AFGHANISTAN: STATUS AND PROSPECTS OF THE INSURGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R002404760066-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2008
• Sequence Number: 66
• Publication Date: September 14, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/02/27: CIA-RDP85M00364R002404760066-0
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14 September 1983
Afghanistan: Status and Prospects of the Insurgency
Three and a half years after the Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan, the resistance has become an effective force that
controls much of the country
Barring a drastic change in Soviet policy, we judge the fighting
will continue over the next few years because existing Soviet
forces will be unable to destroy the resistance. Despite
improvements in weapons and training, however, we believe the
insurgents will lack the firepower and organization to defeat
major Soviet units.
The Soviets are becoming more concerned about their
difficulties in coping with the resistance
Soviet costs in the war have been considerable, according to
our estimates
-- We estimate that over 16,000 Soviets have been killed or
wounded in Afghanistan. The Afghan Army has suffered
50,000 casualties and nearly 80,000 men have deserted.
This memorandum was prepared by the South Asia Division
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis,
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Information as 25X1
of September 12, 1983 was used in preparation of this paper.
Comments and queries are welcome and should be addressed to
Chief, South Asia Division, 25X1
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 Approved For Release 2008/02/27: CIA-RDP85M00364R002404760066-0
-- The insurgents have shot down or destroyed in attacks on
airfields some 350 Soviet and Afghan aircraft (mostly
helicopters) and nearly 150 more have been lost in
accidents.
-- Approximately 10,000 Soviet and Afghan armored vehicles
and trucks have been destroyed or damaged.
-- Direct Soviet costs in Afghanistan probably total around
12 billion dollars since the invasion.
Nevertheless, we judge the Soviets still find the costs
bearable and apparently believe that their relations with many
countries are recovering from the damage done by the invasion and
.that in the long run they will overcome the resistance. We
believe there is no immediate prospect that the Soviets will
decide to reduce their military effort in Afghanistan.
We judge that the resistance fighters will become more
politically sophisticated and militarily effective in the next
two years, but they will remain vulnerable.
-- The most serious threat to the resistance is civilian war-
weariness and the loss of popular support over the long term
that would directly affect the will to continue fighting.
-- Cooperation among insurgent bands has grown, but because
of deep ideological, political, and religious differences,
we do not foresee a united resistance movement emerging in
the next few years.
The Soviets and the Kabul regime are likely, in our view,
to continue and probably increase a wide variety of covert
and overt activities--such as arranging truces,
encouraging defections, and subverting groups--to exploit
insurgent weaknesses inside and outside of Afghanistan.
? There are some Soviet options--massive troop reinforcement
or a widespread scorched earth policy against civilians--that
might drastically reduce the insurgency in the next two years.
-- Moscow would, however, be reluctant to assume the high
economic, political, and military costs associated with
these options, in our judgment
The Soviets have started a number of economic, educational,
social, and political programs in Afghanistan that they believe
will eventually turn the country into a viable Soviet-dominated
communist state Because of wide-
spread insurgent activity and opposition from the Afghan people,
however, these programs have been implemented in only a few
areas.
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Approved For Release 2008/02/27: CIA-RDP85M00364R002404760066-0