WESTERN EUROPE: YOUTH ATTITUDES AND THE SUCCESSOR GENERATION

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• Publication Date: April 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Western Europe:
Youth Attitudes and
the Successor Generation
A Research Paper
MASL;
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EUR 84-10068
April 1984
Copy 3 41
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Secret
Erratum Notice to recipients of DDI Research Paper Western Europe: Youth Attitudes and
the Successor Generation=EUR 84-10068,
April 1984.
Table 4
Partisan Change and Aging
1975-83
Supporting left-of-center
parties in 1975
Supporting left-of-center
parties in 1983
Table 4 on page 15 is incorrect. Please replace it with the new Table 4 below.
Less Than
18-29
22-31
30-39
32-46
40-59
47-Plus
60-Plus
21 Years
Years
Years
Years
Years .
Years
Years
Years
in 1975
in 1983
in 1975
in 1983
in 1975
in 1983
in 1975
in 1983
Supporting center and right- 40 39 54
wing parties 1975
Supporting center and right-
wing parties 1983
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tnrectorate of secret
Western Europe:
Youth Attitudes and
the Successor Generation
This paper was prepared by
Office of European Analysis, with the support of
of the Analytic Support Group.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, European Issues Division,
EURA,
Secret
EUR 84-10068
April 1984
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Secret
Overview
Information available
as of 1 April 1984
was used in this report.
Western Europe:
Youth Attitudes and
the Successor Generation
Political leaders and scholars on both sides of the Atlantic point to the left-
ist politics of West European youth, the prominent role they play in the
peace movement, and the rise of "dropout" youth subcultures as portents of
a major shift in West European politics when the "successor generation"
comes of age. The results of several recent opinion polls focusing on EC
and NATO countries suggest that these concerns have some merit-
particularly in the case of West German youth-but the same polls present
evidence that the "generation gap" is not as wide as is frequently assumed.
and NATO's defense preparedness.
The troublesome tendencies that surveys have detected among young
people in Western Europe include:
? A disregard for conventional political norms and a preference for "direct
action" techniques such as demonstrations and sit-ins, which threaten
further to immobilize governments in areas such as defense and economic
policy.
? A propensity to support leftist political parties, which could tip the
balance in favor of forces opposed to NATO and to close ties with the
United States.
? A lack of confidence in the United States, unconcern about the Soviet
Union, and hostility to strengthening or even maintaining their countries'
The more reassuring trends emerging from the same surveys are:
? West European youth by and large are not alienated from their societies.
They are as likely as their elders to support their countries' political and
social institutions and to participate in politics. Despite extremely high
levels of youth unemployment, they remain reasonably content with their
economic lot and not unduly pessimistic about their economic future.
? Although younger West Europeans are more inclined than their contem-
porary elders to support leftist parties, their attitudes on specific issues
are more moderate than their voting tendencies might indicate. For
instance, the young are only slightly more supportive than their elders of
the traditional left's program of economic development through central-
ized controls. Instead, they tend to favor a "new left" political agenda
emphasizing increased citizen involvement in public decisionmaking,
greater personal freedom, and protection of the environment.
iii Secret
EUR 84-10068
April 1984
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? Young people differ from their elders only slightly on issues such as
confidence in US foreign policy, degree of alarm about the Soviet threat,
and opposition to INF deployment. Moreover, most young West Europe-
ans remain committed to their countries' continued membership in the
Atlantic Alliance.
Because few West European youths are alienated from their societies, we
believe that the younger generation as a whole will not pose a threat to po-
litical stability. We think they will, however, retain their preference for
direct involvement in politics, and this tendency will impede government
decisionmaking on critical issues, in the process weakening individual
countries and the Alliance to some extent
Although data limitations preclude hard and fast predictions concerning
the survival of youthful political attitudes into middle age, we suspect that
the current young generation will probably continue to identify dispropor-
tionately with leftist causes as it matures. This is because the "new left" in-
clinations of many of its members spring from such factors as their relative
affluence and high level of education, which will exert an enduring
influence on their collective attitudes. But taking into account the predomi-
nantly moderate views of young people, their relatively weak attachments
to political parties, and the possibility of growing fragmentation between
parties of the old and new left, we believe that leftist party dominance of
future West European politics is not inevitable or even likely.
Given the modest age-based attitudinal differences on international issues
among all age groups and most young people's support for NATO, we
expect that generational replacement will not by itself bring about any
dramatic changes in basic West European foreign and security policies. On
the other hand, because public confidence in US foreign policy has been
declining among all age groups throughout Western Europe, trans-Atlantic
relations could come under increasing strain. This is especially true of
West Germany where the young are strongly supportive of the new left
agenda and the old are becoming increasingly disenchanted with US
leadership of the Alliance
But there are likely to be limits to the extent to which even Bonn distances
itself from the Western Alliance: the views of young people who identify
with center-right parties do not differ significantly from those of their
parents, and young people in all parts of the political spectrum still show
impressive support for NATO.
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Secret
Western Europe:
Youth Attitudes and
the Successor Generation
Introduction
Observers such as the US-based Atlantic Council and
West German Chancellor Kohl have expressed fears
that West Europeans under 35 years old do not share
their elders' moderation on domestic issues or their
support for security cooperation with the United
States-and that some young people may not even
share their commitment to democratic values. Observ-
ers worry that, in the short term, West European
youth could prove a disruptive force in society as
young people were in the late 1960s. They are also
concerned that generational differences in political
attitudes are now so great that dramatic changes in
West European domestic and international policies-
many of which will be detrimental to US and Atlantic
Alliance interests-will take place when members of
the present youth generation accede to positions of
This paper compares the political attitudes of younger
and older West Europeans, particularly in the United
Kingdom, France, Italy, West Germany, the Nether-
lands, and Belgium. Using recent public opinion data,
it seeks to determine whether generational differences
exist of a sufficient magnitude to augur changes in
West European politics. Specifically, it addresses four
questions that are frequently raised in discussions of
West European youth attitudes and of the successor
generation:
Are younger West Europeans alienated from the
societies and values that their elders appear to
support strongly?
? Are younger West Europeans further to the left
than their elders?
? Are younger West Europeans less inclined than
their elders to support the Atlantic Alliance?
? To the extent that there is a "generation gap," how
much is a life-cycle phenomenon that is likely to
disappear as the present youth cohort ages and how
much is a generational difference that is likely to
endure?
different from those of their elders.
The Youth Problem in Western Europe
In postwar Western Europe, young people first
emerged as a major political force in the late 1960s.
Student protest movements arose that demanded re-
forms in universities and other institutions, espoused
radical social ideologies, and opposed US involvement
in the Vietnam war. Violent student-police clashes
and student strikes took place in West German,
Italian, and British universities, while in France,
Parisian students nearly toppled the Gaullist regime
in May 1968. The changes that the affected govern-
ments made in response to these demands in areas
such as education and employment opportunity cer-
tainly blunted the revolutionary edge of the student
movement. Nevertheless, it has become clear that
West Europeans who were born after World War II
hold political beliefs on both domestic and interna-
tional issues that are, if not revolutionary, at least
The clearest sign is their voting behavior. According
to various polls undertaken in recent years, younger
people between 18 and 34 years old in France, Italy,
the Netherlands, and West Germany have been in-
clined to support parties of the left by margins of
some 3 to 2 while a majority of their elder counter-
parts have supported parties of the center-right. Ac-
cording to a leading academic expert, such dramatic
age differences in partisan preference were not pres-
ent in these countries during the 1950s and early
1960s. Only in the United Kingdom and Belgium
have younger people's partisan preferences not been
significantly different from their elders' in recent
years
The second sign is the conspicuous involvement of
large numbers of young people in the peace move-
ment, which suggests that the younger generation
may not share the pro-American, anti-Soviet, and
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pro-Atlantic Alliance proclivities that the majority of
older West Europeans are assumed to hold.' Some
scholars have linked the purported neutralist tenden-
cies of many younger West Europeans to their coming
of age during an era when the American image in
Western Europe had been tarnished by Vietnam and
Watergate while the perception of the Soviet threat
was dulled by "detente." Younger people thus may
have less reason than their elders-who experienced
American beneficence in the form of the Marshall
plan and Soviet intimidation-to view a strong trans-
Atlantic connection as either desirable or essential.
A third sign of generational difference has been the
rise of an "alienated" youth subculture and outbreaks
of violence involving young people. Although disaf-
fected youth have always been present in Western
Europe-for instance, the United Kingdom's "teddy
boys" and "rockers"-their numbers, according to
various press accounts, appear to have grown along
with the propensity for violence and lawlessness. In
West Germany, a substantial "alternative culture"
has arisen comprising, according to some estimates,
more than 10 percent of the 17- to 23-year-old
population. Its members preach or practice dropping
out of modern society in favor of living in communes
which they often set up unlawfully in abandoned
dwellings. More nihilistic groups, such as the Swiss
and West German "chaotics" and the British
"punks," have occasionally been involved in violent
confrontations with authorities. And, of course, young
people have formed the nucleus of various West
European terrorist groups such as the Italian Red
Brigades and the West German Red Army Faction.F_
West European scholars and press commentators have
cited these developments as reflecting widespread
alienation from society among young people-espe-
cially those in their late teens or early twenties. They
link this alienation to the deterioration of the region's
economic performance in recent years. Younger peo-
ple have, in fact, borne the brunt of this slowdown:
those under 25 have constituted about half or more of
' Although the West European peace movement dates back to the
late 1950s when it was marked by such occurrences as the "ban the
bomb" marches in the United Kingdom, it was not as conspicuously
the unemployed in most West European countries in
recent years (table 1). This fact-and the absence of
any indication that the economic situation will im-
prove any time soon-has led some West European
press commentators and academics to suggest that
young people have become depressed and pessimistic,
as well as indifferent or hostile toward the society they
blame for their plight.
Youth Attitudes in the Light of
Public Opinion Data
These developments at first blush suggest that West-
ern Europe is heading for a future of leftist domi-
nance of the political system, neutrality in the East-
West rivalry, and growing lawlessness. We believe,
however, that indicators such as current voting behav-
ior and participation of minorities, even large ones, in
social movements or subcultures present an incom-
plete picture of West European youth. To gain a
clearer idea of the mind-set of "young Western
Europe," we have tapped the results of a wide range
of surveys, paying special attention to those from a
European Community-sponsored "Eurobarometer"
study of youth values published in 1982.2
Are Younger West Europeans Alienated?
Public opinion data suggest that "alienation" is, in
fact, not particularly widespread among West Euro-
pean youth-at least it is no more so than among the
population in general. Young people are somewhat
less proud of their countries than their elders, but they
are about as satisfied with the functioning of democ-
racy and major institutions. Moreover, younger people
tend to be at least as favorable as older ones to the
' Although we believe the examination of public opinion data
provides the best insight into contemporary youth attitudes, this
approach has some limitations. West European public opinion
researchers have generally not asked identical questions from year
to year; nor have they, in past years, often reported results broken
down by age. Thus it is not possible to determine with accuracy how
today's youth stacks up against its counterparts of previous
decades-or to gain a clear idea about how today's youth will
behave in the future by examining the evolution of previous young
generations' attitudes as they aged. Moreover, public opinion data
can only provide general indications about that small segment of
the present generation of youth that will become the future West
European political elite and have a disproportionate impact on
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Table 1
Youth Unemployment a
as a Percent
of Total Unemployment
1978
1979
1980
1981
West Germany
28.4
26.2
27.2
29.2
France
40.6
42.0
42.5
42.8
United Kingdom
44.9
44.4
46.6
41.0
Italy
61.4
60.8
62.3
61.6
Austria
36.1
36.4
33.3
36.6
Belgium
45.0
43.5
46.1
45.1
Netherlands
47.6
46.7
52.8
52.5
Norway
52.9
52.6
51.5
47.5
Spain
59.1
54.2
55.6
55.1
Sweden
40.5
39.7
42.0
39.8
EEC
42.6
46.4
47.5
45.1
idea of participating in the political process; indeed, in
West Germany they are considerably more so. But the
young do tend to place greater emphasis on direct
forms of participation-such as sit-ins and protest
demonstrations-rather than on more conventional
means such as involvement in political parties. They
do not in any significant numbers favor the use of
violence to achieve political goals.
Overall Attitudes Toward Society. One of the broad-
est indicators of an individual's feelings toward his
society is his degree of national pride. There is
considerable evidence showing that younger West
Europeans are not particularly nationalistic as a
group. Studies undertaken in the late 1970s, for
instance, found that only about three-fifths of young
people in France, Switzerland, and Sweden expressed
pride in their nation, as compared with 95 percent of
young Americans. A 1982 survey in West Germany
painted a particularly bleak picture for that country:
in what is probably a legacy of the Third Reich and
subsequent attempts by educational authorities to
downplay nationalism, only 31 percent of those 18 to
30 years old voiced national pride as opposed to over
60 percent in the age group over 60. The 1982
Eurobarometer survey indicated that significant age-
related differences in national pride existed through-
out the European Community. Of adults over 25, 75
percent were proud of their countries and 18 percent
were not; of young people 15 to 24 years old, 65
percent were proud and 26 percent were not.
Other responses, however, suggest that younger West25X1
Europeans' overall attitudes toward their societies are
not markedly different from those of their elders. For
instance, the Eurobarometer survey question on "sat-
isfaction" with the way democracy is working in the
respondent's country elicited virtually identical re-
sponses from those under and over 25 in all the EC
member states. These ranged from fairly high levels
of satisfaction in the United Kingdom, the Nether- 25X1
lands, and West Germany, to low levels in such
heterogeneous countries as Belgium and Italy.
Other surveys have shown that, in the major West
European countries, attitudes concerning the "repre-
sentativeness" or social impact of such key political
institutions as political parties and the civil service do
not differ significantly by age. Both young and old
Italians, Belgians, and French are fairly cynical about
these institutions, while the Dutch, British, and West
Germans are at least reasonably positive. An OECD-
sponsored review of sociological research on youth
reported that wherever they were studied in Western
Europe, young people expressed highly favorable atti-
tudes on the most basic institution: the family. F_
Attitudes on Participation. Younger West Europeans
also appear to be about as positive as their elders on
the issue of individual political participation. Accord-
ing to the Eurobarometer survey, 40 percent of West
Europeans 25 years old or under believe they can have
a personal impact on politics versus 36 percent of
those over 25. Moreover, identical numbers of youn-
ger and older West Europeans indicated that they
discussed politics at least occasionally with their
friends. In West Germany, where the presence of a
highly visible "alternative culture" suggests that
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alienation is most acute, one 1983 poll revealed that
18- to 30-year-olds were somewhat more likely than
older people to believe that people should get involved
in politics and that they could have an impact on
national policy.
Younger people differ from older groups mainly in
their preferred form of participation. They tend not
unexpectedly to be somewhat cooler than older adults
toward the idea of involvement or close identification
with a political party: in the Eurobarometer survey,
46 percent of those 15 to 24 said they felt close to no
political party as opposed to only 32 percent of those
over 25. On the other hand, according to the Eurobar-
ometer and other surveys, younger people tend to be
considerably more favorable to the idea of participa-
tion through involvement in social movements and
protest demonstrations. The Eurobarometer survey
revealed that 15- to 24-year-olds were more likely to
approve of ecology, antinuclear, and antiwar move-
ments, and substantially more likely to be willing to
join them. An official West German study of youth
indicated that among 18- to 30-year-olds, the idea of
political "self-help" through petition drives and dem-
onstrations enjoys overwhelming popularity
The attraction of younger West Europeans to "direct
action" techniques does not, in our judgment, imply a
widespread preference for bringing about change by
violent or unlawful means. The Eurobarometer study
revealed that the number of young people who favored
"revolutionary action" to achieve radical change was
not much different from the number of similarly
minded older West Europeans-respectively, 8 per-
cent and 4 percent-and was dwarfed by the number
of young people favoring either gradual reforms
(61 percent) or "defense of society against subversion"
(22 percent). Other studies by reputable polling insti-
tutions in France, Italy, West Germany, and the Low
Countries have revealed that although young people
are considerably more likely to indicate a willingness
to participate in civil disobedience, only minute per-
centages indicate that they would engage in violent
demonstrations. In the official West German study, a
sizable 14 percent of the 18- to 30-year-olds expressed
approval of house "squattin ," but 85 percent rejected
the use of political violence.
Are They Really Frustrated? The findings cited above
strongly suggest that young people-including the
university-educated "successor generation" which will
become the future elite-as a group do not pose a
serious threat to West European political or social
stability. In fact, they raise doubts about the popular
image of West European youth seething with frustra-
tion and anger because of their economic predica-
ment. The evidence suggests that while younger Euro-
peans are concerned about their futures, they are not
unduly pessimistic or angry about their current
circumstances:
? The Eurobarometer survey indicates that younger
West Europeans are indeed concerned about the
possibility of experiencing unemployment. Forty-six
percent of the men and 54 percent of the women 18
to 24 yers old thought that they might not be able to
find a job within the next two years; by comparison,
the respective figures for individuals 25 to 39 years
old were 35 and 39 percent, and for individuals 40
to 54 years old 28 and 32 percent. The survey also
showed that younger West Europeans were more
discontented with their job and career prospects
than with any of the other measured aspects of their
life, such as relationships with family and friends,
housing, and leisure activities.
? Nevertheless, evidence from surveys undertaken last
year in France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, and
the Netherlands suggests that the young in those
countries have not despaired despite their difficul-
ties in the labor market. Young people expressed
levels of "satisfaction" with their overall current
economic situation which were very similar to those
of older adults in all these countries. West Germany
was an exception, but even there youths were only
slightly more dissatisfied. Young people, indeed,
tended to be slightly more optimistic than their
elders concerning their personal economic prospects
over the coming year. And while young people were
somewhat more pessimistic about their "lifetime"
economic situation than older groups, substantial
majorities in all of these countries believe that they
will do as well or better economically as their
parents over the course of their lives.
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ow" CL
West European campuses, spawning grounds for that
segment of West European youth that will become
the future elite, by and large have not been centers of
political radicalism in recent years. According to a
West German sociologist, the Free University of
Berlin-which in the 1960s was a hotbed of radical
protest-is now so quiet that it resembles "the aban-
doned parking lot of an office building on week-
ends. " Reports from the US Embassy in Stockholm
and Consulate in Milan suggest that students in both
Sweden and Italy have been forgoing politics in favor
of paying increased attention to studies and personal
development. In Italy this trend is evidenced in
declining participation for elections to student gov-
erning bodies-and perhaps also in the fact that
independent Christian candidates have won an in-
creased share of the votes in these elections at the
expense of candidates affiliated with leftist parties.
France, in contrast to the other West European
countries, has suffered student disturbances recently.
In May 1983, thousands of French students partici-
pated in protest marches which ended in violent
? Perhaps most significant, 83 percent of the men and
84 percent of the women aged 15 to 24 told the
Eurobarometer survey that they were either very or
fairly satisfied with the life they led. These percent-
ages were higher than for any other age group.
Even the specific group which has been most adverse-
ly affected by Western Europe's economic slow-
down-the young unemployed-does not appear as
pessimistic and alienated as might be expected. The
official West German youth study, for instance, found
only small differences in basic political outlooks be-
tween a small subsample of unemployed youth (50
people) and the general sample of youths. A poll
undertaken before the 1983 British election of first-
time voters-three-fifths of whom had been unem-
ployed during the previous year-indicated a majority
favored the Conservatives over Labor, hardly a sign of
confrontations with the police. Unlike the student
protesters of 1968, those of 1983 were not seeking
radical changes in society. They were, in fact, pre-
dominantly conservatives who were seeking to block
an egalitarian educational reform proposed by the
Mitterrand government, which they feared might
devalue their diplomas by easing admission require-
ments to universities. Leftist students have been quiet
since the mid-1970s. In recent French student elec-
tions, leftist factions suffered a sharp drop in support
while a rightwing faction gained slightly.
We suspect that the source of declining student
radicalism is the poor job market for university
graduates. A recent report in the French magazine Le
Point indicated that in France, for instance, only very
small percentages of social science and humanities
students-who comprise the majority of the student
body-could look forward to employment in their
fields. Insecurity has probably demoralized the stu-
dent left-and made it wary of getting involved in
legal difficulties which might further limit their job
prospects.
mass disaffection. Our review of surveys in other
major West European countries indicates that al-
though unemployed young people are somewhat more
to the left of their employed peers, they are no more
prone as a group to favor violent protest or to reject
basic political institutions.
Are Younger West Europeans Leftist? Younger West
Europeans are somewhat further to the left ideologi-
cally than their elders, although those professing to be
leftists are still a minority, albeit a large one. At the
same time, younger people in most West European
countries are no more hostile to business or favorable
to increased governmental intervention in society than
are their seniors. They do differ, however, from older
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Table 2
Political Self-Placement in the European Community, by Age
7
12
8
7
7
8
20
23
22
16
14
19
Center
31
30
35
35
34
33
Right
14
14
16
19
19
17
4
2
4
8
10
6
24
19
15
15
16
17
groups in being more favorable to what social scien-
tists call "postmaterialist" values: increased individ-
ual freedom, participatory decisionmaking, and pro-
tection of the environment. Their voting tendencies
may reflect a belief that parties on the left are more
inclined to emphasize those values. In fact, the tradi-
tional left's program, with its emphasis on rapid
modernization through centralized controls, to some
extent is antithetical to postmaterialist values. The
more sophisticated young people realize this, in our
judgment, and this probably accounts in part for the
emergence of new left or ecological parties which
compete with the socialist and Communist parties of
Youth and the Old Left. The Eurobarometer survey
asked its respondents to place themselves on a stand-
ard ideological scale ranging from extreme left to
extreme right. The results, displayed in table 2,
indicate that West Europeans under 30 are substan-
tially more likely than those over 30 to indicate they
hold views that are left of center. At the same time,
young people placing themselves in the center or to
the right of center outnumbered those on the left by
margins of 49 to 27 percent among the 15- to 19-year-
olds, 46 to 35 percent among the 20- to 24-year-olds,
and 45 to 38 percent among the 25- to 29-year-olds
(table 2). Age-related differences in ideological prefer-
ence were fairly uniform throughout the European
Community with the exceptions of Belgium-where
there was virtually no age-related ideological differ-
ence-and Greece and West Germany, where youn-
ger people (under 25) were more to the left of their
Although younger people may be more inclined than
older ones to consider themselves to be on the left,
they do not appear to be any more inclined to espouse
conventional leftist ideas.on the economy and the role
of government. For instance, surveys taken in France,
Belgium, the Netherlands, West Germany, and Italy
in recent years indicated that in all but West
Germany, 18- to 30-year-olds were no more likely
than older adults to be critical of the role of corpora-
tions or trade associations in society. And, with the
exception of France, they were not inclined to take a
more positive view of trade unions than older adults;
even in France, age-related differences on this ques-
tion were minimal. Perhaps most important, on the
crucial question of whether governmental powers
should be strengthened to deal with national prob-
lems, young people in France, Italy, Belgium, and the
Netherlands were not significantly more favorable
than their elders. In West Germany, where the left-
right ideological gap is wider than average, younger
people by a substantial margin were actually more
hostile to the idea of increased governmental interven-
tion than those over 30.
A "Postmaterialist"Gap. Younger West Europeans
do differ ideologically from their elders in one key
response: they place greater emphasis on what has
been variously called in the United States the "new
politics" or "postmaterialist" agenda. This involves
demands for increases in personal freedom, in greater
citizen involvement in the policymaking process, and
elders than in the other countries
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the preservation of the environment. Studies under-
taken from the early 1970s onward have consistently
found that younger West Europeans, including those
now in their early and middle thirties, are significant-
ly more likely than older ones to favor postmaterialist
values over traditional materialist ones-such as
maintenance of social order and price stability-when
offered a forced choice between them. In the Eurobar-
ometer survey, for instance, 19 percent of the 15- to
24-year-olds and 17 percent of the 25- to 34-year-olds
were "pure postmaterialists" as compared with an
average of less than 7 percent among those over 45.
According to the survey and other studies, postmater-
ialism is positively associated with self-perceived left-
ism.
We believe that the relatively strong preference of
younger West Europeans for the "new politics" is
linked to the following factors:
? The impact of Western Europe's postwar success:
older West Europeans, particularly those now over
50, experienced personal hardships during their
early years in the 1930s and 1940s because of
economic and political instability and war. They
thus came to place a high value on social order and
personal material gain. By contrast, younger West
Europeans have matured within an environment of
economic plenty and political safety because of the
outstanding success of Western Europe's postwar
economic and political institutions. With their mate-
rial needs basically satisfied, young West Europeans
have had the opportunity to turn to higher order
values such as self-expression and environmental
preservation.
? The expansion of higher education: between 1960
and 1980, university enrollments increased over
three times in Western Europe-from 5 to 16
percent of the university-age population. The bulk
of the rise has been concentrated in the humanities
and social sciences. Thus the number of individuals
within the younger generation who have acquired
the skills and background knowledge required for
political participation-the central feature of the
new politics agenda-is considerably greater than in
the older generation. Evidence from Eurobarometer
surveys taken in the late 1970s indicates that stu-
dents and younger people in occupations requiring
advanced educations were up to three times more
likely to be pure postmaterialists than workers or
housewives.
We believe that the marked tendency of those under
35 to vote for parties of the left and the new left stems
from their preference for the "new politics"-which
leftist West European parties come closer to embody-
ing at present-rather than a widespread desire for
old-style socialism. Indeed, using 1979 Eurobarom-
eter data, we have discovered that, in the major West
European countries and in the Low Countries, post-
materialists under 35 were twice as likely to support
parties of the left than of the center-right, and that
this fact explained about three-fifths of the difference
in the relative tendency of those under and over 35 to
support leftist parties. In our judgment, the rise of the
new "ecological" parties in France and Belgium and
the "Greens" in West Germany highlights the new
politics orientation of the younger generation. All of
these parties have garnered substantial youthful sup-
port-between 10 and 20 percent of the under-35
population-by emphasizing an environmental and
participatory agenda rather than a traditionally so-
cialist one.
Leftism and the Successor Generation. The course of
West European politics and policy will be shaped at
least as much by the views of its future leading
politicians, civil servants, and journalists as by those
of the younger generation as a whole. Because West-
ern Europe's elite is generally drawn from the ranks
of the university educated, we have examined the
ideological views of the younger members of this
group (those under 35).
According to data offered in various national surveys,
the extent of ideological differences between younger
and older educated West Europeans varies from
country to country. In Belgium and Italy the succes-
sor elite generation is, much like the current elite,
oriented toward the center-right side of the political
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spectrum; indeed, younger educated Italians are to
the right of Italian youth as a whole. Educated
younger Frenchmen are about half again as likely to
place themselves on the left side of the ideological
spectrum as their older counterparts but are no more
leftist than the rest of the younger generation. In the
Netherlands the ideological age gap is fairly wide,
but, because age differences on other measures of
ideological orientation such as attitudes toward busi-
ness and government intervention are small to insig-
nificant, we think that it would be unwise to exagger-
ate their importance.
In West Germany the successor generation is far to
the left of the current elite and even farther to the left
than less educated younger West Germans. Moreover,
better educated younger West Germans appear to be
exceptionally hostile to corporations; some 70 percent
of them in one poll said they thought that activities of
business were harmful to West Germany as compared
with only 17 percent of the current elite. At the same
time, a recent USIA survey of the successor genera-
tion revealed very low levels of support for the concept
of a "planned socialist economy"-and a fairly favor-
able attitude toward such concepts as "capitalism"
and a "free market economy." Taking these findings
into account and the fact that the overwhelming
majority of younger educated West Germans (some
80 percent) are opposed to increased governmental
intervention into society, we believe that the West
German successor generation is unlikely, despite its
self-expressed ideological inclinations, to be a force
for traditional socialism.
Do Younger West Europeans Support the Alliance?
In our judgment, public opinion data broadly confirm
that age-related differences exist in views toward the
United States, the Atlantic Alliance, and related
international issues. In comparison to their elders,
younger people tend to be more skeptical of US
foreign policy, less concerned about the Soviet threat,
and thus less favorable to an increased defense effort,
especially the stationing of new US nuclear missiles in
Western Europe. At the same time, age differences on
international issues are generally small in most coun-
tries, indicating that the popular source of the grow-
ing differences between US and West European
policymakers emanates on the West European side
from the broader public rather than from young
people alone. Only in West Germany are youth,
particularly the educated young future elite, notably
more negative than the rest of the West German
population on a number of key security issues. Never-
theless, substantial majorities of younger people
throughout Western Europe continue to want their
countries to remain in NATO.
United States Less Trusted, Soviets Less Feared.
USIA surveys in recent years have revealed that
younger West Europeans tend to have even less
confidence in US foreign policy than their elder
compatriots. For instance, asked to indicate in mid-
1983 whether they had confidence in the ability of the
United States to deal with world problems, 52 percent
of the lesser educated between 18 and 34 years old in
the United Kingdom answered in the affirmative as
compared with 62 percent of those over 35. The
comparable figures for Italy were 46 and 54 percent,
and for West Germany-where confidence appears to
be extremely low among all sectors of the populace-
26 and 34 percent. National surveys in the Nether-
lands and Belgium last year on the issue of confidence
in the United States reveal age differences roughly
similar to those in the other countries. In France,
however, age has no influence on confidence levels-
close to three-fifths of both young and old expressed
at least a fair amount of confidence in US foreign
policy.
West European youth's relative lack of confidence in
US foreign policy does not result from any special
concerns about Washington's willingness to come to
their aid in a crisis: USIA polls taken in 1981 in the
major countries and in the Netherlands show that
similarly large majorities among all age groups be-
lieved the United States would defend Western Eu-
rope. Rather, young people seem to fear that the US
military buildup and Washington's assertive policies
in Central America and the Middle East may lead to
a confrontation that will embroil their countries. Fifty
percent of the 18- to 34-year-olds in West Germany
and 62 percent of the same group in Italy and the
United Kingdom queried in a USIA poll last year
believed that US policies were leading toward war. By
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Greek youth are among the least favorable to the
United States and to NATO in Western Europe,
probably because of a perception that the United
States is biased in favor of Turkey on the Cyprus and
Aegean issues and was responsible for the overthrow
of Greek democracy in the 1960s. One recent survey
by a reputable Greek polling firm suggests that anti-
American and anti-Alliance feelings have reached
truly alarming proportions among younger Greeks.
Fewer than one in 10 of Greeks under 35 indicated
they have a good opinion of the United States as
opposed to about three out of 10 Greeks over 50. On
the other hand, over half the Greeks aged between 18
and 24 said they had a favorable opinion of the
Soviet Union. And over two-thirds of those under 34
want Greece out of NA TO as compared with less than
half of older Greeks.
contrast, among those over 35, only 31 percent of the
West Germans, 47 percent of the Italians, and 52
percent of the British held the same view.
Although younger West Europeans may have qualms
about the current direction of US foreign policy, we
believe they are neither basically anti-American nor
attracted to the Soviet Union. USIA studies under-
taken in the early 1980s suggest that Vietnam and
Watergate have not had an especially profound im-
pact on youth's overall image of the United States.
Younger Italians, West Germans, and Frenchmen-
like their elders-considered the United States "trust-
worthy" and its human rights record favorable. At the
same time, they gave the Soviets very low marks for
trustworthiness and for their human rights per-
formance. Moreover, according to 1983 USIA data,
younger West Europeans are about as likely to be
alarmed about the potential of current Soviet policies
to lead to war as they are about American policies.
Although they may not be favorable to the Soviet
Union, they are not especially fearful of it either.
According to USIA surveys, only minuscule numbers
of younger people believe that a Soviet invasion is
likely; in this respect, however, they are not much
different from the rest of the population. West Euro-
pean youth's lack of concern about a Soviet military
threat may reflect, in addition to the general impact
of "detente," their belief that the East-West military
balance is either tilted in favor of the United States
(France) or at parity (West Germany, Italy). Among
the major states, only the United Kingdom's young
people believe that the Warsaw Pact holds a military
edge over the West. Significantly, a substantial 45
percent of them (about the same proportion as those
over 35) are worried about the possibility of Soviet
political intimidation; in Italy and West Germany the 25X1
number of younger people who are similarly worried
(respectively 31 and 28 percent) is not only smaller
than in the United Kingdom but smaller than the
number of older Italians and West Germans express-
Views on Security Issues. Because they neither partic-
ularly trust the United States nor fear the Soviet
Union and because their concern about the environ-
ment leads them to be hostile to anything nuclear,
younger West Europeans have been generally opposed
to the NATO decision on INF deployment. According
to USIA estimates, about 85 percent of the anti-INF
demonstrators in West Germany have been between
18 and 35, while in the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom, two-thirds of the demonstrators have fallen
into this category. In Belgium and Italy, the propor-
tions of younger people participating in these demon-
strations are somewhat smaller-around 50 percent-
but still considerably larger than the proportion of 18-
to 35-year-olds in the general population.
The prevalence of younger faces in the crowds of anti-
INF demonstrators provides a somewhat exaggerated
indication, however, of the extent of age differences
on the INF question. Younger people are, as noted
earlier, generally more inclined than their elders to
participate in protest demonstrations, and the abso-
lute number of younger people who have been in-
volved in demonstrations is a very small percentage of
the total youth population. The Eurobarometer survey 25X1
has indeed indicated that while younger people
throughout the European Community were massively
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in favor of "antiwar" movements-about 73 percent
of the 15- to 24-year-olds and 68 percent of the 25- to
39-year-olds indicated they approved of these move-
ments at least somewhat-substantial majorities of
older West Europeans held a similar view.
Surveys directly probing attitudes on INF deployment
have revealed only small differences by age. In three
of the INF-basing countries-Italy, the Netherlands,
and Belgium-similarly high levels of opposition exist
among all age groups in the general population. In the
United Kingdom and West Germany, according to
mid-1983 USIA surveys, less educated 18- to 35-year-
olds were more likely than those over 35 to consider
themselves "unconditional opponents" of INF, al-
though only by the modest respective margins of 34 to
24 percent and 42 to 33 percent.
In addition to opposing INF deployment, younger
West Europeans are also hostile to expanding, or even
maintaining, their countries' national defense efforts.
In polls taken last year in West Germany, the Nether-
lands, Belgium, Italy, and France, between three-
fifths and three-fourths of young people between 18
and 30 thought current levels of defense spending
were too high-and that national budget deficit prob-
lems should be resolved through defense cutbacks.
Only in France and the Netherlands, however, were
older age groups substantially less likely to hold these
views. British young people are less opposed to defense
spending than their continental counterparts-a 1981
survey indicated that a narrow majority opposed
reductions-probably because of their demonstrated
greater suspicions of Soviet intentions
Security Issues and the Successor Generation. Recent
USIA surveys have provided age breakdowns of the
educated elite's attitudes in the United Kingdom,
Italy, and West Germany on the United States, the
Soviet Union, and INF. As in the case of ideological
preferences, it is the West German successor genera-
tion that stands most strikingly apart from its elders
and from the larger pool of less educated young
people:
? In the United Kingdom, the views of the better
educated 18- to 34-year-olds do not differ greatly
from those of their elder counterparts. Britain's
successor elite generation has the same moderate
level of confidence in US foreign and military
policies as the older elite; it is even more likely than
the older elite to believe that Soviet policies increase
the risk of war and to be concerned about Soviet
political intimidation. Younger educated Britons
are, however, more likely than older ones (43 to 29
percent) to oppose INF deployment.
? In Italy, there is a fairly substantial age gap in the
views of the better educated. Those who are 18 to 34
are 30 percentage points more likely to be uncondi-
tional opponents of INF deployment, 37 points more
likely to believe that US policies are leading toward
war, and 20 points less likely to have confidence in
US foreign policy. In general, however, the views of
better educated younger Italians are close to those
of the rest of Italian youth and thus not dramatical-
ly different from the older less educated population.
It is the older Italian elite that is "out of step" with
the rest of the population in being more pro-
American and pro-INF.
? In West Germany 63 percent of the successor
generation were unconditional opponents of INF as
compared with 35 percent of those who are better
educated and over 35 and 42 percent of the less
educated young. The younger, better educated were
24 percentage points less likely to be concerned
about Soviet intimidation than their older counter-
parts and nine points less likely than their less
educated peers. And, whereas 40 percent of those
who were better educated and over 35 and 26
percent of those who were less educated and under
35 indicated that they had confidence in US foreign
policy, only 21 percent of the successor generation
did so.
Our review of more recent national surveys in West-
ern Europe confirms the extraordinary dimensions of
the West German elite generation gap. In one survey,
two-thirds of the West German successor generation
favored "getting out of East-West politics" as com-
pared with only about a third of the older elite and a
similar proportion of the less educated, young or old.
Moreover, nearly three-fifths of the successor genera-
tion indicated they had no confidence in US foreign
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The New Politics in West Germany
Nowhere in Western Europe have the new politics
taken as firm a hold on the younger generation as in
West Germany. The Green Party, with its anti-
nuclear and participatory emphasis, has attracted far
more young people in West Germany than have
similar parties in other countries. The West German
"alternatives'-who favor withdrawal from the so-
cial mainstream into the world of self-governing
communes-appear to be significantly larger than the
"dropout "populations in other major West European
countries. National survey data indicate that large
numbers of younger West Germans are hostile to
technology and that only a minority adhere strongly
to the work ethic-a central feature of the "material-
ist" outlook.
The attitudes of younger West Germans contrast
sharply with the strong materialism of their parents'
generation. Older West Germans probably place
heavier emphasis on the maintenance of economic
and social order, and on personal advancement
through hard work than their counterparts in other
West European countries. These preferences reflect
factors unique to West Germany such as their up-
bringing in traditionally German authoritarian fam-
ilies, their harsh experiences with economic and
social disorders (the 1923 inflation and postwar
shortages), and their need to keep their "nose to the
grindstone" in order to make a success of postwar
reconstruction. Today's young have matured within
one of the most prosperous and stable economic and
political environments in Western Europe-and thus
are more strongly inclined to look toward "higher
order" values than younger people elsewhere. More-
over, there is evidence that the West German family
policy while less than a fifth of both the older elite and
the rest of the population did so. Among the other five
major NATO countries, only in the Netherlands were
there gaps between the successor generation and the
rest of the population similar to those in West
Germany.
structure has loosened up in recent years. According
to a West German sociological study, almost half of
teenage West Germans reported in 1976 that they
could go out at night without informing their parents
of their whereabouts as compared with only about 2
percent as late as the mid-1960s.
The strong leftism of the younger West Germans-
and particularly of the successor generation-may be
in part a reaction to the dominance of materialist
values in West German society. Thus it is possible
that, as generational replacement brings postmateri-
alism more into the mainstream of West German
thinking, younger people may be less inclined to
consider themselves social outsiders-and thus less
prone to consider themselves leftists and to vote for
antiestablishment parties such as today's Greens.
Academic experts have suggested that the exception-
ally critical attitude of younger educated West Ger-
mans toward US foreign and security policies reflects
in part the legacy of Nazism. The successor genera-
tion is probably more aware than youth as a whole of
Germany's behavior while under the Nazi regime.
They may resent their parents' generation's acquies-
cence to totalitarianism and their subsequent tenden-
cy to "sweep under the rug" Germany's crimes during
World War II. They may for this reason be disin-
clined to adopt their parents'foreign policy prefer-
ences, such as support for the United States. More-
over, by being critical of US policies and behavior,
they may be displacing their own subconscious sense
of guilt over their country's past.
Still With NATO. The major bright spot in the
international perspectives of West European youth is
their attitudes toward NATO. Despite their critical
stance on security issues and on the United States,
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younger West Europeans including the successor gen-
eration remain committed to the Atlantic Alliance.
Numerous USIA and national surveys in recent years
have pointed out that approximately three-fifths or
more of less educated 18- to 34-year-olds and similar
majorities of better educated young people believe
that NATO is still "essential" to their country's
national security. Age differences in attitudes toward
NATO vary according to the wording of survey
questions and the timing of polls. They are generally
small in the case of the United Kingdom and the Low
Countries, however, and relatively modest in the case
of West Germany and Italy. Younger Frenchmen are
less supportive of NATO than most other younger
West Europeans (somewhat less than half) but are no
different in this respect than their "Gaullist"-oriented
older compatriots
Youth and the Future of West European Politics
To predict the behavior of West European youth
either over the next few years or over the "long
term"-when current youth will attain positions of
power and influence-it is necessary to determine
whether present age-related differences are likely to
last over time. There are two possible sources of age-
related differences, each of which has profoundly
different implications for their persistence:
? They may first of all be products of the "life-cycle"
phenomenon. Young people are different from their
elders simply because they are young: they have
fewer responsibilities and less experience with the
harsh realities of the world. They may thus be prone
to certain modes of thought, such as idealism and
concern for the unfortunate. As they acquire respon-
sibilities and experience with age, however, their
attitudes may increasingly become more hardhead-
ed. To the extent that age differences reflect the life
cycle, they will fade over time.
? Age differences can also result from changing his-
torical and social circumstances, what social scien-
tists call generational sources. Common experiences
of major historical developments such as wars or
depressions can leave a psychic imprint on young
individuals which may condition their future
thought and behavior-and set them apart from
those who matured under different circumstances.
Moreover, major socioeconomic changes can alter
the relative size of various demographic group-
ings-the educated, the affluent, the religious, for
example-and thus change the aggregate attitudes
of the affected generation. Unlike life-cycle differ-
ences, "generational" differences tend to persist,
although their strength will be affected by changes
in the political and economic environment facing a
young generation as it matures.
Because of the absence of long-term comparable data
on West European public attitudes, it is not possible
at this point to gauge the relative importance of life-
cycle and generational causes of age-related differ-
ences in political attitudes, much less the impact of
ongoing events on these differences as a young gener-
ation matures. Thus predictions about the behavior of
the younger generation cannot be made with any
sense of certainty. We believe, however, that the use
of the following common sense "rules of thumb" can
help clarify the significance that current age-related
differences in political attitudes may have for future
West European politics:
? Age differences in the general population which
have a basis in demographic changes such as the
level of education-either alone or in addition to the
common experience of historical events-are likely
to persist in some form despite the aging process or
subsequent developments, because such changes will
exert a continuing influence on attitudes.
? Small or moderate differences in generational atti-
tudes on specific issues (10 to 15 points between two
groups)-which popular writers often point to with
alarm-should not be taken very seriously as har-
bingers of future political change. Even if such
differences were fully generational in nature, and,
thus likely to persist, they would produce only a
glacial change in overall public opinion-since the
survival of the current middle age group into old age
will dilute their impact. In general, we believe that
only differences in opinion which are wide, persist-
ent over time, and consistent across a range of
related issues-as in West Germany-should be
seen as raising a real prospect for generational
changes in politics or policy.
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Young People and Democratic Institutions. Given
that most West European youth are generally satis-
fied with their life situations, not unduly pessimistic
about their futures, supportive of their country's
democratic institutions, and opposed to political vio-
lence, it is highly unlikely they will resort to mass
antidemocratic behavior-such as participating in
civil disturbances in large numbers. It is even less
likely that they will do so when they age, since the
propensity for this type of behavior is a life-cycle
phenomenon limited mainly to youth. To be sure, a
small youth culture comprising the "alternatives" as
well as hooligans of various stripe (such as punks and
chaotics) probably will persist for at least a few more
years. Thus, house squatting and the occasional vio-
lent protest will continue to absorb the attention of
West European law enforcement and municipal au-
thorities. The success of outgoing West Berlin Mayor
Richard Von Weizsaecker in dramatically reducing
the incidence of squatting in his city (as reported by
the US Mission in West Berlin) through a firm but
measured approach to law enforcement suggests, how-
ever, that youth culture's threat to social order can be
contained by competent authorities.'
We can identify two possible short-term developments
that might bring youthful unrest to levels that would
concern West European governments. One would be a
governmental decision-which the Thatcher govern-
ment has been contemplating in the United King-
dom-to cut youth unemployment benefits, whose
currently fairly generous levels probably have played
a role in keeping youthful frustration in bounds. The
second would be a sharp upsurge in youthful unem-
ployment, such as is currently taking place in West
Germany. Sociologists argue that the unemployed are
most likely to resort to violent protest soon after losing
their jobs or after their initial efforts to gain employ-
ment because their level of frustration is highest then.
We suspect that the potential for youthful unrest will
decline over the course of the decade. West European
birth rates fell sharply beginning in the late 1960s and
thus the number of older adolescents and young
adults will fall by the late 1980s (see table 3). This
Table 3
OECD Forecast of Annual
Youth Population
Growth Trends,
1985-90
-8.4
-1.3
-1.3
0
-0.3
-0.6
Italy
- 1.1
0.3
Netherlands
-3.1
-0.5
United Kingdom
-2.1
-0.7
Sweden
-1.0
0.5
decline in the youth population will decrease the
number of new recruits for the alternative culture and
violence-prone groups, whose own ranks probably will
have been depleted anyway because of the aging of
current members. It should also reduce unemploy-
ment among 15- to 24-year-olds and with it the sense
of frustration that could lead to unrest among this
potentially volatile group."
The most durable difference, in our judgment, in the
attitudes of younger and older West Europeans to-
ward democratic institutions is likely to be on the
question of political participation. The young-partic-
ularly the better educated successor generation-are
considerably more inclined to favor direct forms of
participation such as petition drives, citizen action
groups, and demonstrations. We think that this is a
generational phenomenon and that today's younger
West Europeans will continue to hold this preference
' Because we expect overall unemployment levels to remain high at
least through the end of this decade
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many of today's
younger generation will continue to experience joblessness and 25X1
underemployment as they mature. Although public opinion data
suggest that unemployment has not as yet had a profound impact
on youth attitudes, the possibility that prolonged economic hardshi
might lead to increasing alienation cannot be wholly discounted.
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as they age because direct participation satisfies the
needs of a fairly well-educated generation for self-
expression.
Increased direct citizen participation in the policy
process could have positive consequences for West
European societies, such as increased bureaucratic
sensitivity to public preferences, but also some draw-
backs for them, and for US interests as well.' Leading
scholars have argued that such participation can
render governments ineffective by increasing the op-
portunities for blocking policies or disrupting their
implementation. The continuing activities of the peace
movement against INF and the efforts of antinuclear
power activists are cases in point. Given that the
better educated are likely to be disproportionately
involved in direct participation-and that this group
is favorable to environmentalism and in some coun-
tries hostile to security cooperation with the United
States-such participation could restrain West Euro-
pean economic growth and complicate the task of
sustaining the US military presence in Western
Europe
Youth and the Political Balance
Whether today's younger generation will continue to
vote disproportionately for the left is obviously a
question of central importance both for predicting the
course of domestic politics and foreign policy. Popular
wisdom favors a life-cycle interpretation of youthful
voting behavior-the young vote left because of their
idealism and "compassion," then turn to more con-
servative parties as they age to protect their personal
economic interests. To test this view we have com-
pared the expressed partisan affiliation of various age
groups of West Europeans in 1983 with the affili-
ations expressed by similar groups eight years earlier,
in 1975. The findings of this comparison, displayed in
table 4, show little or no movement to the right-and
in a few cases some movement to the left-among the
age groups examined. Although these results may to
' A good example of the drawbacks is the declaration of the West
German Green Party in February 1984 that it would exploit its
membership on the parliamentary committee overseeing intelli-
gence operations to disclose military secrets if this was in the public
interest. The West German parliament subsequently voted to
exclude the Greens from the oversight committee. In the future,
when the successor generation has more power and influence, it
will, of course, be far more difficult to curb such departures from
some extent reflect the timing of the surveys that are
compared, they do suggest that there will not neces-
sarily be a progression toward center-right parties as
the younger generation matures.
We believe that a large number of today's 18- to 35-
year-olds will continue to identify broadly with parties
of the left over the next five or 10 years, and probably
even when they reach middle age. Our judgment is
based on our belief that the postmaterialist prefer-
ences of the young-which appear to be the key factor
behind their disproportionate support for the left-
derive from basic socioeconomic factors such as their
affluent upbringings and high levels of education.
They are thus unlikely to fade substantially. It is
arguable, of course, that the serious economic prob-
lems which Western Europe is likely to face in coming
years could prompt a return to materialism-and a
turn toward more conservative politics. However, the
Eurobarometer survey finding that 25- to 34-year-old
West Europeans were almost as postmaterialist in
1982 as they were when they were 10 years younger-
despite their likely acquisition of greater responsibil-
ities and the deterioration of Western Europe's eco-
nomic performance over this period-points against
this view, particularly in West Germany.
Despite the probable continuing general preference of
today's young for leftist parties, we do not see future
leftist dominance of West European politics as inev-
itable or even likely:
? Young people may vote disproportionately now for
leftist parties, but they are not, as shown earlier,
leftist in a conventional sense: majorities place
themselves on the center or right of the ideological
spectrum, and there is little or no age difference on
views of corporations, trade unions, or the need for
governmental intervention. If left-of-center parties
were to pursue an old left agenda of widespread
nationalization and centralized control of society,
they might well lose a substantial portion of the
current young generation's support. We note, in this
connection, the British Labor Party's loss of about a
fifth of its younger supporters-mainly to the Social
Democratic Liberal Alliance-when it ran on an
aggressively socialist program in the 1983 election.
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Table 4
Partisan Change and Aging
1975-83
Less Than
18-29
22-31
30-39
32-46
30-59
47-Plus
60-Plus
21 Years
Years
Years
Years
Years
Years
Years
Years
in 1975
in 1983
in 1975
in 1983
in 1975
in 1983
in 1975
in 1983
Supporting left-of-center 60 61
parties in 1975
Supporting left-of-center 66
parties in 1983
Supporting center and right- 40
wing parties 1975
Supporting center and right- 34
wing parties 1983
? The West European public's loyalty to political
parties is likely, in our judgment, to weaken in the
years to come. Studies in the United Kingdom have
shown that strong partisanship has been on the
decline among all age groups in recent years, proba-
bly because of skepticism that either the Labor or
Conservative Party can halt the United Kingdom's
steady economic slide. Because the economies of the
other West European countries are also likely to
suffer stagnation in the years ahead, voting patterns
among all age groups are likely to become increas-
ingly less rigid and more influenced by personalities
and issues in individual elections. This will probably
mean increased governmental turnover, thus limit-
ing the ability of future leftist governments to carry
out extensive programs of socioeconomic change.
Greater fluidity among electorates will also permit
centrist parties to increase their share of the current
young generation's vote if they can present candi-
dates or programs that address some of its new
politics concerns.
? As recent events in West Germany suggest, the
political left could divide between economic-growth-
oriented parties, such as the Social Democrats, and
new politics-oriented parties such as the Greens,
thus paving the way to victory for center-right
parties.
We think it more likely that close left/right competi-
tion rather than leftist dominance will result from
generational replacement. But, whoever governs,
West European political discourse, in our view, is
likely to focus increasingly on the new politics agenda
because of its popularity among the younger universi-
ty educated-the successor generation that will soon
acquire positions of power within the bureaucracy, the
media, and other influential institutions.
Youth and the Atlantic Alliance
We believe that the chances that today's younger
generation will have a major impact on basic foreign
policy stances in Western Europe are likely to be
small in countries such as the United Kingdom,
France, and Belgium; somewhat greater in Italy and
the Netherlands; and greatest in West Germany.'
6 Even if generational replacement failed to produce significant
changes in any of the major NATO allies, this would not mean a
climate of opinion in Western Europe favorable to US and Alliance
interests. USIA studies indicate that, although West Europeans of
all ages remain committed to NATO, they are decreasingly
confident in US foreign policy. In Britain, for example, the overall
level of public confidence in the United States has declined from
the 50- to 70-percent range during the 1960s and 1970s to the 45-
to 55-percent range in the 1980s. Similar downward trends are
evident in West Germany, Italy, and several other allied countries.
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We doubt the t the younger generations in the United
Kingdom and Belgium will alter those countries' pro-
Atlanticist orientations or that France's young people
will fundamentally change its policy of pro-Western
"independence." Age differences in these countries in
the surveys we have reviewed have been small on
basic foreign policy questions and thus not likely to
change the climate of opinion sufficiently to affect
government policy. The impact of these differences
will be further diluted, at least over the short term,
because only minute portions of younger people in
these countries believe that foreign or security issues
constitute their countries' top problem, a designation
that the vast majority of them apply to unemploy-
ment. Finally, the successor generations in these
countries appear to think and thus probably will act,
much like the current elite.
In the Netherlands and Italy, differences among the
general population on foreign policy questions are also
generally on the small side. There, too, most young
people are also primarily concerned with economic
issues. At the same time we have found some substan-
tial differences among the educated elite on such
questions as INF deployment, confidence in the Unit-
ed States, fear of Soviet political intimidation, and the
preference for getting out of East-West politics. These
differences indicate that, in the future, elites in these
countries might seek more independent paths in inter-
national affairs. We think it should be kept in mind,
however, that the successor generations in both coun-
tries remain overwhelmingly committed to NATO,
and that the relative weakness of both countries will
circumscribe their freedom of action.
We do foresee the possibility of a new "youth"
problem in the foreign affairs area arising toward the
end of this decade. Despite widespread antidefense
sentiments, Western Europe has been able to avoid
draft protests up to now. This is partly because the
existence of a large manpower pool has permitted
liberal-and growing-use of conscientious objector
status and health deferments to allow evasion. More-
over, the poor job market has made service in the
military an attactive alternative for some youths.
Because the decline in the youth population will both
dry up the manpower pool and improve the youth job
market, the possibility of tomorrow's young genera-
tion taking to the streets to oppose conscription must
The West German Case. We believe that the chances
that the younger generation will affect basic foreign
policy are greatest in West Germany. In view of that
country's linchpin role in NATO and the EC, this
could have profound repercussions for all of Western
Europe. Age differences on international issues be-
tween the West German successor generation and
older West Germans tend to be somewhat larger than
in the other countries. Age differences in West Ger-
many are particularly pronounced among adherents
of leftist parties (table 5).
Our survey of public opinion polls shows that younger
educated West Germans-particularly those with
leftist sympathies-are far more critical of US for-
eign policy and inclined to stay out of US-Soviet
conflicts than their older counterparts. They may thus
be inclined at least to move West German foreign
policy in a more independent direction when they
assume power. Because their world views may reflect
in part deep-seated psychological complexes arising
from the legacy of the Nazis, the successor elite
generation cannot necessarily be expected to modify
its views simply as a result of aging.
Within the SPD, the impact of young leftists has
already begun to be felt. Although the party is still
controlled by older, Helmut Schmidt-style Social
Democrats, party leaders are taking steps to recapture
the support of young leftists who bolted in 1983 to
vote for the Greens. The SPD has revised its stance on
INF deployment, and, in the interest of electoral
expediency, it may trim further the pro-Alliance
aspects of its foreign policy.
Although we believe that generational replacement
could bring about changes in West German foreign
policy, we also think that there are two important
facts which could act to limit the extent of those
changes:
? Continuity on the Center-Right. Younger people
who identify with the Christian Democrats and the
Free Democrats share the basic international per-
spectives of their elder counterparts with the excep-
tion of the INF issue. This suggests these parties
be taken seriously.
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Table 5
Views on Key International Issues,
by Age and Party Preference,
Percent Answering Negatively
West France
Germany
Italy
Nether-
lands
Belgium
West France
Italy
Nether-
Belgium
Germany
lands
West France Italy Nether- Belgium
Germany lands
West France Italy Nether- Belgium
Germany lands
18-34
3
3
8
2
5
12
34
26
14
31
35 and over
4
5
5
4
8
12
36
21
10
22
a Negative answers signify cancel deployment; not essential for
country to continue to belong to NATO; no confidence in United
States to deal responsibly with world problems; and stay out of
East-West politics.
will be under far less electoral pressure than their
leftist counterparts to alter their foreign policy
positions and are also less likely to be taken over by
anti-American or proneutralist elites. To the extent
that these parties govern or participate in governing
in the future, the impact of generational replace-
ment probably will be greatly reduced.
? The young still look Westward. Younger West
Germans of all political persuasions and educational
levels overwhelmingly favor continued participation
'in NATO. Moreover, the young, according to recent
polls, are less interested than older groups in the
possibility of German reunification-the principal
bait which the Soviet Bloc might dangle to entice
Bonn into neutralism.
Thus we do not see it as inevitable or even likely that
West Germany will leave the Western fold as a result
of generational replacement. But it probably will
become a more independent and difficult partner on
economic issues and on arms control and other de-
fense issues.'
Domestically, generational replacement could also produce signifi-
cant changes in politics and policy because of the special emphasis
that the young place on postmaterialist values. For instance,
protection of West Germany's forests from the alleged threat of
"acid rain" may become as important a political issue as the
promotion of industrial growth. Parties headed by politicians who
offend postmaterialist sensibilities may find it increasingly difficult
to obtain political office. For example, under the leadership of the
stern traditionalist Franz Josef Strauss, the CDU/CSU suffered a
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Conclusion
In sum, we believe that the present generation of
West European youth, while not as iconoclastic or
politically radical as youth in the 1960s, will nonethe-
less serve as a catalyst of change. Fewer of today's
youth are likely to follow the traditional political
pattern of becoming more conservative as they marry,
have children, and acquire an economic stake in the
status quo. More of today's youth will, we judge,
probably retain their leftist political views. As noted
earlier, however, this could have the effect of frag-
menting and weakening the political left rather than
strengthening it.
In the area of foreign and security policy, young
people-particularly the successor generation-are
likely to be in the forefront of those favoring a
reduced defense effort, greater independence from the
United States, and detente with the Soviet Union. But
they are by no means likely to be alone. If recent
trends are a guide, such sentiments will be held
increasingly by West European publics in general. In
that sense, the oft-repeated concerns of those such as
Chancellor Kohl about the dangers of a growing
generation gap are misplaced. It is not so much a
divergence but a convergence of generational views
that leaders on both sides of the Atlantic must
contend with-at least on security issues.
Perhaps the present youth generation's most durable
and consequential contribution to West European
politics is the change it is forging in the norms of
political behavior. Young people's predilection for
participatory politics and direct action already ap-
pears to be giving them disproportionate influence on
governments' capabilities, decisionmaking, and poli-
cies. Although such forms of expression are politically
neutral and could thus be adopted by those supportive
of a strong defense effort and close ties with the
United States, their impact in the short run is to make
it difficult for governments to be responsive allies.
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