ITALY: THE QUEST FOR MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT
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Directorate of Coll 1
Intelligence
Italy: The Quest
for More Effective Government
An Intelligence Assessment
eonfidential
EUR 84-10115
June 1984
Copy 3 5 6
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Directorate of Confidential
Intelligence
Italy: The Quest
? for More Effective Government
An Intelligence Assessment
the Directorate of Operations.
Office of European Analysis. It was coordinated with
This paper was prepared by
EURA,
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Western Europe Division,
Confidential
EUR 84-10115
June 1984
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Italy: The Quest
for More Effective Government
Confidential
Key Judgments Although the weaknesses of Italy's governing system have long been
Information available identified, Italian politicians have only recently begun to give serious
as all April 1984 consideration to reforming the country's political machinery. The current
was used in this report.
system is characterized by:
? An electoral process that has encouraged a multitude of small and
medium-sized parties.
? A Prime Minister with only limited authority to impose discipline on his
large, unruly cabinet.
? Parliamentary procedures that hinder passage of even the most crucial
legislation.
? A policymaking process that too often produces "least common denomi-
nator" compromises on problems that require clear-cut action.
With Italy again experiencing severe economic difficulties-lagging 25X1
growth coupled with rising inflation, unemployment, and deficits-there
has been a growing public demand for more effective government. Prime
Minister Craxi and his Socialist Party have taken the lead in proposing re-
forms, but all of the major parties-with varying degrees of conviction-
are calling for some reform. Since Craxi took office last summer, the major
parties have, in fact, agreed to some small but significant changes. These
include:
? An "inner cabinet" composed of major ministers and party leaders to
facilitate decisionmaking.
? Restrictions on the use of some legislative devices in the Chamber of
Deputies-such as secret votes-that are often manipulated to disrupt
governing coalitions.
? A tightly structured, 45-day parliamentary session for key budget and
finance legislation specially designed to avoid committee. delays or
prolonged filibustering in the Chamber.
In a country as tradition bound as Italy, even such a limited and tentative
willingness to alter the system amounts to a significant change in political
thinking. In addition to reflecting a desire to deal more effectively with the
problems of the moment, it probably also stems from a growing conviction
that Italy's politicians have tried most of the options available under the
present rules and found them wanting. Although much of the impetus for
change has come from Prime Minister Craxi, we believe there is now
enough interest in institutional reform to keep the issue alive beyond his
tenure as Prime Minister.
Confidential
EUR 84-10115
June 1984
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Confidential
We nonetheless expect that further progress will be slow and incremental
and will depend primarily on whether the main parties see changes serving
their practical interests. If basic political attitudes continue to change, we
believe the propensity of the parties to adopt more far-ranging changes will
grow. Some of the ideas being debated include:
? Requiring a certain minimum share of the popular vote for representa-
tion in the Parliament; for example, a 5-percent threshold, as in West
Germany, would eliminate nine of the 14 parties now represented.
? Giving the Prime Minister authority to choose and dismiss ministers at
will rather than accepting the nominees of his coalition partners.
? Instituting a "constructive" vote of no-confidence, again as in West
Germany, which would force politicians to agree on an alternative
government before bringing one down.
? Moving toward functional specialization of the two houses of Parliament,
which would lessen redundancy and opportunities to delay, change, or kill
legislation.
Such reforms would not revolutionize Italian politics, but they would go far
toward consolidating the party system, bolstering the authority of the
Prime Minister, and limiting the scope for parliamentary obstructionism.
Any progress in that direction would, in turn, reduce the risk of social
unrest and instability and make politicians less dependent on Communist
assistance in making the system work. None of this would be a guarantee
against Communist membership in the cabinet-and could not be if
proponents of reform are to win the Communist acquiescence their plans
almost certainly require. But, in our view, the increased governmental
efficiency that could result would, over the long term, be the most effective
antidote to the protest movement that has swelled Communist ranks in
Confidential iv
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Contents
Key Judgments
Introduction
Roots of the System
Weaknesses of the System
S. Multiparty Structure
Parliamentary Procedures 3
A Changing Political Culture? 4
The Socialists 5
The Communists 6
Prospects for Further Change 8
Implications 10
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I. onuaentiai
Italy: The Quest
for More Effective Government
Introduction
Reform of Italy's political institutions has only recent-
ly become a matter for serious attention, even though
the weaknesses of the parliamentary system have long
been obvious. These weaknesses' include an electoral
system that has parceled out power among a welter of
small and medium-sized parties, an executive too
weak to lead, and a Parliament whose rules and
procedures inhibit the timely passage of even key
legislation. These weaknesses are widely. cited as a
major reason for the failure of successive governments
to cope with the country's persistent economic prob-
lems-flagging economic growth, a rate of inflation
well above that-of other major industrial countries, a
burgeoning government deficit, and high unemploy-
ment.
Most Italian political parties did not deal seriously
with the institutional reform question until the parlia-
mentary election last June when the Socialists suc-
ceeded in highlighting the issue. The election cam-
paign raised public consciousness about reform, and
since then the parties have cooperated enough to take
some initial steps toward changing the system. Their
ability and willingness to persist in renovating the
creaky machinery of government could prove crucial
to the long-term political and economic stability of
Italy.
This paper sets out the weaknesses of the present
system ' and examines the political parties' attitudes
toward reform. It reviews the extent of the reforms to
date and weighs prospects for further, more signifi-
cant reforms. Finally, it assesses the implications for
Italy-and the United States-of the success or fail-
ure of the reform movement.
and the extreme political disunity of the postwar
years. The postwar political fragmentation itself had
deep roots in Italian history and culture. Interparty
rivalry and intraparty factionalism, then as now, were
fueled not only by a wide spectrum of ideological and
regional differences but by an inordinate emphasis on
patronage in the distribution of political and economic
power.
To ensure the support of the diverse political forces
and to preclude return to authoritarian rule, the
system was deliberately biased toward a dispersal of
power. The Constitution was designed to make politi-
cal institutions reflect the diverse political forces in
Italian society. It provides for a parliamentary system
with many checks on the power of the governing
majority and few mechanisms to bolster it.
The cost in terms of government efficiency and
effectiveness was high, but the negative aspects of the
Constitution were not immediately apparent because
many of its provisions were not fully implemented
until the 1970s. To limit Marxist influence, the
Christian Democratic (DC)-dominated governments
of the late 1940s and early 1950s worked hard to
ensure that most decisionmaking power resided in the
cabinet rather than in Parliament. The Parliament
began to gain the central position intended by the
Constitution only after a gradual political depolariza-
tion, which began with the breakup of the Commu-
nist-Socialist Popular Front in the early 1950s and'
continued with the admission of the Socialist Party
(PSI) to the governing coalition in 1963. In the late
1960s and early 1970s, both the Socialists-who were
disappointed with their limited leverage in center-left
governments-and the Communists began to press for
greater fidelity to the letter of the Constitution and an
Roots of the System
Experts commonly trace the weaknesses of the Italian
political system to the 1948 Constitution, which was
drafted against the backdrop of the fascist experience
' Although there has been growing criticism of other national
institutions, such as the judicial system and the governmental
bureaucracy, the scope of this paper is limited to political institu-
enhancement of the role of Parliament
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Confidential
The Socialists and Communists were successful in
obtaining major changes in parliamentary procedures
in 1971, which increased the role of Parliament and of
the minority parties. The changes included:
? Shifting authority to set the parliamentary agenda
from the presidents of the two houses to a 'commit-
tee of party leaders. .
? Strengthening the powers of the parliamentary
committees.
? Increasing the access of Parliament-and the mi-
nority parties-to information through direct links
to such institutions as the National Statistical Insti-
tute.
According to many Italian observers, the DC and the
small centrist parties accepted these changes as a
means of co-opting the ever more powerful Commu-
nist Party (PCI) into the decisionmaking process
without allowing it into the government. As a result,
however, the Communists and other minority parties
gained considerable influence in the legislative proc-
ess. Indeed, at the height of the PCI's electoral
strength-from 1976 to 1979-the DC and PCI
moved toward a "historic compromise," under which
the Communists provided parliamentary support for
the governing coalition in return for policy conces-
sions.
Weaknesses of the System
Multiparty Structure. A dozen or so parties are
usually represented in Parliament-at the moment
there are 14. Critics of the system commonly blame
the large number of parties on the excessive propor-
tionality of the formulas used to elect members to the
two houses of Parliament. In fact, the complicated
formula used to elect members to the lower house, the
Chamber of Deputies, was specifically designed to
help small parties gain representation.
The primary drawback of the Italian system is that it
inhibits the formation of cohesive parliamentary ma-
jorities based on clear electoral mandates. It has
encouraged weak multiparty coalitions formed on the
basis of postelection political horse trading. The con-
flicting interests of the participating parties and their
continual maneuvering for advantage has too often
enticed political leaders to focus more on political
intrigue than serious policymaking. The result has
been a stymied legislative process and short-lived
Indeed, maneuvering and strife within governing co-
alitions have increased with the long-term decline of
the Christian Democratic Party and with the
strengthening in recent years of the smaller parties of
the center and center-left-the Republican Party
(PRI), the Liberal Party (PLI), the Social Democratic
Party (PSDI), and the Socialist Party (PSI). This
latest shift in political weight was discernible in the
1979 parliamentary election and glaringly evident in
the parliamentary election of 1983. Moreover, in 1983
the Communists, despite their own smaller electoral
losses, came closer than ever before to matching the
DC's representation in Parliament. The narrowing of
the margin between the DC and the PCI has magni-
fied the leverage of smaller parties in the majority
coalition beyond their increased electoral strength. As
the DC's dominance has declined, dissension within
the majority has increased (see table).
Like the parliamentary majority, the opposition is also
divided. It includes the neofascist Italian Social
Movement (MSI), several single-issue and regional
protest parties, the Communist Party," the small left-
wing Radical Party, and two small far-left parties.
This disparate opposition, combined with parliamen-
tary rules that provide many opportunities for minor-
ity obstruction, has complicated the legislative process
enormously.
Weak Executive. Scholars and political observers have
also focused on the lack of strong executive leadership
as a factor inhibiting concerted policy formulation
and implementation. They have characterized the
system as "government by ministry," rather than
"cabinet government," in reference to the squabbling
and lack of coordination among the numerous minis-
tries.
The prime minister has traditionally functioned more
as a chairman of a committee than as a strong leader.
He lacks, for example, the legal authority to appoint
or replace ministers. In fact, the prime minister and
his cabinet hold office on the basis of a precarious
compromise among party and factional leaders. The
parties-and even party factions-consider ministers
from their group as their "delegation to the govern-
ment." Accordingly, a cabinet minister's first loyalty
governments.
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Confidential
Percent of the Vote and Seats Won
in 1976, 1979, and 1983 Elections, by Party
DC
38.7
262
38.3
261
32.9
225
38.9
135
38.3
138
32.4
120
PLI
1.3
5
1.9
9
2.9
16
1.4
2
2.2
2
2.7
6
PRI
3.1
14
3.0
15
5.1
29
2.7
6
3.4
6
4.7
10
PSDI
3.4
15
3.8
21
4.1
23
3.1
6
4.2
9
3.8
8
PSI
9.6
57
9.8
62
11.4
73
10.2
29
10.4
32
11.4
38
PSDI-PRI-PLI
0.9
1
PCI a
PCI and PU a
29.9
DP a
1.5
PU and DP a
1.5
6
1.7
6
0.5
2
P Radical
1.1
4
3.4
18
2.2
11
0.8
0
1.3
2
1.8
1
MSI
6.1
35
5.3
31
6.8
42
6.7
15
5.7
13
7.3
18
Others
0.8
4
2.4
6
3.2
6
1.9
4
3.0
4
3.1
6
a The PCI usually runs alone in elections, but on occasion (1983) it
has fielded a joint electoral list with one of the small far-left parties.
These parties, when not allied with the PCI, have run jointly or
alone.
usually is to his party or faction, not to the govern-
ment. He tends to see his ministry as a vehicle for
distributing patronage and furthering party or fac-
tional interests.
Parliamentary Procedures. A key factor in the in-
creasing difficulty of getting programs through the
Parliament is the complex set of procedural rules of
the 630-member Chamber of Deputies, particularly
the rules permitting most major legislation to be
subjected to a secret vote. A request for a secret vote
in the Chamber or in committee, for example, takes
precedence over a call for a rollcall vote, and even tiny
minorities can call for a secret vote. Until very
recently, one party group leader I or 20 deputies could
' Generally, a party group consists of at least 20 deputies, but
parties with less than 20 deputies may be permitted to form a party
request a secret ballot in the full assembly; in commit-
tees, a party group representative or five committee
members could request one. Students of. Italian Gov-
ernment point out that by weakening the accountabil-
ity of individuals and factions the secret vote under-
mines party discipline and increases the chances that
government programs will be delayed, changed, or
killed.
Disruption of the legislative process due to secret
votes has worsened with the decline of the DC and the
trend toward larger multiparty governing coalitions
evident since in the early 1960s. Three Italian Gov-
ernments have fallen directly as a result of defections
in secret votes, and others have resigned rather than
face a loss on a key secret vote.
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Another complaint often voiced is the ease with which
legislators can resort to filibustering. The tiny Radical
and other far-left parties in recent years have made
particularly abusive and disruptive use of this device.
According to Italian political,commentators, these
groups increasingly have engaged in filibustering as a
means of pressing for concessions even on issues not
related to the legislation under debate.
Another common target of criticism is the lack of
control by the Prime Minister and the coalition
parties over the parliamentary agenda. As a result of
the 1971 rules changes, the agenda for each house is
set by unanimous agreement of the party group
leaders in that house. This provides opposition lead-
ers-and sometimes recalcitrant minorities within the
governing majority-with a de facto veto over what is
considered and when. Agenda disputes may be re-
solved by a majority vote in each house, but prime
ministers have seldom used this provision.
The excessive duplication in Italy's bicameral parlia-
mentary system also pointlessly impedes the passage
of legislation, according to many critics. The cabinet
is responsible to both houses, and all legislation must
be passed by both the Chamber of Deputies and the
Senate.' Also, differences in the electoral formulas
for the Senate and the Chamber have failed to
produce any meaningful representational distinction
between them."
Plagued by internal strife and faced with frequent
parliamentary impasses, governments have increas-
ingly risked falling before they get even key legisla-
tion (such as the budget and the finance law) passed.
In these circumstances, governments have attempted
to get their bills enacted intact and in a timely fashion
by resorting to "emergency" decrees (see inset).
A Changing Political Culture?
The Italian press, public, and politicians have com-
plained for years about institutional problems, but
until recently no one was prepared to make some of
the hard choices required to remedy the situation.
' Even some of the limited divisions of power that exist in the US
Congress-for example, the Senate's power to approve treaties and
executive appointments and the House's power to initiate bills to
raise revenue-are absent in Italy.
Breaking the Logjam by Decree
Governments have sought to avoid frequent parlia-
mentary impasses by resorting to decrees. The Con-
stitution grants governments the authority to enact
decrees that have the force of law but that are
automatically revoked if not converted into law by
Parliament within 60 days. The decree provision was
intended for short-term use in emergencies, but in
recent years governments have increasingly used de-
crees to obtain timely enactment of a wide range of
ordinary legislation. In fact, the decree mechanism
has been used so often that it has practically become
the normal way of proposing a bill. Contrary to the
constitutional provision, some decrees have been re-
newed up to three times
Not only is this use-of the decree not provided for in
the Constitution, but it has proved counterproductive.
Some critics argue that it has skewed legislative
activity toward immediate, partial solutions and in-
hibited long-term policy planning and coherence.
Others point out that government decrees have been
entirely changed by Parliament without governments
considering this a sign of no confidence. They charge
that decrees both fail to avoid major changes in
government programs, and further obscure the ac-
countability of parties and individual representatives
to the electorate.
Attempts at reform were discouraged because nearly
everyone had a significant stake in Italy's consensus-
style political system-one that was built on patron-
client relationships and designed to accommodate a
broad spectrum of philosophical views. It is difficult to
document that a change in attitude is occurring, but
press and US Embassy reporting as well as scholarly
studies suggest that public sentiment may be building
for government to take decisive action for the common
good-even.if it means tolerating less philosophical
diversity and sacrificing some clientele interests. In
our view, the major parties, particularly the Socialists,
sense'such a change, and their new stress on reform is
probably an effort to capitalize on its
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tonnaennai
To be sure, the growing public interest in reform
reflects a desire to deal more effectively with certain
problems of the moment, such as the flagging econo-
my and the inefficiency of the government bureaucra-
cy. But we believe the focus on reform probably also
reflects a growing conviction among the politicians
and the public that the country is running out of
options in its search for effective government. Since
the adoption of the 1948 Constitution, party leaders
have-tried centrist, center-right, and center-left coali-
tions-everything short of bringing the Communists
into the government. None of these coalitions has
proved very durable, and none has produced a sus-
tained and consistent attack on the economic and
social problems that have accompanied postwar mod-
ernization. In our view, the growing belief that politi-
cians have exhausted the options available in the
current framework has' created a new openness to
changing-or at least tinkering with-the existing
system. In a country as tradition bound as Italy, even
such a limited and tentative willingness to alter the
system amounts to a significant change in political
thinking.
The Socialists. The Socialists became the first to
advocate institutional changes in 1981. The PSI took
advantage of the 1983 parliamentary campaign to
highlight its reformist position and to push its propos-
als.
The Socialist recipe for reform seeks to ensure that
the governing majority can take timely, decisive ac-
tion. In essence, the Socialists propose to:
? Strengthen the offices of the president and prime
minister.
? Bar the smallest parties from independent parlia-
mentary representation.
Reduce the opportunities for minority obstruction.
More specifically, the Socialist program proposes the
direct election of the president, who is head of state, to
a five-year term. The president now is elected to a
seven-year term by the houses of Parliament and
three delegates from each region. Although the So-
cialists have not proposed specific steps to strengthen
the president's constitutional powers, they argue that
direct election would enhance his moral authority and
strengthen his role as a stabilizing force.'
The Socialists also call for several changes aimed at 25X1
reducing the frequency of government crises and
strengthening the office of prime minister. They have
proposed that the prime minister be designated by the
Parliament for the length of the legislature-a period
of up to five years. They want to introduce the West
German mechanism of "constructive no-confidence
voting." Under this proposal, the proponents of a
censure motion would have to be able to offer a
successor government. The Socialists also have pro-
posed creating "a Cabinet.Council"-an inner cabi-
net made up of major ministers-and giving the prime
minister authority to choose and replace ministers at
will and to reduce the size of the cabinet. The
Socialist proposals appear designed to limit the scope
for' political sabotage and to reduce the prime minis-
ter's need to cater to the conflicting interests of his
parliamentary supporters-in sum, to put the prime
minister in a position to exercise strong leadership.
The Socialists also favor borrowing from West Ger-
man electoral law the concept of an electoral "thresh-
old"-requiring a party to win a certain percentage of
the vote in order to earn representation in Parliament.
They have proposed setting that threshold at 5 per-
cent. If such a rule had been in force for the last
election, nine of the 14 parties now in Parliament
would have been excluded, including two of the small
parties in the present five-party center-left governing
majority. As to reforms in parliamentary procedure,
the PSI has called for limiting the use of the secret
ballot and other legislative procedures that encourage
excessive minority obstruction.
' The president's powers under the existing Constitution are not
inconsequential. For example, he appoints the prime minister, can
dissolve Parliament and call new elections, and is commander in
chief of the armed forces. In practice, the president's actual
influence has varied with the propensity of the incumbents to push
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The PSI also advocates reducing the number of
parliamentary deputies and making sharper distinc-
tions between both the electoral districts and func-
tional responsibilities of the two chambers. They have
suggested that the lower house be elected on the basis
of single-member districts and that the Senate be
chosen by proportional voting based on regional lists.
They have proposed giving the Senate sole responsibil-
ity for economic and financial matters, presumably
because it would be a smaller and more manageable
body.
In our view, there is more to the Socialist push for
reform than a desire to achieve short-range tactical
advantage. In essence, Craxi is trying to persuade
voters that the PSI is the party that knows what to do
for the common good-economic austerity-and how
to do it-institutional reform. Nevertheless, the de-
tractors of the PSI have been quick to point out that
the Socialist proposals are also rooted in self-interest.
As a small but crucial swing party, the PSI is in a
position-so long as the Christian Democrats and
Communists remain at loggerheads-to claim the
prime-ministership periodically as the price of its
political support. Indeed, at the moment, Socialists
occupy both the prime-ministry and the presidency,
and the PSI can best turn its present political leverage
to its long-term advantage if its chief officeholders
compile a record of accomplishment. At least in
current circumstances, the Socialist Party has a direct
stake in strengthening the powers of the prime minis-
ter, enhancing the authority of the president, and
minimizing the ability of the opposition to obstruct
government legislative programs. At the same time,
the PSI believes its chances of increasing its share of
the vote will be enhanced as much as the other larger
parties if the smallest parties are excluded from
Parliament.
The Communists. In contrast to the Socialists, the
PCI traditionally has opposed altering the 1948 Con-
stitution, resisted strengthening the government, and
sought to expand the authority of Parliament. We
attribute the PCI's position to its longtime exclusion
from government and its "outsider" status. Its empha-
sis on the central role of Parliament is designed to
ensure the party a significant role and to increase its
influence, even without officially participating in the
government. The Communists consider proposals to
strengthen government authority as schemes to freeze
them out of the decisionmaking process
At the same time, the Communists recognize that the
Socialists' advocacy of institutional reforms may ac-
quire considerable public appeal. The PCI cannot
afford to appear reactionary or allow the PSI to gain
ground at its expense. Accordingly, at their Party
Congress in March 1983 and in the election campaign
last year, the PCI endeavored to put a new face on old
positions by highlighting systemic weaknesses that
they could blame on their rivals.
Specifically, the Communists attributed governmental
inefficiency mainly to the patronage practices of the
traditional governing parties. They argued that the
system of preference votes 6 used in the election of the
Chamber of Deputies reinforces a divisive emphasis
on personal power bases and political favoritism and
should be revised. They have provided no blueprint for
that revision, and they so far have "ruled out"
changes in proportional representation. The PCI has,
however, generally conceded the need to reduce the
size of the cabinet in order to facilitate executive
coordination but has opposed other proposals designed
to bolster executive authority.
The Communists have called for some parliamentary
reforms designed to simplify parliamentary proce-
dures and accelerate the legislative process. These
reforms would cut the number of deputies in the
Chamber by half and abolish the Senate; Communist
advocacy of unicameralism dates back to the 1948
Constituent Assembly. In addition, the PCI has fa-
vored devoting one parliamentary session exclusively
to the budget, terminating "catch-all" decree laws,
and consolidating parliamentary committees to mirror
a consolidated cabinet.
6 When choosing the Chamber of Deputies, voters designate a party
and in addition may cast preference votes for individual candidates
on the list. The order in which the party's candidates are assigned
seats is determined by the number of preference votes they receive.
In all but the Communist Party, which tells its supporters which
candidates to vote for, candidates tend to conduct highly personal-
ized campaigns. Nationwide, nearly 40 percent of the DC voters
have cast preference votes in the-last few elections, more than any
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Not surprisingly, the PCI has opposed abolition of the
secret vote and been cool toward proposals to restrict
its use. The Communists have found the secret vote a
handy tool for taking advantage of disharmony within
the governing majority. Last fall, for example, Com-
munist opposition and defections from the DC on a
secret vote defeated a government bill to grant tax
amnesty to illegal construction projects.
The Christian Democrats. The DC is more a loosely
knit complex of factions than a party, and its views on
institutional reform are as diffuse and contradictory
as its structure. The DC platform for the parliamenta-
ry election in 1983 basically set forth the position of
party Secretary Ciriaco DeMita, one of the few DCs
secretaries to come from the reformist wing of the
party
The DC's position on reform was cautious and vague.
It rejected drastic institutional changes, but supported
limited changes to improve government's capacity to
take action. It explicitly rejected the Socialist propos-
al for direct election of the president and the Commu-
nist proposal to abolish the Senate as "dangerous
shortcuts." It defended proportional representation as
a guarantor of pluralism and freedom and was silent
on the notion of a 5-percent electoral threshold, thus
implicitly rejecting it.
DC reluctance to tinker much with the system is not
surprising. The system bears the mark of the DC
more than that of any other party. Moreover, the
consensus-style system and diffusion of responsibility
have suited the loosely knit DC well over many years.
To keep its diverse constituencies together, the DC
has traditionally preferred to disperse responsibility at
the cost of achievement. This tendency has been
reinforced by the weakening of the ties that originally
bound the party together-anti-Communism and Ca-
tholicism.
The strategy, however, has become less effective.
Even before 1983, the DC's share of the vote had
eroded substantially. A number of DC leaders had
acknowledged that public impatience with the failure
of successive governments to cope with Italy's prob-
lems was making the traditional strategy of avoiding
action increasingly costly. Moreover, the DC, like the
Communists, needed to steal some of the PSI's thun-
der on the issue of reform.
Party leader De Mita's proposed solution is to oblige
parties to commit themselves to alliances and common
programs in advance of elections. His rationale for
preelection pacts is that they would:
? Clarify the electoral mandate.
? Increase party responsibility to the electorate.
? Curtail party bargaining and maneuvering for ad-
vantage.
The DC platform did not set out a specific blueprint,
but subsequently DC leaders have suggested giving
bonus seats to coalitions of parties that win a plurality
of the votes in elections. This proposal is opposed by
the smaller parties and the PCI.
In addition, the DC has supported the adoption of the
constructive no-confidence mechanism and abolition
.of the secret ballot. It still waffles on the role of the
prime minister, offering only a vague proposal to
reinforce his authority with a parliamentary vote of
confidence that would focus on "him in a different
way from the rest of the cabinet." The party has
favored the establishment of an inner cabinet of the
most important ministers, but still emphasizes the
need for collegial responsibility within the cabinet. As
for Parliament, the DC is on record in support of an
ill-defined "adequate reduction" in the size of Parlia-
ment and has called for the establishment of special
parliamentary sessions to deal with major issues like
the budget.
The Small Parties. The small centrist parties-the
Republican Party (PRI), the Liberal Party (PLI), and
the Social Democratic Party (PSDI)-also have ap-
proached institutional reform with caution. They are
cool to direct election of the President, and they
oppose unicameralism and modifications of propor-
tional representation, which could mean their elimina-
tion or subordination to larger parties. On the other
hand, they support some steps to improve governmen-
tal efficiency, such as measures designed to stream-
line parliamentary procedures and bolster executive
coordination. They prefer, however, to limit rather
than abolish the secret vote.
The neofascist Italian Social Movement (MSI), which
usually wins more votes than any of the small centrist
parties but is excluded from coalitions, advocates a
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new "neocorporate" political order. It opposes trying
to improve the workings of the existing democratic.
system on the grounds that the system should instead
be abolished.
The tiny Radical Party's major contribution to reform
has been negative. Its habitual use of parliamentary
procedures to obstruct business and promote its own
goals has added to the impetus for reform and to
efforts to streamline parliamentary procedures. More
positively, its exposure of the abuse of decree laws has
added that issue to the reform agendal
Movement Toward Reform Under Craxi
We believe that the attention the major parties have
paid to institutional reform since the 1983 election
campaign reflects a reluctance to concede the issue to
the Socialists and a fear of public condemnation for
failure to respond to the nation's problems. Most
Italian commentators interpret the DC's unexpected
loss of 6 percentage points of the vote and the PCI's
much less dramatic losses as confirmation that public
patience with the major parties is indeed finally
running out. Focusing public attention on the "sys-
tem" has the advantage of diverting attention from
the failings of the individual parties.
In our view, efforts by the other parties to exploit the
issue have made Craxi and the PSI all the more intent
on achieving reforms for which they can take credit
and which would strengthen their ability to imple-
ment an effective program. Craxi has so far focused
his efforts on making quick progress on the least
controversial reforms. According to US Embassy and
press reports, he has sought to use his limited discre-
tionary powers to streamline the processes of govern-
ment. He has, for example, established a "Cabinet
Council" of major ministers to make key policy
decisions. This Cabinet Council includes senior repre-
sentatives of the parties in the governing coalition and
has the political weight to address controversial policy
issues.
In addition, Craxi has succeeded in pushing a package
of procedural changes through the Chamber of Depu-
ties. First, the requirements for making some impor-
tant motions-such as requesting rollcall and secret
votes-have been tightened to curtail disruptions of
the legislative process by tiny minorities (see insert).
Second, changes in the Chamber rules now provide
for a strictly structured, 45-day parliamentary session
for budget and finance legislation. The new rules are
designed to prevent these key bills from getting held
up in committee. They also strictly limit the discus-
sion time allotted party groups in the full Chamber.
The effectiveness of these rules changes cannot be
evaluated because they have not been fully tested. The
new rules probably aided passage of the 1984 Budget
and Finance Law last December, the first time since
1978 that a government had met the end-of-year
deadline]
According to press reports, the Socialists had pressed
for even tighter restrictions on the use of the secret
vote and wanted to eliminate its use on revenue
matters. The Socialist proposals ran into stiff opposi-
tion from the Communists and other leftist parties, as
well as resistance from some quarters of the DC and
the small center parties.
Prospects for Further Change
The executive and parliamentary reforms achieved to
date are the product of least common denominator
compromises among the major parties and only mar-
ginally improve the system's efficiency. Nevertheless,
because they have general support, we doubt they will
be undone. Moreover, we believe these reforms could
be the opening wedge in a process leading to more far-
reaching changes. Although much of the impetus for
institutional reform has come from Prime Minister
Craxi, we think there is enough interest in change to
keep the issue alive beyond his tenure as Prime
Minister.
Press reports indicate that the Chamber of Deputies
will consider a second package of rules changes
sometime in 1984. This package reportedly will in-
clude proposals to:
? Reorganize the Chamber committees.
? Establish special procedures for "preferential pas-
sage" of key legislation
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Chamber of Deputies-Example of Rules Changes Under Craxi
To request a Roll-Call Vote in the full assembly ...
Now it takes:
20=deputies or one or more leaders of party groupse
representing at least 20 deputies
Before it took:
15 deputies or a single party group leader
Now it takes:
four committee members or one or more representa-
tives of a party group which alone or together have
four or more committee members.
Before it took:
four committee members or a representative of a
party 'group
a Generally, a party group consists of at least 20 deputies, but
parties with less than 20 deputies may be permitted to form a party
We believe there is a reasonably good chance that
such additional rules changes will be achieved in the
near term, because they are generally consistent with
the limited reforms agreed to thus far. In addition, a
bicameral committee has been established and
charged with recommending further electoral and
constitutional reforms to Parliament in October. All
parties except the neofascists and the small far-left
parties supported the establishment of the committee.
In general, further institutional reforms will hinge on
the extent to which the main parties see their practi-
cal interests served by such changes. We believe, for
example, that electoral losses by the DC and the PCI
have enhanced the prospects for movement on elector-
al reform. In our view, the"DC and PCI might be
tempted to support the PSI's proposal for a threshold
for parliamentary representation, especially if their
support at the polls continues to erode. US Embassy
To request a Secret Vote in the full assembly ...
Now it takes:
30 deputies or one or more leaders of party groups a
representing at least 30 deputies
Before it took:
20 deputies or a single party group leader
Now it takes:
five committee members or one or more representa-
tives of a party, which alone or together have five or
more committee members.
Before it took:
five committee members or a representative of a party
group.
and press reports indicate, in fact, that some Commu-
nists and Christian Democrats already are seeking to
find common ground on reforms, although so far
without success. And if the smaller PRI' continues to
attract more than 5 percent of the vote as it did in
1983, it too could support the PSI proposal.
The political consolidation entailed in 'a 5-percent
threshold would greatly change the configuration of
Italian politics. All of the opposition parties, except
the PCI and MSI, and at least two of the parties in
the present five-party governing coalition-the PSDI
and PLI-would probably be forced to merge with
larger parties. Because this would be such a radical
change in the system, the parties might eventually
settle on a lower threshold.
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Similarly, press reporting suggests that a consensus
may also be developing in favor of constitutional
changes' designed to insulate government from the
party and factional power struggles that have made
governments notoriously weak and short lived. Pro-
posals for a "constructive no-confidence" provision
and for giving the Prime Minister the authority to
choose and replace ministers appear most popular. We
also see general interest in constitutional changes to
reduce the size and redundancy of the present bicam-
eral system. The various proposals are still far apart,
but press reports suggest a gathering consensus in
favor of a functional specialization of the two houses.
This is not to say that a Second Republic is at hand.
To the contrary, the roots of the political fragmenta-
tion and fear of authoritarianism that have fostered
the development of a consensus-style system go deep.
Change is likely to be slow and incremental. Never-
theless, we believe that movement to increase govern-
ment efficiency and decisiveness will go in the direc-
tion of consolidating the party system, bolstering the
power of the governing majority, and limiting the
scope for minority obstruction.
The net effect of the reform process, however, is less
clear than its direction. For example, one of the more
likely reform measures-the adoption of a threshold
for representation in Parliament-could have the
effect, by forcing party mergers, of converting inter-
party rivalries into intraparty factionalism. Indeed, it
is uncertain whether any"procedural or electoral
changes can moderate the effect on governments of
the ideological, regional, and clientele rivalries that
have shaped Italian politics.
In certain circumstances, moreover, the current re-
form movement might fizzle completely. Several
events alone or together might rob it of its impetus:
? An international economic recovery of sufficient
strength to carry along the Italian, economy could
dull public concern with the problems of the system.
'Amendments to the Constitution must be passed by the Chamber
of Deputies and the Senate twice at an interval of at least three
months. Approval must be by an absolute majority of the members
of each chamber.
? A public backlash against Craxi's overbearing per-
sonal style could trigger fears of resurgent authori-
tarianism and compromise the movement for
reform.
? A precipitous plunge in the fortunes of the reformist
wing of the DC could reduce the momentum of
reform effort.
? A political polarization and the isolation of the PCI
could lead to Communist interest in perpetuating
weak governments.
We believe that the least likely prospect is for the kind
of change that would result in a more radical consoli-
dation of political parties, a stark division between
majority and opposition, or even a return to authori-
tarian government. Only extraordinary events, such as
a war, extreme natural disaster, or economic collapse,
could precipitate such outcomes.
Implications
The increased government efficiency and decisiveness
that could result from moderate, incremental change
could go far toward reducing the threat of social
unrest, political instability, and even terrorist activity
in Italy. This would obviously serve US interests given
Italy's strategic importance as a member of NATO
and a Mediterranean power and its economic impor-
tance as a major industrial country. Moreover, reform
could reduce the tendency of Italian politicians to look"
to the Communists for assistance in keeping the
system running. But movement away from a consen-
sus-style system cannot exclude the possibility of
Communist cabinet participation if Communist ac-
quiescence in reform is to be won. It is even possible
that the consolidation of the party system through
changes in proportional representation could eventual-
ly open the way for the first Communist-Socialist
majority of the postwar period. Nevertheless, we
believe that the increased governmental effectiveness
that could come through institutional reform would be
the best insurance against popular support for the
Communists and Communist participation in the
cabinet.
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