PAKISTAN: STEADFASTNESS ON AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R002404760067-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2008
• Sequence Number: 67
• Publication Date: September 14, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/02/27: CIA-RDP85M00364R002404760067-9
SECRET
Central Intelligence Agency
14 September 1983
Pakistan: Steadfastness on Afghanistan
Pakistani leaders view the Soviet presence in Afghanistan as
a strategic threat. They believe, 25X1
the Soviets want to gain permanent overland access to.the Persian
Gulf and the Indian Ocean littoral. They are worried that Moscow
will increase its political and military pressure on Pakistan
once it has consolidated its hold on Afghanistan. 25X1
they are concerned that Moscow will collaborate 25X1
witn n is to neutralize. and divide Pakistan--perhaps by a
combination of external military pressure and subversive meddling
in Pakistan's unstable domestic politics. 25X1
We believe Pakistan continues to engage the Soviets in
periodic talks on Afghanistan for a number of reasons:"
-- The UN-sponsored talks provide Pakistan both with a way to
test Soviet intentions in Afghanistan and maintain
international support for its position on Afghanistan.
-- Pakistan keeps its channels open to Moscow because it
worries that the West will in time forget about
Afghanistan or reach an agreement over Pakistan's head as
part of a larger East-West settlement.
-- The refugee problem inside Pakistan has become a major
concern to Islamabad. Rising local resentments and
concern in the Army that some 3 million Afghan refugees
will become a permanent burden for Pakistan have added a
note of urgency to Pakistan's search for a political
settlement. So far, however, relations between the Afghan
refugees and locals--who belong to the same ethnic group--
have been peaceful.
This memorandum was prepared by the South Asia. Division
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis,
n orma ion as
ot September 12, 193 was used in preparation o this paper.
Comments and aueries are welcome and should be addressed to
Chief, South Asia Division,
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 Approved For Release 2008/02/27: CIA-RDP85M00364R002404760067-9
We doubt Islamabad is ready to shift its stand on the issue
in ways that would damage US interests. So far in the indirect
talks at Geneva, Pakistan has remained steadfast in its
insistence that a political settlement is contingent o
withdrawal of Soviet troops.
-- Islamabad supports the Afghan insurgents in order to make
it more difficult for the Soviets to consolidate their
hold on Afghanistan. An active insurgency is crucial to
Pakistan's diplomatic campaign to keep Afghanistan before
world opinion as an issue that can be settled only by the
withdrawal of Soviet troops.
-- A political settlement acceptable to the Zia regime would
have to permit the voluntary return to Afghanistan of the
Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Islamabad knows the refugees
will not return home unless the Soviets first withdraw
their troops.
-- Pakistan has consistently refused to recognize the Babrak
regime. Islamabad knows that recognition is its trump
card. It is doubtful that it would play it until a pull-
out of Soviet troops is largely completed and most of the
refugees have returned home.
-- Pakistan's current policy on Afghanistan receives strong
support from conservative religious parties at home and
vital friends abroad, such as Saudi Arabia, China, and the
US. Pakistan's strong stand on Afghanistan and its
support for an active insurgency enables it to argue more
effectively with the Saudis, the US, and China that it
needs and deserves enhanced diplomatic, economic, and
military support.
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Approved For Release 2008/02/27: CIA-RDP85M00364R002404760067-9