LETTER TO WILLIAM CASEY FROM BARRY GOLDWATER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R001703340029-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 25, 2008
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: January 25, 1983
• Content Type: LETTER

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~ ARIZONA
'Wnifeb .`.ifafez Snnafe
The Honorable William Casey
Director of Central Intelligence Agency
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
COMMITTEES
INTELLIGENCE, CHAIRMAN
ARMED SERVICES
TACTICAL WARFARE. CHAIRMAN
PR EPAR EON ESS
STRATEGIC AND THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES
COMMERCE. SCIENCE. AND TRANSPORTATION
COMMUNICATIONS. CHAIRMAN
AVIATION
SCIENCE. TECHNOLOGY. AND SPACE
The excellent article written by Mr. Taubman, of the New York Times on
January 16th has just reached my desk here in Arizona, and I've read it
with great interest. I think they have done you a very good job. I
think you deserve it, and I look forward to working with you in the
coming years as you continue the directorship of our Intelligence Community.
I understand you and I are going to sit next to each other at the Caraboa
Wallow, so we'll have a chance to chat during that dinner.
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~~
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ARTICLE APPEAR0
all PAGE 14-P 0
THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE
16 January 1983
CAnd His
cot
Oiith(
The Director is
presiding over the,
biggest peacetime
. buildup in the.
intelligence.
community in 30,
. agency faces
continuing .
questions from
critics about its .
intentions, integrity
and capabilities.
iWam J. Casey, the Director
of Central Intelligence, sat at
the end of the mahogany con-
ference table in his. office.
Outside, the late afternoon
sun played across the trees
that ring the Central Intelli-
gence Agency's headquarters
in northern Virginia, filling the windows-.with a
fresco of autumn colors. A short stack -ot docu .
meats, some stamped SECRET, rested'' at Mr.
Casey's left elbow, and a yellow legal pad on which
he had penciled several notes was positioned to his
right.
"'The reason I am here is because I have a lot of
relevant experience and a good track record," Mr.
Casey said, alluding to comments that he was un-
qualified for the job. and had been appointed only
because he was Ronald Reagan's campaign man-
ager. Mr. Casey, an imperious and proud man, had
been fuming over the criticism for months, accord.
ing to his friends, and now, in his first comprehen-
sive interview since taking office, he wanted to set
the record straight... .
He flipped through the papers and extracted a
yellowing clipping from The New York Times that
extolled his record as chairman of the Securities
and Exchange Commission from 1971 to 1973. Next,
he provided several pages copied from a book about
Allied intelligence operations during World War II;
he had underlined a glowing assessment of his con-
tribution to the Office of Strategic Services.. The
final clipping was a story that appeared in The
Washington Star in the summer of 1980, describing
Mr. Casey's role as Reagan campaign director.
The headline: "Casey, the Take-Charge Boss.
It was an oddly defensive performance for a man
who, according to classified budget figures pro-
vided by Government officials, is overseeing the
biggest peacetime buildup in the American intelli-
gence community since the early 1950's. Because
intelligence expenditures are secret, it is not widely
known that at a moment when the.Reagan Admin..
istration is forcing most Government agencies to
retrench, the C.I.A. and its fellowintelligence-or-
ganizations are enjoying boom times. Even. the
military services, which have been' favored with
substantial budget increases, lag well behind in.
terms of percentage growth, although military-run
intelligence agencies,-are growing almost as
quickly as the C.I.A. Spending figures for.inteW-. .
gence agencies, including the C.I.A., are hidden
within the Defense Department's budget: With a
budget increase for the 1983 fiscal year of 25 per-
cent, not allowing for inflation, compared with 18
percent for the Defense Department, the C.I.A. is
the fastest growing major agency in the Federal
Government, according to Administration budget i
officials. n
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On its own terms, the C.I.A. is indisputably on the
rebound. The staff has increased and morale has
improved. A quarter of a million Americans, many
of whom saw the C.I.A.'s sophisticated ("We May
Have a Career for You") recruiting ads in newspa-
pers and magazines, got in touch with the agency
about jobs last year. Ten thousand, most in their
late 20's with college degrees and experience in
fields that involve foreign affairs, submitted for-
mal applications and 1,500 were hired. The C.I.A.'s
work force, another figure the agency has kept se-
cret, now tops 16,000, according to intelligence offi. I
cials, and is growing.
An increased number of intelligence estimates
and analytical reports are flowing to policy
makers, and they appear to be better timed to coin-
cide with policy debates. Overseas operations have
expanded, including covert actions intended to in-
fluence events in other countries, and President
Reagan has given the agency authority to conduct
operations in the United States. As part of a con-
certed effort to enlarge its focus of interest beyond
the Soviet Union and other traditional intelligence
targets, the agency is devoting new resources to the
study of issues long neglected or ignored, including
economic and social developments in specific re-
gions around the world.
But the C.I.A. is trying to overcome a legacy of
troubles and combat a corrosive undercurrent of
doubt about its intentions, integrity and capabil-
ities. Just as Mr. Casey has found it hard to shake
his image as a high-rolling financier and political
operative miscast as the head of a sensitive, nonpo-
litical agency, the C.I.A. has found it difficult to
shed the reputation it gained in the mid-1970's as a'
rogue agency guilty of swashbuckling abuses of
power.
Some developments during the last two years
have not helped. Although the agency maintains
that its covert operations have limited objectives
and are carefully controlled, some American and
Honduran national security officials say that the
activities in Central America amount to a secret
campaign to overthrow the leftist Government in
Nicaragua, an objective that goes beyond plans ap-
proved by the White House and clashes with the de-
clared policy of the Government. Secretary of State
George P. Shultz and other top officials have said
that the United States hopes to resolve regional
problems through negotiations.
Many career State Department officials believe
that Mr. Casey and company, eager to support
some of the Administration's tough rhetoric about
the Russians, have twisted intelligence estimates
to accommodate policy positions. The new author-
ity to conduct domestic covert operations, though
presented by the Administration as no threat to
civil liberties, opens the door to intrusive intelli-
gence activities in the United States.
To dispel some of the distrust, and to display
what they view as important accomplishments,
Mr. Casey and his aides have launched something
of a public-relations offensive in recent months.
Journalists, who were turned away during the first.
18 months of the Reagan Administration, have been
granted access to Mr. Casey and some senior offi.
cials. He gave his first extended interview to The
Times for this article. Mr. Casey, with one excep.
tion, declined to discuss personnel or budget mat:
While it has been popular to attribute the C.I.A.'s
problems to the hostility produced in the mid-1970's
by disclosures of past abuses, and the internal up
heavals that followed, the C.I.A. was headed down-
hill long before the first stories were published
about assassination plots and domestic spying ac-
tivities.
Following a period of rapid and sustained growth
in the 1950's that was tied to the tensions of the cold
war, the C.I.A. began to feel budget pressures in
the mid-1960's as Johnson Administration officials
turned a critical eye on the cost effectiveness of
agency spending. At the same time, the demands of
United States involvement in Southeast Asia acted
as a centrifugal force on agency resources, pulling_i
more and more of the agency's budget and work'
force into secret military and intelligence opera.
tions in Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia.
Meanwhile, vast sums of money were invested in
the technology of intelligence, including photo-
reconnaissance satellites, communications-inter-
cept stations, computers and other hardware. As a.
result, the human Intelligence-gathering system
was allowed to decay. Finally, there were the reve-
lations about dirty tricks, assassination plots, drug
experimentation with unwitting human subjects,
surveillance of American citizens and the long
string of other abuses.
The cutbacks were greater than generally recog-
nized. During the 1970's, according to Mr. Casey,
there was a 40 percent reduction in funding for in-
teiligence agencies and a 50 percent cut in the work
force. In covert operations, where some of the
worst abuses had occurred, the contraction was
startling. Classified figures made available by for-
mer intelligence officials show that the number of
agents and staff devoted to these activities, which
primarily involve paramilitary and political-action
efforts to influence events abroad, dropped from.
more than 2,000 in the mid-1960's to less than 200 by
the end of the Carter Administration. -
The numbers alone, though dramatic, do not cap-
ture the turmoil and skidding morale that accom-
panied the C.I.A.'s declining fortunes. The image of
the C.I.A. as an elite service, cultivated by the
agency for decades and embraced by its employ-
ees, eroded. Hundreds of veteran analysts and
agents retired early. Directors were hired and fired
like baseball managers, with five different men
heading the agency between 1973 and 1977. In addi-
tion, almost an entire generation of college stu-
dents, disillusioned by the Vietnam War and the
behavior of the C.I.A., considered employment at
the agency a stigma, depriving it of fresh talent
and energy.
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 Stansfield Turner, the Director of Central Intelli.
gence in the Carter Administration, aggravated the
morale problem whey he ordered a massive house-
' cleaning in 1977 and 1978. Mr. Turner, claiming re-
ports about the changes were exaggerated, says he
reduced the staff by 820 positions, but actually fired
only 17 people. He says the rest were removed
through attrition and that morale improved as a re-
sult. The upheaval may have been a necessary
though painful way of laying the groundwork for a
revitalized C.I.A., but the impact of all this on the
agency's operations was tangible. In the all-impor-
tant area of analysis, the point at which trends and
insights are pulled out of the mountains of raw in-
telligence information and translated into reports
for policy makers, productivity slipped sharply.
National estimates, the intelligence community's
final word on important international issues,
dropped from an annual average of 51 in the late
1960's to 12 a year in the late 1970's. Mr. Turner in-
sists that the slippage was intentional. "I don't
think that national estimates are a very efficient
way of preparing finished intelligence," he said.
"We did other kinds of estimates." -
oon after moving into the director's ele-
gant but unostentatious seventh-floor of-
fice at the C.I.A. complex in Langley,
Mr. Casey made his agenda clear: more
money, more manpower and more ag-
gressiveness. With the help of Adm.
Bobby R. Inman, Mr. Casey's top deputy
until last June and a veteran of the
budget wars, the new Director quickly got White
House and Congressional approval for large spend-
ing increases, pushing the agency's budget toward
$1.5 billion. The current total exceeds that sum, ac-
cording to Congressional sources. Long-range plan-
ning calls for the C.I.A. to receive large annual in-
creases through the 1980's.
With more money guaranteed. Mr. Casey turned
his attention to the agency's actual operations.
"There's an image of Bill Casey as a tired, dodder-
ing, old man who's primarily interested in spying
on American citizens," Admiral Inman told a
group of retired agents earlier this year. "The
image could not be further from the dynamo that I
worked with..' -
Mr. Casey, who is 69, is described by friends as
being a "voracious reader" and an amateur histo-
rian. He has written several books about the Ameri-
can Revolution. His office desk is cluttered with
stacks of recent volumes, and aides report that he
often startles intelligence analysts by citing infor-
mation from obscure books that they have not read.
For physical relaxation, Mr. Casey plays golf. He
blames improper footwear for a golfing accident
two summers ago that left him with a broken leg
and a badly bruised
'- - - ---
3.
ego. Mr. Casey and his wife of While Mr. Casey has un-
40 years, Sophia, have a deniably gotten the C.I.A.
daughter, Bernadette, who is moving, there is some ques-,
an actress. tion whether all the motion
Mr. Casey has not run the has been positive. From the
C.I.A. by trying to forge a moment he was appointed,
consensus about goals. Nor I there have been questions
has he cared much for the whether he is the right man to
trappings of leadership, such rebuild the C.I.A. A lawyer by
as ribbon cuttings, pep talks training, and a venture capi-
to the staff and public pro- talist by inclination, Mr.
nouncements. He prefers to
exercise authority directly,
succinctly and gruffly. Ac-
cording .to aides, Mr. Casey
addresses problems by con-
suiting individually with
close associates in the C.I.A.
and a handful of outside
friends, including Leonard H.
Marks, a Washington lawyer
and former, head of the
United States Information
Agency; Charles Z. Wick, the
current head of the U.S.I.A.;
Maurice R. Greenberg, presi-
dent of the American Intetana-
tional Group Inc., a New
York financial-services com-
pany, and Senator Paul Lax.
alt. the Nevada Republican
who is also a close friend of
President Reagan.
Mr. Casey, according to
aides, seeks the advice of old
friends because he feels that
Casey is a self-made million-
aire from New York who
served during the Nixon and
Ford Administrations as
Chairman of the S.E.C., I
Under Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs and head of
the Export-Import Bank. He
received . his initiation in I
spying during World War II,
when he directed Allied espio-
nage operations behind Ger-
man lines. Later, while pray
ticing law in Manhattan, he
served as a member of Presi-
dent Ford's advisory
board
on intelligence.
But Mr. Casey is also the
first Presidential campaign
director appointed to run the
C.I.A. By picking him, Mr.
Reagan, by design or not,
seemed to suggest that the di-
rectorship of Central Intelli-
gence was just one more pa-
intelligence specialists often tronage plum. (The Director
take too narrow a view of the has the dual job of overseeing
world. "He isn't dazzled by the Government's foreign in-
the idea that people need all telligenceestablishment, in-
kinds of expertise to under- cluding the National Security '
stand the political dynamics Agency and the Defense in-
of a foreign country," an aide telligence Agency, while also
explained. "Casey believes acting as head of the C.I.A.).
that too many agents get The appointment immedi-
caught up in the craft of gath- ately generated fears that the
ering intelligence and lose C.I.A. would be used to jus-
sight of the big picture." tify and support the Adminis.
Mr. Casey makes decisions tration's foreign policies
quickly - even his, critics rather than serve as a source
concede that he has a sharp,
penetrating mind-and most
often relays them to the staff
in terse instructions he dic-
tates early in the morning. On
more than one occasion,- a
whole day's schedule has
been disrupted when Mr.
Casey, dissatisfied with an in-
telligence estimate, canceled
his appointments and
produced a shower of stinging
instructions to his aides. His
temper and patience are no-
toriously short and his gruff,
no-nonsense style often
lapses into plain rudeness
that is a public-relations
man's nightmare.
Mr. Casey, undeniably, is a -
political animal. In 1966, he
ran unsuccessfully for the Re-
publican nomination . for Con-
gress in Nassau County on
Long Island. Though dropping
.out of front-line campaigning
after the loss, he remained
very active as a Republican
Party fund-raiser and behind-
the-scenes broker.
Professional intelligence of- j
ficials fear nothing more than I
contamination by political in-
terests. According to Admiral
Inman, who was director of the
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National Security Agency
from 1977 to 1981, the key is
finding a balance between as
cess to policy makers and ac-
commodation to policy. "If
you're completely discon-
nected from the policy process,
you're likely to produce intelli-
gence estimates that are ir-
relevant," he said in an inter-
view. "But you have to breed
and train your people to be ex-
tremely independent so that
they don't let the demands of
developing and . defending the interview. "We set up a
policy influence their judg- fast-track system. Rather than
ments ? a lot of pulling and hauling and
Mr. Casey's record on this Papering over of differences
crucial issue is mixed. ' The between agencies, we want to
great majority of intelligence highlight differences and give
reports ' produced during the. Policy makers a, range of
last two years have been neu.. views."
tral and untainted by ideolog-' Historically,' the perform-
ical-prejudices, according to ance of the intelligence branch
a wide spectrum of national { has been varied. Repeated pre-
security officials, many" of diction that the Soviet Union whom are not Casey boosters. would become a net importer
In some areas, however,' of oil in the early 1980's proved
where the political heat is incorrect. These forecasts car,
Particularly high, the agency tributed significantly to fears Foe oAnn,nd o ,.,,, new,een in the Carter Administration
Mr. Casey has made signifi- In addition, he tried to in-
cant,, unpublicized changes in crease communication with
the intelligence division, which policy makers, seeking criti-
is staffed with thousands of cal feedback on intelligence
analysts, including hundreds estimates. Every night, the
with Ph.D.'s, who examine, C.I.A. prepares an intelli-
data on matters as important gence report for distribution
as Soviet military capabilities to senior Administration offi-
and as esoteric as steel produc- cials the next morning.
tion in Bulgaria. "We found I Called the President's daily
that estimates had been kick- briefing; or P.D.B., it covers
ing around for close to a year, overnight developments
going through different around the world and reports
drafts," Mr. Casey said during on important trends. Instead
~
tone. Central America is ghanistan presaged an even--I
cited most often as an area tual move into the Persian
where the C.I.A. has- Gulf. The agency also failed to
stretched to support White anticipate the groundswell of
House policy. Mr. Casey opposition to the Shah of Iran
strenuously denies that the that led to his overthrow in
agency has twisted intelli- 1979
gence to support policy. But throughout the Viet-
C] - nam War, the C.I.A. bucked
the optimistic assessments of
The production of Pentagon and accurately
gence oduc reports, at of least intellf in = gauged the strength and te-
theory, is the most important nacity of the Vietcong and
function of the C.I.A. Of the North Vietnamese. More re-
four main divisions of the cently, analysts reported that
agency, known internally as trade sanctions against the
directorates, intelligence is Soviet Union would not seri-
the most important because it ously impede the construc-
is, in effect, the link between tion of a gas pipeline from Si-
the agency and the policy- beria to western ' Europe.
making process. The other President Reagan recently
three divisions are science canceled the pipeline sanc-
and technology, which han- tions he had imposed. . - -
Was everything from the pro- : Mr. Casey's first move was
cessing of data on Soviet MIS- to reorganize the operation.
sile tests to the research and The change was long overdue.
design of new surveillance Instead of a system where sub-
satellites; support, which jects were divided by disci-
deals with logistics, com- pline, with experts on the
munications and security, Soviet economy, for instance,
and operations, which directs__i separated from experts: on
clandestine intelligence col- Soviet politics, he restructured
lection abroad and conducts the operation along geographi-
covert activities. cal lines, putting together all
the specialists on a given coun-
try or region.
of turning the P.D.B. over to
..
~
White House aides to deliver
and discuss with senior offi-
cials, Mr. Casey arranged for
top-level C.I.A. analysts to
conduct the briefings and re-
port back to him every morn-
ing at 11 o'clock about their'
comments and questions.,"It
.helps us determine and de-.
velop the information and the
analysis they need for' they
next day and for dealing with
"issues on their forward agen-
da," Casey said.
To improve longer-range
management of intelligence,
Mr. Casey established a
weekly "watch" meeting of
top officials from the C.I.A.,
National Security Agency,. De-
fense Intelligence Agency. and
other segments of the intelli-
gence community. In previous
years, such meetings were
held monthly. Mr. Casey also'
approved the creation of two
new study centers, one to track
the flow of advanced American
technology abroad and the
other to examine the causes of
instability around the world
and to identify countries that
appear vulnerable to insurgent
.
movements.
"The idea is to assess
threats against other govern-
ments, particularly. those of
close or special strategic in-
terest to us," Mr. Casey said.
,'The Soviet Union has been
extraordinarily successful in
extending its influence world-
wide by destabilizing estab.
lished governments and in.
stalling and supporting new
ones which follow its line. In
recent years we have seen
some 10 countries taken into
the.Communist sphere in this
way which are' now being
used in efforts to take over
another 10 or so in much the
same way. This is'a process
we work hard to spot and
measure and ' help friendly
governments avoid." Other
intelligence officials said that
countries on the agency's,
danger list include Guatema.
la, El Salvador, Honduras,
Zaire and the Sudan.
He also encouraged the in-
telligence division to renew
the C.I.A.'s dormant relation-
ship with the American aca-
demic community in hopes of
injecting new ideas into the
intelligence system. "The ob-
ject is to keep the intellectual,
juices flowing," Robert M.
Gates, the head of intelli-
gence, explained in an inter
view. "Sometimes we don't
look enough at unorthodox
views. By sending analysts
out to the field, by sponsoring
conferences and: seminars,
and - by consulting. more
widely with outside experts,
we're trying to counter the
bureaucratic tendency to- I
ward- insularity _and, being
satisfied ' with -the conven-
tional wisdom.
Unquestionably, . produc-
tivity has increased. The rum- .
her of national estimates, for- i
instance, has risen from the
-late 1970's average of 12 a year
to 38 in 1981. According to Mr.
Casey, the number will exceed
60 this year. The subjects are
varied, and have included the
following: the - balance of
power in the Middle East,
Soviet strategic offensive and
defensive capabilities, the
strategic implications of Soviet
economic problems, Soviet de-
pendence on western tech-:
nology and trade for its mili-
buildup, the likely impact
tary
and effectiveness': of allied
trade sanctions against the
Soviet Union, the European,
peace movement, the Mexican
financial crisis, the war be-
tween Iran and Iraq, interna-
tional terrorism, Soviet and
Cuban involvement in central
America, the' prospects for,
free elections in El'Salvador,
the involvement of external
powers in the Salvadoran con-
flict, Prospects for conflict in
southern Africa.
But' the quality of the re-
ports appears to vary consid-
erably. Soviet specialists in
the Reagan Administration.
say that evaluations of the.
Soviet economy, have in-
cluded cluded impressive analyses
about raw-material prob-
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lems, capital shortages and
other developments.
Donald Gregg, senior na-
tional security adviser to
Vice President Bush and a
former agency official,. be-
lieves there has been an over-
all improvement in quality
and timeliness. "We're see-
ing a sharper focus on issues
now," he said. "Differences
of opinion between agencies
are highlighted, not sub-
merged the way they used to
be, and the estimates on spe-
cific issues are delivered in
time for consideration of
those issues by the National
Security Council."
a straightforward analysis of
available intelligence data."
Last September, the House
Intelligence Committee pub-
lished a report about Ameri-
can intelligence on Central
:America which, while prais-
ing the overall quality, found
numerous instances of. over-
simplification and exaggera-
tion. In a briefing on outside
interference in Central Amer- I
ica given to the committee in
March, for instance; intelli-
gence officials stated that:
,-lots of ships have been
traced" from the Soviet
Union to Nicaragua. When
asked how many ships, the
C.I.A. later responded that
there had been only "a few."
the intelligence community
that such outside interference
in Central American affairs
was continuing.
A related issue is the some-
times aggressive way the
Reagan Administration has
used intelligence information
to justify its policies. Though
the practice is hardly a new
one in Washington, one intel.
ligence official said this Ad.
ministration has turned more
often than most to what he
called "a highly selective use
of information favorable to
the Government's position."
The political edge that has
slipped into.some of the intel.
ligence reporting is much
more evident - and troubling
- in operations, the area
where Mr. Casey has made
the agency more assertive.
Despite his active involve.
ment in the analytical side,
Mr. Casey's primary interest
- some colleagues say his
"passion" - has been opera.
tions. From the start he took
personal command of the
clandestine services, adding
staff members and re-
sources, and has worked to
rebuild the covert operations
Despite the general praise The committee report also
for the agency's performance noted that the C.I.A., while
from many consumers of in. producing a large volume of
telligence in the Administra- information about leftist
tion, the C.I.A. under William guerrillas in El Salvador, had
Casey has shown a disturbing provided almost none about
in the
sm
i
tendency on some issues to
rally to the Administration's
rhetoric. State Department
and Congressional critics
have accused the agency of
warping its analysis to ac-
commodate policy about Cen-
tral America. Early in the
Administration, for example.
Secretary of State Alexander
M. Haig Jr. charged the Rus-
sians and their allies with
supplying arms and money to
guerrilla movements in Cen-
first made the accusation, in- .Intelligence displayed a
telligence officials privately willingness to claim greater
said, there was little informs- certainty than warranted by
tion to support it. The C.I.A. the evidence, and a compla-
hurriedly prepared a report
ta cent acceptance of official
- _ __?_ ;-di
c
on
ng terro n
nght-w
country. The report said that
C.I.A. officials reported that
they had ,not considered the
subject of Salvadoran right-
est violence as a target for
collection."
On the subject of Salvado-
ran efforts to reduce atroci-
ties by the military, the com-
mittee found that American
intelligence assessments cit-
ing improvements were
based largely on the official
statements of the Salvadoran
I there was heavy Soviet and ------?- ..----
Cuban activity. Some offi- I limitations had already been
cials contend the evidence acknowledged."
was thinner than the report . Mr. Casey noted that Admi-
ral Inman resigned as a con-
suggested. Wayne S. Smith, sultant to the House Intelli-
until recently the head of the _ gence Committee in protest
American interests section in over what he considered to be
Havana, has charged that the i the partisan tone of the re-
evidence of Cuban support port. In general; Mr: Casey
t
d
e
.
was exaggera
Later, three Democratic
members of the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, an-
gered at the quality of an intel-
ligence briefing on Latin
America, complained to Mr.
Casey in a letter that the brief-
ing "evidenced a rhetorical
tone and selective use of infor-
mation which bordered - on
policy prescription rather than
insisted that the C.I.A. had
not slanted intelligence re-
ports on Central America.
Noting that the Carter Ad-
ministration had disclosed
Cuban and Nicaraguan sup-
port for insurgents in El Sal-
vador, Mr. Casey said that
during his tenure there had
been a consensus among all
the separate components - of
intelligence. operations here
and abroad. The first order
was adopted by President
Ford in the wake of revela-
tions about intelligence ex-
cesses. The Ford order, and a
subsequent one signed by
President Carter, set strict
limits on C.I.A. operations,
prohibiting assassinations
and other extreme measures
abroad. The orders also ruled
out agency operations within
the United States to prevent
any recurrence of domestic
spying abuses. Mr. Casey and
Admiral Inman, while prefer-
ring to keep some restraints
that the White House wanted
removed, accepted an order
that removed several key re
strictions. Officials of the
American Civil Liberties
Union call it "a grave threat
to civil liberties."
The most debated - and
debatable - change contained
in the Reagan order is ap-
proval for C.I.A. operations in
the United States, if the focus
of such activity is the collec-
tion of significant foreign Intel-
ligence information. One of the ,
few specific prohibitions in-
cluded in the 1947 National Se-
within the C.I.A. as the inter- I that the C.I.A. "shall have no
national-affairs division. police, subpoena, law enforce-
The changes started with ~ ment powers or Internal se-
the Presidential executive I curity functions." In addition,
order that governs intelli- the legislative history of the
gence activities. The Na- act made clear that Congress
tional Security Act of 1947, wanted the agency's activities,
which created the C.I.A., de- ' apart from headquarters
fined its powers and duties operations, to be confined out-
only in broad terms and of- side the United States.
fered few specific guidelines Despite the ban, the C.I.A.
for C.I.A. activities. It did I conducted extensive domestic
not, for example, include ex- spying during the 1960's and
plicit authority to conduct early 70's. Admiral Inman and.
covert activities. In subse- Mr. Casey both said that the
with a series of directives
that authorized the C.I.A.,
among other things, to con-
duct paramilitary and politi-
cal-action operations. But
neither the Executive Branch
nor Congress ever got around
to establishing a comprehen-
sive charter for the agency.
In the absence of such a char-
ter, the executive order is the
only source of guidelines for
Reagan order does not envis-
age a revival of such abuses.
As an example of what would
be permitted under the Rea-
gan order, Admiral Inman
said, intelligence agents could
interview Americans about
their foreign travels without
identifying themselves as
C.I.A. Aoperatives. .. .
Officials of the American
Civil Liberties Union charge
that it opens the door to all
kinds of domestic operations,
provided they are conducted
under the pretext of gather-
ing foreign intelligence infor-
mation. For example, there is_
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 Approved For Release 2008/07/25 : CIA-RDP85M00364R001703340029-6
nothing to prevent the agency ests abroad. Mr. Casey calls
from infiltrating foreign stu. covert actions "special ac-
dent groups at American uni- tivities." Like so much of the
versifies, or even American vocabulary used at the C.I.A.
student groups that travel - "neutralization" instead of
overseas, if there seems a assassination in Vietnam, for
chance to acquire informa- j example - the phrase re-
tion about a foreign country. moves the sting from a con-
The new order also lifts a troversial concept.
previous ban on physical sur-
veillance of Americans abroad
to collect information that can-
not reasonably be obtained by
other means, such as inter-
views. That means the activi-
ties of Americans traveling or
living overseas may now be se-
cretly monitored by the C.I.A.
If the Americans are suspected
of having useful intelligence
information.
In addition, the new order
authorizes covert actions
within the United States to fur-
they foreign policy objectives,
provided the actions are not in-
tended to influence domestic
public opinion. Denying that
this opens the way for large-
scale domestic operations, in-
telligence officials say pri-
vately the authorization was
needed because previous or-
ders prevented the C.I.A. from
carrying out a secret plan sev-
eral years ago to underwrite
the costs of bringing a group of
Afghan resistance fighters to
the United Nations to discuss
the Soviet invasion of their
country. The plan was prohib-
ited because it would have in-
volved activities in New York
City.
Finally, the Reagan order
permits the Attorney General
to authorize the opening of
mail in the United States with.
out a court order if he finds.
that there is probable cause to
believe that the target is an
agent of a foreign power. The
Carter order required a war-
rant for mall opening.
0
The aggressive tone of the
new order set the stage for
Mr. Casey's buildup in covert
operations, perhaps the most
questionable development
during his two years at the
C.I.A. Drawing on his World
War II experiences, he has
made clear that the Reagan
Administration is not afraid
to use covert operations, in-
cluding paramilitary force, to
help further. American inter-
Covert action can cover a
lot of ground. Over the years,
it has involved financial
assistance to friendly politi-
cal parties in Europe, clan-
destine shipments of military' equipment to anti-Soviet in-
surgents in Afghanistan and
the training of specialized se-
curity forces for a select
group of foreign leaders, in-
cluding the former President
of Egypt, Anwar. el-Sadat.
The assassination of Mr.
Sadat was a particular em-
barrassment to the C.I.A. be-
cause the agency secretly
trained the personal security
guards who ran for cover
when he was attacked.
In their heyday, covert
operations involved attempts
to assassinate Fidel Castro
and other foreign leaders, the
successful installation of pro-
American governments in
Iran (1953) and Guatemala
(1954), and an unsuccessful
effort to block the Marxist
Salvador Allende from taking
office after he had been
elected President of Chile
(1970).
Not surprisingly, few sub-
jects inspire as much debate.
For many intelligence offi-
cials, covert operations are
anathema because they often
risk so much embarrassment
and criticism if exposed for so
little gain if they succeed. Civil
libertarians find covert actions
unacceptable because they
cannot be reviewed and de.
bated openly and are inconsis-
tent with democratic princi-
ples. On the other side, propo.
nents argue that covert activi-
ni ties are indispensable in situa-
tions where diplomacy fails
and the open use of military
force is unacceptable.
The Reagan Administra-
tion considers covert opera-
tions a routine instrument of
foreign policy. "Through all
the investigations and exami-
nations of covert activities,"
Mr. Casey said, "very few
people came away with the
conclusion that the nation
should deprive itself of the
ability to move quietly in pri-
vate channels to react to or
influence the policies of other
countries." Mr. Casey sees
the equation as follows: "To
be, or to be perceived as, un-
able or unwilling to act in sup-
port of friendly governments
facing destabilization or in-
surgency from aggressor na-
tions, or to prevent groups
acting or standing for Ameri-
can interests or values from
being snuffed out, would be
damaging to our security and
leadership."
In practice, according to
Mr. Casey, that means a
series of "low-key, low-level"
efforts, involving a "small.
number of people," which are
"in support of other govern-
ments, closer to the area of
operation and with a bigger
stake in it and ready to take
the main responsibility."
This means, he said emphati-
cally, avoiding anything like
the Bay of Pigs invasion of
Cuba in 1961. What it does
cover, according to Mr.
Casey, are efforts to provide
countries threatened by ex-
ternally supported guerrilla
forces with equipment and
training to "help them defend
themselves."
An example often cited by
the C.I.A. in nearly 10 years,
according to intelligence offi-
cials. While these officials
maintain that this operation is
limited to harassing the San-
dinista and is under tight con-.
trol, there is solid evidence
that the C.I.A. has become in-
volved in a secret war against
the leftist Sandinista by provid-
ing money, training and mili-
tary equipment to paramili-
tary units controlled by the
exile groups.
The program is especially
troubling because it is incon-
sistent with the declared
policy of the United States,
which favors negotiating with
Nicaragua to settle regional
problems, and appears to go,
beyond plans for the covert
action approved by President
Reagan a year ago. -
By encouraging the Hondu-
ran military to support the
paramilitary effort, the
C.I.A. has also drawn Hon-
duras, one of the few rela-
tively stable democracies in
the area, deeper into the re-
gional conflict. In addition,
Honduran political leaders
fear that the American assist-
ance, by encouraging a mili-
tary crackdown on dissent
within Honduras, may even-
tually undermine civilian
rule in the country. It is not
clear whether the expanded
Mr. Casey is the behind-the- ; operation reflects a change in
scenes role the C.I.A. played policy - Administration offi-
m assuring free elections in cials say it does not - or is
providing the Salvadoran
military with equipment and
training to help it locate guer-
rilla units, reduce the flow of
weapons from Cuba and
Nicaragua, and anticipate
rebel offensives, Mr. Casey.
said, the agency helped the
Government prevent the pre-
election attacks that insur-
gents promised would disrupt
the voting.
In a more ambitious and con-
troversial operation, the C.I.A.
has provided funding and
equipment to Nicaraguan exile
groups that seek to overthrow
the leftist Sandinist Govern-
melt in Managua. With dozens
of agents based in. Honduras.
plus others in neighboring
countries, the operation is the
largest paramilitary and polit-.-.
ical-action effort mounted by
the result of working with
paramilitary forces whose
aims . do not coincide with
those of the United States.
Elsewhere, it is no secret
that the agency has expanded
an operation begun during the
Carter Administration to sup-
ply Afghan rebels with small
arms and other military equip-
ment to combat Soviet forces.
Consistent with the Casey doc-
trine. about covert action,
Saudis Arabia has helped fi-
nance the operation, and
Egypt and China have pro- '
vided logistical support, ac.
cording to intelligence offi-
cials.
In the Middle East, the
C.I.A., with assistance from
the Turkish Government, has
provided millions of dollars
worth of arms and weapons to
two Iranian paramilitary
groups in Eastern Turkey that
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 oppose the Khomeini Govern-
ment in Teheran. In addition,
the agency has financed and
tried to unify Iranian exile
groups in France and Egypt
and has set up a clandestine
radio station to broadcast anti-
Khomeini propaganda, into
Iran. In Africa, in an operation
that until now has remained
secret, the C.I.A. has trained
the personal security forces of
Liberia's leader, Master Sgt.
Samuel K. Doe, who seized
power in a bloody coup in 1980.
Mr. Casey's enthusiasm for
covert operations - he has
traveled extensively around
the world, often in private
planes to avoid detection, to
take a firsthand look at cur-
rent efforts - has cost him
dearly in several areas. One
was the loss of Admiral
Inman, who was widely re-
spected in the intelligence
community and in Congress.
Although . Admiral Inman
publicly attributed his resig-
nation to a long-standing de-
sire to work in the private
sector, there were other rea-
j sons_as well, according to his
I friends, including alarm over'
the heavy use of covert opera-
tions. During high-level strat-
egy sessions, according to na-
tional security officials, Ad-
miral Inman repeatedly
warned that covert activities,
particularly the use of para-
military forces, could associ-
ate the C.I.A. with groups
that it could not control.
The turn toward covert ac-
tion also indirectly produced
the appointment of Max
Hugel as chief of clandestine
operations. Mr. Casey, who
now acknowledges that the
appointment was, a mistake,
says he thought that Mr.
Hugel, a Reagan campaign
worker, was resourceful and
innovative and would inject
new ideas into the operations'
division. Mr. Hugel, of
course, never got to imple-
ment whatever ideas he had
because he quit in July 1981,
i less than two months after his
appointment, when two for-
mer business associates ac.
cused him of violating securi-
ties laws. Mr. Hugel denied
the allegations.
Mr. Casey himself was
caught in the riptide, as irreg-
ularities in his own finances
attracted attention and the
Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence discovered that
he had failed to list all his
businesses holdings and legal
clients in a disclosure state-
ment filed before his nomina.
tion came up for confirma-
tion. A long investigation by
the committee ended with the
tepid conclusion that Mr.
Casey was "not unfit" to
serve as Director of Central
Intelligence, an assessment
that infuriated him.
Although the concept of
Congressional oversight does
not appeal to everyone in the
intelligence business, both
the Senate and House intelli-
gence committees provide a
vital form of public account-
ability for the C.I.A. and its
fellow agencies. The commit-
tees, in a way, are a symbol of
public trust in the C.I.A.
On most issues, the com-
mittees have supported Mr.
Casey's effort to strengthen
the agency. They approved
the big funding increases,
and went along with the reor-
ganization of the intelligence
branch. They favored an ex-
pansion of intelligence collect
tion overseas, and have en-
couraged the agency to let
some fresh air sweep through
Its corridors. But the commit-
tees worry about the signs of
political contamination and
have great misgivings about
the expanded use of covert
operations. Until Mr. Casey
gains their trust on these cru-
cial issues, he will have a
hard time gaining the confi-
dence of the public. ^
Philip Taubman, a Washington correspondent for The
Times, writes frequently about intelligence matters.