WHITE HOUSE WATCH-ENDERS S END

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R002204260012-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 5, 2007
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: June 27, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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OIY PAGE. NEW REFJBLIC
--~----- 27 June 1983
WHITE HOUSE WATCH
ENDERS'S ENt
HE REPLACEMENT of Thomas Enders as: the State
Department's top policymaker for Latin America and
.of Deane Hinton as ambassador to El Salvador have been
,
g
e
o
portrayed as part of a move to "toughen" U.S. policy-on - pursue a high-tension policy against] atin American Coin-
Central America, as a power grab by the White House' munists, and he selected Enders to help carrv out his aims
national security adviser, William Clark, at the expense of , even though Enders had no prior Latin experience. (He
Secretary of State George 'Shultz; ;and as a triumph of--has since become fluent in Spanish? no mean feat wnile
Thardliners-such. as- U.N.: Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick': w,,,orking sixteen-hour days as a policy manager.) Haig
and CIA Director William Casey over "soft" forei
c originally wanted a direct confrontation with Cuba, the
e
service careerists. Actually the situation is both simpler- "source" of trouble in Central America, but the Adminis
than all that and more complex. Personality differences
played a big part in Enders's sacking. Hinton was not
sacked at all. The personnel changes were not the result of
a change in overall policy toward Central America, but of a
determination by Clark that policy was not being effective-
ly implemented. Clark has not executed .a Kissinger-style.
power play, though; on the contrary, Enders was ousted
as part of a plan to shift operational control of Central
America policy from the White House back to State. And
at State, the new Assistant Secretary for Latin America,
Langhorne Motley, and the new ambassador in San Salva-
dor, Thomas Pickering, are not noticeably harder-line on
police' than Enders and Hinton were. State's original
choice for the ambassador's job, John Ne.groponte; a ca-
reer diplomat who is currently ambassador to Honduras,
actually was rejected by the -White House as having too
hardline a reputation in Congress.
N EVERTHELESS, the Administration's policy is in-
exorably becoming "tougher" as the military situa-
bon in El Salvador deteriorates and that in Nicaragua im-
proves. At least in the short run, the new personnel
changes will . do-nothing to alter the general drift toward
.it back. Clark's fellow hardliners, including Kirkpatrick,
had lost:some major policy fights to Enders, but in the end
they won his scalp, and that enhances their influence. One
of these days -,after the 1984 election, if it can be put off
until then-there may be a decisive struggle over Central
America within the Administration, probably over wheth-
er or not to send U.S. combat troops or large numbers of
advisers to the region-to win it or stay out. At the mo-
ment, it's likely. that debate will continue over how best to
win while staving out and how best to handle domestic
opponents of Administration policy-by conciliation and
persuasion or by threat and. confrontation.
Thomas Enders's friends in the State Department and
enemies among Democrats on Capitol Hill find it laugh-
able that he should be cast now as some kind of dove. Ten
years ago, as No. 2 man in the U.S. embassy in Phnom
Penh, Enders selected targets for secret U.S. bombing
raids in Cambodia, earning the respectful notice of Alex?
ande_r Haig, then chief of staff to President Nixon. As
Ronald Reagan's first Secretary of State
Hai
intend
d t
tration instead chose quieter options. covert aid to anti-
government guerrillas in Nicaragua ,and stepped-up mili-
terry aid. to the government of 1-:1 Salvador. Enders
supported both-and also backed a process of negotiation
with leftists and pressure for human rights Teform in II-
Sahvador to an extent that aroused suspicion among the
Administration's hardest liners.
Enders's personal and management style did not en-
dear him to his adversaries. He is an imperious, icy man
who at six foot-eight acts as though he is used -to looking
down at other people. One State Department official said,
"If Enders had done the same things he did, but had the
personality of George Shultz, he'd still be here. The Rea-
ganites like to sit around comfortably and talk about
things. You can't do that with Enders present." Enders
also is described as "extremely turf conscious," unwilling
or unable to delegate authority, and disrespectful of other
people's prerogatives. "The White House felt that Enders,
not Shultz, was running Latin American policy," one aide.
said. "Enders really didn't report to anvbodv."Il!Jheh
_ Ci:A Director Casey wanted State to release new data bn
Communist supply lines to El Salvador; .Enders sat on the_
-'information"-. and '-deprecated rt?_as - "warmed-over left-'
military solutions. Clark, instinctively hardline, has not ` overs" He got it into his head tharSpanish Prime Minister
stolen power, but he has demonstrated that he has it. 'Felitse~Gonzales could be brought into Central America
Shur, more of a moderate, has vet to show that he can get diplomacy and flew off to see him without consulting
anyone, leading the White House to decree that hence-
forth no one travels without permission-
From the standpoint.of Enders's friends at State and
-elsewhere, the issues over which he was ousted transcend
style and concern methods of implementing polity. They
say he wanted to conduct it as quietly as possible, so as not
to arouse public and congressional opposition, whereas
others,-: including Ambassador Kirkpatrick, wanted to
crystallize: issues and confront and defeat the opposition.
,
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They say that Enders wanted the United States to maintain
a negotiating "track" in order to mollify domestic and
foreign critics of American policy and to put the onus for
refusing to talk on the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the
leftist opposition in El Salvador.
I N EARLY FEBRUARY Enders wrote a memo recom-
mending a "two-track" policy of military aid and nego-
tiation, an account of which was leaked by Enders's en-
ernies in the White House to 7 -he Washington Post with the
allegation that Enders favored talks that would lead to a
coalition government ("power sharing") between right
and left. in El Salvador. Power-sharing negotiations, fa-
vored by many liberals as a means to stop the killing, are
regarded in the Administration as a formula for eventual
Communist takeover. Enders's allies deny he favored any
such thing and that his February memo explicitly favored
negotiations only concerning the terms for participation in
forthcoming Salvadoran elections. One other official,
however, says that the exact nature of the negotiations
were left vague, "which is very strange for someone who
has made his reputation as a crisp memo writer."
about a new assignment--not. reportedly, the one he got
as ambassador to Spain-but Clark told him his departure
would be asked for when it was desired.
CORDING to N.S.C_ officials, at no time was Clark
ti. usurping the prerogatives of Shultz as Secretary of
State, even though Shultz reportedly is "frustrated" at
Clark's interventions in his department. N.S.C. officials,
say that, unlike Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski
before him-and to the displeasure of some members of
his staff-Clark has resolutely refused to have his subordi-
nates chair interagency committees, leaving that function
to representatives of regular departments of government. .
Clark is said to respect fully the delineations of authority.
spelled out in N.S.C. decision directives allotting oper-
ational responsibility over foreign policy to State. But
when Enders was late getting things done, when Clark
found that too many meetings had to be conducted in the
White House., and when things didn't improve either on
the battlefield in Central America or in American public
opinion; aides say Clark was forced to step in.
Some of Enders's foes were prepared to believe the policy to the public, the press, Congress, and world opin=
worst about Enders's intentions, contending that career ion--4s an especially troublesome item for the Administra-
foreign service officers as a breed are trained to "yield lion. Clark, for one, had hoped that when Pope John Paul
firmly" even when vital U.S. interests are involved. Some visited El Salvador in early March and when;the-Salva-
of Enders's friends suspect Kirkpatrick and others of pur-
suing dark hidden agendas, too. One of them said, "Some
people want an elegant defeat that can be blamed. on post-
Vietnam attitudes and constraints by Congress," leading
perhaps to a "who lost Central America" campaign.
From.the National Security Council perspective, the is-
sues leading to Enders's replacement are described not as
ideological or tactical, but managerial. William Clark did
not like what he was seeing in cables from Central Amer-
ica and in what he was forced to include in the President's
daily briefing. Beginning last fall, one official said, "It
appeared that the government of El Salvador was not
winning on the battlefield." Clark ordered an "intense
review" conducted through several channels, including a
so-called "core group," chaired by Enders and made up of
officials from several agencies. The President himself be-
came increasingly involved personally, especially after his.
trip to Latin America in December gave him an opportuni-
tv to sit in little rooms with presidents and generals and
discuss chopper parts and the security situation and get a
real feel for the situation on the ground."
In January and February Clark brought Ambassador
James Theberge up to Washington from his post in Chile
to review the Central America situation. Clark sent Kirk-
patrick on a fact-finding tour of Central America. Clark
also had former Florida Senator Richard Stone hired as a
State Deparrmerrt consultant for congressional relations
and public diplomacy. And about the same time,. Enders's
memo was leaked. Enders approached Clark and asked
doran government announced a speed-up in holding elec-
tions this year, Congress would somehow be inspired to
vote the. additional military aid- that the president had
requested. This didn't happen, and it was decided that.the
President should address a joint session of Congress to
request the money. At the same time, Clark decided that
Enders had to go. In the process of debating what should
.be in Reagan's April 27 speech. Kirkpatrick urged a "Mar-
shallPlan"-a large economic and humanitarian aid pack-
age for the region. Enders opposed it on grounds that
Congress would never approve the money. Enders won
the point, but fueled Kirk-Patrick's hostility.
One should not weep too long over Tom Enders. Spain
is a choice post--a pleasant-place to live and increasingly
important as a forthcoming member of NATO and the Eu-
ropean Common Market. Getting fared after a policy dis-
pute with hardliners probably has cleansed Enders's repu-
tation of its Cambodia bombing stain, and when
Democrats or moderate Republicans come back to power,
he might even be on the short list for the highest-ranking
career post in the State Department, the undersecretarv-
ship for political affairs currently held by Lawrence Eagle-
burger. In watercooler handicapping around the State De-
partment, Enders has three principal rivals for that post-
Ambassador to Israel Sam Lewis, former Ambassador to
Venezuela William Luers, and,former Ambassador to Ni-
geria Thomas Pickering. Luers had -wanted Spain, but
Enders got it instead, and Pickering is headed off to El
Salvador, a dangerous place to both persons and careers.
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According to both State Department and White House
officials, Enders's replacement by Langhorne Motley was
designed to restore operational control over Central
America policy back to State. Motley, an Alaska Republi-
can who grew up in Brazil and had been Reagan's ambas-
sador there, is regarded as an effective diplomat and politi--
cal operator and was supported for the Enders job by both
Clark and Shultz. During the time it takes Motley to staff
up the Latin America bureau-Enders, doing most of the
bureau's work himself, was short of deputies-Eagle-
burger is to oversee Latin policy for Shultz.
The replacement of Deane Hinton as ambassador to El
Salvador this summer had been slated for months. Hinton
once ran afoul of the White House for openly attacking
human rights abuses in El Salvador, but. he is generally
regarded as having performed courageous service under
enormous pressure. Because State wanted Negroponte to
replace Hinton, Shultz reportedly recommended a "daisy
chain" of diplomatic changes in Central America to the
White House, including also the ambassadors to Costa
Rica and Guatemala, who also were due for rotation..The
White House vetoed Negroponte because it feared his
confirmation hearings would turn into "a circus." Negro-
ponte often is accused of masterminding the U.S. "secret
war" against Nicaragua from his embassy in Honduras.
THE ENDERS STORY was about to leak, so Shultz
announced it aboard Air Force One on the way to the
Williamsburg summit. Then. Hinton's departure:- was
leaked along with- the misinformation that he would be
replaced by a retired admiral, Gerald Thomas, currently
ambassador to Guyana-.Days before, actually, Thomas
had been contacted about a'
new post -and said that he
would do as the President asked, but preferred Kenya to
7E1 Salvador. Because of all the -leaks and because some
unidentified White House ignoramus maligned the entire
foreign service in a crack to The Washington Pcst that "you
don't handle Central American policies with tea and crum-
pets on the diplomatic circuit," it was decided to hold up
on announcement of other embassy replacements.
N.S.C. aides like to represent Clark as. mainly a loyal
servant of Ronald Reagan, but others in the Administra-
tion say he has acquired views of his own. One State
Department official points out that Clark's wife is a refu-
gee from Czechoslovakia and that his attitudes toward
communism reflects hers. "Clark and Reagan have similar
views, not backed by much information," one Adminis-
tration official said. 'Deane Kirkpatrick adds information
and they all reach the same conclusion: that a Soviet-
backed, Cuban-assisted effort is underway to overthrow
the governments of Central America, and that because of
the history of the region, the poverty and injustice, there is
a great opportunity for this. They think it is central to U.S.
interests that this not happen and they are not going to let
it happen."
How far will the United States go? The Reagan Adaeinis-
tration's formal policy-and obvious hope-is that large
numbers of U.S. advisers or combat troops will not be.
necessary. Scenarios are being discussed at lower levels,
though, .under which one?or the