INTERAGENCY REVIEW GROUP MEETING ON NSSD 1-82 US NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 2008
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: March 11, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

.F. , Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
TOP SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED
when blank-TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document-Automatically downgraded or declassi-
-
fied
fied when filled in form is detached from controlled document.
CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
REGISTRY
STATE S
tate Dept. review completed
CIA CONTROL NO.
TS820210
DOC
/2
. NO.
DATE DOCUMENT RECEIV
D
DOC. DATE 11 Mar. 82
E
12 M
COPY N
ar. 82
O. 2
LOGGED
NUMBER OF PAGES i
BY
XX L
NUMBER OF
TT
S
A
ACHMENTS
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency
or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or
transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official
duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form
and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and
indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.
REFERRED TO
RECEIVED
RELEASED
SEEN BY
OFFICE
SIGNATURE
DATE
TIME
DATE
TIME
SIGNATURE
OFFICE/DIV.
DATE
NIC
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below
and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.
DOWNGRADED DESTROYED DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)
TO
BY (Signature) TO
BY (Signature) WITNESSED BY Si nature
( g ) BY (Signature)
OFFICE
FORM
DATE
OFFICE
DATE
OFFICE
DATE
8-73 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
 Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0 ^ ^ I ' ^ ^
0 ?
A
Y kaul remer
Executive Secretar
TOP SECRET
RDS-3 3/11/U2
Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
TO:
March 11, 1982
- Mr. William P. Clark i
White House
,
CIA
OSD - Col John Stanford
JCS - LTC Edward Bucknell
SUBJECT: Interagency Review Group Meeting on NSSD 1-82,
US National Security Strategy
Attached is a discussion paper on the role of the
Allies. Also included is a summary of that paper, and
twos issues papers. These papers reflect interagency
discussion of an earlier draft and highlight the issues
which agencies believe should be discussed at Saturday's
Review Group meeting. Some additional points on Africa
may be provided tomorrow.
 Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
0
TOP SECRET
The Role of Allies and Others--
Summary
upport out-of-area missions. Another view
ot press the allies to participate in out-of-area combat
)perations, notably those which might occur in Southwest 25X1
sia (SWA). There is a consensus that en route access is a
function to which almost every NATO nation can contribute.
heir marginal resources to defense capabilities w is
is that we should
Europe
From a military perspective, the size of our commitment
of combat forces to NATO depends more upon our global force
requirements than it does on the commitments of other NATO
nations. We do, however, depend heavily upon the European
allies for logistical support and infrastructure in-theater.
Politically, our.own NATO-related improvements are designed
to elicit similar allied improvements. Our own defense
efforts in other areas are likewise relatively independents
of what our allies contribute because of our uncertainty
about the dependability and magnitude of their out-of-area
activities.
Germany, the UK, and Benelux countries have aqreed to
provide extensive HNS. In addition, we have signed Line-of-
Communications (LOC) and Co-located Operating Base (COB)
agreements with almost all of the NATO countries (which also
involve substantial HNS). Our allies also have agreed to make
available their own civilian airlift and sealift to support
the reinforcement and.resupply of Europe (although there is
room for further improvement in this area).
There is a difference of views about whether and in what
ways we-should ask.the allies to help meet out-of-area Soviet
threats. One view is that we should encourage all allies to.
maintain and increase their contributions in Europe, while
actively encouraging those who can (e.g., the UK and France)
to contribute outside Europe by preferentially allocating
h' h could
We should support the development of balanced and self-
contained forces in regional states to deal with local and
regional threats, with emphasis on Egypt, Jordan, and possibly
TOP SECRET
RDS-3 302
Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
 Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
TOP SECRET
- 2 -
Pakistan for regional intervention roles. The US would have
to be prepared to provide the necessary lift for such forces.
We should size and structure US forces for contingencies
involving the Soviets, relying upon the regional states for
infrastructure and certain types of logistical support, and
upon regional states (and perhaps external allies) for aug-
menting our combat capabilities., as well as for providing
en route and in-theater access to facilities. We should
also recognize that in preparing to fight the Soviets, we
will be providing a hedge against the possibility that: we
may have to intervene in local or regional contingencies.
The US will require access to regional facilities and
support from host governments, including HNS and facilities
at which to preposition certain types of US equipment and
supplies. Given current political realities and military
requirements, we should concentrate on access and improve-
ments to sites in Egypt and Oman. In Saudi Arabia, contin-
gency discussions should seek to identify as quickly as
possible the facilities and support which would be available
to deploying US forces.
We should also continue to examine the possibility of
facilities access and HNS in Pakistan for both regional con-
tingencies and in the event of Soviet aggression against
Pakistan. In Turkey, improvements at the co-located operating
bases need to be carried out for both NATO and SWA contingen-
cies, but a successful effort-to draw Turkey more deeply into
SWA security planning will require a major US diplomatic and
financial effort.
Because the Soviet threat is not paramount in the eyes
of many of our regional friends, their willingness to appear
closely associated with-the US is limited by the political -
vulnerability of some governments in the region, the Arab-
Israeli conflict, and the closeness of US-Israeli relations.
East Asia and the Pacific Basin
While the threats to US intere is in the region have not
diminished, many believe that the gap between threats and the
combined US/friendly capabilities o meet them is not nearly_
great in East Asia as it is in Europe, Southwest Asia, and
p rhaps the Car' . In particular, the US -i)increasingly
o apan and the ROK to bear greater resource responsi-
bilities for their own defense, thereby easingfthe strains
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
 Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
0
TOP SECRET
^. - 3 -
on our own force commitments. Nevertheless, the US has major
security and economic interests in the region which demand
the continued presence of US forces and active security rela-
tionships.
Japan has agreed to be responsible for its own self-
defense and to protect the US-Japanese sea lanes out to 1000
miles from the Home Islands. We should not ask the Japanese
to assume any active defense roles beyond the already agreed
geographical boundaries. The Japanese might be asked to make
available facilities for US deployments to the region or to
Southwest Asia. Japan ought to be pressed to increase its war
reserve stocks. We should make a major effort toenco urige t
he
Japanese to make available relevant technology to
dual-use or defense potential.
It is unlikely that we can bring about significant improve-
ment in Chinese military capabilities to oppose the Soviet
Union and tie down additional Soviet resources so long as China
is unwilling to divert substantial resources of its own to
that purpose. We should seek closer US-PRC coordination on
security relations with Thailand and Pakistan and perhaps en
route access through China.,The US and the PRC might also
cooperate to support Soviet equipment inventories of states
we are seeking to draw away from Soviet arms relationships.
The ROK should be able to continue to pay for a signifi-
cant percentage of its own defense for the foreseeable future,
backed up by the continuation of the US force-presence, a US
security guarantee, and FMS program. Additional economic
assistance from Japan would also be helpful. It is.not
realistic, however, to expect any significant level of direct
defense cooperation between Japan and Korea.
In Southeast Asia, the US relies primarily on local states
to deal directly with internal instability. Should internal
security problems require outside assistance, the US would in
the first instance look for ways to support the threatened
government's own efforts, maintaining our own flexibility to
deal with direct Soviet threats.
Latin America
The US would prefer to rely upon local states to deal with
local insurgencies. Should local forces fail to stem-insurgent
efforts, we probably cannot depend upon the support or direct
intervention of external allies. (Although we should seek to
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
 Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
TOP SECRET
- 4 -
keep the remaining UK and French presence in the region.) US
military forces. therefore represent the essential fallback. In
some instances, we may seek facilities access (e.g., Honduras)
to allow us to project power into the region.
Africa
Morocco, Egypt, Somalia, Kenya, and Liberia can provide
facilities access (either en route or final destination) to
ensure that Western interests can be defended with US rapid
reaction forces.
Against local and regional threats (other than Libya),
we will rely primarily on local and regional forces. In for-
mer colonial areas, we expect the former colonial power, if
appropriate, to take the lead where external assistance is
necessary. US lift and logistical support for either Allied
or regional security and peacekeeping efforts would almost
certainly be necessary.
Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
 Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
?
TOP SECRET
The Role of Allies and Others
?
This paper surveys the international security environ-
ment and assesses cooperative defense roles for-US allies and
friends. The survey is by region (Europe, Southwest Asia,
East Asia and the Pacific Basin, Latin America and Africa)
with reference to transregional cooperation where appropriate.
In each section, the paper will seek to illuminate the extent
to which US programs and resource allocation decisions are de-
pendent on the defense programs and military capabilities of
our allies and friends. It will also examine the extent to
which the nature and size of allied and friendly contributions
affect our common ability to deter and defend.
Introduction
Since the establishment of a Western security framework
in the years immediately following World War Ii, global power
First, there has
relationships have shifted in several ways.
been a shift in the East-West balance from clear US superiority
to a state of rough parity with the prospect of US inferiority.
Equally marked, however, is the altered balance, especially in
economic and political terms, between the US and its. industrial
allies. The latter group (NATO Europe, 'Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, and Japan) now produces a considerably larger share
of the world product than the US. In addition, the post World
War II decolonization process has made the industrial democra-
cies dependent for a number of critical resources upon
100 independent states in the Third World, many of
suspicious, if not actively hostile, toward the United States.
As a.result of these shifting relationships, the US must
increasingly draw upon the resources and cooperation. of our
allies and friends to oppose growing Soviet and Soviet surro-
gate military power and to protect interests threatened from
other sources as well. While our ability to translate coopera-
tion with allies and friends into an effective counter to
Soviet threats offers us an important strength, our dependence
on such cooperation is a potential vulnerability at which the
Soviets will continue to probe.
In brief, the US faces an inescapable dilemma. On the one
hand, we cannot protect all our vital interests without the as-
sistance and support of others. At the same time, we cannot
rely completely on our allies and friends.
TOP SECRET
RDS-3 3/10/02
Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
 Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
?
TOP SECRET
Europe
A strong and unified NATO is indispensable to the protec-
tion of Western interests. Although US conventional military
power together with our nuclear umbrella remains a large and
significant component of the NATO arsenal, the political and
economic resurgence of Western Europe has meant both that our
NATO Allies are better able to contribute to their own defense
and that we can no longer expect to dictate Alliance actions.
Generally, we must seek the support of others before setting
forth new policy proposals, and we must choose carefully the
times we take controversial positions in order to galvanize
our Allies into action.
Western interests require the improvement of the defense
capabilities of all members of the Alliance, even during
periods of economic difficulty. The US must emphasize the
need for Allies to achieve measurable, real increases in
annual NATO defense spending and improve their forces to re-
dress imbalances between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. We should
maintain-.-- in concert with our Allies -- strong conventional,
theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces to provide a full
spectrum of deterrence and defensive capabilities adequate to
defeat Soviet/Pact aggression should deterrence fail. We
should press for Alliance implementation of key enhancement
programs, e.g., force goals, LTDP (particularly readiness, re-
inforsCement, reserve mobilization, air defense, logistics, EW,
and C ), armaments cooperation, and host nation support. The
Alliance must also continue to move forward on the INF moderni-
zation program, while the US and the Soviets continue to nego-
tiate an INF Agreement in Geneva. The US should also adhere
to its commitment to provide a total of six division sets of
POMCUS in Europe by 1987 and to be able to reinforce Europe ten
days following a decision to do so with six Army divisions (for
a total of ten), sixty Air Force tacair squadrons, and 5/9 of
a MAF.
In addition, to improve further Alliance military capa-
bilities and the efficiency of resource allocations, member
nations must be prepared to cooperate and integrate their de-
fense efforts beyond current levels, sometimes at the expense
of national preferences. To that end, we should pursue oppor-
tunities with our Allies for the development and production
of interoperable and/or standardized armaments which yield in-.
creased combat effectiveness and more efficient use of defense
resources.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
 Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
TOP SECRET
As a further effort at cooperation and integration, we
have obtained or are seeking host nation support (HNS) from
our NATO Allies. Germany has agreed to establish a 93,000 man
contingent in their Army reserve to provide wartime HNS for US
forces. The UK, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg have
agreed to provide extensive HNS. In addition, we have signed
Line-of-Communications (LOC) and Co-located Operating Base
(COB) agreements with almost all of the NATO countries (these
agreements also involve substantial HNS). Our European Allies
also have agreed to make available their own civilian airlift
and sealift to support the reinforcement and resupply Europe
(although there is room for further improvement in this area).
Because the balance is at such a high level of military
power in Europe, the Soviets are likely to pursue less risky
and costly opportunities elsewhere, hoping to erode the politi-
cal base of the Alliance rather than attacking it directly.
The region where events could most severely test Alliance co-
hesion is Southwest Asia (SWA). The West faces two interrelated
sort of threats in SWA. The larger threat is that of direct
Soviet military intervention. The more proximate threats, how-
ever,-~_arise out of regional conflict and domestic instability
in the regional states. Only the United States has the power
to deter or defeat Soviet intervention. European pport foro-
Euro-
such efforts is of more political than military utility.
pean powers, acting in concert with regional states, have the
capability of responding to some lower order threats, however,
Additionally,
and may in some cases be better placed to do so.
intervention by European as opposed to American forces, would
generally be a less escalatory step, less likely to legitimize
and stimulate Soviet intervention in a regional conflict.
Thus, many believe that in addition to asking the Allies
to improve the defense posture in Europe, we must continue to
urge those Allies in a position to do so to share the burdens
outside Europe in areas where regional conflicts and Soviet
threats could harm Western interests. Those who hold this view
argue that our strategy should be one which encourages all
Allies to maintain and increase their contributions in Europe
while specifically encouraging those who can contribute outside
Europe to allocate their marginal resources to capabilities
which could support out-of-area missions.
Others, however, believe that we should not encourage
the Allies to participate in out-of-area combat operations,
notably those which occur in
believe the Europeans
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
 Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
. .
TOP SECRET
in SWA, and can be
defense of Europe.
utilize any marginal urces in the
tter
We also need mobility support for US forces tnat m
deployed to either theater, including en route access through
European transit facilities for forces deploying to SWA.
olitical and economic contacts with
h
i
r p
e
Building upon t
countries in SWA, the Allies can provide security and economic
assistance and training to local states. According to their
tainin
i
i
g
n
n ma
capabilities, certain Allies can cooperate
esence in SWA and enhancing their cap-
peacetime military pr
abilities for military operations in the event of hostilities.
In addition, we would expect former colonial powers to play a
leading role in external security assistance in Africa.
We must, however, recognize that only a few European coun-
tries, e.g., the UK and France, have the capabilities to in-
fluence events outside Europe. The FRG has the capabilities
but is inhibited by its history and the current legal interpre-
tation of its constitution from such a role, except for eco-
nomic--and in some cases security assistance.
At the same time, en route access is a function that
almost every NATO nation can contribute. The UK, the FRG,
France, and the nations of the Southern Region can all assist.
We should also encourage the Allies to help improve Turkish
military capabilities given Turkey's role in European defense
and its potential contribution to security in Southwest Asia.
Equally important, we should foster among all NATO members a
political climate which applauds rather than criticizes out-
of-area efforts and which eventually gives specific credit
(e.g., through NATO force goals) for such efforts.
Finally, it is important to recognize that, from a mili-
tary perspective, the size of our commitment of combat forces
rt n NATO depends more upon our global force requirements than
it does on the commitments of otner 1VH1V L1 Ljv1+~? ??`- ?
however, depend heavily upon the Europeans for logistical
support and infrastructure in-theater. Politically, it is
note that our own improvements within NATO-ar
t t
o
importan
it similar Allied improvements, and the con1
li
t
deer
c
o e
-ned--
tinuation of our improvements depends heavily upon the domes-
tic political (and especially the Congressional) perception
that the Europeans are carrying a fair share of the burden.
Our own efforts in other areas are likewise relatively inde-
pendent of what our Allies contribute, because of uncertainty
about of their out-of-area activities.
25X1 TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
 Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
40
Southwest Asia (SWA)
e resemblance
to that in Europe. The more likely p complicate
conflicts and/or internal planning. Moreover, not only is there
other
the problems of security P ainst
no
no formal security framework, but the Asfriendsnag
regional conflicts sometime set our regional
one another. Nonetheless,
a set of well-defined
red.
tion relatinships are clearly
In response to regional conflicts and local instability,
the US will rely primarily upon forces indigenous to the region
'th the possibility in appropriate circumstances of ultimately
with reaction forces from our European
backing them up with the US. Such a division of re-
Allies and if necessary from advisable and necessary to
sponsibility is both politically
reserve the flexibility of US forces for involvement in con-
tingencies order to contain such crises
tingencies with the Soviets. involvement is not required
and ensure that dgionalU states will require capabilities which
are is micien, tog respond to contingencies without outside aug
are sufficient to rend regional states will need accessaito
mentation. To that end, rtPchnological expertise,
arms, logistical support, t, Israel, Jordan, and Pakistan,
incl . Some states, e.g" E9Yp for these arms and as-
sociated require security assistance to pay
sociated transfers. Some will also require economic assistance
to help maintain stability and absorb the impact of military spending. The United States, together with other
r, external rna a l l
pre-
pared and thide?suchfassistancetes of the reg
pared to prow to main-
rity military assistance be necessary
of a. friendly regional state from a local
tain the sShouldecu external
artunities for sub-
or regional threat and/or to the prime can-
didat n or intervention by Sov
governments should be other regional
ver
idtes to aid embattled governments
exist within the
maintenance
the ap establishment and J thin
sates. To ure recion, he enswillstsut uppo orrt th capabilities
possibly of appropriate interveetUSnwouldbhavelto be prepared to pro-
vide the necessary lift. If additional or alternative esgis-
tance is necessary, US allies from outside the region
e UK or France, may be preferable to the US both polo ically
e
the and in order to avoid escalating tthe
(for the recipient) iansuperpower confrontation (recognizing
poossibbility
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
 Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
9 ?
TOP SECRET
there is a difference of views about the desirability of out-
of-area military activities by the Allies). If no other rea-
sonable alternative exists, the US should also be capable
of intervening militarily in regional or local conflicts. It
should not be necessary, however, to tailor significant US
forces to hedge against such contingencies.
In response to the less likely threat of direct Soviet ag-
gression, only the US can provide full. spectrum of capabilities
necessary to deter or counter a Soviet attack. However, the
US cannot stand alone. Without the cooperation and participa-
tion of friendly regional states and external allies, we are
unlikely either to deter the Soviets or to contain conflict to
the region. In this regard, the capabilities of regional
states (and possibly of certain European Allies) to respond to
lower order (non-Soviet) contingencies will also contribute to
deterring or countering the Soviets. Nonetheless, the US will
have to provide core forces for resisting the Soviets, while
we look to others to respond, in the first instance, to lower
level but more proximate threats arising from regional conflict
and internal instability.
As in Europe, the US cannot militarily help regional
states in opposing the Soviets without access to regional
facilities and support from host governments. To maximize the
value of facilities access during contingencies, such coopera-
tion must be manifest in peacetime, if possible. In some
cases, access will require augmentation only by contingency
planning and occasional exercising. In other instances, infra-
structure improvements will also be necessary, most likely in-
volving US military construction funds. In addition, both to
demonstrate cooperation politically and to enhance capabilities
militarily, the US must seek host nation logistical support
(HNS) and facilities at which to preposition certain types of
US equipment and supplies.
Because the Soviet threat is not paramount in the eyes
of many of our regional friends, their willingness to appear
closely associated with the US is limited by the political
vulnerability of some governments in the region, the Arab-
Israeli conflict, and the closeness of US-Israeli relations.
Consequently, access, HNS, and prepositioning will have to be
pursued with both persistence and flexibility.
In Egypt, Oman, Kenya, and Somalia, we will need to main-
tain and develop the facilities to which we have access, as
quickly as possible. In Saudi Arabia, contingency discussions
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
 Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
TOP SECRET
between USMTM and the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation
(MODA) should seek to identify as quickly as possible the
facilities and support which would be available to deploying
US forces. Saudi concerns regarding more visible contingen-
cies, e.g., the threat from Iran and recent associated events,
may improve the prospects for engaging them in a more purpose-
ful dialogue with us on security cooperation. Following on
our strengthening of US-Pakistani security relations over the
past year, we should also continue to examine the possibility
of facilities access and HNS.in Pakistan for both regional
contingencies and in the event of Soviet aggression against
Pakistan (taking care not to increase Indian anxieties about,
or to incite retaliatory actions against, Pakistan in the pro-
cess). In Turkey, improvements at the co-located operating
bases need to be carried out for both NATO and WA contingen-
cies, but an effort to draw Turkey more deeply into SWA secu-
rity planning with any real prospect of success will require
a major US diplomatic and financial effort.
g_~ven- om ination o mi nary requirements
~ we should concentrate US defense
?
a
ea
nd political
'1'ties access and im rovements in
resources allocated for face If, however, th ol
eQ_ o LARn Egypt and Oman. -----
a ib were to increase, Saudi Arabia (to the extent that
UST-resoutcces were necessary) and Turkey should receive the
ction focuses
hi
s se
same priority as Egypt and Oman. (While t
on contingencies in SWA, Israeli capabilities might be able to
make a contribution in a war involving US and Soviet naval/air
forces in the Mediterranean.)
To bolster both our capability and our credibility with
regional states regarding our intent to participate in their
defense against Soviet threats, the US will need to maintain
an important peacetime presence in the region.. For the time
being such presence is almost exclusively naval and afloat
Marine forces (AWACS in Saudi Arabia being the prime excep-
tion). Occasional exercises will place additional forces
ashore temporarily. In time, however, we should extend our
cooperation with regional states to include increasingly
frequent tacair visits (and perhaps ground force units) to
improve our quick reaction capabilities. We will also wish to
station a forward headquarters of the RDF in the region at some
future date, should the political environment there permit.
In conclusion, we should support (through our own and
allied security assistance) the development of balanced and
self-contained forces in regional states to deal with local
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
 Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
r S
TOP SECRET
and regional threats, with emphasis'on Egypt, Jordan, and
Pakistan for regional intervention roles. We shohedSsizetand
structure US forces for contingencies involving
relying upon the regional states for infrastructure and certain
types of logistical support and upon regional states (and per-
haps external allies) nornurouteiand?in-theatercaccessitoes,
as well as for providing e
facilities. We should also recognize that in prepaarint toe
.fight the Soviets, we
local or regional
possibility that we may wihaveetorintervene in hedge
contingencies.
East Asia and the Pacific Basin
Japan is limited by its constitution and history in the
amount and extent of its responsiblesforaits
and the US have agreed
t the US-Japanese sea lanes
protec
own self-defense and and will p
The Japanese can and
Islands.
out to 1000 miles from the Home
more to their own should be encouraged th
tuth t their contribution ddoes)
t
c
en
ex
e
defense efforts. To
flexibility to use US forces
h
e
ease t
increase, it will incr for other missions in the Pacific or elsewhere.
Beyond expanding their self-defense effort to enhance the
e
north Pacific, the Japane
h
e
e in t
overall air/naval balancents
might be asked to make available facijaPansoufor US ght to belpressed
to the region or to Southwest Asia. s to bring its POL, munitolevelsa other war matockjors
full inventory objective
to encourage the Japane or?demake fensevpotentialeleAsna prioritygy
to us which has dual-use
Japan should also increas~o further
assistance, particularly
such as Pakistan, Egypt, and Sudan, though not at the expense
of its defense effort.
On the other hand, we cannot reasonably expect any signi-
cooperation
ficant level of direct defense
activeade-
Korea, nor should we ask Japan
a reed geographical boundaries.
f tense roles beyond the already g
to increased
Rather, we should concentrate e avon ways ailable to
Japanese and others
Jfinancial resources
for defense purposes.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
 Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
? r
TOP SECRET
The PRC causes the Soviets to devote resources against
it that might otherwise go elsewhere. In addition, it provides
a constraint upon Vietnamese actions against Thailand. It
also lends political-military support and Third World credibil-
ity to US opposition to Soviet expansionism in Afghanistan,
Ethiopia, and Angola (though not in other areas such as Latin
America).
We can (if they are interested) improve Chinese capabil-
ities to oppose the Soviet Union and tie down additional Soviet
resources by supplying appropriate arms and other military
technology, by associated training, and by military exchanges;
however, over the short- and mid-term, it is unlikely that we
can bring about significant improvement in Chinese military
capabilities so long as China is unwilling to divert substan-
tial resources of its own to that purpose. We also should
seek closer US-PRC coordination on security relations with
Thailand and Pakistan and perhaps en route access through China
for a Pacific air line of communication to Southwest Asia. The
US and the PRC might also cooperate to support Soviet equipment
inventories of states we are seeking to draw away from Soviet
arms relationships.
In addition to Japan and the PRC, the ROK also plays a
beneficial role in supporting US interests in East Asia. By
virtue of its strong armed forces, the ROK, together with cur-
rently forward deployed US forces in the region, maintains a
rough balance on the Korean peninsula. Moreover, the basic
strength of its economy (despite its current problems) is
such that the ROK should be able to pay for a significant
percentage of its own defense for the foreseeable future,
backed up by the continuation of the US force presence, secu-
rity guarantee, and FMS program. Additional economic assis-
tance from Japan would also be helpful. Any increases in
Korean defense investment, however, should maintain the cur-
rent division of labor (predominantly Korean ground forces
and predominantly US tacair.)
In the Southeast Asian region, Australia and New Zealand
are allied with us in a solid ANZUS relationship. Both
Australia and New Zealand are seeking to improve security co-
operation with Malaysia and Singapore bilaterally and through
the Five Power Defense Arrangement which includes the UK.
Such cooperation strengthens deterrence against the Vietnamese/
Soviet threat in the region. Australia also could provide ex-
panded base and other support facilities, in addition to its
potential direct military contribution in the Indian Ocean as
well as the Southeast Asian region.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
 Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
?
TOP SECRET
The Philippines and Thailand are also treaty allies which
The Philip-
are important to US security interests in Asia.
pines provides a major and perhaps irreplaceable US base net-
work for support of our military posture in the region and en
route access to Southwest Asia. Thailand can also provide en
route access. In return the US helps these two countries deal
with their security problems, essentially through security
assistance.
As in Southwest Asia, the US relies in Southeast.Asia pri-
marily on local states to deal directly with internal insta-
bility. Should internal security problems require outside
assistance, the US would in the first instance look for ways
to support the threatened government's own efforts, maintain-
ing our own flexibility to deal with direct o eat threw s.
In sum, while the threats to US inter sts in he region
have not diminished, many believe that th gap between threats
and the combined US/friendly capabilitie to meet them is not
_n.early~ so .-great in East As_aas it is i Europe, Southwest
As ia, and perhaps the Caribbean. Nevertheless, the US has
major .security and economic irit'erests in the region which de-
mand the continued presence of US forces and an active security
relationship. The US can increasingly look to Japan and the
ROK to bear greater resource-responsibilities for their own
defense, thereby easing the strains on our own force commit-
ments. At the same time, the maintenance of adequate US mili-
tary strength is an essential ingredient of continued regional
stability. In Southeast Asia, given the present military
balance, continued security assistance programs, as well as
continuing attention to the maintenance of our present security
relationships, should be sufficient. However, our basic secu-
rity posture already factors in China as a strategic. counter-
weight, and a visible drawdown in the US security presence
or a visible lessening of. our present security role would be
seriously destabilizing:
Latin America
The primary direct Soviet threat in this region emanates
from Cuba. In a major contingency or war against the Soviet
Union, US military forces would be responsible for neutraliz-
ing Cuba as apotential base for operations against the US or
its lines of communication. Should Nicaragua serve as a stag-
inq area for threats against the Panama Canal or Caribbean or
Pacific lines of communication, the US would also be respon-
sible for neutralizing that threat. In the South Atlantic,
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
 Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
?
TOP SECRET
Brazil and Argentina might contribute to the defense of sea
lines of communication, through access for US forces and the
employment of their own naval forces. Additional analysis,
however, is required to determine the parameters of such co-
operation.
As in Southwest and Southeast Asia, the US would prefer
to rely upon local states to deal with local insurgencies. To
aid such efforts, we must be prepared to provide political sup-
port and emphasize security and economic assistance. In some
instances, we may seek facilities access to allow us to project
power into the region. We should also seek to keep the remain-
ing UK and French presence in the region.
Should local forces fail to stem insurgent efforts, we
probably cannot depend upon the support or direct intervention
of external allies. In fact, the Europeans, except for the
British, have been opposed to our policy in Central America,
and we should seek their political neutrality if we cannot
gain their support.
US military forces, therefore, represent the essential
fallback should local forces be unable to counter the insurgen-
cies. We should, however, make a maximum effort to employ US
forces under a multilateral umbrella, whether under the Rio
Treaty or a sub-regional grouping such as the Central American
Democratic Community of El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica.
Because threats in the region have been limited in the past,
US forces dedicated exclusively to regional roles have also
been limited. In considering the use of US forces in Central
America or elsewhere in the region, we must measure the bene-
fits and costs of diverting those forces from missions in
other regions or consider increasing US force size overall to
undertake tasks that friends and allies cannot or will not
take on.
Africa
The Soviet Union mainly seeks to gain advantage in Africa
through the use of numerous surrogates, chief among them Libya
and Cuba. Because of Libya's international behavior, the US
has sought directly, through political and military means, to
rein in its activities. While we would prefer to deal with
Libyan threats exclusively through friendly states, we must be
prepared to act directly against Libya should the situation
warrant it.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
 Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
?
TOP SECRET
Because the possibility of confrontation with the Soviets
is greater in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean (stemming
from conflicts in other regions) and because the threats from
Soviet surrogates (Libya and Ethiopia) are also greater in
this area, our support for and reliance on friendly states oIf
the North African littoral and the Horn region is greater.
Morocco, Egypt, Somalia, Kenya, and Liberia, in addition to our
providing security assistance, host nations can provide facil-
ities access (either en route or final destination) to ensure
that Western interests can be defended with US rapid reaction
forces.
Against other local and regional threats, we rely primar-
ily on local and regional forces. We are prepared to assist
with security and economic assistance, and we ask our external
allies and affluent friends to do the same. In former co-
lonial areas, we expect the former colonial power, if appro-
priate, to take the lead where external assistance is neces-
sary. France, the UK, and Belgium are the major actors in that
regard. We also support regional peacekeeping efforts such as
the OAU in Chad. US lift and logistical support for either
Allied' or regional security efforts would almost certainly be
necessary.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
 Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
? TOP LURLF ?
Issue Paper: Role of Allies and Others
Should the NATO Allies be encouraged to contribute combat forces for con-
tingencies in Southwest Asia (SWTA)?
Options
1: The Allies should be encouraged to plan to contribute combat
forces for contingencies in SWA involving either direct Soviet
aggression or regional hostilities or local instabilities.
2. The Allies should not be asked to contribute combat forces for
any contingencies in SWA.
Discussion/Pro-Con Analysis
Option 1: some believe that, if forthcoming, Allied contributions could
add both to deterrence and warfightina capabilities on a political (European
involvement/Alliance cohesion) as well as military level. In addition, encour-
aging European combat contributions would demonstrate our intent and add to our
capabilities to contain any conflict to the region, thus responding to an
Allied fear that any conflict in SVGA would immediately escalate. European
ces,
forces have the potential to move to SWA more quickly than
thus increasing initial Western combat capabilities in any SWA conflict. Also
European participation would certainly make European overflight and en route
facilities access available for US efforts in SWA. Even if European contribu-
tions were small, the solidarity of US-European opposition would indicate to
the Soviets that they could not seek to outflank the Alliance militarily or
divide the Alliance politically by attacks outside the Treaty area. In
regional/local contingencies requiring extraregional assistance instances
could arise (French support for the Mecca Mosque incident) in which European
assistance would be more politically acceptable locally and/or less likely to
raise tensions to the level of superpower confrontation. In addition, propo-
nents of this option believe that defense resources allocated to SWA (which
can also be used in Europe) have a greater marginal value than those devoted
exclusively to Europe. Moreover, those Europeans who could contribute could
be more easily encouraged to devote additional resources for defense in areas
of greater marginal return, e.g., dual-use European/SWA security forces.
Option 2: Combined efforts complicate operational planning considerably
in the negotiation of roles and missions, force size contribution, command and
control arrangements, etc. Given the limited forces likely to be made available
by contributing Allies, the technical/operational problems of planning for co-
alition warfare appear to some to outweigh the potential benefits of a coalition
strategy. Moreover, these efforts would be further complicated by -the uncer-
tainty of Allied participation in an actual SWA contingency. In addition, those
ean resource allocations
l Euro
iti
p
ona
who argue for this option submit that add
are more needed in Europe than SWA and that they are more likely to be encour-
e
Euro
t
l
i
.
p
o
y
ve
aged for political reasons for missions tied exclus
Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
 Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0
TOP SECRET
Issue Paper: Role of Allies and Others
Is the balance between Soviet threats and US/friendly cap-
abilities less in East Asia than Europe, Southwest Asia, and
possib-ly he Carib n Does this judgement, in combination
wrth-the reliability of friends in East Asia, afford the US
some flexibility to allocate marginal defense and security as-
sistance resources to other regions?
Options b
1. The US should allocate marginal defense and security
assistance resources regions other than East Asia.
2. The US should continue to allocate marginal defense
and security assistance resources to East Asia at
roughly its existing proportion of defense and secu-
rity assistance increases.
Discussion/Pro-Con Analysis
Option 1: Some believe that, while current programs,
force levels, and commitments in the region ought not to be
diminished, there are more pressing unmet requirements in
other regions. The Sino-Soviet balance, Japanese and Korean
resource capabilities and the security contributions of
Australia and New Zealand, together with the existing US pres-
ence in the region, offer a regional balance less threatening
than-those in Europe, Southwest Asia, and possibly the Carib-
bean. Consequently, in reviewing allocations for the FY 84
defense and security assistance budget, decision makers should
guide program planners away from initiating new or major addi-
tive programs in East Asia.
Option 2: Others believe that the current power balance
in the region is neither so tranquil as some would suggest nor
so certain to remain in its current state. To reinforce the
intent of regional states to oppose the Soviets and to serve
as a hedge against unfavorable regional shifts of interest,
proponents of this view would argue additive resources and new
programs are needed.
TOP SECRET
RDS-3 3/11/02
Approved For Release 2008/08/04: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100060015-0