NSSD 1-82 PART III SECTION C

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 8, 2009
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: September 29, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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NSC review completed.
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
DDI #2460-82
29 March 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council II
VIA . National Intelligence Officer for General PA Ad Forces
FROM
Assistant NIO for General Purpose Forces
SUBJECT : NSSD 1-82, Part III, Section C
1. On 25 March, I attended a meeting at the NSC to review the latest
draft of the military objectives section of NSSD 1-82. Copies of the drafts
(including a summary as well as two issues) are forwarded as Attachments 1
and 2. It is expected that these two issues will be incorporated into a
single issue which will read something like: "In order for the U.S. to
achieve its peacetime military objectives, is it necessary to tailor and
develop a specific military capability for Southwest Asia or is it sufficient
to rely on forces intended for a global capability?" 25X1
2. Although the changes to the military objectives section since the
last iteration are extensive, there is little change in substance. The section
has been shortened, and some JCS language has been included. I also have some
annotations made by Fred I
kl on a p
revious edition of Part III-C if you would
be interested in seeing it
25X1
3. Drafts of NSSD-1
to the President who is ac
The NSC will take up Parts
discussed
ting as "p
I, II and
at the meeting last Tuesday have gone
rincipal" in this stage of the review.
III (A-C) on 15 April in a one-hour
4. You
may
have missed t
he column on NSSD-1 by Joseph
Kraft printed
in the 25 Ma
rch
issue of The W
ashington Post (Attachment 3).
25X1
25X1
Attachments:
1. NSSD 1-82, Part III-C
Summary Conclusions
2. Section C, with Issues
3. Joseph Kraft Column, dtd. 3/25/82
The Washington Post
cc: NIC/AG,
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NSSD 1-82, Part III, Section C
Regional Military Objectives
Summary Conclusions
The wartime strategy of the United States is to employ military
force to achieve our political objectives and secure early war
termination on terms favorable to the U.S. and its allies. In
so doing, the U.S. will seek to limit the scope of any conflict
to the extent commensurate with protecting U.S. vital interests.
For general wartime planning, the highest priority is the defense
of North America, followed by NATO, and the supporting sea lines
of communication. Second priority is ensuring access to the oil
in Southwest Asia, followed by the defense of our Pacific allies,
supporting sea lines of communication, and the defense of other
friendly nations in Latin America and Africa. Specific U.S.
wartime and peacetime regional objectives are keyed to this global
context.
In Europe, our primary military. objective is to strengthen the
NATO Alliance and its capability to deter or defeat a Soviet
attack on Western Europe. The defense of Europe remains vital to
the national security of the United States. In wartime, the
United States will support NATO's current strategy which requires
an integrated forward defense with conventional forces and, if
necessary, by the use of theater and strategic nuclear forces in.
order to protect the territorial integrity of Western Europe. In
peacetime, U.S. objectives will be to raise the nuclear threshold
by improving NATO's conventional posture, to secure a more effective
division of labor among NATO members, and to obtain increased Allied
contributions.
In the Near East/Southwest Asia, the
of the U.S. are to prevent the spread
maintain continued access to Persian
U.S. has three key objectives: deter
two
primary
security interests
of
Soviet
influence and to
Gulf
oil.
In the region, the
or
defeat
Soviet military
aggression, maintain Israel's qualitative military advantage over
any combination of adversaries, and to support moderate states
against external aggression and subversion. In wartime, the basic
U.S. objective is to protect the oil fields, transshipment points
.and sea lines of communication essential to Western security. In
peacetime, our key objective is to acquire, by the end of the
decade, the capacity to defeat a Soviet attack without'having to
spread the conflict beyond the region and its supporting sea lines
of communication.
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Review March 25, 2002
Classified & Extended by William P. Clark
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)
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In the Far East, a direct U.S.-Soviet conflict is unlikely except
in the context of a general war. Therefore, regional wartime
objectives are supportive of global wartime goals: to maintain
sea control necessary to. support the global requirements of our
strategy, to prevent the redeployment of Soviet forces from the
Far East, to protect U.S. bases in the region, and to secure
major regional contributions from Japan. In peacetime, we seek to
develop an active defense partnership with Japan, to maintain the
PRC as a counterweight to the Soviet Union, and to prevent the
Soviet Union or Vietnam from achieving a dominant position in
Southeast Asia.
In the Western Hemisphere, the United States seeks to blunt and
contain the projection of Soviet and Cuban military power and
influence in the Caribbean Basin and South America. Coupled with
our overall global wartime priorities, this means that in wartime,
U.S. objectives will be to defend North America, to maintain sea
control, and to neutralize Soviet and other hostile forces in the
Caribbean Basin. In peacetime, our objectives are to modernize
North America's strategic air defense system, to reverse Communist
gains in Latin America, to foster bilateral and multilateral military
cooperation, and to increase the level and tempo of U.S. military
presence and access.
In Africa, we seek to deny Soviet control or influence over key
African states from which they could prevent Western access to
Africa's mineral resources or interdict the supply of oil to
Western Europe and the United States. In wartime, our objectives
will be to neutralize Soviet and other hostile forces in strategic
locations and to protect access to the region's mineral resources.
In peacetime, we will continue to seek base access and to assist
countries resisting Soviet and Soviet-sponsored subversion.
ISSUES. Two issues surfaced as a result of this portion of the
study.
1. Should it be a peacetime objective of the United States, by
the end of the decade, to build the capability necessary to
achieve our wartime objectives in Southwest Asia through
operations restricted to the region and supporting sea lines
of communication?
2. On what basis should U.S. conventional military forces be
sized? (NOTE: The resolution of this issue must await
analysis that is the subject of subsequent sections.)
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Global
MILITARY O83EC ~ES
A. Introduction
The wartime strategy of the%U.S. is to employ military
force to achieve our political objegtirves and secure early war
termination on terms favorable to theIU.S. and its allies. in
doing so, the Q.S. -will. seek to. li jt the scope of any conflict
with the Soviet Union to the exent cqpmtensurate with protecting
U.S. vital interests. Contingency p1nning_should, -however,
include options for military actions In-regions of clear U.S.
advantage to dissuade the Soviets.frol{ continuing their attack.
--- - In this context, the threat-of - geograjhic escalation is an
essential element of U.S. strategy,-bNt_is not a substitute for
-adequate- military capability. _Mreov z-;- since the Soviet Union
enjoys war-widening-options,at-_l_east_4s__attractive -as-ours, and
particularly since`.geograph c and nuc3~'Ja escalationconsiderations
_, are -1rked~Q:S in terestsremand careful control of-escalation.
~fOP SECItEf
Draift of" NSSD l=8-2,_ Part' I Section C
-- -B . - - - -Priorities for War-t:i me -Res fee Allocation `
The-following-Broad-pr or it' ation:is accurate for general
~+~rartime planning over a wide--range c 4~cenarios
The highest__prior ty-Lis the defense of erorth
SLOCs) , followed by tze
NATO areas and the LOCs
,--A erica {including Hawa ~l- Alaska and Caribbean
1
roil -in- South4est Asja _ allowed by defense of
Then ext priakity-is endu=ing access to the
==U. S.-Pacifiailies=andSe-LOCs=for the Indian
=Pacific -Oceans; -and:'the defense of other
-.friendly nations in Lat n=-America and Africa.
will be designed to prno~rect essential
U.S. interests, take Adlfantage of Soviet
vulnerabilities,- and diArert Soviet
attention and forces fro_ Europe and
Southwest Asia.
-U-. S.: actions= n other-pp[rts of the world
C. Equitable Burdensharinzg. :may -.nations with living
--standards equal to the U. S. -contribute ,parkedly less to the
common defense and to assistance to oo rer nations than does.:
the U.S. In 1982 and- beyond -=US- - q let diplomacy" must be
much firmer in. insisting upan_ increasecr_defense -efforts by_
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It. Regional Object'
Where conflict against the Soviet; Union is the scenario,
regional objectives . provideronly-rougl}-~quidelines-and must
be viewed in the
'
context: o f_ the.
termin
ti
a
on of hostilities.---
A: Europe
The security of Europe is.injpxtricably linked to
that of the United States and will begpme more so over the
course of this decade. The-unpreceden~ed challenges to
Western security, coupled- with-_a-cone'Ruin
interdependence, mandate'a firm-comM~. tteg growth in economic
nt by nations on
both sides of the Atlantic-to the coaltion warfare strategy
of NATO. While - intra-Alliance-'probl
s
h
, -
uc
as burden-
---sharing and- anti-nuclear-movements e t it will be increasingly
important that -we continue to--r-e c of
~?P.Tthat-the defense of
Europe is vital-to the national securi~y-of the-United States.
4
NATO strategy MC14/3 stresseF=defense along the
forward edge, of-'NATO-- territory, _ supper ed- by the possibility.
of nuclear escalation f'NATO z
'
slos n
f conventionally.
This nuclear linkage l---and uncertain ` - is important to
.-deterrence..-- But- the-Europeans--must~sa -a periaitted to use
nuclear linkage as an excuse for--not==^f ndinq conventional
conventional
defense forces. Our , policy _shoul-A be
~__ o._support
while stressing-that-nuclear paritln~ens a strong conventional
---defense is-.necessary-for deterrence =as ~we11 as for defense.
While improvements are required across the full spectrum of
the Alliance's-military capabilities.,-q-__major increase over
current efforts is especially required ?.rom all other- members
with "regard:-to converitiodal_.dapabil ty. Without such an
increase the nuclear threshold could.bq lowered as the
Soviets continue=increasing their-=capab4lities. - Addi.tionaliv,
NATO Should enhancedeterrence th uq ploser Allied coherence,
and clearer expression of political-wild,.
_-Within the context outlined above,. the rollowing are the
specific U.S. military objectives for *e. European region:
Wartime Objectives
To protect --the -'territorial-i:40egrity of Western
Europe.
To-defeat - a Warsaw' Pactatt c F with conventional:
forces--in a- forward-defense ajqd if necessary by
the
use of theater nuclear, -yd.finally---strategic
nuclear- forces in integrat ,Aerations: _ _n
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To fully engage- , a21__HATO my"-hers .in the conflict.
To be able to sustain a : Ion g'_ war.w
To weaken the W
arsaw ract'g ability to wage war by
engaging p act forces on t1e r -own- territo
c_ -disrupting their- OC
'
s, and =a satin
of the Pact ail; a[nrca - g the cohesion
To establish and maintaincfpntrol of Atlantic
LOCs.
Peacetime military Objectives
To enhance MA' `s convent o a1 defense--capabilities
,,to raise the nuclear ethre
_
_wh le also improving
nuclear deterrence, 1d
To achieve increased Allie
d Fontributions to the
defense of Western Europe gefrom those Allies
capable of doing so increa -contributions in
other areas of mutual _bene-
Asia.% td ?include Southwest
To secure -a more effecti
_
ve
d ~visa.dx of labor
within NATO
through cooperat Itve, efforts.-.such as
Bost Nation Support-Agreemgn is.
B. Near East/South
west Asia.._
two primary.nationa security interest4~einn the dregStates ion. has
first is to prevent the Soviet Union f om ac The
military hegemony in the region.----.
U -S- quirin political
.S. support the sovereignty This quires that the
Of the re states
to stabilize U.S. regional reZ
tion shsoon second in order
maintain continued access to :Persian c 1. The second is to
that the U.S.;Ff oil. This mean'
in concert with intra---id-extraregional
allies and friends must be prepared-t94
- magnitude, from internal--subversion-t4-.Rest threats of any
--aggression.--- _-- --- ar _scale _ Soviet - __.
In this context, defense policy has
t4r e -overriding objectives
1 ? Deter-- or defeat- Soviet o ert military and protect Western access to oil
To aggression
la
i
.
p
nn
ng has _ three tiers.=
Fist we P_ pan U. S. defense
, mu ~t -Plan'for. and
demonstrate our abili
n
ty to- pr -J eo
c=the
Joint Task Force -- quickly into the reg ~on revere Oyment
: i on to prevent a
Soviet fait accompli. - Additi
n
l
o
SU
a
extraregional allies and friends PP4 from intro- and
Private must-. el obtained.-
RDJTF requirements. Our to Support
realistic _j-ont~piann3ng_u~st--be unremrPo-n_them for-_
_-
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2 . Maintain Israel' a gu .l~ t.ative military advantage
over any combination of Arab foes.- the most militarily
powerful state in the region, Israe2'~ assistance would be
of considerable benefit in the course:,-of a conflict with the
Soviets, particularly in the Eastern {aediterranean, as
augmentation for the Southern Flank;-1-
3. Support moderate stateiF-against external
:aggression and subversion. This requires U.S. arms sales
to help strengthen substantially--the- I'Felf-defense capabilities
'of key states in the region
To accomplish these objectives for the region,
---"FT" fthe; -U i S. expects regional states to--c~~ntribute---to the extent
possible to their own defense as we.l as assisting in supporting
the employment of U.S.-forces. All4ef.will.-be expected to
offer their facilities for -the-- deplq'ent of:-U.S. forces to
-~ Southwest-Asia: Additional i;-they _s, i ld=be ~isca~uar~e eta
contribute militarily to specific thrIpats if such participation
would not- substant ally educe=thel rar=fighting capability
in their home region and wruld-prov$d -a--beneficial-contribution
-_- i. 1L~ ... t1 ? -i ..._ .vim ~..
1. Within the context.outlined-above, th following- are--the.'
r-specific U S. m litarg``ob3ec sues= e ie r~rEast, Southwest