CONVERSATIONS IN MOSCOW
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85M00364R002404770002-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 21, 2010
Sequence Number:
2
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 5, 1983
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/25: CIA-RDP85M00364R002404770002-9
% I
December 5, 1983
MEMORANDUM
TO: Ambassador Richard Murphy
Assistant Secretary, NEA
FROM: Ambassador (ret.) Robert G.. Neumann
SUBJ: Conversations in Moscow
Former Assistant Secretary State/NEA Harold Saunders and I
went to Moscow November 27 - December 3, 1983 for one of the "Dart-
mouth Conversations" sponsored by the Kettering Foundation.
The American participants were former Assistant Secretary
of State Harold Saunders and I, accompanied by two acedemic Soviet
plus interpreters. Kettering
and "Crisis Management" specialists
and Rockefeller Foundations
Leader of the Soviet Delegation was Academician Evgenie Primakov,
former$oviet ambassador to Cairo and. high ranking advisor to the Soviet
government whose authority was made very clear in several instances.
Saunders and I suggested that it might be useful for us-- two
meet confidentially with ranking Soviet officials. Those appointments,
came through immediately (indicating,Primakov's connections) and were
with the Director (gquivalent to Asst. Sec.) for Middle East Affairs,
MFA . Polifkovr'1~puty Director International Department of the Central
Committe CP-USSR Zaglatin. These are officials whom Ambassador Hartman
dee.e-.~~et see. Weidebriefed Ambassador Hartman but only in general terms
because we were meeting at a reception he gave in our honor in a non-secu
location (Spasso House).
While we were treated personally with great courtesy, the atmosphe
was extremely tense. We were given a clear and unmistakable message
which, because of circumstances, form and direction are, in my and
Saunders' opinion to be taken seriously. We were told the following at
first at lunch, later we were called out individually and given the
message in calm but very serious tone by Primakov obviously acting
-under instruction. This took place before the U.S. bombing attack on
Syrian installations but in clear anticipation of such an event.
The message: Don't hit the Syrians. If you do we shall have to
and will escalate. We shall not be driven out of our presence in the
Middle East and we shall give the Syrians what ever they need.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/25: CIA-RDP85M00364R002404770002-9
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/25: CIA-RDP85M00364R002404770002-9
SECRET
You are escalating and we shall escalate. With specific
reference to the Cuban missile crisis we were reminded of what
the Russians said thereafter (you will never again find us in
such a situation) and told that Syria was the only Soviet window
to the Middle East and the Soviets would maintain it by whatever
means needed.
To this was added: Your and our forces are only a few miles
apart. We both have difficult and at times difficult-to-control
clients. In this situation an escalation can have uncontrollable
consequences.
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/25: CIA-RDP85M00364R002404770002-9