THE NEW WEST GERMAN NATIONALISM: CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00316R000200040005-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
and Implications
The New West German
Nationalism: Causes
EUR 84-10141
July 1984
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence 25X1
The New West German
Nationalism: Causes
and Implications
This paper was prepared by
Office of European Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Western Europe Division,
EURA,
Secret
EUR 84-10141
July 1984
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and Implications
The New West German
Nationalism: Causes
Key Judgments The West German Government is coming under growing domestic pressure
Information available to pursue "German interests" in its foreign and security policies. This
as of 6 July 1984 pressure is the result of increased East-West tensions and changing popular
was used in this report.
perceptions of the two superpowers, as well as of social and generational
changes. The effects, exacerbated by the INF debate, have been most
apparent in the Kohl government's active intra-German policy, its demand
that all prospects for arms control and East-West dialogue be explored, and
its efforts to promote greater European integration.
Despite this new assertiveness and a deepening of neutralist sentiment, we
do not believe there is any significant movement under way now toward
withdrawal from NATO. The leadership of the governing parties and the
Social Democratic opposition firmly endorse NATO membership. Indeed,
polls suggest most West Germans believe their government should assert
its sovereignty within the Alliance, seeking a role there equivalent to that
of the United Kingdom and France.
At the same time, we sense a greater public dissatisfaction with West
Germany's perceived lack of control over its destiny and with its uncertain
national identity-both the result of its continuing status as part of a
defeated and divided nation along the border between East and West. With
most polls showing about one-third of the general population, and a much
higher proportion of younger West Germans, sympathetic toward neutral-
ism, there is some serious question about West Germany's longer term
reliability as an ally. Some of the Kohl government's new assertiveness and
patriotic rhetoric is designed to prevent the transformation of these
sentiments into an active political movement. Specifically, the government
hopes to create a greater identification with Western Europe by promoting
closer European cooperation and to demonstrate that promotion of intra-
German relations is compatible with membership in NATO.
The Kohl government's intra-German policy is aimed above all at keeping
open the longer term prospect for reunification by promoting cross-border
contacts and sustaining a sense of national awareness, especially on the
part of younger Germans. Few West Germans expect reunification any
time soon, and the Kohl government is determined that nothing it does in
the intra-German field will lessen its commitment to the West. Still,
Bonn's high political stake in the intra-German relationship raises the cost
of breaking it off and increases the risk that it will eclipse or conflict with
some policy goals of higher priority to NATO Allies.
iii Secret
EUR 84-10141
July 1984
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We believe the new assertiveness reflects underlying changes in German
society. Some changes-such as the heightened concern about West
Germany's limited sovereignty evident in the long INF debate-may not
be permanent and could wane with an improvement in East-West relations.
Others, rooted in more permanent factors and societal changes, include
West Germany's increasing real national power relative to its neighbors
and the coming of age of generations with less understanding of the
constraints that have governed West Germany's international behavior
until now.
West Germany's belated readiness to be assertive in pursuing its perceived
national interests could be healthy. It could help root West Germany even
more firmly in the West, depending on how the Allies react to accepting
the Germans as an equal partner and the extent to which Washington,
London, and Paris accommodate Bonn's motives, interests, and fears.
Over the longer term, however, West Germany will remain subject to
strong and conflicting pressures that will affect its fidelity to the Western
Alliance. This fidelity could weaken whenever West Germany feels
isolated from its Western partners or if the Allies are seen as wanting to
perpetuate West Germany's postwar subservience. Moreover, the Soviet
Union, which holds a fundamental key to the solution of the "German
problem," will continue to give top priority to undermining West German
loyalty to NATO. Although even an alienated West Germany is not likely
to turn to the East, it could well enter a period of domestic political
realignment that would leave governments in Bonn less decisive and
predictable.
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Contents
West Germany's Limited Sovereignty 7
Government Tactics Regarding Nationalism 15
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The New West German
Nationalism: Causes
and Implications
Forces of change are at work in West Germany that
could have substantial implications-positive and/or
negative-for NATO and the United States. Observ-
ers of the German scene differ sharply in their views
of what is going on. Some see leftist neutralism as the
wave of the future, while others-pointing to polls
showing continued strong support for NATO mem-
bership-argue that little is changing and there is
nothing to worry about. Reality almost certainly lies
somewhere in between. West Germans definitely are
becoming more assertive, or "nationalistic." And the
Kohl government's patriotic rhetoric and aggressive
pursuit of improved intra-German relations have in-
creased concerns about the extent to which the Allies
can count on Bonn in the future.
This assessment presents our preliminary views on the
causes and implications of the new German assertive-
ness. It is intended both to alert and to spark further
discussion of this significant issue.
The specter of German nationalism still haunts many
people inside and outside Germany. West Germans
since 1945 have accepted that the pathological nation-
alism of the Nazi era was responsible for the destruc-
tion of Germany's cities, the end of the national unity
Germany belatedly and painfully acquired in 1871,
the loss of Germany's sovereignty, and Germany's
occasional treatment-subtle and otherwise-as an
international pariah. West Germany's educated pub-
lic and governing elite remain sensitive to the fact that
both Western partners and neighbors to the East
begin to worry at each hint that the "German dis-
ease" is recurring.
In our view, the national assertiveness that is increas-
ingly visible now in West Germany is not the brand of
nationalism that existed before and during the First
and Second World Wars. Except for increased inci-
dents of violence against foreign workers, nationally
focused emotions have not produced a significant
resurgence of political extremism either on the right
or left. The new nationalism does not espouse racist or
religious views, nor does it aim to extend Germany's
borders through use of military force. For much of the
political spectrum, it does not even posit German
reunification as a realistically achievable goal. Few
West Germans publicly advocate reunification of all
Germans in Central and Eastern Europe; most ac-
knowledge that even a more limited reunification of
East and West Germany within their present geo-
graphic boundaries is hardly achievable.
Three Types
The new nationalism is not a unified phenomenon. We
see three distinct elements, each with a different set of
constituencies. All three elements, however, raise
issues of independence and sovereignty, convey some
degree of distance from the United States, and em-
phasize German interests-mainly relating to East
Germany-that the United States is perceived as not
sharing.
Neutralist Nationalism: Support for a Neutral Ger-
many in Central Europe. Proponents of neutralism
generally argue that West Germany should withdraw
from NATO and that all nuclear weapons and foreign
troops should be removed from German soil. Some see
a reunited, neutral Germany; others advocate a neu-
tral status for the Federal Republic alone, if neces-
sary. The underlying assumption is that a neutral
Germany would improve prospects for reunification
and make a war on German soil less likely. Some
West German peace movement activists, including
elements of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), have
sought to make common cause with counterparts in
East Germany. For example, these activists heralded
their common opposition to INF deployments as a
unifying force between the two Germanys.'
' The perception that opposition to INF could serve as a unifying
force led a group of West German leftists and East German
nonconformists in the fall of 1981 to draft a joint letter to Soviet
President Leonid Brezhnev on behalf of a neutral, united Germany.
The letter was widely publicized as a unique step in cooperation
between political minorities in the two Germanys. The East and
West Germans were drawn by the unifying notion of common or
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Figure 1. Social Democrat
Oskar Lafontaine and His
Book Fear of the Friends. In
this book published last sum-
mer, Lafontaine claimed that
the nuclear strategy of the su-
perpowers was undermining the
basis for existing alliance sys-
tems, and he advocated West
From the standpoint of influencing West German
policy, this form of nationalism-loosely called leftist
or neutralist nationalism-is, in our view, the weakest
of the three. Polls indicate it is advocated in its purest
form-West Germany's immediate, unilateral, and
unconditional withdrawal from NATO-by a rela-
tively small minority almost entirely on the left of the
political spectrum. Some elements of the politically
insignificant neo-Nazi rightist fringe also advocate
this viewpoint.
Many proponents of neutralism in a broader and more
theoretical sense appear to be German intellectuals;,
German intellectualism traditionally has included a
strong strain of idealism. The antinuclear Green
Party, which won seats in the Bundestag for the first
time in the national election of March 1983, appears
to be particularly influenced by this sentiment. Its
national congress this March was held under the
slogan "Peace treaty, nonalignment, neutrality-out-
look for a policy of peace." 2 Still, to the extent that
Green positions have had an impact on policy, it has
been more on environmental than security issues. We
also believe that the party's continued electoral suc-
cesses at the state level can be attributed more to
public concerns about the environment than a desire
for a neutralist foreign policy course.'
3 The position of the Greens on NATO appears to have changed
during the past year but still remains unclear. The Greens original-
ly favored dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact as a long-
term goal following achievement of an East-West accord. At their
most recent national congress, however, the Greens adopted a
motion calling for West Germany's withdrawal from NATO,
apparently without tying it to dissolution of the pacts. An EMNID
poll in late 1983 indicated that, given a choice between NATO
membership and neutralism, a considerable minority of Green
supporters-37 percent-favored NATO membership and 59 per-
cent favored neutralism.
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Table 1
Deploy or Withdraw From NATO?
"Assume we only have a choice of withdrawing from NATO or
installing the new American missiles. What should we do: With-
draw from NATO or install the missiles?"
Total
Voter
Selected Voter Groups
Popula-
tion
CDU/
CSU
SPD
FDP
Green
Install the
new missiles
46
64
34
60
11
Withdraw
from NATO
22
9
30
13
73
Although some of the SPD rank and file certainly are
sympathetic to neutralism, the SPD leadership, de-
spite its recent leftward drift, continues to insist that
West Germany belongs in the community of Western
nations. The SPD resolution on security issues passed
at the party's congress in Essen in May reaffirms this
general commitment, although other aspects of the
resolution clearly run contrary to established NATO
positions. Moreover, the SPD-like the Kohl govern-
ment-agrees that reunification can take place only
within the context of a vaguely defined "European
peace order." The furthest any high-level SPD figure
has gone in advocating a change in West Germany's
status in NATO was the call of Saarbruecken mayor
and SPD executive committee member Oskar Lafon-
taine last summer for a unilateral withdrawal from
NATO's military wing. Lafontaine, however, was
criticized by most party officials. Nevertheless, SPD
rank-and-file frustrations sometimes manifest them-
selves in an ambivalence toward NATO. For example,
an Allensbach poll conducted at the height of the INF
controversy showed Social Democratic voters split
almost evenly when asked their preference if forced at
that moment to choose between deploying INF and
withdrawing from NATO (see table 1).
Poll results on neutralism vary greatly depending on
how the questions are worded:
? All recent polls indicate that a substantial propor-
tion of West Germans-30 to 40 percent-remain
receptive to neutralist appeals.
? Some polls indicate that among the population at
large, however, support for neutrality as an alterna-
tive to NATO was higher in the early 1960s than in
the 1980s.4
? EMNID polls conducted in 1980 and late 1983
showed a slight decline in neutralist sentiment-
from 34 to 32 percent-despite the ongoing INF
debate. The question was worded in terms of sup-
port for "membership in the Western defense alli-
ance" or, alternatively, support for "neutralism."
? Other polls show increasing suport for a neutral,
reunified Germany, provided its social system could
be determined in free and secret elections. A 1981
Allensbach poll (see table 2) showed that 53 percent
would support neutralism under these conditions.
These results suggest continued strong support for
reunification, but at the same time a strong attach-
ment to Western values.
In general, analysis of polling results indicates that
support for a neutralist option grows when the alter-
native is posed as "alliance with the United States"
rather than "alliance with NATO" or "alliance with
other Western states." We believe West Germans
favor the collective concept because it seems more
clearly defensive rather than offensive in nature and
less subordinate to the United States. The wording of
the Allensbach polls in table 2 also suggests support
for neutralism will increase if favorable conditions are
included, the issue is clearly hypothetical, and no
mention is made of Western security needs.
' Allensbach polls taken between 1961 and 1981 showed fluctua-
tions in those favoring neutrality over "military alliance with the
Americans": 1961-42 percent; 1965-37 percent; 1969-38 per-
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Table 2
Neutralism and Reunification
Question: "What do you think about the following proposal for
German reunification? Conditions for reunification are the follow-
ing:
? East Germany withdraws from the Warsaw Pact and West
Germany from NATO.
? The reunified Germany is to be neutral and not become a member
"German Interests ':? Support for a More Activist and,
if Necessary, Independent West German Role.6 In
many ways, this sentiment, loosely defined as nation-
alistic, is a return to a pattern of behavior characteris-
tic of most states. Long after recovering from their
defeat in World War II, the West Germans were
reluctant to assert themselves and appeared content to
play the role of "economic giant" while remaining a
"political dwarf." Clearly this is no longer true.
of either alliance. We believe that this strain of nationalism-the desire
? The reunified Germany can determine its social system in free "German
for Bonn to be more assertive in advancing and secret elections.
Would you welcome, or not welcome, German reunification under interests" (see inset, "What Are `German Inter-
these conditions?" ests?' ")-is the most broad-based nationalistic phe-
1978 1979 1980 1981 1981 nomenon in West Germany today. Its proponents
(Septem- (May) (June) (May) (Sep- cover the entire political spectrum from left to right.
ber) tember)
49 47 54 53
26 27 24 20
25 26 22 27
Although sentiment favoring reunification is real, we
believe its intensity remains low among the population
as a whole. Responses to questions on neutralism often
appear to reflect a mood rather than a driving politi-
cal force.' However, close analysis of the EMNID poll
conducted in late 1983 (see inset, "The Demographics
of Neutralism") raises considerably more serious
questions about West Germany's reliability as an ally
in the longer term. In marked contrast to other
segments of the population, the majority of West
Germans under 20 prefer neutralism to NATO mem-
bership while those in their twenties are evenly split
on the issue. Chancellor Helmut Kohl views this as an
urgent problem, and the government's assertiveness
and patriotic rhetoric in part are designed to defuse
these sentiments among the young.
' The ambivalence and confusion of attitudes on neutralism is
indicated clearly by an EMNID poll conducted in the fall of 1981.
In typical fashion, those surveyed at that time opted against
neutralism by a 63- to 35-percent margin. EMNID then asked
those who favored neutralism how they would regard the departure
of US troops from West Germany. Surprisingly, the largest
group-39 percent-would "regret" the departure of American
troops. Thirty-seven percent of "neutralists" were "indifferent"
whether the troops remained or left. Only 24 percent of "neutral-
ists" said they would "welcome" the departure of American troops.
Those who press for a neutral Germany also advocate
this sort of assertiveness as do those-including Kohl,
SPD Chairman Willy Brandt, Free Democratic Party
(FDP) Chairman Hans-Dietrich Genscher, former
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, and CSU Chairman
Franz Josef Strauss-who urge increased European
security cooperation as a means to strengthen West-
ern Europe's voice in the Alliance. This group also
includes leaders such as Strauss-as well as Kohl-
who argue that West Germany should be listened to
because it has proved its loyalty to the Alliance and no
longer should be punished for the Second World War.
Indeed, the public rhetoric across the political spec-
trum defining West Germany's role in the Alliance-
and public expectations of how Bonn governments
should act-would have been unimaginable only 10
years ago.
Opinion polls are not helpful in understanding this
form of nationalism. For example, one poll conducted
in 1982 showed that, when asked directly but in
general terms, only 24.7 percent believed West Ger-
many should play a more active international role.
Other polls, however, indicate strong public support
for an active intra-German policy and Ostpolitik,
thereby implying a more assertive international role.
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The Demographics of Neutralism
A poll conducted in December 1983 by the EMNID
Institute showed that West Germans favored NATO
membership over neutralism by 64 to 32 percent.
Four percent did not respond. Demographically, with
a few exceptions-most notably generational differ-
ences-support for NATO was in the 60- to 70-
percent range.
Age Group. The poll showed sharp generational dif-
ferences in support for neutralism. West Germans in
the 30-to-49 and 50-to-64 age brackets preferred
NATO membership by an overwhelming 3-to-l mar-
gin. Younger West Germans showed marked neutral-
ist tendencies. The 20-to-29 age bracket only narrow-
ly preferred NATO membership (46 to 44 percent),
while a majority in the category 19 and younger
preferred neutralism to NATO (52 to 48 percent). The
ratio of support for NATO over neutralism also
declines to 2 to 1 among those 65 and older who are
old enough to recall the period when Germany was
united.
Party Preferences. Not surprisingly, supporters of the
CDU/CSUfavored NATO over neutralism by a wide
79- to-18 percent margin. FDP support for NA TO-
at 65 percent paralleled the national average, while
support for neutralism-at 34 percent-was slightly
above the average. SPD voters favored NATO mem-
bership by a 57- to-39 percent margin, while the
Greens' preference was reversed by a 59- to-37 per-
cent margin
Religion. Religion does not appear to be a factor in
determining support for neutralism. Catholics were
only slightly more supportive of neutralism than
Regional Differences. The two conservative and rela-
tively prosperous southern states-Baden-Wuerttem-
berg and Bavaria prefer NATO by a strong 3-to-I
margin. North Rhine-Westphalia supported NATO
by a 63-to-34 percent margin-near the national
average. North Rhine-Westphalia is West Germany's
most populous state, is heavily industrialized and
unionized, and is an SPD stronghold. Support for
neutralism is only slightly higher in Hesse (36 per-
cent)-also governed by the Social Democrats-and
in West Germany's three city states, Hamburg, Bre-
men, and West Berlin (37 percent). The poll shows, in
general, that support for neutralism is higher in cities
with populations of more than 100,000. One anomaly
in the survey was that citizens of Rhineland-Palati-
nate and the Saar (they apparently were polled as one
unit) preferred neutralism to NATO by 51 to 45
percent. We cannot account for this discrepancy.
Rhineland-Palatinate has one 4f the highest concen-
trations of US forces of any state, but also is a CDU
stronghold. Hesse and Baden-Wuerttemberg also
have a large US military presence, but, according to
the same poll, strongly support NATO. The sparsely
populated Saar is experiencing serious economic dif-
ficulties, and the present CDU-FDP government prob-
ably will be replaced next year by the SPD.
Level of Education. Education does not appear to be
a significant factor in explaining neutralist sentiment.
West Germans with a higher level of education
(completed Abitur or university degree) are only
slightly more supportive of neutralism (35 percent)
than the national average
Protestants (34 versus 30 percent).
In any case, the Kohl government's rhetoric and
actions indicate to us it feels compelled to respond to
opposition charges that it is a stooge of Washington
and has not been doing enough to bring the two
superpowers toward an arms control agreement.
A Renewed Emphasis on "Germany. "The Social
Democrats generally avoided nationalistic rhetoric
during their long tenure in power. Although they were
assertive in describing West Germany's role between
the superpowers, the Social Democrats avoided talk of
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The term "German interests" is heard increasingly in
West Germany. Until recent years it was widely
assumed-or at least not publicly contradicted-that
NATO serves German interests. During the 1983
national election campaign, however, the SPD began
to discuss German interests in a manner strongly
implying that they are not always served by West
German membership in NATO or close association
with the United States, and certainly not by the dual-
track decision on INF. The SPD ever since has
accused the Kohl government of not protecting Ger-
man interests, and the Kohl government has felt itself
under pressure to prove otherwise.
Despite the lack of a clear definition of what German
interests are, we believe the West German view of
national interests can be inferred from public state-
ments by leaders of the major parties. They stem in
part from West Germany's economic and political
structure, as well as its unique geographic position on
the border between East and West. We believe these
perceived interests include:
? Protecting and maintaining West Germany's demo-
cratic way of life and territorial integrity.
? Preventing the outbreak of conventional or nuclear
war in Central Europe, either of which could
devastate West Germany.
a reunified Germany-or statements that Germans no
longer should feel guilty for Germany's past. Such
rhetoric by the Social Democrats would have caused
problems in relations with the East and, given the
SPD's suspect NATO credentials especially during its
last years in power, with its Allies in the West.
Kohl and the CDU/CSU consider themselves to be
trusted in the West and not bound by the same
constraints as the SPD. Since coming to power, the
Christian Democrats have sought in their rhetoric to
reemphasize the notion of the German "Fatherland."
Kohl has reinstituted the tradition, discontinued while
the Social Democrats were in power, of an annual
speech to the Bundestag on the "State of the Nation
in Divided Germany." Indeed, some of the Kohl
? Promoting and exploiting an open international
economy, because West Germany is heavily depen-
dent on imported raw materials and on external
markets for its products.
? Moving toward or, at least, keeping open the ulti-
mate goal of German reunification by working
toward improved intra-German relations and hu-
man contacts and by not yielding on Berlin.
? Pursuing a political dialogue and economic rela-
tions with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union,
with an eye to maintaining detente.
We believe there is broad agreement among the major
parties on what constitutes German interests and that
pursuit of these interests often involves style as much
as substance. In other words, to pursue German
interests successfully one has to be perceived as being
active on the international scene, no matter whether
one is producing results. German interests are being
successfully pursued if Germany is a focal point of
world attention and its advice actively solicited by
the superpowers. Even if the superpowers do not pay
attention, German interests can be successfully pur-
sued-from the standpoint of Social Democrats, at
least-if Washington views Bonn as a nuisance when
the West Germans disagree with US policy
government's statements have been unusually provoc-
ative. For example, shortly after coming to power,
Kohl accompanied British Prime Minister Thatcher
to Berlin and stated that for Germans "Berlin is not
just any other German state, but the heart of our
Fatherland." During his visit to Moscow last July,
Kohl complained to the Soviet leadership about the
continued division of Germany and Berlin. More
recently, Strauss proclaimed in a speech that "the
Free State of Bavaria is our homeland, the Federal
Republic is our just and democratic state, but Germa-
ny is our Fatherland." According to US officials in
Munich, Strauss received a standing ovation when he
added that it was "high time we stop apologizing to
others for our existence."
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Table 3
National Pride
Percent
Total 100
100 100 100 100
Definitely 42
36 35 29 37
Generally 34
40 41 41 41
Although few conservatives believe that reunification
is likely in the near future, they remain committed to
it as an ultimate goal. Many are worried by polls
showing a declining interest in the issue among
younger Germans. Current government leaders ap-
pear deeply concerned that this trend must be re-
versed if reunification is to be achieved at all in the
longer term. Indeed, in his most recent "State of the
Nation in Divided Germany" speech, Kohl empha-
sized that the "national question" should be dealt
with in West German schools, and he appealed to
parents, teachers, school administrators, and state-
level officials to "contribute to the strengthening of
national awareness." The Kohl government no doubt
also hopes that a renewed emphasis on "Germany"
will reverse a trend-especially pronounced among
younger Germans-toward declining national pride
(see tables 3 and 4). Moreover, by doing this, the
government believes it reduces its vulnerability to
charges it is not advancing "German interests."F--
For the time being, this notion of "Germany" will be
emphasized in public primarily by neutralist national-
ists and mainstream conservatives. The difference
between the two is that the former wish to leave
NATO, while the latter are partly motivated by a
desire to maintain popular support for the Alliance.
Although they share the Kohl government's concerns,
the Social Democrats have not used similar patriotic
rhetoric. Public comments by SPD leaders indicate
Table 4
Degree of National Pride by Age Group,
February 1983
Generally 42 40 40
Generally not 10 8 4
Not at all 5 3 1
Undecided 10 8 5
they think the conservatives' rhetoric sometimes dam-
ages prospects for improved relations with the East.
Indeed, the Social Democrats have sought to exploit
more extremist statements by conservatives question-
ing the permanence of the East German-Polish bor-
der, or advocating the rights of ethnic Germans in
Eastern Europe, as a sign that some in the
CDU/CSU are opposed to Ostpolitik.
We believe that West Germany's new nationalism
and assertiveness stem from the West Germans'
changing view of themselves, their role in the world,
and prospects for eventual reunification.
West Germany's Limited Sovereignty
A strong dichotomy exists in West Germany's atti-
tude toward its Western partners, especially the Unit-
ed States. On the one hand, the West Germans
occasionally express resentment over real and per-
ceived limitations on their sovereignty. On the other
hand, they have been sensitive to the slightest indica-
tion that the West is abandoning them. For instance,
although the West Germans by 1983 had come to
view INF deployments as a burden, there probably
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Figure 2. Peace Movement
Demonstration Against De-
ployment of INF in West Get-
would have been an outcry-especially among
conservatives-that Western Europe was becoming
decoupled from the US nuclear guarantee if NATO
had suddenly given up on plans to deploy.
West Germany's sovereignty is limited militarily and
politically. Some restraints, such as forswearing nu-
clear arms, are self-imposed, but most are limited by
international agreements. Moreover, Bonn's authority
over Allied forces stationed in West Germany is
incomplete, as is evidenced by periodic inquiries about
the nature of weapons already deployed on West
German territory. Some agreements still governing
the activities and disposition of Allied forces were
dictated to the West Germans before Bonn joined
NATO. At the same time, West Germany perceives
itself as bearing a disproportionate burden within the
Alliance. As West German leaders never lose an
occasion to point out, their territory, "the size of
Oregon," includes 400,000 foreign troops, the highest
concentration of nuclear weapons of any country,
NATO's only stockpiles of chemical weapons in Eu-
rope, and a dense network of airbases and military
Most West Germans realize that their country's
dependence on other powers for its security is unlikely
to change any time soon. And most realize that West
Germany will remain dependent on others because the
alternatives are unattractive. For example, there still
is almost no sentiment in West Germany favoring
development of an independent nuclear deterrent, the
only way most observers believe Bonn could effective-
ly renounce dependence on others. Even though this
dependent relationship partly derives from national
preference, we believe that Bonn frequently feels at a
disadvantage in bargaining with its Allies and that
there is a widespread feeling of vulnerability and fear
of being abandoned in a crunch
The dichotomy in West German thinking also is
apparent in attitudes toward Berlin. Bonn views West
Berlin as part of the Federal Republic, but at the
same time it recognizes the authority of the three
installations.
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Western protecting powers. Bonn must coordinate
almost all its activities regarding West Berlin with the
Allies-a task we believe they must regard as de-
meaning on occasion. In the past, for example, Berlin
governing mayors received lectures from the Allies on
how to behave in meetings with East German offi-
cials, and the Allies laid down strict conditions in
1981 for West Berlin's participation in the Soviet gas
project.
At the same time, the Allied commitment to Berlin is
of great symbolic and psychological importance be-
cause it helps reduce the West Germans' feelings of
vulnerability and isolation. US presidential visits are
especially important and are viewed as symbols of the
Western commitment to defend Germany and support
eventual German reunification.' Any hint of a Soviet
threat against West Berlin drives the West Germans
toward the United States. Indeed, Soviet appreciation
of this fact is, we believe, one reason why in recent
years Moscow generally has sought not to disrupt the
status quo in Berlin
Heightened Fears of War. The lengthy INF debate,
with its discussion about the dangers of nuclear war,
strongly reinforced West German concerns about the
limitations on their sovereignty and the degree to
which dependence puts West Germany at risk. Al-
though opinion surveys generally show a large major-
ity of West Germans continuing to favor a US troop
presence, one theme of the massive peace demonstra-
tion in October 1981 was that West Germany is an
"occupied country." Der Spiegel magazine, which
advocates a leftist neutralist nationalism, wrote in
1982 of a taboo against admitting that those who rule
the country are not really sovereign over questions of
war and peace. Egon Bahr, regarded as the SPD's
leading expert on arms control, emphasized at a
' It is an interesting phenomenon that responsible politicians still
regard it as politically imprudent to criticize US policies while top
US officials are in Berlin reaffirming the American commitment to
that city. For example, a major controversy erupted in September
1981 when the Young Socialists, the SPD's youth affiliate, decided
to participate in demonstrations against US security policies during
Secretary Haig's visit to Berlin. The Young Socialists' participation
was criticized even by media elements normally favorable to the
SPD. Genscher, who was looking for a good excuse to change
coalition partners, also sought to play up the issue. We believe he
could have-and probably intended to-use this issue to justify a
switch in coalition partners. He was undercut, however, when one of
the FDP's own youth affiliates also decided to participate in the
Protestant church gathering in June 1983 that West
Germany is not truly sovereign. This was a central
point during the INF debate, and many in the peace
movement even assert that Washington is forcing the
new "American" missiles on the West Germans and
other Europeans as part of a plan to limit any nuclear
exchange with the Soviet Union to Western Europe.
According to polls by the SINUS Institute, the
number of West Germans seeing both the United
States and the USSR as a danger to world peace
increased from 20 percent in 1980 to 38 percent in
1983. 25X1
The SPD's interest in removing nuclear and chemical
weapons from the two Germanys reflects in part, we
believe, a desire to increase West German control over
dangers that the Social Democrats believe could
emanate from the United States. But concerns that
West Germany does not control its own destiny also
increasingly are voiced by Christian Democrats. In a
meeting with Ambassador Burns last December, mod-
erate Christian Democrat Richard von Weizsaecker,
who became Federal President on 1 July, stated that
there is a perception among West Germans that too
many missiles are being deployed on too little territo-
ry in their country. In a speech to the Bundestag in
September 1982, von Weizsaecker spoke of the deter-
mining influence in Central Europe of "the two
leading world powers" in contrast with the frequent
"powerlessness among the Germans." As a variant of
this theme, Strauss remarked last August that West
Germany should share in any decision to fire US
intermediate-range missiles stationed in West
Germany.
West Germany's International Role
West Germany's foreign policy perspective is becom-
ing more complex, independent, and global. Until the
early 1970s, Bonn's foreign policy was notable for its
focus on strengthening and maintaining the Atlantic
Alliance and promoting European integration. Since
then, Bonn has pursued more actively improved rela-
tions with the East, as well as with the Third World.
We believe that what has taken place has been not a
lessening of Bonn's commitment to the West, or a
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move to a point somewhere between East and West,
but rather an overall increase in West German readi-
ness to exert its power in a broad array of internation-
al arenas. Less noticed during this latter period, for
example, has been the simultaneous strengthening of
West Germany's role in NATO and the European
Community, as well as its support for other European
integration initiatives such as coordinated defense
planning under the Western European Union (WEU).
Nonetheless, by 1980, West Germany had established
itself as a particularly important actor in East-West
relations and appeared to regard it as its duty to do all
possible to maintain detente.
The rise in West Germany's international activity has
been a function of its real economic power and its
increased importance as a NATO power, as well as
the emergence of an East-West detente during the
1970s that greatly enhanced West Germany's room
for maneuver. There were other reasons as well, in our
view, including:
? Declining confidence in Washington's leadership.
? A belief that a more independent foreign policy
would not endanger crucial ties with the United
States and its partners in the EC and NATO.'
? A belief that only West Germany has the incentive
to advance "German interests," especially efforts to
promote East-West German reconciliation.
The Social Democrats were extremely proud of their
international role, particularly in the later years of
their 13-year rule in coalition with the FDP. Schmidt
came to see himself as an "interpreter" between the
United States and USSR, and the SPD regarded
itself as having significant influence with both super-
powers. To some extent, the West Germans were
successful. In 1980, for example, Schmidt took credit
for convincing Moscow to give up its demand that
INF negotiations could not begin until NATO re-
nounced its 1979 dual-track decision. A year later,
Schmidt took some credit for persuading Washington
There still are limits to what the West Germans will do
internationally. Politicians in all major parties interpret the Basic
Law (constitution) as prohibiting West German military activity
outside the NATO area. Because of their reliance on the US
nuclear guarantee and on the United States, France, and the
United Kingdom for the security of Berlin, West German govern-
ments have been reluctant to criticize their Allies publicly. Even
today, when Bonn has a choice, it prefers to hide behind its
European partners rather than take the lead in disputes with the
Figure 3. Former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt.
West Germany's international prestige and influ-
ence expanded greatly during his period in office
from 1974 to 1982. (c NF)
to adopt the "zero-option" as its negotiating position
in the Geneva INF talks, and some in the SPD
justified their refusal to accept "automatic" deploy-
ments as a device to put pressure on both superpowers
to reach an agreement. The SPD also played a
significant behind-the-scenes role in the successful
transitions to democracy in Spain and Portugal in the
1970s. Brandt's public statement that Portugal is
democratic today because he "didn't give up on it
after the United States had" typifies the SPD's
confidence-a confidence that can sometimes cross
the line into arrogance-that it understands interna-
tional issues at least as well as the United States.
Former Defense Minister Hans Apel once cautioned
his fellow Social Democrats against acting as if there
are three superpowers-"the United States, the Sovi-
et Union, and the SPD."
One factor causing divisions in the SPD to surface
and lead to the party's agonizingly long departure
from power was the deterioration in East-West rela-
tions following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
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Soviet threats to Poland, and NATO's INF modern-
ization decision. Simple power realities suggested that
West Germany's room for maneuver would become
more limited under these circumstances, yet the So-
cial Democrats-reluctant to accept this-blamed the
United States for the deterioration in international
relations. The fact that they remained in power, and
therefore theoretically remained capable of prevent-
ing INF deployments in West Germany, increased
Moscow's stake in courting the SPD. And Moscow's
conciliatory talks with SPD leaders encouraged the
party to overestimate its role as a mediator between
East and West.
The SPD left a heritage. When the Christian Demo-
crats came to power in October 1982, they felt
compelled to demonstrate that they too could main-
tain a dialogue with the Soviets and were not subservi-
ent to Washington. Indeed, Kohl at one point spoke of
an "equal partnership" between West Germany and
the United States; Schmidt and Genscher, by con-
trast, had never spoken of more than a partnership
between the United States and Western Europe."
West Germany's improved standing has-at least for
the immediate future-changed beliefs in West Ger-
many about the role Bonn can and should play
between the great powers. In particular, fear of the
Soviet Union declined as West German leaders in all
parties came to perceive Soviet vulnerabilities, espe-
cially in the economic sphere. Their public and private
statements indicate that trust in and admiration of the
United States also fell as West German leaders came
increasingly to see weaknesses in US judgment, con-
sistency, and effectiveness. Public opinion polls indi-
cate these sentiments have been accepted by the
public at large.
' These perceptions of West Germany's role between the superpow-
ers were very evident during last November's Bundestag debate on
INF. On the one hand, Schmidt justified his refusal to support the
government's position on INF because of Kohl's alleged failure to
put adequate pressure on the two superpowers to accept an INF
arms control agreement based on the "walk in the woods" formula.
Representatives of the Kohl government countered that Bonn's
influence in Washington had increased because it is perceived as a
reliable ally. Indeed, Defense Minister Manfred Woerner enumer-
ated the large number of high-level meetings between US and West
German officials since Kohl had come to power. He also pointed
out that Washington had modified its negotiating position several
times while the Christian Democrats were in power, whereas it had
stuck to the "zero option" while the Social Democrats were in
Increased tension between Washington and Moscow
is hard for the West Germans to come to terms with
because detente has become a cornerstone of West
Germany's political philosophy. West Germans con-
tinue to believe that detente has won the general
acceptance of most West Europeans, as well as the
endorsement of NATO.10 Increased tensions have
tended to frustrate West German ambitions to pro-
mote East-West relationships in which German na-
tional interests-both political and economic-could
prosper.
Interest in Reunification
The Basic Law (constitution) of the Federal Republic
of Germany legally binds the West German Govern-
ment to pursue reunification. The Basic Law itself is
officially viewed as a transitory document, to be
replaced once reunification has been achieved. The
Federal Republic maintains that all Germans are
entitled to West German citizenship; East German
citizenship and sovereignty are not formally acknowl-
edged. Indeed, a major goal in East Germany's
relations with Bonn is to gain full acceptance of East
Germany's legitimacy. The East Germans constantly
press Bonn to acknowledge East German citizenship,
as well as to upgrade their respective permanent
representations in East Berlin and Bonn to embassies.
The CDU/CSU, FDP, and SPD agree broadly on the
most important aspects of the "German question":
? Bonn must refuse to recognize East German citizen-
ship or raise the level of bilateral diplomatic
representation.
? At the same time, Bonn must respect the Eastern
treaties of the 1970s, which normalized relations
between Bonn and Eastern Europe and ruled out the
use of force to change postwar boundaries.
10 The 1967 Harmel Report, named after the Belgian Foreign
Minister, defined the NATO Alliance's objectives as both the
maintenance of a military balance and the pursuit of East-West
detente. The West Germans were the main movers behind last
December's "Brussels Declaration" by NATO, which reaffirmed
these objectives.
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Figure 4. Symbol of Improved
Intra-German Relations. Chan-
cellor Kohl and East German
leader Honecker meet in Mos-
cow on the occasion ofSoviet
President Andropov'c funeral.
? Although reunification is unlikely any time soon, all
efforts must be made in the meantime to improve
the living conditions of East Germans and to pro-
mote human contacts and travel between the two
Germanys.
? Reunification, when it does come, must be peaceful
and based on self-determination.
? Ties between the Federal Republic and West Berlin
should be strengthened as provided for in the 1971
Quadripartite Agreement among the four occupying
powers.
This consensus has been evident in endorsements by
key SPD figures, including Schmidt and Bahr, of the
Kohl government's efforts to promote East-West
German reconciliation. On 9 February, the Bundestag
passed a resolution in which all parties except the
Greens confirmed the basis for Bonn's German poli-
cy. 11
" The first paragraph of the resolution read: "Our country is
divided, but the German nation continues to exist. We are not
strong enough to change this situation. But we must make it more
bearable. The only way to change it will be to create a permanent
Despite this overall consensus-or perhaps as a result
of it-the major parties recently have begun to com-
pete with each other over which is most effectively
promoting intra-German relations. The Social Demo-
crats, who in the past gained electorally because they
were seen as architects of the Ostpolitik, unexpectedly
have found themselves outmaneuvered by the Chris-
tian Democrats. To date, intra-German relations have
avoided the "ice age" promised by the East once West
Germany began INF deployments. There has been a
flood of West German visitors of all parties to East
Germany since last year, and a visit to West Germany
by East German leader Erich Honecker later this year
is planned. The East Germans also have been unusu-
ally cooperative in several difficult asylum cases, and
in the early months of 1984 East Berlin permitted
emigration to West Germany at a rate higher than
any since construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961.12
" In early May, it became clear that the East Germans were
reducing the emigration outflow, and Bonn officially protested East
German harassment of visitors to the West German permanent
representation in East Berlin. Still, both sides emphasized their
desire that overall bilateral relations not be disrupted. Bonn had
expected all along that the emigration wave would have to be
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niecrer
Table 5
West Germans Satisfied With
Present Conditions
Question: "When do you believe things have gone best for Germany
during the 20th century?"
1951
1959
1963
1970
1980
Total
100
100
100
100
100
The present
2
42
63
81
80
1933-39 (pre-WW II
Nazi period)
42
18
10
5
3
1920-32 (Weimar
period)
7
4
.5
2
2
Before 1914 (the
monarchy)
45
28
16
5
4
The West Germans, for their part, appear ready to
provide additional loans to East Germany, and West-
ern bankers generally assume that West Germany's
financial umbrella over East Germany makes the
latter a safe lending risk.
Adopting a National Identity. West Germans are
loyal both to the Federal Republic and to a larger
German nation. All signs suggest that West Germans
have accepted the Federal Republic as their state and
are in the main satisfied with it. Eighty percent of
respondents to an Allensbach poll in 1980 said "things
have gone better" for Germany now than at any
previous time in this century (see table 5). Another
poll conducted in 1980 showed over 95-percent ap-
proval of the West German political system. A series
of Allensbach poll results indicates that many West
Germans have come to perceive their country as
"Germany."" Polls also show very little sympathy for
the East German regime and for Communism in
general.
" Allensbach polls since 1972 show that a third of all West
Germans and the majority of young people prefer to call their
country "Germany." In sports events, for example, "Germany"
Other poll results can, however, be read as meaning
that West German national awareness and responsi-
bility include the Germans in the East. An INFAS
poll of 1978 showed 44 percent considered Germans
in East and West as members of one nation; 41
percent did not.'" Allensbach surveys of the past 10
years have shown reunification as receiving continued
support but low in priority. These polls also show that
younger West Germans care less than their elders
about German unity (see table 6)
Political and Psychological Significance of Intra-
German Relations. Polls indicate that West Germans
place an extremely high-and increasing-priority on
improved intra-German relations. For example, ac-
cording to a SINUS Institute poll conducted in
August/September 1983, 86 percent of West Ger-
mans believed that increased tensions between the
United States and the Soviet Union should not stand
in the way of Bonn continuing talks and seeking
agreements between East and West Germany. This
represented an increase over similar surveys conduct-
ed in 1981 and 1982 (see table 7). The same survey
indicated that, by 1983, only 14 percent believed that
relations between West Germany and the United
States within the NATO framework should take
precedence over talks with the East Germans in the
event of increased superpower tensions. The survey
also showed that between 70 and 85 percent of the
West German public believes that regular meetings
between West and East German officials, increased
youth exchanges and sports events between the two
countries, and joint church conferences could lead to
improved relations.
The most tangible reason for public interest in im-
proved intra-German relations, especially in the hu-
manitarian field, is the number of West Germans
" INFAS concluded, however, that there is obviously some confu-
sion about what is meant by a "nation." The same poll indicated
that 73 percent do not regard East Germany as a foreign country.
Significant generational differences also were apparent on this
question: 59 percent of 18- to 24-year-olds did not regard East
Germany as a foreign country in contrast to 82 percent in the over-
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Table 6
German Sentiment
About Reunification
Percent Table 7 Percent
Talks With East Germany
"Do you want reunification very much, or is it not too important to
you?"
Want
Very
Much
Not
Important
No
Answer
30 to 44
56
37
7
45 to 59
73
20
7
60 and older
76
18
6
Relatives or friends in East
Germany
CDU/CSU
72
23
5
SPD
64
31
5
FDP
54
46
"Do you think that East and West Germany will ever reunite, or
not?"
Believe
They
Will
Do Not
Think
They Will
Cannot
Say
Total
13
62
25
16 to 29
7
69
24
30 to 44
11
67
22
45 to 59
14
60
26
60 and older
21
52
27
Relatives or friends in East
Germany
Yes, have some
17
65
18
No, have none
11
61
28
Political orientation
CDU/CSU
16
57
27
SPD
10
64
26
FDP
17
71
12
Question: "Relations between East and West Germany are also
dependent on relations between the two superpowers, the United
States and the Soviet Union. How do you think the Federal
Republic of Germany should behave if tensions between the United
States and the Soviet Union increase?"
"On this list are two different opinions. Which is closer to your
own?"
A. Even if relations between the United 72 72 86
States and the Soviet Union should lead to
increased tensions, the federal government
should continue to stay in touch with East
Germany and attempt to conclude agree-
ments between the two German states.
B. The federal government cannot contin- 26 27 14
ue negotiations with East Germany or
conclude agreements if tensions between
the two superpowers, the United States
and the Soviet Union, increase. In that
situation, relations between West Ger-
many and the United States within the
NATO framework take precedence.
However, we believe the pursuit of improved intra-
German relations remains important to younger West
Germans as well for less tangible and definable
reasons. We believe the psychological reasons for this
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Figure 5. First Success of
Chancellor Brandt's Ostpoli-
tik Signature of the Moscow
accords in 1970. F__~
stem from a desire to find an identity and to reduce
feelings of isolation during a period when European
integration appears to be faltering, East-West ten-
sions are high, and doubts exist about whether NATO
serves "German interests." Indeed, some young peo-
ple may see an active intra-German policy as a way to
reduce support for NATO by provoking West Germa-
ny's Allies-thereby demonstrating to the public that
the Alliance does not serve "German interests." For
example, Der Spiegel created a small furor when it
incorrectly reported last fall that Ambassador Burns
had intervened with the Kohl government against
guaranteeing any new credits to East Germany. We
believe the Kohl government, on the other hand, hopes
to use its active intra-German policy to demonstrate
both that it is pursuing "German interests" and that
the Alliance supports the notion of improved intra-
German relations-and eventual German reunifica-
tion.
Government Tactics Regarding Nationalism
Throughout the postwar period, West German gov-
ernments have sought actively to prevent either a
rebirth of the nationalism that led to Germany's
defeat and division or the emergence of a neutralist
nationalism that could weaken NATO. Concentration
on individual welfare, on an anti-Communist, anti-
Soviet ideology, and on aspirations to build European
institutions helped Bonn's early governments to divert
national frustrations concerning West Germany's lim-
ited status. Moreover, the United States was idealized
as a model society, and West Germans were grateful
for America's contribution to West German recon-
struction.
many and set the scene for current uncertainty.
These factors began to lose their effectiveness in the
1960s. Economic prosperity met its first checks, de
Gaulle placed French nationalism in the way of
supranational institutions in Western Europe, and, the
US Government increasingly insisted on the need to
explore possibilities of detente. Subsequently, US
involvement in Vietnam raised questions in West
Germany about the United States and its global role,
while the detente of the 1970s changed West German
views of Soviet motivations. The resulting shifts of
policy intensified differences of opinion in West Ger-
Solutions to West German national aspirations
through partnership with the United States continue
simultaneously to attract the West Germans and to
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Changing Positions of the CDU/CSU and SPD on
National Issues
The renewed preoccupation with national issues can
be clearly seen in the way the major parties coped
with the "Germany" question over the past several
years. As the SPD-FDP governing coalition moved
into the 1980s, aform of leftist nationalism gained
strength in the SPD, while conservative forces grew
dominant in the FDP. When the CDU/CSU entered
the government in 1982, it had to take responsibility
for the conduct of relations with the East-an issue
on which it had not been able to agree internally since
Willy Brandt challenged Konrad Adenauer's policies
in the 1960sJ
The SPD s internationalist and pacifist traditions
had made it suspect to nationalists throughout its
prewar history. Partly in reaction, and partly because
its roots were particularly strong in what is now East
Germany, in the postwar period it became the party in
West Germany that most emphasized all-German
identity and West German sovereignty in relation to
its allies. On the other hand, Adenauer's CDU/CSU,
successor primarily to the prewar Catholic Center
Party, represented the traditionally "national" mid-
dle class and peasantry. Partly in reaction to this
heritage, it became the party that most emphasized
commitment to the West and to multinational organi-
zations. Adenauer-whose views prevailed in the
CDU/CSU-maintained that reunification could
most likely be achieved through military alliance
with the West.
Both parties modified their positions over time. Fol-
lowing West Germany's acceptance of NATO mem-
bership, the CDU/CSU became loudest in demanding
German reunification and in insisting that Germans
in the East be able to claim West German citizenship.
Beginning in the 1960s, the SPD deemphasized reuni-
fication in order to permit reconciliation with the
governments in Eastern Europe and to promote con-
tact with East Germans. A July 1981 Allensbach poll
(see table 6) showed that fewer SPD than CDU/CSU
supporters cared greatly about reunification, or be-
lieved reunification would ever come about.
Brandt's Eastern policy was driven emotionally by
resentment of what he and his associates charged
were fundamental hypocrisies of CDU/CSU govern-
ments and of the United States. Adenauer and other
conservative leaders, in Brandt's view, demanded
reunification of Germany because they knew it could
not be achieved on terms West Germany could accept.
Brandt saw the demand as a way of evading any real
opportunities for changing relationships with East
Germany. He claimed that, although the United
States supported German unity in theory and word,
Washington wanted to maintain ties between the
Germans in East and West only to the extent neces-
sary for maintaining West Germany's reliability in
the Alliance.
Current SPD Stance. The present attitudes of key
SPD figures such as Brandt and Egon Bahr were
deeply influenced by the 1961 Berlin crisis. We think
Brandt and some others still privately suspect some
US-Soviet complicity in constructing the Berlin Wall.
Advocates of a neutralist nationalism periodically
have tried to prove that this was the case.
The SPD set the pace for West Germany's greater
assertiveness during its years in power. The party was
emotionally committed to its Eastern policy and was
especially distressed by the increase of East-West
tensions. Party functionaries at lower levels have
come increasingly to support neutralism and anti-
Americanism. After the party left government in 1982
and lost the election in 1983, the functionaries felt
freer to express their emotions and disregard prag-
matic considerations.
The increasing influence of neutralist nationalism in
the SPD has raised the question of whether the party
will reject NATO membership and either return to
power in a few years under demagogic, neutralist
leadership or lose credibility as a persuasive alterna-
tive to the CDU/CSU government. In the SPD's
executive committee, anti-NA TO views still are in a
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small minority. We believe the SPD is much more
likely to explore changes of relations and strategies
within NATO than to advocate or permit ending the
Alliance
Kohl's Perspective. The CDU/CSU has quarreled
internally for almost 20 years over policies toward
the East. Chancellor Ludwig Erhard fell from power
in 1966 in part because a strong faction of his party
perceived him to have subordinated West German
interests to those of the United States. Opinion
regarding relations with the East was divided be-
tween those who wanted to keep up a consistent anti-
Communist posture and those who wanted to explore
possibilities for detente. Arguments for detente drew
partly on a conviction that trade and credit could
change political relations between East and West.
Disunity over this issue remains a factor of discord in
the Kohl administration. As of last fall, Kohl was
criticized by both sides: on the one hand for his
accommodation of US policies on East-West rela-
tions, and on the other for his economic concessions
to the East Germans.
Kohl contends that he wants to place West German
emotions about the nation in a context that is
constructive to Western interests. His stated inten-
tions include:
? Increasing the pride of West German citizens in
being German; Kohl believes that through loss of
national pride the Germans have lost their moral
center.
? Heading off impulses, which he sees particularly
among educated youth, toward emphasizing Ger-
man interests and values with limited regard for
commitments to the Western Alliance and West
European integration.
? Maintaining the SPD policies of good relations with
the USSR and Eastern Europe while clearly reas-
serting the aspiration to reunification.
make them uneasy. Government spokesmen complain
about US failures of attention and coordination and
about the absence of a "German lobby" in US
politics. West German politicians of all parties make
clear their reservations about a close bilateral partner-
ship. We think they see it as antagonizing West
Germany's European friends and drawing West Ger-
many into commitments outside Europe. In addition,
we believe they have become increasingly aware since
the 1960s of the limits of US capacity to help West
Germany overcome the defects of its national status.
European Cooperation
Supranational cooperation in Western Europe-the
promotion of European integration-continues to be
Bonn's preferred way out of its national dilemma.
Participation in the European Community occasional-
ly has permitted Bonn to express its opposition to US
trade policies, for example, without endangering the
West German-US security relationship. And EC
foreign policy consultation has made enough progress
to give the Federal Republic a voice in issues about
which it has felt limited freedom to assert itself
unilaterally, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the
other hand, West German efforts to strengthen EC
institutions, including its foreign policy consultations,
have shown only limited success.
West German determination for tangible progress on
the European front, including in the defense sector,
has increased markedly since the onset of INF deploy-
ments. Kohl sees expanded European cooperation-
especially since it is supported by the SPD-as one
way to repair the damage done by the INF debate to
the longstanding consensus on security issues in West
Germany. The French-fearful that neutralist nation-
alism was becoming dominant in West Germany-
have taken the lead in advocating a revitalization of
the WEU as a forum for promoting cooperation on
European arms production and coordination of de-
fense policy. In contrast to its response to similar
overtures in the past, Bonn has reacted positively to
the French initiative. Indeed, Genscher was one of the
first advocates of foreign minister-level attendance at
a meeting of WEU defense ministers planned for
October.
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Figure 6. Chancellor Kohl and
French President Mitterrand.
Pushing for progress on the Eu-
A Delicate Balancing Act. The Kohl government's
push for greater European cooperation is related to its
simultaneous pursuit of improved intra-German rela-
tions. Kohl no doubt sees expanded European cooper-
ation as a way both to cement West German ties with
the West and to contain Western fears-particularly
on the part of the French, and even by some conserva-
tives in West Germany-of what might be going on in
intra-German relations.
We believe, moreover, that any Allied expressions of
suspicion over the Kohl government's intra-German
policy would weaken domestic support for NATO,
and we think the government has moved to head off
such a chain reaction. For example, in early February,
the CDU-affiliated Konrad Adenauer Foundation
sponsored a conference on intra-German relations in
Washington which was attended by high-level West
Germans, including the Minister for Inner-German
Relations. The conference, in the view of US observ-
ers who attended, was an obvious attempt to reassure
Washington officials that recent and future develop-
ments in intra-German relations would not detract
from Bonn's commitment to the West. Optimally,
Bonn would like Allied declarations-such as the one
issued following the 31 May NATO ministerial meet-
ing in Washington-to continue to endorse positive
developments in intra-German relations and the goal
The Future: More Active Pursuit
of "German Interests"
Some of West Germany's new assertiveness may not
last. For example, the heightened concerns about
West Germany's limited sovereignty and fears of a
superpower confrontation apparent during the long
INF debate have abated to some extent. On the other
hand, Bonn's more assertive stance in advancing
"German interests" is rooted in more permanent
factors and societal changes, including West Germa-
ny's real national power relative to its neighbors and
the coming of age of generations with less regard for
the constraints arising from the Second World War.
This, we think, is unlikely to change.
Indeed, West Germany's recognition that it has its
own national interests-and its readiness to pursue
them-probably represents attainment of political
maturity and a turn toward normalcy. Given that the
West Germans remain among the least sympathetic
of all Europeans to Communism as a social system,
this development could help to tie West Germany
even more firmly to the West, depending on how the
Allies react to the West Germans as an equal partner.
of eventual reunification.
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Efforts by the East To Exploit
German Nationalism
While the Kohl government is seeking to defuse
neutralist sentiment, the Soviets and East Ger-
mans-probably overestimating its magnitude-re-
cently have sought to exploit it to derail implementa-
tion of NATO's INF modernization decision. In the
fall of 1983, for example, according to press accounts
senior Soviet party officials
hinted to West Germans, for the first time we know of
since the I 950s, of possibilities for reunification and
for a German resolution of Berlin's status. The
Soviets' West German interlocutors-realizing that
Moscow does not desire a reunified Germany-re-
portedly recognized the Soviet gestures for what little
they were worth.
Press reports indicate Honecker has also emphasized
common German interests in apparent support of the
Soviet anti-INF campaign and in order to keep
Bonn's money flowing. The East Germans even have
taken domestic measures that appear to loosen con-
trol. The East Berlin regime has reacted only slowly
and in limited measure to its unauthorized peace
movement. It let the Evangelical Church hold major
rallies in connection with the "Luther year" in 1983,
and it continues to dismantle some border fortifica-
tions to give the appearance of reducing life-threaten-
ing measures against illegal border crossers. Al-
though no East German regime will allow relations
with Bonn to reach the point where its own control
and security are undermined, the current upbeat
mood of intra-German relations in the aftermath of
INF deployments appears not to accord totally with
Soviet desires. The extent to which the Honecker
regime's current opening to West Germany reflects
domestic political impulses or Soviet manipulation is
open to debate.
We believe the extent of West German restiveness-
and aggressiveness in pressing their case-will depend
on the degree to which:
? Frustrations over domestic economic and socio-
political problems make them more prickly in their
foreign relations.
? West Germans view close association with the Unit-
ed States as advancing their security.
? West Germans perceive possibilities for progress in
intra-German relations (if room for progress is
perceived, they will be aggressive in exploiting it).
? West Germans perceive opportunities for intensified
cooperation with their West European allies.
Specific moves-some already under way-serve as
indicators of the likely directions of West Germany's
greater independence. They include:
? Further large loans to East European countries,
including East Germany. The loans would have the
dual purpose of supporting West German trade,
industry, and financial institutions and of increasing
the interdependence between West Germany and
the Eastern countries.
? An increase in the West German role in arms
control discussions with the Soviets, the East Ger-
mans, and the other Warsaw Pact countries. Bilat-
eral discussions between West German and Eastern
Bloc specialists on arms control took place in 1983.
West Germany also is the ally that is pressing
hardest for Western initiatives in multilateral East-
West talks on confidence-building measures and
arms control. All the major political parties share
this interest. The West German Government's em-
phasis on confidence building is likely to limit West
German interest in seeking to influence the East on
other issues, such as human rights.
? An effort to overcome the formal limitations on
West German sovereignty dating from the immedi-
ate postwar period. This could lead to proposals that
would give Bonn the right to veto US transfer of
military personnel and equipment through West
Germany to zones of tension outside the NATO
geographic area. In the shorter term, West Germa-
ny has requested-and probably will receive final
approval before the end of this year-that the
remaining constraints in the WEU treaty on West
German conventional arms production be removed.
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Broader West German initiatives are possible in the
next few years. Some will be directed, for example,
toward further strengthening Bonn's voice in Wash-
ington or Europe's voice in NATO, especially regard-
ing nuclear weapons. But they also could be directed
toward further expanding the economic ties between
West Berlin and East Germany as a step toward
greater involvement by West Berlin and West Germa-
ny in determining West Berlin's future. Allied offi-
cials in West Berlin have interpreted meetings be-
tween West Berlin politicians and East German
officials as pointing implicitly in such a direction. In
German eyes, this would be a necessary condition for
reestablishing sovereignty and setting "German con-
trol of Germany's fate."
Major programs of national assertiveness, we con-
clude, would almost certainly be directed toward
improving relations with the East, with an eye to
finding a palatable solution to the problem of a
divided Germany. This assertiveness also would aim
at achieving either greater independence of the Unit-
ed States or partnership on more equal terms with it.
Such programs would require considered tactics and
sustained efforts-as was the case with Brandt's
Eastern policy. A conservative government would
start with one advantage-it probably would have the
support of the political opposition. But, it might have
to overcome significant internal differences among its
own constituents before it could maintain any such
program
While not sharing the more alarmist views evident
particularly in France, we believe that developments
in intra-German relations need to be monitored care-
fully. The Kohl government does not appear to have
an overall concept as to how to conduct the relation-
ship, but rather appears to be taking advantage of
situations as they arise. Its eagerness to expand this
relationship-and the fact that the East German
regime understands this-makes it likely that the
West Germans will give much more than they receive.
Although West German concessions are most certain
in the economic area, to an increasing extent they
may entail political equities. For example, meetings in
East Berlin between West German (including West
Berlin) and East German officials raise status ques-
tions involving the Allies in that they weaken the
Figure 7. Illustrating the West Germans'Feeling Der Spiegel m
of Helplessness. "Things are not all bad. One
forest is dying (from acid rain), but another is
Western position that East Berlin is not the capital of
East Germany. Along similar lines, the West Ger-
mans are considering formalized relations between
the Bundestag and the East German Volkskammer,
which meets in East Berlin and-in violation of
postwar Allied agreements-includes deputies direct-
ly elected from East Berlin. These West German
actions are significant departures from past policy
even though it is difficult to determine how they
would result in real impairment of the Allied position
in Berlin. The West Germans also may compromise
on two of East Germany's most basic political de-
mands-adjustment of the Elbe River border and
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closure of the Salzgitter center which documents East An Example of West German
German human rights violations. This would have Sensitivity to Isolation
been politically unthinkable only a few years ago.
Although Kohl has no intention of allowing his pur-
suit of improved intra-German relations to interfere
with West Germany's NATO responsibilities, the
momentum of the intra-German relationship raises
the political costs of breaking it off. This could lead to
a weakening of West German support for certain
Alliance policies, especially if Bonn questions their
importance. For example, the Kohl government al-
ready has opposed the Air-Land Battle 2000 strate-
gy-an Alliance issue Bonn perceives as considerably
less important than INF-on the grounds that it
would cause public relations problems in West Ger-
many because it is viewed as an offensive strategy and
would entail fighting on East German territory.F_
The continued contradiction between West Germa-
ny's increasing national power and the constraints on
its sovereignty-historical, economic, and military-
also could lead to future problems for the Alliance.
We believe the greatest danger would be posed if the
West Germans came to consider themselves isolated
from their Western partners (see inset, "An example
of West German Sensitivity to Isolation"). This could
occur if West Germans came to believe that NATO
or the European Community were ignoring German
economic and security interests. A substantial in-
crease in intra-Alliance or intra-EC protectionism
that hurt the West German economy could be such an
instance. NATO blindness to increased West German
sensitivity regarding war damage to the eastern half
of the country could be another. To date, the West
Germans have not felt themselves isolated on any
important issue. For example, on the US-West Euro-
pean rift over the Siberian pipeline, they were allied
Prior to this year's London Economic Summit, Chan-
cellor Kohl was forced to deny, once the story became
public, that he had been excluded from the ceremony
at Normandy commemorating the 40th anniversary
of the D-day invasion. Kohl had hoped to be invited
as a further sign of West Germany's complete accept-
ance by the West, and feelers were sent out to Paris.
But the French, partly out of opposition from some
domestic groups, refused to invite him.
The rebuff to Kohl spawned considerable nationalis-
tic commentary. Foreign Ministry State Secretary
Alois Mertes, a conservative Christian Democrat,
warned that the D-day commemoration could turn
into "a day of alienation between Germany and its
Allies" if they generated the feeling in West Germany
that "Germans were a vanquished people or a nation
of guilty men between East and West. " He added that
the only beneficiaries would be pacifists and neutral-
ists who seek a "special German role between East
and West. "At the other end of the political spectrum,
a Green Party member stated that "the exclusion of
the Germans from the celebrations leaves the impres-
sion that this was a war not only against Fascism, but
against Germany. " A young student added, "Of
course it was good that the British and the Americans
and the French came and ended what was going on.
But now we are Allies. We are not accepted as Allies,
but we are still occupied."
French President Mitterrand did recognize the Ger-
man sensitivities during the commemoration. In his
speech, he was careful to distinguish between present-
day Germany and the regime the Allies had fought.
Moreover, Mitterrand and Kohl agreed to a joint
commemoration later this year of French and Ger-
with the British, French, and Italians.
If West Germany should become alienated to this
extent, we think the danger to the Alliance is not so
much that Bonn will look toward the East, but rather
that the legitimacy of the West German political
system could be undermined as the people come to
question the effectiveness of their leaders in further-
ing "German interests." The risks could grow over
time as West Germans become even less sensitive to
the constraints imposed on their country by its past.
man casualties at Verdun.
West Germany will need a continued string of talent-
ed politicians and diplomats to explain to new voters
why West Germany must shoulder the greatest bur-
den in the European Community and permit large
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stocks of nuclear weapons on their territory if Wash-
ington, Paris, and London increasingly are perceived
as falling short of accommodating West Germany's
particular problems, interests, and limitations.
To an extent, the rise of the peace movement and
Greens in West Germany, as well as the disorder
within the SPD, are a manifestation of this legitimacy
crisis and should serve as an advance warning of what
can happen. In those states such as Hesse and Ham-
burg, where the Greens have replaced the FDP as the
third-largest party and hold (or have held) the balance
of power, the formation of stable and predictable
governments has been impossible. A similar situation
could arise at the national level at some point in the
future
The Kohl government's strong pressure for arms
control talks indicates that it is sensitive to these
internal pressures. In the short term, if a West
German government came to believe that the West
(both the United States and Western Europe) was
ignoring its most fundamental interests-and that this
was having negative political and economic repercus-
sions within West Germany-it may choose to play on
the West's fears of Germany's perceived "historical
orientation toward the East" long enough to get
everyone's attention. Ironically, a conservative gov-
ernment might be more likely to pursue such a course
because of its lesser vulnerability to the charge that it
was jeopardizing West Germany's relationship with
NATO and the EC.
The continued division of Germany ensures that the
"German Problem" will not be settled any time soon.
Indeed, West Germany will be subject to strong
conflicting pressures, as it is the "big prize" in the
struggle between East and West. Influencing the
Federal Republic and its relations with the West will
continue to be the top priority of Soviet policy toward
Western Europe. For the time being, all indications
are that West Germany is politically stable and
remains firmly rooted in the West. West German
attitudes and society are changing, however, and its
longer term stability and complete fidelity to NATO
are likely to depend on the Allies' ability to adjust to
Bonn's more self-interested stance and to limit Soviet
opportunities for seductive meddling.
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