REGROUP TO CHECK THE SOVIET THRUST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R002204280072-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2008
• Sequence Number: 72
• Publication Date: April 22, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2008/01/31 :CIA-RDP85M00364R002204280072-8
V~'ALL ~^RFtT. JCUR1\r~.
22 APFjL 1083
Regroup to Check the Soviet Thrust
B~? 1l'rt.t.tnM J..Cnst:i? . - - Launching Its Ow~t Forces
The efiecu of American defeats in Viet- Fourth. where a vacuum existed or the
ham and Iran undermined the confidence ? costs and risks were low, the U.S.S.R
of L.S. friends and allies in the Third ?proved still willing to launch iu own forces
? World rand Europe and.:lapan) and en- ' at targets on iu .periphery-Afghanistan,
i sured that the Soviet Union would see in and perhaps elsewhere when and if cir?
the Third tt'oriC its principal foreign-policy _ -curnstar-ces seem right.
? opportunities for years -to come. I;Yith, the Sovieu advised
c
to t
e
;rr
new radical
The Sovteu themselves suffered set. ~ i`regimes to mute their revolutionary rheto-
backs in the 1960s and early ?os in the 't'ic and io try to keep their links to?Western
=Third V~orld. They suffered one sethacl; af- ~ commercial resources, 7oreign assistance j L We have too often neglected our '
teitanother in Africa. They saw their hopes and international finaacial institutions. -- :,friends and neutrals in Africa, the Middle
in Smith America dashed by the overthrow " Moscow's?ambitions did not cloud reco~ni- -_ `~ East, Latin America and. Asia until they
of Salvador Allende in Chile and they were ~ 'tiortthat itmould not afford more economic became a mblem or were threatened by
htrtniliat;~ngly expelled from Egypt in 1972. dependents such as Cuba and Vietnam ~p?or,,.,,,,op...,.~ ___-,__-, ~ ._-? _
.. w?+=. ten- uneres[s, ane Trtlyd World now buys 40ia
m fa. r ~a.s va a suate~. desgned ro on that 7tad found itself in 1972 witl;out of ow exports- that ai
minimi~~ th
h
-
e c
ance :
oi? a ?xepetition of
those setbacks. The strategry,-enriched and
:strengthened over several years, is rea]is-
jTic and calculated to exploit effectively
both evenu and oppomrtities.
~? lZrst, shown the ~aay by Castro in An-
Bola, the Soviets helped him consolidate
she radical power of the MPLA there, cre-
ating agovernment +aep~dent on Soviet
and Glrbar, support for survival. This was .
follower by the dispatch of thousands of _
(~tban Croons w Ethiopia. Unlike Sadat,
neither the ;-Lpi.A nor Mengistu could af-
ford worrier the Cubans and Soviets ouL
>1t the nea? strategy, the principal,
obviotL role in Third World countries _
. would b? played by another Third World
stzse-Libya. Vietnam. Nicaragua. No su- ;
~erpower would be seen to be :guiding or'
arming or directing the radical forces at
work- .the host government svouid be main-
gained by foreign advisers and troops who i
couldn't be expelled ,in the event of a ~
change of hear.. Additionally, it was a i
stratee ~ that made (and makes) .any di?
yeti t~sponse by the West appear neo-irn?
perialistic. -
Second. when radical governmenu
carve to power, the Soviets directly or
"ihrou~~; their surrogates ,helped establish l
an internal-security structure to ensure
that an]? challenge from within would be .
stamped out. There would be no more Al-
lead~. Sometimes it worked, as in Ethio-
pia and Angola, and sometimes there was i
not enough time, as in Jamaica. i
Third. the So-~eu supplemented these
tactics with their more traditional offer-
ings. such as technical and political train- ,
ing i. the L'.S.S.R., the rapid supply of -'
weapons and the use of propaganda and
subversion to support friends or help desta- I
.major -successes?..except for .the survival to av one rs reason enough
rof the ~ p greater attention ~to'the proble.~rts of
Castro regime--and with many fail- the less developed countries Q DC`s) before
Wires in the.Third World after two decades vie confront coups, insurgencies or irctabil-
oi effort could count the following achieve- 'try. The priority of the Third World in our
menu by .the ~ end of 1982: overall foreigr, policy must be raised and
? Victory in Vietnam :and Hanoi's con- sustatned. The executive brand must do
solidation of power in all of Indochina. more to educate the public. the Con