PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO EAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R002404750051-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 51
• Publication Date: August 9, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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August 9, 1.983
CONFIDENTIAL
Interagency Group No. 39
Commerce - Mrs. Helen Robbins
Defense - Col. John Stanford
Energy - Mr. William Vitale
JCS - Ltc. Dennis Stanley
OMB - Mr. Alton Keel
OPD - Mr. Edwin Harper
OSTP - Dr. George Keyworth
Transportation - Mr. Logan H. Sallada
Treasury - Mr. David Pickford
USIA - Ms. Teresa Collins
USTR - Mr. Dennis Whitfield
CIA -
ttaeh n . )
OVP - Mr. Donald P. Gregg
NSC - Mr. Robert Kimmitt
Agriculture - Mr. Raymond Lett
AID - Mr. Mark Edelman
CEA - Mr. William Niskanen
SUBJECT: President's Trip to East Asia
Transmitted for your review are documents that Assistant
Secretary Wolfowitz promised at the August 9 meeting of the
East Asia Interagency Group.
T~ ~3
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SECRET
ISSUES CONCERNING THE PHILIPPINES FOR THE IG
US-Philippine relations are excellent; they have not been
better for a very long time. President Marcos believes that he
enjoys a special relationship with the President, based on the
state visit last September.
Strategic Relationship
The primary US interest in the Philippines is in continued
access to our important military facilities at Subic Bay and
Clark Air Base. We have recently completed a successful review
of our Military Bases Agreement (MBA) with the Philippines. It
produced no major changes. Accompanying the review was a
presidential "best efforts" letter pledging a total of $900
million in economic assistance and military aid for the
Philippines over the FY 85-89 period, subject to Congressional
approval.
We kept the appropriate Congressional committees informed
about the course of the MBA review. Many members were pleased
by the relatively low cost for the continued unhampered use of
the bases. However, Chairman Solarz of the HFAC Asian and
Pacific Subcommittee has indicated that he might wish to alter
the mix in the security assistance package in order to signal
dissatisfaction with Marcos' human rights record. Such an
action would have serious consequences. for our security
relationship.
Financial and Economic Relations
The Philippines, is currently in financial difficulty.
Economic growth in the 1980's has slowed to 2%. The value of
its traditional commodity exports is down (coconut, copper,
sugar) though new manufacturing exports industries
(electronics, textiles) are doing well. Major US and Japanese
banks continue to be guardedly optimistic regarding the medium
and long term prospects for the Philippines. The financial
situation is serious, but the easing of the situation in Latin
America might permit the U.S. (and Japanese) commercial banks
to assist the Philippines in getting over the difficult 12-18
months ahead.
Trade issues which the Philippines and ASEAN promote with
the US include renewal of liberal GSP programs, special CBI
type preferences, and an improved textile agreement. Manila
recognizes the need for more foreign investment, but needs to
improve the ground rules to attract it. Our most serious
current issue is a countervailing duty (CVD) case on canned
tuna brought by the US Tuna Association, alleging export
subsidies.
SECRET
DECL.OADR
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The Government has recently adopted politically painful
austerity measures to reduce the budget, devalue the currency,
and cut subsidies. GOP reserves are nearly gone and they are
seeking relief from the larger US banks. Philippine financial
managers still maintain excellent reputations, since the larger
part of their problems were externally caused during the
recession. In response to strong appeals for assistance, we
are examing possible sources of financial support to help carry
the Philippines through the difficult short-term period.
Domestic Philippine developments and Human Rights
In recent years the Marcos Government has eased limits on
some civil liberties but significant problems persist, notably
military abuses in insurgency areas. Over the past months, the
government has hardened its stance toward the moderate
opposition and activist Catholics, a policy which has caused
problems with the Catholic Church. Cardinal Sin, the primate
of Manila, has publicly opposed U.S. military assistance on
grounds it will be used to suppress legitimate dissidents.
In conversations with Philippine leaders about the
insurgency threat, political "normalization," next year's
parliamentary elections, and human rights in general, the keen
interest of the US Congress in these subjects should be noted.
Marcos does not relish the subject of human rights, but he
appreciates that we talk with him about it only in private. It
is important, however, to do so in private and not. to leave the
impression that we are indifferent. An important milestone to
note is the promise of free parliamentary elections next year
and our hope that the democratic opposition will have the
opportunity to participate fully in those elections.
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CONFIDENTIAL
Issues Concernin Indonesia for the IG
Following is a list of possible initiatives and issues for
the President's trip, both of a bilateral and ASEAN nature,
which might be discussed in the TG. Certain overreaching
economic matters (e.g., protectionism, G-77 issues) will also
surface in President Suharto's meeting with the President, as
well as in discussions with the ASEAN Foreign Ministers.
A. 4, w of the Sea: We might seek interagency concurrence
to pursue with the an n LOS "understanding" whereby the USG
would recognize Indonesia's archipelagic claim as defined in
the LOS Convention in exchange for GOI recognition of U.S.
transit and overflight rights under customary international
law. This issue may also arise in connection with the Tax
Treaty.
B. Tax Treaty: Treasury and the GOI are presently
reviewing previous work done on a tax treaty; a treaty signing
may be possible for the President's visit.
C. Development Assistance/PL-480: We need to consider
what the President might say about future development
assistance and PL-480 levels during the visit.
D. Scientific Cooperation: Planned discussions with GOI
Research and Technology Minister Habibie may yield ideas on new
S&T initiatives. These could be pursued before the President's
visit by White House Science Adviser Keyworth, who will visit
Jakarta in September; by the National Academy of Sciences,
which is hosting an October symposium on Indonesian scientific
planning; and by AID and OES.
E. Investment Promotion: OPIC is sponsoring an investment
mission in December 1983, fulfilling a USG commitment made
during the Suharto state visit last October to encourage US
investment in Indonesia. Commerce is also exploring the
feasibility of a joint MOU on investment promotion, which might
be signed by a principal accompanying the President.
F. Refugees: We should reassure the GOI of our intention
to continue playing a significant role in containing the
Indochinese refugee problem, making as positive as possible a
statement on US resettlement levels.
CONFIDENTIAL
DECL:OADR
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G. FMS: We may need to explain again the rationale behind
the 60% cut in planned FY83 FMS credit levels. We hope to pin
down a $5 million FY83 supplemental soon, underscoring our
intention to maintain significant levels of FMS in the future.
H. Human rights: If the "mysterious killings" persist, we
might consider expressing USG concern at some sub-Presidential
level. Depending on the then current situation, we may wish to
commend the GOI on progress achieved in East Timor..
I. I;K ort promotion: We might package several existing
Commerce-organized advisory programs and possible new USAID
projects on marketing or other issues as a new initiative to
assist the GOI increase non-oil exports.
J. Shipping : Although we have so far been able to work
out ad hoc arrangements to mitigate the impact of the GOI's
restrictive maritime regulations, we may wish to point out
their deleterious impact on US shipping and free trade.
K. Advanced fighter aircraft: Although now on the
backburner because of Indonesia's fiscal problems, the GOI
could raise its interest in procuring a new fighter aircraft.
We should have an appropriate response ready.
L. Defense Industrial Cooperation (DIC): Although the DIC
agreement has so far had little content, we could attempt to
find new projects proposals to surface in the context of the
visit.
CONFIDENTIAL
DECL:OADR
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CONFIDENTIAL
Issues Concerning ASEAN for the IG
A. GSP: Concern will be expressed that the GSP renewal
legislation recently presented to Congress is not as generous as
the current scheme and may particularly disadvantage Singapore.
The IG should determine how the President can respond to ASEAN
concerns.
B. Textiles: Given ASEAN concern over textiles we should
stick to our MFA obligations.
C. Caribbean Basin Initiative: The President should reassure
the ASEAN countries that CBI will not adversely affect their trade
interests.
D. EXIM Bank: A new estimate of potential lending to ASEAN
should be prepared, together with a list of major projects on
which U.S. companies are bidding. The President should note the
importance of EXIM loans in his public statements on private sector
cooperation.
E. Tariff Reductions: The IG should consider using this visit
to try to develop support for the North/South round which could
also be a vehicle for reductions in specific U.S. tariffs. Hard-
wood plywood was raised by President Suharto last year but a
tariff cut would benefit several ASEAN countries.
F. Investment: The President should make a strong statement
supporting increased U.S. investment in ASEAN, accompanied by*a
commitment to work constructively with ASEAN governments to reduce
impediments to investment.
G. Commodities: The centerpiece will be U.S.-ASEAN con-
sultations on GSA tin disposals which should be launched by the
time of the President's visit. We should explain our preference
for effective CFF operations to assist in offsetting balance of
payments shortfalls relating to commodity exports.
H. Management Development Program: The President could
announce a joint USG-private sector program to plan and carry out
specialized management training for small and medium sized
industries and agribusiness. A public-private sector task force
will be needed to refine and implement this initiative.
CONFIDENTIAL
DECL:OADR
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CONFIDENTIAL
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1. ASEAN Economic Projects: The President could propose a
joint U.S.-ASEAN Cooperation Council to meet periodically to
review and formulate cooperative activities. Also, the
President could declare USG willingness to consider technical
assistance projects in the following areas:
--tax administration (Treasury);
--marine science and remote sensing (Commerce/NOP.A);
--quality control for food and'.natural commodity
exports, such as fish, shrimp, spices, coffee, rice,
etc. (FDA);
--food storage and processingg technology;
--toxic waste disposal (EPA);
--pollution control technology (EPA, NAS); and
--use of video techniques in health education (USIA,
HHS).
J. Other Cooperative Projects: The President could
declare or reiterate USG interest in the following:
--participation in 1984 ASEAN Science and Technology
Week in Singapore;
--regional narcotics projects;
--support for the Southeast Asian Tin Research and
Development Center (SEATRAD);
--economic journalists program (USIA sponsorship of a
second U.S. visit of ASEAN economic editors);
--visits and training of museum curators (USIA and
Smithsonian);
--increased sports exchanges (coaches and teams);. and
--increased USG support of American scholars for study
in the ASEAN region (USIA).
K. Common Fund: Should the USG position on the Common
Fund be questioned, we need to prepare an appropriate response.
L. Refugees: We should reassure the ASEAN nations of our
intention to continue playing a significant role in containing
the Indochinese refugee issue, making as positive as possible a
statement on resettlement levels.
M POW-MIAs: We need to consider whether it is necessary
to follow-up what Secretay Shultz has already said to the ASEAN
Foreign Ministers.
CONFIDENTIAL
DECL:OADR
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Checklist of Issues: Thailand
The major issues for the trip and and the scheduling
issues have been discussed elsewhere. The following is a
list of potential action issues for Washington agencies.
-- Refugees. The decline in the offtake of refugees is a
troublesome aspect of US - Thai relations and must be
addressed during the visit.
-- Rice (Food and Drug) Problems. This is potentially a
serious problem. The Food and Drug administration just
placed Thai rice and rice products on the "automatic
detention" list circulated to FDA field offices. Action
is being taken by State with the cooperation of FDA to
arrange consultations in August. This issue must be
pressed to early resolution, before the trip.
-- Treaties in the Legal Area.
Extradition Treaty. A new extradition treaty is a
candidate for signature during the President's visit. A
draft has been initialed, but an article on capital
punishment remains "bracketed." State is lead agency,
Justice shares responsibility for negotiation and
implementation of the treaty. Early Senate action will
also be required in order to allow for the treaty to be
signed in Bangkok in November.
Prisoner Exchange Treaty. This agreement was signed
in Bangkok by Attorney General Smith late last year. It
could also be a candidate for signature if a) the Thai
pass implementing legislation b) we get Justice
concurrence and Senate action by then.
-- Economic Issues.
Economic issues which could be raised in discussion, or by
way of a note given to senior staff officers, include the
following:
Bilateral Aviation Agreement. The RTG has requested
consultations before the end of the year under our
bilateral agreement on civil aviation. The principal
issue will be the Thai request for increased service to
the U.S. The Thai believe that they are now entitled to a
fourth flight (called frequency) through Seattle. They
will be pressing for a fifth frequency through Seattle.
Talks on this point have been unsuccessful from the RTG
point of view and aviation rights may arise during the
8/8/83
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President's visit. [We understand that CAB (Civil
Aeronautics Board) is preparing a briefing paper on this
topic for the White House.]
Tin and other commodity issues. The Thai government
has taken the lead on these issues only when charged with
doing so on behalf of the other ASEAN states. As a major
tin exporter, the RTG will be interested in the outcome of
discussions between the U.S. and the ASEAN nations,
principally Malaysia. [State action.]
Tax treaty. The Secretary of State proposed a tax
treaty to the Thai in June and the Thai have said they
would be prepared to talk in February 1984. Treasury has
action on responding. It is not likely to arise in
Bangkok, but may arise in Jakarta.
August 8, 1983
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DECL: OADR
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MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: US Japan Relations and the President's Trip to Japan
The President's trip comes attbeginning ofhap new e phase
in Japanese-American relations. Under the nge assertive in
Minister Nakasone, Japan is becoming increasingly for
global matters and is forging an
itself. We wish to encourage this trend toward an increased
sense of international responsibility by the Japanese, but it
is essential that it be within the framework of a close
bilateral relationship with the United States. The President',s,
visit to Japan, and the themes ta Jahseland Ameerrecwianlpl
instrumental in indicating to the pane i
the kind of relationship we want in the years ahead.
Despite our concerns over trade'and defense issues, our
overall relationship with Japan is healthy. Ambassador
Mansfield has said many times that ours is "the most important
bilateral relationship in the world -- bar none".
The nature of our relationship with Japan continues to
change. In the 1950's and 60's it was a relationship of US
leadership and Japanese dependency. From the 1970's to the
present we have achieved a close bilateral partnership, with
Japan gradually becoming more of an equal rather than a junior
partner. As we look toward the future, we are moving beyond a
simple bilateral relationship toward global cooperation.
Objectives During the Visit
During his visit, the President should emphasize our i,
overall relationship and its broader issues, and not get bogged
down in the details of specific or contentious issues. Global
cooperation with Japan to achieve peace and prosperity in the
world, based on our shared values and close political,
economic, and security ties, should be the overarching theme.
Our overall goals will be:
--To reaffirm the depth and importance of our bilateral
relationship with. Japan across an extraordinary range of
political, economic, security, educational, cultural,
trade, and scientific areas.
--To convince both the Government and the people of Japan
that that the Reagan Administration and President Reagan
personally, are committed to work creatively with them to
resolve outstanding issues.
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SUBJECT: Issues Concerning Japan for the IG
1. The following issues should be addressed early on:
-- Letter from President Reagan to PM Nakasone in late
August outlining US hopes for visit;
-- Public relations; speeches, backgrounders, with press,
Congress, etc. building understanding and support for
objectives during the visit;
;2. The following issues shout: be addressed prior to the visit:
-- Voluntary auto restraints;
Citrus and beef quotas;
MOU on Defense transfer;
-- Pursue political dialogue on fishing/whale issue.
3. The following issues should be addressed prior and during
the visit:
Economic (Starred items not at presidential level)
-- Press energy cooperation;
-- Lowering tariffs on agricultural products;*
-- Lowering tariffs on US forestry products;*
-- Mutual elimination of tariffs on semiconductors;
market-opening;
-- Cooperation on high tech; COCOM issues and list review;
-- Speedup of licencing direct sales of US cigarettes;*
-- Implementation of Japan's standards and certification
agreements;*
-- Renewal of NTT procurement agreement; Japanese action
on procurement;
Science
-- Conclude nuclear cooperation agreement;
-- Cooperation on space station project;
-- Rationalize science/technology agreement.
CONFIDENTIAL
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--To show that the President, personally, is seeking to
reach an equitable and verifiable nuclear weapons agreement
with the USSR.
--To convey to Asian nations that the US looks to them as
much as to Western Europe and is determined to maintain --
even increase -- its presence in Asia.
In economic matters, the President should call for even
closer cooperation to resolve global economic issues and call
for faster progress in settling our bilateral trade
differences. He. could call for an acceleration of Japanese
investment in the US to create jobs and defuse trade tensions.
We should seek a package of expanded cooperation on energy,
peaceful nuclear cooperation, space, and perhaps, cancer
research.
In security affairs, we want to give public recognition to
Japan's increased defense contribution and stress the role that
our mutual security relationship and cooperation on aid make to
Japan's prosperity and world peace. In private, the President
will want to indicate that we will do everything we can to
assist Nakasone politically in his effort to change public
attitudes and achieve the prompt implementation of Japan's
increased defense missions.
Political Issues
The President will visit Japan at a time when conservative
political rule in Japan and support for the alliance with the
United States are firmly established. Discussion of political
issues therefore, will revolve primarily around regional and
global affairs.
As Japan moves toward an increased political role in the
world, it is important that we consult and cooperate closely
with each other. Based on past experience, Japanese interests
are likely to include:
--Relations with the Soviet Union and arms control
--Relations with China, Taiwan, and Korea, and the
general security situation in Northeast Asia
--Relations with the ASEAN nations and the situation in
Indochina
--U.S.-Japan cooperation on economic assistance, and
general North-South issues
--The situation in the Middle East
--Central America and the Caribbean
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Economic Issues
Public and press attention during the President's Tokyo
stop will focus most clearly on trade. Japan is our largest
overseas trading partner, and two-way trade is expected to
cross the $60 billion mark in 1983. Estimates of our trade
deficit with the Japanese this year range around $30 billion.
The recent Congressional outcry over the possibility that Japan
will not continue to restrain auto exports to the U.S.
demonstrates that trade issues are still a very live and
emotional topic in our bilateral relatinship.
We have just concluded US-Japan Economic Subcabinet
consultations. (The US delegation was led by Under Secretary
for Economic Affairs Allen Wallis.) The time before the
President's visit in November presents us with the opportunity
to make progress on a number of outstanding trade issues and
improve the atmosphere before the President arrives in Tokyo.
Prime Minister Nakasone's political position has been
strengthened by the recent upper house elections, and there are
indications that he wants to "clear the decks" for the
President's visit, although the political constraints on him
will be many.
The two most important issues to deal with before November,
which will have the greatest symbolic impact in our trade
relations, are a substantial increase in Japan's quota for beef
and citrus products and another year of Japanese restraints on
auto exports to the U.S. We have a good chance to achieve both
of these. We should try to resolve some other pressing issues
within the context of the President's visit. These include
lowering the tariff on U.S. forestry products, mutual
elimination of the tariff on semiconductors, Japanese impetus
to implement the NTT Procurement Agreement. Successful
implementation of Japan's new standards and certification
regulations, and a lowering of Japanese tariffs in various
sectors. Regarding energy, we'hope that the President will
engage in a frank exchange on the increasing importance of
bilateral cooperation. (The U.S.-Japan Energy Working Group is
exploring specific possibilities) In general, we should move
to defuse protectionist sentiments in the U.S.
With these actions taken before the November trip, the
stage would be set for a productive high level visit that
focusses on the broader, long term cooperative economic
relationship that we seek with the Japanese in the 1980's and
beyond.
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Defense Issues
Japan is moving toward acceptance of a greater defense role
and a recognition that it can no longer be an island unto
itself. Prime Minister Nakasone, who is a long time advocate
of a strong Japanese military, clearly is out ahead of his own
government and the public on this issue, and he has proceeded
cautiously since his "unsinkable aircraft carrier" remarks to
the Washington Post in May.
Although Japan has agreed during the past two years to
accept additional roles and missions in its own defense and has
increased its support of our security presence in the area, its
defense budget has been inadequate to implement the new
responsibilities it has accepted. In the latest budget, the
Government has set a 6.88 percent increase in the ceiling for
defense spending, although domestic spending will be cut by an
average of 10 percent.
Prime Minister Nakasone has asked us to help him out
politically by keeping a low public posture on Japanese
defense, and we have tried to accomodate him. During the
President's visit, we hope to play the defense issue in a
low-key, reserving discussion of this issue principally for
private meetings between the President and Nakasone, and
carrying out our discussions in ways which reinforce Nakasone's
committment to strengthening Japan's ability to fulfill its
roles and missions at a quickened pace.
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CONFIDENTIAL
ISSUES CONCERNING KOREA FOR IG
I. Issues to be Addressed by the IG
A. Immediately 11"'Y
--Whether to send a letter from President Reagan to
President Chun outlining our hopes for the visit. (The
main reason for doing this would be to preserve symmetry
with Japan; if Nakasone is to get a letter, the Koreans
will expect one also. It could be useful in setting the
stage.)
-- Public relations activities. The impact of the
Presidential visit, domestically and in Korea, could be
enhanced by calling attention to the relationship in
advance. The 30th anniversary of the security treaty in
September would provide a logical peg.
B. Prior to the Visit
-- Security Assistance: informing the Koreans of the
final FY 83 supplemental levels; discussing prospects for
FY 84 and out-years in terms that will convey our
determination to help, while avoiding unrealistic ROKG.
expectations.
-- "Strategic Partnership": achieving an agreed line for
the President to take in the event Chun raises the issue.
-- VOA Transmitter Site: insuring that a technical team
visit takes place and that the ROKG fully appreciates the
political priority we attach to this project.
-- Human Rights/Democratization: making clear to the ROKG
that these issues are prominent on our agenda; crafting
the President's National Assembly speech.
-- Economic Issues: achieving interagency agreement on a
Presidential approach to two or three priority issues
(e.g., market access, investment climate), while
avoiding excessive detail.
CONFIDENT IAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
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II. Issues to be Addressed During the Visit
Security Relationship:
-~- firmness of US commitment;
-- US-ROK alliance in context of security situation
in Northeast Asia;
--- Korea as a "strategic partner" (if raised);
-- Security assistance/third-country sales.
Domestic Politics/Hutnan'rights:
-- importance of progress in this area for stability
and strength of ROKG and for long-term viability
of US-ROK r-eiati.onship.
North-South Relations/Tension Reduction:
-- support for ROKG initiatives toward the North;
-- assurance of continued close consultation with
ROKG on these issues;
-- need to respond alertly to opportunities for
tension reduction, and to explore together
possible initiatives to advance "cross-
recognition."
-- continued liberalization of Korean domestic
market, and need for Korean support in resisting
protectionism.
VOA Transmitter:
-- importance of project; need to move it along
quickly.
international:
-- regional and global developments; need'for Korean
support where possible, and for broader ROKG
foreign policy approach.
CONFIDENTIAL
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US-KOREA RELATIONS: OVERVIEW
US-Korea relations are basically sound. Confidence in our
security commitment, shaken by the plans of the Carter Adminis-
tration to withdraw US forces, has been restored. The pro-
foundly damaging impact of the Korea-related scandals of the
late seventies has largely dissipated. President Chun's diffi-
cult and sporadically violent consolidation of power following
the assassination of President'Park in 1979, while not fully
accepted by a significant minority in.Korea (or their support-
ers iin this country), has beers.generally accommodated. Econo-
mic relations with Korea have grown in importance. Significant
policy issues nonetheless remain in all these areas, and will
need to be addressed in connection with the President's visit.
Security. The alliance between the US and Korea has been
successful in its central aspect: deterring war for nearly
thirty years, despite a heavily armed and threatening North
Korea. The threat is undiminished, and in fact has grown sub-
stantially in recent years, resulting in a significant military
imbalance in favor of the North. The ROK and we have sought to
redress that imbalance through a substantial Korean force
modernization program, requiring large annual amounts of
Foreign Military Sales credits, and measures to improve the
capabilities of US forces. Our continuing inability to discern
with. confidence North Korean intentions, and the proximity of
the demarcation line to Seoul, combine to produce one of our
most-demanding warning problems. We would have little time to
react to a North Korean attack, and hence must maintain a high
level of readiness. We have seen no indication of a shift in
North Korea's basic strategy and therefore see little prospect
for a reduction of tension on the peninsula or a dialogue
between North and South. In view of the profound effects war
in Korea would have for the stability of Northeast Asia and our
broader interest, the maintenance of peace and security on the
peninsula remains our fundamental policy goal, and is one that
requires constant attention.
In view of this Administration's staunch record of support
for our security commitment, we do not anticipate major prob-
lems in this area during the President's discussions. The
President will, however, need to be prepared to respond to
several specific Korean interests and concerns:
-- Security Assistance. We provide Foreign Military Sales
credits to Korea, to assist ROKG efforts to pursue a force
improvement plan designed to narrow the North's military lead.
The necessity to operate under Continuing Resolutions, combined
with Congressional earmarking of funds and competing priorities
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DECL: OADR
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- -2-
elsewhere, have resulted in for
great concern to the ROKG.
will continue to do what we can to obtain adequate FMS
ep but hsame time
political
de-emphasize
expectations. We s should also
importance of security assistance in Korean eyes, making the
point that security assistance levels Sshouldd not be regarded as
an indicator of the strength of the
While
-- Korean Interest in a "Strategic" Relationship:
the US commitment and troop presence is strategically impor-
tant, in the sense that the maintenance
etof peaceoonNthehpenin-
sula is essential to the security and r
Asia, our forces in Korea, and the commitment itself, are
directed toward the threat from North Korea, not the broader
a
Soviet military challenge. The Koreans would like to addta
more explicit strategic dimension to the relationship,
because they share our view of the dangers posed by the Soviet
threat and want to help counter it, and because they believe
this would give Korea advantages in its bilateral relations
with us (e.g., by reducing our leverage on such issues as human
rights). Thus, the Koreans have indicated they would welcome
the deployment of strategic forces to Korea (e.g., ground-
launched cruise missiles, or a homeported carrier). wWedhavet
responded to those overtures in a noncommittal way;
wish to foreclose the possibility that we might at some point
wish to take advantage of such offers, but we would want at
that time to weigh carefully the potential negative effects
upon our bilateral and regional interests (incl dinghiseissue
reactions of Japan and the PRC).
with the President.
North Korean Perceptions: While it is.important for the
President to affirm our commitment to the security of the ROK,
this should be done in-a way that will not contribute to North
Korean paranoia and result in higher tension on the peninsula.
The ROKG tendency will be to emphasize North Korean bellicosity
and the solidity of our alliance in countering it. Without
denigrating the threat, we should stress the defensive nature
of the US-ROK securhcanagaaduallypbetreduced.
danger of military confrontation
Political Stabilitv and evelopment in the RK. It
ROKG has ooten beensboth
this area that the performan
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inadequate and controversial. Because his rise* to power was
:marred by violence and signalled a continuation of military
domination,' President Chun's governnhas faceancd con inuingean
difficulties in winning broader popular
political life continues to be charaacterizedebylconfrontation
between the government and asmall but activ eement of he
opposition. Despite some notable progress (e .gm . r the release
d
from prison of the leading Korean y Dae ofung, an
a partial lifting of a ban on political activity by
of the Park era), the opposition remains dissatisfied wit th
degree of government control of politcal life, and skical
of possibilities for future liberalization of the present the
strongly authoritarian system. It seems likely pace of change increases, tension will rise. Political stabil-
ity could be threatened.
itsysole
Moreover, as the guarantor of Korean
in the mind.
ally, the US inevitably is associated
Koreans with the ROKG and the entire rageoof i t s policies (an
Anti
impression the government often sees t to
aken on anti-American
government sentiment has increasingly
overtones, sharpening the basic dilemma we have aowgilacedoin-
Korea: how to preserve security on
ing identification with the repressive aspects of a government
allied with us in that task.
Thus, it is important that wecontinue
liberalizatone andttor
steady progress in the area of political
make clear the importance we attach to aecredible8andwpeaceful
transfer of power at the end of h
has announced that he will President'sROKGvisist
an opportunity to do this,
bilities.
Economic Relations. Korea's dramatic economic growth over
the past two decades has countryefcroom the
the
the least developed in Asia to
world. Because Korea's economy is pastrtwoed,
global recession impacted heavily on it over we ,
two l years. It nonetheless haperformed
real growthrinn1982y As the
registering more than 5 percent
Korean economy has grown, its importance as aarket and su
plier for the US has increased accordingly. our Two-way trade
largest
exceeded $11 billion in 1982, making
trading partner worldwide, anaaccountrwas]essentially
trading partners in that our bilateral
balanced.)
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In addition to the uncertainties attendant to heavy depend-
ence on exports, Korea faces the complex task of shifting from
a heavy industrial base to a higher technology economy if it is
to remain competitive. This second stage of economic develop-
ment will be more difficult to reach than the impressive indus-
trialization achieved to date and, given global economic reali-
ties, the phenomenal growth rates of the 60s and 70s are
unlikely to, recur. Continued steady growth is, however..essen
tial, both to support the required heavy military expenditures
(6% of GNP), and to contribute to political stability among a
populace by now accustomed to rising standards of living.
Despite these potential problems, the policy issues posed
for us in this area stem basically from success, e.g.: we seek
greater access to Korean markets; a liberalized investment cli-
mate for American business; our fair share of Korean purchases
of major equipment (e.g., aircraft, nuclear power plants); and
the successful management of recurring sectoral trade prob-
lems. The President's visit will enable us to make a number of
points in all these areas, and in general to encourage an
increasingly mature and responsible Korean role in the manage-
ment of interational economic issues, commensurate with its
growing economic importance.
July 15, 1983
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