THE EAST GERMAN MILITARY: SCHOOL TO THE NATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00316R000100030005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: April 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
Directorate of
Intelligence
The East German Military:
School to the Nation
April 1984
copy 2 9 5
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
! Intelligence
The East German Military:
School to the Nation
the Directorate of Operations.
Office of European Analysis. It was coordinated with
This paper was prepared by
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, East European Division,
EURA,
Secret
EUR 84-10063C
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
secret
The East German Militar :
School to the Nation 25X1
Key Judgments The East German regime, far more than any of the other East European
Information available governments, has used the country's military establishment as an instru-
as of 10 March 1984 ment of political and social indoctrination. The National People's Army, at
was used in this report.
the behest of the Communist Party, directs and administers a system of
"military education" in which virtually every citizen, young and.old, must
actively participate. The authorities have long employed military educa-
tion-for example, weapons training, schooling in strategy and doctrine,
and related political indoctrination-to ensure party control, enforce social
discipline, and nurture political loyalty. They also have increasingly tried
to kindle popular pride in Prussian military history and traditions to help
create a national identity. General Secretary Erich Honecker has intensi-
fied these efforts since the early 1970s, primarily, we believe, to counter
growing disaffection among youth but also to remedy military recruitment
and retention problems. These moves, however, have fallen short of the
"militarization" of the East German state, as charged by some in the West.
Although the authorities have been able to force compliance from some
segments of East German society, their methods have failed to create real
enthusiasm for the regime. Indeed, Honecker's persistence, in our estima-
tion, has increased alienation of youth, helped give impetus to an inde-
pendent peace movement, and strained relations with the Lutheran
Church. And the regime has not solved the Army's manpower shortfall;
rather, we believe its policies have probably prompted more young men to
apply for conscientious objector status and may have exacerbated discipline
and morale problems in the armed services.
Despite these failings, Honecker seems intent on intensifying efforts to
regiment and discipline East German society in response to apparently
spreading pacifist sentiments, especially among alienated youth, and to the
need for more severe economic austerity measures. Although, in our view,
even stronger applications of "military education" probably will not
precipitate violent reaction from a heavily intimidated populace, we do
believe such methods are likely to provoke more youthful restiveness and
support for the peace groups, which, in turn, could raise concern within the
military over recruitment and discipline. In addition, church-state rela-
tions, in our judgment, would further deteriorate. The long-term effects of
EUR 84-100630
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
 - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
Honecker's policies are less clear but perhaps more sweeping. The regime's
continued harkening to German history may only arouse stronger-feelings
for a reunited Germany, which in turn can only lead, in our estimation, to
more popular frustration-prompting even greater numbers of especially
young East Germans simply to tune out or to try harder to emigrate. And
Honecker still will not have achieved the large measure of legitimacy that
East German regimes have sought since 1949
Secret iv 25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85S00316R000100030005-3
Secret
Key Judgments
B. Organizations for Political Socialization
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85S00316R000100030005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
Secret
The East German Military:
School to the Nation
Most East European armies are involved in social,
political, or economic activities that go beyond their
purely military missions. In Poland, for example,
Premier Jaruzelski uses the armed forces to help
administer the government, and Romania's President
Ceausescu relies heavily on the Army as a source of
labor and technical expertise for the civilian economy.
The East German leadership also uses its military in a
unique way-a way that involves the military more
thoroughly in the lives of the people than in any other
East European state. The regime has created an
extremely broad system of "military education,"
which it uses as a major instrument for encouraging
discipline and political loyalty to the state on the part
of the East German people.
Such a substantial sociopolitical role for a Communist
East European army has drawn attention at home and
abroad. Many East Germans,
question the glaring contradiction between
the regime's pervasive peace propaganda and its
reliance on peculiarly military methods of political
indoctrination and regimentation as instruments for
domestic control. Beyond its borders, particularly in
West Germany, the Honecker regime has opened
itself to considerable criticism for bringing about
what many call the "militarization" of East German
society or the creation of a new Prussia. This paper
explains the reasons successive East German regimes
have relied increasingly on the military as an instru-
ment for socialization, analyzes the consequences of
this effort, and assesses the prospects for greater use
of military education and the political implications.'
Logo of the GDR's Societ for
Sport and Technology 7
East Germany has long included various aspects of
military education as an important part of its Soviet-
style political indoctrination efforts (see appendix B).
While still administering an occupied zone, East
German leaders were pressing military training and
discipline on the population through civilian organiza-
tions. This trend accelerated after the formation of
the German Democratic Republic in 1949 and the
emergence of Walter Ulbricht as party leader in 1950:
? The Free German Youth (FDJ), the Communist
Party's youth organization created in 1946, was
soon tasked with recruiting young people for the
"garrisoned police," the forerunner of the national
army.
? The Society for Sport and Technology (GST),
formed in 1952 as a forum for recreation and
athletic competition and initially subordinated to
the Ministry of Interior, by 1963 became the re-
gime's primary organization for teaching basic mili-
tary skills to youngsters while also conveying heavy
political indoctrination.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
? The Workers' Militia, organized in July 1953 in the
wake of large-scale worker riots,' was initially
charged with protecting factories during national
emergencies, but subsequently became more of a
territorial defense force and mass political control
organization with the recruitment of many nonparty
workers. Military-style exercises increasingly domi-
nated its training activities during and after working
hours.
? After universal military service was adopted in
1962, reserve "collectives" were organized in virtu-
ally every place of employment. Reservist duty-
compulsory for ex-servicemen and young men
awaiting conscription-consisted of training in mili-
tary schools, assignments to active duty, and partici-
pation in mobilization exercises.
2 As many as 300,000 workers were involved in strikes protesting
food price hikes in June 1953, and Soviet military forces ultimately
The regime's motives for increasingly expanding mili-
tary education, in our view, stemmed from a drive for
self-preservation and legitimacy given East Germa-
ny's unique postwar position. The Allied agreements
made at Yalta and Potsdam, though not legally
binding, prohibited the building of any German stand-
ing army, so East Berlin in the late 1940s and early
1950s sought, with Soviet support, indirect means of
creating a national defense capability. The leadership
was also trying to overcome a strong sense of pacifism
among many East Germans, especially the young,
that it said was "nurtured by their bitter experience in
World War II." Additionally, we believe Ulbricht
turned to paramilitary groups like the GST, the
Reserve Collectives, and especially the Workers' Mili-
tia, to strengthen party control and security in the
factories and to try to inject military discipline into
civilian life. As Cold War tensions rose, the regime
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
Secret
sought to rally popular support, and evidently at-
tached considerable value to military-style indoctrina-
tion, with its simple "friend-foe" approach and heavy
emphasis on the looming military threat from the
West.
Finally, Ulbricht, in our estimation, glorified military
service as part of an early attempt at cultivating an
East German national identity, implicitly appealing to
lingering respect among older Germans for military
service and pride in military history. After creating
the National People's Army (NVA) in 1956 in re-
sponse to rising Cold War tensions, the mustering of
the West German Bundeswehr, and Soviet wishes,
Ulbricht introduced military garb reminiscent of the
Wehrmacht gray. By the 1960s the regime was
erecting monuments to famous Prussian military com-
manders, and Ulbricht was proclaiming the Army the
"party school of the nation," an idea borrowed from
East Germany's Prussian heritage.'
education programs and placing even more emphasis
on the country's military heritage:
? In 1973 he revised the GST's curriculum to improve
training in specific military skills and to make youth
more understanding of the need for a "vigilant
defense of socialism." A year later the government
required all adolescents to participate in military
sports activities sponsored by the GST and tasked
local officials to ensure compliance.
? The regime in 1973 introduced in the secondary
schools optional coursework covering military strat-
egy and doctrine and training in military skills.
? By the mid-1970s the authorities had significantly
enlarged the civil defense system to encompass most
workplaces, increased the frequency and scope of its
"exercises," and intensified its political indoctrina-
tion activities.
When Erich Honecker succeeded Ulbricht as party
chief in 1971, he quickly began expanding military
' The "school to the nation" concept originated with Prussian Gen.
Gerhard Scharnhorst and his reform-minded military colleagues of
the early 19th century who wanted to develop a loyal and effective
army in part through universal conscription. Scharnhorst believed
such a "people's army" would help transform "subjects" of the
King into "citizens" of the state, and each soldier would therefore
have considerably more vested interest in protecting his country.F-
? "Duty to country" became a dominant political
indoctrination theme. Taking a cue from his prede-
cessor, Honecker increasingly stressed that "social-
ist" Germany's heritage included King Frederick
the Great and Prussian generals von Clausewitz and
Scharnhorst, citing them as fine examples of such
"Communist" virtues as social discipline and alle-
giance to the state.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
Am Freitag, 20.00 Uhr, im Fernseh n der DOR
SCHARNHORST
Even more than Ulbricht, Honecker, in our view,
wanted the Army to serve as an important instrument
in nurturing an East German national identity. By
wrapping Communist dogma in the uniforms and
patriotic bunting of the People's Army and by evoking
the names of Prussian soldiers, he was trying to create
a role model for all of society. By harkening to
Germany's military heritage, he was also trying to
establish a distinctly East German "socialist" history
(see inset).
We believe Honecker's actions particularly reflected
erowine official concern over youthful ferment.
10 fiun itig Serie ?r f'r u(3e {a trio
n Hens Pfeiffer, je it freitagS, 20.00 U hr.
at$ harts V. Soornhomt t utnt r$Chos
pit iv a rte 13 rt lrrt 1tTrall Die Ke o h
. 1
Announcing a special serialized The East German Army
drama on East German televi-
Honecker's efforts, in our view, reflected his own
political experiences and his response to emerging
challenges. Having been chairman of the FDJ for its
first nine years, he placed particular confidence in
political indoctrination and probably was chagrined at
the party's limited success in bolstering political loyal-
ty. He apparently considered intensified socialization
efforts necessary at a time of easing East-West
tensions and increased contacts between East and
West Germans following the intra-German accords.
He hoped, in our estimation, that military-style indoc-
trination-with its aggressive hostility toward the
NATO alliance-would help keep the people in line
and encourage them to identify more with the regime
as their protector. Honecker's emphasis on political
indoctrination was probably only heightened by offi-
cial polls in the mid-1970s that indicated that most
East Germans considered themselves simply "Ger-
mans," rather than "citizens of the German Demo-
cratic Republic," and that showed few people were
interested in domestic or foreign political issues other
than East German-West German relations.
Honecker apparently was so concerned about
the youth problem that he created a special Politburo
commission in 1976 to find solutions. At the same
time, he ordered the FDJ in 1977 to take over full
responsibility for improving the military education of
all East German youth. He complemented this by
focusing much of his heralded "consumerism" on
young people, trying to win their support with domes-
tically produced blue jeans and rock music, and
regime-sponsored nightclubs.
Violent street demonstrations by young East Germans
in 1978 ' brought home to Honecker, we believe, the
ineffectiveness of his policies for socializing youth and
provoked swift regime reaction, which, in our estima-
tion, marked the year as a watershed in East Germa-
ny's use of military education for political ends. The
Politburo formally 25X1
reprimanded the head of the FDJ for failing to
implement party directives and launched a broad
"new" propaganda campaign replete with more mili-
tary and patriotic themes.' Perhaps most importantly,
incidents occurred in
Witten erg on May, in Erfurt on 28 May, and in several other
cities near the West German border; a two-hour melee between
youngsters and police erupted in East Berlin's main square during
the 7 October national day celebrations
' The regime reinvigorated the rubric of "National Defense of the
Homeland" by ordering party activists to drive home the ideas of
"pride in the national armed forces," "awakening love of the
fatherland." and "immunizing East Germany from Western influ-
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
,ecrei
East Germany's military leaders, in our view, consid-
er their sociopolitical "assignment" an effective way
to strengthen the Army's credentials as a national
institution. The East German Army, unlike some of
its East European counterparts, cannot easily draw
upon the prestige enjoyed by its 20th-century prede-
cessors: hailing the battles of the Kaiser's army
would carry too much of an anti-Russian overtone,
and any favorable public treatment of the Nazi
Wehrmacht is strictly taboo. The Army therefore has
had to reach much further back to establish its own
history and traditions, by touting such "heroic strug-
gles" as the Great Peasant War of 1525 and the 1848
revolution as proof of its pedigree.- The military
apparently has had some success in cultivating a
favorable image, judging by the expressions of public
support for the Army reported by US Military Liai-
son Mission officers in Berlin.
Military leaders, in our estimation, no doubt also
believe that the glorification of military service that
is implicit in so much of the education programs
helps boost the morale and self-esteem of career
soldiers. We believe that many East German officers
as a result probably consider themselves coequals
a The highest medal attainable in the East German National
People's Army is named after Gerhard Scharnhorst, who also
An FDJ group learns about air
defens
with their counterparts in the government and party
apparatus-a status some other East European offi-
cer corps do not enjoy.
retiring military officers easily secure senior
positions in the civilian bureaucracies because of
their administrative and party credentials.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Despite its glorification, the military, in our view, has
remained very much under party control, largely
because the party has gone to great lengths to ensure
subservience. The East German officer corps under-
goes some of the most rigorous political training and
screening, and it probably has by far the highest
percentage of party members-about 97 percent-of
any in Eastern Europe. Additionally, East German
political officers, in our view, are given more author-
ity and greater opportunity to conduct their party 25X1
"oversight" duties than some of their East European
counterparts, largely because of what former officers
and military publications describe as an elaborate
system of political checks in the command structure.
The East German party secretary who "oversees" the
work of the district military headquarters probably
exerts more control than counterparts in other East
European countries.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
An article in the weekly youth magazine Bummi shows the
different career opportunities in the National People's Army.
the Ministry of Education in 1978 instituted obliga-
tory courses of military instruction and civil defense
training in the secondary schools. Honecker subse-
quently took additional measures to impress military
education on the people:
? A 1978 defense law required all state organs,
combines, enterprises, institutions, co-ops, social or-
ganizations, and citizens to ensure that the party's
guidelines were followed. It also offered lengthy,
full-time service in the civil defense system as an
alternative to regular military' service.
? In early 1982 the Ministry of Public Education
ordered stricter adherence by teachers to party
guidelines on teaching military-related subjects in
the classrooms.
? A 1982 defense law made all state managers "legal-
ly responsible" for fully implementing military edu-
cation programs within their jurisdictions.
? The Workers' Militia increasingly held periodic
recruitment drives, applied heavier pressure on
members to join party cells, and undertook more
"training exercises" after normal working hours..
? In September 1981 the regime announced that all
secondary school seniors would be required to take
"practical" military courses in the schools-weap-
ons training for the boys and civil defense instruc-
tion for girls.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
acct ci
Conscript Availability and Demand in East Germany, 1968-2000
Males reaching draft age
etch year'
Percentage of 18-year old pool.
normally conscripted`
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ~L-I-~f 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
60
1968 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 2000
Excludes 10-15 percent who would not qualify for military service because
of medical disabilities, criminal records, and so forth.
b This number may increase with some organizational expansions in the
armed forces.
Reflects historical average of about 60 percent.
This policy, according to Defense Minister Heinz
Hoffmann, was intended to remedy the lack of "high
personal initiative to Socialism" and the absence of a
."clear friend-foe concept" among East German
youth
The Manpower Dilemma
The regime also looked to increased military educa-
tion to alleviate some burgeoning military manpower
problems. What in the early 1960s was a disturbing
downward trend in the birth rate had become by the
late 1970s a serious shortage of 18-year-old males
that persists to this day. The East German armed
forces in the last several years have drafted over
80,000 men a year primarily from the 18-year-old age
group; in 1992 the entire male population in this age
bracket will only total about 90,000. We believe
Honecker in 1982 balked at extending the obligatory
term of military service (currently 18 months) because
of likely negative reaction at home and adverse
publicity in the West. Rather, the regime has tried to
use pervasive premilitary education and training pro-
grams to attract more young men to military careers,
to encourage more women to volunteer for military
service, and to better prepare draftees for active duty.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85S00316R000100030005-3
"Socialist Military Education"
in Practice
The following sketches give a sense of how much the
regime's military education programs pervade every-
day life in East Germany. They are based on East
German newspapers and textbooks
? Arriving at school, the kindergartners are told it is
a special day: a soldier from the People's Army has
come to visit. He will tell them about military life,
lead them in patriotic songs, and invite them to visit
his military unit.
? Seventh-grade math teacher Frau Goebling closely
follows the party's guidelines in using military
examples to demonstrate East Germany's 'peaceful
use of science" and the West's "misuse of technol-
ogy for aggression "? to learn how, she attended
special classes for teachers at a local Army st.cxff
school. She will soon get a salary bonus for exceed-
ing her quota in recruiting students for the FDJ's
"Military Applicant Collectives-special groups
for those youngsters interested in the Army as a
career.
? Sixteen-year-old FDJ member Wolfgang completes
every day at his vocational school with a class on
"Military Instruction. " Nearly every afternoon and
weekend is filled with related "extracurricular"
activities: an FDJ rally at townhall to protest
NATO's policies; "sports" competitions with his
The manpower problem prompted the regime in a
1982 defense law to begin registering draft-age wom-
en to fill certain service jobs during national emergen-
cies-a move unprecedented in the Warsaw Pact. The
government has also resorted to using more reservists
to fill out active units and has delayed the callup of
some conscripts to have them available in future years
(see figure).
The System Today
The system of "Socialist Military Education," as the
East German regime calls it, has evolved into a
comprehensive program that begins in nursery school
GST unit; marksmanship training, again with his
GST comrades, at a local Army rifle range. His
girlfriend is similarly occupied with her FDJfunc-
tions and civil defense training; she will get even
more schooling in civil defense at the university.
? Hans had heard that Army life was drudgery, but
he had no idea ... he is strictly forbidden to watch
West German TV ... he cannot have a personal
radio in his possession ... he has long political
classes every day ... he is forbidden to write his
cousin in West Berlin ... and those "Friendship
Days" with the Soviet troops, how absurd!
? Joachim thought he had military life behind him
last year when he began working at the Erfurt
tractor combine. But his foreman told him that few
apprentices get promoted unless they are active in
the shop's "Reserve Collective, " so he volunteered
to teach map reading and pathrnding to a local
GST group. His boss also has been telling him for
months that the combine's Workers' Militia battal-
ion desperately needs members, and Joachim's in-
fantry background makes him an ideal candidate.
And just today the leader of the factory's civil
defense unit approached him about "helping out "at
next month's exercise. Joachim doubts that he will
ever have any real "leisure time" until he retires.
and extends almost to the retirement home (see inset).
Its fundamental aims, nonetheless, are still those
initially pursued by Ulbricht: to teach practical mili-
tary skills, to instill discipline, to mold political atti-
tudes, and to build popular identification with the
state. Directed by a hierarchy of party committees,
the system encompasses all age groups, although it is 25X1
oriented heavily toward young people. It involves
virtually all state institutions, including elementary
and secondary schools; youth and sports groups; and
factories and government offices.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85S00316R000100030005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85S00316R000100030005-3
Secret
The GDR 's Ideological "Hate"
Campaign Against the West
? Gen. Heinz Kessler, Chief of the Army's Main
Political Directorate, on political indoctrination in
the armed forces (August 1983):
(Our) work is to convey an enemy image which
clearly illustrates the threat of impending imperial-
ist aggression, which leaves no doubt about the
brutality and insidiousness of the enemy, and
which causes abhorrence and hatred.
? Dr. Heinz Ahlborg, Secondary School Principal, on
the importance of political-military indoctrination
in the classroom (November 1981):
A man is ready to defend his Socialist Fatherland
... only if he is convinced of the correctness of our
social development and hates the imperialist sys-
tem with all his heart
? Wolfgang Reischock, SED party education expert,
on the role of East German mass media in counter-
ing Western influences (August 1982):
... it must develop youth's capability... to see
through enemy methods, tactics, and strategies of
opinion molding and render them ineffective. F-
25X1
ZoA]
A variety of activities are employed: formal
coursework in military strategy and doctrine; field
training with small weapons and related equipment;
elaborate sports competitions highlighting military-
related physical activities; and extensive field exer-
cises in civil defense skills. Intense political indoctri-
nation pervades all its activities, with a specific focus
on the NATO military threat and the East German
citizen's obligation to participate actively in defense
preparations (see inset). To ensure participation, the
regime uses various forms of intimidation and induce-
ments, from trying to exploit peer pressure among
school children to withholding highly prized appren-
ticeships from uncooperative young workers. In some
instances, the allure of activities such as parachuting
or sailing undoubtedly is enough to prompt a young-
ster to join a regime-sponsored organization.F_~
The military fulfills the regime's "party school" con-
cept in the broadest sense by providing the classroom,
the teachers, and the administrators:
? Regular commissioned and noncommissioned offi-
cers, as well as reservists, teach courses in schools
and colleges.
? The Army reportedly conducts special classes for
civilian school teachers to show them how to convey
military-related material in the classroom (see
,inset).
? The legal statute revised in 1976 to provide clearer
guidance to the work of the Free German Youth
proclaims it "will ... steel the young people of the
GDR in irreconcilable hatred for imperialism and
its reactionary policies."
? Reserve officers and NCOs serve extensively as
administrators and advisers in all youth and sports
groups.
25X1
? Military reservists also are forced to serve in the
25X1
civil defense and Workers' Militia units.
25X1
Some within the Soviet leadership, especially those
who experienced war with Germany firsthand, proba-
bly shudder at East'Berlin's extensive use of military
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85S00316R000100030005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
"Socialist Military Education"
in the Classroom:
A Sampling of the Curriculum a
Kindergarten Marching Song: "I Drive a Tank"
I drive a tank, ra-ta-ta-ta-ta
I drive a tank, ra-ta-ta-ta-ta
I load the cannon, rum-bum-bum,
I load the cannon, rum-bum-bum,
When I grow up,
I'll join the People's Army
Second-Grade Reading Exercise
Peter and Paul race to the creek. Tanks have
stopped there. Who is smiling at them from the
turret? It is a tank soldier. Peter says, "What kind
of wheels does the tank have?" The soldier says,
"There are tracks. Watch out! Get out of the way!"
Already, the tanks are rumbling and grinding on.
Peter and Paul shout, "Tomorrow, we'll be tank
soldiers, too!"
Third-Grade Math Problem
Out of 54 soldiers in one unit, 12 have won the
"sharpshooters" medal. How many collectives of this
unit are still vying for this honor, if each collective has
six soldiers?
Fourth-Grade Reading Exercise "On Maneuvers"
The voice of the CO gives the order "Advance!" Our
armored personnel carrier jumped across the rocks ...
then we assumed battle positions ... Suddenly, a
deafening noise. Motorized infantrymen were firing
their machine pistols. In between, the dull thuds of
antitank guns ... Then, suddenly, complete quiet.
Our forces had destroyed the enemy's last positions.
On our stubblefield, we had a brief rollcall ... our
commanding general gave us a grade of "excellent"
for our operation.
Tenth-Grade Math Problem
The antitank turret machinegun of a medium tank is
installed on the upper edge of the turret at 2.7 meters
above the ground. The gunsight quadrant elevation is 25X1
adjustable between - 5 degrees and + 30 degrees.
Compute the "dead space" radius around the tank
with respect to the antitank turret machinegun.
education. But we believe Moscow has allowed Hon-
ecker such latitude for some very practical reasons,
although there are definite limits to which it will
permit the cultivation and exploitation of German
national pride. East Germany's use of youth and
paramilitary organizations follows long-established
Soviet methods for mass control, even though, in our
view, East Berlin often exceeds its mentor in the
degree of regimentation and the intensity of its propa-
ganda. The Soviets also apparently recognize the
unique problems that East Germany has faced since
its artificial creation, particularly its lack of historical
legitimacy and heavy exposure to West German
media. And the party's firm grip on the Army
probably serves to reassure the Soviets that the mili-
tary will not abuse its political role
More importantly, the Soviets probably feel they can
afford to grant Honecker certain liberties because of
their penetration of East German institutions. Al-
though evidence is scanty, we believe that Moscow
has established a network of "close friends" within
the East German party hierarchy that probably is
more extensive than in any other Pact country. Soviet
controls in the East German military establishment
seem especially pervasive.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
Secret
FDJ political activities take up
much of the young people's free
counterparts, most East German military officers on
the way up attend various Soviet staff and technical
schools.'
The regime's heavy reliance on military education as
a means of political socialization has had mixed
results. Many East Germans participate in the re-
gime's programs because of the heavy pressure and
prospective material benefits. The authorities' en-
forcement of social regimentation has, in our view,
achieved a certain degree of compliance. Indeed, the
" Moreover, Moscow's military presence in East Germany-which
includes 19 tank and motorized rifle divisions-far exceeds such
deployments in other Pact countries and greatly overshadows the
strength of East Germany's own national forces-six such divisions.
regime has demonstrated repeatedly its ability to turn
out thousands of students and young workers for
rallies orchestrated to demonstrate support for its
policies. Moreover, there has been no recurrence of
the violent 1978 youth disturbances. And, we believe
that, because of its intensity and appeal to patriotism,
the government's militarized political propaganda is
probably accepted by at least some of the people,
especially among the older generation, and helps
provide the regime a small measure of the legitimacy
it continues to seek.
Alienation
We believe that the regime clearly has not succeeded,
however, in overcoming considerable public apathy,
which is growing, especially among young people.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85S00316R000100030005-3
fur example, has experienced growing problems in
atithorities, is the
failure of their efforts to use the Militia as recruiting
ground for party members.
Mille participation in most youth organizations
is high, enthusiasm for many of the political functions
remains low. Even the carefully controlled television
coverage of mass youth rallies often inadvertently
betrays the considerable indifference of many partici-
pants.
celcd an official petition campaign against NATO
IN F deployments because it garnered such embar-
rassingly little popular support.
In fact, the regime's programs appear to have gener-
ated subtle forms of resistance. Former Fast German
dissidents Rudolf Bahro and Karl Winkler claim that
many youngsters stop adapting naively to every re-
gime dent.tnd by the time they reach adolescence and
that even the offspring of some officials eventually
begin rejecting the party's line
after participating in
the Young Pioneers, the FD.I, and the GST and then
serving in the military, most workers simply want to
be left alone.
even sonic young party members
arc open y c ismaye over the regime's "hard sell"
attitude toward military education. An article in the
respected West Berlin newspaper Der Tagecspie,ge/,
Mhich has numerous contacts in the cast, opined last
car that bast Berlin's efforts to raise the "socialist
consciousness" of its youth through political indoctri-
nation have hit a ''dead end" because the constant
propaganda barrage has turned off so many young-
sters. Indeed, the regime's extensive efforts to indoc-
trinate and regiment its citizens probably intensify the
already considerable appeal of West German media,
particularly television, which are received in most of
Fast Germany.
File Fast Germans have acknowledged these problems
in several vyays. The media, for instance, have de-
fended at length universal military training and heat-
edly rejected the notion that this is incompatible with
the regime's advocacy of disarmament. The FDJ
journal Forum in December 1982 admitted that many
students were criticizing the saturation of academic
curriculums with political-military indoctrination. A
West German official responsible for Berlin affairs
told US Embassy officers in Paris last year that
Honecker was so concerned about the young people's
rejection of "socialist ideals" that he set up a secret
commission, with representatives from youth organi-
zations, universities, and the government, to find
solutions-- a move reminiscent of his creation of a
Politburo commission in 1976.
The Peace Issue
We further believe 1ionecker's efforts at regimenta-
tion have helped spawn an unofficial peace movement
that commands a small and perhaps growing follow-
ing. What began in 1981 as a grassroots movement of
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85S00316R000100030005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
Secret
The idea oja European nucle-
ar-free zone is not new, but
East German paciflsts added
their own emblem-which was
banned by the authorities.F_
a few conscientious objectors demanding an alterna-
tive to military service has developed into a loosely
knit amalgam of peace groups whose -broadened plat-
forms now advocate dismantling the military arsenals
of both East and West. Such attitudes were no doubt
inspired in part by the activities of peace groups in
West Germany, but, in our view, the growing sense of
pacifism among many East German youth is also a
direct reaction to the regime's intensified military
education programs. Actual membership in the vari-
ous groups, according to the US Embassy
probably numbers only several thousand, but
some of their peace workshops and festivals, even
under the close eyes of security police, often attract
tens of thousands. Most of these participants, accord-
ing to US Embassy reports, want advice on resisting
military education and obligatory military service,
seek the anonymity of a large group to express their
opposition to the government, or simply want to
participate in a social function that is not regime
controlled. Although the independent movement of-
fers little real threat to the regime, its very existence
and ability to garner public attention and even modest
active support, in our estimation, have proved to be a
growing embarrassment.
According to the US Embassy
Honecker's policies on military education
have also caused friction with the Lutheran Church.
the church hierarchy has
persistently asked the regime-in public and pri-
vate-to tone down militarist propaganda in the
schools, ease compulsory military coursework in the
classrooms, and lift penalties on those who resist such
education. Church leaders also continue to press for a
social service alternative to the military draft and,
despite repeated regime rebuffs and warnings, have
provided support-particularly sanctuary-to the in-
dependent peace groups and their activities. A num-
ber of worshipers apparently sympathize with the
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
ideals of the unofficial peace movement and are
repelled by what they see as hypocritical regime
policies. Some of the clergy may feel morally obligat-
ed to support their parishioners on such emotional
issues, and church officials, not wanting to lose credi-
bility, are trying to keep in step with popular atti-
tudes. Church leaders may also be speaking out from
a sense of moral obligation because of the indifference
to German militarism shown by their predecessors
some 50 years ago.
The Military's Mission
Despite their vigorous application, the military educa-
tion programs have also not fulfilled many of their
specific military goals. In some ways, indeed, the
regime's policies appear to have made matters worse.
Although we do not believe these setbacks have
seriously eroded the East German Army's state of
preparedness, we do believe they are sources of con-
cern for political and military leaders alike.
The extensive military education of the vast majority
of young men apparently has not significantly im-
proved the average conscript's level of military exper-
tise. Although the programs have provided young East
Germans an understanding of fundamental military
concepts and some rudimentary practical skills (like
small-arms handling), they have not been effective
enough to prompt Army leaders to alter basic training
for inductees-the format and number of hours devot-
ed to teaching basic skills have remained constant. At
the same time, the programs apparently have not kept
pace with the demands of force modernization: in late
1982 the regime revamped the compulsory courses
run by the GST for male high school seniors to
provide better training in more advanced military
Reports from the US Embassy
indicate that since 1981 discipline
problems in some Army units have increased and
morale has declined. Infractions reportedly include
"antistate" activity (that is, political dissent), deser-
tions, insubordination, and maintaining personal con-
tacts with Westerners. Articles in professional East
German military journals stressing the need for more
discipline among the soldiers suggest increasing offi-
cial concern over morale problems. According to the
US Embassy, several Army generals-perhaps re-
flecting concern especially in the Army's political
administration-have publicly called for strengthened
political education of draftees, even at the expense of
weapons training. In October 1982 the Army institut-
ed tougher disciplinary regulations,
The regime's efforts also have not persuaded more
young men to stay in the armed forces. Rather,
the
Army is still experiencing serious difficulty in recruit-
ing sufficient numbers of military careerists
the e regime has stepped up efforts to recruit women for
certain job categories. Most young adults, however,
evidently prefer careers in the more lucrative-and
relatively less regimented-industrial sector.
US Embassy reporting indicate,
moreover, that many soldiers who volunteer for ex-
tended service terms are primarily interested in the
civilian education benefits offered as incentives-such
as preferential admission to universities and lucrative
stipends-and leave for the universities once they
have fulfilled their obligation
The regime's socialization policies, in our estimation,
have, indeed, contributed to increased resistance to
military service. Conscientious objection-something
relatively unheard of in East Germany a couple of
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
decades ago-is 25X1
up markedly. To be sure, a very small 25X1
num er of young men-mostly Jehovah's Witness-
es-have consistently resisted the draft. But, despite
the almost certain prison sentence of 18 to 24 months 25X1
for such an offense, their number has been slowly
growing. Moreover
since the late 1970s the number of conscripts
annually seeking entry into the Army's noncombatant
construction battalions-the only legal alternative
available to conscientious objectors-has risen steadi-
ly from a few hundred to about 1,000.
because the construction units are overflow-
ing many are being shunted into other noncombatant
service jobs-such as hospital orderlies.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
Secret
Marching to the "Monument to
Victims of Fascism and Milita-
rism, " the National People's
Army with traditional regalia.
party officials have become increas-
ingly disturbed about the problem, despite the still
relatively small numbers, because it potentially could
spread. But they do not know what to do other than
requiring applicants to submit written "certification"
of "active involvement" in religious life before they
report for induction. Those who persist in trying to
obtain such status after they have been placed in
combat units often spend their service time in penal
units or prison.
Even though the military education programs have
not fulfilled expectations of the regime, we believe it
will not abandon them, but redouble such efforts.
Honecker appears convinced that even stronger doses
of military-style indoctrination and regimentation will
keep a lid on-and ultimately win over-alienated
youth. Honecker's professional "agitprop" back-
ground, with its emphasis on repeatedly hammering
home the same message, probably prevents him from
recognizing the fundamental shortcomings of his so-
cialization policies. The regime's natural inclination
to rely heavily on military-style regimentation as a
means of managing society and its concern about
political unrest during a period of continued economic
austerity will help reinforce its commitment to
strengthening social discipline.
We believe the regime's appeal to Prussian virtues,
nonetheless, has passed the point of diminishing re- 25X1
turns. Even heavier applications of military education,
in our view, will not win the kind of loyalty and
obedience that Honecker seeks, but probably will only
compound some of the domestic problems he is trying
to solve. Honecker's demands for discipline through
military training are unlikely to lead to serious dis-
turbances because most of the population remains
thoroughly intimidated, but they could easily provoke
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85S00316R000100030005-3
increased protests from young people, especially zeal- The long-term implications of what Honecker and
ous peace activists, who are more daring about chal- company have let loose are less clear but perhaps
lenging the regime's pervasive control mechanisms. A more sweeping. The regime's appeal to traditional
church source recently told US Embassy officers that, German values may inadvertently be fostering even
despite regime warnings and sanctions, young people stronger yearnings for a Germany reunited, and put
are still joining the peace movement. We seriously even further out of reach the large measure of
doubt, moreover, that the church will abandon its legitimacy that East German governments have long
criticism of "creeping militarism" despite the possibil- sought. And the more ordinary East Germans realize
ity of increased strains with the regime; indeed, that reunification is out of the question, the more
deepening government intransigence could in turn likely they are to sink into a deeper apathy or,
make some clergy more defiant and widen the gulf alternately, the more eager they may be to try by any
between church and state. means to emigrate.
Although we do not anticipate that persisting youthful
discontent and spreading pacifism will pose serious
morale and discipline problems for the East German
military, these phenomena could raise some questions
about the East German Army's reputation for politi-
cal reliability. They may further dampen popular
support for the military. Moreover, continuing prob-
lems in recruiting enough highly qualified and proper-
ly motivated career soldiers could stir more concern
among military leaders in both East Berlin and
Moscow. And increased efforts to evoke military
history and traditions could ultimately foster a recru-
descence of the kind of German national sentiment-
that is, feelings of uniqueness-that would raise hack-
les among East Berlin's Slavic allies and potentially
become a source of friction within the Pact.'
' Chancellor Otto von Bismark, credited for unifying Germany over
a hundred years ago, is the latest historical figure undergoing
partial rehabilitation by East German authorities. They cite Bis-
mark's "realistic and common-sense" attitudes toward foreign
relations as considerably more enlightened than the "adventurism
and military megalomania predominating in ruling circles of
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85S00316R000100030005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
aecrer
Appendix A
Previous Research
Virtually immune to societal unrest for decades, East
Germany has entered a period of increasing ferment.
Since the late 1970s, consumers have become more
assertive in protesting increasingly evident shortages.
At the same time, young people have become more
rebellious, which has led to increased delinquency and
youth crime, greater job dissatisfaction, and a grow-
ing attraction to idealistic causes. Although the level
of discontent is very low compared with Poland during
Solidarity's heyday, it marks a sharp departure from
the traditional acquiescent behavior of East Germans.
Young East Germans especially appear to expect the
relative prosperity they knew in the 1970s. Moreover,
they are repelled by authority-perhaps even more
than rebellious Western youth-because of the re-
gime's endless demands for conformity. Their involve-
ment in Eastern Europe's only spontaneous peace
movement-the first grassroots political movement in
East Germany-is a dramatic way of resisting regi-
mentation
The regime is trying to counter the ferment with a
mix of persuasion and coercion. Party leaders have
shifted around consumer goods to dampen discontent
and sought to siphon off pacifist sentiment into a
"peace movement" directed by the official youth
organization. At the same time, the authorities are
increasing pressure on peace activists and their church
supporters. We expect this restiveness, nonetheless, to
grow, especially as East Germany's economic prob-
lems mount. The austerity measures-necessary be-
cause of the large foreign debt and the end of cheap
Soviet raw materials and easy Western credits-
virtually ensure that the regime cannot sustain its all-
important "Consumer Communism."
In the near term, we believe the regime's pervasive
controls will prevent East Germany from becoming a
major crisis point in Eastern Europe. Repression will
nonetheless undermine the leadership's long-term goal
of public acceptance, contribute to the downward
economic spiral, and wreck any hope for economic
reform. In the end, the high costs of repression may
strengthen the hand of those-including younger,
technocratic elements in the party-who argue for
more pragmatism
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316ROO0100030005-3
Secret
Appendix B
Young Pioneers (JP) Ages 6 to 10 Parallels military education in the classroom with training in hiking map
(1948 established) and compass reading; terrain orientation; camouflage; first aid; and
weapons handling (including bow and arrow, crossbow, and air guns).
1.8 million (99
percent of age Encourages participation in "extracurricular" groups such as: Young
group) Infrantrymen, Young Radio Operators, Young Seamen, Young Model
Makers, Young (Air) Pursuers.
Ernst Thaelman Pioneers Ages 10 to 13 Sponsors annual "Children's Maneuvers"-tightly regimented, military-
(1948 established) style summer camp with training conducted by regular Army officers.
Free German Youth (FDJ) Ages 14 to 26 2.1 million (65 Conducts intensive political indoctrination to "awaken" defense willing-
(1946 established) percent of age ness and readiness.
group)
Society for Sport and Ages 14 to 26 600,000 (16,000
Technology (GST) units country-
(1952 established) wide)
Recruits prospective career soldiers in "Candidate Collectives."
Sponsors "brother units" in the armed forces.
Sponsors "Hans Beimler Sport Contests" in secondary school grades
eight to 10, in which military skills predominate.
Subordinated to the Ministry of National Defense since 1956.
Conducts compulsory premilitary basic training for 16- to 18-year-olds:
? Weapons training (including handgrenade throwing); nuclear-biologi-
cal-chemical training; first aid; and map and compass reading.
? Administered by regular army officers..
Offers members advanced training in marksmanship, motor sports,
communications, aviation, parachuting, underwater diving, and
navigation.
Workers' Militia Males, ages 400,000 to Subordinated directly to party Central Committee.
(KampJgruppen) 25 to 60 450,000
(1953 established) .
Members required to complete 132 hours of weekend political and
military training annually.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316ROO0100030005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
Organizations for Political Socialization (Continued)
Organization Composition Size Functions and Activities Relating to Military Education
Reserve Collectives Ages 20 to 60 1.5 million After active military duty, enlisted men are required to remain in the
(1964 established) reserves until age 50; officers, until age 60.
Members encouraged to be active in other groups-FDJ, GST, Workers'
Militia, and Civil Defense.
Civil Defense System Ages 16 to 65 650,000 active The Civil Defense System was subordinated to the Ministry of National
(1958 established) members; over 7 Defense in 1978.
million have re-
ceived training Full-time training is mandatory for females from age 16 through 18;
part-time training is obligatory for female university students, as well as
male students unfit for military service.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
 Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP85SO0316R000100030005-3