According to their
own manifestoes, all these groups aim to overthrow
the constitutional order through violent means and to
force the removal of US facilities from Turkey. Their
tactics emphasize armed assaults and bombing raids
on government officials and facilities, as well as on
rightist opponents and leftist rivals.
Security sweeps on the part of the Turkish National
Police (TNP) once again are turning up signs of
terrorist activity. The TNP, for example, arrested two
militants in Istanbul in February who possessed siz-
three people
were killed and 64 injured in violent incidents during
municipal elections. In late June, Turkish police
discovered three incendiary devices in Istanbul, and in
early July a bomb exploded in an Istanbul office
building. In August, terrorists bombed an office of an
American bank in Istanbul. Elsewhere, security forces
earlier this year seized large quantities of arms in the
Provinces of Erzurum, Agri, Kayseri, and Tokat.F__
The Foreign Dimension. In addition to the domestic
wellsprings of terrorism, foreign terrorist activities on
Turkish soil add to the challenges facing the new
government. The war between Iran and Iraq and the
upheaval in Lebanon have produced a spate of terror-
ism throughout the Middle East that occasionally
Armenian terrorism, although it has garnered more
headlines abroad, is a much less serious threat. Arme-
nian-sponsored terrorism for the most part takes place
outside Turkey and has not contributed significantly
to political instability. In fact, we believe Armenian
terrorism tends to unite Turks and reinforce govern-
ment efforts to portray the problem of terrorism
simply as a result of foreign subversion. Even so,
attacks by the Armenian Secret Army for the Libera-
tion of Armenia (ASALA) and the Justice Comman-
dos for the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) have un-
nerved the Turkish foreign service, generated
unfavorable publicity about Turkey, and further bur-
dened the security services
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Table 2
Turkey: Major Terrorist Groups a
Revolutionary Way Marxist-Leninist and
(Dev Yol) pro-Soviet; emphasis on
a continuing revolution
Revolutionary left Marxist-Leninist and
(Dev Sol) pro-Soviet
Marxist-Leninist Armed Marxist-Leninist and
Propaganda (MLAPU) pro-Soviet
Turkish People's Libera- Marxist-Leninist and
tion Party-Front-Swift pro-Soviet; faction be-
Ones (Acilciler faction- lieves militants need not
TPLP-F-A) be well trained or well
indoctrinated for partici-
pation in violent acts
"Partizan" Group; Uncertain, but probably
Turkish Communist anti-Soviet and pro-Chi-
Party (TKP/ML) nese
Turkish Communist Unknown
Labor Party (TKLP)
Turkish People's Libera- Umbrella organization
tion Party-Front for several groups such
(TPLP-F) as the "Swift Ones" and
the MLAPU described
above; pro-Soviet
Turkish People's Libera- Broadly aligned with Al-
tion Army (TPLA) banian Marxism and the
ideas of Che Guevara;
chief rival of the
TPLP-F during the
1970s
Ibrahim Keceiler,
Taner Akcam,
Ali Baspinar,
Akin Dirik,
Nasuh Kitap,
Nasuh Mitar,
Oruzhan Muftuoqlu,
Melih Pekdemir,
Mehmet Yilmaz
Ozden Bilgin,
Celaleddin Can,
Faruk Erner,
Pasha Guven,
Sursun Karatas,
Sinan Kukul,
Huseyin Soqun,
Mehmet Venlue,
Mehmet Murat
Kirkor Aluc,
Tafun Bilgen,
Hayrettin Can,
Hasan Erciyas,
Semsi Ozkan,
Suleyman Polat,
Hasan Sensoy,
Kerim Sonatilgan,
Tamer Tabak
Enngin Erkiner,
Cemil Orkunoqlu,
Hilal Orkunoqlu,
Mirac Ural
Taner Akcam,
Tayfun Bilqin,
Gulten Cayan,
Nalan Gurates,
Mirac Oral
Immediate establishment of a Active
proletarian dictatorship; focuses
on propaganda and demonstra-
tions as well as armed assaults
Same as groups above, but the Active
MLAPU has been more profes-
sional than any other group in
its political assassinations and
success in attacking US service-
men
Same as above, but with more Active
emphasis on violence for its own
sake
Uncertain, but probably a "na- Active
tional democratic people's" rev-
olution with emphasis on the
rural dimension of popular re-
volt
Proletarian revolution; well- Less active
established history of bombings than other
and assassinations groups but
highly
dangerous
Popular revolution with an em- Inactive
phasis on the rural dimension
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Table 2
Turkey: Major Terrorist Groups a (continued)
Turkish Revolutionary Marxist-Leninist; off- Hasam Acan-Central Active
Communist Union shoot of TPLA Committee
(TRCU or TIKB)
Turkish Workers and Principal pro-Chinese Doqu Perineck Revolution based on rural peas- Inactive; not
Peasants' Liberation revolutionary group ants and workers as involved in
Party (TWPLP) violence as its
offshoots
Turkish Workers and Offshoot of TWPLP; Mertol (LNU) "Murat" Same as above with greater em- Active
Peasants Liberation anti-Soviet and Maoist phasis on terrorism as a precur-
Army (TWPLA or sor to revolution
TIKKO)
Grey Wolves (Idealist Rightwing militant arm Alpaslan Turkes, Destruction of Communist Self-imposed
Hearths) of the disbanded Nation- Omer Baqci, groups; pan-Turanism, or unity inactivity
alist Action Party; neo- Ali Batman, of all Turks including those in
fascist Oral Celik, neighboring countries; armed
Hasan Taskin assaults on leftist militants
Kurdish Liberation Kurdish separatism con- Abdullah Ocalan Unity of all Kurdish groups and Unknown
Army (KLA) or "Apocu- taining both pro-Soviet formation of a people's dictator-
lar" and pro-Chinese ele- ship in an independent Kurdish
ments state; undertakes propaganda
and armed assaults
Kurdish Democratic Kurdish separatism Unknown Same as above Unknown
Party
Labor) Party (KWP)
Rizgari
n The Turkish Government indicated a year ago that about half of
these groups remain active in some fashion. The organizations
listed represent either the most active and violent groups in
existence today, or those which we believe have the potential of
Foreign support of Turkish, Kurdish, and Armenian
militants is a serious concern for the Turkish Govern-
ment. Damascus is one of the main culprits
providing money and weapons to Islamic-oriented
groups in Turkey. Both countries presumably hope to
weaken Turkey's ties with the West, particularly with
the United States and Israel, and support the growth
of Marxist or Islamic groups.
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Secret
We believe the Soviets also lend support to proscribed
Kurdish and Turkish groups. Although there is limit-
ed information about Soviet activities in Turkey,
Turkish officials are convinced that Moscow plays a
The general sparsity of information is
attributable, we believe, to Soviet reliance on interme-
diaries to provide discreet assistance to Turkish mili-
tants. Bulgaria and Syria
They, in turn, probably
rely on well-established smuggling networks and
Kurdish infiltration routes across the southern border.
In our view, however, these operations are not critical
to the survival of leftist groups because Turkish
militants appear to have sufficient indigenous re-
sources at their disposal (see inset, "Soviet Perspec-
tives on Turkish Terrorism").
The Kurdish problem is the one most susceptible to
foreign manipulation, given the predominance of eth-
nic Kurds in southeastern Turkey and their cross-
border ties with compatriots in Syria, Iraq, and Iran
Reports earlier this year from
a contact of the US Consul in Izmir
indicate that Kurdish organizations have become
more active. Army officers reportedly also have be-
come more concerned of late about the Kurdish
problem, especially because of Baghdad's decision
earlier this year to grant limited autonomy for Iraq's
Soviet officials no doubt viewed the breakdown of
public order in Turkey in the late 1970s as a political
opportunity, but Moscow's overriding interests in the
country are not necessarily served or promoted by
terrorism. Moscow must balance the benefits of
weakening a key NATO ally through terrorist activi-
ty with the risk of provoking a violent, rightwing
reaction or the intervention of solidly pro-Western
officers. To be sure, Moscow would derive some
benefit from the strains likely to arise between an
authoritarian regime and Turkey's allies, but in the
past the Soviets have clearly shown their dislike for
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press reports and government announcements, in mid-
August Kurdish guerrillas launched raids in several
towns in eastern Turkey. Several gendarme officers
were killed or wounded.
military rule
We believe Soviet influence over Turkish militants is
limited. Despite their avowed link to Lenin, most
Turkish groups appear to have more in common
ideologically with Mao and Marcuse. Turkish terror-
ist groups feature rapidly shifting and charismatic
leaderships and a predilection toward action instead
of the establishment of a broad basis of support
within the labor movement. These factors help ex-
plain why the pro-Soviet Turkish Communist Party
remains a marginal factor in the country's politics.
Throughout its 60 years of existence as an illegal
party, the TKP has focused its efforts on unifying
divergent leftist parties as a cover for its own activi-
ties. The latest version of this approach is an attempt
to unite Turkish workers in West Germany. The
strategy has failed to produce any significant elector-
al support or control over antisystem movements.
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Still, the Turkish Communist Party and the Soviets
have enjoyed a certain degree of success in influenc-
ing Turkish public attitudes. The key targets of the
Soviets are the nonviolent, left-of-center elite, includ- 25X1
ing writers, intellectuals, some student leaders, and
labor bosses. In turn, these Turks have promoted
Communist ideas, if not always identification with
Moscow. It is to this general group of Turks that
Moscow probably looks as the best hope for enhanc-
ing Soviet manipulation.
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Police Capabilities
The ability of the security forces, and particularly the
police, to cope with the threat posed by terrorism will
be crucial to the Ozal government. The Turkish
National Police, which has primary responsibility for
internal security, was discredited by its failure to put
down extremist violence in the 1970s. As a first step
in its rehabilitation after the 1980 military interven-
tion the NSC disbanded
competing leftist and rightist police unions and
purged extremists within police ranks. Officers with
poor records and a history of political activity were
exiled to outposts in eastern Turkey. The NSC also
equipped the police with better weapons and obligated
more financial resources to the TNP in order to
improve housing and discourage influence peddling
(see inset, "Turkish Police").
In perhaps the most significant change
NSC appointed Army officers to
administer police training programs. While this has
made some policemen unhappy, it has also tended to
foster greater cooperation between police and Army
officers, and the training programs' emphasis on
commando techniques has improved the TNP's ability
to operate in the rugged, rural areas where terrorism
has shifted to avoid urban dragnets.
The development of better communications between
TNP headquarters in Ankara and the provinces al-
lows more efficient and timely dissemination of infor-
mation on terrorist groups.F __1
While substantial progress has been made to rebuild
the TNP since 1980, it is still hindered by material
The Turkish National Police (TNP) and the gen-
darme have primary responsibility for law enforce-
ment in Turkey. The TNP has 90,000 to 100,000
personnel devoted to maintaining order in urban
areas. It conducts antiterrorist sweeps, antismuggling
operations, security investigations, and penetrations
of extremist groups and is responsible for surveil-
lance of foreigners in collaboration with the intelli-
gence service. The TNP is subordinate to the Interior
Ministry, and its key officials are appointed by the
Prime Minister with the approval of the President.
The key role played by Evren and the military's role
in reshaping the organization, plus the continuance of
martial law, give the military considerable influence
over the TNP. Chief officials include Saffet Arikan
Beduk, director general, and Rennan Gurman, deputy
director.
TNP.
The 125,000-member gendarme is responsible for
maintaining order in rural areas and villages, guard-
ing prisons and major industrial installations, and
protecting the country's frontiers. Unlike the TNP,
the gendarme's involvement in intelligence and inves-
tigative activities is limited. Although the gendarme
falls under the responsibility of the Interior Ministry
in peacetime, the Turkish General Staff would take
control in wartime. New laws also make the General
Staff responsible for training and educating gendarme
personnel. Because its leaders have always been
Army officers-General Celasun of the President's
Council was one of the five members of the former
National Security Council-and its personnel consist
exclusively of soldiers, the military has more infor-
mal power over the institution than it has over the
and personnel shortcomings
espite a itiona un mg, t e police
have not fully recovered from the traumatic 1970s.
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tage on occasion.
TNP opponents. The militants' access to sophisticated 25X1
Western weapons also puts the police at a disadvan-
police to scatter their resources. In addition, Turkish
terrorists are highly motivated and by and large
appear to have a higher level of education than their
that local forces had been penetrated
ed entirely by the Izmir police because of concerns
There are indications, too, that radical officers still
exist within TNP and military ranks. The US Consul
in Izmir reported in February that a large-scale police
sweep through several Aegean provinces was conduct-
TNP officers were dismayed
In our own view, it is questionable whether the police
can gain the upper hand over terrorism, both because
of their own shortcomings and because of the inherent
advantages of extremist groups in this kind of strug-
gle.' The lack of cohesiveness and homogeneity among
Turkish terrorist groups-their small size, highly
personalized organization, and tight cell structure-
makes them extremely resilient. The fragmentation of
leftist extremists into more than 50 groups-not all of
which engage in violent activities-also forces the
groups is virtually nonexistent.
that the militants appeared to have had warning of
the police raids. About 500 military officers reported-
ly have been tried in military courts since 1980 for
political activity, and retired and active duty military
officers have been arrested for membership in Marxist
groups such as the "Third Way" and the "Union of
Young Kemalist Officers." Information on these
Ozal, Evren, and Security Prerogatives
The Ozal-Evren relationship, which has never been
entirely cordial, will be a critical factor in determin-
ing the ability of the government to deal with internal
security problems. At present, there are no apparent
problems. Ozal has a solid majority in Parliament and
an established working relationship with Evren. The
two men have similar philosophical outlooks, and they
appear to have an informal arrangement whereby
Evren takes a greater degree of responsibility for
foreign and security affairs, while Ozal concentrates
on economic policy. According to press reports, Evren
chairs monthly meetings of the new National Security
Council consisting of Ozal; the ministers of defense,
interior, and foreign affairs; the chief of the General
Staff; force commanders; and the commander of the
gendarme.
We expect the formulation of internal security policy
to become progressively more difficult as Ozal's politi-
cal imperatives come into conflict with Evren's inter-
est in security and in maintaining the authority of the
military. Ozal probably will want to gain a greater
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degree of control over the national and local bureauc-
racy as a means of strengthening his hold on power
and ensuring that his controversial economic policies
are carried out. Evren, on the other hand, will proba-
bly oppose any such effort, especially if it involves the
removal of former military officers serving, for exam-
ple, as provincial governors.
An early test of the Ozal-Evren relationship could
come through the issue of amnesty for prison inmates.
Opposition parties in parliament have advocated the
release of sizable numbers of prisoners to deal with
overcrowded jails. Evren and other military leaders
are firmly opposed, and Ozal has been reluctant to
take a clear stand. In our judgment, Ozal's sympa-
thies probably are with his fellow politicians; we
believe there is a better-than-even chance that he will
eventually propose some limited form of pardon for
juveniles and nonviolent offenders as a compromise.
Even this could cause unease among the military.
Outlook
In our judgment, the most likely outlook for Turkey is
a gradual resurgence of terrorism and violence. The
government under the best of circumstances will be
unable to eliminate the deep-seated roots of violence.
As importantly, it may not be able to convince the
public that headway is being made since strains are
likely to emerge in the Ozal-Evren relationship, creat-
ing uncertainty within the bureaucracy. Tensions
between Ozal and Evren could also conceivably sap
the dynamism of the antiterrorist effort. Both are
strong-willed men, and Ozal clearly is intent on
asserting his own authority.
and Evren's mandate runs until 1989.
While we expect a gradual worsening of the terrorist
problem, we do not expect the problem to become so
severe over the next one to two years as to threaten
political stability in Turkey. Martial law remains in
effect throughout most of the country, and the gov-
ernment and security forces have ample authority to
take action under new laws. The powers and authority
of the president are, in our judgment, the best assur-
ance of a strong government approach to the problem,
Even a modest revival of terrorism, however, could
pose fresh risks for US personnel in Turkey. In the
year or so before the military takeover, several US
servicemen were killed by Marxist terrorists.
Because the United States was perceived as a
staunch supporter of the former military government,
we believe Turkish militants could well attempt to
exact revenge by seeking out US personnel. Such
incidents would provide them with a great deal of
propaganda and a way of demonstrating the new
government's weaknesses. We also believe there is an
increasing threat from non-Turkish terrorists entering
the country from neighboring Arab countries.
Broader US interests will be damaged if Turkey
proves unable over the longer term to master the twin
challenges of the return to democracy and the sup-
pression of terrorism. A revival of terrorism and
political instability would again produce some of the
political vacillation that characterized Ankara's for-
eign and domestic policies during the 1970s and make
it less willing to support US policy in the region.
Moreover, if Turkey reverts to authoritarian means to
deal with terrorism, relations with its allies would
suffer because of the setback to democratic develop-
ment, and its ability to play a constructive role in the
defense of Europe would be weakened.
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