GLOBAL TERRORISM: THE JUSTICE COMMANDOS OF THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00315R000200060002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Global Terrorism:
The Justice Commandos of the
Armenian Genocide
25X1
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GI 84-10148
September 1984
408
 Global Terrorism:
The Justice Commandos of the
Armenian Genocide
This paper was prepared by the Terrorism Analysis
Branch, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of
Global Issues. Information about the United States
was provided by and coordinated with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. The paper was also
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Terrorism Analysis Branch,
Secret
GI 84-10148
September 1984
 25X1
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Global Terrorism:
The Justice Commandos of the
Summary The Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) is a very
Information available efficient terrorist organization whose meticulous planning has allowed it to
as of 24 August 1984 i
was used in this report. attack Turkish interests worldwide with virtual impunity. From its incep-
tion in 1975, JCAG has shunned connections to other terrorist groups or
patron states, preferring to view itself as an elite cadre of freedom fighters,
"un-uniformed soldiers," engaged in a war with Turkey for recognition of
the Armenian genocide. JCAG's terrorist attacks are designed to force
Turkey to admit responsibility for the deaths of about 1.5 million
The Justice Commandos' parent organization, the Armenian Revolution-
ary Federation (ARF), is in competition with the other major Armenian
terrorist group, the Marxist Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of
Armenia (ASALA), for control of the Armenian revolutionary movement.
The escalation of terrorist violence by ASALA since 1979 has convinced
the ARF that it must step up terrorist activities to retain the membership
of the young radicals who demand action against Turkey.~ 25X1
JCAG and the ARF have the support of a segment of the worldwide
Armenian community, which views the Justice Commandos as freedom
fighters, not terrorists. Recent large-scale Armenian immigration to the
United States has resulted in the development of a well-organized JCAG
infrastructure in Los Angeles and the radicalization of portions of the
Armenian community in California. Although JCAG has heretofore
avoided and criticized attacks on non-Turkish targets, Armenian commu-
nity perceptions that the United States is bowing to Turkish pressure to 25X1
halt international investigation or recognition of the Armenian genocide
may trigger JCAG terrorist violence against US interests
the 1982 slaying of the JCAG leaden
iii Secret
GI84-10148
September 1984
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25X1
Global Terrorism:
The Justice Commandos of the
Armenian Genocide
Background to Armenian Terrorism
The Armenian terrorist group, the Justice Comman-
dos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG), first appeared
in 1975, but terrorism has intermittently held an
important position in the cause of Armenian national-
ism for nearly 100 years. The Armenian revolutionary
movement and the terrorism it inspired grew out of
the late,-19th-century self-defense organizations de-
veloped by Armenians to protect themselves against
victimization by Turks, Kurds, and Azeris. Modeled
on Russian nihilist organizations-which advocated
the use of intimidation, terror, and assassination-
these paramilitary groups evolved into well-trained
soldiery, influenced strongly by the revolutionary
ideals promulgated by Russian social democrats
The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) was
one of the early nationalist revolutionary organiza-
tions. Founded in 1890, the ARF quickly developed a
strong sense of national identity and fostered early
dreams of an Armenian homeland-nonexistent since
Armenia was conquered by the Ottoman Turks in the
mid-I3th century. The ARF produced the first real
fighting units-fedayihs-volunteers who left home,
lived off the land, and defended Armenian land.and
rights. The heroism, valor, and sacrifice of the early
fighters provided a nucleus of values important to
contemporary Armenian history. The ARF also pro-
vided a hero hierarchy around which the Armenian
national consciousness was awakened and with which
modern day Armenian terrorists have identified their
exploit's. Indeed, thefedayih oath to "kill the enemy
or die trying" has served as a model for at least one
recent suicide attack by Armenian terrorists'in their
attempts to gain international recognition of the
Terrorism has been an important tactic of the ARF
since its inception. The ARF's first success in gaining
West European attention for the plight of Armenians
massacred under the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid
resulted from a terrorist act. On 26 August 1896,
ARF terrorists seized the Ottoman bank in Istanbul
and held it for 18 hours, thereby gaining guarantees
from Russia to press Turkey to promulgate reforms
that favored the Armenians. The subsequent release
of the terrorists and their safe conduct out of the
Ottoman Empire provided a psychological victory for
the ARF and a stimulant for the continued use of
terrorist tactics. 25X1
Nemesis, the shadowy predecessor of JCAG, was
created by the ARF in 1921 to assassinate former
Ottoman government officials it believed responsible
for the massacre of 600,000 to 1.5 million Armenians
in 1915-an event that has become known as the
Armenian genocide. While officially sanctioned by
the ARF, these attacks were blood-feud killings car- 25X1
tied out by Armenian assassins whose family mem-
bers had been killed in the forced relocation march in
1915. Between 15 March 1921 and 25 July 1922, four
principal figures in the defunct Ottoman govern- I
ment-including Minister of Interior Talaat Pasha-
were slain by Armenians believed linked to Nemesis.
ARF-sponsored attacks on Turkish Government offi-
cials ceased after the deaths of the officials most
prominently linked to the genocide. The dispersion
and subsequent assimilation of the Armenians after
the massacres seemed to presage an end to terrorism.
25X1
An isolated event in 1973 triggered the return to
terrorism by Armenians. The revenge slaying of two
Turkish diplomats in 1973 by an aged Armenian
whose entire family had been slaughtered in 1915 ~
captured widespread media attention (see inset) and
provided inspiration to many young Armenians who
were frustrated by the inability of the Armenian I
community to gain an international investigation ofi
their claims against Turkey. ' 25X1
This act of vengeance and the subsequent publicity
surrounding a campaign to obtain his parole became
the springboard for Armenian terrorism throughout
I
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 On 28 January 1973, Gourgen Yanikian, a retired
Armenian engineer haunted by memories of having
watched while most of his family was slaughtered in
Turkey almost 6 decades earlier, lured the Turkish -
Consul in Los Angeles and his aide to the Biltmore
Hotel in Santa Barbara and shot them. At his trial
Yanikian refused to acknowledge that his act had
been criminal, claiming to have killed the diplomats
in just retaliation for the deaths in 1915 of 24 of his
family members. He also used the occasion to draw
world attention to the Turkish massacre of 1.5:
million Armenians and the dispersal of thousands of
other Armenians throughout the world.
the world. Between October 1973 and February 1975,
Armehian terrorists claimed responsibility for three
bomb attacks against Turkish facilities in the United
States and the Middle East. They used a variety of
names-the Yanikian Commandos, the Yanikian
Group, and the Prisoner Yanikian Group-linked to
the "martyr" Yanikian. The Armenian Secret Army
for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)-in a com-
munique announcing its creation in Beirut in 1975-
acknowledged its debt to Yanikian, calling him the
godfather of modern Armenian terrorism. It pledged
to lead the struggle to gain an Armenian homeland
and to retaliate against Turkey for the Armenian
genocide (see inset)
The Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide
The rightwing Armenian terrorist group, the Justice
Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, began its
'campaign of assassinations and bombings against
Turkish diplomats in 1975. Stressing the narrow
limits of its fight, JCAG has operated only against
Turkish targets-usually diplomatic personnel and
The ethnic cohesiveness of the Armenian community
and its inherent distrust of non-Armenians provide a 25X1
distinct advantage for Armenian terrorists. In addi-
tion to a reluctance by most Armenians to talk to
police, some segments of the community have rallied
around arrested Armenian terrorists, providing finan-
cial and moral assistance. We suspect that a small
portion of the Armenian community may also be
involved in peripheral support to terrorist actions- 25X1
including preoperational casing, weapons procure-
ment, escape arrangements, and propaganda distribu-
Organizational Structure. Worldwide investigations
of acts committed by JCAG since 1975 have deter-
mined that JCAG is a component of the ARF. The
ARF political structure resembles a pyramid with
individual chapters throughout the world forming its
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Fi are 2. Flyer political ral-
ly
POLITICAL RALLY
AND CONCERT
to benefit the Los Angeles Five
featuring
in concert
KARNIG SARKISSIAN
VIK: ' 16IAN
at the 1 .ity Center
19310 Ford Rc,.`. Mich., 5:00 p.m.
Hors d'oevres - - refreshments
Donation: $10.00
ALL PROCEEDS TO GO TO LA5 DEFENSE COMMITTEE
 base. A small intellectual elite makes up the central
committee, which has strict authority over the rank-
and-file members. Central committee members'
names, activities, and missions are kept secret'to
thwart Turkish retaliation. The central committee
members, in turn, are subordinate to a geographic
bureau composed of five of the most important ARF
figures. Party dues and solicitations at public meet-
ings appear to provide the main source of funds for
the ARF to conduct its political, social, and educa-
tional activities, including the clandestine operation of
its military wing, the Justice Commandos.[
Every four years the ARF holds a world congress at a
secret location to elect a new ARF bureau, which is
the supreme ruling body for all ARF members.
Delegates to this congress are drawn from a world-
wide network of central committees and are elected
every two years by delegates-one for every 15
members-from individual local chapters. Central
committees assure implementation of ARF bureau
decisions and are responsible for maintaining a strong
Figure 3
Typical Armenian Assassination
Attempt
A car with driver
and diplomat is
held up in traffic
Assassination teams
1-3 members
9 mm automatics
Two men fire
into rear window
Then run to sides
to fire intoside
windows
Modus Operandi gfAttacks. JCAG assassinations-
15 have been successful since 1974-are meticulously
designed to maximize the chance of success. Prelimi-
nary planning includes extensive surveillance of the
target's movements and identification of an area
where the victim is most exposed and vulnerable. It
focuses on frequently used routes and aims to pinpoint
a location where the victim is forced to stop or slow
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for turns or traffic signals (see diagram). At least 12
JCAG assassination attempts have taken place when
the victim was in a slowed or stopped automobile or
when he was entering or leaving his home or office.fl
All sites chosen for assassinations have included care-
fully chosen escape routes. The effectiveness of this
meticulous planning has been reflected in the failure
of police to capture JCAG terrorists at the scene or
identify them through police investigation. Only the
actions of bystanders on the scene resulted in the
capture of one JCAG assassin-Haroution Levonian,
arrested in Belgrade immediately after the slaying of
the Turkish Ambassador in 1983. To date only three
JCAG assassins have been arrested and stood trial.
r
All th
ee have been convicted.
The analysis of eyewitness accounts of several JCAG
assassinations reveals a uniformity in the techniques
and type of perpetrator. The attackers are described
as two or three men in their late teens or early .
twenties, often wearing jogging outfits to allay suspi-
cion and frequently carrying two weapons to ensure
the success of their mission. One or more of the
attackers approaches the victim, fires several shots at
the target, then steps in close to administer the coup
de grace if necessary. Analysis of autopsy reports and
forensic evidence indicates these attackers are skilled
and practiced marksmen who are able to fire rapidly
into small areas with remarkable precision. The weap-
ons-untraceable in most instances-are left at the
scene by the assassins, who flee to waiting escape
vehicles, frequently driven by local supporters
Immediately after an attack, telephone calls to press
agencies in cities throughout the world claim the
attacklfor JCAG, frequently emphasizing the distinc-
tion between the Justice Commandos and their rival
group, I ASALA. Written communiques-usually for-
warded to news agencies and wire services-provide
elaboration on the attacks and reiterate Armenian
JCAG (Versus ASALA: A Deadly Rivalry. The rivalry
between the ARF and ASALA has existed since the
creation of ASALA in 1975. ASALA's emphasis on
terrorism to further the Armenian cause found a
ready audience with young ARF members who could
see no results from the ARF's political activities.
ASALA's propaganda organ, Armenia, fueled the
rivalry by publishing interviews with ex-ARF youths
who had been involved in ASALA operations as well
as criticisms of ARF refugee programs that helped)
Armenians to relocate rather than attempt to return
to an Armenian homeland. Claims by ASALA to
terrorist attacks conducted by JCAG have further
heated the enmity between the two groups. Successful
attacks by one group often have prompted attacks by
ASALA's taunting criticism of JCAG's terrorist tac-
tics-"cowardly hit-and-run assassinations with little
fear of capture"-which began appearing in the
Armenian press in 1982 and 1983, may have stung
the ARF to vary its tactics. On 27 July 1983 a group
of Armenian terrorists, identifying themselves as
members of the Armenian Revolutionary Army
(ARA), attempted to take over the Turkish Embassy
in Lisbon. Circumstantial evidence
indicates
that probably ordered the attack. We sus
pect the Embassy seizure, which resulted in the
deaths of two Turks and five terrorists was intended
to be a lengthy hostage situation aimed at garnering 25X1
extensive publicity. It followed by less than two weeks 25X1
a spectacular ASALA bombing at Orly Airport in
We doubt this rivalry between the ARF and ASALA
will abate, and it may even increase in intensity. In la
letter to the Armenian Reporter in December 1983)
ASALA cited recent ARF criticisms of ASALA as la
tactic to gain control of the Armenian community and
threatened violent retaliation against the ARF. This
struggle for control of the Armenian revolutionary
movement may prompt further changes in tactics by
both groups and could trigger more indiscriminate
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 The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of
Armenia
The second prominent Armenian terrorist organiza-
tion, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of
Armenia (ASALA), is a Marxist group with links to
Palestinian terrorist groups and Middle Eastern pa-
tron states. Like JCAG, ASALA demands an Arme-
nian homeland and official Turkish recognition of the
ASALA was formed in January 1975, advocating an
armed struggle to achieve the liberation of Armenia
and to improve the lot of the "exploited classes:"
ASALA sharply criticized the ARFfor its lack of
progress in furthering Armenian goals and provided
an alternative to radical young Armenians who em-
ASALA initially conducted attacks, mainly bomb-
ings and assassinations, solely against Turkish tar-
gets. After the capture of three of its members in 1980
in Switzerland and France, however, ASALA-using
covernames such as Orly Group and 3 October Orga-
nization-began retaliatory attacks.against other
countries who held ASALA militants.
ASALA terrorist attacks in 1983-the June ma-
chine- gun attack in the Istanbul bazaar and the
July bombing of the Turkish Airlines counter at
Orly Airport in Paris-indicated a growing pattern
of indiscriminate violence aimed at garnering
maximum publicity. This trend has provokedfrag-
mentation within ASALA; one splinter group, the
ASALA Revolutionary Movement, insists on lim-
iting its attacks to its traditional enemy, the
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oment to Reflect.." %
commemorative! service for
Hosted by the following:AYF?YOARF chapters:
January u; 1at 8:00 p.m.
Soorp Khatch Churcht_;?5
;.19310 ,Ford Road 4
;Dearborn, Michigan
New York 11yortikInd,
New Jersey' Arsen Chapters;
...,January Z U, P?m.
Si,. Vartanantz Church Hall
461.BergenBoulevard,
Ridgefield,, New. leriey.. ;
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The Turkish Response. The fanaticism of Armenian
terrorism has strengthened the Turkish Government's
public refusals to make concessions or political ges-
tures to Armenian nationalists. Turkey has consistent-
ly denied any responsibility for the massacre of the
Armenians in 1915. While admitting that deaths
occurred, Turks cite attacks by bandits and the
ravages of economic deprivation as the cause.
Turkish Government efforts to underscore the plight
of Turkish victims of Armenian terrorism and gener-
ate support for Turkey's position have largely failed.
The European press has tended to side with the
Armenians in the matter of the genocide and has not
focused attention on the Turkish victims of Armenian
terrorist attacks. Media campaigns-particularly in
France-that sympathetically depict the Armenian
Turkey's frustration over Armenian terrorism has led
to intensified diplomatic efforts to obtain internation-
al assistance against Armenian terrorism F-
Retaliatory attacks against Armenians may also have
convinced the Turkish Government that violence
would hurt more than help the Turkish case. Recent
press reports have linked the bombing of the newly
unveiled Armenian Genocide Memorial in Alfortville,
France, on 3 May to the Turkish Government, which
has been harshly critical of the French Government's
recognition of the Armenian genocide. A previously
unknown terrorist group, the Anti-Armenian Organi-
zation, claimed credit for the bombing and threatened
more attacks in retaliation for Armenian attacks
Public expressions of
sympathy by several West European governments for
the Armenian cause and the perceived reluctance of
them to provoke retaliation from Armenian terrorists
have apparently fueled Turkish suspicions that the
West Europeans are doing far less than they could to
thwart Armenian violence against Turks.
The continuation of Armenian terrorist violence has
resulted in increasing domestic political pressure on
the Turkish Government to deal more effectively with
Armenian Terrorism in the United States. Armenian
terrorism is not confined to Europe and the Middle
East, but has become an increasing problem in the
United States in the past two years. Most Armenian
terrorism in the United States since 1980 can be
linked to the Armenian community in southern Cali-
fornia. Analysis of evidence gathered by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) indicates that the US
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Figure S. Armenian demon-
May 1982
Washington Post O
leadership of JCAG is in Los Angeles. FBI investiga-
tions also indicate that suspected JCAG members in
Los Angeles have been informed of JCAG attacks
conducted elsewhere. Forensic evidence has linked the
Los Angeles organization to JCAG bombings in New
York. FBI investigation has also determined that the
attempted bombing of the honorary Turkish consul in
Philadelphia on 22 October 1982 was planned by
JCAG members in Los Angeles. Six of the eight
JCAG members arrested worldwide have been appre-
hended in California.
Political Initiatives. The success of Armenian terror-
ism can be measured in the resurgence of expatriate
community efforts to redress their grievances. Public
terrorist trials, particularly in Los Angeles and Paris,
have repeatedly focused attention on Armenian griev-
ances and provided public forums for Armenian ef-
forts to publicize the genocide. Concern is growing
within the Armenian communities that the impact of
these trials-and the sacrifices of the "freedom fight-
ers"=will be lost if the momentum of the new wave
of nationalism cannot be translated into political
Worldwide political organizations-linked to both
JCAG and ASALA-are also attempting to exploit
for political ends the extensive publicity generated by
terrorist actions. The ARF has created its own politi-
cal action committee, the Armenian National Con-1
gress, to orchestrate political initiatives regarding the
Armenian cause. The ARF is attempting to return Ito
the Socialist International and establish closer rela
tions with socialist parties to elicit support for the
Armenian cause. ASALA, too, was active behind the
scenes in organizing the Second International Arme-
25X1
nian Congress in July 1983, which drafted a constitu-
tion for a permanent organization to lead the Arme-
nian
nian Diaspora.0 25X1
Armenian communities in North America and West-
ern Europe now appear to be turning to political
organizations in individual countries to push for rec-
ognition; in the United States they have organized
direct mailing campaigns to stimulate pressure for
Congressional resolutions to acknowledge the geno-
cide and to cancel US aid to Turkey. Armenian
communities worldwide are exploring international
avenues, such as asking the European Community
Court of Justice for reparations for losses stemming
from the Diaspora and successfully petitioning the I
United Nations to reopen deliberations on Paragraph
30 of the Human Rights Commission on the Preven-
tion of Genocide. 25X1
 Other grassroots organizations have appeared in the
past 10 years to assist these political initiatives.
Groups such as the Society for the Recognition of the
Genocide Committed Against the Armenians have
embarked on a wide range of activities-including
development of a film series documenting testimony
from genocide survivors and publication of a series of
historical books explaining the genocide-to aid the
campaign for international recognition of the geno-
cide. These groups help organize and participate in
worldwide demonstrations and rallies on 24 April
every year to commemorate the genocide and to
encourage the Armenian community to rededicate
itself to the struggle
These international political initiatives are beginning
to show concrete gains. At least in part as a result of
these efforts, the United Nations has scheduled delib-
erations during the summer of 1984 on Paragraph
30-referring to the existence of the Armenian geno-
cide-for possible inclusion in the United Nations
Human Rights Commission report on preventing
genocide. Armenian groups have been successful in
having candidates for office in the United States
sponsor several resolutions before the US Congress
concerning the genocide and Armenian grievances
against Turkey, including one that would curtail US
Outlook
We anticipate no early end to Armenian terrorism.
We doubt that any of the Armenian political initia-
tives being undertaken-even if successful-will have
a long-term ameliorating effect on the violence. Ar-
menian terrorism is rooted in the frustrations of an
ethnic group that feels terrorism offers it the best
chance of ultimately achieving its goals. The refusal
of the Turkish Government to acknowledge the geno-
cide will continue to antagonize the worldwide Arme-
nian community and may provide impetus for, even
more terrorism within the Armenian Diaspora.
Although the Justice Commandos have
suffered some serious setbacks in the past two years-
the arrests of eight of their members, the deaths of the
Lisbon Five and the disappearance of their leader-
California's large Armenian population has been
largely responsible for making it the focal point for
Armenian terrorism in the United States. Following
the genocide, thousands of Armenians settled in the
San Joaquin Valley of California and quickly became
assimilated. A second wave of Armenian immigrants,
who arrived from the Middle East over the past 10
years, have proved, however, to be a destabilizing
force. According to numerous open-source articles
been radicalized by the violent political instability of 25X1
Turkey in the 1970s and the Middle East-following
the Lebanese civil war and the Israeli invasion of
Fired by a resurgent Armenian nationalism and an
enhanced sense of identity, these newer immigrants
attempted, at first unsuccessfully, to spur the older,
politically passive Armenian community into action.
According to academic and press articles, both cul-
tural and economic differences-between a dispropor-
tionately wealthy group of third-generation Arme- 25X1
nians and newly arrived, destitute immigrants-
hindered unified political action by the California
The killing of the Turkish Consul General in Los
Angeles in January 1982 proved to be the catalyst
that unified both segments of the Armenian commu-
nity. Extensive publicity surrounding that assassina-
tion focused US'attentionon Armenian grievances
against Turkey but, more importantly, directed Ar-
menian attention to its neglected cultural heritage.
Numerous press sources have reported that, in the
eyes of the older generation of Armenians, the assas-
sination demonstrated that terrorism obtained re-
sults whereas the peaceable efforts of 69 years had
failed. To the young, third-generation Armenian-
Americans, the terrorists represented romantic fig-
ures who did more than merely talk about the
genocide.' Various open sources note that, while most
Armenians recognize that terrorism alone can never
solve the Armenian questions and gain Justice for the
Armenian. cause, many Armenians have become con-
vinced that, if it had not been for the use of violence,
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we do not believe these reversals will curtail JCAG
terrorist activities. ~
To date, the Justice Commandos have not attacked
US interests despite the arrests of six JCAG members
in the United States. We note that ASALA's target-
ing of only Turkish diplomats changed radically to
include retaliatory attacks against other governments
when they began arresting ASALA members. Ac-
cording to FBI analysis, JCAG may conduct retalia-
tory attacks against US targets if it comes to feel that
the United States is restricting JCAG's activities as a
11 Secret
 e
sto
The intense passion that inspires modern Armenian
terrorism is rooted deeply in centuries of conflict
between Armenians and Turks. Armenia has not
existed as an independent state since the mid-13th
century, when the Ottoman Turks conquered the area
which now comprises parts of Turkey, Iran, and the
Soviet (Union. Although given some measure of auton-
omy-in exchange for passive political loyalty-the
Armenians were always considered by the Turks as
zimmi; a Turkish term meaning tolerated infidels.
The delicate balance of interests between the Muslim
Turks and the Christian Armenians was shattered by
the rapidly escalating decay of the Ottoman Empire
at the end of the 19th century.
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire played a key role
in creating the conditions that resulted in large-scale
massacres of Armenians by Turks in the late 19th and
early 20th centuries-and which, in turn, spawned the
current blood feud being waged by some Armenians.
The decline of the Ottoman Empire had encouraged
European involvement in Turkish affairs. Simmering
discontent by minorities throughout the empire
proved) a readily exploitable avenue for foreign inter-
vention. This foreign involvement, coupled with reli-
gious antagonism and deep-seated economic jealousy
of minorities, including the Armenians, focused Turk-
ish anger and repression on the Ottoman minorities,
particularly the Armenians. Moreover, Armenians-
who had frequently looked to Russia for guarantees of
protection under the umbrella of Christianity-be-
came onvenient scapegoats. The oppression came to
a head! during the years 1890 to 1915 under the
Young Turk regime, which blamed Armenians for the
inevitable disorders and upheavals that were resulting
from centuries of Ottoman decline=
The date of 24 April 1915-when the leaders of the
Constantinople Armenian community were rounded
up by the Turks and sent away to their deaths-is
commemorated annually by Armenians worldwide in
remembrance of the Armenian genocide. This date
marked the beginning of mass deportations to the
desolate Syrian wilderness of Deir al-Zor (Dayr az
Zawr), which stripped central Turkey of its Armenian
Modern Armenian Terrorism:
Hi
rical Background
Th
population and resulted in the deaths of tens of
thousands of Armenian men, women, and children.
Estimates from foreign observers of the death toll
range from 600,000 to 1.5 million Armenians, who
died as a result of Turkish and Kurdish attacks,
Death statistics alone fail to illustrate both the magni-
tude of the loss and the effect on the survivors.
Armenian scholars claim that nearly every Armenian
household lost relatives in the massacres. The disrupt-
ed existence of the survivors in the years immediately
after the massacres forced the internalization of the
pain and suffering. Few Armenians forgot, however, 25X1
and, as the immigrant press began to develop in
countries where the survivors had fled, the genocide
became the primary topic. Sixty-nine years after the
event, the genocide is still referred to in the Armenian
press, along with demands for international recogni1
tion of Turkey's role in the slaughter
Turkish historians have routinely dismissed Armenian
accounts of the atrocities of 1915 as propaganda.
They cite the anger of local Ottoman bureaucrats over
alleged Armenian treason in aiding Russia during the
First World War as the reason for any excesses which
occurred during the deportations. Moreover, Turkey,
disavows all responsibility for the policies of the
Testimony and evidence from numerous international
sources-missionary, press, and diplomatic, especially
the reports of the US Ambassador to Turkey, Henry
Morgenthau-have influenced historians that the
massacres occurred. The point of contention has been
whether it was an organized, government-directed I 25X1
genocide or a series of spontaneous outbreaks of racial
violence. International attempts to investigate Arme-
nian allegations of genocide have been consistently I
25X1
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The denial of the genocide by Turkey has provided a
powerful stimulus for modern Armenian terrorism.
The ARF has been uniquely qualified to lead Arme-
nian efforts to gain international recognition of the
Armenian genocide. Efforts of the ARF in 1915 to
organize and direct the few pockets of resistance
against the Turks have become imprinted in the
Armenian psyche through literature, art, and music,
providing the ARF with powerful emotional leverage
over the Armenian Diaspora today.F____1
The dispersion of Armenians following the massacres
of 1915; however, spawned a generation free from
Armenian violence against Turkey. The survivors'
struggle to relocate, rebuild their lives, and overcome
economic deprivation supplanted the desire for re-
venge. Traumatized by the massacres and frequently
discriminated against by the communities where they
settled, Armenian immigrants hastened to lose all
traces of their Armenian background. This assimila-
tion resulted in a temporary rejection by many Arme-
nians of Armenian culture, language, and politics.fl
A series of events in the period after World War 11
spurred the Armenian Diaspora to a recovered sense
of national identity. The appearance of the term
"genocide" during the Nuremberg war trials in 1946
awoke bitter memories within the victims who had
survived the events of 1915. The United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 96 on 11 December
1946-identifying and condemning genocide as a
crime under international law-and the demand of
the Convention on Genocide in 1948 that states
punish those responsible for committing. genocide
provided an international basis for Armenian claims
against Turkey. These milestones, combined with
changing international political attitudes toward eth-
nic and minority movements and their problems of
Armenian political activism received its first impor-
tant stimulus from events surrounding the publication
of the United Nations Human Rights Commission
Report on Preventing Genocide. Paragraph 30, refer-
ring to the Armenian genocide,' was removed at the
insistence of the Turkish Government. A statement of
the Special Rapporteur claimed that no proof existed
that the genocide of Armenians occurred. Despite
intervention by the United States, the USSR, France,
and others, subsequent attempts to restore Paragraph
30 have been unsuccessful to date
This denial of the massacres without a hearing in any
international forum sharply radicalized the diaspora.
Lacking a state to present its case to international
organizations, Armenian communities tried to create
media interest in their cause. They had little success,
however, until Armenian terrorist activities began to
25X1
garner publicity 25X1
"'Passing to the modern era, one may note the existence of
relatively full documentations dealing with the massacre of Arme-
nians, which has been described as "the first genocide of the 20th neon
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Secret
Appendix B
A Chronology of Armenian Terrorism,
October 1973-June 1984
Date'
Location of Attack
Group/Name Used
Incident Description
1973 I
I
26 October
New York City, United States
Yanikian Commandos
Smoke bomb sent to Turkish Consulate
1974
26 October
New York City, United States
Yanikian Commandos
Bomb sent to Turkish Consulate
19,75 I
20 January
Beirut, Lebanon
Prisoner Karekin (Gourgen)
Yanikian Group
Bomb discovered at World Council of Church
office I
es
20 February
Beirut, Lebanon
Yanikian Group
Bombing of Turkish Airlines office
22 October
Vienna, Austria
ASALA and JCAG
Assassination of Turkish Ambassador and driv
er
24 October
Paris, France
ASALA and JCAG
Assassination of Turkish Ambassador
1976
28 May
Zurich, Switzerland
JCAG
Bombing of Turkish Consulate and a Turkish
bank
1977
14 May
Paris, France
New American Resistance ?
(NAR)
Bombing of Turkish tourism office
9 June
Rome, Italy
JCAG
Assassination of Turkish Ambassador to the
Vatican
1978
3 January
London, England
NAR
Bombing of Turkish bank
Brussels, Belgium
NAR
Bombing of apartment of a Turkish Embassy
counselor
2 June
Madrid, Spain
ASALA and JCAG
Assassination of brother, wife, and chauffeur o
Turkish Ambassador to Spain I
f
6 December
Geneva, Switzerland
NAR
Bombing of Turkish Consulate
17 December
Geneva, Switzerland
NAR
Bombing of Turkish Consulate
1979
January,
Madrid, Spain
JCAG
Bombing of British Airways and TWA offices
8 July
Paris, France
JCAG
Bombing of Turkish tourism office and Turkis
labor attache's office I
h
12 October
The Hague, Netherlands
JCAG
Assassination of son of Turkish Ambassador I
9 December
Rome, Italy
NAR
Bombing of El Al and British Airways offices,
injuring nine I
)
22 December
Amsterdam, Netherlands
JCAG
Bombing of Turkish Airlines office I
Paris, France
Commandos of Armenian Aveng- Assassination of Turkish press attache
ers (probably JCAG)
1980 1
I
19 January
Spain
JCAG
Bombing of British Airways, TWA, Swissair, e
Sabena Airlines offices (JCAG later denied
responsibility)
nd
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 A Chronology of Armenian Terrorism,
October 1973-June 1984 (continued)
I February
Brussels, Belgium
NAR -
Bombing of Aeroflot and Turkish Airlines offices
Paris, France
NAR
Bombing of Soviet information office
6 February
Bern, Switzerland
JCAG
Attempted assassination of Turkish Ambassador
17 April
Rome, Italy
JCAG
Attempted assassination of Turkish Ambassador
to the Vatican
6 October
Beverly Hills, United States
JCAG
Firebombing of Turkish Consul General's
residence -
12 October
Los Angeles, United States
JCAG
Bombing of Music City Tours
New York City, United States
JCAG
Bombing of Turkish mission to the United
Nations
1 December
Paris, France
JCAG
Bombing of British Airways, Lufthansa, and Sc-
bena Airlines offices
17 December
Sidney, Australia
JCAG
Assassination of Turkish General Consul and
bodyguard
2 April
Copenhagen, Denmark
JCAG
Attempted assassination of Turkish labor
counselor
20 November
Los Angeles, United States
JCAG
1982
28 January
Los Angeles, United States
JCAG
Assassination of Turkish Consul General
22 March
Cambridge, United States
JCAG
Bombing of Turkish Consulate
8 April
Ottawa, Canada
ASALA and Armenian
Liberation Front (probably
linked to JCAG)
Attempted assassination of Turkish Commercial
Counselor
24 April
Cologne, West Germany
NAR-
Attempted bombing of Turkish bank
Dortmund, West Germany
NAR -
Bombing of Turkish bank
4 May
Boston, United States
JCAG
Assassination of the honorary Turkish consul
27 May
Ottawa, Canada
JCAG
Assassination of Turkish military attache
7 June
Lisbon, Portugal
JCAG
Assassination of Turkish attache and wounding of
wife, who later died
9 September
Burgas, Bulgaria
Combat Units of Justice
Against Armenian Genocide
(probably JCAG)
Assassination of Turkish administrative attache
22 October
Boston, United States
JCAG
Attempted bombing of honorary Turkish Counsel
(alleged member of JCAG arrested aboard air-
craft in Boston)
9 March
Belgrade, Yugoslavia
JCAG
Assassination of Turkish Ambassador to
Yugoslavia
14 July
Brussels, Belgium -
ASALA, JCAG, and ARA
Assassination of Turkish administrative attache
27 July
Lisbon, Portugal
ARA
Takeover of Turkish Embassy, which resulted in
killing of hostages and deaths of five terrorists
? Analysis of the types and nationalities of targets, locations, and
forensic evidence indicates the NAR may also be a cover name used
by the ARF in claiming attacks against Turkish targets.
 Figure 7
Attacks Linked to the Armenian Revolutionary Federation
gue (``1''
Rotta&
West
i -\ Germany
Paris (6)
"ri h (1)
France Bern 16
/ Swaz.
Geneva'(2)
Number in parentheses indicates number
of attacks during this time period.
200 Kilometers
200 Miles
o Site of terrorist attack
between 1975 and 1984
o /
Boston.(3k
s
SOVIET
UNION
NCe l: r;.
Yerevan
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11 -