U.S. STRATEGIC AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R002204280049-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 19, 2007
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: May 23, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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U.S. STRATEGIC AFFAIRS
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CONTENTS
REFLECTIONS
THE STRATEGIC MEMORY CONCEPT
THE COMMAND CENTER CONCEPT
THE STRATEGIC STRUCTURE CONCEPT
A PRONOUNCEMENT STRATEGY CONCEPT
SOME MEASURES OF U.S. STRATEGIC
EFFECTIVENESS
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GOAL
WE SHOULD PUSH WITH ALL'AVAILABLE RESOURCES TO
ESTABLISH AN IRREFUTABLE STRATEGIC POSITION' THAT
WILL LAST FROM NOW UNTIL AT LEAST THE YEAR 2000.
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"The Need is Great
The Time is Late
Our Cause is Just
Forward we must Thrust"
Dr. George Roche
May 23, :1983
"As our case is new,
so must we think anew
and act anew"
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REFLECTIONS
Looking back over the last thirty-five years or so,
many Americans sense that despite enormous advantages and
effort, our nation had not done too well in creating the
kind of global environment we all wished to see. The prin-
cipal reason for this is that we as a nation did not think
strategically and therefore did not employ the critical
element that would enable us to obtain better results frov
our efforts.
It is to our advantage as a nation to more fully under-
stand strategy as it applies on a global scale; both as a
way to comprehend what those hostile to us are doing and to
understand what we must do.. Our lack of a sense for stra-
tegy deprives us of a positive and attractive theme and re-
lated actions that increase our standing in the eyes of the
people and governments of the world.
There is such a thing known as strategy. It is an orien-
tation in thinking that guides the employment of resources,
whether in political, economic or military fields of endeavor,
as a way to achieve goals in a competitive environment. The
use of strategy in the American business world is illustrated
in the recent book entitled: In Search of Excellence.
There is such a thing as a global strategy. It is a
strategy which a nation adopts as a guide to its international
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policies as a way to achieve its global goals on its own
terms. A global strategy is applicable only to those
nation's that have responsibilities or intentions that are
global in scope. We Americans have tended to think. in terms
of isolated policies instead of an overall strategy. We
have not fully realized other nations used the strategic
method of thinking as a way of guiding their policies. A
sound global strategy should be thought of as one that com-
bines political, economic, social, military, psychological
and moral factors in such a way they related to and support
each other. Too often in the past we have relied principally
on military means in the world without lasting positive effect.
For a nation to employ a global strategy in a meaning-
ful way, it requires strategic leadership either by an indi-
vidual or group that practices the art of designing, initia-
ting, directing, adjusting and sustaining strategy. This re-
quires a strategic orientation that involves a basic thinking
process about strategy; what strategy is, what is its func-
tion, what is its effectiveness, what concepts underlie it,
what structure is needed to implement it, and how strategy
meets its internal and external challenges.
For the strategic leadership of a nation to be effective,
it must be supported by a strategic structure that is the
organizational means through which strategic leadership
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implements its strategy. This strategic structure must be
composed of individuals who not only have a common strategic
orientation, but a clear understanding of strategies used
by nations in the past so that they have what might be
termed a?common strategic frame of reference with which to
guide them in the future. This team approach involves a
shared outlook and language as the basis for a consensus on
strategic affairs.
While there is strategic thinking in the United States
today, and strategic concepts abroad, there has been diffi-
culty in attaining agreement on key aspects. Many of the
strategic ideas that are afloat are inconsistent with one
another and therefore do not form a coherent body that could
comprise anything like a U.S. global strategy. Without a
clear and coherent global strategy as a guide, the alloca-
tion of national resources for U.S. international affairs
by the budget process tends to be for various programs in
support of policies that are not related to a whole. This
condition is evident not only within the U.S. Congress but
also in the relationship between the Congress and the Execu-
tive branch.
It may be time for a complete review of U.S. strategic
affairs, beginning with the National Security Act of 1947
and then extending to all amendments and laws that effect
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U.S. global behavior. This could be done either by a Presi-
dential commission whose members are appointed on a biparti-
san basis or by the creation of a special body in Congress
for this purpose. This review process could cover the basic
strategic concepts, structure and procedures under which the
U.S. government now operates.
The goal of such a review process would be to generate,
if at all possible, a consensus on U.S. strategic affairs
that would operate much as the former bipartisan foreign
policy did in earlier days. It would serve as a way of com-
municating the need to establish a climate for strategy that
is harmonious in nature. This kind of process would provide
an opportunity to present a carefully crafted articulation
of what U.S. strategy is now, and what it could be with a
consensus. For additional justification, refer to a separate
paper entitled: "The Case for a Review of U.S. Strategic
Affairs."
As a starting point for such a review, the following
observations have been prepared as a basis for discussion
and elaboration by others who wish to participate in the
process.
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THE STRATEGIC MEMORY CONCEPT
This concept is based on certain world events which occur-
red over the last thirty-five years or so. It postulates that
two general conditions have existed during that time: (1) The
National Security Council, authorized by the National Security
Act of 1947 as the highest decision-making instrument for U.S.
national security affairs, has not had a member that represented
an institutional "strategic memory," and (2) A number of events
in which the U.S. had an interest that seemed to be isolated
events, were in fact interrelated by virtue of hostile forces'
use of variations of basic SUN TZU strategy concepts.
A "strategic memory" as used here refers to an institu-
tion that has systematically analyzed and catalogued strategies
employed by nations and national groups that pursued political
goals by a combination of political, military and other means
over the last thirty five years or so. This involves what would
be essentially a comparison between U.S. and friendly strategies
on the one hand and hostile strategies on the other. The pri-
mary purpose of a strategic memory is to provide a readily
accessible source of such strategic information to the National
Security Council for its guidance in applying strategy to cur-
rent and future situations that effect U.S. national security
interests.
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The relationship between a "strategic memory" and the
National Security Council should be perfectly clear. If stra-
tegies.have been in play in the world for extended periods of
time as we know it has, and we credit SUN TZU's admonition to
not only know ourself but know our enemy, which in its true
meaning is to infer we should know our own strategy and know
the hostile strategy as well, can there be any other more mean-
ingful kind of guidance that the National Security Council
could use? The answer should be self-evident.
Some assume the staff of the National Security Council
performed the role of a "strategic memory." Unfortunately,
this has not been the case. Members of the National Security
Council staff have been by custom appointed at the pleasure of
the President. But since the Eisenhower Administration, the
average term of a Presidential Administration has been slightly
over four years. This usually means that the maximum term of
service for Individual National Security Council staff members
had not exceeded that of the President in office. A recent
study by the Congressional Research Service indicates the aver-
age term of service for all officials at comparable levels in
the U.S. government has been only two and one-half years. It
therefore cannot be assumed that any individual or group of
individuals who have served on the National Security Council
staff have had time to develop and utilize a "strategic memory."
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What is the significance of a lack of a "strategic
memory" that provides an input directly into the National
Security Council? SUN TZU advised that one way to counter a
hostile strategy is to publicize it; that is, to make it
known to all. If a "strategic memory" is functioning properly,
any U.S. President is thus armed with strategic insights that
enable him to relate the essence of current hostile strategies
in a way that undermines their utility.
Some major events that have occurred over the last thirty-
five years in which the U.S. has had its interests at stake
can be illustrated by the "case history" method. The first two
cases are clear examples of U.S. loss. The third and current
one remains doubtful. All three are related in that strate-
gies hostile to U.S. interests were in play. All three are
related in that the hostile strategies were essentially a
variation of vintage SUN TZU strategy which was either not
clearly recognized or not acted upon by U.S. decision-makers
at the time.
CHINESE CIVIL WAR
This is a case of the U.S. supporting an existing govern-
ment in the face of a politically. oriented military rebellion.
The net effect was that the U.S. aided and supported the side
which ultimately lost in this particular competition. The
central question is: why this outcome?
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The Nationalist government, which the U.S. supported in
its own interests, had a large army equipped with ample U.S.
weapons, supplies, and advisors. It faced a numerically much
smaller band of rebels at least during the initial stages.
The rebel forces under the leadership of MAO TSE TUNG
conducted a protracted civil war against the Nationalist
government. Under that leadership, the rebels avoided action
with superior forces and engaged Nationalist forces unexpect-
edly at the Nationalists' weak points. MAO TSE TUNG retained
the initiative most of the time in the choice of when and where
to engage the opposition. He not only created conditions
which ultimately demoralized the Nationalist army, :but which
in the meantime won over the peasant population with strict
standards of behavior on the part of his forces coupled with
superior performance in the field. While this is only a
brief sketch of the way it enabled MAO TSE TUNG to prevail
over an initially superior opponent, it illustrated the util-
ity of applying SUN TZU's overall concepts to the China of
that day.
VIETNAM
The significance of the Chinese Civil War lies in the
fact that U.S. involvement in Vietnam where it again supported
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the side that would lose was almost a repeat performance. The
only difference was the direct involvement of U.S. military
forces.
Relative to SUN TZU's concepts, we did not know the
North Vietnamese or their allies, we did not know the South
Vietnamese, and we did not know ourselves. We did not under-
stand the nature of the conflict because we learned no lessons
from the Chinese Civil War. We did not fully understand the
North Vietnamese strategy of'inflicting casualties on American
troops as a way to create disharmony in the U.S. and to dis-
orient and discredit our leadership.
We did not seek to defeat the North Vietnamese strategy
because we didn't understand what it was. As a result, we
employed both military force and negotiations without suc-
cess. The North Vietnamese had faith in their strategy,
knowing that it had previously been successfully employed
against the French during the Indo-China War and later by others
against the French in Algeria. In effect, the North Vietnamese,
from their point of view, were looking at a long track record
of success and adapting its lessons which made them difficult
to deal with on our terms.
The U.S. disaster in Vietnam became a demonstration, not
only to the North Vietnamese that their strategy was a success,
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but to their principal ally who in all probability made future
global moves on the basis of it.
EL SALVADOR
The outcome of the civil war in El Salvador is not yet
a historical fact. The outcome depends on moves to be made
by each side in the future. Again, the U.S. in its own per-
ceived interests supports the existing government against an
insurgent group. The El Salvadoran government is currently
being supplied with U.S. economic aid and military equipment.
A plan for regional economic aid has been proposed to prevent
the spread of similar type conflicts to nearby nations.
The initial stage of the conflict in El Salvador began
in much the same fashion as in South Vietnam and merits atten-
tion for that reason. Both situations indicate the difficul-
ties which the U.S. will probably face in similar cases in the
future. If the U.S. viewed itself in a leadership role that
demanded acceptance of responsibility for situations like
Vietnam and El Salvador, its response in the initial stage of
El Salvador as in Vietnam can only be described as too late
with too little. This means our national decision-making appa-
ratus has not developed a process for bringing these kind of
situations. under control quickly enough to prevent unfavorable
escalation of the conflict. As used here, the national decision-
making process refers to the interactions between the Adminis-
tration and the Congress and the people.
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The term "too late with too little" applied to El Salvador
as the most recent case, refers to the fact that we in the U.S.
tend to underestimate and misperceive the severity of the
situation and react in a piecemeal fashion without a complete
picture of how the hostile strategy in operation works inter-
nally and externally. For that hostile strategy involves not
only creating a climate of sympathy in the world for the rebels,
it also involves impacting the U.S. decision-making process
and creating disharmony in the U.S. It is SUN TZU strategy
in action. The term "too late with too little" also refers to
the fact that the U.S. displays an inability to support a
nation under seige in a way that enables it to cope successfully
with the problem.
Bear in mind the fact that virtually no small country in
the Third World is immune from an assault by a band of highly
organized, disciplined and motivated rebels who have an oligar-
chially structured government as their target. Whatever that
government may justifiably be accused of and whatever its
merits, the rebel strategy is to conduct random terrorist acts
that provoke government reprisal as the way of enforcing a
perception of incompetence and corruption. As soon as the U.S.
moves to support the government, psychological guilt by associ-
ation comes into play and the U.S. also becomes a target.
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As the cloud of conflict in El Salvador enveloped the
U.S. Congress in the same way it did in Vietnam, the debate
over terms and conditions for U.S. aid begins. Some members
of Congress see the solution in military aid, others in social
and economic aid, and others in a combination of all of them.
It is important to note that this kind of debate centers
around dollar amounts that the Congress as a whole will agree
to. The debate on aid becomes another devisive issue. Al-
though the issue as a whole is a strategic one the actual
process for achieving U.S. goals remains unclear to most
members of Congress and is lost in the debate over money.
It should be noted that while each of the above three
"case histories" cover different conflicts, the fact of the
matter is that almost all have as a common thread the inter-
play of strategy.
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THE COMMAND CENTER CONCEPT
Regardless of how a nation of peoples select their lead-
ers, once chosen those leaders are looked upon by peoples of
other nations in terms of the moral authority and power they
command. The process for selecting leaders is an internal
matter. But relative to global strategic affairs, that por-
tion of a government that deals with the nation's external
affairs operates as a command center. In a world environment
characterized by change and conflict, this is the only real-
istic way to look at it.
Those governments that operate to induce change in the
world, and those governments that strive to resist change
come into conflict with each other in a variety of ways. What
develops from this conflict becomes a contest between command
centers which in its fundamental sense is a moral contest.
The contest is global in scope for the logic of the situation
drives each opposing command center to radiate its moral lead-
ership as a means of influencing the maximum number of the
world's peoples to be on its side, or at least not oppose it.
Each command center represents control over a finite geo-
graphic area and functions in accordance with a specific govern-
ing system and a specific system of beliefs and values. The
moral contest evolves from the attempt by each command center
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to proclaim its own systems as the best and to discredit
opposing command centers in the eyes of the world's peoples.
In this sense, world events which are created or manipulated
by either command center have as their object the eventual
degrading of the opposing command center's moral leadership.
Thus, world events which create division and confusion
in an opponent's command center tends to bestow increased
moral authority in the other. It is the nature of men to
react in this way. In the strategic sense, disharmony with-
in a command center makes the implementation of anything like
a global strategy rather difficult if not impossible. This
has a cumulative effect over the years, for once the opposing
command center's strategy is seen to be more effective, it be-
comes more prestigious and its moral authority is raised in
the eyes of the world's peoples which tends to enable its:
strategy to be more successfully executed in the future. Suc-
cess tends to breed success. Under this hypothesis, the
moral contest could be won by the command center which most
consistently exhibits the moral strength and resolution to
conduct a winning strategy.
The command center of the United States is both blessed
and cursed at the same time. The Founding Fathers wisely pro-
vided for the division of power into the Executive, Legisla-
tive and Judicial branches of the U.S. government to prevent
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its abuse. However, for strategic purposes the U.S. command
center consists of the Executive and Legislative branches
only. These branches must be considered as a whole since
realistically there is very little any U.S. Administration
can do of a substantive nature without the support of the
Congress. The Congress must provide the funds but it does
so by addressing itself to programs that support policies,
not primarily a clear and coherent global strategy.
Looking at the way the Executive branch has tradition-
ally done things in an environment in which global strategy
is not fully appreciated, international efforts are divided
into two major and sometimes contradicting administrative
categories: foreign policies and defense policies. Foreign
policies are commonly assumed to be reflected in the diplo-
matic functions of the Department of State while defense poli-
cies are reflected in the activity of the-Department of De-
fense. This self-perpetuating division into foreign and
defense policies at the Executive branch level is duplicated
in both Houses of the Congress by distinct foreign and defense
related committees. This somewhat arbitrary division of labor
makes it difficult for the Executive branch to achieve a co-
herent synthesis in these two areas, and worse, it tends to
allow the vital moral, psychological, social and economic
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factors that must be taken into account to fall by the way-
side or be relegated to secondary importance.
This is probably why many Americans, both inside and out-
side the government, seem to believe that the parts of.our
global efforts do not relate to any coherent whole. What
they hear from these two major departmental spokesmen are
mostly the result of differing perspectives. But foreign and
defense policies are not the only thing they have in mind.
Arms control, foreign aid, trade and other policies and pro-
grams that combine with foreign and defense matters to form
the sum total of our international efforts are involved.
We Americans tend to view things in terms of specific
issues that seem to come unexpectedly from over the horizon,
cause a flurry of dissention and confusion, and then disappear
after a time. We lack a strategic framework by which to pro-
perly evaluate these issues. Our elected representatives in
the Congress are much like ourselves in this respect. It is
why a bipartisan consensus on the more important aspects of
our foreign and defense policies has been difficult to main-
tain in the Congress. In the resulting climate of division and
confusion, diverse organized pressure groups use their influ-
ence as a fulcrum to leverage the nation's. policies toward
their direction and interests and ignore the overall interests
of the nation as a whole. It is the curse of. the U.S. command
center.
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THE STRATEGIC STRUCTURE CONCEPT
The National Security Council was established as the
apex of U.S. national security affairs by the National Secur-
ity Act of 1947, as amended. Note that the key word is
security, not strategy. It was envisioned as a sort of su-
preme defense council in which important foreign and defense
policies would be considered. It is headed by the President
and its regular members include the Vice-President and the
Secretaries of State and Defense. The same Act provides for
participation by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Tech-
nically, what is represented by those members is only diplomacy,
military force and intelligence. This is illustrated on
Chart A.
The two principal departments of the Executive branch
charged with the execution of most policies of an internation-
al nature are the Department of State and the Department of
Defense. The Department of State is generally recognized as
responsible for foreign policy execution while the Department
of Defense is responsible for defense policy. Funding for
the activities of.these two departments come under the pervue
of comparable committees in the Senate and House of the Congress.
This is illustrated on Chart B. The terms "foreign policy" and
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"defense policy" have been assigned to these separate admi-
nistrative departments by tradition, for strategy has had
no administrative significance heretofore.
If these traditional ways of looking at the national
security structure of the U.S. government are temporarily
set aside and we look at the same structure in strategic
terms, there tends to be some clarification in functions of
the Departments of State and Defense from the strategic point
ov view. Such a conception is illustrated on Chart C as a
way of indicating that structure follows strategy and not
vice versa. Inherent in this is the concept that policy
follows strategy. Terms like foreign policies and defense
policies would gradually become outmoded by strategic func-
tions as indicated. Thus, the Department of Defense would be
charged with the execution of military strategy and the Depart-
ment of State with negotiation strategy.
Referring to Chart C, there are as yet no departments of
the Executive branch that can be assigned functions of econo-
mic strategy or communications strategy nor are these two
function represented on the National Security Council. How-
ever, they are represented to some extent within the staff of
the National Security Council.
Chart D represents a concept for the eventual formation
of Committees on Strategic Affairs in both houses of the
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Congress as a way for the Congress to address the combined
effect of foreign and defense policies as a whole. Stra-
tegic thinking could be advanced in the process of attaining
agreement among the Members of the Congress on the need for
such committees.
Once established, these Committees on Strategic Affairs
could cause to be devised measures of U.S. strategic effec-
tiveness for their own use and serve much as envisioned by
the Bellmon Resolution and the Collins Report as reviewing
bodies. If not already done, these committees could, as
their initial action, hold hearings on the need for a revi-
sion of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended and
related acts and amendments.
These Committees on Strategic Affairs could serve as a
way for the Executive branch to present its broad strategic
concepts to the Congress and involve the Congress in stra-
tegic decision-making as part of the process for striving to
attain a bipartisan consensus on U.S. strategic matters,
whether short or long-term. Such Committees could also serve
as a natural focal point for those private citizens and orga-
nizations that wish to present strategic ideas and concepts
for consideration by the U.S. government.
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The underlying hypothesis is that a broader understand-
ing of strategic affairs as a guide to specific policies
should provide a framework by which the Congress can readily
make funding decisions for all U.S. international affairs in
a more meaningful way.
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THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MEMBERS
PRESIDENT
VICE PRESIDENT
SECRETARY OF STATE
SECTRETARY OF DEFENSE
ADVISORS
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
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CURRENT U.S. POLICY ORGANIZATION
('FOREIGN OPERATIONS
1 APPROPRIATIONS
\ SUBCOMMITTEES
DEFENSE
APPROPRIATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEES
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STRATEGIC FUNCTIONS CONCEPT
PRONOUNCEMENT
STRATEGY
(WHITE HOUSE)
NEGOTIATION
STRATEGY
(DEPT. OF STATE)
ECONOMIC
STRATEGY
GLOBAL
GEOPOLITICAL
STRATEGY
COMMUNICATIONS
STRATEGY
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ILITARY
(DEPT. OF DEFENSE
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SENATE %
ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE
SENATE
COMMITTEE
JOINT
STRATEGIC AFFAIRS
\ COMMITTEE* i
HOUSE
ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE /
HOUSE
COMMITTEE
/ SENATE
STRATEGIC AFFAIRS
\ COMMITTEE* -1.0-10
HOUSE
COMMITTEE*
*COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN OF:
ARMED SERVICES
FOREIGN RELATIONS
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A PRONOUNCEMENT STRATEGY CONCEPT
This concept involves the realization that the communi-
cation of ideas is an essential part of a nation's strategic
affairs. It is the only way to achieve a measure of stra-
tegic harmony or, in other words, a consensus in support of
a nation's global strategic actions. In reality, it is prob-
ably the most important sub-strategy of an overall strategy.
It is especially important under our system wherein the Ameri-
can electorate as a whole is the final arbiter.
The concept of a carefully crafted pronouncement stra-
tegy would have this consensus building as its goal. For
this purpose it should be considered basically as a truth
campaign.
A sound pronouncement strategy under this concept would
entail a description, from the strategic point of view, of
where we have been and why and what we need to do in the fu-
ture. A reiteration by the case history method as indicated
in the Strategic Memory Concept section herein is suggested
as an example of where we have been. The why would be slight-
ly more complicated. But it could be done by describing the
long-standing strategic challenge to the U.S. and its central
nature in a manner suggested by SUN TZU.
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SUN TZU suggested that a hostile strategy could be rend-
ered less effective by exposing it to common knowledge. While
this may not be easy to do, nevertheless most Americans admire
and respect those who speak the truth when.they hear it. This
strategic approach would require the outright acknowledgement
that a hostile global strategy has been in existence for some
time and it had been successfully employed to our great dis-
advantage. It would necessitate an accurate and precise in-
depth description of that strategy in all of its details. It
could become a significant media event if handled properly.
5/31/83
RVR
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SOME MEASURES OF U.S. STRATEGIC EFFECTIVENESS
Since strategy is a way of thinking directly related
to the attainment of goals, an important feature of
any U.S. strategic package should be a way to measure
progress toward those goals. While admittedly this
concept has not yet been perfected, it may be helpful
to suggest some measures that could be considered in
this respect.
1. The U.S. strategy appears to be successful in
the eyes of an expanding number of other peoples
in the world.
2. There is increasing support over time by the
American electorate for the ongoing U.S. stra-
tegy.
3. There is increasing sympathy over time by
governments of independent nations for the on-
going U.S. strategy.
4. There is increasingly favorable opinion of the
U.S. as a result of its strategy among the
peoples of the world.
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5. The allocation of national resources by the
government in support of U.S. strategic affairs
is either reduced over time or stabilized at a
level that can be sustained without a disruptive
effect on the U.S. economy.
6. The U.S. strategy has a clearly visible impact
that gradually renders hostile strategies ineffec-
tive, so that threats emanating from them are
reduced over time.
7. The U.S. strategy operates in a way that gradual-
ly reduces the probability of either a nuclear
or conventional war of attrition between the
U.S. and another major power.
8. The U.S. strategy is such that the actions of
those implementing the strategy and the percep-
tions of observers combine to induce a cummula-
tive effect that renders the strategy easier to
accomplish by heightening the willingness of
more people to participate in the process over
time.
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