WESTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL AMERICA: INFLUENCE BUT NOT POWER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00316R000100050006-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: April 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of -eP-
Intelligence
Western Europe and
Central America:
Influence But Not Power
-Secret
EUR 84-10066
April 1984
.238
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Secret
EUR 84-10066
April 1984
Intelligence
Western Europe and
Central America:
Influence But Not Power
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared byl 25X1
Office of European Analysis. It was coordinated with
the Directorate, of Operations 25X1
directed to the Deputy Director, EURA, 25X1
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
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Western Europe and
Central America:
Influence But Not Power
Summary ' West European interest in Central America has risen over the past few
Information available years, and at the same time the West Europeans have grown more
as of 10 April 1984 skeptical about US policy toward the region. As a result, it often seems
was used in this report.
that the most the United States can hope for from its allies is a sort of
pained silence; at worst, West Europeans seem inclined to take initia-
tives-albeit not very effective ones-that work at cross-purposes with the
United States.
We think three factors go a long way to explain. this attitude. First, the re-
gion is of marginal intrinsic interest to West Europeans and their influence
is commensurately small. Second, however, Central America carries
considerable symbolic, emotional significance in Western Europe-and not
just for leftists. Third, the West Europeans know that the region is of great
importance to the. United States and that what they do there will come un-
der close scrutiny in Washington.
Only the leftist Governments of France and Spain have actually attempted
significant initiatives recently. The Mitterrand .government's efforts pro-
duced a Franco-Mexican declaration in August 1981 calling for negotia-
tions with the Salvadoran rebels and an arms deal with Nicaragua the
following December. The French also developed a series of other ambitious
but unsuccessful initiatives, each of which was criticized by one or more of
the non-Communist participants. We think Paris will be more cautious
from now on, but the urge to do something remains strong. The best the
United States can look for from the French is passivity.
The record of Spanish activity is modest by comparison, partly, we think,
because Prime Minister Gonzalez and his colleagues started with a clearer 25X1
sense of what was possible. The principal Spanish initiative centered on
Gonzalez's trip to Latin America in May and June 1983.
We think West European socialists now acknowledge, as one of them put
it, that they have influence but not power in Central America (and by
implication that, without power, influence has little meaning when the
chips are down). We believe the socialists have decided, therefore, that
there is little point in jeopardizing their ties with Washington in the slim
hope of furthering their goals in the region. Furthermore, in our view, they
have become less starry-eyed about the Sandinistas and the Salvadoran
iii Secret
EUR 84-10066
April 1984
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leftists. We think anyone reaching such conclusions is likely to be
interested mainly in keeping out of controversy. Thus we think West
European leftists will be more cautious than in the last couple of years.
But we believe sympathy, for the left and dislike of the right in Central
America, together with a belief that the conflicts in the region there should
be resolved through negotiations, will remain the most common attitudes
among West Europeans who focus on'the region. We see very little chance
that West Europeans of any political persuasion will actively support the
military and paramilitary aspects of US policy in Central America. Their
"reticence will grow, we believe, in proportion'to the scope of US activity. It
could turn into outright criticism-even from sympathetic governments-
if the United States were to send its own forces into action. The likelihood
of criticism would increase further, we believe, if US involvement should be
prolonged.
We believe that, if they do anything, the West Europeans-socialists more
eagerly than centrists and conservatives-will keep pushing the United
States toward negotiated solutions. But the net effect of all the pressures on
them is to discourage rather than to encourage activity. As_a result, we
think the West Europeans will remain on the sidelines, keeping quiet most
of the time and criticizing US policy more often than they praise it.
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Summary
Popular Attitudes and Historic Ties
2
. Spain:.A Partial Exception
2
The Symbolic Aspect
The Centrists and Conservatives
4
Gonzalez Makes His Move
10
The US Factor
10
Appendix
Western Europe and Central America: Economic Relationships
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West European Aid to Central America
Nearly all the West Europeans' assistance comes in
the form of credits rather than grants. US Embassy
reporting suggests that the Central Americans have
not found the Europeans generous when it comes to
negotiating terms or repayment schedules-although,
with a country like Nicaragua, socialist governments
may in practice not hold the recipient to the letter of
the contract. Thus, on the one hand, the US Embassy
in Paris reports that the Mitterrand government has
not been particularly forthcoming in the terms of its
aid to Nicaragua, but, on the other, Spanish officials
have told the US Embassy that they do not expect
Managua will repay the $45 million credit granted in
1983.
To the official aid must be added the assistance
flowing through unofficial channels, notably the West
European political parties. Although again not great
in absolute terms, this aid sometimes has a measur-
able political effect. The US Embassy in San Salva-
dor reports, for example, that the Spanish Socialist
party has been a principal source of support for the
National Revolutionary Movement of Salvadoran
leftist Guillermo Ungo. In the case of the West
German parties, moreover, much of the money actu-
ally originates with the government. It is channeled
through four foundations, each of them an affiliate of
one of the four major parties. According to documen-
tary evidence, the Christian Democratic and Social
Democratic foundations each submitted proposals in
1982 valued at. about $30 million for the developing
world as a whole. The Free Democrats'foundation
requested about half that amount and the Christian
Social Union's foundation about a third.
No comprehensive data are available on how much of
this money goes to Central America, but the avail-
able information suggests that the amounts are
small. in 1982 the Free
.Democratic foundation was involved in projects in
Nicaragua valued at a little under $500,000. Accord-
ing to the Embassy in Bonn, in the same year the
Christian Democratic foundation was providing
about $5,000 to the Nicaraguan Human Rights Com-
mission.
The West German foundations are required to ac-
count closely for their expenditures,, and most of the
money goes to such recipients as trade unions and
study centers.
funds from the Social Democratic Party's
oun ation make their way to leftists like El Salva-
dor's Ungo, and,
the Christian Democratic foundation was supporting
Napoleon Duarte last year, and in 1982 the founda-
tion provided aid to a Nicaraguan Social Christian
exile.
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Western Europe and
Central America:
Influence But Not Power
The West European approach to Central America has
changed over the past few years. Concern about the
area has risen; and West Europeans have become
more critical of US policy. As a result, it often seems
as if the most the United.States can hope for from its
allies is a sort of pained silence; at worst, West
Europeans seem inclined to take initiatives-albeit
not very effective ones-that work at cross-purposes
with US policies
Three factors go.a long way to explain the West
Europeans' attitude, in our'opinion. First, the region is
of marginal intrinsic interest to them and their influ-
ence is commensurately small. Second, however, Cen-
tral America carries considerable symbolic, emotional
significance for West Europeans-and for conserva-
tives and centrists as well as leftists. Third, the West
Europeans know that the region is of great importance
to the United States and that what they do there will
come under close scrutiny in Washington. The three
factors pull them in different directions, and their
reactions are diverse-not just between countries, but
also across the political spectrum within a given
country.and over time as well.
West European Interests .
Central America is of little intrinsic interest to West-
ern Europe. Direct West European interests-defined
as "economic involvement and historical ties"-are
modest. On the economic side, trade with the region is
a tiny fraction of total trade for every West European
country, and Western Europe does not loom large. in
the trade of any Central American state (see table 1,
appendix). We have not discovered any examples of
West European companies that are dependent on
Central American contracts. Ritual commitments are
periodically made to increase trade in both directions,
but we see no sign that. West Europeans think of trade
with Central America as an issue they must pay much
West European investment is similarly meager. Al-
though the data are incomplete, it is clear that the
West Europeans rarely seek investment opportunities
in the region, and in no country is substantial West
European capital tied up (see table 2, appendix).
Nowhere are investments so extensive that a West
European country is likely to-feel a need to protect
them, as the French and British do in much of Africa,
for example. Most of the time, we believe, the West
Europeans simply try to remain on good terms with
the region's governments so as not to miss any
economic opportunities. But this inclination is not at
all strong and can be overridden when political factors
seem to call for action (or, more often, inaction).
Witness West Germany's dilatoriness between 1980
and 1984 over sending an ambassador to San Salva-
dor or Spain's refusal to resume diplomatic relations
with Guatemala four years after the sacking of the
Spanish Embassy. Indeed, economic relations are so
meager that neither side has much trouble keeping
them divorced from politics. The US Embassy in
Guatemala notes, for example, that Spanish exports
increased markedly.in 1981 and 1982 despite the
suspension of diplomatic relations (see table 3, appen-
dix)
The pattern- of West European aid conveys a slightly
different picture. The assistance provided by the
Europeans is not terribly extensive on their own scale
of values (see tables 4 and 5, appendix),' and in this
sense it confirms Central America's relative unimpor-
tance. It sometimes has a significant effect on the
much smaller Central American economies, however;
according to our analysis, for example, Western Eu-
rope was the source of about one-fifth of the official
aid disbursements to Nicaragua in 1983. Moreover,
the provision or denial of West European aid may
' It may be worth noting, however, that the gap between US and
West European economic aid levels before 1981, was narrower in
some cases than might have been. expected (see table 4, appendix),
attention to.
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convey a political message even if the amounts in-
volved are small. It is clear from diplomatic reporting
that the Sandinistas looked on their 1981 arms deal
with the French as a political as well as a military
boon, and we think the Salvadoran Government has
been heartened by the announcement last December
that West German assistance would be resumed.F_
Aid, in other words, is valued as much for its symbolic
as its practical impact. For the West Europeans the
symbolism involves supporting (generally at little ac-
tual cost) those Central American groups with which
they feel ideologically compatible; we would speculate
that the Central Americans gain enhanced status
and-in the case of leftists like the Sandinistas-
access to a possible source of influence on US policy.
Popular Attitudes and Historic Ties
Generally speaking, West Europeans know little
about Central America and are not particularly inter-
ested in it. In a USIA poll late last summer, for .
example, fewer than half the respondents could name
any of the countries involved in Central American
conflicts. To be sure, mass surveys rarely show a high
level of awareness on any foreign policy issue, but
West Europeans have consistently proved more
knowledgeable about other external topics than about
Central America.
Polls and diplomatic reporting indicate that awareness
is gradually increasing, but it tends to be concentrated
among elite groups whose influence is out of propor-
tion to their numbers. We think there remains a core
of validity in Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez's
comment to an interviewer in December 1982 that
Latin America as a whole-let alone Central America
by itself-"continues to be, for what the press calls
the political class, the 'great unknown' as a conti-
nent." In our view, the lack of awareness means,.first,
that West Europeans sometimes take positions on the
basis of rather superficial knowledge; second, that
those who do care can often wield considerable influ-
ence; and third, that within certain limits West
European governments can sometimes adjust their
policies-in particular, pull back from un romisin
initiatives-at little political cost
Ignorance of Central America and lack of interest in
it are partly the result of history. Spain was the only
substantial colonial power iri.the region, but its influ-
ence has long since been. superseded by that of the
United States. Of the other West European countries,
Britain has been working for years to reduce its
commitment in Belize. The weakness of the United
Kingdom's tie is symbolized by the government's
unwillingness-stated all but explicitly when British
officials talk with their US counterparts-to go to
war over Belize and by a scarcely concealed belief
that London is staying on for reasons that have as
much to do with US as with British interests.
Spain: A Partial Exception
To some extent Spain does not fit the picture of
ignorance and lack of involvement in Central Ameri-
ca. Spanish cultural links, particularly through the
Catholic Church, are still pervasive, and Spaniards
often speak of themselves as being unique among
West Europeans in their Latin "vocation." Spaniards
are heavily represented in the Central American
clergy; the late, cardinal-archbishop of Guatemala, for
example, came from Spain.' According to the US
Embassy in Madrid, ties through the church serve as
a source of information on Central America for
Spaniards, helping explain the. strength of popular
outrage in Spain over the assassination of Salvadoran
Archbishop Romero by. rightists in 1980. The cultural
links almost certainly have sensitized Spanish leaders
to developments there.
But by and large, the record indicates that the
historical connection by itself was not sufficient to
galvanize the Spaniards into significant political ac-
tivity. In our view, other factors were crucial,
including:
? The Sandinista~victory in 1979, which focused
greater international attention on the region and
raised the possibility of fundamental changes there.
? The growing civil war in El .Salvador.
? The accession of an administration in Washington
that was committed to devoting more resources to
its side of the struggle.
'Central Americans do not always look positively on the Spanish
presence. The current archbishop, locally born, told the US Charge
in January 1984 that American priests adapt more easily and that
Spanish priests tend to retain a "Spanish" outlook and sometimes
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Poll Findings
In the late-.summer of 1983, USIA sponsored a survey
of attitudes on `.Central America in six West Europe-
an countries-the United Kingdom, West Germany,
the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, and Ireland.
The results, in our view, give e-a striking profile of
popular feeling. First, although between 63 percent
(Ireland) and 85 percent (Denmark) said they were
aware of conflicts in Central America, the percentage
of those able to name one. of the countries involved
ranged only from 35 percent (the United Kingdom) to
55 percent (the Netherlands). Second, pluralities from
both the entire group and the, well-informed minority
said they disapproved of US policy in El Salvador
and Nicaragua. Those saying they "strongly disap-
proved" were consistently more numerous than those
who merely "disapproved."
Because of the large.number of people who were not
well informed or had no opinion, however, those who
disapproved of US policy-were a minority in each
country. In fact, USIA's statistical analysis suggests
that only very small percentages. of the respondents
could be considered "hardcore" opponents of US
policy in Central America. The pattern of responses,
however, suggests to us that the number of "hard-
core" supporters is likely to be even smaller than the
number of "hardcore" opponents.
Only a fourth to a third of the respondents were
willing to say whether they thought Cuba and Nica-
ragua were aiding the Salvadoran rebels, but, of
these, a wide majority said they believed such aid
was beingfurnished. On the other. hand,-those who
thought the war would go on even without Cuban and
Nicaraguan aid were three to four times as numerous
as those who thought it would not.
The.electoral victory in December 1982 of Felipe.
Gonzalez's Socialist Party-ambitious, leftist, and
knowledgeable about Central America-obviously
was'another element. But Spanish policy had begun to
take a more activist turn under Gonzalez's predeces-
sors, and factors other than the Spanish "vocation"
clearly played a major role.
When those who disapproved of US policy in El
Salvador were . asked for their reasons, easily the
most common type of response was that the United
States was exceeding its proper role. Those who
spoke of the danger of a wider conflict, who said the
United States was on the wrong side, or who voiced
general antiwar sentiments were far less numerous.
Finally, surprisingly high percentages in some coun-
tries-33 percent in Britain, 50 percent in West
Germany, and 69 percent in the Netherlands-said
that what the United States does about Central
America is the "Americans' own business. " These
percentages were actually a little higher among well-
informed respondents than among the respondents as
a whole.
Results of a USIA poll on El Salvador, taken in
France in late February 1981, generally parallel
these findings. Two-thirds of the French respondents
in 1981 said they had not "heard or read enough to
comment" on the situation in El Salvador; and, even
after being informed about the groups involved, 80
percent would not say which group would be "best for,
the people of El Salvador. " Among the 20 percent
willing to express an opinion, however, 10 percent
said they thought a leftist government would be best,
compared with 6 percent who favored the Duarte
regime. Very few looked favorably on the rightists.
.But responses to another question indicate that sig-
nificant numbers believe the United States supports
the Salvadoran-right. When the respondents were
asked who was receiving US military aid, 14 percent
named the right, compared with 18 percent who
named the Duarte government.
Minister Suarez's new talk of a more active Central
America policy was based on a positive evaluation of
El Salvador's Napoleon Duarte and a general sense of
the region's growing international importance. In the
case of Gonzalez himself, voluminous reporting from
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the US Embass~ since the late
1970s suggests that the events of the time played on
his socialist predilections to impel him to action. We
think it is similarly true for the other West European
countries that they needed something besides econom-
ic and historic interest to get involved in the region.
The Symbolic Aspect
We believe ideological, emotional, or symbolic ele-
ments have triggered the greater West European
activism of the past two or three years. Some of these
factors, which predate the controversies of the past
few years, remain fairly constant across the European
political spectrum. Moreover, the low level of popular
involvement and the region's minimal intrinsic impor-
tance, in our view, often allow the symbolic factors to
take on even greater importance.
The Centrists and Conservatives
We think the following vignettes illuminate nonleftist
attitudes:
? In February 1981, a few months before the Social-
ists came to power in-France, Foreign Minister
Francois-Poncet told US officials that the Giscard-
Barre government recognized there were some
things that were important for France and some
that were important for the United States, and
when an important US interest was involved France
could be counted on for support. Although France
could not endorse the Duarte government in El .
Salvador, he said it would come out against outside
interference and violence. He noted that, with a
presidential election approaching in France, the
government would have to handle the issue
carefully.
? In February 1983 the Italian Ambassador in Wash-
ington worried aloud to a US official about the
situation in Central America, particularly in El
Salvador. He said. he thought the Salvadoran Gov-
ernment's tactics were alienating the populace, and
a guerrilla victory was possible. He asked for the US
analysis because the United States would "of
course" be playing a major role.
? British Foreign Secretary Howe said to Ambassador 25X1
at Large Stone last October that he hoped the
United States would not walk around Central
America "in hobnailed boots." US pressure, he
opined, must make it harder for the Sandinistas to
moderatetheir policies.
Except for Howe, all these interlocutors spoke in
diplomatic language designed not to offend. Looking
behind the words, however, we believe all the speakers
were hinting that Central America will become a
source of controversy in Western Europe and hence of
political trouble. The Italian Ambassador's worried
reminder that the United States would "of course" be
a major actor seems to speak to this worry, and
Francois-Poncet made the point explicitly when he
spoke of the impending 'presidential election in
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makes it harder for them to pursue a moderate course.
The tendency to question the effectiveness of pressure
alone is common among West European leftists, but
Howe's reference suggests the tendency is shared by
some important nonleftists. Francois-Poncet's refer-
ence to condemnation of "outside" interference and
violence echoes another formula common in leftist
rhetoric but notable in a spokesman for a centrist
government: by lumping together all "outsiders," he
at least implicitly included the United States among
the forces open to condemnation.3
Finally, we are struck by Francois-Poncet's distinction
between things that are important to France and
things that are important to the United States. He
may have been saying that there were areas-for
example, Central America-where the French Gov-
ernment may disagree with the United States but
accepts the primacy of the US interest. If so, tactful
acquiescence was disguising a continuing potential for
friction. Notwithstanding Francois-Poncet's explicit
commitment to back the United States, we believe
' A resolution on Central America, issued in April 1984 by the
heads of the Christian Democratic, Liberal, and Socialist Interna-
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increasing public controversy over:Central America
would have made it harder for the Giscard regime to
give Washington its active support. Indeed,, the limits
to the French commitment were made clear in Fran-
cois-Poncet's refusal to back the Duarte government.
An extensive examination of the public and classified
literature convinces us that these comments are repre-
sentative of nonleftist attitudes in Western Europe.
We think these attitudes. include the following
elements:
? Discomfort over the relationship between a super-
power like the United States and the small states of
the region. West Europeans like Howe and Fran-
cois-Poncet, steeped in a diplomatic tradition that
prides itself on prudence and sophistication, are
predisposed, we suspect, to see the United States as
impetuous. and none too subtle. We believe their
prejudices are close to the surface on Central Amer-
ica, partly because their view of the region's history
tends to picture the United States as a practitioner
of political and economic imperialism. We think
Europeans from this part of the spectrum are willing
to accept that the United States is the most power-
ful influence in the region, but the acceptance does
not come without a struggle. Their acceptance
grows shakier, in our opinion, when they anticipate
having to defend US actions that are unpopular in
Europe. They worry that they will be caught be-
tween their principal ally and popular opinion on an
issue of little real importance to them.
? A belief that Central America's problems are essen-
tially home grown. West European centrists and
conservatives, as well as leftists, tell US officials
that Communist activity would have little impact
were it not for indigenous social, economic, and
political conditions. The US Embassy in Oslo re-
ports, for example, that the Willoch government
believes the United States underestimates the sig-
nificance of indigenous problems and overempha-
sizes Soviet and East-West factors. British Ambas-
sador Wright, in his speeches to US audiences,
expresses concern that stressing the East-West as-
pect increases the danger of a wider conflict;
conservative newspapers like the West German
Rhenische Merkur/Christ and Welt argue that the
possibilities for negotiating an accommodation have
not been exhausted.
The Financial Times Agonizes Over the US Role
in Central America
.. The [Kissinger] commission as a whole assumes
that US strategic interests permit it to influence, if
not determine, events in its backyard, and at the same
time to decide what constitutes afriendly regime.
This is perhaps understandable: but it is to be
doubted whether this kind of thinking brings peace
and stability any closer to the region.
Indeed the report does nothing to minimize the fears
of those both inside America and outside who believe
that sooner or later the US administration will be
sucked into greater military involvement....
The report proposes the creation of a new Central
American development organization as a sort of
expanded version of President Reagan's Caribbean
Basin initiative. However, the value. of this associa-
tion risks being undermined, if created, by the criteria
suggested. Only those countries willing to 'commit
themselves to internal democracy' would be admit-
ted. At present only Costa Rica should qualify....
It is hard to argue with the central premise that
Central America is vital to US security interests. But
the report brings the US no closer to pursuing
constructive policies that accommodate both its own
interests and the legitimate aspirations of the coun-
tries in the region."
Financial Times
12 January 1984
? A sense that, in most of Central America (Costa
Rica is always mentioned as an exception), Western
concepts of democracy are of questionable rele-
vance. The image of military dictatorships and
banana republics seems to retain its strength.
? Above all, a desire not to see the region become a
topic of controversy. What centrists and conserva-
tives want most, we think, is simply to keep Central
America off the list of things they have to worry
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about. We suspect, moreover, that they think the
United States is as likely as anyone to do something
that puts the region on that list. Indeed, we think
they would agree with our assessment that the issue
will become controversial in Western Europe only to
the degree it does in the United States. On balance,
these leaders probably view the region as an unlikely
source of political benefit and a very possible source
of some political damage.
Leftist Concerns
West European leftists share many of these attitudes,
in our opinion, but they differ from more conservative
leaders in ways that sometimes have led them into
controversy. A key question is whether this tendency
has diminished in the past several months.
Socialists and social democrats, for example, not only
have a mind-set against many of the region's estab-
lished regimes, they also regard support for the non-
Communist left as a point of honor. Moreover, al-
though as a group they have little sympathy for
Communism, they do not think East-West issues are a
major factor in the region's political dynamics. Final-
ly, there is a strong tendency to believe that the
United States systematically opposes the non-Com-
munist left-a belief that colors socialist thinking
about other parts of the world but is particularly
clear, we think, in Central America.
According to the US Embassies in Madrid and Paris,
French and Spanish Socialists see Central America in
the light of the Spanish Civil War of the 1930s, and
we think other socialist parties share this attitude. To
these groups the Civil War proved that, if democratic
countries fail to provide enough support, the efforts of
the non-Communist left will be eclipsed by the strug-
gle between the totalitarian left and the totalitarian
right. According to the Embassies, that lesson was
reinforced by the overthrow of the socialist Allende
regime in Chile. In public and private the Socialists
tout Portugal's peaceful transition to multiparty de-
mocracy in the 1970s as an example of the way their
approach can work. These mind-sets help account, we
believe, for the leftists' emphasis on the need to defuse
East-West tensions in Central America and for their
insistence on maintaining contact with the Sandinis-
tas
In addition, the socialists make it clear in their public
statements-and in the policies they have adopted
when in power-that they view the extreme (and not-
so-extreme) right in Central America as posing a
greater threat than the extreme left. Rightists are
considered the "bad guys"; leftists, although given to
excesses, are the agents of constructive change." Be-
cause the Sandinistas ousted the despised Somoza
regime, the tendency to minimize or wink at their 25X1
shortcomings is especially strong. According to US
Embassy and press reporting, some Spanish Socialist
leaders were even able to rationalize the discovery
that members of the Basque terrorist organization
ETA were being allowed to operate in Nicaragua and
perhaps were receiving training from the Sandinistas.
25X1
In August 1982 the US Embassy in Paris attributed 25X1
the relative softness of French policy on Central
American issues to a combination of three factors:
? Attitudes rising out of the general heritage of the
West European left, notably the. Spanish Civil War.
? A need to do something that offset both its tough
line toward Moscow and its policies in Africa that
were at odds with past socialist rhetoric.
? A need to demonstrate "independence" of the Unit-
ed States.
We concur; we would only add that, for the French
and other West European socialists, the Communism 25X1
issue is much less clearly defined in the Third World
'There is a striking contrast between the way the French and
Spanish Socialists treat the left in Central America and the way
they deal with it closer to home: in the latter case they make a
significantly sharper distinction between the non-Communist and
the Communist left. The Mitterrand government's firm line on
relations with the USSR is a matter of public record, as is the
coolness of the French Socialists toward their Communist col-
leagues-cum-adversaries in the governing coalition. Gonzalez is
equally explicit about the adversarial relationship, between his
Socialist Party and the Spanish Communists, and his acceptance of
Spanish membership in NATO-in the face of wide opposition in
his party-suggests he is correspondingly wary toward Moscow.
(The dichotomy is less clear in the case of the West German Social
Democratic Party. Many West German Socialists are inclined to
conciliate domestic radicals and leftists rather than compete with
them, and West Germany's unique international position has'
consistently encoura ed the party to maintain fruitful relations with
the Soviets.
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President Mitterrand on the US Role in Central
America
"There are divergences, certainly. For example, I
have serious reservations, not to say more, about US
policy in Central America. The people of this area
want to get rid of the oligarchies, which, relying on
bloody dictatorships, exploit them; crush them into
senseless conditions. A tiny portion of the population
possesses the quasi-totality of the wealth. How can
one not understand the popular revolt? It is not a
question of Communist subversion, but the rejection
of misery and humiliation. It would be wiser for the
West to aid these people rather than force them to
remain under the heel. When they call for help I
would like that Castro not be the only one to hear
them. But I believe in the capacity of the American
leaders for reflection. "
than in the European or the East-West context. Even
more than West European centrists and conservatives,
the socialists see problems in Central America as
springing from an "inheritance of social injustices,
humiliations, and cultural and political segregations,"
to quote French Premier Mauroy. Thus they have
been able to rationalize the Communist connections of
a country like Nicaragua even while acknowledging
that the Sandinistas are not living up to their commit-
ments. Moreover, the socialists' own public statements
indicate that they see the non-Communist European
left playing an independent role between the two
superpowers-using a mixture of aid, diplomacy, and
persuasion to "wean" the Sandinistas away from the
Soviets, for example, and perhaps even serving as
mediators between the United States on the one hand
and the Soviets and the Cubans on the other.
The US Embassy's third point-the Mitterrand gov-
ernment's need to demonstrate "independence" of the
United States-also deserves elaboration. Public
statements make
it clear that the Socialists see US support as enabling
the right to survive in Central America. We think a
belief along these lines is common among leftists
The Socialist International, like similar groupings of
Christian Democratic and liberal parties, serves as a
forum where activists communicate with each other,
often reinforcing each other's predilections in the
process. The internationals have. almost no money of
their own to disburse, and they serve essentially as
soundingboards-notably in the SI s generally lauda-
tory statements on Nicaragua under the Sandinistas.
Central American leftists put a high priority on
maintaining the SI s support
throughout Western Europe.' It sometimes combines
with an emphasis on the power of the United States to
produce a kind of paranoia:
Distrust of the United States is one factor leading
West European socialists to give Central American
leftists the benefit of the doubt, in our opinion. Indeed
the resolutions of the Socialist International on Nica-
ragua tend to emphasize the US angle rather than
address the issue of the Sandinistas' merits.
' The USIA polls cited earlier suggest that milder versions of the
same attitude are common across.a broader segment of the political
spectrum. We think the comments of nonleftist spokesmen point to
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The obverse of the paranoia is a belief that the United
States has the power to bring peace to the region if
the
United States could buy Cuba out of the Soviet orbit
but refuses to do so. The perceived refusal, we would
speculate, merely confirms the socialist suspicion that
US and leftist goals are fundamentally at odds with
each other.
To this set of attitudes, in our view, must be added the
predictable tendency of any politician to look for ways
of gaining points with his or her supporters through
highly visible activity. Because many of the main
actors on the socialist side are politicians first and
foremost, their tolerance for behind-the-scenes activi-
ty, or for playing a secondary role in public, is bound
to be limited.
Finally, the socialists make it clear by their public
rhetoric that they know they are not strong enough to
influence events in Central America on their own.
Thus they are constantly looking for ways to link up
with others, especially states such as Mexico which
they think share their goals and their skeptical atti-
tude toward the United States. Often they get some
encouragement from these states, but most of the time
rivalries eventually crop up that help to stymie any
initiative.
Political Initiatives-and Noninitiatives
Neither conservative nor leftist West Europeans have
taken many specific political initiatives in Central
America. Inaction-often with political overtones-
has been the rule. West Germany's refusal for nearly
four years to send an ambassador to San Salvador is
typical.
With far more urgent
controversies to contend with, nobody in the coalition
was interested in going to the mat over El Salvador.
We think it is an indication of the outlook even a
conservative government brings to Central American
issues that the Kohl government took a year to name
an ambassador and resume economic aid to the
Salvadorans. Foreign Minister Genscher in February
1984 was still reluctant to let the ambassador leave
for San Salvador, according to the US Embassy; the
envoy finally departed in March.
Secret
Only the leftist Governments of France and Spain
have actually attempted significant initiatives in the 25X1
past three years. The French effort produced some
tangible results-a joint declaration with Mexico on
El Salvador and an arms deal with Nicaragua. The
ensuing criticism, however, forced Paris to back off.
The Gonzalez government was less aggressive; its
activity was no more productive.
French Initiatives. The Mitterrand government took
office in July 1981 at what seemed a critical and
propitious time:
? A new US administration had made clear its deter-
mination to follow a more assertive line in Central
America, one hostile to leftist interests as the
French saw them.
? The Salvadoran Government was under heavy rebel
pressure.
Much of the bloom was still on the Nicaraguan
revolution.
? The Mexican Government, flush with its oil wealth
and a heightened sense of regional influence, was
attempting to mobilize international support for a
political settlement in Central America.
25X1
25X1
French Socialist leaders clearly were predisposed to
take action. Reporting from the US Embassy0 25X1
indicates that Central America was 25X1
an emotional cause for many in Mitterrand's inner 25X1
circle, including Regis Debray, who had fought along-
side Che Guevara in Bolivia in the 1960s and was
influential with Mitterrand's wife. According to the
Embassy, the activists believed they were on not just
the right side, but the winning side.
The French found Mexicans also eager. In the ex-
change of visits between Foreign Ministers Cheysson
and Castaneda, which led to the declaration on El
Salvador, the Mexican side was pushing for a strongly 25X1
worded statement that would promote the cause of the
Salvadoran radical left. But we think Cheysson was
being disingenuous when he later told US officials
that France had been swept along by the Mexicans.
We suspect that individuals like Debray were as
influential as the Mexicans in shaping the final
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Secret
declaration, which recognized the rebels as a "repre-
sentative political force," urged "free" elections, and
asserted that international organizations, particularly
the United Nations, should be involved
The seed for the Nicaraguan arms deal was planted at
least as early as June, when a French Foreign Minis-
try official told the US Embassy that the Sandinistas
were looking for "defensive" arms and that France
might sometime grant their request. Again, Debray
bray represented Mitterrand at a meeting in Decem-
ber when the government decided to go ahead. The
French Defense Ministry apparently was cut out
The deal included two Alouette helicopters, two light-
ly armed patrol boats, 42 heavy trucks, 7,000 air-to-
ground rockets, and 100 rocket launchers. All appar-
ently came on attractive credit terms.
The reaction to the French activity was largely nega-
tive, particularly where it counted most-among Lat-
in Americans with an interest in Central America,
and in the United States:
? The French seem not to have anticipated the
strength of the US reaction, and US Embassy
reporting suggests they underestimated it even after
they had received several US protests.
? Salvadoran Foreign Minister Chavez Mena told US
officials that Venezuela was threatening to cut back
its economic ties with France as a result of the
Franco-Mexican declaration. .He added that Cheys-
son had apologized to him for the declaration.
? According to press reports, Spain thought the
French were meddling and the Mexicans were
angered by the arms deal.
? When Cheysson gave a dinner for Latin American
ambassadors in December 1981, most of them
reportedly took him to task. Only the Nicaraguans
praised French policy.
Furthermore, we think Paris came to regard the
Sandinistas as less worthy of spending political capital
25X1
on-to look on them as a group that, however noble
25X1
its origins, had strayed far enough from its ideals that
vigorous support was no longer warranted
25X1
25X1
For all these reasons, Paris made it clear beginning in
25X1
1982 that it would supply no more arms to the
Sandinistas and would take no more initiatives like
Central America
the area, but nothing.came of the visit. Paris returned
to the issue yet again in April 1983, this time with a
quickly aborted proposal in New York that the UN
Secretary General undertake a good-offices mission in
the declaration on El Salvador. We think the evidence
makes it fairly certain that the French did pull in
their horns, but they still were looking for ways to
make themselves felt. In March 1982 the Chilean
Ambassador in Paris told the US Embassy that a
French initiative was in the works but had been
delayed because of Colombian and Venezuelan objec-
tions. In April the government told the United States
that Debray and a deputy of Cheysson would be
visiting the region. The two Frenchmen did travel t125X1
Two points emerge from this narrative, in our view:
the persistence with which the French searched for
some sort of workable initiative, and the questionable
results of all their efforts from their own point of view.
We think Paris now acknowledges the second point,
albeit grudgingly. French diplomats in Central Amer-
ica have in fact told their US counterparts that Paris
intends to keep a low profile there, and
the French representative
at a Socialist International meeting in January 1984
was highly critical of the Sandinistas-even more so
than the other delegates, most of whom showed
considerable disillusionment.
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But we also think the urge to do something will
remain strong. We suspect that passivity is the best
the United States can look for from the French. Any
action by Paris probably would cut across US poli-
cy-although it probably would also be as ineffective
as what the French have done up to now.
Gonzalez Makes His Move. The record of Spanish
activity is modest by comparison, partly because
Gonzalez and his colleagues had the French example
to learn from, but partly, we think, because they
started with a clearer sense of what was possible.
Gonzalez, often working through the Socialist Inter-
national, had been involved for years in Central
American problems, and, according to US Embassy
reporting, he had a reputation-in the context of an
unquestionably leftist outlook-for pragmatism and
clearheadedness. He has been more insistent than the
French, for example, that no initiative will work
without the support of the countries of the region,-and
we are impressed with the strength and consistency of
his emphasis on the need to maintain good relations
with the United States.
Moreover, Gonzalez clearly has been in charge of his
country's policy on Central America-unlike Mitter-
rand, who seems to have been subjected to pulling and
hauling by various factions. A Venezuelan official
told the US Embassy in Caracas, for example, that it
does not matter what Foreign Minister Moran thinks;
Gonzalez, he said, determines policy. Gonzalez also
has benefited, we think, from the relatively broad
interest in Central America among Spanish leaders
f consensus they have shown.
and from the dear 7
Pragmatic reputation or not, Gonzalez has not been
immune to the temptation to develop far-reaching
proposals for Central America. After the Spanish
Socialists came to power in December 1982, he
proposed a "little Helsinki" conference on Central
America, and in February 1983 he told then Assistant
Secretary Enders that Venezuela, Panama, and-Co-
lombia had approached him with a proposal for a
"regional" initiative-that is. one that did not involve
the United States or Cuba.
the Panamanians had been
developing a plan centering on Gonzalez; we think
Gonzalez probably was encouraging them. Gonzalez
and the Mexicans reportedly were in touch as well.
The Spaniards were not above putting out word that
things-were further along than they were. According
to press accounts from Spain, rumors of a major
initiative were common in Madrid at this point.
Assistant Secretary Enders was said to know of the
plan, and some of the rumors claimed Gonzalez's
efforts.had the tacit backing of the United States.
This activity, we feel certain, was generated with an
eye to the trip that Gonzalez took to Latin America
and the United States. in May and June 1983. But he
was no more successful than the French in getting the
Latin Americans united behind a plan. Moreover, we
think Gonzalez and his colleagues, like the French,
found it harder and harder to ignore-the authoritarian
tendencies and Communist connections of the Salva-
doran leftists and the Sandinistas.
Finally, we believe, the Spaniards ran up against two
hard facts: Washington has more influence than they
in Central America, and their ties with the United
States are more important than their links with
Central America. They themselves have told US
officials that, whereas the United States has both
power and influence in Central America, Spain has
only influence-and implicit-in the remark, in our
view, is a recognition that influence has little meaning
without power when the chips are down. Another
Spaniard stated the problem this way: he told US
officials that the Gonzalez government had to remain
faithful to its ideological ties while not alienating the
United States. Thus in the end the Spaniards found
little to do beyond urging other West European
governments to make explicit statements of support
for the efforts of the so-called Contadora four (Mexi-
co, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela).
The US Factor
The Spaniards' experience highlights the third
important facet of West European attitudes toward
Central America: The West Europeans know that
Central America is of great importance to the United
States, and that what they do there will come under
close scrutiny, in Washington. For West European
socialists this means they must constantly gauge what
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necrei
is worth attempting. This, we think, is a fair para-
phrase of the Spanish Socialist's comment about
balancing faithfulness to ideological ties against the
need not to alienate Washington. We think the Social-
ists have decided it is not worth jeopardizing their ties
with Washington in the slim hope of furthering their
goals in the region-particularly because the images
of the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran leftists have be-'
come tarnished. If so, the Socialists' conclusion is
similar to that of their more conservative colleagues:
that Central America is not likely to be a source of
much political benefit to them and could be a source
of political trouble.
Thus, although it would be unrealistic to expect that
West European leftists will never be heard from again
on Central American issues, we think they will be
more cautious than in the past couple of years. In our
view, for example, Regis Debray is not likely to have
the influence on French policy that he sometimes had
in the first two years of the Mitterrand government.
Embassy reporting indicates, moreover, that both the
French and the West German socialists have recently
been pressing the Sandinistas more strongly to fulfill
their past commitments to democratic processes. We
think they will continue to do so, although they will
remain reluctant to take a strong stand in public and
still will be inclined to give the Sandinistas the benefit
of the doubt. They have praised Managua's decision
to hold elections, for example, but many of them have
been careful to leave the option of distancing them-
selves from the elections if the Sandinistas impose
inequitable restrictions. By the same token, we believe
they have been somewhat less vocally negative about
the current round of elections in El Salvador than
they were about the last.
But we think sympathy for the Central American left
and dislike of the right, together with a belief that the
conflicts in the region there should be resolved
through negotiations, will remain the most common
attitudes among those West Europeans who focus on
the region. A recent visit to Nicaragua by a Norwe-
gian parliamentary committee is symptomatic: the
committee came away favorably impressed by the
Sandinistas and inclined to recommend an increase in
Norway's modest aid program.
We think the West Europeans will continue to support
the Contadora process, part of whose appeal, in our,
view, is the diminished role assigned the United
States. By the same token, we think there is little
chance that West Europeans of any political persua-
sion will come out in favor of the military and
paramilitary aspects of US Central American policy.
Although some conservative leaders may express
qualified support in private, no leader, in our opinion,
will be eager to.identify himself publicly with the
United States in this regard. Their reticence will
grow, we believe, in proportion to the scope of US
activity. It almost certainly would turn into outright
criticism-even from sympathetic governments-if,
for example, the United States were to send its own
forces into action. The likelihood of criticism would
increase further, we believe,. if US involvement should
be prolonged.'
The reticence of West European leaders is in part a
reaction to popular opinion, which (to the extent it is
articulated at all) probably will remain at least poten-
tially unsympathetic to the US effort in Central
America and will tend to take its cue from public
opinion in the United States. We think that in many
cases, however, it also flows from the attitudes of the
leaders themselves. In our view, moreover, not even
relatively sympathetic governments will think the
region important enough to use up their own political
capital in trying to change popular attitudes in their
countries. For instance, Belgian Foreign Minister
Tindemans, one of the leaders most sympathetic.to
US policy, has told US officials that he cannot afford
to be open in his support because public opinion is so
strongly negative.
Nor do we see much chance that the West Europeans
will commit more of their own economic resources in
the region. The Kohl government's decision last De-
cember to suspend its aid to Nicaragua and resume
assistance. to El Salvador probably is at the limit of
what the United States can look for; French diplomats
6 We think it indicative of West European attitudes that, in the
wake of the Grenada operation, Prime Minister Thatcher felt
constrained to state publicly that she believed a US move against
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say that Paris plans to make its aid to Nicaragua
roughly equivalent to what it gives Managua's neigh-
bors. And in many cases, we believe, the West
Europeans will be trying mainly to balance their
desire to fend off US criticism against residual sym-
pathy for the region's leftists. "People-to-people" ac-
tivity will continue to favor the leftists: "harvest
brigades," we feel certain, will volunteer for Nicara-
gua, but not for El Salvador. In their bilateral
relations with Central American countries, we believe
West. European governments will do their best to
maintain the separation between politics and econom-
ic activity: they will hold the Mejia government in
Guatemala at arm's. length, for example, but will do
nothing to discourage trade and investment
We believe that in their dealings with the United
States the West Europeans-socialists more vocally
than centrists and rightists-will keep trying to push
Washington toward negotiated solutions. None will
push too hard, however. Moreover, we, think they will
search for a genuine consensus among Central Ameri-
can states and the Contadora countries and make
some effort at bringing their activities into conso-
nance with those of the United States. Gonzalez
reportedly stated last March that to move without
such preparations would be like "making a jump
without a safety net." We think Gonzalez is some-
what likelier than the other West European leaders to
return to the issue, and, because he is politically adept
and familiar with the issues, we think his chances of
achieving significant progress would be marginally
better than those of other leaders-although they still
would be poor
But the net effect of all the pressures on them is, in
our opinion, to discourage rather than to encourage
activity. The West Europeans, we believe, either
started with a strong inclination not to get involved in
the region or learned the hard way that they got little
benefit from trying. We think there is little chance
that the United States can change this attitude. As a
result, we believe that the United States will remain
the only significant external actor on the Western side
in Central America and that the West Europeans will
remain on the sidelines, keeping quiet, most of the
time and criticizing US policy more than they praise
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Appendix
Wetern Europe and
Central America:
Economic Relationships
Table 1
EC Exports to Central America
World
213,857
278,927
300,613
330,995
384,970
461,828
577,251
665,896
612,469
589,888
Latin America
1,247
1,848
2,021
1,963
1,814
2,674
3,235
4,150
4,894
3,592
Central America
442
695
782
826
833
959
1,003
1,054
1,296
1,111
Of which:
Guatemala
73
107
111
129
164
205
190
180
186
124
Honduras
30
43
39
41
54
71
93
99
90
56
Nicaragua
49
95
56
63
86
68
33
51
66
76
El Salvador
58
91
81
94
117
135
125
84
91
70
Costa Rica
73
96
75
80
107
138
135
128
91
72
Panama _
159
263
420
419
305
342
427
512
772
713
World
220,658
300,291
307,127
351,154
397,029
468,151
611,147
729,116
644,756
615,620
Latin America
778
1,078
1,194
1,246
1,863
1,671
2,233
2,930
3,426
3,483
Central America
548
646
782
804
1,331
1,136
1,559
1,443
1,269
1,083
Of which:
Guatemala
92
151
215
179
291
267
301
367
228
221
Honduras
62
57
61
83
129
141
177
174
136
133
Nicaragua
59
105
107
93
184
154
159
119
95
95
El Salvador
74
117
145
229
377
217
384
322
301
191
Costa Rica
121
141
138
105
202
222
260
255
250
219
Panama
140
75
116
115
148
135
278
206
259
224
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Table 2
West European Investment in Central America
(Total Receipts Less Official Aid) a
Recipient
Donor
1978
1979
1980
1981 .
1982
Total
17.9
6.3
63.1
22.6
-0.5
France
-5.1
-4.2
17.5
6.6
4.8
West Germany
2.0
-2.2
24.1
20.0
Netherlands
1.8
2.0
12.6
-4.1
Norway
17.9
9.9
-0.1
0.2
United Kingdom
1.3
0.8
9.0
-4.0
-1.4
Total
20.7
3.0
17.7
5.9
-6.8
France
-1.1
-1.6
19.8
8.8
-2.2
West Germany
0.9
3.8
0.2
-0.3
Italy
18.9
-3.5
United Kingdom
2.0
0.8
-2.1
-3.1
-0.8
Total
47.1
24.4
0.6
103.9
77.6
France
4.8
25.1
7.8
93.2
77.7
West Germany
5.1
10.1
0.1
-3.6
7.9
Italy
13.1
1.3
0.3
19.4
-2.0
Switzerland
23.5
-6.7
-3.9
0.3
United Kingdom
0.6
-5.4
-3.7
-5.4
0.6
Total
-14.6
20.8
65.1
31.5
-25.0
Denmark
17.3
France
4.7
1.6
6.9
-3.7
West Germany
-0.2
14.6
-1.4
4.4
0.6
Italy
-14.5
0.1
26.7
4.7
-21.3
Switzerland
0.2
0.9
20.9
12.3
United Kingdom
-0.1
0.5
3.2
-0.6
Total
-0.2
5.4
4.0
32.3
23.1
France
0.8
1.4
1.0
26.0
West Germany
-0.4
4.3
-5.4
0.6
-4.7
Italy
0.2
0.3
34.9
1.8
Total
4.6
-1.5
284.1
98.7
32.9
Belgium
10.9
_ 39.2
-30.0
-29.9
2.0
Denmark
1.0
0.1
-9.8
France
36.7
-35.3
250.2
-19.5
44.3
West Germany
-62.6
-29.3
48.5
89.0
-25.9
Italy
-2.6
2.4
0.6
20.6
14.4
Netherlands
14.1
14.0
-16.3
14.1
15.0
United Kingdom
8.1
6.5
31.1
24.3
-7.1
a Some minor investment flows omitted. OECD data do not include
Spain. The US Embassy in Madrid reported in 1982 that the
following amounts were known to have been invested by Spanish
firms in Central America in 1979 and 1980 (in US $):
Costa Rica 740,000 $640,000
Guatemala 5,050,000 13,720,000
Panama 7,450,000 7,620,000
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Table 3.
Spain-Exports to Central America
Million US $
World Exports
5,158
7,059
7,672
8,727
10,221
13,118 '
18,208
20,719
20,335
20,498
Latin America
97
116
141
194
185
226
374
516
676
728
Of which:
Central America
42
55
81
131
118
116
123
99
143
202
Guatemala
6
7
8
12
14
14
17
17
25
86
Honduras
4
2
3
. 3
4
6
7
9
7
5
Nicaragua
2
4
5
9
40
28
4
5
7
21
El Salvador
3
5
6
17
10
11
12
10
15
10
Costa Rica
5
12
10
9
17
30
45
22
22
8
Panama
22
25
49
81
33
27
38
36
67
72
Imports World
9,591
15,380
16,234
17,462
17,834
18,713
25,437
34,077
32,153
31,465
Latin America
59
109
86
74
107
232
529
1,374
2,053
1,920
Central America
28
47
48
40
47
109
111
101
63
64
5
13
11
14
13
10
19
11
3
2
6
7
4
5
8
9
20
18
20
27
Nicaragua
2
10
10
9
10
5
5
17
10
11
El Salvador
2
2
11
2
10
57
16
18
1
4
Costa Rica
4
2
1
3
1
0
9
4
5
6
9
13
11
7
5
28
'42
33
24
14
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Table 4
Western Europe: Economic Aid Disbursements
to Central America a
Total
143.4
218.3
340.1
297.2
457.8
Total
11.7
20.3
11.1
9.9
5.0
Canada
4.5
4.8
1.1
0.4
0.2
United Kingdom
7.2
15.5
10.0
9.5
4.8
Total
16.0
22.8
19.8
33.4
60.6
Canada
3.2
3:8
0.2
0.5
1.1
West Germany
7.9
6.8
12.7
16.2
9.0
Italy
0.6
0.3
0.2
1.8
1.8
Netherlands
1.8
2.0
1.2
1.4
1.2
United Kingdom
0.5
0.9
0.5
0.5
0.5
United States
2.0
9.0
5.0
13.0
47.0
Total
25.8
38.7
46.3
105.7
175.0
Canada
0.3
0.6
2.1
6.3
1.3
France
7.4
0.5
0.2
-
West Germany
1.6
2.2
1.4
1.4
1.3
Netherlands
0.6
0.8
1.2
0.7
1.2
1.2
EC
0.1
0.7
0.1
United States
23.3
27.6
43.0
97.0
170.0
Total
31.6
26.4
72.9
30.3
32.6
Austria
1.0
1.1
1.4
1.3
Canada
3.1
-3.9
1.7
1.3
1.3
France
5.6
3.8
44.6
0.3
0.1
West Germany
4.2
6.3
7.8
6.8
8.5
Netherlands
0.7
1.2
1.7
1.5
1.4
United States
18.0
18.0
16.0
19.0
20.0
Total
30.3
34.4
19.6
49.6
103.8
Canada
7.5
3.6
9.5
10.3
5.8
France
0.2
0.6
2.2
West Germany
3.4
3.5
4.9
4.5
7.4
Netherlands
0.9
1.7
6.9
2.3
3.9
Switzerland
0.2
0.9
3.7
2.7
4.5
United Kingdom
0.6
0.5
0.8
10.2
4.0
EC
1.7
3.2
4.6
1.5
9.0
United States
16.0
26.0
19.0
41.0
67.0
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secret
Table 4
Western Europe: Economic Aid Disbursements
to Central America a (continued)
Donor
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
Nicaragua
Total
28.0
70.7
134.4
68.3
80.8
Austria
0.2
0.7
0.7
8.7
France b
0.5
1.4
8.5
West Germany
1.0
17.8
13.3
14.1
10.2
Italy
0.2
1.1
1.1
5.0
2.5
Netherlands
0.4
6.4
14.6
15.8
23.9
Norway
0.9
0.5
0.4
2.1
Sweden
8.1
7.7
3.9
9.3
Switzerland
0.1
2.3
0.5
0.8
1.4
EC
0.3
5.9
14.5
10.2
7.2
United States
26.0
28.0
81.0
16.0
7.0
a Spanish aid data are not included in OECD statistics. In May
1982 the US Embassy in Madrid, warning that the Spanish
Government itself did not have definitive figures, reported that as
of March 1982 Madrid had granted the following lines of credit to
b According to the US Embassy in Managua, French credit alloca-
tions totaled $6.25 million in 1980, $8.75 million in 1981, $13
million in 1982, and $13 million in 1983.
Central American countries (1982 exchange rates in US $): Spanish aid worldwide totaled a little less than $1.2 billion,
Honduras
Nicaragua
Panama
according to the Embassy; Latin America as a whole received 75
800,000 percent of the total. Spain extended an additional $45 million line
25,000,000 of credit to Nicaragua in 1983.
10,660,000
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Table 5
Western Europe: Military Aid Allocations
to Central America
Total Non-Communist West European Allocations
Country
Details (including dates)
Allocations 1954-83 1981
(US excluded)
1982
1983
Total
312.1
18.7
39.7
8.3
Belize
5.0
5.0
UK: patrol boats, transport aircraft (1983)
Costa Rica
3.1
France: helicopters (1978-79) Spain:
miscellaneous military equipment (1981)
Guatemala
79.1
Belgium: tanks (1982)
Honduras
85.5
3.3
UK: armored vehicles (1978-81 Spain: jet
trainers (1983)
Nicaragua
65.2
15.8
5.0
France: helicopters, patrol boats, trucks,
rockets (1981) Spain: transport aircraft
(1982)
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Secret
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