CENTRAL AMERICA: THE REFUGEE DILEMMA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00315R000200080001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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utrecturate nt ~--
i' Intelligence
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Central America:
The Refugee Dilemma
GI 84-10152
September 1984
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a`? `r~ Directorate of Secret
s l~ it Intelligence s
Central America:
The Refugee Dilemma
This paper was prepared b~of the
Office of Global Issues and was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations --
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Geography Division, OGI, on
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Secret
G184-10152
September 1984
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Central America:
The Refugee Dilemma
Key Judgments
Information available
as of 21 July 1984
was used in this report.
Central American refugees represent a serious and growing dilemma. The
diverse, sometimes conflicting demands of humanitarian concerns, security
interests, national pride, and limited local domestic resources present
complex issues that will be difficult to resolve:
? Although the outflow from Central America has slowed over the past
year, the number of refugees is large and increasing.
? Even if many refugees repatriated, most would probably join the masses
of displaced persons in their home countries, and the need for interna-
tional assistance on a regional basis would remain high.
? Displaced persons, especially those in sensitive border zones, will contin-
ue to be susceptible to subversion and to complicate counterinsurgency
efforts. I
? Given their large numbers and the lack of absorptive capacity in host
countries, refugees could become a'source of instability.
? As the capacity of Central American countries and southern Mexico to
absorb refugees is filled, more and more refugees may seek to enter the
United States. .
? We believe that Guatemala, El Salvador, and, increasingly, Nicaragua
could produce major new outflows of refugees. Nicaragua's deteriorating
economy, combined with the insurgency, has sparked a large-scale
displacement of persons, and is creating new refugee outflows.
Secret
G184-10152
September 1984
 Refugee Camps
? United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR)-sponsored refugee camp,-camp
cluster, or resettlement site
^ Active resettlement site
O Proposed resettlement site
Population Density
(persons per square kilometer)
North
Pacific Ocean
150 or more
75-149
50-74
25-49
Less than 25
. '
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Central America:
The Refugee Dilemma
Introduction
Political turmoil and violence coupled with economic
deterioration have spurred an unprecedented move-
ment of people within and from Central America over
the past five years. We estimate that Central America
and Mexico are now burdened with more than 1.1
million displaced persons (DPs). This estimate in-
cludes 800,000 who have been uprooted from their
homes but remain in their native countries. Another
350,000 have fled to neighboring lands. In addition to
these two groups, there are perhaps several hundred
thousand economic migrants who have moved tempo-
rarily or permanently from one country to another
within the region. (See appendixes A and B.) This
paper does not examine in depth the large migration
to the United States, about which we have little
information.)
Sources of Refugees
Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala are the three
major sources of refugees in Central America. The
political background against which the refugee situa-
tion has developed in each of these countries has
varied. During the past five years, El Salvador and
Guatemala, with tough anti-Marxist regimes and
records of atrocities both by rightwing death squads
and leftist guerrillas, have produced the largest out-
flows of refugees. However, an effective counterinsur-
gency program and improvements in Guatemala's
human rights performance have sharply reduced the
flow from that country. And, in El Salvador, suppres-
sion of the death squads and movement toward a more
democratic political process have helped to reduce and
even reverse the flow of refugees. On the other hand, a
general deterioration of human rights conditions in
Marxist Nicaragua during the past few years has
resulted in that country's emergence as the region's
most important generator of refugees. The numbers of
internally displaced persons have remained stable in
El Salvador and Guatemala but continue to increase
in Nicaragua, according to US Embassy and other
The Role of Nicaragua. Nicaragua is the current
principal source of refugees in Central America and
the only country of the region to officially force
Secret
People who have been forced from their homes by war
or oppression are generally termed displaced persons
or DPs. U they remain in their native countries, they
are referred to as internally displaced persons. DPs
who have fled across an international bordei are
known as refugees. The. 1951 United Nations Conven-
tion Relating to the Status of Refugees damned a
refugee as a person who "...owing to religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality (or habitual residence) and is unable, or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country. ' In Central America, 25X1
political refugees are often difficult to distinguish
from people who have left their homes primarily for
economic reasons.F___1 25X1
Most of the estimates in this study have been derived
from various reports of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Unfortunate-
ly, not all of the UNHCR data are reliable, much
being based only on estimates by host governments
whose own sources and data bases are questionable.
For example, for information on Guatemalan refu-
gees in Mexico, the UNHCR relies solely on data
provided by the Mexican Government-data which
have shown wide, inexplicable variations over the
past year. Other important sources of information on
numbers of refugees used in this study include the US
Embassy reports contained in the State Department's
annual Country Reports on the World Refugee Situa-
tion. However, these draw mainly on the same mate-
rial as the UNHCR and suffer the same weaknesses.
Occasionally, Central American refugee or immigra-
tion officials will estimate the numbers in their own
i
countries, but the bases for their estimates or even
their definition of "refugee" are seldom provided.
Thus, all figures in this report must be used with
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The United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
The UNHCR has programs in Mexico, Honduras,
Costa Rica, and Nicaragua. It oversees, rather than
manages, these programs, usually providing one rep-
resentative and several observers in a host country. It
also provides the funding for refugee'needs such as
food, clothing, and shelter. Aid is indirect, being
channeled through public or private organizations
such as the Red Cross or World Relief. These, in
turn, coordinate other relief efforts such as Caritas or
Catholic Relief Service. The UNHCR's direct in-
volvement in refugee programs is minimal.
Some of the UNHCR-sponsored refugee camps in
Honduras and Costa Rica have been used by leftist
insurgents. Although there is no evidence of direct
links between UNHCR officials and the guerrillas,
the guerrillas reportedly have received aid from
certain personnel of private relief organizations work-
ing in the camps. For example, in 1983 small. bands
of Guatemalan insurgents were using a UNHCR
camp in Honduras as an operations base with the
cooperation of two relief workers of the Caritas
private voluntary organization. As a result, these
workers were transferred, and a number of Guatema-
lans were deported to Bolivia for resettlement. In
1982, a Costa Rican Government study indicated that
a refugee camp for Salvadorans in Costa Rica had
apparently been "taken over" by leftists, who used it
for propagandizing and possibly for recruiting and
training insurgents. The investigation also found that
agitators in the camp had frequent contact with local
relocation of selected nationals. Harsh treatment of
opponents of the Sandinista regime-refugees cite
murder and torture-the insurgency, plus the large-
scale impressment of youth into military units to fight
insurgent forces have led to a sizable flow of people
from Nicaragua over the past two years. The figures
Somoza's fall marked the beginning of an outflow of a
diverse group including supporters of the former
regime, disillusioned ex-Sandinistas, and persons who
felt persecuted on racial and religious grounds.10n the
basis of UNHCR and US Embassy reporting,'we
estimate that more than 100,000 Nicaraguans'have
Communists and made a number of trips to Nicara-
gua. The UNHCR, which finances the camp, denied
any knowledge of such activities and noted that the
camp was actually administered by the Costa Rican
Red Cross. Also denying any knowledge of insurgent
use of the camp, the Red Cross withdrew from the
project. Administration of the camp was then taken
over by the Costa Rican Government
In 1983, the UNHCR expended more than $23
million in assistance to Central American refugees, a
figure that is expected to exceed $24 million this
year. Specific figures for UNHCR programs are as
follows:
In addition, refugee maintenance depends on contri-
butions by numerous private voluntary charitable
organizations and government assistance in the form
of services such as health care and schooling. We do
not have reliable data on the costs of these types of
fled to other Central American countries since the
Sandinistas came to power in 1979. Some 19,000
Miskito and Sumo Indians have fled eastern Nicara-
gua into Honduras. The largest exodus of Indians
occurred from mid-1981 to early 1982, when the
Government of Nicaragua brutally and systematically
cracked down on Miskito resistance to clear a swath
of territory along the northern border for security. In
December 1983, more than 1,000 fled north with a
local Catholic bishop. Since then, individuals, fam-
ilies, and groups of a hundred or more have continued
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Attacks.by insurgents on Nicaraguan ports have
raised concern for the security of inhabitants. Follow-
ing an attack on Corinto, in October 1983 they govern-
ment announced its intention to relocate the entire
population of approximately 20,000. Press reporting
indicates that some 1,500 women and children were
evacuated from Potosi early this year. Continued
deterioration of Nicaragua's economy and internal
security probably will increase the number of DPs,
many of whom are likely to flee to Honduras or Costa
Rica. Additional refugees could also be generated if
the Sandinista government fails to fulfill its promise
of open and honest elections in November. 25X1
Mocoron, in Honduras. once housed up to 10,000 Miskito Indians
from Nicaragua. Most have been dispersed to other nearby sites,
and the facility is now used largely as a reception center for those
who continue tofee Nicaragua.)
Although the plight of the Indians has drawn most
international attention, most Nicaraguan refugees are
ladinos, the Spanish-speaking mestizos who make up
the dominant element of the country's population.
About 83,000 have fled to both Honduras and Costa
Rica. Many are campesinos, simple peasants trying to
escape violence between government forces and anti-
Sandinista insurgents: Some arrive in Honduras un-
dernourished after a monthlong hike through the
mountains. They complain of Sandinista mistreat-
ment, severe religious persecution, and attempted
Marxist indoctrination of their children. We think the
As with other Central American countries, internally
displaced persons have proved at least as troublesome
as refugees in Nicaragua. We estimate from Embassy
and press reports that internally displaced persons
now total about 100,000. The Sandinistas resettled
about 10,000 Miskito Indians from the Rio Coco area
to detention centers inland from Puerto Cabezas
during 1982, and they forced the relocation of resi-
dents in northwestern and southern border areas in
1983. According to US Embassy reporting, in Sep-
tember of last year the Sandinistas claimed that
65,000 Nicaraguans had been displaced by counter-
revolutionary activities. A Red Cross official in Ma-
nagua noted that the number of DPs was rising
beyond the capacity of the Nicaraguan Government
El Salvador. We estimate that some 220,000iSalva-
doran refugees are now residing in other Central
American countries or Mexico. UNHCR and other
data indicate that approximately half are in Mexico, a
third in Guatemala, and most of the balance j some 25X1
50,000, about evenly divided between Nicaragua,
Costa Rica, and Honduras. The flow to Honduras was
reversed in 1982 after Tegucigalpa relocated Salva-
dorans from several camps along the border to a new
site at Mesa Grande. Over the past year, there has
been some additional voluntary repatriation from both
Honduras and Nicaragua, although the total 'nobets
remain small. The only significant refugee movement
from El Salvador this year has been prompted by the
forced recruitment policy implemented by the insur-
gents. According to US Embassy reporting from
Tegucigalpa, some 1,500 Salvadorans have fed to
Honduras from insurgent-controlled areas near the
northern border-and this was followed by voluntary
repatriation to areas of El Salvador under the control
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An estimated 450,000 Salvadorans have been inter-
nally displaced by the insurgency, according to recent
US Embassy reporting. They not only tax limited
domestic resources and outside assistance, but also
form a pool of potential supporters and recruits for
insurgent forces as well as the government. Perhaps
10 percent of these internally displaced people live in
an array of DP camps maintained by the government
or private relief agencies. The quality of these camps
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varies considerably. Most of the displaced live with
relatives or in shantytowns throughout the country.
Most are poor campesinos from rural areas of north-
ern and eastern El Salvador. For most, life in the
shantytowns, where the government is providing serv-
ices such as water and facilities such as schools, may
be an improvement over their situations before dis-
placement. Getting these people to return to their
original residences may be difficult even after peace is
Guatemala. We estimate that some 120,000 political
and economic refugees from Guatemala have moved
to other Central American countries and Mexico
since 1979. About 75,000 of these are former seasonal
migrants who entered Mexico to harvest coffee and
cotton and did not return to Guatemala. They are not
recognized as refugees by the UNHCR. An addition-
al 43,000 Guatemalans, some 42,000 of whom are in
The insurgency in Guatemala expanded in 1980 after
almost a decade of near dormancy. In 1981 the
government began a major counterinsurgency effort,
and two years of widespread combat led to an exodus
of natives from areas where the fighting was most
rebuilding villages was initiated by the military in
1982 and has significantly set back Guatemalan
insurgents over the past two years. However, the
insurgency has not been eliminated and some parts of
the country remain only marginally controlled by
government forces. Moreover, economic constraints
intense. Over the past two years, the government, Host Countries
through military and civic actions, has regained con- With the exception of El Salvador, every country
trol of much of the contested area from the Rio Grande to the Panama Canal has
they try to return Mexico. Mexico has a long tradition of sheltering
those fleeing political persecution, and, in seeking to
To improve its international image, the Government maintain its "revolutionary" image, it has become a
of Guatemala has encouraged Mexico to establish a mecca for Latin American opposition groups. The
formal repatriation program. According to Guatema- influx of a new type of refugee since 1979, however,
la's Foreign Minister, the bottleneck in these negotia- has led to a tightening of immigration policies and
tions is Mexican concern over the validity of Guate- threatens the country's open-door tradition. Mexican
malan guarantees for the security of returning officials have discovered that it is one thing to admit
refugees. To entice the refugees to return voluntarily, small numbers of professionals and intellectuals, but
the Government of Guatemala is constructing. model something else to accept masses of peasants and
An equally pressing problem for Guatemala is reset- can countries in Mexico range from 150,000 to
tling an estimated 250,000 internally displaced per-
sons. A major civic action program that includes
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250,000 persons. This is in addition to migrant work-
ers from Guatemala. While trying to maintain its
image, the Mexican Government is taking measures
to cut down or reverse the flow, including:
? Imposing visa requirements on Central Americans.
Relocating Guatemalan refugees farther from the
border.
? Departing from international norms by terming
Honduras. Security concerns and political consider-
ations have made refugees a major issue in Honduras.
Hondurans particularly distrust Salvadorans, and a
special commission has been formed to review policy
options. Honduras shelters about 60,000 refugees, of
whom about 37,000 are participants in UNHCR
programs. Nearly 18,000 Salvadorans reside in three
camps sponsored by the UNHCR-Mesa Grande
(10,000), Colomoncagua (6,600), and San Antonio
(1,300). Nicaraguan refugees, some 42,000, are more
scattered and ethnically diverse than Salvadorans.
While thousands are now self-sufficient in Honduran
society, many still need public and private assistance.
Approximately 16,000 Miskito and Sumo Indians
from Nicaragua have been resettled in a scattering of
small towns in northeastern Honduras under the
auspices of the UNHCR. An additional 3,000 who do
not receive UNHCR assistance remain in some two
dozen small settlements near the Nicaragua border.
Over the past year, there has been an increasing
influx of Nicaraguan ladinos. About 3,000 are nearly
evenly divided between UNHCR-sponsored refugee
sites in Jacaleapa and Teupasenti. A small number of
Guatemalans have also sought refuge in Honduras;
they are maintained in a UNHCR-sponsored camp at
Costa Rica. Costa Rica, Central America's only well-
established democracy, has traditionally maintained
an open-door policy. Until recently, its borders were
only marginally controlled and its immigration laws
only loosely enforced. Recent regional political ten-
sions and the refugees they have created, are threat-
ening the country's security and liberal traditions. We
estimate that Costa Rica now has approximately
70,000 refugees. Some 20,000 of these-about evenly
divided between Salvadorans and Nicaraguans-have
officially registered as refugees; the 50,000 balance
consists almost exclusively of Nicaraguans who have
entered Costa Rica illegally or entered legally and
simply overstayed their visa. Approximately 2,800
Costa Rica has placed relatively few refugees in camps: The two
facilities for Nicaraguans-Tilaran (above) and Limon'(below)-
are former construction camps. 25X1
refugees are maintained in three camps funded by the
UNHCR: Tilaran, with 2,200 Nicaraguans; I Limon,
with 300 Nicaraguans; and Los Angeles, with 300
Salvadorans. Economic constraints and the rising 25X1
number of refugees have made prompt integration
Guatemala. Many thousands of Salvadorans and Nic-
araguans have fled to Guatemala. The number of
refugees in the country is unknown, but estimates
range from 10,000 to 100,000. The UNHCR has
estimated the Salvadoran refugee population alone at
70,000. According to US Embassy reporting many,of
the Salvadorans are former seasonal migrants who
remained in Guatemala after the harvest season
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 rather than return to El Salvador. A recent defense
attache report from the Embassy in Guatemala' linked
the large numbers of refugees to high unemployment
and increased crime in the capital. Guatemala has no
assistance program for Salvadoran and Nicaraguan
Nicaragua. Nicaragua hosts some 17,500 refugees
from other Central American countries, mostly. Salva-
dorans. In 1980 the first refugees came directly on
ferries across the Golfo de Fonseca, but starting in
1981 most refugees have traveled overland through
Honduras. The Salvadoran refugee situation. has re-
mained relatively stable in Nicaragua during the past
year, with a small outflow matching an equally minor
inflow. Because Nicaragua integrates refugeesquick-
ly into the general population, only one small refugee
camp and processing center remain. Near Leon, it
housed some 450 Salvadorans in 1983. About 3,000
Salvadoran refugees are receiving assistance from the
UNHCR. The only other significant group of refu-
gees in Nicaragua are approximately 50.0 Guatema-
lans, of whom about 100 are receiving aid from the
Belize. A sparsely populated country with undevel-
oped land, Belize is culturally distinct from the major
refugee-generating nations of Central America. Its
160,000 inhabitants are almost evenly divided be-
tween creoles (blacks) and noncreoles (mestizos; Indi-
ans, and others). Anything that threatens this balance
is viewed locally with great concern. Consequently,
the government's refugee policy has become a sensi-
tive political issue. We estimate that there are 6,000
Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees in Belize. Gov-
ernment policy calls for their integration into society,
preferably through land-development projects involv-
ing joint participation with Belizean families. One
such project involving some 250 Salvadorans is now
under way near Belmopan. To offset concern a mong
the creole population over the incorporation ofmore
mestizos, the government agreed to establish with the
UNHCR a land-settlement program for Haitians in
southern Belize. In April the government announced a
grace period in which illegal aliens should register and
Panama. Panama is reluctant to receive refugees,
although a small resettlement facility for Salvadorans
has been established. Most Central American refu-
gees in Panama probably have adequate skills to.
sustain themselves without causing significant prob-
lems. Public references to an immigration bomb by
high-level Panamanian officials late last year was
apparently intended to raise awareness of a potential 25X1
influx.)
Refugee Problems
Besides the heavy economic burdens refugees impose
on their hosts and relief agencies, refugees present
many other problems for both generating and receiv-
Security Problems. Refugees create international se-
curity concerns that contribute to regional tensions.
The usual preference of refugees to remain close to
their homelands makes their camps potential support
bases for insurgents and, in some cases, targets for
cross-border raids by government forces. A 1982
investigation of the Los Angeles camp in Costa Rica
embarrassed government authorities when it was dis-
covered that Salvadoran insurgents were using the
facility for rest, recreation, and recruiting. More
recently, high-level Costa Rican officials have ex-
pressed concern over the influx of Nicaraguan refu-
gees, fearing that some may be anti-Sandinista guer- .
rillas while others may be saboteurs or terrorists 25X1
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Similarly, Guatemalan insurgents have been using
some of the refugee camps in Mexico for sanctuary
and for funneling supplies to Guatemala. Guatemala's
frustrations with the failure of Mexican authorities to
halt these activities have probably spurred occasional
actions by its security forces against some of the
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camps despite numerous denials. According to a US
Embassy report from Mexico City, a UNHCR source
has confirmed incursions in December of last!year and
January of this year, the latter involving a brief
overflight of one camp in which two handgrenades
were dropped.
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Internal Relocation Problems. To reduce security
problems, UNHCR policy is to locate refugee camps
at least 50 kilometers from the border of the~generat-
ing country. This is a frequent irritation to host
governments, which, for domestic political consider-
ations, usually prefer that the camps remain'in fron-
tier regions. In Costa Rica, for example, the 'govern-
ment has long sparred with the UNHCR over where
Nicaraguan refugees at the Tilaran camp should be
relocated. Both agree that they should be settled on
land where they can quickly become self-sufficient-
that is, on functioning agricultural estates-but there
are few such facilities for sale in increasingly land-
scarce Costa Rica. In 1983 the government leased a
farm to resettle some refugees, but the UNHCR
refused to approve the site because of its proximity to
the Panama border. 25X1
Honduras is the only country to relocate a sil able
number of refugees. In late 1981 and 1982, with the
cooperation of the UNHCR, about 10,000 Salvadoran
refugees were moved from the central portion of the
border with El Salvador to a new camp at Mesa
Grande. Some 7,000 additional refugees in the area
preferred to return to El Salvador. About 8,000
Salvadoran and 450 Guatemalan refugees in! Hondu-
ras remain along the borders of their homelands.
UNHCR insistence on sites where they can become
self-sustaining and have access to a significant mar-
ketplace has caused serious delays. In January the
government announced a plan to transfer all1refugees
from Colomoncagua and El Tesoro to the Aguan
Valley of northern Honduras. In mid-July, the plan
was suspended because of concern that Salvadoran
refugees would be receiving better treatment than
Honduran peasants and that the new location might
attract more refugees.
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.ecrer
Guatemala views the return of refugees from Mexico
as an important part of improving its international
image. According to Embassy reporting, Guatemala's
Foreign Minister stated in March that Mexico's
intransigence could affect bilateral cooperation in the
Contadora negotiations. Both the Guatemalan Gov-
ernment and the UNHCR have pressed the Mexicans
to move the camps. In April, Mexico announced its
intention to relocate the refugees near Campeche
more than 100 miles from the border. The schedule
has not been made clear; however, several thousand
refugees were relocated in June and early July.
Mexico has publicly stated that it will not force either
repatriation or relocation. However, other information
indicates that the relocation, in which there is consid-
erable military involvement, is being forced in some
cases. Some Guatemalan refugees prefer to remain
near their homeland and fear movement to a possibly
hostile new environment. Church leaders in southern
Mexico have accused the government of brutality,
claiming that Mexican soldiers attacked one camp,
killing three refugees-a charge the government
Mexico probably hopes that many refugees will return
home voluntarily. Reports from the Embassy in Gua-
temala City indicate that a few refugees have volun-
tarily returned to Guatemala from Mexico since the
relocation began.
Competition for Land and Jobs. Local resentment
against any preferential treatment of refugees is a
sensitive issue for host countries. In Honduras, the
government's announced intention to transfer Salva-
doran and Guatemalan refugees to Yoro department
triggered petitions and protests by natives. Until
recently, on the other hand, little popular concern was
expressed over the influx of Nicaraguan Miskito
Indians'in eastern Honduras. This year, some articles
have appeared in the native press on the deforestation
Miskito resettlement is causing and on how Honduran
Miskitos of the area are being overwhelmed. Accord-
ing to Embassy reporting, arrivals are now held at the
Mocoron reception center rather than quickly reset-
tled.l
Fear of social unrest in southern Mexico has led to
close government control of assistance to refugees to
assure that they do not enjoy higher living standards
than the natives. In the spring of 1982, a leading
expert on the Indians of southern Mexico told Embas-
sy officers that local resentment was not widespread;
he attributed this to the popular perception that the
situation was temporary, but cautioned that tolerance
would not last in view of the competition for land.
This appears to have been a major consideration in
the decision to relocate the Guatemalan refugees far
awayF_____1 25X1
Health Hazards. The outbreak of disease and the
threat of epidemics are recurring concerns. The Gov-
ernment of Costa Rica declared a health emergency
along its northern border area in the fall of 1982
because of malaria among Nicaraguan refugees. Also
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culosis
at that time, the Mexican Government's public health
coordinator in Chiapas blamed Guatemalan refugees
for a worsening local health situation and the fact that
almost 20 percent of the state's population had tuber-
Outlook
Central America could generate many more refugees
together with all of the interrelated problems they
create. Depending on political and military develop-
ments in the region, any of the current principal
source countries could produce sizable outflows. The
most immediate threat of an exodus lies in Nicaragua,
where the insurgency has focused on sparsely settled
portions of the country rather than the more densely
populated western core. In El Salvador and Guatema-
la, the potential remains for a return to widespread
insurgency and increased political repression. Should
this occur, or should one or both of the countries fall
to insurgent forces, a massive outflow of refugees
For the near future, most Central American refugees
are likely to remain in their host countries and to
present a multitude of regional problems. The con-
flicting demands of border security, refugee desires to
be near their homeland, and domestic political stabil-
ity in the host countries will continue to create
tensions. The governments sheltering large refugee
populations lack the financial and technical resources
to support these groups in a manner that would lead to
economic self-sufficiency. Thus, a greater need for
international assistance and innovative diplomatic ini-
tiatives can be anticipated.
Central American refugees will continue to be of
direct concern to the United States for more than
purely humanitarian reasons. The refugees contribute
to political instability in the region and heightened
tensions between neighboring countries. Continuing
political upheaval may turn today's refugee within
Central America into tomorrow's illegal immigrant in
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Appendix A
Estimates of Central American Refugees
in Mexico and Central America a
From In
Total
Mexico Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua
Costa Rica
Panama
Belize
El Salvador 10,000 b 70,000, 17,900 17,000
10,000
1,300
5,000
131,200
(0) (0) (All) (400)
(300)
(300)
(250)
(19,150)
Guatemala 118,000 500 500
1,000
120,000
(42,000) (All) (0)
(0)
(42,500)
Nicaragua 42,000
60,000
102,000
(19,000)
(2,500)
(21,500)
Total 128,000 b 70,000 60,400 17,500
70,000
1,300
6,000
353,200
(42,000) (0) (37,400) (400)
(2,800)
(300)
(250)
(83,150)
Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of refugees
in UNHCR refugee camps or resettlement projects.
? Estimates are as of 21 July 1984.
Excludes an estimated 90,000 Salvadorans in Mexico who are
largely economic rather than political refugees.
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The general economic picture in Central America has payments,problems. Economic activity within the
been bleak for the past five years. Large foreign debts, region has declined nearly 20 percent, and unemploy-
coupled with declining production and deteriorating ment has risen to unusually high levels. See 'the table.
terms of trade, have caused severe balance-of-
Population Population Change in Per Capita Unemploy- Balance of Public
(millions) Growth GDP Change in ment Payments Foreign Debt
(percent) (percent) GDP (percent) (million (billion US $)
(percent) US $)
Guatemala 7.9 2.9 -2.0 -4.9 20 -283 1.4
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