WHITE HOUSE WATCH-ENDERS S END

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R002204260007-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 5, 2007
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: June 27, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2007/12/05: CIA-RDP85M00364R002204260007-2
They sav that Enders wanted the United States to maintain
a negotiating "track" in order to mollify domestic and
foreign critics of American policy and to put the onus for
refusing to talk on the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the
leftist opposition in J Salvador.
I N EARLY FEBRUARY Enders wrote a memo recom-
mending a "two-track" policy of military aid and nego-
tiation, an account of which was leaked by Enders's en-
emies in the White House to The Washington Post with the
allegation that Enders favored talks that would lead to a
coalition government ("power sharing") between right
and left in El Salvador. Power-sharing negotiations, fa-
vored by many liberals as a means to stop the killing, are
regarded in the Administration as a formula for eventual
Communist takeover. Enders's allies deny he favored any
such thing-and that his February memo explicitly favored
negotiations only concerning the terms for participation in
forthcoming Salvadoran elections. One other official,
however, says that the exact nature of the negotiations.
were left vague, "which is very strange for someone who
has made his reputation as a crisp memo writer."
Some of Enders's foes were prepared to believe the
worst about Enders's intentions, contending that career
foreign service officers as a breed are trained to "yield
firmly" even when vital U.S. interests are involved. Some
of Enders's friends suspect Kirkpatrick and others of pur-
suing dark hidden agendas, too. One of them said, "Some
people want an elegant defeat that can be blamed on post-
Vietnam attitudes and constraints by Congress," leading
perhaps to a "who lost Central America" campaign.
From. the National Security Council perspective, the is-
sues leading to Enders's replacement are described not as
-ideological or tactical, but managerial. William Clark did
not like what he was seeing in cables from Central Amer-
ica and in what he was forced to include in the President's
daih' briefing. Beginning last fall, one official said, "It
appeared that the government of El Salvador was not
winning on the battlefield." Clark ordered an "intense
review" conducted through several channels, including a
so-called "core group," chaired by Enders and made up of
officials from several agencies. The President himself be-
came increasingly involved personally, especially after his.
trip to Latin America in December gave him an opportuni-
tv to sit in little rooms with presidents and generals and
discuss chopper parts and the security situation and get a
real feel for the situation on the ground."
In January and February Clark brought Ambassador
James Theberge up to Washington from his post in Chile
to review the Central America situation. Clark sent Kirk-
patrick on a fact-finding tour of Central America. Clark
also had former Florida Senator Richard Stone hired as a
State Department consultant for congressional relations
and public diplomacy. And about the same time, Enders's
memo was leaked. Enders approached Clark and asked
about a new assignment not. reportedly, the one he got
as ambassador to Spain-but Clark told him his departure
would be asked for when it was desired.
rCCORDING to N.S.C. officials, at no time was Clark
I. usurping the prerogatives of Shultz as Secretary of
State, even though. Shultz reportedly is "frustrated" at
Clark's interventions in his department. N.S.C. officials
say that, unlike Henry Kissinger and Tbigriiew Brzezinski
before him-and to the displeasure of some members of
his staff-Clark has resolutely refused, to have his subordi.
nates chair interagency committees, leaving that function
to representatives of regular departments of government.
Clark is said to respect fully the delineations of authority
spelled out in N.S.C. decision directives allotting oper-
ational responsibility over foreign policy to State. But
when Enders was late getting things done, when Clark
found that too many meetings had to be conducted in the
White House, and when things didni t improve either on
the battlefield in Central America or in American public
opinion; aides say Clark was forced -to step in.
"Public diplomacy" that is, the selling of American
policy to the public, the press, Congress, and world opin-
ion-is an especially troublesome item for the Administra-
tion. Clark, for one, had hoped that when Pope John Paul
visited El Salvador in early March and whenthe-5alva
doran government announced a speedup in holding elec-
tions this year, Congress would somehow be inspired to
vote the additional military aid- that the President had
requested. This didn't happen, and it was decided that the
President should address a joint session of Congress to
request the money. At the same time, Clark decided that
Enders had to go. In the process of debating what should
be in Reagan's April 27 speech. Kirkpatrick urged a "Mar-
shall Plan" -a large economic and humanitarian aid pack-
age for the region. Enders opposed it on grounds that.
Congress would never approve the money. Enders won
the point, but fueled Kirkpatrick's hostility.
One should not weep too long over Torn Enders. Spain
is a choice post-a pleasant place to Eve and increasingly
important as a forthcoming member of NATO and the Eu-
ropean Common Market. Getting fired after a policy dis-
pute with hardliners probably has cleansed Enders's repu-
tation of its Cambodia bombing stain, and when
Democrats or moderate Republicans come back to power,
he might even be on the short list for the highest-ranking
career post in the State Department,. the undersecretarv-
ship for political affairs currently held by Lawrence Eagle-
burger. In watercooler handicapping around the State De-
partment, Enders has three principal rivals for that post-
Ambassador to Israel Sam Lewis, former Ambassador to
Venezuela William Luers, and former Ambassador to Ni-
geria Thomas Pickering. Luers had 'wanted Spain, but
Enders got it instead, and Pickering is headed off to El
Salvador,'a dangerous place to both persons and careers.
Approved For Release 2007/12/05: CIA-RDP85M00364R002204260007-2
 Approved For Release 2007/12/05: CIA-RDP85M00364R002204260007-2
According to both State Department and White House
officials, Enders's replacement by Langhorne Motley was
designed to restore operational control over Central
America policy back to State. Motley, an Alaska Republi-
can who grew up in Brazil and had been Reagan's ambas-
sador there, is regarded as an effective diplomat and politic
cal operator and was supported for the Enders job by both
Cary, and Shultz. During the time it takes Motley to staff
up the Latin America bureau--Enders, doing most of the
bureau's work himself, was short of deputies-Eagle-
burger is to oversee Latin policy for Shultz.
The replacement of Deane Hinton as ambassador to El
Salvador this summer had been slated for months. Hinton
once ran afoul of the White House for openly attacking
human rights abuses in El Salvador, but he is generally
regarded as having performed courageous service under
enormous pressure. Because State wanted Negroponte to
replace Hinton, Shultz reportedly recommended a "daisy
chain" of diplomatic changes in Central America to the
White House, including also the ambassadors to Costa
Rica and Guatemala, who also were due for rotation. The
White House vetoed Negroponte because it feared- his
confirmation hearings would turn into "a circus." Negro-
ponte often is accused of masterminding the U.S. "secret
war" against Nicaragua from his embassy in Honduras.
T HE ENDERS STORY was about to leak, so Shultz
announced it aboard Air Force One on the way to the
Williamsburg summit:. Then Hinton's departure- was
leaked along with-the misinformation that he would be
replaced by a retired admiral, Gerald Thomas, currently
ambassador to Guvana_.Days before, actually, Thomas
had been contacted about a new post and said that he
would do as the President asked, but preferred Kenya to
-M Salvador. Because of all the-leaks and because some
unidentified White House ignoramus maligned the entire
foreign service in a crack to The Washington Post that "you
don't handle Central American policies with tea and cum-
pets on the diplomatic circuit," it was decided to hold up
on announcement of other embassy replacements.
N.S.C. aides like to represent Clark as mainly a loyal
servant of Ronald Reagan, but others in the Administra-
tion say he has acquired views of his own. One State
Department official points out that Clark's wife is a refu-
gee from Czechoslovakia and that his attitudes toward
communism reflects hers. "Clark and Reagan have similar
views, not backed by much information," one Adminis-
tration official said. 'Deane Kirkpatrick adds information
and they all reach the same conclusion': that a Soviet-
backed, Cuban-assisted effort is underway to overthrow
the governments of Central America, and that because of
the history of the region, the poverty and injustice, there is.
a great opportunity for this. They think it is central to U.S.
interests that this not happen and they are not going to let
it happen."
How far will the United States go? The Reagan Adminis-
tration's formal policy-and obvious hopes that large
numbers -of U.S. advisers or combat troops will not be'
necessary. Scenarios are being discussed at lower levels,
though, under which one-oreheother -ignt-be needed-
Oneisanin,n,;r+entcollapsein ElSalvador. The.otherisan
imminent victory by anti-Sandinista rebels in Nicaragua
which Cuban troops-were-called in to prevent. The United
States-could counter-such:a znovelbyair-sea blockadeas
well as insertion of troops.
it is impossible to know for sure