PD/NSC-18 U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060034-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2008
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: August 24, 1977
• Content Type: MEMO

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ATTACHMENT
TS 77021%
WASHINGTON CIA 4~
.August 24, 19??
MEMORANDUM FOR
~.
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
ALSO: The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: PD/NSC-18
U. S. National Strategy
Attached is a .copy of PD/I~TSC-18, "U. 5. National Strategy".
This PD is to be held very closely and distributed only to those
officers in your department or a~enc r~~vith strict need to know.
~t
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ATTACHMENTS
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Presidential Directive/NSC-18
SUBJECT:
The Vice President
.The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
TS ~~0210
Q:A #1
August 24, 1977
ALSO: The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs .
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
' "Agency ~ `.
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff _
The Director of Central Intelligence ~ .
U. S. National Strategy
D
I have reviewed the PRM/NSC~conclusions and the discussion of the
Special Coordination Committee. It is clear-thaw in the foreseeable
future, US-Soviet relations will continue to be characterized by both-
competition and cooperation, with the attendant risk of conflict as well
as the opportunity for stabilizing US-Soviet relations. -
~n that competition, military aspects aside, the United States .continues
to enjoy a number of critical advantages: it has a more creative tech-
nological and economic system, its political structure can adapt more
easily to popular demands and relies on freely given popular support,
and it is supported internationally by allies and friends who genuinely
share similar aspirations. In contrast, though successfully acquiring
military poi=per matching that of the United States, the Soviet Union
continues to face major internal economic and national difficulties, and
externally it has few genuinely committed allies while lately suffering
setbacks in its relations with China, parts of Africa., and India.
In this situation I direct that US national strategy will be to take advantage
of our relative advantages in economic strength, technological superiority
and popular political support to:
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 -- Counterbalance, together with our allies and friends, by
a combination of military forces, political efforts, and
economic programs, Soviet military power and adveY?se
- influence in key,,~:~:eas, particularly Europe,' the Middle
East, and East Asia.
-- Compete politically with the Soviet. Union by pursuing the
basic American commitment to human rights and national
independence.
-- Seek Soviet cooperation in resolving regional conflicts ~ ~ ?
and. reducing areas of tension that could lead to confrontation
between the United States and the Soviet Union.
-- Advance American security interests through negotiations
with the Soviet Union of adequately verifiable arms control
and disarmament agreements that enhance stability and
cuxb arms competition.
-- Seek to involve the Soviet Union constructively in global
- activities, such as economic and social developments and
peaceful non-strategic trade. ?~
To fulfill this national strategy, the United .States will maintain an
overall balance-of military power between the United States and its
allies on_ the one hand and the Soviet Union and its allies on the other
at least as favorable as that that now exists. Iri this connection, the
United States will fulfill its commitment to its NATO allies to raise
the level of defense spending by approximately three percent per year
in real terms along with our allies.
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To carry out US national strategy, I am also providing the following
initial guidance regarding US military strategy, programs and policies.
Strategic Force Objectives - '
The purpose of US strategic forces is to deter a nuclear attack on the
United States, upon our forces, aur- allies and others whose security
is important to the United States and, if deterrence fails, to inflict
appropriate retaliatory response on the Soviet Union. In conjunction
- =with general purpo::e and theater nuclear forces, it is the further
purpose of our strategic forces to enhance deterrence of non-nuclear
aggression against NATO and our Asian zllies. ~.
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Strate is Pro rams
The United, States will maintain a strategic posture of essenannot usealence
with the .Soviet Union so as to insure that the Soviet Union ,c
strategic forces for political leverage and ~coercionr and akin aconventional
strategic balance will not deter t:he United StaL-es f g
military action where its interests dictate,
Essential equivalence will require that advantages in strategic force
characteristics enjoyed'~by the Soviet Union must be offset by United
States -advantages in strategic forces. The United States will not accept
a strategic posture inferior to .that of the Soviet Union.
The~Utited States will not seek a capability for a disarming first
strategic nuclear strike against Soviet strategic forces so long as the
Our pasture should be designed
Soviet Union does not do so against us.
to promote nuclear stability particularly in a crisis and to the extent
possible reduce an}' Soviet incentive to use nucleax weapons. The US
-~ force posture should be capable of inflictuzg an unacceptable level of
damage on the So~~i:et Union following a Soviet first strike.
The United States will maintain adequate command and control capability
,and forces to execute limited strategic employment. options.
The United States wall maintain the capability to puate sur a llanceategac
attack warning and assessment and to insure adeq
and control of US airspace. The United States research and development
efforts on active strategic defenses should be sufficient to assess and
respond to Soviet strategic pxograms as appropriate.
Strategic Targeting Policy
If deterrence should fail and nuclear conflict occurs, US targeting
plans should provide options for Limited retaliatory responses designed
to control escalation and flexibly respond to aggression. If control of
escalation fails, US target plans should seek to limit damage to the
United States and its allies to the extent possible, and to inflict un~
acceptable levels of~darnage on the Soviet Union (subject to a separate
targeting review), .so chat the conflict terminates on the most favorable
terms possible. , . .
US #arget plans should Provide for the maintenance of a secure reserve
force to be withheld for possible use subsequent to a major nuclear
' TOl' SLCLt1:.1'
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General Purpose Forces - ?
The conventional forces take on increasing relevance to the defense of US
security interests under conditions of strategic nuclear equivalence.
Planning for US general purpose forces will focus on .dealing with the
Soviet threat to Europe but v~ill also provide capabilities for use in the
defense of major US and allied interests outside of Europe. US planning
for NATO and for global contingencies must take into account the
heightened significance of conventional capability in the setting of
strategic nuclear equivalence. ?
-The?US reaffirms NATO strategy as expressed in?MC-14/3. Deterrence
and defense in the NATO areas will continue to rely on a combination
of conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces. To this
end it is necessary in the light of advances in the military posture of
the lYarsa~v Pact to emphasize the strengthening of NATO's conventional-
forces for deterrence and defense. ? '
Consonant with. present NATO strategy, including forward defense, the
.US is committed to having the capability, iii conjunction with its allies,
to stop a ~Yarsaw Pact attack with minimum loss of territory and ulti-
mately to restore prewar boundaries. To this end priority should be
given to initial combat capabilities.
in this connection, the United States together with its allies shall main-
tain capabilities adequate to protect the lines of communication and
access to raw materials that are vital to the economies of.the United
States and its allies in the event of a NATO 1~Yarsaw Pact war.
Global Contingencies - -
In addition, the United States will maintain a deployment force of light
divisions with strategic .mobility independent of overseas bases and
logistical support, which includes moderate naval and tactical air
forces, and .limited -land combat forces. These forces will be designed
for use against .both local forces and forces projected by the USSR based
on analyses of requirements in the It4iddle East, the Persian Gulf, or
Korea, taking into account the contribution of our friends and allies in
these regions. -US pl~u~ning should provide that these requirements may
be met by a combination of the light deployment forces, supplemented
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able for global contingencies as described above.
by forces in the United States, primarily oriented toward NATO defense.
The 2nd Division will be oriented toward deployment in Asia but avail-
an meet treaty commitments zn the event of aggression.
With the exception of withdrawals from Korea directed under PD/NSC-12,
the United States vrili maintain the current level of combat forces
deployed in the Western Pacific in order to preserve regional stability,
to deter aggression in Korea and elsewhere, and to protect US interests
d
The Secretary of Defense will undertake, subject to separate instruc-
tions, a xeview of US targeting policy, as well as other studies;
recommendations on the appropriate level of US capability to sustain
a worldwide conventional war against. the Soviet Union and its allies
Additional Studies
should be coordinated by the National Security Council for my decision,
as per additional instructions.
to employ zts stxategic forces according to NSDM 242.
Otherwise, this Directive supersedes NSDM 242.
Pending the conclusion of the targeting review, the US will continua
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